

CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER OF THE WORK PERFORMED BY THE POST OFFICE ENGINEERING GRADES SINCE 1931

In the twenty three years since 1931 the developments in telecommunication techniques have markedly improved efficiency and the scope of the service that can be given to the public, and have markedly altered the character of the work that has to be undertaken by the maintenance staff of the engineering department. The more prominent developments in these new techniques include new cabling methods and the use of new types of cable and street cabinets and pillars, shared service, growth of the automatic network, mobile automatic exchanges, the experimental extension of electronics to replace electro-mechanical switching, new trunk signalling methods, long distance dialling for both international circuits and the inland trunk network including "single-communication D.C. impulsing", cordless-type switchboards with call-queueing and automatic circuit selection, rapid advances in long distance transmission, television transmission by very high frequency, radio link and special coaxial cables, new-type submarine cables and submerged amplifiers, improvement of valve lines and the application of short wave radio for telephone service to islands.

The major development however has been in the switching over from manual to automatic working and this can be illustrated by comparing the percentage of telephones which were connected to automatic exchanges in 1931 and the percentage so connected in 1953. The respective percentages were 26.2 and 73.6. This changeover to automatic working has been the dominating feature in the telephony field, but all the while it has been introduced experimentally in the sense that automatic equipment which has been used by the Post Office at any given time has always had to be tested in practice before being fully accepted. In many cases, therefore, equipment which has been introduced has later had to be modified or even completely replaced. The practical upshot of this has been that the men in the field working this equipment have had to master not only the basic principles of automatic telephony, but also how to maintain and repair many different types of equipment doing very much the same sort of job.

Today, however, the possibility of an electronic system is the subject of much interesting speculation by telephone engineers. The valve is a speedy worker and can carry out operations thousands of times quicker than any mechanical device. It thus opens up possibilities denied to mechanical switches, and this is likely to lead to new concepts in automatic exchange switching. It is known that consideration has been given to the application of electronic circuit technique to the solution of other problems wherever it can be shown that advantages would thus be conferred over existing electro-mechanical methods.

But if the most general development has been the change-over to automatic telephony, then perhaps the next most significant development has been in the field of long distance transmission; that is to say, in the field of the service that can be given for trunk calls. The developments here have been mainly in the expansion of carrier-current working as the result of the application of new ideas in cables, terminal equipment and in intermediate amplifiers. There has consequently been developed a system of signalling which enables the trunk operator at the originating end to dial the wanted subscriber without calling on another operator. Signals are sent by currents in the audio-frequency range, transmitted over the speech circuit. This system is known as two-voice frequency and is now in use between all large centres.

The general objective in inland trunk workings is that a controlling operator situated at any trunk centre should be able to complete a call to any subscriber connected to an automatic exchange anywhere in the country without the assistance of another operator. On economic grounds maximum availability to trunks in the larger routes is necessary; and trunks for the national network are provided on the basis of a grade of service of one lost call in fifty during the busiest hours of the day and to employ, for automatic trunk switching, high speed motor driven 200 outlet uni-selectors.

This development has meant that the requirements of manual switchboards are fundamentally altered, in that the selection of outgoing circuits is increasingly being performed by switches, and hence the need to provide an outgoing multiple disappears. Moreover, calls incoming to operators from subscribers are queued to be sure that they are answered in strict order of arrival, and this entails the automatic storage and distribution of calls by switches. The cord-type board will ultimately be superseded by a cordless board in which jacks are abolished and the cord circuits replaced by key controlled circuits.

Apart from the immediate objective of saving in the number of operators, trunk mechanisation is an essential first step towards any ultimate countrywide scheme of subscriber to subscriber dialling with national numbering.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

1-2

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

FIRST and SECOND DAYS

Wednesday, 24th February, 1954

and Thursday, 25th February, 1954

Treasury Witnesses



LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1954

TWO SHILLINGS NET

List of Witnesses

FIRST AND SECOND DAYS

RT. HON. SIR EDWARD BRIDGES, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., M.C.
Permanent Secretary

SIR THOMAS PADMORE, K.C.B.
Second Secretary

MR. A. J. D. WINNIFRITH, C.B.
Third Secretary

MR. B. D. FRASER
Under Secretary
on behalf of the Treasury

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

FIRST DAY

Wednesday, 24th February, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E.,
F.R.S.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

First Memorandum of Evidence* by H.M. Treasury

I. INTRODUCTORY

1. The Civil Service comprises both industrial and non-industrial staff. The part of the Service which is included in the Commission's terms of reference numbers today just over 670,000 non-industrial staff and just over 72,000 industrial staff in the Post Office engineering and allied grades. About one-third of the total of 743,000 are employed in London.

2. This total may be broadly subdivided as follows:—

	<i>Approx. Nos.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Administrative Class	3,000	0.4
Executive Classes	69,000	9.3
Clerical and sub-clerical Classes	198,000	26.7
Typing Grades	29,000	3.9
Professional, Scientific and Technical Classes	75,000	10.1
Post Office manipulative grades	210,000	28.3
Messengers, Cleaners, etc.	31,000	4.1
Post Office engineering and allied grades	72,500	9.7
Others	55,500	7.5
	743,000	100.0

3. Of this total about 650,000 (including the 72,500 industrial staff in the Post Office) draw salaries or wages of up to £600 a year; about 81,000 draw salaries between £600 and £1,150 a year; about 12,000 draw salaries over £1,150 a year.

4. The Civil Service has to perform a great variety of tasks, for which purpose it is organised into many hundreds of grades, some peculiar to particular Departments, others common to the Service. In this memorandum an attempt is made to give a broad survey of some of the main problems covered by the Commission's

terms of reference: it is therefore expressed in general terms and deals with questions common to the whole Service or to large sections of it. It does not deal with any special problems which may arise in regard to particular classes or areas of the Service.

5. Given the heavy burden and the wide scope of duties which now fall to be performed by the Civil Service, the right settlement of its conditions of employment is a matter of the utmost importance. It is essential that these conditions should be adequate to ensure the recruitment of a fully qualified staff at all levels and the maintenance of an efficient and healthy Service, so that the reputation of the Service for high standards of administration may be both maintained and deserved. And since there is no reason why the Civil Service should be treated either better or worse than other members of the community, it is of almost equal importance that its conditions of service should be such as to be recognised as a fair return for the service given.

6. The settlement of these conditions of service is a very responsible task. Successive Governments have derived great help over the years from the reports of Royal Commissions and other authoritative bodies. It follows naturally from what has been said that the first question put to the Commission should be

Whether any changes are desirable in the principles which should govern pay; or in the rates of pay at present in force for the main categories—bearing in mind in this connexion the need for a suitable relationship between the pay of those categories.

7. The Treasury hope that the Commission will be able to propound clear and undisputed principles for settling civil service pay: and to say not only whether the present rates of pay for the main civil service classes are appropriate, having regard to those principles, but also, in any cases where the Commission think that they require amendment, to suggest what changes should be made.

8. The question of *equal pay* in the Civil Service is technically within the Commission's terms of reference, but the Commission will have observed the statements made by Ministers in the House of Commons, and the letter subsequently sent on the Government's behalf to the National Staff Side, which are quoted in Chapter 6 of the Factual Memorandum (paragraphs 52-4). It is there indicated that the Government's policy on this matter is already determined, and that they "are not seeking to modify their policy on the basis of further advice". The Treasury therefore do not propose to offer any evidence on this subject, nor, so far as is known, do any representatives of the staff. In these circumstances it may be that the Commission will not think it necessary to examine the subject.

9. The second part of the terms of reference refers to hours of work, overtime, leave and remuneration for extra duty. These are clearly an inseparable part of any broad enquiry into civil service remuneration. But apart from this the Government feel that the time has come when these particular conditions of service should be looked at comprehensively.

10. The third part of the Commission's terms of reference refers to superannuation. This is not dealt with in this first memorandum since, as the Treasury see it, the points which will require to be dealt with are not likely to be of sufficient importance to affect the issue of the appropriateness of other civil service conditions of service.

11. Most of the matters covered by the Commission's terms of reference are normally the subject of discussion with staff representatives; and the conditions of service of particular grades and classes are usually fixed by negotiated agreement or by arbitration. This system has worked well and the appointment of the Royal Commission implies no dissatisfaction on the part of the Government with the established conciliation machinery. But one part of the Commission's task—the enunciation of general principles governing civil service pay—falls outside the normal ambit of staff negotiations, and, for the rest, the Government have formed the opinion, as explained in paragraph 27 below, that the present situation calls for a more comprehensive review than can be undertaken by way of negotiations or arbitration hearings on particular claims.

II. THE PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING CIVIL SERVICE PAY

12. As the Commission are aware, this subject was dealt with by the Tomlin Commission. The views they expressed in different passages in their Report are quoted in Chapter 10 of the Factual Memorandum. Doubts have sometimes been expressed as to whether the Tomlin Commission's conclusions are applicable without qualification to present day conditions.

13. In the Treasury view, the task of settling the remuneration of civil servants of all grades would be greatly facilitated if the present Royal Commission were to review the matter and set out the principles on which they think remuneration ought to be determined.

14. The need for an authoritative statement of this kind derives in part from the fact that in the Government service the test often applied by other employers, namely whether the profitability of a business will stand a given rate of pay, is usually inapplicable. The Government therefore have to look to the practice of outside employers, and in the Treasury view the Tomlin Commission were right in indicating that the prime consideration, in fixing the pay of any grade of civil servant, should be the current rate of pay for comparable work in outside employment. (Though the Tomlin Commission did not specifically say so, it is, the Treasury submit, necessary that, in making this comparison, differences either way in conditions of service other than pay should be taken into account.)

15. The Tomlin Commission also indicated that they thought that there was no incompatibility between this comparison and the principle recommended by (for instance) the Anderson Committee, that the employer should pay what is necessary to recruit and retain an efficient staff, since, if the comparison is properly applied, "it may be assumed that a satisfactory staff will be recruited and retained".

16. The principle of making comparison with outside rates of pay in comparable employment, propounded by the Tomlin Commission, has been adopted and applied since then by a number of other bodies, such as the Chorley Committee and the Gardiner Committee, whose Reports are already before the Commission (Documents V and VIII).

17. But the twenty-three years since the Tomlin Commission Report have brought with them changes which, in the Treasury view, may call for some qualification or modification of what the Tomlin Commission recommended.

18. First, the Tomlin Commission recommended that in effecting comparisons with outside employment, "the State should take a long view. Civil service remuneration should reflect what may be described as the long-term trend, both in wage levels and in the economic conditions of the country". This recommendation was perhaps made against the background of an unstable economic situation in which outside wages showed a tendency to fluctuate; and the Commission were at pains to point out the undesirability of frequent variations upwards and downwards in civil service rates to correspond with small market variations. This accorded with the Commission's conclusion that the cost of living bonus then payable to civil servants, and variable every six months, should be abolished and replaced by a system of consolidated scales, which would not need such frequent adjustment. And in fact, a few years after the Commission reported, wages and salaries in general did achieve a measure of stability, which lasted until the outbreak of war in 1939.

19. In recent years outside rates of pay have moved much more frequently than before the war. And there appears to the Treasury to be no particular reason why such movements (unless their amount is trivial) should not be reflected in civil service pay merely because they appear at short rather than long intervals. It is no doubt undesirable that changes in civil service pay should be made very frequently, but in certain circumstances fairly frequent changes may be inevitable if comparisons with outside rates are to be fairly applied. The reference to "the long-term trend" which was relevant in 1931 is therefore no longer in point, at any rate as regards most of the Service.

20. But the position in regard to the highest grades of the Service is rather different. Frequent changes of a relatively minor character in the pay of the highest posts in the Civil Service would undoubtedly be repugnant to parliamentary and public opinion and to the senior officers themselves. It is clear that in this area of the Service changes can only be made at longer intervals. This accords with the fact that the comparison of top rates in the Civil Service with outside rates can never be very precise, and that changes in this area can be made only when they correspond with some substantial change in comparable outside rates.

21. Secondly, there have been great changes in the structure of the Service since the Tomlin Report. In particular professional, scientific and technical grades are now a much more important part of the Service than they were; and there are to-day many grades which did not exist in 1931, and which are doing work which either did not exist in the Government service in 1931 or existed only in embryo: all these grades now have to be considered as parts of the whole. At the same time, largely as a result of the increased development of Whitleyism and Staff Association activity, relationships between different parts of this whole are felt to be much more important. As a result, the question of pay relativities within the Service has acquired much greater prominence, and comparison with outside rates in comparable employment must frequently be supplemented by consideration of the need to maintain reasonable internal relativities. By this is meant both horizontal relativities—i.e., between different post, grades or classes of the Service calling for roughly the same level of responsibility—and vertical relativities—i.e., the differentials between a higher class and a lower class, or between a higher grade and a lower grade in the same class. Internal relativities have come to be regarded as specially important in certain kinds of case, e.g. :—

- (a) Grades for whose work there is no very close outside analogue.
- (b) Grades or classes whose work is of roughly similar status or whose members are required on recruitment to show roughly similar attainments.
- (c) Supervisory grades (because, even though broadly similar work may be found in outside employment, the difference between grade-structures in the Civil Service and outside may result in important differences in the measure of responsibility carried).
- (d) Professional, scientific and technical grades, particularly in the upper ranges, whose pay must be fixed with due regard to the pay of administrative officers in the same Department.
- (e) Grades or classes whose pay is traditionally linked to other grades and classes within the Service.

22. The Commission's terms of reference make special mention of the need for a suitable relation between the pay of the main categories of the Service. They will wish to consider whether the greater attention paid to internal relativities since the issue of the Tomlin Report is in general sound; and whether in certain types of case too much importance may perhaps tend to be paid to the linkage between different grades or classes, seeing that as a result a pay increase justified for a particular group by a movement in comparable outside rates may be held to lead inevitably to an increase in the pay of another group for which no such justification exists.

23. Thirdly, there has been a considerable increase in the number of higher posts outside the administrative class. Many of them are individual posts, requiring high professional and managerial abilities, and it is not easy to strike an exact comparison either with other posts in the Service or with any posts in outside employment. It is undesirable that at these levels there should be a multiplicity of different salary rates, and the principle which the Treasury commend to the Commission is that known as the principle of "broad-banding". This means that, where different jobs are roughly on the same level of skill and responsibility, they should have the same pay, and that no attempt should be made to mark minor differences in the content of the jobs by minor differences in the rates of pay. This principle is of more importance in the higher ranges, where fixed salaries rather than scales are the normal rule, than in the rest of the Service. It is already applied

in the case of the administrative class, and its application to professional posts was recommended by the Gardiner Committee, whose views were accepted and applied by the Treasury.

24. The Treasury suggest that any new statement made by the Commission, of the principles on which pay ought to be determined should be based on the principles laid down in the Tomlin Report qualified or modified as suggested in the preceding paragraphs. They would agree that the application of these principles is often difficult. Nevertheless they feel that if the Service is to offer fair competitive market rates for each grade it is important that these principles should be adhered to.

25. Other methods which may appear simple at first sight would in their view be much less satisfactory. For instance, a suggestion is sometimes made on the following lines. Assuming that at some given date—say, after review by the present Royal Commission—appropriate rates of pay have been fixed for the whole Civil Service by reference both to outside comparisons and to in-Service relativities; it may then be argued that it would be easier to make adjustments thereafter by the simple process of following the movements in some appropriate index covering outside employment as a whole. But there are serious objections to this. The first and most obvious one is that no such appropriate index exists. In the industrial field there is an authoritative index of wage rates, but this clearly could not properly be used to determine salaries for non-industrial employees. In the salary field, such statistics as are at present available are far from exact, and relate not to rates of pay, but to earnings (which are clearly an inappropriate guide). Furthermore, even if an index of salary rates did exist, it could not appropriately be used for fixing the different salary rates of the hundreds of different grades in the Civil Service. This is partly because it would yield no information as to the rates of salary currently in payment for different types of employment, but only as to the average percentage change in salaries as a whole since some previous date or dates; and partly because it would not be sufficiently discriminatory. It would not distinguish between different types of salaried work or between different levels of salary. For instance, a percentage increase in average salaries over the whole of the salaried field might be the result of a substantial increase among lower-paid salary earners and a less increase, or no increase, among higher salaried earners; or of an increase for certain types of salaried work and a different increase, or no increase, for other types of salaried work. If all civil service salaries were altered by the same percentage as the salary index for the whole of outside employment, the result would be that some civil service grades would get a larger increase and some a smaller increase than analogous grades in outside employment. Existing in-Service relativities would be stereotyped, and before long the rates of salary for many civil service grades would diverge widely from the fair market rates for similar employment outside.

26. To sum up. The Treasury suggest that the principles which should govern civil service remuneration should be restated in such a way as to cover the following points.

- (1) The main point should be a comparison with remuneration in outside employment, proper account being taken of differences in conditions of service other than pay.
- (2) For any particular class or grade of civil servant, in order that the Civil Service may offer fair market rates, the comparison should be with the current rate paid by the generality of outside employers to staff engaged on comparable work.
- (3) Due regard must be paid to in-Service relativities both horizontal and vertical, and the Commission are asked to consider how much importance should be paid to this factor.
- (4) The principle of "broad-banding" should be applied as far as possible to the higher grades remunerated at fixed rates.

III. REVIEW OF CURRENT STANDARDS OF CIVIL SERVICE PAY

27. The Royal Commission are invited by their terms of reference to consider whether any changes are desirable in the rates of pay at present in force for the main categories of the non-industrial Civil Service. The need for such a review arises in the following way. Granted that, at a particular time, rates of pay, and the relationship between rates of pay, are fair and reasonable, having been settled, for example, by a Royal Commission; thereafter for the next, say, fifteen or twenty years, rates of pay of particular grades and classes are settled *ad hoc* either by negotiated agreements, or by awards of the Arbitration Tribunal, or (exceptionally) by administrative action. However carefully this is done, the fact that it is done piecemeal is apt to lead, in the course of time, to some disturbance and dislocation of the pay structure as a whole. For example, relativities either between higher and lower grades or between broadly parallel grades and classes may have become disturbed, or, on the other hand, relativities which were right at the time of the last review may have become inappropriate fifteen or twenty years later. Thorough diagnosis and cure of imperfections of this kind can be effected only by a comprehensive review by such a body as the present Royal Commission.

28. If the Commission accept the Treasury's view that civil service pay should be fixed primarily by reference to current rates of pay in comparable outside employment, due account being taken of conditions of service other than pay, they will doubtless wish, before reaching a conclusion as to the appropriate current rates of pay of the Civil Service, to review those other conditions of service. This matter is dealt with in the ensuing section of this memorandum. But it will be convenient first to conclude what the Treasury have to say at this stage on the first part of the Commission's terms of reference.

29. The facts about present rates of pay and the history of pay-changes since the Tomlin Report are set out in the Factual Memorandum, as respects both the Service as a whole and particular grades and classes. And the Commission will no doubt wish themselves to collect further facts as respects rates currently paid in outside employment. In the light of these facts, and of any representations they may receive from staff representatives, they will doubtless consider, first, whether the present rates of pay for the main basic grades of the Service are appropriate, in relation both to each other and to outside rates; and, if so, whether the present pay-structure above the basic grades provides suitable remuneration for the higher responsibilities involved.

30. The Treasury would not at this stage wish to offer any detailed comments, though they will be glad to deal with any points the Commission may wish to put to them when they have made further progress with their enquiry.

31. The only feature of civil service remuneration to which the Treasury wish at this stage to draw the special attention of the Commission is the system of provincial differentiation (described in Chapter 3 of the Factual Memorandum). In the Treasury's view, it is both right on the merits and in accordance with general outside practice that lower rates should be paid outside London than are paid in London. They also consider that the present arrangements are sound in providing a "three-tier" system—that is, three different levels for London, "intermediate centres", and "elsewhere", respectively; and they have no comments to offer on the present delimitation of the areas.

32. The determining factor in each case is the officer's place of work, not his place of residence. There is no doubt that the system leads to anomalies in certain cases; the boundary line between one classification and another may run between one Government office and another; again, two civil servants living next door to each other may get different rates of pay because one works in a different area; an officer may also gain or lose in pay through transfer from one office to another though he does not change his residence; and so on. But anomalies of this kind are inevitable under any system which depends on the drawing of boundary lines; they are comparatively infrequent and constitute no condemnation of the system as a whole.

33. Nor do the Treasury recommend a departure from the present *method* of differentiation (e.g., a return to the system of percentage deductions).

34. It is rather the amounts of differentiation to which, in the Treasury's opinion, the Commission might direct its attention. The Commission will observe that the lowest rates of differentiation (up to the £275 level) are £5 (intermediate) and £10 (elsewhere). The rates rise gradually thereafter until a rate of £50 (intermediate) and £100 (elsewhere) is reached at the salary level of £1,577: this rate is applied to all salaries above that figure.

35. In fact, however, provincial differentiation is at present steeper than these rates would suggest, because virtually the whole Service up to, roughly, the £1,500 level is receiving overtime pay or extra duty allowance: and this extra pay is greater in London than elsewhere. Thus, most overtime classes are conditioned to a 42-hour week in London and a 44-hour week elsewhere: therefore a 45½-hour week (which is at present commonly worked) attracts more overtime pay in London than elsewhere, and is of course based on a higher rate of pay. Similarly, extra duty allowance is paid at the rate of 3 per cent. in the country in general, but at the rate of 8 per cent. in London. The very marked differentiation caused by overtime pay and extra duty allowance has been constant and all but universal for some years, but it will of course disappear if, as is suggested in paragraph 46 below, working hours and conditioned hours are brought into alignment.

36. The Commission may like to take the facts in the two preceding paragraphs into account in considering how any new rates of pay which they may recommend ought to be differentiated as between London and the country in general.

IV. OTHER CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

37. These cover a wide field. But in this memorandum it is proposed to deal only in very general terms with the most important items, viz.:—

- Sick leave
- Superannuation
- Hours of work
- Annual leave

Overtime, and other extra remuneration for hours worked beyond the normal.

38. *Sick Leave.* The present civil service conditions are set out in Chapter 8 of the Factual Memorandum. Civil service conditions are in general rather more favourable than those in outside employment, but the practice of outside employers varies very widely.

39. *Superannuation* (See Chapter 9 of the Factual Memorandum). Outside practice has shown considerable advances in the last twenty years but, as with sick leave, civil service conditions are generally more favourable than those in outside employment. The civil service system is non-contributory. Superannuation schemes in outside employment are almost always on a contributory basis, and in parts of the field there are no superannuation rights at all. Employees' superannuation contributions in outside schemes vary, the commonest figures being 5 per cent. and 6 per cent. of gross pay.

40. It is not one of the Commission's tasks to consider any amendment of civil service sick leave conditions, or any alteration in the general framework of the existing superannuation scheme: but certain proposals affecting particular features of the superannuation scheme will be brought to the Commission's attention.

41. On hours of work, annual leave and overtime pay, on the other hand, the Treasury think that the present arrangements are unsatisfactory and call for review.

42. *Hours and Leave.* The facts and recent history are set out in Chapter 7 of the Factual Memorandum. Hours and leave form part of the same problem, and fall to be considered mainly in relation to those classes of the Service which are normally conditioned to 42 hours a week gross (i.e. inclusive of meal intervals) in London and 44 hours a week gross elsewhere—that is, broadly, the clerical, sub-clerical, typing, executive, administrative, professional and scientific classes.

43. The pre-war conditioned hours of 42 per week gross (London) and 44 per week gross (elsewhere) represented actual net working hours of $34\frac{1}{2}$ (London) and $40\frac{1}{2}$ (elsewhere). These hours, at any rate the London hours, undoubtedly were then, and would be now, short compared with outside practice; and they were commented on unfavourably by several Commissions and Committees, as was the length of civil service leave allowances.

44. During the war, working hours were increased and annual leave allowances were reduced, and an undertaking was given that pre-war conditions in both respects would be restored, on the analogy of the Restoration of Pre-War Trade Practices Act. Annual leave allowances have now been restored, except that the highest allowance is now 6 weeks instead of 8 weeks, but working hours, though reduced from war-time levels, are still, in general, longer than pre-war. It would be of great assistance if the Commission would indicate what in their view would in present circumstances be a reasonable set of conditions, regarding both hours and leave, for these classes of the Civil Service.

45. The present hours, both in London and elsewhere, are commonly $45\frac{1}{2}$ per week gross, as compared with conditioned hours of 42 or 44 per week gross. The $45\frac{1}{2}$ hour (gross) week represents, both in London and elsewhere, between 40 and 42 hours net, according to the permitted length of meal intervals.

46. It seems to the Treasury thoroughly unsatisfactory that it should be normal rather than exceptional for civil servants to work more than their ordinary hours, and they submit that as soon as possible civil servants' actual hours of work should be brought into line with their conditioned hours of work—at whatever level it may be right to fix those hours.

47. In settling what the new conditioned hours should be, it would be reasonable to pay regard to the standard of hours normally worked by comparable staffs in outside employment. Regard must of course also be paid to what is necessary to ensure the efficient working of Government Departments and a satisfactory service to the public. It would also be reasonable, in the Treasury's opinion, to continue the long-standing practice of prescribing a slightly shorter week in London than elsewhere: this is thought to accord with outside practice. The Commission will wish to consider whether it would be right that different civil servants in the same area should, as pre-war, be conditioned to different hours according to their established status or the status of the office in which they work.

48. Regard might also be had to one respect in which outside practice is now more favourable than the practice in the Civil Service. In outside employment it has become increasingly common in recent years to allow some or all Saturday mornings off. The need referred to in the previous paragraph to ensure efficient working and a satisfactory service to the public would make it impossible to shut all Government offices on Saturdays. But consideration might be given to a scheme whereby in general the staff should receive every other Saturday morning off, this being taken into account in settling the working hours on other days. In such a scheme it might be found convenient to fix conditioned hours not on a weekly basis, but on the basis of a $10\frac{1}{2}$ day fortnight.

49. If the civil service staffs were allowed, say, every other Saturday morning off, this is a factor which should be taken into account in any revision of the present civil service leave allowances which, disregarding the more favourable practice of many employers as to Saturday mornings, are substantially more favourable in the Civil Service than in comparable outside employment as a whole.

50. If such a review of annual leave allowances were to be undertaken, it might be found desirable, instead of fixing annual leave allowances separately for each grade, to adopt a new and more simple formula applying generally to all grades in the Civil Service. Such a formula might be based on a combination of salary level and length of service.

51. The Treasury suggest that a general reform on these lines, which incidentally would bring civil service conditions more closely into line with comparable outside employment, would be advantageous and should be undertaken.

52. *Overtime Pay* in certain respects, for example payment to clerical grades of overtime pay at multiple rates, the civil service overtime conditions are somewhat more favourable than is usual in outside employment. But if a reform of hours and leave is undertaken on the lines indicated in the preceding paragraphs, and it again becomes normal for civil servants to work no more than their conditioned hours, this is not perhaps a factor of very great importance. The conditions governing "restricted overtime pay" and "long hours gratuity"—see paragraphs 64 and 68 of the Factual Memorandum—are in the same category.

53. *Extra duty allowance* is on a different footing. It is not payable to grades entitled to ordinary overtime pay, but only to certain grades entitled to "restricted" overtime pay or to no overtime pay. It was introduced in 1947 as an abnormal and temporary measure, designed as compensation not for extra hours casually or exceptionally worked at special time, but for a continuing obligation to work extra hours week after week over a period of years.

54. If conditioned hours and ordinary working hours are once more brought into line, that obligation will no longer exist and the allowance will therefore cease to be payable. The Treasury do not think it would be right to substitute for it any new arrangement entitling the grades concerned to overtime pay in respect of extra hours worked in period of special pressure. No doubt extra hours will often be required, particularly of administrative staff whose work is closely connected with ministerial or parliamentary business, as they were often required before and during the war; but a right to overtime pay in respect of periods of special pressure has never been enjoyed by the grades concerned, and it must be almost unparalleled at corresponding levels in outside employment. In the Treasury's view, the salaries of the grades now entitled to E.D.A. should, if the obligation to work continues excess hours disappears, once again be regarded as covering all time necessarily worked, save only that the existing arrangements for "restricted overtime pay" and "long hours gratuity" might remain as at present.

55. A review of civil service hours and leave on the lines which the Treasury suggest (i.e. a review of total effective attendance) would have the effect of determining the amount of actual work to be covered by civil servants' normal pay. And the Treasury submit that a decision on this point is necessary before there can be a realistic examination of what normal rates of pay should be.

56. The Treasury will be ready, if it is the Commission's wish to present further written memoranda dealing in greater detail with the matters dealt with in this memorandum, and also with certain other points of lesser importance.

Examination of Witnesses

RT. HON. SIR EDWARD BRIDGES, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., M.C., *Permanent Secretary*,
 SIR THOMAS PADMORE, K.C.B., *Second Secretary*,
 MR. A. J. D. WINNIFRITH, C.B., *Third Secretary*, and
 MR. B. D. FRASER, *Under Secretary*,

on behalf of the Treasury

Called and examined

1. *Chairman*: Thank you for coming yourself, Sir Edward, to start us off. I wonder whether you would care to say something of a general nature about the genesis of the Commission. When I was commissioned, there was some criticism that there was no need for such a review. Moreover it appeared to me that we are not really in a direct line of succession to the Tomlin Commission or, if so, we are

suffering very considerably from fragmentation of inheritance. Would you care to say something about the arguments which have led to the appointment of the Commission?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Certainly. I wonder if I could get at it in this way—if I were to make a short statement based mainly on the material in the introductory section of this memorandum, but directing attention to the point which you have made.

We have tried in this memorandum to deal with the main subjects covered by the Commission's terms of reference; I shall come back later to why those general subjects were selected for the Commission under its terms of reference. The Civil Service is a very large body; it is also a very varied body and it covers many different types of skills. To emphasise this variety we included the summarised particulars in the second and third paragraphs of the memorandum. But I think it follows that when one is making general statements about the Civil Service, one is bound to use rather different language and say rather different things from what one would if one were dealing with the particular sections or classes of the Civil Service.

If you look at the Commission's task at its widest, it is the settlement of proper conditions of service for the Civil Service and that, if I may say so, seems to be something of very considerable importance for two reasons. The first is that without proper conditions of service one cannot hope to recruit the right people and to maintain an efficient Service. That is so obvious that it only needs to be stated. The other reason is what I may call the public relations side. Any public service like the Civil Service has to do its work in the full glare of publicity; all our detailed arrangements are published in Parliament and subject to criticism. That is right and inevitable, but it does increase very much the value of an impartial objective appraisal of the conditions of service of the Civil Service. For it is important not only to have the right conditions, but that there should be public recognition of their rightness.

Now I come to the point you have mentioned. There have in fact been Royal Commissions on the Civil Service about every 20 years: Playfair, Ridley, MacDonnell, Tomlin, Priestley—that is five in three-quarters of a century. And those Commissions have all done, if I may say so, an important public service not only in making wise and helpful suggestions about changes which were needed in the Civil Service at the time, but also in ensuring that those changes were carried out with general approval and in an objective and non-political atmosphere. You said, Mr. Chairman, that you were not quite sure how this Commission stood in the line of succession. It is true that the terms of reference of this Commission are less wide than the terms of reference to the Tomlin Commission, and that has been done for deliberate and I hope I can persuade you, good reasons.

First of all the Tomlin Commission was asked to look at the superannuation scheme in detail. Since the Tomlin Commission we have had several Superannuation Bills

which have made considerable improvements in the greatest lack in the civil service scheme, namely, some provision for dependants. And I think you will find that the general view taken not only by civil servants, not only by the Official Side, but by the Civil Service Associations, and I think by people outside, is that on the whole we have got a sound and by no means ungenerous superannuation scheme. I do not think any of us feel that the scheme needs structural alterations. I think, therefore, it was natural to ask this Commission not to go through the whole structure, but rather to assume that the scheme is about right and to examine certain points which need inquiry.

Second, the Tomlin Commission were asked to examine the grading structure of the Civil Service. Here again there has been a great deal of work done over the last 25 years, and it was felt by the Government that, broadly speaking, the structure was sound. It would be unnecessary to trouble the Commission to undertake a very laborious task since it was not felt there was much of real value which would come out of such an inquiry.

That leaves the three points covered by the Commission's terms of reference. If I may say so, they are all of great importance and make a necessary and worthwhile inquiry. I come back to what I was saying about the importance of a proper settlement of the conditions of service for the Civil Service but, given the enormous scope of the Civil Service and the variety of classes, it is not possible to deal with the whole thing pragmatically. You have got to lay down certain principles to start with, and it is very important that those principles should be clearly expressed, that everybody should know what they are, and that they should meet with general approval.

I have, perhaps, special personal reasons for feeling some affection for the Tomlin Commission but we all of us feel that the Commission did a very valuable piece of work in their recommendations on the principles which should govern civil service pay, which are known somewhat compendiously as the Tomlin formula. I think also that the formula has withstood the test of time. It is true, however, that there have been certain changes in circumstances in the last 25 years, which suggest that if the Tomlin Commission were here today they might put certain things rather differently. And we think, therefore, that the formula perhaps needs—I am tempted to say a "wash and brush up", if that is not disrespectful—revision and amendment in some particulars.

But there are other reasons. Negotiations and discussions on civil service pay are almost continuous in the Civil Service,

and reference is always being made by both Sides to the Tomlin formula. It will not surprise you to learn that different people have at different times tried to put different interpretations on this and that phrase. Some have gone even so far as, almost blasphemously, to suggest that one section is not wholly consistent with another.

Moreover, there is another important function which, as we in the Treasury see it, can only be performed by a Royal Commission. There is a great difference between a succession of negotiations and arbitrations dealing with the pay of particular classes in the Civil Service, and a comprehensive view by a body which looks at the structure as a whole and sees whether it has got distorted and needs re-drawing. That type of thing can be done only by a body like a Royal Commission. And these reasons seem to me to be more than adequate for the appointment of a Royal Commission of this kind.

There is only one other point which I need mention, and that is "other conditions of service". I agree one would not normally think that the hours, leave and overtime of the Civil Service were matters which would need review by a Royal Commission, but there are special reasons for it on this occasion. There is, of course, the general reason that, if you are looking at remuneration you ought to look at the other conditions of service too. But we also want a revision of the existing arrangements for hours, overtime and leave—all looked at together comprehensively. We very much hope that one result of the Commission's labours will be that we shall get such a fresh start.

2. *Chairman*: Thank you very much. You feel that at the moment, except in these fields, the situation is satisfactory and only in these fields is a general inquiry needed?—Yes.

3. You said that if you are looking at remuneration you must look at other conditions of service. It is equally true that we have to look at recruitment?—Certainly. Recruitment is a very important matter. If I did not mention it, it was because I assumed that one of the things you will certainly look at in considering whether the conditions of service are appropriate is whether recruitment is satisfactory. I do not know if you would like me to say a few introductory words on that now?

4. *Chairman*: It might be as well to have a few words about it?—I take it you will be hearing detailed evidence from the First Civil Service Commissioner—he, of course, can speak with much greater authority than I can about the particular classes but I think very broadly the position is this. We certainly have difficulties in recruitment

in some classes, but only in those in which there is a national shortage. Even where there is a national shortage we feel that we get about our fair share of what is going. In the administrative class, of course, we recruit more staff than before the war. I think the First Civil Service Commissioner will tell you that he is satisfied with the quality of the people we get, but it is also fair to say that there is at the moment virtually no margin. If we wanted more people than we take, we doubt whether we should get people who were up to the quality required.

In the executive class on the other hand we have no difficulty at all; we get an abundance of candidates of very good quality. In the clerical class we are just about in balance, though at one time we wanted to recruit more than we were getting. When you come to the professionals, the position is patchy. Thus, in employments like quantity surveyors or engineering draughtsmen, where there is a national shortage, we have difficulties, but generally we manage fairly well. As regards typists and shorthand typists, there is a shortage in London and at one time there was some shortage in some of the other large centres. Outside London and possibly one or two other centres we have no difficulty. If you want more details perhaps Sir Thomas Padmore could enlarge on the point.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: As far as typing grades are concerned, there is a general shortage at any rate in certain places. The position was very difficult indeed four or five years ago, but it is now by no means so difficult. So far as we are looking at our conditions of service as measured by the test "Are they good enough?"—the test being do we get enough people—we should say that we do not get enough but we do not do too badly. We think that our conditions are reasonably competitive. We do not get enough because nobody gets enough in areas of difficulty.

Chairman: I wonder if members would like to ask general questions before we come to the details of the memorandum?

5. *Lady Albemarle*: May we hear more about recruitment to the scientific classes?

—There again the situation is a little patchy. There are some kinds of scientists of whom there is a general shortage and we suffer from that as other employers do. But on the whole we think that we get a very reasonable share.

6. *Mr. Menzies*: Do you get your due quota of what I might call research scientists as opposed to scientists doing executive work? Big employers like I.C.I. send out talent scouts in the second year ear-marking those who are likely to get a good degree. If they get it, they can obtain guaranteed employment at rates above civil service rates. Does that affect the position?

—Not, I think, very greatly. The First

Civil Service Commissioner can tell you more about that than I can, but the Civil Service Commission do a certain amount of talent scouting in the universities for administrative, for scientists and other professionals. They also carry out a good deal of publicity about careers and the structure of the classes into which the candidates are being invited.

7. In competing with these outside concerns, may career values enter into the issue?—They undoubtedly do. It is difficult, of course, to know how far a potential recruit looks at what his conditions are going to be immediately on recruitment, and how far he looks further ahead, but undoubtedly in some classes the prospective career is a material factor in the recruitment position. The reason why there are plenty of candidates for the executive class, for instance, seems to be not so much that our terms are particularly attractive initially as that the masters and parents and people who advise young men and women are becoming aware that there is quite a favourable prospect in front of the young entrant.

8. I would like to pursue the question of scientists a little further. Going back to the Barlow Committee Report, the idea was to give some kind of parity of remuneration with the administrative class, and the idea was that if a first class honours man elected to be a scientist in the Civil Service, he should not be prejudiced compared with an administrative man. If you look at the actual careers you find that the assistant principal gets to the principal grade after about 7 years which brings him to about 30. The scientific officer, before he becomes a principal scientific officer, finds another grade interpolated. I should imagine he must get his principal scientific officership which equates with the principal on the administrative side much later. Would that be so?—It is true that while, with the exception of the additional grade you have mentioned, the rates of pay in the middle levels and on the recruitment of the scientific classes are identical with those of the administrative class, the average rate of promotion—particularly perhaps to principal scientific officer—is not as rapid as it is in the administrative class.

9. The point I am submitting is that it is most important to get a due quota of the scientific brains of the country. I would like to ask whether you are successful in getting what I call this quota having regard to the less satisfactory career values in the scientific Civil Service? There are several more rungs in the scientific ladder.—If I may say so, it does not necessarily follow that a ladder with more rungs is more difficult to climb.

10. The magic word “complements” comes in there?—Yes. The answer to

your question is that the Departments employing scientists and the Civil Service Commission would tell you that although they do not get all they want, few employers do in relation to some of these categories. I think they would say we are getting a reasonable share, and we agree with what you said about the importance of getting such a share into Government service. As regards the specially able pure research scientist, there are arrangements for special promotion by annual selection not related to the ordinary hierarchical structure, but to the value of the man and the work he is doing. These arrangements are, I think, of some use in obtaining the most able people.

Chairman: We are meeting the First Commissioner in a fortnight's time and we can pursue this further then.

11. *Mr. Willis Jackson:* May I ask a more general question about engineers? The question of recruitment cannot be dissociated from that of training. Would some consideration of this by us be desirable from your point of view?—*Mr. Winnifrith:* We should rather like to go into it before we give an answer. *Sir Edward Bridges:* We will gladly get the information for you. Could we know the classes you are interested in?

Mainly engineers.

12. *Sir Alexander Gray:* You have told us the position is fairly satisfactory in regard to these grades. Would you say the same was true about architects, planners and medical staff?—*Sir Edward Bridges:* Architects do not present any difficulty at the moment.

13. Is there not a need for more staffs of this type and are you satisfied with the quantity and the quality?—There were difficulties after the war in some of these classes, but whereas we have had difficulties with quantity surveyors and certain specialised types of engineers, the architects have been easy.

14. What about lawyers?—*Sir Thomas Padmore:* Very little difficulty, I think. There again after the war there was a shortage, but that has been overtaken now. My impression is that for the recent competitions there have been plenty of adequate candidates.

15. May I just add perhaps an awkward question? When there is a shortage, do you do without or take an inferior quality?—*Sir Thomas Padmore:* A little bit of both.—*Sir Edward Bridges:* I think so. Over the whole field of recruitment it is fair to say, of course, we have a more difficult time than we did before the war, like everybody else. It is one of the consequences of full employment and it will go on being more difficult. That is inevitable, but what we have to do is to see that we

get our fair share of staff of the right quality.

16. *Mrs. Wootton*: May I ask Sir Edward a question? The other side of recruitment is wastage, of course. Are there any particular classes in which the wastage is what he would regard as abnormally severe?—I am not aware of it.

17. Scientific officers?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: No. There is of course a heavy wastage among typists.

18. Perhaps the question might be answered purely for male classes to eliminate the marriage factor?—The wastage among typists is not wholly attributable to marriage. There is a good deal of wastage of people shortly after coming in. For one thing during the great shortage of short-hand typists after the last war we embarked on a programme of free training. We found that, as we expected, a certain number of people came in and trained, and then went and got other jobs at higher pay or, more important, with free Saturday mornings. But apart from that particular trouble, I do not think there is any serious wastage anywhere from the established Civil Service.

19. *Mr. Menzler*: Sir Thomas Padmore used the phrase "From the established Civil Service". Scientists were not established in the sense that they did not come under the Superannuation Acts?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: They are established, though under a different scheme.

20. The point I am making is that their superannuation arrangements were calculated to make it easy for them to leave the Service without loss of pension rights?—*Mr. Winnifrid*: The odd thing was that despite that freedom there was no great wastage.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: The use of the F.S.S.U. scheme was based on the theory of transferability, but in fact, it just did not work.

21. There was no wastage either before or after the change to the Superannuation Acts?—No.

22. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I am worried about the effect of the new superannuation arrangements on mobility. Not all the scientists and engineers recruited from the universities in the early twenties will be wholly suited to permanent employment in the scientific Civil Service, or happy in it, and it is now going to be more difficult for them to leave it without embarrassment to their pension arrangements.—I think it is true to say many arrangements have been made in recent years to enable civil servants to carry their pension to other employments, but not to industry.

23. *Mr. Menzler*: Could we have a memorandum on transferability?—Yes, gladly.

24. *Mr. Cash*: Paragraph 20 of the memorandum submitted to us refers to the fact that frequent changes in pay are not desirable at the highest levels of the Service.—Yes.

25. At the same time it is suggested in paragraph 19 that there is no reason in the view of the Treasury why short-term movements should not be reflected in civil service pay at lower levels. If this Commission's task is directed to finding some new formula, it seems to me it will then have to be divided into two parts.—There is a necessary difference here. So far as concerns, say, the clerks and the typists, if we go on with a state of affairs in which you have a round of wage increases every year or so, it is very hard to say that these staffs shall not be treated in the same way as the rest of the community. But I am quite sure it would be wrong, and would be felt to be wrong, if permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries had an increase every year or so. I think that we should lose all sense of respect from the public, and that in that area, changes, when they come, can only come at longer intervals, when there has been such a change outside as to make a change in the top rates a worthwhile one.

26. How far is the Treasury satisfied about the decentralisation of staffs, because, of course, in commerce one of the great difficulties in London is the problem of travel. How far does the Treasury think it either possible or wise to decentralise Government Departments more than has already been achieved?—Perhaps I may start with a small but significant instance. We in the Treasury like other Departments in London suffer from a shortage of typists, and we have a branch in Brighton. There is no difficulty in getting typists in Brighton, and for the last few years we have had a staff in Brighton, and messengers carry bags up and down from London twice a day. They take down long papers of a sort which are not wanted within 24 hours, they get them typed down there and brought back again. That is a sensible and worthwhile relief in the subordinate grades. A number of other Departments have done the same thing. If you pass from that small-scale expedient, at the end of the second world war there was a great scheme for decentralising branches and sub-Departments from London; it was part of the Government's general planning policy. Quite a lot was done. There are, for example, branches of the Inland Revenue in Cardiff and Worthing. But there is another aspect, that is getting Departments to decentralise their work to regional offices. That movement had a great impetus in the war when it was thought that centres like Birmingham and Manchester would be cut off from London. I am sure that it is a

good tendency to get people doing work on the spot and in touch with the local people. But it is not a very easy thing to be sure that you avoid duplication. It is a thing on which we want more experience before we are certain that we have got it in the right way. But of the general soundness of regional devolution we are all convinced. Perhaps Sir Thomas Padmore could supplement what I have said.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: In relation to the general programme which Sir Edward mentioned of decentralising headquarters offices, a good deal has been done—not so much, perhaps, in the direction of positively reducing the total staff in London as by avoiding what would otherwise have been a large expansion. A good example is the Ministry of National Insurance which does all or nearly all the centralised headquarters work in Newcastle, whereas in pre-war days the natural thing would have been to establish an organisation either in London or in one of the suburbs. Of the main programme of decentralisation there is still much which remains to be carried out, and it will take some time to do this. I should, therefore, advise the Royal Commission that nothing is likely to happen for a long time which will materially alter the proportions of civil servants employed in the places in which they now are employed.

27. *Chairman*: From one point of view then this devolution has eased the situation?—Yes.

28. Turning back to recruitment, I take it the Treasury view is that although there are difficulties, they are not primarily due to unsatisfactory conditions of pay?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes. But we hope that the Commission will look at some of the more important classes and satisfy themselves.

29. Coming now to the memorandum, I have some questions to put. We are told that the Tomlin formula has given rise to difficulties. Would you like to tell us more about these difficulties?—The first difficulty is this question of the long-term view. As I see it, that expression of the long-term view was really written against the background of economic conditions between the wars, and it is not altogether appropriate now. Although, of course, the Treasury would much rather not always be having changes in rates of pay, so long as in the outside world there are frequent changes in rates of pay, I do not see how the great majority of the civil servants can expect to be treated differently. That was the difficulty we had in mind, if difficulty is the right word. The second point is this argument in paragraph 21 about relativities. This is something which is not only important but difficult. Assuming you accept the general point of view

of the Tomlin formula and look for your main test for civil service pay to comparable outside employment, it does remain that there are certain areas in the Civil Service in which it is very difficult to find a close analogue outside. Thus the tendency there is to look to other classes of the Service who have been recruited in the same kind of way and who would say they are doing work of comparable importance—and to build up by a sort of statistical process the structure of their pay. Some instances of this are given at the bottom of page 6 of the Memorandum of Evidence—(a) Grades for whose work there is no very close outside analogue; (b) Grades whose work is of roughly similar status or whose members are required on recruitment to show roughly similar attainments. The next issue is that of the supervisory grades. The structure of the Civil Service is often different from the grade structure in industry because the responsibilities in the Civil Service are of a different nature from outside. Therefore you cannot make close outside comparisons and you tend to construct the top so as to make it suitable in relation to the bottom, keeping an eye on what is at the top of other pyramids in the Civil Service. Again in the professional, scientific and technical grades, when you consider the pay of, say, the chief civil engineer in the Admiralty or the director of works in the Ministry of Works, you necessarily look not only at what civil engineers and architects get outside, but at the position which he occupies in the hierarchy of the Department, and to what his pay and standing ought to be in relation to the permanent secretary and the deputy secretary. In recent years the position of the top professional people in the Civil Service has been considerably improved not only absolutely but relatively to the administrative people. Nevertheless this is a very important point and one at which I hope the Commission will look pretty closely. Lastly there are grades or classes whose pay is traditionally linked to other grades and classes within the Service. There are some instances where particular grades and classes say they always have moved with some other grade or class. We are not sure that they always should move in the same way. To sum it up, it comes to this. First of all much more attention is paid to this relativity argument than at the time of the Tomlin Report, and it is important that the Commission should look at this argument and see whether they feel that right use is made of it. For my part it seems to me it should be recognised as something which is inevitable and right, but equally I think you can very easily go too far.

30. Is the Treasury view that it has already gone too far?—No. I was only voicing a personal doubt that it is a thing

which can get out of hand. There are one or two cases where we have arguments about this with the Staff Side, and I do not think that we are always completely satisfied with the result of the argument.

31. Are these traditional linkages one of the weak points in the structure?—Yes. *Sir Thomas Padmore*: If too much attention is paid to these linkages, you get a rigidity which is most undesirable and which prevents you from making adjustments which would be in accord with changes that may have taken place in non-civil service employment. One has, I think, to look at these traditional relativities with a rather more critical eye than at the others.

32. Would any member of the Commission like to ask a question on this?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Perhaps I could just mention a case. There is always argument as to whether, when the rates of pay of the manipulatives in the Post Office move, the rates of pay of the clerks in the Civil Service should move. I would not say the relativity has been established but I think a relativity might be established there which would make the whole structure too rigid. If it becomes too rigid you get to the point where you cannot alter the pay of any class of the Civil Service without everybody else wanting to move by the same amount. That makes it impossible to establish a proper comparability with outside workers.

33. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Paragraphs 182 and 212 of the Factual Memorandum give some figures of top posts in the administrative class and scientific classes. There are many more in the former. Did I understand *Sir Edward Bridges* to say that he was satisfied that was a reasonable state of affairs?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think I would say that the first thing to do would be to take evidence from Departments who employ the scientists and find out if they are getting the type of people they want, and if they are not doing so to diagnose the trouble which may not be the grade structure.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Perhaps it is relevant to add that virtually all Government activity includes or necessitates the employment of administrative staff. That is not true of scientific work.

34. *Mr. Menzler*: I should like to pursue this doctrine of internal relativity with *Sir Edward*. I rather infer from the memorandum that there is a certain rigidity in the structure?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes.

35. Might it not be that, for example, scientists who, by reference to outside conditions should get some improvement in remuneration, would be inhibited by the internal relativities of the Service?—If you establish absolute parity between two classes

and then find you can recruit one at a certain rate of pay and not the other, something has got to break somewhere.

Chairman: That is particularly likely in the medical field.

36. *Mr. Menzler*: May I ask whether the B.M.A. have ever placed an embargo on the recruitment of doctors into the Civil Service?—*Mr. Winniffrith*: They have placed an embargo on advertising which comes to the same thing. Doctors are one of the harder cases where, if you set out to give the outside rate, you find yourself at once in a peculiar difficulty in that the great majority of the medical profession are fee paid. You cannot employ doctors in the Civil Service on that basis. In that field therefore your first outside comparison lies not with the great majority of doctors, but with a small field who are also employed on a salaried basis. Obviously, not only in the Civil Service but in other occupations like local authority where there are salaried doctors, the salary rates may be affected by what is being paid to the fee-paid doctors; but the primary comparison must lie between the two types of salaried doctors inside and outside the Service respectively.

37. Do you then generally have more regard to salaried employment than fee-paid?—Yes, we regard the main or most obvious comparison as being with people in salaried employment.

38. May I draw attention to paragraph 35 of the Chorley Report?

"We have given particular thought to the relationship between the highest professional and technical salaries and the highest administrative salaries, i.e., those of Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries. We think it should be exceptional for a professional or technical civil servant to be paid more than the Permanent Secretary of his Department, but we see no reason why it should not happen now and then, when men of professional or technical eminence are appointed for particular jobs outside the ordinary team-work of the Department—especially if they are appointed for a short term without any superannuation provision."

Now we come on to what is the much more important part:

"We think the Deputy Secretary should normally have the second highest salary in the Department, but there are cases where a professional or technical civil servant may well be paid more than a Deputy Secretary. Two cases which occur to us particularly are:

- (i) the case where the work of the Department is predominantly technical or professional in character, and
- (ii) the case where the technician is in effect the Civil Service head of his

profession and has a status higher than that of his strictly departmental work."

I would like to ask one or two questions on that sub-heading. Are there in fact any professional officers other than the Treasury Solicitor getting as much as a permanent secretary?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: There is the head of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, there is also the Chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee and the First Parliamentary Counsel.

39. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Could I ask where the Chief Planning Officer comes in here?—He was taken on at £6,500, which was substantially above the rate of the permanent secretary of the Treasury.

40. *Chairman*: But he was a special case?—Yes.

41. *Mr. Menzler*: But, Sir Edward, I think you will agree, there are no recent additions to that £4,500 relativity from the ordinary professional and technical classes.—I have given one example—the Chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee.

42. But take the case of the engineer-in-chief of the Post Office, is not the difference between his rate and that of the director general very substantial?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I am not sure whether you are arguing that the top professional people are paid badly compared with other top civil servants or compared with professional people outside.

43. On the doctrine of internal relativity, the outside world must be surprised at these big differences between the top professional man and the permanent secretaries. May I go on to relationships with deputy secretaries. Could we have a list of professional posts with higher rates?—*Mr. Fraser*: There is the Post Office engineer-in-chief, the director of naval construction, the director general of works at the Ministry of Works and the director general of Ordnance Factories.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think we would like to put in a note on this point.

44. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I would like to ask two questions on internal relativities. In paragraph 21 of the memorandum we are told: "Internal relativities have come to be regarded as specially important in certain kinds of case". In example (b) you say: "Grades or classes whose work is of roughly similar status or whose members are required on recruitment to show roughly similar attainments". Is the second part of the sub-paragraph to be taken literally as it is worded, or are we expected to assume that where recruits have somewhat similar attainments they would also be engaged in work of roughly similar status?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: The two things

to some extent overlap. Can I give you some instances? One is clerical assistants and typists, another is statisticians and administrative officers; another is information officers and executives. I think that shows the sort of case we have in mind, and I think sometimes you could read "and" instead of "or", sometimes "or" is more appropriate, and sometimes it is halfway between the two.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: But on the whole when we are recruiting people of generally similar attainments we should expect to be employing them, at any rate initially, on work of roughly similar status.

45. That was what I expected. My second question is in relation to horizontal relativities. Whatever relativities of a horizontal character may be determined at any given date, are they not liable to be disturbed because of separate claims by different staff organisations being advanced at different times, with different results?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes.

46. *Chairman*: That is really one of the reasons for the setting up of this Commission?—Exactly. That raises the question whether the structure has got unduly distorted. It may be right that the structure as it existed at a certain date should be altered; on the other hand it may be wrong; it may have got distorted. That is one of the reasons for having what the Americans call an overall review.

47. *Mr. Burman*: Disregarding the horizontal relativities, but dealing purely with the vertical relativities, the lower grades obviously are conditioned by pay and conditions outside the Service and have therefore gone up quite a lot in recent years. The top ones have not gone up nearly so much. How far is the whole structure becoming so compressed that there is practically no room for manoeuvre except by reducing the number of steps in the hierarchy or the number of steps in the scales?—It is true that the differentials for skill and more responsibility in the middle of the Service have got too small; the concertina has got pressed up and wants to be pulled out in the middle. I think many Heads of Departments feel that in certain areas of service when a man gets promoted he does not get a sufficient reward for the additional burdens and responsibility which he has to carry.

48. We have not quite got to the stage where we are overlapping?—No, it is just that the differences are too small.

49. *Chairman*: The general negotiating structure being what it is, the only answer to that really is pushing up the upper levels?—In general terms, yes, but you must not take me as expressing any view about the top levels. The middle top levels would, of course, have to go up to make more room.

50. *Mr. Cash*: When I asked just now about the long-term trend of the Tomlin formula and how far it should apply at the top but not the middle and bottom ranges, I was wondering how far we are unduly obsessed with the fact that salaries and wages outside the Civil Service are continually on the rise? What would be the attitude of the staff associations representing the clerical and executive classes if they saw the long-term trend formula considerably mitigated, if not abolished, in view of the possibility, which I suppose is still a possibility, that outside rates may fall?—I think the general view of the Civil Service Associations has been that the Civil Service has suffered since the war from an undue time lag in getting increases, as compared with what happens in the community as a whole. It is thus possible that they would welcome the long-term trend argument being mitigated, and would be prepared to take their chance of the change in the economic climate which your question suggests.

51. I was thinking particularly of your concertina.—The drawing out of the concertina, if the Commission should find that that is necessary, I regard not as a continuing process but as something which is done as part of this twenty-year review of structure. When it is right one hopes that it will run for some time.

52. *Chairman*: You hope that we may produce a reference point?—Yes.

53. *Sir George Mowbray*: In regard to internal horizontal relativities, does Sir Edward Bridges envisage that any formula or principle can ever last for any appreciable time, because, as I see it, varying negotiated settlements and awards are bound comparatively soon to destroy in fact any such formula?—I think it depends on how you do your formula. If it were simply that such and such a grade should have so much more than this, that and the other, then it would be destroyed, but if it is expressed in more general terms then I think you will leave something which will be of great guidance and help for many years.

Sir Thomas Padmore: I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if I might say just a word about relativities generally. I think that in what we have just been saying we may have tended rather to stress, perhaps to over-stress, the difficulties and dangers of too much attention being paid to internal relativities, and to the obvious fact that if a pay structure for the Civil Service as a whole is based too much on internal relativities it will be either extremely rigid, or liable to be upset very soon. We think that the prime formula for settling civil service pay should be the formula of outside rates, and that internal relativities,

whether vertical or horizontal, should only be used generally as a second check, though they have to be the prime factor where the first formula does not work at all because you have not got an appropriate outside rate to look at. I think we hope that the Commission in their report would feel that they could issue some quite general guidance about relativities, not as to what internal relativities there should necessarily be between particular grades and classes, although that may be important, but general guidance which would prevent the structure from becoming too rigid through excessive use of internal relativities and at the same time would see that account is taken of relativities in proper cases. It is a difficult subject and I do not think anybody has tackled it before, but I am sure it is an important matter and it would be of great benefit in the future if the Commission could examine it.

54. *Chairman*: We all appreciate the point. Turning to "fair comparison" I have a few questions. This doctrine of fair comparison assumes that large outside employers do pay fair salaries and wages. The staff might contend that many large employers wait to see what the Government is doing on salaries, particularly if the Government is advocating a policy of wage restraint. What would be the answer to that argument?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think that in the clerical field generally there is apt to be a certain amount of hesitation by some large bodies, each wanting to see what the other is doing. Apart from that, I do not see that it arises.

55. What about the new nationalised boards?—The nationalised boards pursue their own wage policy, and I do not think they pay very strict regard to us.

56. Do you think, Sir Edward, that the wage-paid classes are in a stronger bargaining position than the salaried classes, because they have got the big trade unions behind them?—I would have thought that the bargaining position of the staff generally had improved.

57. I was thinking of outside the Civil Service. If you are comparing clerical salaries inside and outside, is it not likely that clerical salaries outside are rather less well-adjusted to rises in the cost of living than the wage structure, simply because the clerical workers are not so strongly organised outside?—Yes, I think there is some force in that. But I should have thought on the whole that most of the wage classes and the lower-salaried classes were fairly well organised nowadays and put their case very strongly. I do not know that we have noticed any marked hanging back, have we?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: No. It is true, of course, that when you look at outside employment the degree of organisation of particular

categories varies a good deal. As Sir Edward said, it has greatly improved in recent years in those areas where it was defective in the past, and notably in relation to clerical workers. Local authority staffs are much better organised than they used to be, and have quite powerful joint conciliation machinery. I would have thought, if I may say so, that it would be a very odd thing for the Government to say in relation to any particular category of its employees: "We will not look at the outside rate because it is not fair, and it is not fair because the people concerned outside are not properly organised and cannot strike a fair bargain with their employers". The doctrine of fair wages, as we have always held it in the Civil Service, has been the doctrine not that wages outside were in the main fair, but that it was fair to pay to Crown servants something which was, by and large, the same sort of thing as they would get in other employment.

58. Do you think the best way to deal with salaries is to compare all grades with outside employment, or to take certain key grades and compare those and then use the internal relativities to a great extent in between?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We are rather distrustful of trying to compare civil service rates as a whole with outside rates as a whole. We think the right thing to do is to take comparable work, work calling for the same skill or attainments, outside, and compare civil servants with the people doing that work.

59. At all levels, or just here and there?—So far as we can at all levels, but admittedly it is much easier to make a comparison, say, with the basic clericals and the typists than with the supervisory grades, when it is much harder to establish a direct relationship between the different types of work.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think that if the Commission were to approve of the general approach suggested in our memorandum they would find, in fact, that there were quite large categories, mainly in the lower grades, where there were obvious and straightforward outside comparisons which would give them firm ground to stand on; they would find that ground less and less firm as they went up the hierarchy, particularly in some classes, and would be bound, we think, to look more and more to the question of relativities, particularly with supervisors, and to consider the question, what is the right lead to give a particular category of supervisor over those he supervises, because there is no direct means of comparing with outside employment.

60. *Mr. Menzler*: I would like to ask what seems to me to be an important question of principle, but which may dissolve into thin air when I get the answer. I looked in vain for the words "good" and "model" in your Memorandum of

Evidence, though there are frequent references to these terms in earlier reports. There is reference to the current rate paid by the generality of outside employers, but "the generality of outside employers" is not the same thing as "the generality of good employers", and I wonder whether the disappearance of the word "good" throughout is significant?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think there has been a change in the facts. If you go back about 30 or 40 years, the employer who really cared about staff welfare was perhaps the exception rather than the rule. I should have thought that far more attention is now paid, and rightly paid, to staff conditions and staff welfare than 20 or 30 years ago, and that whereas you could have said in the days of the MacDonnell Commission that there was a very big gap between the model employer and the good employer and the average employer, I should doubt whether you would find such a gap existing today. No doubt you may say it is partly due to conditions of full employment; if you are cynically minded you will say people have to pay good wages or they will not get staff. I should have thought it was more than that. I should have thought there was far greater recognition of the need for good conditions of employment all round and that nowadays that gap between the good employer and the average employer has really rather ceased to exist. Because we have omitted the phrase "model employers" we certainly do not want to suggest that the Civil Service should base itself on employers who are not good employers. It is rather that we feel that most employers now are good employers.

61. *Chairman*: As a matter of fact, in paragraph 311 the Tomlin Report itself throws out the phrase "model employers". It says: "We think that a phrase which lends itself to such a varied and contradictory interpretation affords no practical guidance for fixing wages or for indicating the responsibilities of the State towards its employees".

62. *Mr. Menzler*: But ever since the Tomlin Report the Treasury for the purpose of negotiation or arbitration must have had some information about outside standards amongst good employers. Can the Commission be informed of the machinery for obtaining this information?—*Mr. Fraser*: We write round and ask them.

63. *Mr. Menzler*: Is there a set list of employers to whom you have recourse regularly?—It is not the same, of course, for every grade, but we do go to the same people roughly every time.

64. Are you satisfied with the information you get, owing to the great differences in conditions, and so forth?—It is always difficult to say one is satisfied that one has

got a wide enough field of enquiry, and it is also difficult, for the reason you gave, to interpret and quantify the evidence you get, but we just have to do our best.

65. Do you ask for what I call the marginal amenities of employment, the motor-cars and expense allowances, free luncheon vouchers, and so on?—I do not recall a recent case where we have had occasion to make enquiries of that kind for a grade where they were relevant.

66. There is another way of getting information, namely through the Inland Revenue. Is that method ever employed in order to establish professional standards outside?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Do you mean, to get the totality of people on certain salary rates or to get information about the particular companies? The latter of course they would not give.

67. I am thinking of the technique adopted by the Minister of Health in dealing with the doctors' claim. In the Report there is a reference to the evidence given by the Inland Revenue in camera; it was never published, though I believe Mr. Justice Danckwerts expressed great satisfaction with it and it must presumably have had a material influence on his award. Is that technique ever employed at all in connection with staff negotiations?—*Mr. Fraser*: As I understand it, that was a question of how to follow the average of professional remuneration as a whole over a particular period of years. It was not a question of comparing one set of people with another set of people, but of tracing the history of earnings.

68. I do not wish to press that unduly but it is so important to the professionals and scientists that they should be in keeping with outside standards, and I should have thought that the general rising standard since pre-war would have been thrown up in general terms through Inland Revenue statistics, and I am just wondering whether that line of thought is ever explored?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I should think that the area in which one could do anything of that kind would be very limited indeed, because after all the Inland Revenue do not know who are the people who are comparable with any particular category in the Civil Service. The Revenue's return shows that a man is a scientist, but not what kind of a scientist, what his abilities are or on what he is employed. It would be very difficult for them to produce for us any kind of statistics that would really indicate to us what were the rates of remuneration of people who really could properly be compared as a category with any civil service category.

69. In order that the Commission might form some opinion on that point, is it possible to have the information that went

to the Danckwerts Commission?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: The Treasury would have no objection at all; if the Commission wants to see it no doubt either we or they could make enquiries.

70. If for any reasons of policy you do not wish to publish it, it could be given to the Commission in camera, as it were, as it was given to Danckwerts?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: We could certainly look into that, but I do want to repeat, if I may, that it was a very special case. Those were statistics about the earnings of identifiable professions which the Revenue could very easily assemble. It is difficult to see that there would be many other categories for which similar statistics, which would be of any value, could in fact be produced by them.

71. *Mrs Barbara Wootton*: I think it would be very useful to have this particular material in camera.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We will certainly enquire about it.

72. *Mr. Menzler*: There is just one other thing I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, on this question of comparing duties. I notice that in one very important arbitration award on the executive class, one of the matters in dispute was whether the executive class were or were not comparable with bank clerks. Many of these things, I should have thought, could be the subject of what in the scientific world we call operational research; in other words, some one in the Treasury might very well carry out research into the intellectual effort demanded of the two kinds of work. It seems that in these cases which go to arbitration there is no meeting of like minds at all.—*Mr. Fraser*: I speak as having been at that arbitration case on behalf of the Treasury. If I may say so with great respect, the comparison with the bank clerk was not the main point on which the arbitration turned; it was mainly on the internal relativities with civil service clerks. Evidence about outside bank clerks was put in rather incidentally and neither side had, as you say, put their minds together to get an agreed answer on exactly where the comparable work line was to be drawn. But I do not think the Treasury has ever been unwilling to pursue that particular line of thought, because obviously if one can get a clear answer it is a highly useful and relevant one to get.

73. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I should like to follow up a point that Sir Thomas Padmore made. You said that down at the bottom you can get comparison outside, but as you go up it is more and more difficult to get comparison of outside work. Is there any basis at all for comparison at the top? Does not all work become specialised, so that you do not really have a basis for comparison?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think there are a great many

of the higher posts in the Civil Service of which it is true to say that there is really no very valid comparison, but there are some posts—particularly perhaps posts of a technical character—where I should not be surprised to find that there were reasonable comparisons which could be made.

74. Apart from a comparison between jobs do not people say: "Where would I have been if I had gone into another job?" or: "If I had been a lawyer I would now be a sheriff", and so on. Is there any basis along that line on which you could make a comparison between a certain grade of civil servant and, say, a county court judge? There is no comparison in work, the question rather is: "If I had gone into a different line of life at the age of 21, where would I have been to-day" and I suggest it is the kind of comparison that most people make in this kind of thing.—Yes, I think you do find yourself asking, and the Commission may find themselves asking, what happens to this kind of animal in a different walk of life. But it is, I suggest, very much less direct and very much less helpful than the kind of direct and immediate comparison I was talking about.

75. Yes, but I think all the same that operates. If we take my kind of job, you may take in Scotland a Sheriff substitute, or a civil servant of a certain rank and you may think of them as the same kind of people; if they get out of line there is a fuss.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think if one is dealing with careers, if I may say so, that is the right approach. People think of where they would have gone and where they would have finished up.

76. *Mrs. Barbara Wootton*: I want to ask a rather far-reaching question. I do not know whether *Sir Edward* would agree that in practice, apart from a few very clearly defined jobs, where you have got people doing almost exactly the same work, and you really can make a comparison between them, there is nearly always a considerable circular element in all fair comparisons, that is to say, when one is looking for a class outside with which to compare one inevitably chooses a class which is somewhere about the same rate of pay at the moment. I have had to look, for other purposes, at a great many comparisons, and I find that there is nearly always this difficulty?—With respect, I do not think there is in the bottom grades. If you are comparing what a clerk or a typist or assistant principal gets when he comes into the Civil Service or if he goes into commerce, I think you can get a pretty direct comparison there. The difficulty of getting involved in the circular comparison comes when you try and find what is the comparable grade up above, and there I agree you have got to watch that you do not take

the grade which looks most alike and assume because it looks most alike in pay it is the one which is in fact most alike. But I think you have got to check that up by taking the careers as a whole, and in that kind of way, although there is a danger, one can minimise it.—*Mr. Winnifrid*: Could I say one word on the practicability of getting a cross-check at a level other than the basic level. If the Commission refer to paragraph 18 of the Report of the Gardiner Committee on works group classes they will see that the Committee were able to get what they regarded as equivalent occupations at a number of points above the basic grade, and on the strength of that were able to satisfy themselves that the rates of pay they were going to recommend were fair by outside comparison, and it took them quite a way up the hierarchical structure. It may be of course that in that field comparison was easier, but it does suggest that comparison is possible in some cases.

77. *Mr. Cash*: In a period of full employment, when you are making a comparison between the Civil Service and outside, however valid, of course the factor of risk has more or less disappeared.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes, it is much less than it was. I think it is also true to say that superannuation schemes of general application to clerical staffs are much commoner than they were.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: It is not only that superannuation schemes have diminished the risk, but that they themselves form another factor in which the comparison is changed. It used to be said of the Civil Service: "Never mind, they have got safe jobs and they have got pensions"; there are more people nowadays in other employments who also have safe jobs and pensions, and that affects the comparison.

78. *Chairman*: There is one thing in your arguments, *Sir Edward*, which seems to be a little curious. In paragraph 18 you quote from the Tomlin Report: "the State should take a long view. Civil service remuneration should reflect what may be described as the long-term trend, both in wage levels and in the economic conditions of the country" and then go on to say this recommendation was perhaps made against the background of an unstable economic situation in which outside wages showed a tendency to fluctuate"; in paragraph 19 you say: "In recent years outside rates of pay have moved much more frequently than before the war", and use that as an argument for more frequent revisions.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Between the wars the fluctuations were not all in the same direction; there were at least two occasions when there were marked downward fluctuations, about 1921 and then again at the time of the great depression. The question of downward

fluctuations was very much in the mind of civil servants because of the fluctuating bonus, which became very unpopular. The thought here is that what the Tomlin Commission had in mind was that the State should ignore a short-term fluctuation either way and try and take a level line and cut off the curves both ways. But now, although there is plenty of movement, in recent years it has all been in the same direction. The position is that the Civil Service Associations say, and I think with some force, that they suffer because they are told they have got to have their wages fixed by comparing them with other people, and as they are also told they have got to have a long-term comparison it means they have got to wait a very long time. I think that is rather hard and that with outside comparison in present circumstances you have got to be prepared in those grades to readjust fairly often.

79. If we are to believe our economists, might we not in the near future come up against exactly the same position as the Tomlin Commission came up against?— I am not going to prophesy.

80. Suppose it did happen, would you feel that we had to go back to the long trend?—If one got to a position in which wages and prices fluctuated up and down quite often, then I would be in favour of going back to the long-term trend. I admit I had assumed that we were not going to be in a position of repeated ups and downs.

81. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You said, *Sir Edward*, that frequently in this internal relativity business you have to give a rise to one set of people and somewhere else some people claim a rise, when in fact the same considerations do not apply, and quite obviously therefore in that case the second claim ought to be refused. Is there any way of making clear why you give a rise to the first claimants and so choking off the second? It is an extraordinarily difficult question, and this is not a civil service example, but take the concrete case of the policeman and the fireman; there you get policemen given a rise for perfectly good reasons; since the beginning of time policemen and firemen have been linked together, and the moment the policemen get a rise the firemen want a rise. I know it involves the whole question of arbitration procedure, but is there any way in which you can make it clear why you give a rise, and its inapplicability elsewhere?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: It is to be borne in mind, of course, that the last resort in all these negotiations is the Tribunal. The Tribunal does not give reasons for its awards, and therefore we are necessarily limited by that fact.—*Mr. Winniffrith*: The Treasury has always got this bogey of repercussions. Sometimes people say that we have got that far too much in the front of our minds.

If we are minded to give a rise to a class we should try to limit it to that particular class. To take a hypothetical case, where you have got an intense scarcity of a certain category, you would say: "We are raising the pay of this class because we cannot get them at existing prices. This state of affairs does not apply elsewhere and we do not expect the same kind of thing to happen in these other cases". Supposing that class had traditionally been in a certain relation with another class, we could not possibly stop that other class from negotiating with us and saying: "We always got much the same rates as these people", and, if disappointed with our answer, going to the Arbitration Tribunal, where they would use all the arguments that are open to them, including traditional relativities.

82. And including the fact that there was scarcity in one place and not scarcity in the other?—Of course, we should use that argument. But what the Arbitration Tribunal may decide is a matter for them, and, as *Sir Thomas Padmore* has said, they do not give reasons for their findings.

83. *Chairman*: That is the sort of case that might go straight to the Arbitration Tribunal without your meeting the Staff Side at all?—No.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We would argue the case, and then they may be dissatisfied because we have not given them the same rates, and say: "Then we will take it to the Arbitration Court".—*Mr. Winniffrith*: That is the standard form in our conciliation machinery. I cannot remember a single case where, even when tempers have been most frayed, the march has been straight on to the Arbitration Court.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: For one thing, *Mr. Chairman*, of course the staff representatives want to find out in negotiation what our attitude is, and what is the strength of our case, and there is that reason if no other for coming and talking to us first before they take it to the Court.

84. Yes, but that might be a reason for your not wanting to talk to them?—It might, but in fact we find that the machinery works much better by a constant readiness to negotiate and discuss. We regard the Arbitration Tribunal as a long-stop, and we try to do the wicket-keeping as much as we can, leaving the long-stop to take only what goes past us.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

85. *Chairman*: I have a few questions on fair comparisons. Reference has often been made to the fact that comparisons with outside rates are to be drawn at basic levels. Could you tell us exactly what you mean by basic levels, with examples?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: The assistant principal in the administrative class, the clerical officer and the executive officer.

86. At the beginning of their service?—That is right, the point at which the man or woman comes into the Service.

87. In measuring comparisons should our main attention be focused on changes in rates over a period or on rates as they are at a particular time?—We think on the rates as they are at a particular time.

88. Does that mean that the rates should be changed when they fall below the average outside?—Yes, if they get out of harmony with the rates outside.

89. One thing we have not referred to is the Tomlin reference to the economic position of the country. Do you think we ought as a Commission to consider it or whether we should leave it out of our consideration?—That is a rather puzzling question. I think probably what it amounts to is that there are times in the history of the country when it is faced with economic difficulties, when it is extremely difficult for any Government to do anything about radical improvements in the pay of its service. But that is something, it seems to me, which can only be settled by a Government in the circumstances of the time. The last instance when this happened was when the Government decided to put up the pay of top grades in the administrative class, and almost next day sterling was devalued. You clearly could not put up the pay of permanent secretaries on the day that was happening, so the increase was postponed. That is the sort of thing which must be tackled by the Government of the day, and I doubt whether this Commission, or any other Commission, need worry much about it.

90. *Mr. Cash*: There are one or two privileges which have not been fully restored?—Yes, related to leave and hours.

91. How far were they conditioned by economic conditions?—If everybody had felt that the pre-war hours and leave were inherently reasonable, they would, I think, have been restored before now. It was because there was a doubt of their reasonableness that that has not happened.

92. *Chairman*: That is not a real example of the effect of economic conditions?—No.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: In the years immediately following the war it was. It did arise out of the economic situation, but I do not think that could be said now.

93. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Given the theory that you equate with outside conditions making allowance for advantages and disadvantages, could we have an estimate of these?—So far as concerns superannuation, before the war a pensions scheme on civil service lines was comparatively rare outside. Now it is probably more common than not. It follows there-

fore that the difference in favour of the Civil Service is much less than it used to be. There is, however, one difference in favour of the Civil Service, that is that our scheme is non-contributory and a good many outside schemes are contributory to the rough extent of 5 or 6 per cent. That is something which you can evaluate fairly closely. As regards leave our conditions are probably rather more favourable than outside employment. Other conditions, I think, are much less tangible—welfare services, canteens and so on. I should doubt whether the Civil Service has any advantage over most outside professions in that kind of way. Indeed, when you get to the middle and upper grades, I think outside firms probably do more for their people than we do, that is in such matters as transport and cars where we have to be rather austere because of the criticism of using public money on that kind of thing.

94. I wondered whether you allowed anything for the old-fashioned idea of prestige or position?—I have no doubt that the work is more interesting than the work in a great many professions, and that has a great attraction for people thinking of entering the Service. But it would hardly be fair to say: "Well, I know you work very hard, but it is a very interesting job and we will not pay you the full rate."

95. In the past have you not in fact done that? Take the Services, the Navy and the Army. Was it not said in the past that in place of part of their pay they had a situation of respect in the country? Do you allow anything for that?—It is very difficult to allow for this sort of consideration. I do not think you can treat the Civil Service as a whole. So far as concerns the clerk or the executive officer his position in the community is not so different from that of the bank clerk to make it right to put any different evaluation upon his pay by virtue of his position or the interest of his work. But when you come to the top grades of the Civil Service, then I think there is a difference because I do not think that the top people in the Civil Service ever have been paid commercial rates, nor that they expect to be so paid. It is there I think that these other factors may enter into it, because no doubt we do have very interesting work and that is something which is a considerable solatium.

96. *Chairman*: In those rarefied levels the hours are of course very long?—I think it is a more strenuous life than that of many people outside.

97. *Mr. Hall*: I have sometimes heard it said that, particularly for the arts graduate, his experience in the Civil Service is also useful, as a matter of training.—Yes, one of the factors which helps us in recruitment is that the job is interesting, and on the whole it is good training.

98. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Do you mean good training for the Civil Service, or good training as a possible entry into life outside?—Good training in the art of administration, which would enable him either to go on for a higher job in the Civil Service or perhaps something outside. He has the capacity, and he is using his brains for what they are worth to the uttermost.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think that on the one hand there is the interest of the work, and on the other—as some people think—a certain prestige at high level of the Civil Service. Those two things I think are useful to us in recruiting. On the other hand, there are certain disadvantages by which these are offset, the amount of work to be done for instance. There is also the fact that most senior civil servants are not masters in their own occupations to the same degree that many corresponding people in other occupations are. They are the servants of the Government of the day. I should have thought these intangibles roughly fall into balance and that there was not much to be said for using them as a ground for paying more or less in salary than what would otherwise be paid.

99. *Mr. Cash*: There was at one time—I do not know whether it is still so—the social ostracism which the tax gatherer met with. Is that still true?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I should have thought that had passed away.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I have served in the Inland Revenue Department, which is a very happy place, and I do not think the people in it in any way felt themselves surrounded with hostility.

100. Not in London, but it used to be true in the provinces.—I think that it was to some extent against the collectors, but that it has disappeared.

101. *Chairman*: I was wondering, Sir Edward, what is your view as to who should take the initiative about rising points on the pension scheme.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: There is one point we wish to raise on which we hope to lay a memorandum before you in the next few days.

102. *Chairman*: It is excluded from our terms of reference, but I should personally be quite interested in a further point. Not only the Tomlin Commission but the Chorley Committee have commented very strongly against the non-contributory system. This is ruled out of our consideration, but it would be interesting to know the reasons for rejecting the Tomlin Commission recommendations.—(*Sir Edward Bridges*.) The difficulties of transferring from a non-contributory to a contributory scheme were held to outweigh the advantages of a contributory scheme.

103. *Mr. Menzler*: Would not one effect be that you would have to raise the salaries of civil servants to the extent of their contributions?—We have also since then made some changes which diminish some of what might have been regarded as the harshnesses of the non-contributory scheme. The civil servant now can go out at the age of 50, of his own free will, and draw his pension when he is 60, so that he does not sacrifice all his accrued pension rights.

104. *Chairman*: You recognise that this scheme as it then existed had defects, but you have used other means to remedy them?—Yes.

105. Turning to pay, is it fair to ask what the Treasury views are on current general standard of remuneration, whether you think it is about right?—My answer to that is really contained in the answer which we gave about recruitment. We have certain difficulties, but only where there is a shortage. For the rest we get along fairly well, so our view is that the standards are about right, although we have mentioned one or two of these points about the structure of civil service pay which we think want looking into.

106. *Mr. Burman*: May I raise one general point on the question of broad banding? In your opinion, Sir Edward, is further extension of the broad banding principle likely to come about?—I should have thought more could be done. One finds one gets into great administrative difficulties if one tries to refine too much on the differences between particular posts. On the whole, I think after a certain point the more you try to refine the more are the arguments and the jealousies about the value of particular posts, and it is much better above a certain point to have only a certain number of fixed points, so that a man has either got to be on one scale or the next.

107. You would prefer to see more broad banding, particularly at the higher levels, than we have at the moment?—The problem arises chiefly in the higher professional posts. We have overcome it in the administrative class. The Chorley Committee took the view that all permanent secretarial posts were not of equal value and they considered dividing them up into two or three groups. We were strongly against that because we saw that although it might have some justification on the merits, the jealousies which would come on between particular Departments and their staffs might be considerable.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: And the more fragmentation of that kind the more difficult it is to move people about.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: You have got to have a certain rather rough measure of justice in that kind of matter. It makes

for a much better Service.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: There is no more unrewarding and tiresome job the Treasury has to do than that of trying to hold the ring between Departments in relation to the pay of their more senior employees. We constantly get cases of three or four people doing entirely different jobs, but in our view the same sort of level of responsibility is required. Unless we can stick to this broad banding, the job becomes quite hopeless.

108. *Chairman*: Is broad banding part of the duty of the Commission?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We did hope you would endorse the principle.

109. *Mr. Burman*: Would you think it right to extend it very considerably?—No, not very considerably. I do not know how one can quantify it more.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I did personally hope that the Commission would, where it was a question of doubt as to whether broad banding is appropriate in a particular area or not, tend to be rather in favour of broad banding, not against it.

110. *Mr. Menzler*: *Sir Edward*, on this broad banding I think you rather accepted the suggestion that there was scope for more on the professional side and that you would welcome some reduction in the numbers of grades?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: It is not a question of grades. When you get to the top posts you get a certain number of individual top posts which may differ by £50 or £100. It is that which is wrong. I should have thought at that level you wanted to have no differentiation less than £250 or £300 or something of that kind.

111. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Have you any qualms in applying broad banding to the Scottish offices? Take the four departmental heads at St. Andrew's House, Edinburgh.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: The principle is in fact applied there whether rightly or wrongly. In the Scottish Office you have your permanent secretary on the same rate as an English permanent secretary; he is in charge of the Scottish Office. Then you have the four sub-Departments, if I may so describe them, each headed by an officer who is on the same rate of pay, subject to provincial differentiation, as a deputy secretary. It may be argued that not all of those four Departments have exactly the same sort of responsibility, and certainly they are not the same size. Nevertheless, all four of them are in the same grade and have the same rate of pay.

112. *Sir Alexander Gray*: The same as the corresponding second grade in England?—Yes.

113. *Chairman*: This is perhaps a convenient moment to turn to provincial

differentiation. It is clear you accept the present system, and also the areas of classification, but you do not seem to be so clear about the amounts. I wonder if you would amplify that a little?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: One particular reason why we wanted to draw your attention to this is set out in paragraph 35. The degree of provincial differentiation at present in force between London and the rest of the country is rather greater than you might think at certain levels, because of the extra duty allowance. This was differentiated because of the larger obligation for extra hours in London than in the rest of the country. We felt therefore that it was worth while drawing your attention to that. If you decide that the extra duty allowance might be swept up in any general settlement on hours, overtime and leave, then this is something which would have to be taken into account in any re-assessment of the provincial differentiation arrangements. I think provincial differentiation is a difficult matter. We get a good many complaints about it from Departments. Departments say that the London staff object strongly to going to the provinces on to the lower rate of pay. We also get the complaint from the staff transferred from the provinces to London that provincial differentiation is inadequate to make up for the extra cost of living in London. There certainly is a marked difference in the cost of living and it must be reflected in the pay arrangements.

114. Are you then happy about the present rates of differentiation?—I think there is a view in some quarters that, if anything, the provincial differentiation might be a little steeper, but I do not know that it is universally shared.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: We would like the Commission to be aware that, if they accept our views about overtime pay, as it will be affected by the adjustment that we have suggested of bringing actual hours into line with conditioned hours, they will, by that, be altering and reducing the current amount of provincial differentiation. Perhaps they would like to look at the question whether that is a proper thing to do or whether they would want to make some kind of adjustment on the rates of provincial differentiation. We should have thought, subject to what I have just said, that there is nothing very much wrong with them, except that it is a question in our minds whether the higher rates of differentiation are as big as they ought to be. They taper off in effect as a proportion of salary quite steeply.

115. *Lady Alhmarle*: It is a fact, is it not, that there is provincial differentiation of hours as well as pay?—Yes.

116. And that has always been so?—It has certainly been so since the first world war; whether it was so before I do not

know.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think the justification for it is the extra travelling time in London, which is quite considerable.

117. And which has increased since then?

—Yes.

118. *Chairman*: There might be a point here about the place of work or place of residence. This travelling business certainly operates in favour of the place of work, but if it is a question of the cost of living it is rather more the other way. My experience in universities is that what you mean by provincial differentiation depends a good bit on where you happen to live?—I think the way we put it is that the logical point of view is to pay regard to what is the State's business, where you are calling upon the man to work. If you do, as I do, live 20 miles outside London you have to pay for the extra travelling, and that is your own business. It really would be illogical to pay regard to where a man lives.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I should add that provincial differentiation is not primarily justified by differences in the cost of living. After all, we do not examine the cost of living before we determine remuneration, but take into account the fact that in other occupations people outside London are paid less than in London and in that as in other respects we follow outside employment.

119. *Chairman*: Is this not an example of the operation of the circular factor? You are doing it because outside bodies are doing it; why are they doing it?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think they take account of the difference in conditions. I have no doubt that on the whole the man who works in a London office in central London is put to certain expenses which a man living in the rest of the country on the average is not put to, for example travel.

—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I do not think it can be held that provincial differentiation existing in outside employment is in any material degree a reflection of what we do. I should have thought it was so common throughout employment generally that you would be right to say it derived from the play of the market, as it has done for as long back as anyone cares to go. It tends to run through all employment. If you want to employ a domestic servant, you pay more for her in London than you do elsewhere. That is the market situation for that particular job, and I think it is almost universal.

120. *Mr. Menzler*: In the Ministry of Labour Survey showing how income was spent, the two main factors were rent and food.—Those are the two most obvious factors and probably the biggest factors in the cost of living; but I do suggest there are quite a lot of other things, indeed almost everything which involves the direct or indirect employment of labour.

121. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Maybe the reasons in the first instance for differentiation have disappeared, and to-day it depends on the market?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: The man in the small provincial centre is put to much less expense. He can probably bicycle to the office and may be able to go home for lunch.

122. *Chairman*: We have differentiation in simple form in the university world, but the staffs generally are by no means sold on it.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Nor are ours. It will never be a popular feature of remuneration, but I have always been convinced that if it were to be abolished tomorrow the pressure for a London allowance would develop almost at once and would be irresistible.

123. *Mrs. Wootton*: It has been suggested that the difference in costs between London and the provinces is mainly in the basic living costs—the things that you may say people spend the first part of their income on or practically the whole of a very small income. I have heard it suggested that it ought to be tapered, because at higher levels the difference is less material. Would you say there was anything in that?—I do not think we should deny it ought to be tapered. The question I was raising was whether the amount of tapering is right or might have to be adjusted.

124. *Mrs. Wootton*: I wanted to come to the question of whether you agree with the principle of tapering. Do you have any views as to whether this is advisable or not?—We are not sure whether the amount of tapering is right. If we have a doubt about it, it is whether it is not too great, and whether the amount of differentiation should not be higher at the higher levels.

125. *Sir George Mowbray*: The tapering is only a percentage tapering and not an actual one?—Yes.

126. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Would you explain why the staff object to differentiation? Is it partly a question of prestige?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I should myself not have thought that that was a material factor. After all, most jobs have the same titles in London as outside. What people object to is perhaps the fact that there are other people with exactly the same title who are getting more money for what appear to them to be (until they come to London at any rate) inadequate reasons. And of course the great majority of civil servants work outside London.

127. *Mr. Cash*: Is there any ground for the suggestion that differentiation affects the policy of decentralisation or mobility?—It has no effect on decentralisation, because we use various devices when we decentralise staff to ease their position. It certainly has an effect on mobility, but, in

times like the present, with housing and education difficulties, mobility is inevitably much more difficult to obtain by consent than it used to be.

128. *Chairman*: You do pay compensation?—Yes.

129. *Lady Albemarle*: Do you feel that these transfer grants are quite adequate now?—*Mr. Fraser*: They rise to £100 and are paid on top of actual expenses.

130. *Mr. Burman*: Do you get the reverse argument put forward, when moving a senior officer from London to the back of beyond, that he wants more, not less, because he says he lacks the cultural advantages and amenities which you get in a metropolis?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Certainly. We get it a good deal, not in the shape of an actual claim for more pay, but certainly in the shape of resistance to movement, particularly when we move large organisations as we did parts of the Inland Revenue; there was a good deal of resistance for all sorts of reasons, including the reason that they were being banished from the centre of the world.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: There is another side to that. I believe that when some Admiralty staff went to Bath they complained to start with, but afterwards came to the conclusion that it was a good move. Resistance is more at the outset. People do realise when they have settled down that there are advantages. And any reduction in pay is made on a mark-time basis.

131. *Chairman*: Could we go on to hours and leave? My first question is about the pledge to return to pre-war conditions. I was wondering how far the Treasury regard this as essentially a relevant factor, and whether it applies to pre-war staff or to all staffs.—It certainly is a relevant factor. It was a definite pledge which was given and it is still there. As to whether it applies to all staffs, I think there would be some difficulty in arguing that it did not apply to restoring the conditions of the class.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think so; we would not claim that it was only given to those who were in the Service at that time.

132. Then there is the question of staffs in the same area conditioned to different hours. Would you be prepared to see all this tidied up?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes. I think the hours in the London offices should be the same whether the London offices are headquarters offices or non-headquarter offices.

133. Do you think there is a case for different hours in London and outside?—Yes. That is partly based on general practice and partly based on what the general practice is based on, namely that there are more difficult travelling conditions in London.

134. I notice that here there is no three-tier system?—No.

135. *Sir George Mowbray*: What is the evidence that it is a long standing outside practice to have a slightly shorter week in London than elsewhere?—*Mr. Fraser*: A survey which we carried out in 1951. We have not brought it up to date because we thought perhaps the Royal Commission might want to do a survey of their own, but in 1951 we found there was this difference in average hours. We have no reason to think that there has been any great change since then.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Of course it is fair to say we start from the point of view that traditionally there has always been a difference between the hours of headquarter offices in London and the hours of other offices. If we are going to put forward suggestions for a revision of the present arrangements, we start from the presumption that we should continue some degree of differentiation, unless we are convinced that the reasons for that differentiation have disappeared. So far as we know, the evidence supports the continuance of differentiation, and we have a bias in our minds in favour of continuing it.

136. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: The memorandum before us ends up with the suggestion of a 10½-day fortnight? That means a rota on Saturdays?—Yes.

137. *Mr. Cash*: Is there any practical difficulty about that?—It is not quite plain sailing. I think many of the headquarter Departments in London would find little difficulty in operating a rota system. The difficulty comes with Departments which are open to the public and have counter work. But the general principle we put forward is every other Saturday off. There is no doubt that in certain kinds of employment we are badly out of line with commercial practice, and it is a real handicap.

138. *Mr. Cash*: It is true to say that the practice began very largely because people could not get their rations?—That is how it started in London.

139. *Chairman*: This 10½ day fortnight was put to the staff as part of the 1949 offer and turned down by them?—Yes.

140. Did they turn it down on general grounds or did they object to this particular aspect of it?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think the staff interests should speak for themselves but one factor was no doubt that certain groups thought the price in terms of reduced annual leave was too high.

141. *Mr. Menzies*: When I was in the Service and I had a Saturday morning off it cost a day's leave. Is that still the same?—Yes.

142. And the 45½ hour week is almost general, is it not?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes.

143. If you have people working a 45½ hour week with extra duty allowance, that is part of the pay packet. Would any proposal to reduce the working hours involve a diminution of the pay packet and create reactions in another direction?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: It undoubtedly would. But it is in our view wrong that the Service should continue indefinitely to receive pay packets which regularly contain payment for overtime or extra duty. If this is to be abolished, we have to face a situation in which one of two things happens. One is that there is an actual reduction of pay, and the other is—that one would hope would happen—that the adjustment would take place gradually and at times when pay was being adjusted for other reasons. It might therefore be possible to avoid actual reductions in remuneration.

144. In other words, there would have to be some transitional arrangement?—*Yes*.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: The extent of the reduction depends on the level you settle for the new conditioned hours but I very much doubt if there can really be any question of going back to the pre-war hours in London.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: We feel that hours, leave and Saturday attendance, should in principle be adjusted. We realise that, given not only the desirability of making changes in those respects, but also the fact of the pledge, this will have to be handled carefully. There will have to be a good deal of negotiation and discussion. It will no doubt have to be brought into operation over a period. But what would be extremely helpful to us would be if we were in a position to tackle these problems against the background of recommendations from this Commission on these matters.

145. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I am not too anxious to see hours too much reduced. But people in business say that Saturday mornings do not make much difference because they do not produce much work anyhow. Do you really get a full half-day's work out of a man purporting to put in a half-day's work?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I would have thought so, but I think there is a feeling that, for a man to do 2½ hours travelling for 3½ hours work is not an awfully good arrangement.

146. Is it as long as 3½ hours?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think it varies a good deal. As to the offices which are open to the public, the staff work very hard on a Saturday morning. At the other extreme there are no doubt offices where the burden rather falls off. I should hesitate to

say that we get full value for our Saturday mornings over the Civil Service as a whole, but I should not have thought it fell below full value by very much.

147. In some offices you lose the value?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We lose a little but not a lot.—*Mr. Winniffrith*: Particularly in the provinces. For the bulk of the civil servants working in these provincial offices it seems more natural to go in on a Saturday when they are not spending so much time travelling, and to achieve a good output.

148. *Chairman*: Have you got any detailed proposals to put forward on this problem?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We would be happy to put in some proposals. If you would like us to give you informally the sort of things we were beginning to think about, I could do so, but our minds are very much open on all this.

149. I should have thought it would have been useful to us to get the two sides of this as on the other things we are going to hear?—I am not sure how far the Staff Side will be prepared to volunteer on this.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think it is fair to say many of the staff have come to regret 1949.

150. *Mr. Cash*: Could we hear about those 1949 arrangements? I am not quite sure whether the whole thing was correlated?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes.

151. It was all in one packet?—*Yes*; you cannot deal with it separately.

152. There was no question of turning down one thing and accepting another?—*No*. The sort of line we have been thinking on is a 10½ day fortnight, where you can do it, and of conditioned hours and working hours being made the same over a period. As to what the hours should be, that perhaps is the crux of the thing. There should continue to be a difference between London and the provinces, and the sort of figures we had in mind are in the provinces an 88-hour fortnight and in London an 84-hour fortnight inclusive of meal times. There must be, I think, some reduction in the leave scales, because of the two factors, first of all the additional entitlement to Saturdays off, and secondly that the leave scales are very generous compared with outside practice. We think that this could be worked in with a rather simpler method of settling leave allowances which might be on a combination of salaries with length of service. I do not think I need give you details of what we have got in mind, but the question really is the bottom and the top. Starting with the clerical officer I think if one followed outside practice strictly and if you gave every other Saturday off, one could probably not justify more than a

fortnight's leave a year to start with, going up to, say, three weeks. That is a very big reduction from the present entitlement. So, although that might be the strict comparison, I think when one comes to look at it in the whole package one might feel that one would have to put it up a bit. If you come to the top levels of all, the senior ranks of administrative and executive classes at the present moment are entitled to 48 days' leave after a number of years' service. That has not been restored. It was reduced in the war to (at one time) a week and has been put back to 36 days. I think our feeling was that, given an entitlement to Saturdays off, the top limit should probably be 30 days, though there might be a case in some instances for 36 days. That is broadly the outline, but we give that, if we may, with all reserve because all these things are interlocked.

153. *Chairman*: Do you think you would be in a position later on to put something to us in writing?—Yes, certainly.

154. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Perhaps when Sir Edward does that he might have a point in mind. You rather stress the advantage of an entitlement to every other Saturday off. If that arrangement were introduced you cited that as a reason why the annual leave should be reduced. But why do you stress that factor since the working hours would at least not be reduced greatly even though there were an alternate Saturday off?—The working hours would be reduced below what they are at present; in London from 91 to 84. But we are really basing ourselves on the broad comparison with what is given outside, and I do not think that a junior clerk or an executive officer going into business would ever get such generous leave allowances as the present entitlement. I certainly do not want to suggest that the civil service conditions in this respect should be, so to speak, screwed down precisely and mathematically to commercial practice, but the present disparity seems to us to be greater than it is easy to justify. If one is trying to give the Civil Service a fair deal and give them what people get outside in other respects, it is difficult to justify leave allowances for all the junior staff so much in excess of what they get outside.—*Mr. Fraser*: Another answer to Mr. Thorneycroft's point is this. Leave allowances are expressed in terms of working days. Under the present system if you want a fortnight's leave you take twelve days. If you had a 10½ day fortnight, the fortnight's leave would only cost you 10½ days. So at least to the extent of that difference the leave would have to be re-expressed in the form of a smaller number of days.

155. I rather assumed what you had in mind was that the leave allowance should be expressed in terms of week days rather

than working days.—We would still do it in working days, but you would not have to use up so many of them to get a week or a fortnight off.

156. *Sir Alexander Gray*: How long is it since the Civil Service as a whole got and took the leave to which they were entitled?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: The bottom grades have had it restored; it is only the top grades who have not had it since the beginning of the war.

157. The point that impresses me is that it is so bad from the public point of view to appear to give the civil servant much more leave than in fact he gets. Would you attach importance to that?—The present Saturday arrangements of course embody that, because I imagine pre-war most of the people entitled to 48 days only got near it by taking a great many Saturdays. This arrangement of giving them a certain amount of Saturdays *de jure* and reducing the leave allowances helps from the point of view of public presentation.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Pre-war I think it was general experience that nearly all civil servants except the most senior took the leave to which they were entitled, though they took some of it in the shape of Saturday mornings.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I do not think it follows that the senior administrative people got it; I do not think they were able to.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think it is true that between the wars the big allowances were taken by a very large proportion of the people to whom they applied, although there were of course a certain number of senior officers who did not take that amount of leave or anything like it. I also think that nowadays most of the people entitled to 36 days take 36 days.

158. *Chairman*: Any change such as that envisaged in your paragraph 46 would presumably involve the engagement of additional staff; the work, I take it, will remain the same?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We are not sure it really would.—*Mr. Fraser*: There are some Departments where it would, particularly those with blocks of routine work where output is closely related to attendance, but there are other offices where that would not be so. A great deal depends on what is done about leave, because if there is less leave given there is more attendance, and to that extent you would not need the extra manpower. Then there is the possibility that in the course of time a 45½ hour week could be reduced without proportionate increases in manpower if the tempo were perhaps speeded up a little bit. And the suggested changes in hours are not quite as big as they appear, because they would regulate such factors as meal allowances and odd intervals of absences at

other times. A new, comprehensive and well understood system of hours and leave might take up a certain amount of slack. This would again militate against a proportionate increase of manpower.

159. If you started to take in that sort of slack would you not get into trouble with the Associations?—When I said "slack" I chose the wrong word. What I meant was that there might be alterations in the regulations which might define more accurately what is allowable. I do not think there would be difficulty on that point with the Associations; as to "slack" in its other sense, the Associations are never in favour of slacking or not giving a fair day's work for a day's money.

Mr. Cash: From statistics I have in my possession, outside firms do of course save on sick leave.

160. *Chairman:* Sick leave has been ruled out of consideration I take it. I was interested in that because there has been a good deal of controversy in the press in the last few days about the doubling of sick leave in certain areas of the Civil Service, the Post Office I thought.—*Sir Edward Bridges:* It is very carefully watched. It is quite true that when first we gave paid sick leave to certain staffs, their total absences increased. The answer was that until they had it they could not afford to go sick and came to the office when they were ill. One must not take statistics of increased sick leave as being all on the wrong side; some of it is on the good side.

161. Are there any other questions anyone would like to ask about hours or leave? What about overtime? That will largely be reduced if we tackle the conditioned hours situation?—Yes. Civil service overtime conditions in clerical grades are probably more favourable than outside because they are on multiple rates. If the amount of overtime worked is reduced I do not know that that matters very much. It is something of long standing.

162. You think the present rates are reasonably satisfactory?—It is a question whether you feel a man should start getting more than time rate the moment he works overtime, and I suppose that is arguable.

163. What about extra duty allowance?—We feel that one thing which should be done as part of this general review is that it ought to be brought to an end. It is not right, particularly with administrative officers, that they should continue to be paid regularly for working more than their conditioned hours. It never was so before the war and we ought to get back to pre-war.

164. *Mr. Menzler:* E.D.A. is not pensionable, is it?—No.

165. May I ask a general question? It is a fact, is it not, Sir Edward, that compulsory arbitration only goes up to about £1,500?—*Sir Edward Bridges:* Yes.

166. And beyond that area arbitration can only take place by consent of the Treasury?—Yes.

167. Is there any dissatisfaction on the part of the higher grades with this?—That question would be better answered by the First Division Association or the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. So far as concerns the top grades in the Civil Service, permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries, I am sure they would be strongly opposed to being within any arbitration arrangement.

168. I believe that senior L.C.C. staff have had special arbitration machinery set up, the Ministry of Health appointing the present Chairman of the Arbitration Tribunal as the arbitrator and that they got not negligible increases in pay. I was wondering on what grounds of principle, excluding of course permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries, such machinery of a special character might not be given to the ranks of the Civil Service below the ranks you mentioned?—*Mr. Winniffrith:* That L.C.C. arrangement was *ad hoc*; it was not standing machinery.

169. I appreciate that. Whether it is *ad hoc* or continued the point of principle is there.—*Sir Thomas Padmore:* It was not very different from what the Government did for the Civil Service when it set up the Chorley Committee. It made arrangements for an independent review and the Chorley Committee heard evidence from two sides. It is true that it was not a tribunal in form but it was not a wholly dissimilar way of settling the remuneration of the higher grades.

170. I know nothing about the proceedings, obviously, but it was arbitration analogous to that before the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal, the same arbitrator in fact.—*Mr. Winniffrith:* Could I suggest that there are reasons against arbitration machinery at that level. Arbitration in the ordinary way is a straight pay claim and it is argued out on the day. When you are dealing with staff at this kind of level, the considerations are rather wider and you need more detailed enquiry with perhaps different kinds of experience and knowledge brought to bear.

171. But it is very significant that people getting over about £1,500 a year up to about £3,500 or £4,000 were allowed to go to arbitration by the Council, after consultation with the Minister of Housing and Local Government. If I were a senior civil servant today I should feel very upset that I should not have similar facilities, but I gather you do not think that would be appropriate?—That would be my answer.

172. *Chairman*: We may hear what the Associations say.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think it is very much open to question, whatever the L.C.C. may have thought proper, whether the Government can be expected or asked to hand over to an independent body the task of final decision about the rates of remuneration of its most senior servants.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I am bound to say I have always felt strongly that the position of senior civil servants as advisers to Ministers, and with very close relations to Ministers, does make the procedure of compulsory arbitration much less appropriate than in other fields. I think this is felt by most other senior civil servants.

173. *Mr. Menzler*: While I would agree with you on general grounds, my own feeling would be that there is a very wide area between £1,500 and £4,500 in which those considerations do not obtain. There are people (assistant secretaries, for example), to whom perhaps those considerations to which you have referred are not so relevant and where some form of *ad hoc* arbitration might be appropriate.

174. *Chairman*: We seem to have covered the memorandum pretty comprehensively, *Sir Edward*. I think you finish up in paragraph 55 with a suggestion about our procedure. I take it you suggest our best line would be to deal first of all with principles and then to consider conditions of service before we come down to some attempt to evaluate pay levels?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes, that seems to be the proper order in which to take the subjects, although no doubt you will hear bits of evidence as you go along which would be relevant to a later part of the proceedings.

175. *Sir George Mowbray*: May I ask one very general question which is at the back of my mind and which I would like to clarify? Coming back to the terms of reference of the Commission which read:

"Whether any changes are desirable in the principles which should govern pay; or in the rates of pay at present in force for the main categories . . ."

Sir Edward, in the course of what he has said today, has indicated that owing to a variety of circumstances certain things have become distorted in varying degrees. Does the Treasury or *Sir Edward* envisage we should endeavour to tidy up small differentials in the course of our report, or that we should lay down general principles and leave the ordinary procedure of the Civil Service to tidy up the details?—I think we feel it would be very helpful if, when you have settled what you want to do about the main principles, and then come to some conclusions as to what extent the structure has got distorted or out of focus, you could give some fairly clear indications as to what sort of

distortion you think had taken place and how it ought to be remedied in different parts of the main hierarchy. How far you would want to go in being specific as to the changes you suggest is rather difficult to determine at this stage. It probably depends to some extent on how far you think that the thing has gone wrong, or how much you think it needs correcting.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: May I add to that just to say that the terms of reference as I remember them are in two limbs. They ask the Commission first of all to lay down the principles and then to say what those principles mean in relation to rates of pay at present in force. I hope that the Commission may think it right to do in relation to pay broadly what the Tomlin Commission did. They did not lay down rates for the whole Civil Service, but they did lay down many actual rates by applying their own principles, and we hope this Commission will do the same in relation to the main grades and classes. In other words, we would like the Commission to give us a fairly comprehensive skeleton, on which no doubt it would be appropriate for us in the process of negotiation to add the flesh afterwards.

176. *Chairman*: That is exactly what you are asking us to do by your terms of reference—"rates of pay at present in force in the main categories."

177. *Sir George Mowbray*: The terms of reference are—"Whether any changes are desirable in the principles which should govern pay or in the rates of pay at present in force." It does not go on to say in the terms of reference what those specific changes should be, and that was the point of my question—I agree, but we would hope the Commission would not simply say—"We think the rate for an assistant secretary is wrong"—without telling us by how much.

178. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You want us to give you a pointer?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Pointers as far as the main grades are concerned; the greater the detail, without getting embroiled, the easier our job would be.

179. *Sir George Mowbray*: But the absolutely specific recommendations are very difficult to lay down without a tremendous amount of what I would call bargaining across the table.—But unless one has some fairly specific points at strategical places, general remarks are apt to remain so general that it is difficult to apply them. That does not mean you have to carry yourself into figures all the way down, but one does want some strategic points fairly clearly defined.

Sir George Mowbray: A semi-fleshed skeleton, but not with every bit of flesh on the outside.

180. *Chairman*: Some specific recommendations are bound to come out, because there may be consequential changes in rates if we alter hours, overtime and leave?—Yes.

181. The Treasury view of main categories is in the Factual Memorandum?—Yes. They are listed in paragraph 178 on page 45, and cover a very large proportion of the Civil Service.

182. *Lady Albemarle*: We have had representations from other classes; shall we have an opportunity of discussing that with the Treasury some time?—It is for you to settle how many you include.

183. There are some of these classes in the Memorandum which are more important from this point of view than others?—Yes, certainly.

184. You can get a complete vertical structure with four or five of these classes together. The others are a little bit off on the right or left, as the case may be?—Typing grades, clerical assistant class and machine operators are closely connected. You could probably deal with those together.

185. *Mr. Cash*: Just to get it on the record, we are not dealing with anyone overseas?—Not as such.

186. Nor with industrial workers?—*Mr. Winnifrith*: No.

187. Is there any other point you would like to raise, Sir Edward?—No, thank you very much.

188. *Chairman*: I think that we as a Commission should meet again tomorrow at 10.30 and I hope you will come along at 2.15.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Thursday, 25th February, 1954, at 2.15 p.m.)

SECOND DAY

Thursday, 25th February 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C., (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E.,
F.R.S.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Examination of Witnesses

RT. HON. SIR EDWARD BRIDGES, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., M.C., *Permanent Secretary*,

SIR THOMAS PADMORE, K.C.B., *Second Secretary*,

MR. A. J. D. WINNIFRITH, C.B., *Third Secretary*, and

MR. B. D. FRASER, *Under Secretary*,

on behalf of the Treasury

Called and examined

189. *Chairman*: We have been thinking over yesterday's discussion and we have produced and put on the table before you what we think might be a Treasury restatement of the Tomlin formula. Could we have your comment on it?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: "Outside pay rates" in line 2 means "for comparable work" rather than general trends?

190. Yes—The words "applied rather frequently throughout the lower ranges, but less frequently to the higher ranges", imply the assumption that outside rates are going to continue to rise frequently. We do not endorse frequent change for its own sake. Nor had I myself thought that it was easy to define how often you had reviews in the higher ranges, but rather of putting it that you would only have reviews when there had been a material movement outside. I also doubt whether you can put a quantitative expression on how often such reviews should take place, but I am sure it is much less often than in the rest of the Service.

191. Do you think that in the immediate past reviews have been too frequent or not often enough?—That is rather a big question. We have had two changes in top salaries since the war. I think that is quite enough in that period.

192. I thought that was your idea.—Yes, but it is difficult to argue that what

happened in the past is necessarily right in the future when circumstances may be different.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: If I may say so, this question of the frequency of reviews is rather more one of what will in fact happen than in any sense part of a principle. I do not think it is a principle that you should make reviews with any particular frequency, and in fact the initiative is always, and I think rightly, taken by the employees. The Government does not take it upon itself to initiate comparisons and to say "We find we are not paying our clerks enough." But in present times when changes are taking place outside fairly frequently, it does happen that claims are made and require to be considered by the negotiating machinery much more frequently in the case of the lower grades than of the higher.

193. Of course my qualifying clause applies only to the higher grades.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Yes, but perhaps the right way to put it is to say that you wash out or do not pay so much attention to what Tomlin said about the long term trend, but not necessarily that you should put anything else in its place except a caution that the higher grades obviously cannot be reviewed as often as the rest of the Service.

194. Does the rest more or less state your position?—The business of “internal horizontal relativities” may need to be expanded rather more. There are some internal horizontal relativities which I do not think you can do without and you have to accept them. There are also those which are unnecessary and which get the Service too rigid, and I feel that that thought ought to come into it. As regards the bit about vertical relativity that, I think, links up very nicely with opening the concertina again in the middle and upper middle ranges. That is all that occurs to me on a first reading.

195. So our version is very broadly on the right lines?—Yes, but the summary we gave in paragraph 26 of our Memorandum was intended to be as far as we thought it appropriate for witnesses to go.

196. Now another point. Is the compression of the concertina simply a reflection of a national tendency in the welfare state? If so, it may be difficult to work out the formula as “fair comparison” and “vertical internal relativity” may be in opposition except in the case of certain privileged classes which are highly organised. Is there not a general tendency throughout the country to reduce the recognition of skill?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: By comparison with pre-war times there has been a general compression in employment generally and we should expect that that would be and should be reflected in the Civil Service. But we venture to wonder whether when the Commission come to look into outside comparisons they may not find that the process has been applied rather more in the Civil Service than elsewhere.

197. Is there any evidence of an increased tendency in the upper ranks of the Service to resign to go to outside employment, because one might expect this if salaries are considered unsatisfactory and it is possible to go out with pension benefits?

—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We have had some losses in the upper ranks, but if you would like particulars we could put them in. On the whole I would have thought that they would work out at very little more than what we had before the war.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: There may have been twice as many resignations as before the war, but even if that were so the total number is not really significant now.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: It is that twice one is two rather than twice twenty is forty.

198. *Mr. Menzler*: Is the wastage to industry or to the nationalised industries?—There has been some loss to industry, but even if you include the loss to nationalised industries it does not add very many. I think we have lost one permanent secretary or equivalent officer to three or four nationalised industries, some of them at

the end of their time and some just before the end of their time. That I regard as something special. There were very few undertakings in the country with staffs who had experience in running big undertakings, and since some civil servants had such experience it was natural to draw on them in setting up the nationalised boards. I do not think that is something which will continue.

199. But would not loss of pension below fifty have a deterrent effect?—Yes, but, as we said, when the “over 50” pension provision was passed, a lot of people thought that we should have a large number of civil servants leaving between the ages of 50 and 60. In fact there has been only a trickle.

200. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: At a recent meeting of the Scientific Advisory Council at the Ministry of Supply it was mentioned that they wanted 140 in the scientific officer grades, mainly to cover wastage. That is 140 in about 3,000. Would it be possible to have details?—We can get them but, of course, scientists are one of the areas in which there is a national shortage, and where you get a national shortage you get rather more wastage than elsewhere.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Even there there has been nothing in the nature of a mass movement.

201. *Mrs. Wootton*: When *Sir Thomas* says that the span is or may be less (we will try to get away from the concertina), than it used to be and that that is more marked in the Civil Service than outside, have you any hard evidence on that?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I admit I am speaking from a general impression, but my colleagues may have more information than I have.

202. Would you say that it is true of the whole span or would you say that it is perhaps particularly true of the middle area?—I think it is particularly true of the middle area.

203. *Mr. Hall*: About £800 to £1,800?—That is the rough range.

204. *Mrs. Wootton*: If you have any hard evidence about it I think we would very much like to see it.

205. *Chairman*: We shall probably get it in the course of our enquiries.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: We are also influenced by the firm and constantly expressed views of the Heads of Departments that people do not get enough out of promotion and that there is a lack of proper reward.

206. *Mrs. Wootton*: Do they say in fact they have difficulty in getting people to take promotion? It is commonly said there are not sufficient inducements for promotion but when you have a job vacant there is usually no difficulty in finding candidates. Is that your experience?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: They do in fact say they have

some cases where they are not able to persuade the man they think best fitted to take the promotion, but that is still very rare. People grumble and say, "Why should I take promotion, it is not worth my while", but in the end I think they take it.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: They are not getting what they should get for the extra responsibility, and that is not a very healthy sign.

207. One argument is that there is insufficient inducement, and the other is that it is unjust or unfair. Insufficient inducement is a purely practical thing, that in fact you cannot get people for promotion.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Most people in the last resort will take promotion even if they get nothing.

208. *Chairman*: You mentioned yesterday that provided a civil service rate is in harmony with outside rates it must be regarded as adequate. Could we have this idea of "in harmony" amplified?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: It means that it compares reasonably with outside rates. You get a lot of outside rates and you have to strike a reasonable and fair average of them. It is not an absolutely mathematical process.

209. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Where you are trying to find some comparable outside positions, how would you evaluate the comparison between the civil service scales and those outside? Would you take the minimum, or the mean, or the maximum for determining the comparison?—*Mr. Fraser*: Might I just explain what we do when we ask outside people for information? We ask them as regards the grade we are interested in about the rates which they pay, what are the duties which they intend to cover by those rates—both type of duties and also the level of responsibility which they expect to see discharged at the particular rates. This is to avoid the point about circular comparisons. Also where it is necessary we give them a detailed description of the sort of jobs in the Service that we are trying to strike a rate for. We say, "If you had a job like this what is the sort of remuneration you would pay for it?" We ask also about career prospects and numbers. The results are not always easy to evaluate, but I think in that sort of way we avoid the circularity snag. We can collect something which provides a fair base for the civil servant as compared with the comparable job outside.

210. I assume that you try to draw a comparison between the lowest scale in the Civil Service and the lowest scale operating outside; this is often an age scale intended to cover work of a routine character. What is your method of making comparisons at this level?—In almost all basic grades we also have the age point system. Thus the clerical officer scale is age pointed. So is that of the clerical assistant which is perhaps a grade not always found outside. They do the more

routine clerical work. The best one can do is to ensure that one is giving the same sort of remuneration for the same sort of job.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: At the same sort of age.

211. *Mrs. Wootton*: Do you go to particular employers or to the British Institute of Management?—*Mr. Fraser*: We look at the British Institute of Management figures, but they do not always give us the answers we want with sufficient particularity, and therefore in doing a pay review of a particular class we go direct to as large and representative a selection of employers as we can arrange.

212. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Does that include banks?—Yes.

213. *Mrs. Wootton*: Do you tie a particular job in the Service to one or two specific comparable jobs outside? For instance, if you take clerical officers, do you tie them specifically, say, to bank clerks? Or assistant principals to, say, university teachers?—In the case of clerks we try to get a fair and full span of comparable employment, and we go not only to the banks, but also to other employers with large clerical forces. As regards assistant principals we take a general conspectus of the prospects offered by commerce, industry, universities and so on. *Sir Edward Bridges*: We certainly do not tie civil service clerks to the pay of any fixed group of clerks outside whether railway or bank clerks, nor do we relate assistant principals, shall we say, solely to university teachers. We try and get a range to compare them with in both cases.

214. You come down to concrete jobs?—Yes, a range of comparable jobs.

215. They must be comparable?—Representative of what we regard as comparable jobs for the community as a whole.

216. Could you possibly let us have a note on this process?—*Mr. Fraser*: Yes.

217. *Mr. Cash*: What happens when you come to certain grades of the big five banks, because their rates are notoriously out of step with everybody else.—That would come into account in the general comparison. When the work is not wholly comparable one has to make allowance for that. The process is not exact, there is room for a margin of error, but one tries to get it as fair as one can.

218. *Mr. Menzler*: The civil service clerical grades number nearly 200,000, and it is said outside that so far from the Civil Service fixing their scales in relation to outside standards, in fact the Civil Service sets the pace. What would you say to that?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I would not think it is true. *Mr. Winniffrith*: The L.C.C. were quoted yesterday. Perhaps I could quote another L.C.C. case. I

remember going into the Arbitration Court one day on clerks and we had the wind considerably taken out of our sails by the other side announcing that the L.C.C. had got a march ahead of us that very day. That certainly was one case where there was a definite lead from outside.

219. I have also heard that as a result of a recent award the Civil Service sets the pace for the executives. Do you think there is anything in that?—*Mr. Fraser*: It sounds like a criticism of the award which it would not be proper for us to make. *Sir Edward Bridges*: I suppose it is true in any area in which the Civil Service is a large employer, just as we are influenced in our comparison by what large employers do outside so the civil service rates affect rates for some people in particular employments outside.

220. *Mr. Cash*: I remember it being said that that happened when a large block of civil service employment was suddenly introduced into a provincial centre.—Yes.

221. *Chairman*: One would expect the process to be reversible.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Where we are large employers of any particular category what we do is bound to have an effect. Just after the war when we were dealing with a shortage of typists, if we had said we will remedy this by doubling the pay of typists, it would have had a great effect on the pay of typists generally. In fact we did not take any such decision. But on the whole although what we do must have some effect on other employment we do try not to create or influence the market but to follow what other employers do.

222. *Mr. Cash*: Could I ask one question on the draft formula? I am still not clear in my own mind whether Sir Edward thinks that no one formula will do.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I hope that you will put a passage in your report in which you will recite the principles which should govern the pay of the whole non-industrial Civil Service, top to bottom, and somewhere embodied in that will be some qualification which takes into account the special position of the higher grades.

223. What Sir Thomas Padmore was saying just now about the pressure coming from the staff associations is related, is it not, to the fact that our minds are conditioned to a process of continual raising of salaries and wages?—Yes.

224. It seems to me that we ought to have at any rate at the back of our minds some slightly more realistic view that in the next ten years or so that process might be reversed. Then, of course, the pressure will presumably come from the other side of the table. Ought we to consider what on that basis would be the attitude of the Treasury to these claims and

to the formula?—If I may give a quick answer, it is that if you get that kind of situation, fluctuation and falling prices and wages, then I think you will probably wish that you had paid a little more attention to the Tomlin long term trend, because there will be the feeling that the Civil Service having necessarily lagged a bit behind on the upward process should not take the lead in going down again. Therefore you do not change the thing down at once. But when you see that wages have dropped and are staying down, then a comparable process would no doubt have to be set in hand for the Service. I think you should allow for that.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Supposing that in place of the steady upward movement in prices and wages there was a steady and continuous downward movement, the initiative for doing anything about it in the Civil Service would pass to the Government. If the Government were securing periodic downward adjustments in the pay of civil servants, the same thing would happen in relation to time as with upward movement, that is to say revision would necessarily take place more frequently in the case of the lower grades than the higher, because you do not adjust the pay of the higher grades until the movement has made it worth while to deal with what is *ex-hypothesi* a high salary.

225. And that would be parallel to outside practice? You would not suddenly cut down a £2,000 a year man in a commercial job just because wages and lower salaries had fallen?—No.

226. *Mr. Hall*: The point I wanted to ask ties up with what Sir Thomas has just been saying. As I understood it yesterday the phrase "long term trend" has come to be taken to refer to changes over a longish period of time. Since the Tomlin Report was published there have been some very rapid rates of change that I should have thought might have justified immediate action over the whole salary range. I do not know whether it would help if the phrase "long-term trend" could be interpreted to include rapid changes, particularly if these are likely to be permanent in their effect. I am thinking, for example, of the immediate effect of devaluation or the total effect of the war period. Further references have been made today to "the economic condition of the country". These references might be thought to refer to changes in price and wages levels. But I took the Treasury yesterday, when the phrase was used, to mean what I should call political (in the non-party sense of the word) considerations. For example, there are occasions when it is necessary for the Government to give a lead, particularly when restraint is called for. I think therefore there may be three things lying behind the phrase

"long-term trend"—the trend itself, the rate at which changes may develop and, thirdly, the influence of political considerations on public policy.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: I think I agree with that.

Chairman: Coming back to internal relativity, I think Mr. Thorneycroft had a question.

227. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: To what extent, do the Treasury feel there is a relationship to be borne in mind between clerical officers' rates and those paid to Post Office manipulative grades?—*Mr. Winniffrith*: It is inevitable that where, as in the Post Office, you have got a whole series of workers some of whom are some of the time doing clerical work, there must be a comparison between what they are paid and what the great body of clerks in the rest of the Service are paid. The difficulty we find about that comparison is, that there is a traditional linkage inside the Post Office by which a man who is doing a clerical job has his pay fixed by that of his colleagues who are almost industrial workers. It sometimes happens therefore that you get an upsurge in the industrial world carrying with it clerical workers who in the ordinary way are remunerated on a totally different basis. That is the difficulty we find about having any fixed and pre-ordained linkage between manipulatives in the Post Office and the general body of clerical workers in the rest of the Service.

228. You do recognise that there is a traditional linkage?—Yes, indeed.

229. And would I be correct in assuming that if there were an increase in the rates paid to manipulatives, there should be a more or less automatic lift in clerical scales?—I would not like the automatically to be emphasised too much.—*Mr. Fraser*: The automatic link referred to is within the manipulative grades, between those grades that are doing work not far removed from industrial and those grades that are doing work not far removed from clerical. That is what has been a hallowed link, but there has never been such a link between the manipulative as a whole, and the non-Post Office clericals as a whole.—*Mr. Winniffrith*: There is one other point about this link. Under a long standing arrangement it is regarded as a promotion to be picked out of the manipulatives and given a seat in the clerical class. Each year in the clerical class, a number of places are reserved to be filled by promotion from the manipulatives grades. Clearly you could reach a preposterous situation if you had an Irishman's rise on promotion from the manipulative to the clerical field.

230. It does seem to me in view of what you have said that you must pay regard to movement of manipulatives' rates in dealing with the salaries of the clerical classes, but that there is

no question of an automatic adjustment.—*Sir Edward Bridges*: Quite, but you cannot ignore it.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: If the general body of civil service clerks come to the Treasury and say "Look, the manipulatives in the Post Office who include a number of people doing work not very dissimilar from ours have had a rise—what about it?", we cannot say we pay no attention to it. We can say on the other hand "But look what has happened or has not happened in the case of people in other employments engaged on the same kind of duties as yours—that also is a factor that we have to take account of." There is no automatic presumption that because one body has moved the other must move to the same extent.

231. You do not rule out a claim from the clerical people on the grounds of something having happened among the manipulatives?—*Mr. Winniffrith*: No. Could I make one more point? What, in our view, would be inadmissible would be if a claim were made on behalf of the general body of clerks. "In the old days before the war we always got at least £100 more than Post Office clerks. That lead must be preserved for all time." If because of the rise in manipulative wages that lead has been reduced, we would not admit that it should automatically be restored.

232. *Lady Albemarle*: Is not this a good example where you have a traditional internal relativity which is counterbalanced by a good check on outside comparison?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: It needs to be counterbalanced.

233. *Chairman*: The last point on yesterday's discussion are some questions on hours and leave. We noticed the difference in London hours between the 1949 offer and your current very rough ideas?—That is deliberate.

234. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: *Sir Edward*, I suggested yesterday you were seeking to increase working hours and at the same time to reduce leave because of Saturday mornings off. What you have in mind is an 88 hour fortnight in the provinces and one of 84 in London, but the conditioned hours at present are precisely those, are they not?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Yes.

235. So your proposal would not entail any reduction in hours. I know that at the present time you have longer working hours, but it is the case that the conditioned hours qualify for the leave entitlement?—*Sir Edward Bridges*: They are linked up with it.

236. The conditioned hours qualify for the entitlement?—Conditioned hours and leave are an important part of conditions of service.

237. That may be, but I cannot see that, since conditioned hours will stay the

same, there is any reason to alter annual leave allowances.—I think, if I may say so with respect, that the way you have put it does not take into account quite all the facts in the package. First of all there is the fact that the man would get every other Saturday morning off. You may say that the work will be spread over other hours, but there is some advantage in not having to come to the office on 26 Saturdays. Also we do feel that the pre-war leave entitlement was longer than could be justified on merits, and we seek as part of this package which would clearly have to be negotiated with the staff to bring about a certain reduction in that leave standard.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: It is true, as Mr. Thorneycroft says, that the Treasury propositions involve the same conditioned hours as before the war and a shorter actual working week than at present. On the other hand in the case of certain London people, they involve a requirement to work longer than before the war. I said yesterday we were hoping that we should be able to carry out these changes at a time and in a manner to avoid actual loss of pay by the disappearance of overtime which goes into almost everybody's pay packet now. It does mean that we are not proposing to alter the conditioned hours at all. We are only proposing to reduce the working hours and, as I say, for part of the staff to increase the actual working hours over pre-war standards. When we come to leave there are really two factors. First there is a simple arithmetical adjustment which would be appropriate; under the old system six days meant a week's leave, twelve meant a fortnight. Under the system that we have suggested only ten and a half days would mean a fortnight's leave, and therefore if you want to give the same actual proportion of leave expressed in terms of weeks, it would be natural to make an arithmetical adjustment in the ratio of 12 to 10½ on the old leave allowances. Then there is the separate point that the old leave allowances, in some respects at any rate and in some parts of the Service, were unduly far removed from normal practice. We therefore had it in mind to suggest to the Commission that they might well in reviewing the whole of hours and leave propose some adjustment to take account of that.

238. *Mr. Hall*: If you introduce this 10½ day fortnight, clearly some parts of the public service will require Saturday working. Would it be possible to have some formula for payment in lieu of the Saturday off where the public service requires it which could be added to the normal formula? Has anything of the sort been considered?—We have not yet thought how we should handle the problem of the compulsory attendance that might be required at some offices on all Saturdays. Obviously there

are two things you can do, you can either give time off in lieu, or you can give an addition to pay. Which it would be necessary to choose, or what combination of those two things I do not know.

(At this point *Sir Edward Bridges* withdrew.)

239. *Lady Albemarle*: I notice that in two of the classes in the Memorandum, temporary clerks and architectural and engineering draughtsmen, temporary staff are conditioned, wherever employed, to a 44 hour week while established clerks are conditioned to 42. Is it only in these two exceptional cases that temporary staff are conditioned to 44 and if so why?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: The 42 hour week was a pre-war oddity which applied only to certain grades in London. It did not apply to anybody who was not established. It applied to the general administrative, executive, clerical and sub-clerical classes. It did not apply to the very large bodies of departmental clerks and there were other parts of the Service in London to which it did not apply, I fancy for historical reasons. But it was part of our proposition that, if there is a case for different hours in London from the provinces, those hours should be applied generally to staffs in London.

240. I am sorry, but I am still not clear. Here are two groups within a class who, because they are temporary, have to work a 44 hour week in London. But none of the other temporary classes in London do more than 42?—*Mr. Fraser*: There are some cases where they do, but these are two classes where the temporary element is particularly large and we therefore brought it to the Commission's attention.

241. Does not the difference create problems?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: It would provide many more but for the fact that everybody is doing 45½.

242. Surely that can cause ill feeling?—It does mean, of course, that the people enjoy different conditions.

243. But what justification is there for it?—I doubt if in theory it can be justified.

244. *Chairman*: Does it follow from this that you would be in favour of doing away with these differences?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Certainly.

Chairman: I think, Sir George, you have a question on definition of ranges.

245. *Sir George Mowbray*: Is it possible in any way to define the lower ranges at which there may have to be frequent changes, and the higher at which there should not? Unless one has some form of definition of "lower" and "higher", there may be difficulty.—There have, I think, never been in our minds two classes between which there is a dividing line. There is a gradual change from bottom to

top. May I illustrate it in this sort of way? If clerical workers in the Service can demonstrate that their pay has lagged behind the generality of the people engaged on similar work by, let us say, as little as 7s. 6d. a week, they bring a claim and, if they can establish it, either we or the Arbitration Tribunal will make a change. That is a thing that is nowadays liable to happen quite frequently. When you get to the top, there are two reasons why you do not carry out such adjustments. It would be absurd for a body of people paid, let us say, £4,500 a year to try to establish a claim to another £50. Moreover the comparisons on which their remuneration is based are not so exact as to make anything of that kind at all possible. In the nature of things at these levels movement takes place very much less frequently. Between those two extremes it seems to me there is a gradual adjustment all the way up.

246. In other words, it is proportionately slower as you get up the scale?—Yes, that is how it happens. If one looks at past history, the very top levels have had two adjustments in pay since the war; the clerks have had perhaps half a dozen. If you go about half-way in between you may find that they have had a number of adjustments about half-way between.

247. It is the sort of £2,000 level that can be caught up fairly rapidly, if you have got a rapidly increasing market and the internal relativity therefore goes by the board unless there are comparatively frequent, as distinct from very frequent, adjustments in those sort of ranges?—If you take the administrative class as an example, the principal scale has been moved a number of times, and has been moved again as a result of a recent arbitration award; the top effective rate of remuneration is now £1,570. The scale above, the assistant secretary scale, begins at £1,600. If nothing happens to the assistant secretary scale it may not be very long before there is an actual overlap. In any case, we would say that the present difference between those two scales is inadequate to represent a proper return for the different responsibilities and duties.

Chairman: £1,500 a year is at present about the level at which Treasury consent is necessary for arbitration, and I think, Mr. Menzler, you had a question to ask on that.

248. *Mr. Menzler:* Yes, Sir. Could the Commission know how many applications you have received over a reasonable recent period; how many you have rejected and how many you have agreed?—Yes. We will put in a note.

249. And there must be some principle on which you reject certain cases? Could you make a statement on that?—It might

be useful to add something to our note on that. I should have thought, generally speaking, that the presumption was against arbitration above the limit. After all, the purpose of laying it down was, rightly or wrongly, to exclude the upper grades from arbitration, and I should therefore suppose that where arbitration has been conceded above the normal limit, it has been for special reasons, rather than that there have been special reasons in cases of withholding consent.

250. There is an area where in accordance with outside practice, say local government, you could go much higher up than £1,500. It is a little difficult, for example, to say that chief constables should be arbitrable, but not certain people on £2,000 or £2,500 a year in the Civil Service?—It may be arguable where you should draw the line, but it might be held that in some respects the Government is perhaps less favourably placed for conceding arbitration at the higher levels than other employers. After all the basis on which arbitration is withheld from the higher grades is partly what Mr. Winnifrith said yesterday about the relative unsuitability of the procedure of the Arbitration Tribunal for handling claims from higher staffs. It is also that arbitration means that the Government say: "We will not settle the pay of those grades coming within the arbitration agreement; we will hand it over to an umpire", and I think it is very difficult for the Government to do so at the highest levels.

251. *Chairman:* The line has moved up from time to time. That is simply a reflection of the cost of living increases I suppose?—Not wholly. It has advanced not only absolutely but relatively since before the war.

Chairman: We want now to call your attention to paragraph 25 of your memorandum on which we have some questions.

252. *Mrs. Wootton:* May I first take two other questions? One is purely factual—I think you are going to let us have some figures about resignations?—Yes.

253. Is it possible in those figures to distinguish ages of resignation as well as grades, and, of course, sex?—*Sir Thomas Padmore:* Yes. I take it you are thinking mainly in terms of the higher grades, or at any rate the middle grades, and we shall leave out resignations on marriage.

254. *Chairman:* Men only, and the higher ranges?

255. *Mrs. Wootton:* Are we sure that we only want higher ranges?—I am not sure how complete our information is.

Mrs. Wootton: We would be helped by as much as you can give.

256. *Mr. Willis Jackson:* I think we should like some information on where

they have gone to, if you have it?—*Mr. Winnifrith*: I am afraid we almost certainly have not.

257. *Mr. Hall*: There is one point on which you may have information, namely, where there has been transfer to a nationalised industry?—Yes.

258. *Chairman*: And I take it you could distinguish too between transfer to an approved employment and going out of the system altogether?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Yes. It may be indeed that the distinction between approved employment and resignation without approved employment would indicate the answer to Mr. Hall's question.

259. *Mr. Menzler*: And of course you would distinguish between established and temporary—or perhaps we shall not be interested in temporaries, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman: No, established staff are what we want.

260. *Mrs. Wootton*: The second question is on the perpetually thorny problem of outside comparable grades. When you say that you want to go by outside rates for comparable work, do you mean movements outside or existing levels outside?—*Mr. Fraser*: Existing levels. We think we ought to look at what is in fact now being paid and compare it with what we are paying.

261. And you go so far as to shut your eyes to movements if you are satisfied with levels?—If the level of one year has moved from the level of a previous year, and one makes a comparison each time with the outside level one inevitably follows the outside movement; but the mere fact that a comparable rate now on a level with a civil service rate was once different does not seem to us to be relevant.

262. Then may we turn for a moment to paragraph 25, where you say you do not feel that a salary index, if there was one, would help you? You think all the information at present available about salaries is suitable for your purpose?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: Our difficulty about it is, I think, that use of an index puts us in a straitjacket, and may lead to making adjustments in the Civil Service which are not the same kind of adjustments as have been made outside. If a salary index is based on 50 per cent. of people who have improved their pay by £100 a year, and 50 per cent. who have had no improvement at all, thus showing a movement of £50 per year for the whole, we should have to put up the whole Civil Service on the basis of that movement by £50 a year. It means we are not in fact following outside practice at all, and that in some categories we shall be over-paying by outside measurement and in some categories we shall be under-paying.

263. Some of the objections you raise apply also to the wage index?—We find the use of the wage index almost equally objectionable, because it only shows what has happened on average to a large number of people who may or may not be comparable with our employees.

264. Did you in fact use it when calculating pay addition?—*Mr. Winnifrith*: Yes—for lack of anything else. *Sir Thomas Padmore*: It is in fact of course frequently used by claimants before the Arbitration Tribunal. How far the Tribunal are influenced by its existence and what it shows is not for us to say.

265. You say that one of the objections which you have against the existing information about salaries is that it deals only with earnings and not with rates?—Yes.

266. In civil service middle levels that distinction would not be very important, would it?—*Mr. Fraser*: The difficulty about something which depends on earnings is that it does not show what different levels earn; it is just the average figure for the whole of a group. If you are trying to apply that to fix scales which have got to begin with the proper opening salary to catch the right recruits, and go on with how much more you should offer for more responsibilities, and what their career prospects would be, clearly you get no guidance from a single figure of average earnings of a whole group. It does not tell you where to begin, how to go on, or where to leave off.

267. There is, as of course you know, a possibility that a salary index will be with us before very long—do you view that prospect with alarm?—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: No, the more information there is the better, provided that we prevent ourselves from misusing it.

268. *Chairman*: You cannot control the way the Associations use it?—We must do our best.

269. There is nothing else you want to add about the possible use for it as a rough guide, for instance to the higher salaries that are only changed at infrequent intervals—to tell you that the time has come for a review?—*Mr. Fraser*: It might in some circumstances be useful, but the trouble is that if it is expressed, as it will be, as an average of a group, it will always be dominated by the lowest earners, because they are the most numerous, and it really gives no guidance whatever as to what, if anything, has happened at any particular level.

Chairman: I think Mr. Hall had a question on age distribution.

270. *Mr. Hall*: I have been studying the profiles of the established non-industrial staffs by age groups, and the point that

interested me was the very substantial number of persons above the age of fifty in the male groups of executive, higher clerical officer and clerical assistant. I want to make quite sure I have understood the reasons. Firstly, perhaps, some kinds of work that have formerly been done by men are now done by women. Secondly it seems to me that some grades are the terminus for promotion, and this accounts for what I would regard as a rather exceptional age distribution.—The executive class constitutes the upper hierarchy for clerical entrants, and indeed for those who come in below. There is a very large intake into the executive class by promotion. The clerical class used to have an upper structure of its own which has now been fused with the executive class. It is therefore natural that you should get a high proportion of the older people in it. As to the sub-clerical grades, I think it may be mainly the result of the very large intake of temporary clerks during the war. The older people rather than the younger have remained with us, and indeed opportunities of establishment have been extended rather more freely to the older people, in accordance with general Government policy.

Chairman: Mr. Cash, I think you had a question on the proportion of temporary civil servants in the different classes.

271. *Mr. Cash:* Yes. How far is it due to war-time circumstances and how far deliberate policy?—*Mr. Winnifrith:* We try and follow the same principle in all classes, that is, to give establishment wherever we can foresee permanent work. But the uneven distribution between classes results from the fact that, particularly in the clerical field, we had large blocks of work which we could see were temporary, and which are indeed now coming to an end. It was there we had to keep the temporary fringe larger.

Chairman: You also wanted to ask about other conditions of employment.

272. *Mr. Cash:* Sir Edward mentioned yesterday the difference between the Civil Service and outside employment on such things as entertaining allowances and cars. There is also a point which I do not think was mentioned, that is office buildings in which people have to work. Do these considerations carry any weight in your comparisons, and, if so, is it only a scruple or of some moment?—*Sir Thomas Padmore:* I would have thought that those considerations counted for very little, if anything, when one is assessing remuneration. After all, some of the things you mentioned, like cars and entertainment allowances, apply only to the higher grades and, as I said yesterday, these things work both ways—there are advantages as well

as disadvantages. On the character of the buildings in which we work and general working conditions, on the whole things are much better than they used to be, and much more nearly comparable with what is offered by other employers. There are some employers, of course, who outdo anything that we can do, but some of our new buildings and some of the working conditions for the staff compare very favourably with anything that one would find amongst the generality of employers outside.

273. Of course you are endeavouring to catch up like everybody else on your building programme. No doubt other members of the Commission here have seen conditions of work in the Civil Service, some of which are at least as bad as anything outside.—There are still some offices as bad as anything that one would find outside, except in the very worst cases, but they are much less numerous than they were.

274. *Mr. Menzler:* An important change in emoluments in City offices and banks since the war is the giving of meal vouchers which are non-taxable emoluments worth as much as 20s. or 30s. a week. Is that a fact you take into account in making comparisons?—Yes; if it were demonstrated that all or most clerks, for instance, received free meals or cheap meals which we did not make available, I should have thought that was a proper consideration to be taken into account.

275. A tax free benefit?—Yes.

Chairman: Mrs. Wootton had a question to ask about overlapping scales.

276. *Mrs. Wootton:* We have not, I think, asked you if you had any settled policy about overlapping scales?—*Mr. Fraser:* This is a very large question depending a good deal on the structure of the class in question. I go to the administrative class for the first illustration because it is familiar and simple. There would be no sense in having an overlapping scale between assistant principals and principals; you want a bit of a jump when you get to that particular promotion. The same thing applies all the way up in the administrative class. On the other hand you get some hierarchies where you have a multiplicity of grades with short or fairly short scales. Where it is found convenient to have a very tightly knit hierarchy of that sort, you may have overlapping scales. But of course these scales do not in practice overlap now as often as they used to, because of the recent arrangements for promotion increases; those mean very often that if you are promoted from one scale to the next you start a bit up the higher scale. If you would like a statement I am sure we would gladly put one in on practice and policy.

277. Thank you very much. I think the first part of what you said did imply a policy that if there is an important element in the promotion there should be quite a jump?—Yes.

278. That is a clear principle anyhow, and it is not a principle which is everywhere observed outside.—*Sir Thomas Padmore*: I think we do generally take the view that in a structure where the different grades are discharging duties of supervision of the grade below them, or duties that are clearly and distinctly higher than those of the grade below, the grades should be separated rather than overlap. For example, we do hold that any assistant secretary, even the newest, should be paid more than any member of the grade below, however long he may have been in it.

279. *Chairman*: Has anyone any questions which have struck them as a result of this afternoon's discussion?

280. *Mr. Menzler*: Unless you wish to make a general comment, could we have a considered memorandum about the question of the position of professional men as regards access to administrative posts? This has been the subject of recommendations by the Tomlin Commission in 1931, who said (page 64): "In view of the functions of the Post Office, we should have expected that, over a period of years, some technical officers would have been found to possess qualities rendering desirable their transfer to the administrative side. We were told, however, that no officer from the technical side had ever been promoted to an administrative post in the Department"; and by the Bridgeman Committee, in 1932, who said (page 39): "... we consider that where a member of the technical staff has shown he possesses administrative talent, he should be eligible for other appointments." Since the War the Gardiner (Works Group) Committee (page 16) remarked: "It would in our view be to the advantage of Departments in which members of the Works Group are employed if Professional officers who have shown a flair for administrative work were transferred to administrative posts to a greater extent than is at present the case. ... but no great enterprise seems to have been displayed in seeking out likely men and the number of such transfers which actually take place strikes us as disappointing"; while the Gardiner (Accountants) Committee (page 15) also said: "It is disturbing that not a single place, so far as we have been able to discover, has been found in the Principal grade for a man of Professional Accountant origin." Finally, in the Fifth Annual Report of the Advisory

Council on Scientific Policy (page 6) it is stated: "... it is important, if we are to adjust ourselves to current trends, that more men with scientific training should be employed in top-level managerial posts in industry and in the Civil Service."

—We will certainly produce a memorandum. But I would like to make one or two comments. First of all during the war and just after the war, when we were desperately short of administrative officers at all levels, we did do a great deal to comb through the Service to find potential administrative officers, and there did indeed take place a fairly substantial number of transfers under schemes that were run in those early post-war years. Second, so far as the reference is to top managerial posts as distinct from what we call administrative posts, of course there are a great many such posts which are filled by people with professional qualifications or of professional origin. If one takes a post like that of director general of works, the occupant of that post, although a qualified architect, is, I imagine, no more doing the job of an architect now than I am. He is a general manager of the production side, as it were, of the Ministry of Works. The same will be found, I think, in many of the professional hierarchies of the Civil Service, the top people are managers. To that extent, although we do not call them administrators, they are administrators just as much as those of us who have that label. The other thing I wanted to say was that I think sometimes people who look at this thing tend to forget that being an administrator is also a trade which people have to learn; and that the extent to which a man, having spent the first twenty years of his working life in the exercise of some professional duties, can comfortably and with satisfaction to himself transfer completely to a different kind of duty will never be very great. While nobody wants to close the door to managerial and administrative talent wherever it may be found, I would guess that we should never reach a situation in which it would be found that a suitable training-ground for any substantial proportion of administrative officers was a career the first half or two-thirds of which consisted of professional work.

281. *Chairman*: Thank you very much. We have asked you for a number of memoranda, and I take it that when we get those we shall have the pleasure of seeing you again to discuss them?—Certainly.

Chairman: In the meantime we are extremely grateful for all the trouble you have taken.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Monday, 8th March, 1954, at 11.30 a.m.)



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ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

3-4

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

THIRD and FOURTH DAYS

*Monday, 8th March, 1954
and Thursday, 25th March, 1954,
morning session only*

Civil Service Commission
Witnesses



LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1954

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MR. J. W. A. CHORLEY
*Senior Assistant Director
of Examinations*

on behalf of the Civil Service Commission

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

THIRD DAY

Monday, 8th March, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E.,
F.R.S.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum submitted by the Civil Service Commissioners

PURPOSE AND ARRANGEMENT OF THIS MEMORANDUM

1. The Royal Commission have asked the Civil Service Commissioners to provide material to enable them to see whether civil service rates of pay etc. seem reasonably competitive judged by the number of recruits they attract. They have asked for pre-war in addition to post-war material; and have also invited the Commissioners to give their views in writing on the reasons for any shortage or surplus where either of these exists. The Anderson Committee on the Pay etc. of State Servants (1923) said, "the employer should pay what is necessary to recruit and to retain an efficient staff". The purpose of this memorandum is to throw light on the question how far present rates of pay etc. in the Civil Service conform to this principle so far as recruitment is concerned.

2. In this memorandum the Civil Service Commissioners submit material of three kinds:—

- (a) Tables designed to show at a glance the facts about post-war as compared with pre-war recruitment. For this purpose the years 1936–38 and the three most recent years for which complete information is available have been chosen. A separate Table is given for each of the main classes of the Service.
- (b) Notes on the Tables designed to bring out deductions from, or to explain the reasons for, the figures shown in each Table.
- (c) General comments, based on (a) and (b), but referring to recruitment to the Service as a whole or to a group of classes. For convenience in presentation, these comments will normally be given before (a) and (b).

3. For the purpose of this memorandum it may be convenient to regard the classes of the Civil Service as falling into three main groups:—

- (i) The main "Treasury" classes—administrative, executive, and clerical. Here normal recruitment by the traditional methods of open competition conducted by the Commissioners continues to fill the bill with varying degrees of success. These classes form the subject of Part I of this memorandum.

- (ii) The "sub-clerical" classes. Because of the shortage of acceptable candidates it has become necessary in practice to man these classes largely with temporary staff. The factual material therefore provided by the Commissioners, who are concerned only with selection for permanent posts, is necessarily incomplete. Recruitment is in practice mainly carried out by Departments: subsequently the Commissioners may be brought in to take part in schemes for establishing temporary staff either by Departmental nomination or by competitions limited wholly or in part to existing temporary staff. (Part II of this memorandum).
- (iii) The scientific, engineering and allied professional and technical classes. The Commissioners now select for permanent appointment to these classes, but did not do so before the war; they are therefore unable to make a comparison with the pre-war position. Moreover initial recruitment continues for practical reasons to be carried out to a considerable extent by Departments, and on a temporary basis. A large part of the Commissioners' functions in this group consists in selecting for establishment from amongst existing temporary staff. (Part III of this memorandum.)

Part I

ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND CLERICAL CLASSES

GENERAL COMMENTS ON POST-WAR RECRUITMENT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE

4. The most important factor affecting post-war, as compared with pre-war recruitment is the existence of full employment. There is a greater choice of jobs than before the war, and at the same time the attractions of the security offered by the Civil Service are lessened. As a result the Commissioners are now, generally speaking, buyers on a sellers' market. Before the war they were on a buyers' market. The difficulties arising from this have been particularly clear in recruitment to the lower Classes of the Service.

5. Moreover, for most classes of the Service, the Commissioners are seeking more recruits than before the war owing to the increase in the size of the Civil Service. At the same time the total population of boys and girls is smaller than it was before the war; this, however, is off-set by the tendency for boys and girls to stay at school longer than before the war (see Table I and paragraph 19).

6. Another factor which adversely affects recruitment to certain classes is the difficulty of arranging local postings. Young people (or their parents) often dislike the idea of a post away from home, especially if it means coming to London. A considerable proportion of successful candidates each year for the clerical class, for instance, decline appointment for this reason. It is one of the main reasons why recruitment to the "sub-clerical" classes has to be carried out on a temporary and local basis. It does not affect the higher Classes of the Service to any considerable extent, except where recruitment is from amongst people already in other jobs, e.g. professional engineers. The post-war shortage of housing and accommodation, together with full employment, have intensified the relative immobility of potential recruits compared with before the war.

7. The civil service system of selection by competitive examination, and the consequent inevitable delay in the offer of appointment, is undoubtedly a deterrent to many potential recruits. When the number of vacancies habitually exceeds the number of acceptable applicants the Commissioners are able to adopt simplified and speedier methods of selection without departing from the principles of open competition. In other cases, however, competitive examination is necessary and the deterrent effect has to be accepted.

8. These are some of the general reasons why the number of acceptable candidates for most classes of the Service is now rarely more than adequate, and why, for some classes, there is a marked shortage of candidates. (A notable exception is the executive class, for which there is an abundant supply of acceptable candidates). Other reasons applying to particular classes will be mentioned later. On the whole it seems true to say that where the Civil Service experiences a shortage the shortage is experienced by many other employers also.

GENERAL NOTES ON THE FORM OF THE TABLES

9. Table I is designed to provide a general background to this memorandum by giving a birds' eye view of

A. Numbers of school leavers

B. Total boy and girl population

at ages between 14 and 19 for pre-war and post-war years.

10. From Table II onwards the Tables are given in the following form for each class of the Service:—

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Year	Number of vacancies	Number of applicants	Number declared successful	Number of surplus acceptable candidates	Number certificated for appointment

The Tables cover open competitions only, except for classes where permanent recruitment is in practice largely from temporary staff already in the Service (see paragraph 3 above). Limited competitions in the strict sense, i.e. competitions amongst established staff for promotion to a higher Class, are not shown because they are not relevant to the main purpose of this memorandum.

11. Column (1). Particulars are given in the Tables of three pre-war years, 1936 to 1938 inclusive, the last pre-war years in which recruitment was uninterrupted by the war. They were however years in which the Service was already expanding. Particulars are also given of the three most recent post-war years for which reasonably complete information is available. To go further back than 1950 or 1951, would not be very profitable because for a variety of reasons, especially the overlapping of "reconstruction" and "normal" recruitment, the position was far from normal.

12. Column (2). The vacancy figures given are those notified to the Civil Service Commission at the time when the first lists of successful candidates were approved. Sometimes however additional vacancies were notified subsequently and if surplus acceptable candidates were available some of these were offered posts. As a result the numbers of candidates certified for appointment are sometimes larger than the vacancy figures given.

13. Column (3). The numbers of applicants are the numbers of people who submitted application forms to the Civil Service Commission. The numbers of effective candidates, i.e. candidates who attended for examination or interview, are usually smaller. The differences in the figures however are not usually sufficiently large to be significant.

14. Column (4). The numbers of candidates declared successful include not only the numbers originally declared successful but also candidates subsequently called up to replace others who had for any reason declined appointment. This is why the numbers declared successful are frequently larger than the numbers of vacancies or the numbers certified for appointment.

15. Column (5). The numbers of surplus acceptable candidates are the total numbers of candidates who reached the appropriate minimum standard less those shown in Column (4). The "minimum standard" of acceptability is normally fairly consistent between pre-war and post-war years. In practice the standards have been based largely on the standards prevailing at the various levels of the educational system e.g. G.C.E. (Ordinary Level) etc. (In principle the standards should be based largely on "follow-up" investigation into the subsequent careers of candidates accepted. This however is a long-term process, and the period of normal recruitment since the war has not been sufficiently long to provide as yet adequate follow-up evidence on which to base conclusions about any desirable raising or lowering of standards at entry).

16. Column (6). The numbers of candidates certified for appointment are those considered suitable in all respects (including health, character, etc.) and assigned to Departments. In most competitions there are a certain number of successful candidates who do not take up their appointments. Where the number of such people is significant the point is referred to in the notes on the Tables.

17. In some cases the number certified for appointment is less than the number of vacancies, despite the existence of surplus acceptable candidates. This is usually due to the fact that the process of calling up surplus candidates to replace others who have declined appointment, coming as it does after the usual enquiries into health and character etc., has not been completed before the next competition in the same series of competitions is commenced. The Civil Service Commission normally closes a competition as soon as the next one in the series begins. Conversely, in a time of rapid expansion the number of candidates certified for appointment may exceed the number of vacancies originally announced.

18. In some columns exact figures cannot be given without detailed explanations about individual cases. For the present purpose and for the sake of simplification the Commissioners have thought it advisable to give approximate figures only. All figures therefore should be regarded as liable to an error of, say, up to 5 per cent.

TABLE I

NUMBERS OF SCHOOL LEAVERS AND OF POPULATION BETWEEN THE AGES OF 14 AND 19 INCLUSIVE DURING THE PERIODS 1936 TO 1938 AND 1950 TO 1953

(i) All figures relate to England and Wales only. To obtain figures for other parts of the United Kingdom is difficult on some points and impossible on others.

(ii) The figures for school leavers exclude in the pre-war period all independent schools, and in the post-war period those independent schools which have not applied to the Ministry of Education for recognition or which, having applied for recognition, have not been granted it. The number of schools excluded in the pre-war period is certainly larger than that excluded in the later period, although it is impossible to say to what extent. Close comparisons between the positions in the two periods are therefore impossible, but the trends shown in the figures are sufficient for the present purpose.

(iii) For the post-war period figures are available showing the numbers leaving schools (a) to receive further education and (b) to seek employment. These subdivisions however are not given here, because comparable statistics for the pre-war period are not available.

I. A.—NUMBERS OF SCHOOL LEAVERS

Thousands.																				
During year ending 31st July.																				
Age	14			15			16			17			18			19 and over				
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total		
1936...	...	...	246	239	485	24.1	22.5	46.6	25.1	20.8	45.9	7.1	5.4	12.5	3.8	3.7	7.5	1.5	.7	2.2
1937...	...	...	243	239	482	25.5	22.1	47.6	26.1	21.7	47.8	8.9	6.7	15.6	3.5	3.3	6.8	1.1	.5	1.6
1938...	...	...	193	194	387	21.7	19.6	41.3	22.2	20.0	42.2	8.7	6.6	15.3	4.5	4.7	9.2	.9	.4	1.3
1950...	...	...	36.7	35.6	72.3	163.7	155.2	318.9	31.1	28.7	59.8	8.7	9.4	18.1	8.8	8.0	16.8	2.5	1.0	3.5
1951...	...	...	35.6	35.1	70.7	161.8	155.4	317.2	32.4	30.0	62.4	8.1	9.2	17.3	8.1	7.9	16.0	2.5	.8	3.3
1952...	...	...	37.7	36.7	74.4	162.1	154.8	316.9	32.2	29.9	62.1	8.0	9.4	17.4	7.7	7.9	15.6	2.7	.8	3.5

Thousands.

During year ending 31st July.

Figures for 1953 are not yet available.

Notes on Table I

19. The total boy and girl population, i.e., the total potential field of recruitment at these ages, is considerably smaller in the post-war years than in the pre-war years (except at age 19). From the point of view of recruitment to the Civil Service however this should be more than off-set by the tendency to stay at school longer. Table IA shows that at every age except 14 the population of school leavers is greater for the post-war years than for the pre-war years. Other things being equal, this tendency should be favourable to civil service recruitment, which is largely based on examinations of an academic type. The increase in the number of school leavers at age 18 is perhaps one of the reasons for the success of recruitment to the executive class. Recruitment to the clerical class however is somewhat unsatisfactory in spite of the increase in the number of school leavers at age 16. It seems reasonable to suppose that a number of boys and girls who would have tried for the clerical class before the war now try for the executive class.

ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS

TABLE II
ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS (OPEN COMPETITION)

(1) Year	(2) Number of vacancies	(3) Number of applicants	(4) Number declared successful	(5) Number of surplus acceptable candidates	(6) Number certificated for appointment
1936 ...	50	284	64	See note below	56
1937 ...	48	352	62	„	51
1938 ...	50	389	75	„	61
1951 ...	about 60	950	75	„	65
1952 ...	about 60	873	63	„	57
1953 ...	about 50	838	56	„	51

Notes on Table II

20. In the three pre-war years shown in the Table the number of candidates appointed was higher than the average for the 1930's as a whole. The annual average for 1930 to 1938 inclusive was 37. For the 1920's (excluding reconstruction recruitment after the First War) it was much less.

21. Column (5). For the administrative class the minimum acceptable standard cannot be tied to a fixed mark from year to year. It is affected by a variety of factors (standards of marking, changes in syllabus, etc.), and to fix it for any one year requires careful study of the performance of individual candidates. In the pre-war years this study was not made, because there was a fairly ample surplus of clearly acceptable candidates. In the post-war years the surplus has been very small or even non-existent.

22. The Commissioners consider that the quality of the successful candidates continues in general to be satisfactory. They are doubtful however whether the number of really outstanding candidates is quite sufficient for the future needs of the Service: another three or four such candidates a year would be welcome. "Outstanding" in this context does not necessarily refer to candidates who are outstanding in intellect or any other particular quality, but to candidates who seem to show already in their early twenties just the right combination of intellectual and personal qualities for administrative work in the Civil Service. "General purpose all-rounders" might be a better description. Various reasons might be suggested for this small but important shortage (if the Commissioners are right in their supposition that it exists) and for the reduction in the number of surplus acceptable candidates; but the Commissioners are not in possession of evidence such as to justify them in suggesting any definite conclusion or in pointing to one reason rather than another.

23. The total number of full-time university students in Great Britain was approximately 50,000 in 1936-37, and 85,000 in 1950-51. This very large increase in the size of the university population has not increased the number of acceptable candidates, although it is probably one of the main reasons for the increase in the number of applicants.

EXECUTIVE CLASS

TABLE III
EXECUTIVE CLASS (OPEN COMPETITIONS)

(1) Year	(2) Number of vacancies	(3) Number of applicants	(4) Number declared successful	(5) Number of surplus acceptable candidates	(6) Number certificated for appointment
1936 ...	100	1,577	221	82	212
1937 ...	150	1,772	223	93	217
1938 ...	200	2,389	355	122	336
1950 ...	583*	5,747	564	733	482*
1951 ...	505	4,663	565	564	473
1952 ...	500	4,253	539	338	484

* The final number of vacancies which it was desired to fill proved to be less than had previously been announced: consequently the Commissioners did not call up surplus acceptable candidates to replace other candidates who had declined appointment.

Notes on Table III

24. The outstanding features of this Table are as follows:—

- Compared with other classes in the Service the number of surplus acceptable candidates for the executive class is relatively high.
- Compared with the pre-war figures for the executive class, the post-war number of applicants and of successful and acceptable candidates has greatly increased (though there has been some decline in the course of the three post-war years shown).

25. The very large majority of successful and acceptable candidates in the executive open competitions come from the "young people's" competition, i.e., between 17½ and 19 years of age. (See para. 270 of the Introductory Factual Memorandum submitted by the Treasury). Most of the following remarks apply mainly to the "young people's" competition.

26. The standard of "acceptability" is reasonably consistent between the pre-war and the post-war years, after allowance has been made for the introduction of an interview in the post-war competitions. The intellectual standard is approximately that of a candidate passing G.C.E. (Advanced Level) in at least three subjects. This standard has certainly not been pitched too low: indeed the very great majority of members of the executive class enter the Service at much lower academic levels. For 1952 the proportion of people entering the executive class at this academic level or above was approximately 17 per cent. The remainder entered the class by promotion, or by examination at a lower academic level, or by assimilation of lower Classes of the Service. (Para. 270 of Introductory Factual Memorandum). In the executive class as a whole at the present time the proportion who entered at the "young people's" competition academic level is much less than 17 per cent. Treasury records suggest a percentage of about 10 of the executive class of the Service as a whole. It might therefore be argued from the actual level of the class that the acceptable standard for the "young people's" competition is pitched too high: in that case the number of surplus acceptable candidates would be much greater.

27. One reason for (b) above is that more children are staying at school until they are 18 or 19. (See Table I.) Thus many children who before the war might have entered the competition for the clerical class now enter for the executive class.

28. An immediate attraction to boys leaving school at this age is that arrangements are made, where necessary, to defer call-up under the National Service Acts to enable boys to compete before they go into the Armed Forces, and if they are successful posts are kept for them in the Civil Service until they are released from the Forces.

29. After making allowance, however, for the points made in the two preceding paragraphs, the conclusion must be that the attractions, including the financial attractions, held out by the executive class are, from the point of view of recruitment, at least adequate.

30. Whether there are any special attractions, in comparison with other employment of a similar nature, is necessarily a matter of opinion. The Royal Commission may wish to consider the two following points in particular:—

- (i) How the career prospects held out by the executive class, especially the salary scales in the higher grades of the class, compare with the prospects offered by other employers to boys and girls straight from school without previous special training.
- (ii) After taking into account Saturday attendance, how the annual leave allowance of 36 days compares with that offered in outside employment of a similar nature.

CLERICAL CLASS

TABLE IV

CLERICAL CLASS (OPEN COMPETITIONS)

(1) Year	(2) Number of vacancies	(3) Number of applicants	(4) Number declared successful	(5) Number of surplus acceptable candidates	(6) Number certificated for appointment
1936 ...	1,500	6,691	2,069	3,087	1,960
1937 ...	3,000	12,320	3,431	5,225	3,196
1938 ...	2,500	13,372	4,178	5,327	3,897
1950 ...	2,750	7,733	3,193	Nil	2,397
1951 ...	4,575	7,570	3,855	Nil	3,199
1952 ...	2,780	5,480	2,679	Nil	2,312

Notes on Table IV

31. Before the war the only open competitions were those among boys and girls. There was one competition in 1936 and two in each of the following years. During the period 1950 to 1952 there have been one competition a year for ex-Regular Servicemen and since 1951 two competitions a year for ex-National Servicemen, in addition to two competitions each year for boys and girls (aged 16–18). The standard of the boys' and girls' competition is approximately that of the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level).

32. In each of the recent years the number of candidates certified suitable for appointment is substantially less than the number declared successful. A certain number of successful candidates were found ineligible on health, character, and other grounds. But the main explanation of the differences between the two sets of figures is that candidates have withdrawn from the competitions after being declared successful and before they have been certified.

33. In the competitions for boys and girls a certain number of candidates withdraw without giving any explanation, and it is assumed that these candidates try simultaneously for two or more jobs and that they are not seriously interested in the Civil Service. Other candidates say that they have decided to remain at school for a further period; others that they have got other jobs. The majority of the boys and girls, however, who decline appointment do so because they do not wish to leave home (or their parents do not wish them to), and there are no local jobs in the Civil Service which can be offered to them. Even when candidates say that they have found other jobs, one of the main attractions of the other jobs is probably that they are local.

34. Ex-Regular Service candidates also decline appointment in considerable numbers, because their homes and families are in districts where there is a shortage of civil service posts. Ex-National Servicemen are more mobile, and not many of them decline appointments.

35. The Civil Service Commission have no detailed information about what happens to candidates after they have been certified and assigned to Departments, but they have reason to believe that almost as many decline appointment at that late stage or quickly resign, as decline appointment before certification and assignment. The main reason probably is that the Departments cannot give them jobs in their home towns.

36. There are some reasons why one would expect the numbers recruited to the clerical class through open competitions to be larger than they were before the war. For example the number of children leaving school annually within the current age limits for the boys' and girls' competitions (16 and under 18) is somewhat larger than before the war (when the limits were 16 and under 17). The new competitions for ex-Servicemen have given additional sources of recruitment; in the three years 1950 to 1952 they produced 1,452 candidates who were certified for appointment. There are now rather more vacancies in the provinces where so many potential candidates live. Nevertheless the numbers of candidates declared successful and certified for appointment during the recent three year period are less than the figures for the three pre-war years; and there have been no surplus acceptable candidates, although before the war there were several thousand surplus candidates each year.

37. The main reasons for this change in position must be the fact that there is now no appreciable amount of unemployment, and that other employers can offer more attractive conditions, including, in the provinces at least, more posts in the areas where many potential candidates live. Even within the London area school leavers tend to demand jobs in their own locality.

38. There are two relatively minor current factors which may be worth mentioning. In the first place a certain number of children are deterred from competing for civil service posts by the fact that they are required to take another examination in addition to their school examinations. In the autumn of 1953, as an experiment, a special competition was held, for posts in London only, in which candidates were considered, without further examination, on the results of their General Certificate of Education examinations. This competition was launched just after the ordinary autumn boys' and girls' competition, and produced about 160 people who were certified for appointment to the clerical class who had not applied for the ordinary competition.

39. A certain number of children, who might otherwise have been candidates for the clerical class, stay at school until they are old enough to compete for the executive class when they are 17½ but under 19, only to find that they are not quite good enough to be successful. The present age limits for the boys' and girls' clerical competitions are 16 and under 18. In connection with the April 1953 competition among boys and girls for the executive class the Civil Service Commission offered clerical posts to candidates who had not been successful in the competition for the higher posts but could be regarded as up to standard of the clerical class and who were within the age limits for the clerical class competition. This exercise produced about 110 additional clerical officers. Similar arrangements are being adopted in connection with the October 1953 executive competition, but the results are not yet known.

40. Recruitment through the boys' and girls' competitions is particularly important, it is to this body of recruits that the Civil Service at present looks for a substantial number of recruits to the executive class.

41. In considering whether the rates of pay etc. at the clerical level are sufficient to recruit an efficient staff (paragraph 1), the Royal Commission may wish to take the following point into account. The clerical recruitment problem could largely be solved without lowering standards if the number of promotions (both through the limited competition and departmentally) from the clerical to the executive class were to be reduced. The consequent vacancies in the executive class could be filled from the surplus acceptable candidates in the open executive competitions. This course would tend to improve the general intellectual calibre of the executive class. It would however involve obvious internal difficulties; and it is possible that a worsening of promotion prospects might in the long run have an adverse effect on recruitment to the clerical class.

Examination of Witness

MR. A. P. SINKER, C.B., *First Commissioner*
on behalf of the Civil Service Commission
called and examined

282. *Chairman*: May I start the proceedings by thanking you for your memorandum. There is more to come, is there not?—*Mr. Sinker*: Yes, on the sub-clericals, the scientists and engineers.

283. The first question I have is on your reference in paragraph 6 to the immobility of potential recruits; we wondered whether the Commission attach great importance to this factor? Do they regard as a serious deterrent the civil service principle that no payment can be made towards household or removal expenses to a man on first taking up appointment in the Civil Service? Is that really more important than pay?—I think that enters into it where a man is already in a job and is more or less settled in life, but I do not think it is really a practical consideration when we are thinking of school leavers. One could hardly expect removal expenses to be paid in such a case, and moreover I think very often it is that parents do not want their daughters to go to London or to leave their home, so for the purpose of Part I of this memorandum it is not a very serious consideration.

284. *Mr. Menzler*: Does that feeling by the parents apply equally to the executive class?—No.

285. Do you know of any outside practice whereby big firms give a settling-in allowance or some kind of help like the special lodging allowance?—No. Perhaps I ought to explain from the outset that the Treasury places the orders and we try to deliver the goods, but we have to try and supply them on Treasury terms. Sometimes we advise the Treasury where we think their terms are not sufficiently good, but it is not our business to decide the terms.

286. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: It is very largely a matter of accommodation and the parents allowing them to come?—Yes, coupled with the fact that there are far more jobs going in their own locality than there used to be before the war.

287. *Chairman*: In paragraph 8 the Commission say that where the Civil Service experiences a shortage so do many other employers. Have you any evidence on different methods of inducing candidates to take up jobs? Do you think the Civil Service go to the same amount of trouble in looking out for suitable candidates as do other large employers? What is done in the way of approaches to universities, headmasters and so on?—We have to try and steer a middle course between not doing enough and not doing too much, because we ought not to get more than our fair share of potential recruits. It would be quite wrong if the Government used the power it has to overbid other employers financially, and it would also be wrong if we did too much in the way of propaganda and publicity. So we try to see that information is available to all possible candidates. But we do our best to avoid anything that might be regarded as propaganda. In the case of universities we have literature which is published and the Commissioners keep in close touch with heads of colleges and with the University Appointments Boards. In the case of schools we have in the last two or three years held a series of meetings all over the country at which a Commissioner has addressed audiences consisting mainly of headmasters and headmistresses and youth employment officers in order to tell them what we are looking for, and in order to answer their questions.

288. Do you produce pamphlets about promotion prospects, the type of work they are expected to do, and things of that sort?—Yes.

289. *Mr. Hall*: Are these mainly for the executive grade?—The meetings with headmasters and headmistresses are mainly for the executive class, the clerical classes and typists, and also for the scientific classes.

290. *Mrs. Wootton*: Are these a new development?—We started them two or three years ago.

291. Do you get any light from headmasters on the fact that you get a good supply of executives and a poor supply of clericals?—I think they confirm what one would expect, namely, that they like boys and girls to stay on at school. Therefore they like them going in for the executive class, and they are not so keen on them going in for the clerical.

292. *Lady Albemarle*: Is there anything for the children to take back to their parents? It does seem the parent is a stumbling block there.—There is a pamphlet about the clerical classes.

293. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Do I understand that these pamphlets do no more than give the bare facts on salaries and grades of employment? Do they give any sort of pictorial representation of the activities of various classes?—Yes, they do. They give a number of descriptions, as vivid as we can make them, of the work that has to be done just as any other large employer would. We try to avoid painting too rosy or too gloomy a picture.

294. *Mrs. Wootton*: Do you have your conferences with all types of schools or do you concentrate on secondary grammar schools?—We concentrate on secondary grammar schools, but we are looking into the question of how far we ought to do more with secondary modern schools. I should add that another new development in the last two or three years is that every six months we send out to every secondary grammar school a brief statement of the programme of competitions for school leavers together with any changes that have taken place in the conditions of entry.

295. The fact that the heads want to keep the children at school would be less powerful in secondary modern schools?—In theory the secondary modern schools would not provide many clerical officer recruits because the standard is that of the General Certificate of Education, but we do get a good many of our present recruits to the typing and clerical assistant classes from secondary modern children, and we think that perhaps we ought to do rather more than we have done in the past to get in touch with them.

296. *Sir Alexander Gray*: May I ask if these things you send out are in the form of pamphlets which are mainly for the headmaster's room or are there placards which can be pinned up for the students to read?—We try to do a bit of both. We have a special circulation for headmasters and headmistresses about the more important things, and the normal circulars go, we assume, to the careers master or mistress. They can be pinned up because they are in the form of a single sheet of dates.

297. *Sir George Mowbray*: To what extent do you tackle the secondary modern school? You used the expression "do more". I wondered from what level that "more" would commence?—We are already in close touch with youth employment officers, and in principle, of course, they are our contact with all schools. A recent development has been that we have made direct contact with schools ourselves.

298. With secondary modern schools?—Secondary grammar.

299. You have no real direct contact with the secondary modern?—No, not at the moment.

300. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: The trend with big industrial concerns is that they offer part-time day release facilities for continued education. Is this the practice in the Civil Service?—Yes.

301. And this is brought to the notice of potential recruits?—Yes. One day a week up to the age of 18 is the practice in the Civil Service, and that is made known to potential recruits.

302. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 7 I see that there is a reference to the "inevitable delay" due to the competition system.—Yes.

303. Are the candidates told they will not get the answer for so many months?—Yes.

304. What sort of delay is it for the clerical class?—The delay for the boys' and girls' competition is about six months. It is a very large competition.

305. In the same paragraph you say something about adopting simplified methods of selection. I read about the relaxation under which you take the General School Certificate people merely on their certificate, but what other methods do you use?—If I might go back a little to explain about the difficulties, we have to give every possible candidate a fair and equal chance of getting into the public service. That has in the past meant that we have had to hold open competitions which necessarily involved delay, but where we found over the course of some years that the number of vacancies was consistently greater than the number of acceptable candidates, then we began to say to ourselves "For the time being we can drop this traditional method. We can more or less take anybody who applies provided they are up to standard, and tell them at once." And then we use common sense methods for doing the thing as quickly as possible. These methods we adopt for the clerical assistants and typists, and we have also been using them for the scientists and for some of the engineering classes. But elsewhere we must stick to the old method of open competition which involves delay we have to accept; otherwise we should not be giving everybody a fair chance.

306. *Mr. Cash*: Do those methods exist side by side at any given moment?—Yes, for example, at present in the clerical officer class.

307. Is that not rather unfortunate? You have your two candidates, one of whom is accepted at once and the other has to wait some months?—We are trying this as an experiment.

308. *Sir Alexander Gray*: If you take people in without an examination you must have some standard in your own mind of what is an acceptable candidate?—Yes.

309. Is that accepted by the candidates as reasonable?—I do not think we have ever had any complaints. The standards of the various classes are well known and, I think, accepted. In the case of the clerical officer class where we tried the experiment of bringing in people on their G.C.E. results I think it is too early to say what we shall do in future. It is conceivable we might go over to that completely, though there is one objection. We have been criticised because the method favours certain kinds of school where they do take the G.C.E. to the detriment of other schools where they do not.

310. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: What form does this competition take?—The applicant tells us what he has done in the G.C.E. and we check up and see he has done it, and then, subject to a satisfactory report from his school authorities and personal referees, we take him.

311. *Chairman*: You do not have an interview?—No.

312. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: It has been suggested that the Civil Service is less attractive to young men than it used to be. Is this true in your opinion, and, if so, can you give us the chief reasons?—When you say young men, are you thinking of any special level?

313. I would rather generalise the problem in the first instance?—I do not think one can generalise it because the executive class, for instance, remains extremely popular, perhaps more popular than before the war.

314. Could I ask about the administrative class?—It is clear from the figures that it is not so attractive as it was before the war. I think there are many reasons for that. First that industry and commerce probably offer more opportunities to good Arts graduates than before the war. Secondly we are in competition with the universities themselves who have doubled their staffs in size compared with before the war. I notice that of 32 candidates who declined appointment in the administrative class over the last six years no less than 20 declined because they were going into academic work, and that, I think, is quite a significant figure. Other people say that

because the administrative class has increased in size and more are taken in, it has perhaps lost some of the prestige it used to carry. It used to be rather an achievement to get into the Home Civil Service administrative class, and it may be that that is less so than it was before the war.

315. You mentioned specifically Arts graduates?—Yes.

316. Do I take it that you regard the Arts graduate as still the only satisfactory sort of recruit to this class?—No, the reverse is the case, but unfortunately the scientists and engineers do not go in for the administrative class.

317. Is this because the examination as at present operated does not give comparable opportunities for them to compete?—No, it gives them identical opportunity.

318. Would you think it a good thing that scientists should go into the administrative class immediately on leaving the university, or better that they should go over at some subsequent stage after strengthening their standing in science in the scientific Civil Service?—I must speak within the existing framework of recruitment to the administrative class which is up to the age of 26 including National Service, and within that framework I would say without hesitation I wish more of them would apply to come in by the ordinary door. We did send out a letter a few months ago to all headmasters and headmistresses saying that we hoped they would remind scientists in sixth forms that they could, if they wished, get into the administrative class of the Civil Service and not merely into the scientific Civil Service.

319. *Mrs. Wootton*: There are two questions I would like to ask. The first is related to your answer just now, Mr. Sinker, that apparently the administrative class is less attractive than it used to be. On the face of your figures it appears to be more attractive than it used to be—I am looking at Table 11.—Yes.

320. In which the number of applicants in relation to vacancies is far higher than it used to be?—Yes.

321. The inference is that now you get a terrible lot of rubbish?—I would not myself use the word "rubbish", but when I said it was less attractive I meant less attractive to graduates of the standard that we are looking for.

322. It seems a little surprising that so very many more people should be applying and that a much smaller proportion of them should be suitable. Can you throw any light on the reasons?—I think that those who have sat on selection boards would agree that the reason is that there are a very large number of Arts graduates at the universities who find it very difficult to get a job, and in some cases we are not surprised they find it difficult.

323. Following on from that I have a second question. You say that you are getting a good supply of executives at 18 or 19?—Yes.

324. Just at the moment the universities are expanding enormously and one might say that everyone who can read and write at all is being put into the university. It seems very odd then that you are getting a good supply of people of the age of university entrants and you are apparently getting a poor supply of people who have gone into universities. The inference would seem to be that the universities are taking the wrong ones, that the people who are applying for the executive class at 18 or 19 must be the cream, and that the people who are going on and taking a university course must be the very skimmed milk?—I think if you look at Table 1A and see the very large increase in the number of school leavers at age 18 in the post-war years compared with pre-war years, that answers the question. The increase is really sufficient to explain the increase in the number of successful candidates or acceptable candidates in the executive class as well as the increased number of candidates at the graduate level. I would add the further point that when we are selecting for the administrative class we are setting the standard very high. When we are selecting for the executive, although we set it reasonably high, the requirements of the work are nothing like the same.

325. *Chairman*: That is intellectual quality?—Intellectual and personal.

326. There is a difference in personal quality between administrative and executive?—Yes.

327. *Mr. Menzler*: I would like to pursue Mrs. Wootton's point about the administrative class applicant and the great increase over pre-war. Were they all second class or better?—I cannot answer that, because we do not follow up the careers of unsuccessful candidates, but I should imagine the majority of them thought they were going to get seconds.

328. *Mr. Cash*: It is also true to say the National Service factor comes into this quite a lot. What would the average person going into the executive class do about National Service?—If he comes into the Civil Service, he is very well placed, because, if he gets in before, we keep his place open, and, if he does not get in before, he can still try again for the Civil Service afterwards. I think one of the advantages in recruiting for the executive class is that a good many other employers do not recruit at that age.

329. Because of the disturbance?—Yes.

330. I am sure that is a fact that helps you to recruit executives against other forms of employment.—Yes.

331. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Which do you prefer? Would you rather the men came in and got the job and put it in cold storage, or would you rather they did their National Service first?—Are you speaking of executives? I do not think I can generalise on that.

332. *Mr. Burman*: You dealt with the quantitative aspects of the school leavers and the entrants to the executive and administrative classes. What about the qualitative comparison. Is the quality of the school leavers at 18 or 19 better now than it was pre-war? Have the schools come up in quality and the universities gone down?—I do not think I can answer that, because before the war there was no interview for the executive competition, and we can only compare people on paper. On paper we have set our standard after the war at the same level as we did before the war for recruitment—Higher School Certificate in three subjects. I, therefore, think we can say that, granted the fact that the examiners are human beings and not machines, the level is much the same before and after the war, but we cannot compare personal qualities.

333. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You use throughout the phrase "acceptable candidates" and "not acceptable candidates". What sort of standard have you got at the back of your mind there? Take a concrete case, take the executive class in 1936. There you have 1,577 applicants, 221 successful, 82 acceptable in addition; that makes 300-odd. In what way do you say the other 1,200 are not acceptable?—In just the same way as the examiners in the General Certificate of Education say that some people have passed and some have not passed. You have to draw a line.

334. Do you tell people that they have not passed?—They are told they are not successful. Column 5, the number of surplus acceptable candidates, is not a figure that we make public, because there is no need to do so.

335. Is the decision regarding acceptability made on the written results of the examination?—Yes, for the executive class before the war.

336. You had a percentage, or something of that sort?—The papers were marked by examiners and we had a percentage which meant a pass and a percentage which meant a fail.

337. How long have you been doing that?—Ever since the Commission existed.

338. Did you do that way back in my time? As I remember the old Indian and Home Civil Service examination there were so many vacancies you just filled up as you went down, but nobody was told they had not passed.—No, nor are they now. They are told they are not successful, but we in the Commission make up our minds

that in some competitions there are a good many acceptable candidates on the list of the unsuccessful candidates and we call them up to fill any places.

339. *Mr. Hall*: There is an increase in the total number of surplus acceptable candidates in the executive class post-war as compared with pre-war?—Yes, a very remarkable one.

340. Is that partly due to adding to the written examination some selection on interview?—No, we have tried to eliminate that for the purpose of these figures.

341. *Sir Alexander Gray*: In this matter of acceptability what is the part played by the interview?—In which class?

342. Either executive or administrative. Is it solely on the written marks of the examinations that you draw the line or do you include the mark of the interview?—We conduct interviews for the administrative class and we have also been conducting them for the executive, but we have recently dropped them for the top band in order to speed up the process of getting out results. We think if a man is above a certain level on paper he is worth putting into the executive class and we save perhaps three months.

Immediately after the war we had an interview and written examination for the executive class and we added the marks up and drew a line at a certain point. In the last year or two we have decided the delay was too great, and therefore for the upper band of candidates we dropped the interview and declared them successful on their written work. For the purpose of this memorandum so far as possible we have eliminated the interview in order to have a fair comparison between post-war and pre-war. So these figures in Table III are a fair comparison between post-war and pre-war conditions.

343. May I follow this up? To these top people you say "You have done well enough in the written and we will take you in." Is it not a fact that the interview is introduced to get rid of people who are good on paper and no good otherwise?—At the age of 18 I do not think any interviewer would feel on very certain ground in judging young men and women, and we found that in practice people who are high enough up on the written examination of the executive class did get in whatever their interview mark was, so the interview was not having any effect.

344. You would not say that of the administrative?—I would say it less of the administrative.

345. I would have thought that in the case of the administrative, if a candidate got a low mark in the interview he was done

for where the marks are fairly close together?—Yes, in most cases.

346. Unless he was a genius on paper?—Yes.

347. *Mr. Cash*: Would you not say that the characteristics required for the successful interview are more necessary in the administrative than the executive?—Much more.

348. They have to stand up to interview in their career in the way that the executive officer has not got to?—Yes.

349. Sometimes people say you must make allowance for this person or that because they are very nervous, but in fact you must not make allowances; they must not be nervous?—It is certainly true in the administrative class where you are looking for much higher qualities than in the executive class.

350. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: You give the appearance of a good deal of confidence in your ability to select young men with the right type of qualities for administrative work?—I have no confidence in our infallibility, but we can do it better than drawing the names out of a hat.

351. What happens to a young man who proves in fact not to be very good as an administrator?—He is thrown out or occasionally offered an appointment in the executive class.

352. Is this the same kind of transfer as from scientific officer to experimental officer class?—It is different in that for the administrative class we are setting our sights higher than for the scientific class.

353. How is that?—We take a very much smaller proportion of the candidates for one thing, and we are looking for personal qualities which are not necessary in the scientific officer class.

354. I am surprised at that. I should have thought, having in mind the close relationship between many branches of the scientific side of the Civil Service and industry, that there was great need for men with good personal qualities?—Yes, there is, but we can also fit in a good many people who have not got those personal qualities, and in the administrative class we cannot.

355. *Mrs. Wootton*: You said just now you had no confidence in your ability to select, but you would claim to do it better than taking names out of a hat. Does that apply equally to Method I and Method II?—In Method II we have more evidence. I would say that where there is more evidence there is more likelihood of good judgment.

356. *Mr. Menzler*: I would like to pursue the point on paragraph 22 of the missing three or four candidates. I take it that is three or four people with personality?—Of the right kind of personality.

357. Do you think that that kind of person would be attracted by the career offered to the administrative class? There are only 33 jobs as permanent secretary and 68 jobs as deputy secretary.—I did wonder whether some of these young men who are pretty good and have done pretty well at the university might be a bit put off by the initial pay that is offered. I did with the Treasury's agreement write round to some heads of colleges to ask what they would get if they became Fellows of colleges at Oxford and Cambridge and also to some employers in the larger firms because I wondered really whether a young man who after doing his military service comes in on £530 and after five years is getting £700 odd might not feel a bit discouraged. Those figures have recently been put up to, I think, £570 and £800 odd so that is quite substantially better, though the candidates do not yet know about it. I have a feeling that we may have lost perhaps a few young men who realise they can do better at the university itself, because I found as a result of this correspondence that so far as industry was concerned they got in the early stages very much the same as in the Service, but certainly at some Oxford and Cambridge colleges in the early stages they can do a good deal better. I do not want to suggest that that is not right, but it is a fact. On your question about the more distant salaries I do not know. I should have thought that a young man would think it looked fairly good. But my feeling was that it might be that some young men could get better money initially elsewhere in work that is equally congenial, for I do think quite a lot of young men find university work very congenial. I think the figures bear this out, since of 32 candidates who declined appointment 20 went to universities.

358. I have always heard it said that the administrative man does pretty well if he gets to under secretary.—Yes.

359. That would imply that a man has been reasonably successful in getting to £2,500, but from what I know outside that would not be regarded as adequate. I wonder whether that is a major factor in your not getting the three or four people of outstanding quality that you want?—I would not myself want to emphasise the financial side of it. I think the real attraction of the Civil Service to the bright young man at the university is the responsibility, variety and difficulty of the work, but, so far as money comes into it, what his feelings are when he looks at the higher ranges I do not know.

360. But the higher ranges of industry have equal interest and variety.—Yes.

361. *Sir Alexander Gray*: May I ask this question. Would you think that the young

man of 21 or so under-estimates or over-estimates his ability, because I think that comes into this question? I suggest that a young man of 22 would look at these big jobs and say "I will never be fit for them."—I do not know.

362. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I do not think it comes in as a really important factor at that stage; he is not looking so far ahead. What concerns him perhaps more is that the range of recruitment is 20½ to 24.—Yes, or 26 because of National Service.

363. But I would have thought there was a need to recruit men who had had a few years' experience of industry and this would take them over 26. Is there any facility at all for recruitment beyond 24 from outside because here are young men being recruited from the universities to the administrative side of the Civil Service with no subsequent opportunity of gaining experience of life in general, and I would have thought this important?—Of course it has been much discussed, and the view generally taken is first that he has got a lot to learn in the Civil Service and he had better get on with it, and second, that although if we could get the cream of people from industry we should be glad to have them—if it was in the national interest—nevertheless I think we should not expect to get the very best coming out of industry if they were obviously doing well there.

364. Has consideration been given to the desirability of a number of your administrative class recruits being sent out to industry or commerce for a period in the preliminary phase of administrative employment?—That has been considered, but the practical difficulties are very great.

365. Frankly I look with concern at an administrative branch of the Civil Service which is made up wholly of men who have come into it in the very early 'twenties in a world which is changing very rapidly, and I would have thought there was a need for some with outside administrative experience to be brought into the Civil Service.

366. *Chairman*: This question of the shortage in the administrative class seems to be the danger point? I was wondering how far the provincial people are coming into the class.—More than before the war. I could let you have figures on that. I would rather say no more than that the proportion of successful candidates from universities other than Oxford and Cambridge is higher than before the war.

367. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: It is very small though?—Yes, from any one university.

368. *Chairman*: The number of applicants has greatly changed in accordance with the increasing numbers at the universities, but the number declared successful has not increased at all?—No.

369. And it really looks as if the universities are not producing a larger number of first class men or else the Civil Service are getting less than their former share? My experience has been in provincial universities, and though I think this creaming off to Oxford and Cambridge of the intellectuals is still extremely efficient there are I should have thought in the provincial universities quite a number of men not necessarily right at the top of the intellectuals but who have got all the other qualities necessary?—Yes.

370. Are they being missed? Do the graduates at the provincial universities still think that the scales are weighted against them in these examinations?—Not to judge by the numbers who put in.

371. Large numbers of applicants do come from the provinces?—Yes.

372. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Would you tell us how many apply from provincial universities?—We could certainly give you the figures, but perhaps I might follow up what Sir Raymond Priestley said. The creaming off to Oxford and Cambridge is done at an earlier stage, and broadly speaking any bright boy at school who wants to go to the university thinks first of getting to Oxford or Cambridge. So it is perhaps natural that Oxford and Cambridge get the majority of our vacancies because they have already creamed off the schools.

373. Sometimes finance comes into the question of whether they go to Oxford or Cambridge and I was wondering if sufficient attention has been given to potential recruits from provincial universities?—It does not matter to us where they come from; we take the best we can get. The provincial universities get just as much canvassing as the others, and judging by the number of candidates they are very fully aware of the possibilities in the Civil Service.

374. *Chairman*: How do the results of Method I and Method II compare?—I think perhaps the provincial universities score a little more in Method I, but there is not much in it.

375. *Mr. Menzler*: The number of vacancies to be filled by open competition has not gone up very much, despite the increase in the number of candidates. Is this due to the greatly increased number of promotions from other classes?—That is partly the reason. It is partly that the three pre-war years were not normal years; the Service was already expanding.

376. There has not been a great increase in the number of posts?—No.

377. A quarter of the posts were filled by promotion from within the Service in the last five years?—Yes, and the present position is, I think, that half the administrative class have been promoted.

378. *Mrs. Wootton*: The fact that you are getting such a very large number of applicants in relation to the number of vacancies rather contradicts the view that there is much wrong with the terms and conditions. It may be that they do not appeal to the scientists or to the very, very top, but they clearly appeal to the upper half of honours graduates in the universities?—I do not myself measure the success of recruitment by the number of applicants but by the number of those acceptable.

379. *Mr. Menzler*: Do Departments share your view about the missing three or four candidates?—That statement is partly based on representations we have from Departments about the people we are sending them. There is no complaint about the general quality, but from more than one Department I have had the kind of request: "Can you not send us one or two more people whom we can put into a Minister's private office fairly soon?" That is the sort of job which requires all-round qualities, good judgment and quickness, and we cannot always meet those requests. But opinions differ. We are on very treacherous ground here. Some people might take the view that you cannot tell whether a candidate is outstanding or not, and I would hesitate to say that we really can.

380. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I was rather puzzled by this same point—you refer to the Minister's office, and that comes quite early; I rather thought you were looking to a future generation, the really super civil servant of 25 years hence. Can you at the time know that?—We can only do our best to guess. I am sure there will be many dark horses who will in fact turn out to be absolutely first class civil servants and who in their early twenties would not have given one that impression, but I still think we could do with a very few more people who were obviously going to be first rate civil servants and could at a fairly early stage be put into a Minister's private office, with the expectation that later on they would go to the highest posts in the Civil Service.

381. How long will it be before you can make that investigation?—We are now doing a rather careful follow-up, but I do not think we shall be able to answer this question for 10, 15 or even 20 years.

382. *Mr. Menzler*: Would you say that the intake of the administrative class was as good as pre-war?—Opinions differ. I think we can say that we are getting less people who are bad choices and that the average quality is as good.

383. And the standard of selection is as high, is it?—The standard at which we draw the line, so to speak, is as high, but there are fewer acceptable people below

it. Before the war I do not think the Commissioners had to concern themselves with the question of whether there were sufficient acceptable candidates, because there were so many successful.

384. You were going to give us a statement of the applicants analysed by universities; may I suggest at the same time you should analyse them by reference to public schools and non-public schools?—That is a very big undertaking. Someone in the London School of Economics is about to produce a book on this, and perhaps that will give you the information you want.

Chairman: I think we should try to do it.

385. *Mr. Lloyd Williams:* When was Method II introduced?—After the war.

386. In your last review I think it was stated that 30 per cent. entered the administrative class under Method II.—Yes, that would be about the figure.

387. What are the relative merits of Method I and Method II, in your experience, on the results?—It is a very large question, and I think it is too early to say, because we are trying to crystal-gaze, not merely two or three, but 10 or 20 years ahead.

388. *Chairman:* I was wondering whether it is possible by altering Method II a bit to bring in a little more of the good human material in the universities. The people who really would make good administrators, I think, are the sort of people who are President of the Students' Guild, people who have good executive and administrative ability and show it in the universities. The sort of person I am thinking of is Chester Wilmot who I think would have made a very good administrative officer, and who played a leading part in the administration of the University of Melbourne; I do not know what degree he got, but it was not a very high one. I think a lot of the people who take a big part in university administration do not get good degrees, because of what they do. Is it possible to rope in a few more of them, because I think you are missing first class material, even for the administrative class—they have got the brains, but they are not easily measured by examination?—Of course, a lot of administrative work does demand qualities which are measured by examination.

389. If these people had really set to work they would have got a first class honours degree easily, but they devoted too much of their time to something else, and yet they are intrinsically the type you want. They are far more valuable to us in the universities than these people who get a first class and do nothing else.—I would not dream of dissenting from the Chairman, but one problem is that if you drop your paper

qualifications it brings in yet more candidates, and we are already finding it nearly impossible to deal with those we have.

390. *Mr. Cash:* Is it possible that you are missing some of the best people?—Best in what sense?

391. For the requirements of the administrative class. Is one of your troubles not so much the lowering of the standard but the fact that the people who would make your ideal administrators are not applying at all? You have already mentioned the drain which the universities themselves make on the sort of class of person, and I was wondering whether there was anything in that point?—We should like a few more, but whether they exist and whether, if they exist, we ought to get them—because clearly we ought not to get more than our fair share of this very limited class—I do not know.

392. *Chairman:* I wonder whether your self-denying ordinance may not be a bit dangerous; I do not suppose anybody else is thinking about not taking a fair share?—We ought to think about it. It is arguable that before the war the Civil Service did perhaps get more than its fair share of the cream *vis-à-vis* industry. But whether we are getting our fair share now, if I may say so, is one of the problems the Royal Commission have to think about.

393. *Mr. Menzler:* Do you know whether the number of firsts has increased with the great increase in the number of people going to universities since before the war?—I am told that it has increased a very small amount, but the size of the universities has increased a very large amount.

394. *Mr. Cash:* Immediately after the war both Oxford and Cambridge were complaining about the very poor quality of the people coming up.

395. *Chairman:* I think the answer is that there has been a comparatively small increase in the best people, intellectually speaking, and in the worst people, but a big increase in the middle people.

396. *Mr. Willis Jackson:* There has of course been a big increase in the number of organisations, industrial and otherwise, which are now going out consciously to get the best men.

397. *Chairman:* Could you tell us why you think the recruitment to the executive class is so satisfactory? You mention in paragraph 30 the career prospects; do you think that materially affects the question of getting more people for the executive class?—I am not an expert and that is a Treasury question, but so far as I know as an individual, and from discussions with friends in industry and comparable occupations, I should have thought that the salary scales offered to the executive recruit were better than those offered by a good many outside concerns.

398. And the leave, of course, also?—
Yes.

399. You think that may be quite an important factor in the fact that you get so many people applying?—Yes. There are other factors: public service, security, and so on, but my guess would be that both those are important factors.

400. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: And promotion prospects?—Yes; the fact that there is a career structure up to quite a high salary level.

401. *Mr. Hall*: There is the possibility of promotion into the administrative class?—Yes, but we do not say much about that in literature because, although the proportion of administratives who come from the executive class is high, the proportion of executives who get into the administrative class is still very small indeed.

402. *Mrs. Wootton*: Could I put a small follow-up question to get your reaction on that: could it be that there is a social change which is important here? The people you are getting for the executive class are people who go largely to the secondary and grammar schools; their prototypes a generation ago, one might guess, would only have thought of going into manual work in industry, and the Civil Service would carry a pretty high prestige in that group, whereas when you are coming to university people going into the administrative class, there has been no corresponding social change and there are very many more opportunities open. Could it be that the executive class in the Civil Service has a much higher prestige value for the available population than the administrative class of the Civil Service?—I do not think I can give an opinion on that.

403. *Mr. Menzler*: There is another point which is worth making. You would agree, *Mr. Sink*, that in industry there is not this grading as between clerical and executive, so that the Civil Service by recognising and giving markedly higher pay for a higher secondary education is very attractive as compared with industry, where if a man comes in at 18 with Higher Certificate or Advanced Level of G.C.E., he has to go into the clerical grade at the ordinary age point and take his chance with those who come in a year or two earlier. Is that not a selling point in favour of the executive class?—I do not know enough about industry to give a definite answer to that, but we are conscious of less competition with other employers at the executive level than we are at the clerical.

404. Mainly, I suggest, because they have not got an executive class in industry, they are all clerks?—That may very well be the case.

405. *Chairman*: You did not say anything about executive graduates?—They are such a small proportion that I did not bother the Royal Commission with them, but they take a competitive examination, a shortened version of the administrative.

406. So the people I was concerned about might get into the administrative class eventually by promotion?—Yes.

407. *Sir Alexander Gray*: What age are these graduate executives?—The same as the administratives.

408. *Mr. Menzler*: Do the figures in Table III include the departmental executive classes?—Yes.

409. Do you get your due quota of those?—There are no marked shortages. We have had slight difficulties with actuarial assistants, but I think we can get over those.

410. Because in these departmental classes they have to take examinations of a professional or quasi-professional character?—Yes, subsequently.

411. And that may act as a deterrent?—I do not think it does.

412. *Sir Alexander Gray*: May I ask how inspectors of taxes enter now?—They are recruited by examination which is nearly administrative level. There was a shortage of those some years ago, but we have now put that right.

413. How far do you offer jobs in that category to men who are not quite good enough for administrative?—That is the main source of recruitment.

414. Is there not a special examination?—It is the same examination; they go in for both at the same time.

415. *Chairman*: Will you turn to the clerical class now? What was the reason for the large increase in vacancies in 1951?—That is a Treasury question, but I am told the answer is Korea.

416. The post-war proportion of successful candidates to applicants is much higher than in the executive class?—The requirements are much lower, G.C.E. Ordinary Level, and there are many more people up to that level than G.C.E. Advanced.

417. Why is recruitment to the clerical class so difficult? Is it a question of pay and conditions?—I think locality comes into it as almost the most important factor, because at that age boys and girls, or their parents, do not particularly want to go away from home, and in present conditions of full employment they need not go away from home, they can get a job near at hand. That loses us a great many candidates who after they have been declared successful just throw it up and go into something else, and one can argue from that that it must lose us still more candidates who never go in at all.

418. *Mrs. Wootton*: Is there any geographical distribution of unsuccessful candidates—or the successful ones who decline?—No, I think it is fairly generally experienced. There is a geographical point in that there is very often an objection to coming to London, partly because of the cost of living, partly for other reasons.

419. *Mr. Cash*: Do you think there is anything in the differentiation of pay which needs adjustment, or that the differentiation for London is on the whole reasonable and adequate?—Purely from the point of view of recruitment of the clerical class, I doubt myself whether pay is the main consideration in unwillingness to come to London.

420. It is the social side rather than the pay side?—That is my guess, and shortage of accommodation.

421. How far do candidates know they may be sent anywhere?—The notices tell them.

422. Are they given any choice?—Yes, they are given a preference both as to Departments and as to locality, and if they are high enough up on the list and are reasonably lucky they can get more or less what they want, but it is when they get lower on the list there is difficulty.

423. When you come to a big provincial centre of employment such as Newcastle, for example, do you find most of your recruits are drawn from Newcastle?—I would like notice of that question. Undoubtedly for the majority of temporary recruits, clearly the answer is, yes, but to what extent we fill permanent posts mainly from Newcastle people I do not know without looking into it.

424. *Sir Alexander Gray*: How far have you decentralised your examinations?—They are very widely decentralised; we have centres all over the country, and I do not think the difficulty of getting to the examination hall is a deterrent. We pay travelling expenses over a certain amount.

425. *Chairman*: In paragraph 39 the Commission refer to the 110 clerical officers taken in from the executive competition. Could you tell us how many were approached, and what sort of proportion does this 110 represent?—It is quite a high percentage. What the exact figure of those approached was I do not know, but I should say this is probably the majority of those approached.

426. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In that case you would only accept those who failed to attain the higher grade, in the lower grade, provided they were within the age limit for the lower grade?—Yes.

427. You might have some suitable candidates at the age of 19?—Yes.

428. In view of the shortage in the clerical grades, would it not be possible to extend that age limit to 19?—That is a Treasury question.

429. *Chairman*: They decide those things?—Yes, and it is a point we have raised with them, but I think they will have to give the answer.

430. *Mrs. Wootton*: Your explanation of the satisfactory position of the executive class is partly the fact that there is a very good crop of school leavers; do you offer at all a similar explanation for the shortage of clericals, that with the 16 year olds you have got a comparative shortage of school leavers? Do you think that is a factor?—The school leavers at 16 have increased since before the war quite a lot, though nothing like as big an increase as at age 18.

431. Is it not a fact that originally the dates of entry were intended to match the dates of exit from the school?—Yes, and still are intended.

432. But in point of fact they do not. The clerical class does not match any date?—It matches the very large figures in Table I.A. If you look at the figures of the school leavers at age 16, there is a very large exit from the schools at the age of 16. We have to recruit where the people are, and in view of these figures I think we must come to the conclusion that 16 is a very frequent age of leaving school, particularly for the kind of people we are looking for, which is about school certificate standard.

433. *Mr. Menzler*: The school leavers at age 15 on the average I suppose leave school at age 15½?—Presumably.

434. Over 300,000 of them, so there is six months' gap between their leaving school and the minimum age for the examination. When the national policy of raising the school leaving age to 16 is realised, will not all your problems disappear with regard to clerical grades? Is not that six months' gap, to which is added your own six months' delay in declaring results, not a major disability?—I do not think many children who leave school at 15 would succeed in the clerical officer competition, and if there were many who wanted to come into the Civil Service we should welcome them in the clerical assistant class.

435. The point I was making is that when we get to 16 you will have a very much larger population of school leavers from which to draw, not 60,000 but nearly 400,000. Is this not a temporary factor due to the fact that there is that gap between 15½, the normal school leaving age, and 16, which is your minimum age for the clerical examination?—There are so many uncertain factors in that question that I would hesitate to try and answer it.

436. Do your figures for the clerical class in Table IV include the departmental clerical classes?—Yes.

437. Do you have less difficulty in filling those posts because they tend to be more localised?—No, because the vacancies always happen to be in the wrong place.

438. I am interested in this method of relaxation, if that is the word, under which you just take the general school certificate and the headmaster's certificate. You recruited 160 in that way. Was there a much larger number than that 160 who were offered jobs and refused them?—Unless they applied for the jobs they were not offered them.

439. It is not done through approaching the schools? They write in?—They write in, yes.

440. Does that system involve lowering of standards?—No.

441. You think it is as high as the open examination?—Yes.

442. *Mr. Hall*: Is there any evidence that some people regard success in passing one or other of these examinations as a certificate of eligibility that might be useful for other employment; that some of the entrants go in just to have it on their record that they have passed?—That may be so, but our examinations are so like the G.C.E. at the Advanced and Ordinary Levels that I should have thought normally they would use the G.C.E. for that purpose rather than our examination.

443. Is there a fee for it?—Yes, there is a fee, which we doubled not long ago in the interests of economy, and it did not materially affect the number of candidates.

444. *Chairman*: Generally speaking, the memorandum seems to suggest that while there is cause for anxiety in certain parts of the field, it is not due so much to questions of pay and conditions as to full employment and the fact that there is considerable competition from outside?—Yes, I think that would be my general conclusion. I would like to add one point on an alternative way in which the clerical shortage might be made good, that is recruitment of older people. The Treasury is thinking of introducing this as a normal feature of clerical recruitment. In our opinion that is a perfectly practical way of solving the

problem; we think the candidates will be forthcoming thus solving the shortage and having advantages of its own in view of the Government's policy on employment of older people.

445. *Mr. Cash*: What exactly do you mean by older people?—Over 40.

446. Over 40 up to what?—60 years of age.

447. *Chairman*: I suppose this is really partly a temporary shortage, because in 8 years' time the post-war bulge will be coming along and help matters considerably?—Probably, yes.

448. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: On the general question of recruitment, I understood you to say that in your opinion your recruitment difficulties were not so much attributable to the unattractiveness of the present civil service scales and conditions as to the competition from outside due to the present full employment policy. I wondered whether you would care to have second thoughts on that, because if competition outside is so much keener, is it not the case that that competition has as an element more attractive scales of pay and service conditions?—Yes, you cannot separate the two, I quite agree. But nevertheless I think I would stick to what I said originally. I think the facts in this memorandum do show that on the whole things are reasonably satisfactory—except in the executive class, where they are more than satisfactory.

449. I understood you to say that your recruitment difficulties were not due so much to any inferiority in the present civil service scales as to the keener competition in outside industry and professions, and I felt that that competition is keener because outside there are perhaps more attractive salaries and conditions of service than the Civil Service offers at the moment.—That, if I may say so, is for the Royal Commission to judge, but I do not think that the Civil Service Commissioners can come here and say that we really cannot do our job properly because of the pay offered by the Treasury.

450. *Chairman*: Thank you very much, Mr. Sinkler. I am afraid our questions have been mainly on points of detail, but you have your own memorandum to thank for that!—Thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew)

(Adjourned until Thursday, 25th March, 1954 at 11.00 a.m.)

FOURTH DAY

Thursday, 25th March, 1954, morning session only

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MR. N. F. HALL

MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum submitted by the Civil Service Commissioners

Part II

THE SUB-CLERICAL CLASSES

GENERAL COMMENTS ON RECRUITMENT

1. This Part is concerned with the classes, sometimes referred to as "sub-clerical", i.e. typists (including shorthand typists), clerical assistants, machine and duplicator operators. Evidence about recruitment to the Post Office manipulative grades is being submitted separately by the Post Office, who can give a more complete picture than the Commissioners of the whole field of recruitment (i.e. temporary plus permanent).

2. The chief feature of recruitment to these classes since the war has been the extreme difficulty of recruiting in anything like sufficient numbers the girls and young women traditionally regarded as most suitable for this sort of work. The general tenor of the story is, therefore, that in spite of all manner of devices to facilitate the recruitment of young women, including widening of the age limits, simplification of the entry tests, and much increased frequency of the opportunities of taking them, it has been necessary, in order to fill the gap, to recruit many thousands of older women, and also to open the doors to older men. Age limits for typists were virtually abolished in 1949. Permanent recruitment of older men and women as clerical assistants has so far been only on an *ad hoc* basis. But the Treasury are considering proposals to make this part of the normal recruitment arrangements for the grade and are about to open discussions with the staff.

3. Because of the difficulty referred to in the preceding paragraph, "open competition" for entry to these classes has to a large extent been superseded by temporary recruitment on a departmental and local basis. Subsequently the most suitable amongst the temporary staff are certified by the Commissioners for permanent appointment as a result of limited competitions (confined to existing temporary staff) or departmental nomination. For this reason the Tables in this Part are headed not "open competition" but "permanent recruitment". The Tables give only part of the picture: there is no central authority (apart from the Post Office for the Post Office grades referred to in para. 1) which can give a comprehensive picture of temporary recruitment to these classes. It is, however, well known that the shortage is most acute in London and that in the provinces generally the position is more satisfactory.

TABLE I
TYPING GRADES—PERMANENT RECRUITMENT

Year	No. of vacancies	No. of applicants	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	Certificated for appointment
1936 ...	1,100	4,133 (1,521)	1,656 (571)	48	1,460 (520)
1937 ...	2,100	4,164 (1,451)	2,011 (664)	Nil	1,831 (616)
1938 ...	2,500	4,314 (1,540)	2,562 (846)	Nil	2,348 (804)
1950 ...	Several thousand	6,990 (4,579)	3,588 (1,871)	Nil	3,029 (1,523)
1951 ...	Several thousand	2,960 (2,960)	1,499 (1,499)	Nil	1,322 (1,322)
1952 ...	Several thousand	6,425 (2,063)	4,301 (1,085)	Nil	3,987 (1,009)

Note—The figures in brackets cover London only. The other figures are totals covering both London and the provinces.

4. In the pre-war years there were two open competitions a year for typists throughout the United Kingdom. These competitions were the only channel through which permanent employment in the typing grades could be secured. Candidates had to be 16½ and under 25 (under 28 in the case of people already serving in a temporary capacity in the Civil Service).

5. Since the autumn of 1949 open competitions have been held every fortnight for posts in London only. The age limits have been 15 and under 60. These competitions include a simple written examination, and candidates who are successful are given the appropriate grading according to their technical skill by the Departments to whom they are assigned. Typing training schools are run by the larger Departments. Until 1952 candidates who could not type were given posts as learner typists and were expected to reach an acceptable typing standard within a reasonable period. The recruitment of learner typists did not prove satisfactory for various reasons and it was discontinued during the course of 1952.

6. In recent years it has also been possible for women and girls who have obtained temporary civil service employment in London to secure permanent employment later on by success in limited competitions, i.e. competitions confined to people already in the Civil Service. The examinations in the limited competitions are precisely the same as in the open competitions in the London area. During the three years 1950-1952 roughly equal numbers of candidates have secured permanent employment in London through the open and limited competitions but the tendency has been for fewer candidates to compete in the open competitions and more in the limited.

7. There have been no open competitions for typist vacancies in the provinces since 1949. Since then Departments have been recruiting typists in the provinces in a temporary capacity. In July, 1950, there was a limited competition confined to members of typing grades who had given a few months' satisfactory service in a temporary capacity. To be eligible candidates had to possess the necessary technical qualifications. Those who were eligible had to pass a short written examination. There was a similar limited competition in June, 1952. There was also a small limited competition in July, 1951, confined to men who had been excluded from the 1950 competition (there were 22 candidates, of whom 20 were successful). The age limits in these provincial limited competitions were 15 and under 60.

8. The Civil Service Commission has no detailed knowledge about the temporary recruitment position in the provinces, e.g. about the numbers of vacancies and the

numbers of applicants for temporary posts, but so far as it is aware there is no serious problem in the provinces as a whole, though occasionally there may be some local shortages.

9. The main recruitment difficulty is in London. During the three years 1950-1952, although the total number of candidates declined, the figures were rather larger than in the pre-war years. But the number of vacancies to be filled was also considerably larger than before the war and the shortage has at times been acute. There is also cause for anxiety in the low educational standard of many of the applicants.

10. Since the summer of 1952 about 1,700 applicants have been interviewed by officers of the Civil Service Commission. It has thus been possible to obtain direct impressions of some of the factors that determine whether a typist enters the Civil Service or not. The attractions of the Civil Service appear to be:

- (a) security, particularly in the case of older women and of girls still influenced by parental advice;
- (b) good leave compared with smaller private firms;
- (c) good facilities for training from a fairly low level of technical skill.

Deterrments are:

- (i) the 5½ day week (many other employers in their classified advertisements make a special point of "no Sats"), particularly in the case of married women under about 45;
- (ii) fear that the personal touch will be lacking in treatment of staff in a large organisation like the Civil Service;
- (iii) delay or fear of delay in placing the candidate in a job—most of the younger applicants can get immediate work without difficulty from a private employer, and are not prepared to wait even a few days without salary;
- (iv) fear of examination—to get a permanent post in the Civil Service it is necessary to pass a written examination (even though it is a simple one) and to pass a test of technical skill;
- (v) the older experienced secretarial type of enquirer is not usually keen to work in a typing pool;
- (vi) the same type of enquirer is not usually willing to accept the rate of pay appropriate to a woman aged 25, as is required by the present starting pay rules;
- (vii) except in the cases mentioned in (vi), pay, considered as total remuneration (i.e. basic pay plus overtime plus proficiency allowances) appears to be acceptable, although the remuneration is sometimes compared unfavourably to that obtainable elsewhere for a shorter working week.

TABLE II
CLERICAL ASSISTANTS—PERMANENT RECRUITMENT

Year	No. of vacancies	No. of applicants	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	Certificated for appointment
1936 ...	4,326 (4,244)	8,655 (6,366)	6,317 (5,238)	692 (65)	6,018 (5,093)
1937 ...	3,042 (2,758)	7,626 (5,039)	5,201 (3,964)	604 (Nil)	4,677 (3,652)
1938 ...	3,393 (3,138)	6,896 (4,240)	4,657 (3,297)	604 (Nil)	4,164 (3,145)
1950 ...	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
1951 ...	26,000	18,780 (8,221)	16,408 (6,738)	Nil	14,881 (6,111)
1952 ...	6,000	4,748 (994)	4,479 (1,129)	Nil	3,816 (913)

Note—The figures in brackets, which are approximate, only cover London. The other figures are totals covering both London and the provinces.

11. Much of the work of the clerical assistant class is of a routine nature and the salaries paid are commensurate with the nature of the work. Potential candidates are always specially anxious to secure jobs near to their homes, and recruitment has been on a much more localised basis than that for higher Classes in the Service.

12. In the years 1936-38 there were two main sources of recruitment. The first consisted of open competitions confined to girls who were 16 and under 17. There were two competitions each year. In the three years these competitions produced a total of nearly 10,000 recruits. Secondly, temporary civil servants were still being established as male "S" class clerks, ex-temporary women clerks and women clerical assistants grade I, and employed on work similar to that of the ordinary clerical assistant class. People in these categories could be established up to the age of 49. They were nominated by their Departments and took no examination. In the three years 1936-38 just over 5,000 people secured permanent posts in this way. The numbers were declining fairly rapidly. It is impossible to say how many of these officers secured posts in London and the provinces, but in the above Tables it has been assumed that the great majority were employed in London.

13. In 1950 there was no permanent recruitment. In the spring of 1951 open competitions were resumed in the London area. These competitions, which include a simple written examination, are held every fortnight. The age limits are 15 and under 20. The numbers of successful candidates have been extremely disappointing (263 in 1951, and 159 in 1952). The number of posts advertised in 1951 was 6,000; as the competitions that year produced very poor results, the same vacancy figure was repeated the following year.

14. In the autumn of 1950 a big scheme for the establishment of temporary clerks as clerical assistants was announced through Treasury Establishments Circular 50/50. This establishment scheme was open to men and women who were 45 and under 60 (and registered disabled persons under 45). This scheme introduced men as permanent clerical assistants for the first time, and also brought in many more older people than hitherto. Candidates were nominated by their Departments, and there was no examination. The number of vacancies available was about 20,000. About 16,500 people were established, the great majority of them in 1951. The scheme covered both London and the provinces. Information is not available about the precise numbers of vacancies filled in London and the provinces, and as a result the London figures given in brackets in the Table for the two years 1951 and 1952 are only approximate. In nearly 2,000 cases in which the Civil Service Commission rejected the candidates for health reasons the employing Departments may have given permanent unestablished status.

15. In 1952 there was a limited competition for temporary staff in the provinces with three months' temporary service who were 15 years old and under 20 (or under 21 in the case of candidates with a year's temporary service). About 1,900 candidates were successful in this competition.

16. In the near future, as announced in Treasury Establishments Circular 31/53, there is to be another large establishment operation similar to that announced in the autumn of 1950, with age limits of 40 to 60.

17. The great majority of clerical assistant work is now being done by temporary clerks, men and women, and as the figures show, large numbers of the older ones secure permanent status through large-scale nomination schemes. Some clerical assistant work is also probably done by clerical officers who could be better employed on superior duties.

18. It is no longer possible to recruit anything like so many girls and young women for this class of work as before the war, notably in the London area. The Royal Commission will no doubt wish to consider whether in conditions of full employment, other employers experience a similar shortage.

TABLE III

MACHINE OPERATOR AND DUPLICATOR OPERATOR CLASSES—PERMANENT RECRUITMENT
LIMITED COMPETITIONS

(i.e., competitions confined to existing temporary staff)

Year	No. of vacancies	No. of applicants	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	Certificated for appointment
1936 ...	} No competitions in these years.				
1937 ...					
1938 ...					
1950 ...					
1951 ...	Not stated	1,189 (571)	885 (440)	Nil	815 (400)
1952 ...	Not stated	2,166 (1,036)	1,765 (850)	Nil	1,508 (750)

Note—The figures in brackets which are approximate only cover London. The other figures are totals covering both London and the provinces.

19. It is not possible to compare the position before the war with that in recent years. Before the war there were no competitions. A certain number of officers were recruited in a temporary capacity to specialist grades in certain Departments, such as the Stationery Office, and were subsequently nominated for establishment after a period of satisfactory service. In other Departments work appropriate to the present machine operator and duplicator operator classes was done by either clerical assistants or typists.

20. In recent years small numbers of girls and young women have been recruited by open competition in the London area. The open competitions in London referred to in the section about clerical assistants cover posts in the machine operator and duplicator operator classes as well as clerical assistant posts, but the total numbers recruited through these competitions are small and although the Civil Service Commission has no precise information on the point it believes that only a minority of the successful candidates take up posts as machine assistants and duplicator operators.

21. With this small exception, in London and the provinces all Departments have recruited to the two grades in a temporary capacity to begin with, giving the recruits the necessary training on machine or duplicating work. Subsequently temporary staff who have acquired the necessary technical qualifications have had opportunities of securing establishment through limited competitions which include a short written examination. There was a limited competition in 1951 and again in 1952.

22. The Stationery Office, under special arrangements, still recruits duplicator operators in a temporary capacity without restriction on age, and nominates for establishment those employees who have given efficient service for at least one year. In 1950-52 about 100 officers a year on average secured establishment in this way, in addition to the figures in the Table above. The numbers have tended to decline.

23. The Civil Service Commission has no precise information about the numbers of vacancies, and it is difficult to judge the real extent of the shortage. In general, however, the present recruitment position resembles that in the clerical assistant class.

Examination of Witnesses

MR. A. P. SINKER, C.B., *First Commissioner* and

MR. J. W. A. CHORLEY, *Senior Assistant Director of Examinations*
on behalf of the Civil Service Commission
called and examined.

451. *Chairman:* On Part II, Mr. Sinker, the general picture seems similar to that of the clerical officers in that there just are not enough girls available?—*Mr. Sinker:* Yes.

452. And that is a national problem rather than special to the Civil Service?—*So far as I know*

453. *Mrs. Wootton:* You say in paragraph 2 that the Treasury are considering proposals to provide for the normal recruitment of both older men and women—As clerical assistants.

454. Yes. I do not know whether we should address ourselves to the Treasury or whether you can tell us more about these proposals—The Treasury can give you fuller details than we can, but the main lines of the scheme would be in accordance with the Government policy for the employment of older people in the country as a whole. We know from experience that we can recruit older men and women for this work at something like the present pay and conditions of service, and the fact we have not done so hitherto, with some exceptions, is because the old doctrine was that this work was appropriate for young women because a lot of it is routine and you do not want people to spend their lives on it. That old doctrine has ceased to work and now it is proposed to kill two birds with one stone, fill the posts and employ the older people by throwing the class open to them.

455. The situation has been affected I suppose by the very great increase in the marriage rate at an early age?—I would hesitate to say it has really affected the question, because at the same time the marriage bar has been raised and so the young married woman can and often does come back or rather stay in the Service.

456. It has been argued that with the smaller family in spite of the higher marriage rate about 12 effective years have been added to a woman's working life because she is less occupied now than before. Do you know what proportion of the older people are being taken who are in fact married women?—No.

457. Would anybody know?—I think the Treasury would have a very rough idea.

458. *Sir Alexander Gray:* Is the object of bringing in older people to give them employment or do you think that there are certain advantages to the work in employing older people for the sake of their greater experience of life?—No, I do not think at this level one can say that the

second consideration seriously enters into it because the clerical assistant can do the job very well whether she has experience of life or not.

459. *Mrs. Wootton:* There is a wide discrepancy between older people and old people in this context. The Government is particularly concerned about people at or near pension age, if I understand Government policy rightly, but here you are concerned with employing people, say, in their forties.—That question must be addressed to the Treasury, but I understood that the Government were concerned with the difficulty of finding employment for people who are out of a job for one reason or another from about 40.

460. *Chairman:* Do you know whether the fact that the salary scale was designed for young people is a deterrent to getting the older ones?—From Table III and paragraph 14 you see that in 1951 we brought 16,500 people over 45 into the clerical assistant class. That appears to be evidence that a considerable number of people of that age are willing and anxious to come into the Service at the present clerical assistant rate.

461. *Mr. Menzler:* Are not the older people who are being established already serving as temporary clerks? If so I do not quite see how that indicates anything about recruitment.—Temporary clerks in the Civil Service come in on a rate of pay which is similar to the clerical assistant rate, and if they are willing to take that as temporary clerks and for a permanent career in the Civil Service, that seems to be evidence for the open market price.

462. *Mr. Thorneycroft:* In the case of shorthand typists and typists all your recruitment now is initially on a temporary basis?—Yes.

463. Does that mean that if you were to make appointments initially on a permanent basis you would not nevertheless attract the better type of applicant?—The evidence was that we were not doing so, and we were therefore forced to what is in effect temporary recruitment all round.

464. *Chairman:* You say in paragraph 5 that recruitment of learner typists was not satisfactory. Could you tell us why?—They take a long time to train, and I understand that a good many of them after training went out to higher paid jobs elsewhere, but we have no detailed knowledge of that.

465. In paragraph 9 you mention the low educational standard. Has there been any sign of improvement lately?—*Mr.*

Chorley may be able to answer that. I have not been in close touch lately, but I came into contact with it when I was in the Treasury and responsible for the typing training schools all through the Service, and I know that we have been very much concerned by the point. For instance there is the very simple fact that so many young girls simply cannot spell, and although some educational theorists say that does not matter, it does rather matter if you have to sign the letters. Has there been any improvement, Mr. Chorley?—*Mr. Chorley*: There has been nothing to show from the examination that there has been an improvement, but the tests are at a very low educational level, so that I do not think our deductions will be very significant.—*Mr. Sinker*: The majority of typists, or a very large proportion, were temporary typists, so the Commission do not see them, but we hear about the experience of others.

466. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: On Table I, is the difference between the numbers in the last column and the numbers declared successful attributable to medical failures?—No, I should imagine it is attributable to girls going to other jobs, or not liking the locality they were going to be posted to.—*Mr. Chorley*: I should say the proportion due to medical failure is relatively small.

467. *Mr. Cash*: With the shorthand typists, the first trouble is of course to get anybody to come to London. I suppose recruitment in the provinces is easier?—Generally speaking, yes.

468. The second point is that a girl does not like working in a pool, and the first question they always ask is, is there a woman supervisor?—*Mr. Sinker*: I hesitate to disagree with you, but when I used to go and talk at courses for typists and superintendents I learned that a good many girls prefer working in a pool because of the companionship, and that they do not think a boss is as wonderful as perhaps I and other bosses were under the impression they thought. But I think that the girl with experience, and perhaps the rather older girl who has had some kind of secretarial experience or training outside, does want to do a secretary's job and I am not sure that we have solved that problem of secretaries in the Civil Service.

469. *Chairman*: Might it not help if there were direct recruitment to the clerical officer (secretary) grade and you could get experienced people?—I am in a slight difficulty here, because I think the answer is yes, but the Treasury does not.

470. *Mr. Menzler*: In listing the attractions of the Civil Service at (a), (b) and (c)

in paragraph 10, you do not mention superannuation and marriage gratuities? Are these candidates not interested in them?—Security is meant to include superannuation, but I think a young girl of 16 is not going to think of the pension at 60. Marriage gratuity, I would perhaps have put in, but this information is taken straight from the report of the people at the Commission who interview the typists.—*Mr. Chorley*: The experience of these people is that it is the older candidates who ask about the future. The youngsters are not in general very much concerned.

471. *Chairman*: You mention delay as a deterrent. Is it not true that a candidate is often taken on on a temporary basis while awaiting the result of the examination?—Yes, almost invariably.

472. *Mr. Hall*: Is the order in which deterrents are listed accidental, or are they in relative order of importance?—*Mr. Sinker*: I think (i) is in order of importance, apart from that I would not say that they are.—*Mr. Chorley*: Number (vi) should go rather higher than it is.

473. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Age pay was raised in 1946 from 21 to 25. Is there anything special about the age of 25? Might it be an advantage to raise the age further?—*Mr. Sinker*: From the point of view of recruitment we would favour more flexibility in starting pay.

474. *Chairman*: Passing on to clerical assistants, can you say anything about the standard of the post-war recruits?—*Mr. Chorley*: Judging by our very limited experience in examining them in London, I should say that the educational standard is very low.

475. Here again surplus candidates have disappeared altogether.—*Mr. Sinker*: Yes. Except that if the recruitment of older people were to be introduced I think we might find there were surplus candidates.

476. *Mr. Hall*: The capacity to pass a very simple educational test appears to have been improving in the last two or three years, and the difficulty in London may be partly associated with educational disturbances in the war. In 1950 there was a very low educational standard. I do not know whether the Commissioners think there has been any improvement.—*Mr. Chorley*: Our examinations show no improvement at all, but I would emphasise that it is a very small sample that we examine, and only in London.

477. *Chairman*: In paragraph 17 you say that the great majority of clerical assistant work is now being done by temporary clerks, men and women, but there are in fact about 28,000 clerical assistants as

against 34,000 temporary clerks, are there not?—*Mr. Sinker*: Yes, temporary clerks grade III. I should have thought a lot of clerical assistant work was being done rightly or wrongly by temporary clerks grade II, and indeed by clerical officers because of the shortage.

478. In paragraph 18 you refer to the position of other employers. Have you any information on this? We are trying to get it of course.—No, I do not think we have. It is merely from hearsay and conversations with other employers that we get the impression of a big general shortage.

479. On machine operators has there ever been any question of using older people in substantial numbers for this type of work as with clerical assistants?—*Mr. Chorley*: The position is the same as with clerical assistants; but with machine grades it is rather a disadvantage to have the older people, and there is to be a lower upper

age limit in this class because we find the older people cannot be trained.

480. *Mr. Menzler*: To ease recruitment difficulties has the device been explored of part-time employment, morning, afternoon, or so many days a week? On routine work, one would have thought there was scope for it.—*Mr. Sinker*: I think that is a Treasury question, because it would all be temporary employment, and we have never been asked to establish as permanent civil servants people who are employed part-time. In my capacity as an ordinary civil servant I know that it is done on quite a large scale, but I have no knowledge of it as a Commissioner.

481. *Chairman*: I think we have now finished with Part II, may we now go on to Part III?—May I apologise for the vagueness of the picture we have presented in Part II, but I am afraid that is inevitable from the nature of our responsibilities.

Memorandum submitted by the Civil Service Commissioners

Part III

SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, ARCHITECTURAL AND ALLIED PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL CLASSES

GENERAL COMMENTS ON RECRUITMENT

1. In this group of classes a good deal of initial recruitment is carried out by Departments on a temporary basis. There are two main reasons for this: first, the sudden spurts in demand for defence research and production since 1945 (e.g. a marked increase in 1950), which have made it effectively impossible over a wide area of the work for Departments to assess the "normal" complements of their scientific, professional, and technical staffs: second, the difficulty of judging the suitability of an applicant for many kinds of such posts until he has actually proved himself by doing the job. This second difficulty applies most acutely to the more purely experimental posts. For these reasons candidates for permanent appointment are selected by the Commissioners through competitions open to external candidates and to existing temporary staff. In some competitions the latter form a large proportion of the total number of candidates.

2. Before the war scientific, professional and technical work was done by a large number of separate departmental classes and grades, and recruitment was mainly on a departmental basis. Permanent scientific appointments were usually made under the Federated Superannuation System for Universities and the Commissioners' certificate of qualification was not required. Professional and technical classes were appointed under the Superannuation Acts and in their case the Commissioners' certificate was necessary. For a very few types of professional and

technical posts recruitment in a permanent capacity was through open competitions run by the Commissioners. In many more cases, although recruitment to permanent posts was under rules issued by the Commissioners, the applications were received by the Departments, and the Departments arranged the necessary interviews, the Commissioners being represented on the interview boards. In other cases the Departments advertised temporary posts and conducted the necessary interviews, the Commissioners being usually represented on the interview boards; the Departments subsequently nominated to the Commissioners for certification people who had given a reasonable period of satisfactory service. Since the war the great majority of the various departmental classes, including scientific classes, have been merged in general service classes, and permanent posts are now filled by central recruitment through open or limited competitions run by the Commissioners. Over most of the field it is not possible to make any useful comparison between pre-war and post-war recruitment. One case in which reasonable comparisons are possible is that of Post Office engineering and allied grades, which are dealt with separately below.

3. The range of work covered by Part III is very wide. Much of it is highly specific, e.g. one physicist may be suitable and another unsuitable for a particular vacancy because of the special line of work in which each has specialized, even though their level of ability may be indistinguishable. As another example, the same is true of most engineers and draughtsmen. For these reasons, and for the reasons stated in the two preceding paragraphs, the picture of recruitment is necessarily less clear-cut in Part III than in Part I. In particular, the figures of vacancies given in the Tables in Part III do not accurately reflect the number of permanent posts unfilled.

4. The principles of open competition, which it is the Commissioners' duty to observe, normally involve a certain amount of inevitable delay. The closing date for applications has to be put sufficiently far ahead to give all potential applicants a reasonable chance to apply. All eligible applicants have to be given equal consideration, and the final results cannot be announced until after the latest applicants have been considered. In normal circumstances it is not possible for the Commissioners to adopt the system of "first come, first served". For some of the classes dealt with in Part III, however, it has been possible to adopt this speedier system for the time being, because experience has shown that the vacancies habitually exceed the number of acceptable candidates. Under this system, known in the Civil Service Commission as "continuous competition", candidates can apply, and be interviewed, at any time of year; and they can be informed of the result fairly soon after the interview. This system at present applies to the three scientific classes, to mechanical and electrical engineers, and to quantity surveyors. There are now signs, however, that for some categories of appointment the number of suitable candidates may begin to exceed the number of vacancies: in this case the Commissioners will be bound to consider whether a return to the more normal system of competition should be made.

THE SCIENTIFIC CLASSES (see Table I below)

5. The educational levels of recruitment to the scientific, experimental, and assistant (scientific) classes are in general comparable with those of the administrative, executive, and clerical classes respectively. A higher proportion of graduates, however, is recruited to the experimental than to the executive class. For instance in 1952 approximately one third of the competition recruits to the assistant experimental officer and experimental officer grades were university graduates (of whom a majority had taken pass degrees). Of the open competition recruits to the executive class, on the other hand, only five per cent. are university graduates. Another difference is that there are wider age limits for entry to the scientific classes. The main reason for this is that the Service can utilise scientific experience gained after the end of a formal education. On this account, too, age pay for open competition recruits is on a more generous scale than for the classes dealt with in Part I.

6. The general picture given by the figures in Table I, i.e. that the number of suitable candidates has not approached the demand is, of course, true. But the trend suggested by the figures for 1952 and 1953 is misleading. During those years Departments have been in doubt about their real vacancies, partly owing to the cuts in 1952 and partly owing to the existence of large temporary "fringes". In 1952 we were able to settle on a standard of quality for admission to the S.O. and E.O. classes which was higher than it had been in earlier years when, in conditions of extreme scarcity of scientists and extreme demand, we had been forced to pitch it at the minimum. In fact, in both 1952 and 1953, we have had more suitable candidates than in 1951; and the real vacancies for 1954 we now know to be smaller than in either of the preceding years. Much of the scientific work in these classes in the largest employing Department—the Ministry of Supply—is being done by temporary officers, and a correct assessment of the recruiting position would need an examination of the large-scale recruitment of temporaries by individual Departments (especially in the scientific assistant class). The Commissioners' experience is limited to recruitment to permanent posts.

7. The difficulty of recruiting to the scientific classes varies very much from subject to subject. In general, the highest quality of scientist still makes his career in fundamental research at the universities. Of the scientists just below the highest class, the Government Service recruits its fair share, and possibly more than its fair share. In the last two years the standard of intake has been high. There have been two major obstacles to recruitment:—

- (1) Up to 1953 the starting salary in all grades was slightly but perceptibly lower than the corresponding salaries in industry so far as we could judge them. Now the starting salaries for most successful candidates are probably at least as attractive as they can expect in industry. Industry is able however to outbid us for the exceptional candidates, who in the Civil Service have to enter at a starting salary the upper limit of which is related to age.
- (2) The fact that a large proportion of Government scientific work is military, and accordingly, is cloaked in secrecy and security. This is not such a deterrent as it would have been in the thirties, since a generation is growing up to whom the conditions of military science are taken for granted. But it always will be a deterrent to some of the best men.

8. In subjects, there is a nation-wide scarcity in physicists, especially electronic physicists, and in engineering scientists. We have more applications from first-class organic chemists than we can use and far more from all kinds of biologists.

9. A scheme of Research Fellowships, first introduced by the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, and now applied all over the Government Service, has proved remarkably successful in attracting applicants of very high class. In effect, these Fellowships are really short-term engagements at salaries about the same as those paid to the scientific officer class but not tied to a rigid age-scale i.e. a brilliant young candidate can be paid at the maximum Fellowship rate. They attract men who are quite glad to do three years in the Government Service before settling into their final career. In most cases their final career will be in the universities, but the Government Service will retain a useful proportion.

10. In most fields of scientific recruiting the market has now changed, not dramatically but perceptibly, more in favour of the buyer. The standard of applicants both for the scientific officer class and the Research Fellowships has shown signs of rising. There are further indications that this trend is continuing. The Commissioners are not dissatisfied with the present position, and believe that in the next five years they will be able to give Departments suitable candidates for a high proportion of their demands in all the scientific classes.

TABLE I
SCIENTIFIC CLASSES

Year	No. of vacancies (as notified by Depart- ments)	No. of applicants	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	No. certified
<i>Scientific officer class</i>					
1951 SSO	97	213	59		50
SO	398	860	235	294	179
1952 SSO	49	265	49		46
SO	218	851	141		122
Patent Office Examiners	50	317	26	216	17
				See notes	185
1953* SSO	50	282	28		27
SO	250	756	107		94
Patent Office Examiners	55	355	14	149	9
					130
<i>Experimental officer class</i>					
1950-51 AEO	851	2,545	690		629
1952 AEO	771	1,694	237		218
EO	339	962	101		95
Dual	—	235	—	338	—
	1,110	2,891		do.	313
1953* AEO	351	1,493	151		142
EO	190	783	61		60
Dual	—	196	—	222	—
	541	2,472			202
<i>Assistant (scientific) class</i>					
1951	1,081	1,042	483		453
1952	1,363	832	366	do.	349
1953*	1,019	669	171		166

* 1953 competitions not yet completed. Position given as at 31.12.1953. Candidatures not complete on that date:—

S.S.O. 45
 S.O. 44
 A.E.O./E.O. 308
 Assistant (Scientific) 189
 S.S.O. = Senior scientific officer
 A.E.O. = Assistant experimental officer

THE ENGINEERING, ARCHITECTURAL AND ALLIED PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL CLASSES (see Tables II-V below)

11. In these classes the Commissioners are dealing primarily with candidates who have completed some years of training and have obtained in some cases considerable industrial or professional experience. A proportion of the professionals already have well-paid jobs with commercial concerns. This field of recruitment therefore differs from most other fields of recruitment with which the Commissioners are concerned.

12. The general country-wide shortage of trained professional and technical personnel is well known. So far as civil service recruitment is concerned there is no shortage in the number of applicants, except in one or two highly specialized professions such as quantity surveyors. There is however a real shortage of quality in the scarce categories, though in some professions, e.g. architects and surveyors, there has been no difficulty in filling all vacancies with staff of adequate quality.

13. The Commissioners' experience suggests that not more than about 10 per cent. of the candidates for professional posts in the scarce categories are of really high quality, and for these the Civil Service is in keen competition with industry. Unfortunately in this small fraction there are many withdrawals at a late stage. There is no doubt that in such cases the industrial firms appreciate the candidate's value and are prepared to outbid the Civil Service. In this respect industry has the advantage of being able to assess starting pay according to their assessment of the quality of the recruit and of the salary needed to secure his services. In the civil service basic grade there is no discrimination between the man who is assessed at a high mark by the selection board and the borderline candidate who just scrapes through.

14. An additional deterrent is that, for a man already in a job, appointment to a civil service post normally involves the expense of removal and, for a first appointment in the Civil Service, no removal expenses are allowed.

15. The present system by which a new recruit tends to be permanently retained in the Ministry to which he is originally assigned does not make for equality of opportunity. For instance, external economic conditions can materially affect the technical progress and achievement of the professional men assigned to a particular Ministry. This may prove a deterrent to potential recruits, which might be lessened by the encouragement of interchange between Ministries.

16. The technical classes in their present form have only recently been set up. The Commissioners therefore have not had sufficient experience of recruitment to these classes on which to base any firm conclusions. There is at present no evidence to indicate that there is likely to be serious difficulty in meeting future departmental demands.

17. The experience we have gained in the draughtsmen competitions (other than cartographic) indicates that our advertisements draw very few candidates from the outside market. Each of the employing Departments has a considerable temporary fringe of draughtsmen and almost all the applicants to our "open competitions" have come from this source. The quality of these candidates is not particularly high. Of the "mechanical" and "electrical" and the "architectural" and "civil" who are accepted, about 80 per cent. are passable and only 20 per cent. are really good. It would not appear that the civil service rates of pay are much at variance with those offered by industrial concerns, though the latter pay somewhat better rates in the early years. The most important attraction other than pay is certainly accommodation. It has been noted that the new concerns such as the atomic energy establishments, where houses have been made available, little difficulty is experienced in securing older staff though the younger unmarried men are less willing to accept the appointments. For obvious reasons candidates with family commitments are very reluctant to take up first appointments which involve a move unless new accommodation is available. The tendency is for a man to secure temporary employment at an establishment near his present address and at a later date to enter a competition for an established post, in anticipation that he will be able to stay in the establishment. This gets over the initial expense of moving to take up the appointment and any subsequent move is paid for out of public funds.

18. The following Tables for these classes are necessarily more complicated, owing to the great diversity of posts covered, than the other Tables in this memorandum. Moreover in these classes post-war "reconstruction" recruitment (i.e. recruitment to fill the vacancies which accrued during the war) was belated owing to difficulties over the settling of pay, grades etc., and overlaps into the period of normal recruitment with which the rest of this memorandum is concerned.

TABLE II
WORKS GROUP (INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS)

Year and competition	No. of vacancies	No. of applications	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1951					
Works group	219	934	255*	—	219
Professional engineers ...	166	1,153	137	—	130
	385	2,087	392	—	349
1952 NIL					
1953 (Position as on 31.12.53)					
Architects	13	195	14	—	16 { 13
Maintenance surveyors	4		5	5	
Lands officers	27	313	27	13	24†
Estate surveyors ...	7		7	19	
Quantity surveyors ...	77	113	52	—	41‡
Civil and structural engineers	110	365	97	Competition not completed	77§
Professional engineers ...	180	1,667	125		93¶
	418	2,653	327		251

* Of whom 36 declined.

† 10 cases proceeding.

‡ 11

§ 20

¶ 32

TABLE III
TECHNICAL GRADES LIMITED COMPETITIONS

Year and competition	No. of vacancies	No. of applications	No. declared successful	No. surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1951 NORMAL					
<i>Min. of Agric. and Fish.</i>					
Clerks of works ...	28	11	8	—	7
Lands assistants ...	63	35	26	—	23
<i>Prison Commission</i>					
Supervisors of works	4	4	4	—	4
<i>Min. of Civil Aviation</i>					
Special telecommuni- cations officers ...	Not more than 35	32	19	—	19
Normal telecommuni- cations officers ...	Not less than 10	19	15	—	15
<i>War Office</i>					
Clerks of works (estates)	8	23	8	3 (res.)	8
	148	124	80	3	76

Year and competition	No. of vacancies	No. of applications	No. declared successful	No. surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1951 RECONSTRUCTION					
<i>Admiralty</i>					
Production inspectors	12	12	9		9
Supervisors A/C repair	50	31	10		9
	62	43	19		18
1952 NORMAL					
<i>Crown Lands</i>					
Surveying assistants...	3	3	3		3
<i>Home Office</i>					
Mechanical engineering (supply and transport branch) ...	6	7	3		3
<i>D.S.I.R.</i>					
Engineering	4	5	1		1
Works	13	35	9		9
	26	50	16		16
1952 RECONSTRUCTION					
<i>Ministry of Works</i> ...					
Maintenance surveyors assistants III and IV	649	1,191	648		621
Time and materials assistants IV ...					
Supplies division III					
Mech. and elec. eng. III and IV					
Sanitary officers III ...					
Quantity surveyors assistants III and IV					
Land surveyors assistants III					
Estate surveyors assistants III					
Foreman (bldgs.) III					
Clerk of works (bldgs.) III					
Artist craftsmen III ...					
Civil eng. inspectors III					
<i>Ministry of Supply</i>					
Engineering technicians (reclassified) ...	220	172	129		126
	869	1,363	777		747

Year and competition	No. of vacancies	No. of applications	No. declared successful	No. surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1953 NORMAL					
<i>Min. of Transport and Civil Aviation</i>					
Telecommunications tech. officers ...	Not less than 46	100	50	4 (res.)	
<i>Ministry of Works</i>					
Fire officers ...	at least 4	19	4	2 (res.)	
Estate surv. assts. I ...	104	194	88 to date (Boards still being held)		
Quantity surv. assts. I ...					
Architects' assts. I ...					
Maintenance surv. I ...					
Sanitary officers I ...					
Mech. and elec. eng. I					
Tech. costs officers ...	2	3	2		
<i>Admiralty</i>					
Quantity surv. assts....	16	16	15		
	172	332	159	6	
1953 RECONSTRUCTION					
<i>Admiralty</i>					
Tech. assts. motor transport III ...	14	10	7	—	7
<i>Air Ministry</i>					
Clerks of works (bldgs.)	13	87	Boards still being held	—	—
Quantity surv. assts....	21	29	20	—	—
Station engineers ...	32	77	Boards still being held	—	—
<i>War Office</i>					
Clerk of works (construction) ...	215 Approx.	No forms received by C.S.C. to date			
Clerk of works M. & E.	130 Approx.				
Quantity surv. assts....	13 Approx.				
Civilian W/S ...	4				
Civilian assessors ...	4				

TABLE IV
TECHNICAL GRADES OPEN COMPETITIONS

Year and competition	No. of vacancies	No. of applications	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1951 <i>Min. Agric. and Fish.</i> Land service assistants.	50	327	53 (including 3 from reserves)	—	51
Clerks of works ...	19	232	19	—	15
<i>Min. of Fuel and Power</i> Fuel engineering assistants ...	11	63	11	1	17
<i>Min. of Trans.</i> Tech. assistants ...	7		7		
<i>Min. of Civil Aviation</i> Telecommunications tech. officers ...	5	79	6	7	6
	92	701	97	8	89
1952 NIL					
1953 (Position as on 31.12.1953) <i>Min. of Trans. and Civil Aviation</i> Telecommunications tech. officers ...	17	60	15	—	

TABLE V
DRAUGHTSMEN

Year and competition	No. of vacancies	No. of applications	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1951 Architectural and civil engineers ... Mech. and elec. eng. draughtsmen ...	829	988	407	—	384
1952 Architectural and civil engineers draughtsmen ... Mech. and elec. eng. draughtsmen ... Cartographical draughtsmen ...	118 } 216 98 }	824	49 } 124 75 }	—	102
	137		124		
	353	1,510	248	—	203
1953 (Position as on 31.12.1953) Cartographical draughtsmen ...	78	274	78	—	

POST OFFICE ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC GRADES—OPEN COMPETITION

19. Engineers in the Post Office engineering department have for many years been recruited by open competition at two levels:

Executive engineers (formerly probationary assistant engineer) at university honours degree standard.

Assistant engineers (formerly probationary inspector) at Advanced General Certificate of Education standard.

20. Recruitment to the grade of telecommunications traffic superintendent (formerly assistant traffic superintendent) is also at Advanced General Certificate of Education standard.

21. The Tables compare the figures in the years 1936-8 with figures for the post-war years in which comparable competitions have been held. It will be seen that before the war there was generally an appreciable surplus of acceptable candidates for the engineering posts, whereas since the war the Civil Service Commission has failed to fill anything like all the vacancies in every case, except that in 1953 the Commission filled nearly all the executive engineer posts.

22. These competitions are on traditional lines, i.e. they are not part of the system of "continuous competition".

EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (NAMED PROBATIONARY ASSISTANT ENGINEER IN 1936-8)

Year	No. of vacancies	No. of applicants	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1936 ...	20	178	25	12	25
1937 ...	15	180	18	—	16
1938 ...	18	165	19	5	18
1951-2 ...	53	*	11	—	8
1953 ...	16	*	16	—	14

* This recruitment was merged with the competition for mechanical and electrical engineers, and the number of candidates applying for the Post Office posts is not known.

ASSISTANT ENGINEER (NAMED PROBATIONARY INSPECTOR IN 1936-8)

Year	No. of vacancies	No. of applicants	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1936 ...	60	416	89	21	87
1937 ...	99	306	104	5	103
1938 ...	94	555	95	37	89
1951† ...	36	83	15	—	15
1952† ...	32	82	11	—	11

TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC SUPERINTENDENT
(NAMED ASSISTANT TRAFFIC SUPERINTENDENT UNTIL DECEMBER, 1953)

Year	No. of vacancies	No. of applicants	No. declared successful	No. of surplus acceptable candidates	No. certificated
1936 ...	31	241	59	—	54
1937 ...	25	232	31	—	28
1938 ...	21	246	43	—	38
1951† ...	50	67	10	—	8
1952 ...	50	70	18	—	18

† In 1950 a single competition was held for assistant engineer and assistant traffic superintendent, and candidates could enter for either or both situations. No useful comparison can therefore be made in this case; only 23 out of a total of 91 vacancies were filled.

Examination of Witnesses

MR. A. P. SINKER, C.B., *First Commissioner*

DR. C. P. SNOW, C.B.E.

MAJOR A. T. SUMNER, C.B.E., M.C. } *Commissioners*

MR. J. W. A. CHORLEY, *Senior Assistant Director of Examinations*

on behalf of the Civil Service Commission

Called and examined

482. *Chairman*: I have one general question to ask first. You say that it is not possible to make useful comparisons between pre-war and post-war. There is not much pre-war material available, but there seems enough to make at any rate some rough comparisons. Could not that be useful?—*Mr. Sinker*: Yes, but I do not think the Commissioners can draw them because we did not take sufficient part in this kind of recruitment to be able to give valid opinions. Perhaps my colleagues might give their views.—*Dr. Snow*: As Commissioners I think we cannot give any valid opinion. As interested persons we can say we have moved in subjects like physics from an extreme buyers' market into an extreme sellers' market.

483. My impression was—and I think it is shared by other Commissioners—that physicists are not so much in short supply as chemists and chemical engineers. You say in the document that organic chemists are fairly easy. Our evidence in the universities was that chemists were in shorter supply than physicists.—That is totally unlike our experience. Last year we had at least one hundred chemical applicants for

scientific officer positions with first class honours, excellent research experience and personality, but we could not find jobs for them; with physicists the position is reversed.

484. Is that partly because of the specialisation of physics in universities?—The physicists we want are largely electronic physicists and certain kinds of classical physicists, and some of the physicists coming from universities are not very useful in either of those capacities. Nevertheless, to be fair, any physicist of first or even second class honours ability who has any sort of aptitude for research we can take in.

485. My evidence is based on Commissions of Inquiry where we were told that we were not to increase our recruitment of physicists but that of chemists and chemical engineers.—The position has altered markedly since 1950. I sit on a sub-committee of the Advisory Council for Scientific Policy, and last autumn made particular representations that the prevalent impression that physicists are not required as much as they used to be should be contradicted as sharply as possible.

486. *Mr. Menzler*: May it not be that the demand for physicists has been much greater than for chemists owing to the advent of atomic research establishments?—I think that is part of the story but not all. They want special kinds of physicists, but they also want special kinds of analytical and inorganic chemists.

487. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In paragraph 4 of your document you tell us that under the continuous competition system a candidate can be told the result fairly soon after the interview. Can you tell us how long this "fairly soon" means, and do you think that that particular device is an aid to recruitment?—About four to eight weeks after interview, and we have done very much better since we adopted this method.

488. Why then do you appear to contemplate towards the end of paragraph 4 the likelihood of the Commissioners having to consider whether a return to the more normal system of competition should be made?—*Mr. Sinker*: If we were private employers we should adopt the principle of first come first served, but it has been regarded for nearly a century as an essential part of the British Civil Service that it should be freely open to all qualified candidates and, if there are more qualified candidates than posts, the best candidates should get the posts. If Parliament were to tell us they did not want open competition and were more interested in getting things done quickly, of course the Commissioners could do without it, but, until Parliament tells us, we must continue to hold open competitions whenever the qualified candidates exceed the number of vacancies.

489. *Mr. Cash*: Can you give any idea of the number of open competitions that you would aim at?—*Dr. Snow*: It would have to be a minimum of two a year and more likely three. May I give one example to show what is in our mind? At the moment we can find a job for any competent physicist who comes along, so the continuous competition is perfectly fair. But with biologists we have perhaps fifteen jobs through the whole Service and hundreds of applicants. Therefore you have got to find a method which does justice, if justice is to be the first consideration.

490. *Mrs. Wootton*: When you have these occasional competitions is there a long delay between the competition and the result?—It would depend entirely on the luck of the draw whether you came in the first part of the competition or right at the end. Imagine the thing took two months to run, and we had a number of interviews spread over two months. If you came to the first there would be two months delay plus the delays of choosing the successful ones, and it might be as long as four months. For people at the end it would be only two.—*Mr. Sinker*: The vital period

is between the closing date of the applications and the announcement of the results, and I should have thought in a scientific officer competition conducted by the normal method of open competition, the delay would probably be about two months between the closing date for applications and the announcement of the results.

491. *Chairman*: Do you reckon on the Dominions as a source?—There are always some applicants.

492. You make a reference to the age pay for open competition recruits being on a more generous scale. I presume that refers to the facts that you can take account of approved post-graduate experience, and that you can make an appointment, if necessary, to a higher grade, because for scientific officers there is not any real age pay?—*Dr. Snow*: There is both age pay and approved experience.

493. Age pay for scientific assistants and assistant experimental officers, but is there any age pay for scientific officers?—No, that is approved experience.

494. And also I suppose the fact that, as in a university, you are quite likely to make an appointment to senior scientific officer, or even higher, if you get an exceptional man?—Yes, we run the two competitions concurrently, the scientific officer and senior scientific officer, and a number of men are candidates for both. We have to judge whether the man is good enough to be put in at 26 to the senior scientific officer grade. We have also got a special arrangement for quite exceptional men. We are prepared to put them in as senior scientific officers at 24.

495. *Mr. Menzler*: Does not that depend on the complement or is there elasticity between S.O. and S.S.O.?—There is elasticity.

496. Departments have a certain play between S.O. and S.S.O.?—I think that is a question which should be put to the Treasury or Departments.

497. May the answer to my point be that you have a large number of vacancies you have not been able to fill; therefore you have had elasticity in finding places for really super-men?—All I can say is that we have had no difficulty in finding suitable jobs for them.

498. There seem to be overriding limits on an age basis to the salaries you can pay to scientific officers on entry. Is not this unduly restrictive? Knowing the market as you do, would you say a really able man would demand more than £700 at the age of 27?—I think the answer is that—if he is really able—he would not be coming in as a scientific officer, but as a senior scientific officer and would therefore be paid more. *Chairman*: That would certainly be the answer in a university.

499. *Sir George Mowbray*: The super-man of 27 coming into the S.S.O. grade may start above the minimum?—Yes.

500. He can be fitted in anywhere?—He is given pay for each year above the age at which he could have qualified for S.S.O. If he is a super-man who could have become an S.S.O. at 24, he would have three increments above the minimum.

501. *Sir Alexander Gray*: May I ask what the super-man of 27 has been doing before he reached the age of 27? Has he been in a university?—Normally in a university.

502. Any from business?—Yes, quite a number.

503. *Mr. Hall*: I would like to go to paragraph 6 where there are references to settling a standard of quality for admission to the S.O. and E.O. classes which was higher in 1952 as compared with the difficult post-war period. Could we have more indication as to what factors are taken into account in settling this standard of quality?—Scientific work in the Government Service can take in a whole range of ability—the individual research worker, the person who has some capacity for research but who is better at administering a small group, or even someone who is not in the strict sense a scientist at all, but has a gift for making the wheels go round in technical administration. Any of those we need, and we have now acquired sufficient experience by what you might call case law to know roughly the sort of real qualifications a man needs to be of use in such capacities. Someone with a first class or second class honours degree can be completely hopeless in all those jobs, and we have some sort of vague criteria, based entirely on case law, of the sort of people who are paper qualified but are no good, and the sort of people who do in fact make good.

504. *Mr. Cash*: Do the Commissioners have any opportunity of watching careers subsequently to discover whether the criteria work out in practice?—*Mr. Sinker*: If I may answer that as a general question first, it is a thing we are doing on a fairly elaborate scale for the general classes of the Service, particularly the administrative class, but it will be a good many years before we think the results are valid, because we are trying to look a long way ahead. Perhaps *Dr. Snow* will speak for the scientific classes. *Dr. Snow*: We have no serious statistical follow-up yet.

505. It is being built up over the years?—Yes.

506. And in the next ten years or so you will have some valuable check on what has been done?—At the moment we can only do it on a personal basis by going to Harwell or the Telecommunications Research Establishment and seeing how people of five years ago are getting on.

507. *Mr. Menzler*: It is said in paragraph 5 of your document that the educational levels of recruitment to the scientific, experimental and assistant (scientific) classes are in general comparable with those of the administrative, executive and clerical classes respectively. Lower down you say that one-third of the open competition entrants to the assistant experimental officer and experimental officer grades have degrees. Does not that suggest they represent a rather higher educational calibre than the executive class?—*Mr. Sinker*: It is difficult to generalise because the executive class covers such a very wide range of educational background and general ability. And the experimental officer class is itself still rather experimental as a general service class. It has only recently been invented, but the answer to your question is contained in paragraph 5, and I do not think there is anything we can add to it.

508. If one-third of the entrants on the open competition to the experimental officer class have degrees and only 5 per cent. in the case of the executive class, it would argue that they were a superior type educationally.—I have no comment.

509. *Chairman*: There is no equivalent of the executive "bulge" in the surplus of acceptable candidates?—No.

510. *Mr. Menzler*: Is it not an important recruiting factor to have a career open to a man? If you look at the Tables given in the Factual Memorandum there is an avenue of promotion from the executive class to a large number of higher posts, possibly even in the administrative class. Is there an analogous series of openings for the experimental officer?—On career prospects we cannot tell you more than you have already got here. As to their effects on recruitment I have already said that in the executive class in my opinion the career prospects exercise a considerable attraction.

511. People of the same educational calibre who happen to go in on the scientific side have not such good prospects. I would have expected that it is much easier to pass from experimental officer to scientific officer than from scientific assistant to experimental officer.—*Dr. Snow*: That is true.

512. *Chairman*: The scientific assistants are really rather like laboratory assistants?—Yes, a large number enter for the experimental officer class and some get in, but it is a fairly small proportion.

513. But from the experimental officer class to the scientific officer class there ought to be a rather easier passage.—There is a genuine passage. At a very rough guess out of about 200 scientific officer appointments something like 20 of those people come from the experimental officer class.

514. *Mr. Menzler*: It is a much inferior career compared with that of the executive class. Again the openings

for the scientific assistant seem to me to be on a much more slender scale than for clerical officers. Is that not a deterrent to recruiting good people, seeing that the educational standards are similar?—I have not any strong views, or indeed knowledge, on the comparison, but I would have thought on the facts that it was likely that it would be so.

515. You might get inferior people because there are much better prospects on the clerical side?

516. *Chairman*: Does the assistant (scientific) class get the same opportunities of training as they do in the university, doing part-time work for a degree?—Yes, there is a great deal of encouragement for that.

517. That is the best way of overcoming this career difficulty, is it not?—Yes.

518. *Sir Alexander Gray*: It seems to me that we are comparing two incomparable things in a way. On the scientific side to get to the top you require very specific and specialised qualifications, whereas in administration you only want commonsense or something like that. That takes you a long way.

519. *Mrs. Wootton*: In paragraph 6, I wonder if you could elaborate the distinction which you make between real vacancies and other vacancies?—The answer is this—and I am going to confine it to a rather smaller number than is really the case. Imagine you have a large establishment like the Telecommunications Research Establishment, which you can take as a model. It has at any time, say, 200 specific jobs which cannot be filled in the ordinary civil service way by just drafting 200 people of roughly the same standard. You need 200 people of whom perhaps 10 will be particular kinds of physicists, and so on. In filling those jobs at any time there are two distinct processes going on. The first is our machine grinding away year after year interviewing people in London. At the same time the establishment itself is trying to fill as many of those jobs as it can. They will do that by going round universities, as we do ourselves, and making contacts with professors, getting people to go as unestablished civil servants after they have gone through a Ministry of Supply machine which works in parallel with ours. So that what appears as a vacancy of 200 to us may suddenly have gone down to 100 or even 50 if they have produced enough unestablished persons within a given period. Owing to slight changes in the market, and the enthusiasm of the Ministry of Supply "travelling circus", they have been increasingly successful at getting people to go in. From the point of view of the jobs, it does not matter whether they come through us or through them. From the point of view of the man there are certain risks.

520. *Chairman*: Do a lot of them afterwards get established?—Yes, but it is a question you should pursue with Departments.

521. *Mr. Hall*: Having regard to the large number who come in as temporaries and eventually get established, have the Commission any views on whether it might be better to select for established posts only those who have served in temporary posts?—*Mr. Sinker*: We are doing our best to get the best of both worlds. There are advantages in both central and departmental recruitment. But I should hesitate to say it would be right to go to one extreme or the other.—*Dr. Snow*: I think with many kinds of position Mr. Hall's suggestion is right, that you can only tell that the man is going to be useful when you have seen him doing the job, but on the other hand there are certain kinds of position, particularly of the more theoretical sort, where you can judge the man on sight and academic record, and where he would be seriously deterred if he had to start as a temporary. This method may seem loose and untidy, but it has worked well.

522. *Mrs. Wootton*: Is it possible for you to keep up-to-date with what Departments are doing on temporary recruitment?—*Mr. Sinker*: The practical difficulty is not as great as it appears; the difficulty occurs when a Royal Commission is set up which wants precise figures!

523. *Sir George Mowbray*: Does the working of the double system in fact result in jobs being offered twice?—*Dr. Snow*: No, but a January figure of 200 vacancies suddenly and mysteriously drops and jobs are crossed off the lists which are brought to our board meetings. Really we are in daily touch.

524. *Mr. Cash*: You are providing another hole in your open competition principle all the time?—*Mr. Sinker*: I do not think we mind that, so long as we are satisfied that there are not a lot of people trying to get into the established Service who find the jobs are filled before they apply.

525. *Sir Alexander Gray*: How many of the temporary people do you reject for establishment?—*Dr. Snow*: I should guess something like thirty per cent. in the scientific officer class.

526. *Mr. Hall*: Are there a number of cases where Departments find temporary officers satisfactory, wish to retain them and have difficulty in retaining them?—*Mr. Sinker*: I think Departments must answer that.

527. *Mrs. Wootton*: I have a question on paragraph 6 and on your Tables. It does appear that you get a very large number of applicants in relation to the number declared successful. I wonder if

you could tell us whether something is causing inappropriate people to apply?—*Dr. Snow*: I should have thought there was a large number of totally unsuitable applicants for all the civil service positions with which I am familiar. We have great masses of people for instance who have just got the bare qualifications, that is a second class honours degree (and in a scientific subject which is often one which we have almost no vacancies for), and absolutely nothing else to recommend them. Our propaganda visits to universities tend to inflate this tail rather out of proportion to the number of good candidates we attract.

528. Is there something wrong with the propaganda, because they do not apply for university jobs in nearly the same proportion?—*Mr. Sinker*: Is it not the case that an undergraduate being at a university looks round the university teachers and sees the kind of chaps they are and knows he has not got a good first or second, and therefore does not apply? He thinks perhaps the Civil Service set their sights less high.

529. *Chairman*: In paragraph 7 there is a reference to the tendency of the higher quality scientists to remain at universities. I take it the scientist does that in spite of the fact that the initial reward in salary in the Civil Service compares quite reasonably with what he would get in the university? It is the other things which cause him to stay?—*Dr. Snow*: Yes.

530. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Could we ask the witness to expand that? The advantages of the university, if there are any, are another way of saying the disadvantages of the Civil Service.—I think it is that the whole spirit of science produces a climate in which the first class man really feels that the much greater rewards of science are going to come in doing fundamental research.

531. *Chairman*: Is the secrecy deterrent very significant now? There have been negotiations with the universities about the use of secret work for doctorates. I suppose to some extent that will have modified the situation?—Yes. What we meant to imply here was that a number of the best men would object to secret work at all, either at the universities or outside, them.

532. Is not that also a handicap to industry?—A great handicap, yes.

533. So that industry and the Civil Service are on all fours regarding that?—Yes.

534. But the universities have a marked advantage?—Yes. I should say, as we have said here, it is not such a deterrent as it would have been 20 years ago, because the fashion of thought, owing to the world we are living in, has changed a good deal, but it is still real.

535. You refer to Research Fellowships in paragraph 9; how many are there?—We are appointing something like 30 a year. We expect to be able to keep that sort of number, say 50 as an upper limit.

536. That has been a really successful supplement to recruitment?—It has astonished us by how successful it was.

537. *Mrs. Wootton*: How long has it been going?—It was started first by private enterprise, at Harwell and T.R.E., and that showed signs of being attractive, so we thought of applying it to the whole Service, and last year was the first full year of operation.

538. So the observation you make in the last sentence of paragraph 9, that the Government Service will retain a useful proportion, must at this stage be a hope?—Not quite, because we have seen it in operation at Harwell for about four to five years, and we have already retained a proportion of those, perhaps about forty per cent.

539. *Sir George Mowbray*: That Research Fellowship system, as you said, has been remarkably successful in attracting applicants of very high class. Does it attract what you refer to a few lines earlier as the exceptional candidate? Are those meant to be synonymous?—Yes.

540. I was not sure it was meeting that particular need, the exceptional case?—Yesterday, we saw and appointed a candidate who would be an almost certain starter for a Research Fellowship at a Cambridge College.

541. *Mr. Hall*: Is there an age bracket for this?—Yes, a very wide bracket, and we have the advantage that we can pay the really good man the top level of this at any age. We can pay a man of 23 or 24 £800.

542. *Chairman*: Do you take people in at any age?—We have junior Fellowships and senior Fellowships, for which there are no age limits.

543. Could you tell us why you think recruitment will be easier in the next five years?—Yes, it is because of applications which are already flowing in for 1954, and the standard of the people we have already actually seen in the Fellowship competition and in other applicants for that competition. We are seeing signs of a very much higher standard than we had three years ago.

544. Is that partly due to improved conditions in service pay and status, or is the supply getting better?—I think partly the first but—this is my opinion as a private citizen—I think the state of the market is much more important than anything you do by improved conditions.—*Mr. Sinker*: The supply of scientists is now coming more in keeping with the demand.

545. I take it you are satisfied that you are not losing much by restricting recruitment for the scientific officer class to first or second class honours?—*Dr. Snow*: We have always interpreted that with the greatest liberality. In fact we would always look at anyone who has not those qualifications but who shows any aptitude for research.

546. You take account of post-graduate experience?—Yes.

547. Of course there is the other avenue, through the experimental officer class?—Yes, and it is very useful.

548. Could we pass to the professional and technical classes now. I believe Mr. Menzler wanted to ask a question on them.

549. *Mr. Menzler*: Do you insist on people having the recognised professional qualifications in all cases?—*Major Sumner*: In the basic grade we insist that they shall have the Higher National Certificate, but not the full qualification. We say in the regulations that the candidate has got to acquire associate membership within the probationary period. In addition to that in some Departments we have an exceptional clause so that we can consider somebody who has not got the qualifications at all.

550. *Chairman*: Looking at the engineers, are the 90 per cent. who are not accepted all qualified engineers?—They all have the qualification of the Professional Engineering Institution.

551. What proportion of candidates are university men?—Not more than about 10 per cent.

552. So 90 per cent. of the people do not come through the universities at all?—Yes, something of that order. They have all gone through the technical colleges to Higher National Certificate. It does not necessarily follow that the university graduates are better than the others; we get quite a number of university graduates who are rejected.

553. These students who have taken Higher National, has it been part-time or whole-time?—Usually part-time.

554. We found during the war that the people who survived part-time tuition, did their apprenticeship and also got Higher National Certificate were pretty good material. It is difficult to understand such a large proportion of them not qualifying. —We do not interview all these candidates. We have the powers, and we exercise them, to sift out quite a number, on paper, perhaps 60 or 70 per cent.

555. I should have thought you might be missing something with these part-time National Certificate people. I interviewed very large numbers of them during the war in connection with industrial bursaries at

the university and they were very high quality. We thought they were better than a good many of the people we were getting at the university.—I have no doubt we do miss a few. It is impossible to interview such very large numbers.

556. *Mr. Menzler*: To what extent do you have consultations with staff associations on the improvement of standards and so on?—That rests entirely with the Department.

557. *Chairman*: You refer to "scarce categories", what are the scarce categories?—Quantity surveyors and high grade electrical engineers. Civil engineers were also in the scarce category until recently.

558. *Mr. Menzler*: What about naval constructors?—*Dr. Snow*: We have not got the figures.

559. Could we ask about the starting rates and career prospects in the professional and technical field?—*Major Sumner*: So far as our information goes on the recruitment position, the starting rates seem to be quite acceptable. The career prospects seem to vary a great deal in different Departments.

560. *Chairman*: On the outbidding by industrial firms, I take it that they would do so for the exceptional people in any case.—There seems to be a good deal of evidence that people use our competitions with a view to increasing their own prospects in the firms they are employed by.

561. That is not unknown in the university world.—*Mr. Sinker*: It is unknown in the Civil Service!

562. Do you consider you are getting a fair share of these candidates?—It is a very difficult question for us to answer, and if I may be bold enough to say so, it does seem to me a problem which is proper for a Royal Commission because we are naturally interested parties. At the same time we act for the Government and the Government must clearly be interested in a proper spread of the talents in particular fields of activity over the country as a whole. I do not know whether Major Sumner has any views in his own field? *Major Sumner*: I do not think we are getting a very fair chance in the mechanical and electrical engineering field, but we are in other categories.

563. I was surprised by the shortage of civil engineers because my experience at Birmingham was that we always had as many candidates as the school could get in.—Recruitment has changed within the last 12 months and the vacancies have been filled. But as to mechanical and electrical engineers we have a very large number of applicants from temporary people in Government employ; the number of outside candidates is very small, and the quality is rather

poor.—*Mr. Sinker*: We ought to add that so far as we are aware the work is being done by temporary staff, and that the real shortage is one of quality and not of quantity. Whether the quality exists in the country in sufficient quantity to fill all the posts available in the Civil Service and in industry of course we do not know, but it may be that industry also is conscious of a fairly high proportion of people who are doing the work but are not quite as good as the employers would like them to be.

564. I think the universities were told about three years ago that we ought not to expand our mechanical and electrical engineering side and that the shortage was only temporary.—*Dr. Snow*: That is dangerously untrue. I think there is no doubt what I said about physicists applies to almost the same extent to mechanical and to electrical engineers. I think they would be generally regarded as the three acutest shortages in the country.

565. Do you use the City and Guilds Engineering Certificates as well as the Higher National Certificate?—*Major Sumner*: Yes.

566. *Mr. Menzler*: There is a point I would like to put on liability to posting abroad. The Gardiner Report on the organisation, structure and remuneration of the works group of professional civil servants has a passage I will quote for the record:—

“It is the practice in industry to grant a man so situated an increase in emoluments which not only covers any increase in living and other family expenses but also includes a substantial solatium because of the fact of expatriation. This seems to us clearly just and we recommend that the relative Civil Service Regulations be amended so as to compensate a man for having to work abroad, and that the compensation continue for so long as he has so to work.”

Do you agree that the absence of such compensation is a deterrent in recruitment?—We have extreme difficulty in persuading satisfactory recruits to go to the Departments where this applies, the Air Ministry particularly. They do not specifically tell us it is because of the money.

567. *Chairman*: Do you get any Australian engineers?—Very few indeed.

568. I should have thought that might have been a possibility. A majority of university-trained engineers in Australia seem to go into Government Service.—As far as I am aware we have had practically no recruits either from Australia or New Zealand.

569. *Sir George Mowbray*: In paragraph 13 the Commission point out that industry has the advantage of being able to assess starting pay according to quality and that the Civil Service are debarred from doing so. Is that bar a very serious deterrent to the Civil Service getting the best type?—I think it is.

570. It raises a big issue.—There is no doubt that, as we have said later in this paragraph, we cannot differentiate between the good candidate, the really first-class candidate, and the man who just scrapes through as being satisfactory. It is the really first-class candidate we should like to get from industry from time to time, and those are the candidates to a large extent who decline our appointments.

571. *Mr. Menzler*: Would there not be scope for extending the practice of the scientific side of special credit being given for experience? Would not that be helpful to recruitment?—Yes.

572. *Chairman*: Do you make appointments to above-basic grades fairly frequently?—We have to do it by special competitions, and there we have powers we often use to recommend that candidates should come in above the minimum all the way up the scale. We have no powers at all in the basic grade where they come in on age pay.

573. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Could I ask a question on Table II? In 1951 I see that of the 255 works group who were declared successful 36 declined appointments. Can you say why?—Many of these people were already temporaries, and in many cases in the main grade, or even above that. Since the competition was for the basic grade, many of these temporaries rejected appointments.

574. Do you find the presence of an age scale to 34 an aid to recruitment in the basic grade?—Yes.

575. If the age scale were extended would the aid to recruitment be enhanced?—That is very doubtful. The really good man we want to get is somewhere between the ages of 30 and 34 and if we went up to 36 and 38 men of the quality at that age should really be coming into the main grade.

576. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Is the information about above basic grades put into the advertisements?—Yes.

577. *Chairman*: You stated in paragraph 17 that 80 per cent. of the successful draughtsmen candidates are only passable. Does this reflect a nation-wide shortage?—*Mr. Sinker*: We are told by the Ministry of Labour that at the relevant

dates the apparent shortage outside was somewhat greater than the shortage inside the Service.

578. It is not the sort of thing one could remedy by improving pay and conditions of service?—*Major Summer*: Unless of course you can persuade a rather different

class of people to become draughtsmen and that you may be able to do by increasing the rates. It is a problematical answer.

Chairman: May I say thank you, Mr. Sinker, and to your colleagues for the assistance which you have given us both in your written statements and oral evidence.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)



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ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

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ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

FOURTH and FIFTH DAYS

*Thursday, 25th March, 1954,
afternoon session only,
and Friday, 26th March, 1954*

Civil Service Alliance and
Civil Service Union witnesses

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1954

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List of Witnesses

FOURTH DAY (afternoon session) and FIFTH DAY (morning session)

MR. L. C. WHITE, *General Secretary, Civil Service
Clerical Association*

MR. G. F. GREEN, *Deputy General Secretary, Civil
Service Clerical Association*

*MR. A. N. L. D. HOUGHTON, M.P., *General Secretary,
Inland Revenue Staff Federation*

MR. C. T. H. PLANT, *Deputy Secretary, Inland Revenue
Staff Federation*

MR. E. M. THOMAS, *General Secretary, Ministry of
Labour Staff Association*

MR. E. E. SLACK, *Executive Committee, County Court
Officers Association*
on behalf of the Civil Service Alliance

FIFTH DAY (afternoon session)

MR. L. H. MOODY, *Assistant Secretary*

MISS K. L. EDWARDS, *Assistant Secretary*
on behalf of the Civil Service Union

Mr. Houghton was in attendance on the fourth
day only.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

FOURTH DAY

(afternoon session only)

Thursday, 25th March, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum on Pay submitted by the Civil Service Alliance

I. REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OF CIVIL SERVICE ALLIANCE

1. The Civil Service Alliance comprise the Civil Service Clerical Association, the County Court Officers Association, the Inland Revenue Staff Federation and the Ministry of Labour Staff Association. They represent a total membership of approximately 200,000.

2. The Civil Service Alliance are officially recognised directly as the negotiating body for clerical assistants, typing grades, machine operating grades and temporary clerks. Through their affiliated organisations, the Alliance are also recognised for clerical officers of the general service and departmental clerical classes. The latter include tax officers in the Inland Revenue Department and grade 6 officers in the Ministry of Labour and National Service. The general clerical class includes the higher clerical officer grade for which the Civil Service Clerical Association, a constituent of the Civil Service Alliance, share recognition with the Society of Civil Servants. Separate representation will be made by the Civil Service Clerical Association on their account.

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING PAY SCALES FOR THE CLERICAL AND ANALOGOUS CLASSES

3. The MacDonnell Commission recorded that it was an accepted principle with all parties that the Government should be a "model employer". The Anderson Committee, in their Report dated 25th July, 1923, recognised that, however desirable this might be as a doctrine, the stresses within the economy made it impracticable to apply. In their view, the employer should pay what is necessary to recruit and to retain an efficient staff.

4. The Royal Commission on the Civil Service (1929-1931) recommended, in paragraph 308 of their Report, that in effecting comparisons the State should take a long view:

"Civil Service remuneration should reflect what may be described as the long term trend, both in wage levels and in the economic condition of the country. We regard it as undesirable that the conditions of service of civil servants when under review should be related too closely to factors of a temporary or passing character."

5. The Civil Service Alliance agree that the concept of the Government as a model employer, in the sense that it should be ahead of every other employer, cannot be sustained within the framework of the existing economy where wages and salaries are influenced, if not determined, by fluctuations of profits. The fixing by the Government of remuneration for their employees in excess of the general level outside would create of civil servants a privileged class and this would be out of tune with the times.

6. Experience has shown, however, that the "Tomlin formula", as the recommendation of the Royal Commission of 1929-31 became known, lacked precision and can no longer be regarded as an acceptable guide.

7. The phrase "long term trend" is imprecise. Comparisons with workers outside the Civil Service are invalidated when, as in the case of the clerical grades, the available material with which comparisons have to be made is exiguous and misleading. In certain spheres of outside clerical employment the rates of pay are themselves fixed by reference to civil service scales, the Government being the largest single employer of clerical labour in the country. Thus the rates operating in the Civil Service regulate outside rates, and, in turn, are invoked by the Government to justify civil service rates. Comparisons of rates of pay may also be quite misleading unless the undertakings with which the comparisons are made operate similar grading arrangements. The "economic condition of the country" mentioned in the formula is not, as might be inferred, something which negotiators and arbitrators accept as factual. In recent years, particularly, it has tended to become a matter of opinion, often party political, as to what is the economic condition of the country at any time.

8. It is not necessary to elaborate at length on the difficulties involved in assessing whether a change in outside levels of remuneration is "long term". Must the change have persisted for a lengthy period before it is proved to be "long term"? And if this was intended, does the recommendation mean that the pay of civil servants must not only fall behind that of outside workers, but must remain behind for sufficiently long to prove the extent of the trend before the civil servant is entitled to any compensatory increase?

9. The requirement that the remuneration of civil servants should reflect the long term trend of outside wages would seem to imply that the trend outside provides an independent guide to what the Government should pay to their own employees in comparable occupations. This is not the case if, as the Treasury contend, comparisons of clerical rates of pay in the Civil Service must be made with those of clerical workers outside. The Government are the largest single employer of clerical labour in the country. Probably nowhere in outside clerical employment does negotiating and arbitration machinery exist to the same extent as among clerical workers in the Civil Service. The experience of the Alliance is that an important factor in outside negotiations affecting clerical workers is the prevailing pay situation of clerical staffs in the Civil Service. The major employers appears to be fully informed about those rates and are usually familiar with the reasons which have been advanced in negotiations or at arbitration for any improvements given to civil service clerical staffs. They tend to restrict any increases within the limits of changes in the Civil Service. In this situation the Treasury use the consequences of their own policy to justify their own policy. Thus the movements of outside pay rates of clerical workers do not provide the sort of independent guide which it could be inferred from the Tomlin formula was intended. Exceptions to this fairly general practice are certain banks whose rates of pay in recent years have increased to a greater extent than the rates of pay of clerks elsewhere. But comparisons with the banks produce another difficulty. It is disputed whether these scales of pay apply for comparable work. It has been suggested in official quarters that clerks in the "big five" banks, for example, have a salary scale which is related to a range of work comparable to some extent with that of both executive officers and the clerical officers in the Civil Service. Where a comparison with outside rates appears to put the Government's own rates for clerical work in an ungenerous light, the Treasury contend that there are differences in grading arrangements. This contention emphasises the unreliability of outside pay comparisons unless the grading arrangements are similar to those in the Civil Service. So far as the Alliance are aware, employers of clerical labour outside have not adopted the civil service pattern of grading to any considerable extent.

10. The rates of pay of any grade of civil servants cannot be determined without some attention being paid to internal relativities no matter what outside comparisons may purport to show. A clerical officer on promotion proceeds to the executive officer or to the higher clerical officer grade. He is selected for the performance of better quality work, and the scales of pay offered purport to reflect this fact. But if precise outside comparisons are to govern the fixation of pay in the Civil Service, internal relativities based upon the administrative needs of the Service will go awry unless the grading and pay arrangements at all levels of employment of office staffs outside happen conveniently to fit into the civil service pattern. If, for example, outside employers attach relatively greater value to their executive work than is done in the Civil Service and pay their executive staffs accordingly, a case would, on the Treasury's conception of the Tomlin formula, be established for improving executive scales in the Civil Service. But the resultant situation could involve a distortion of internal relativities notwithstanding the fact that no material change had occurred in the relative value of the work of executive officers and clerical officers in the Civil Service.

11. The Royal Commission on the Civil Service (1929-1931) recognised that there were limits to the use of outside comparisons. They specifically referred (in paragraph 308 of the Report) to the difficulty of making an effective comparison between executive work inside and outside the Civil Service.

12. The practice that has been adopted in recent years is for the pay claims of the clerical grades first to be settled by negotiation or arbitration, and, thereafter, for the Treasury to propose revised scales of pay for the executive grades based on changes made to the pay of the clerical grades. In 1953 the Treasury sought to follow this course but the terms of the proposed revision were rejected on behalf of the executive grades and the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal later made an award which gave more than the Treasury had offered. The effect was approximately to restore the relativities which existed between executive officers and clerical officers in 1951.

13. This procedure for revising scales of pay for various civil service grades, with which no reasonable outside comparisons can be made, reveals another defect in the Tomlin formula. In certain areas of the Service there has been no pretence of revising pay scales according to the long term trend of outside salary movements. The scales have been adjusted solely by reference to pay movements of other grades in the Civil Service. And there is considerable circumstantial evidence to suggest that the pay scales of those grades which have been used as the criteria have not always been reassessed on the basis of the Treasury's interpretation of the Tomlin formula. For example, the Alliance do not presume to speculate as to the criteria used by the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal in 1950 and 1953 to determine revised rates of pay for clerical officers. They suggest, however, that on neither of these occasions were the increases of pay awarded related to any substantial change in the rates of pay of outside clerical workers. Indeed, it was in relation to the relatively unchanged position of these outside rates that the Treasury opposed the claims.

14. The abandonment of the "Tomlin formula" would pose the question of what should take its place.

15. The Civil Service Alliance submit that it should be the Ministry of Labour's index of wages rates.

16. Since 1939 the earnings of manual workers have risen more rapidly and to a greater extent than those of non-manual workers. The wages of lower grades within each trade or occupation have, generally, shown a greater relative increase than those of higher grades. The view that employees are divided into two layers—manual and non-manual—with the non-manual on top, is no longer valid. There has developed a vertical structure in which non-manual and manual workers are to be found in similar income groups. The current emphasis on the importance of the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual worker in raising productivity and the need to offer higher rewards as an incentive for greater output is understandable. But it would be unjust if the contribution of the non-manual workers were underestimated in the process. A trained clerk is a skilled and essential worker. To the extent that he shares in production bonuses his actual basic rate

of pay ceases to be relevant for purposes of comparisons with the trained clerks employed in the public service for whom there are no production bonuses. The Civil Service Alliance claim that clerical officers in the Civil Service are also entitled to be regarded in their own right as skilled workers. Recruited, as they are, with a good educational background and, if they are late entrants, with a mature commercial or industrial experience, they perform a wide range of duties. Although those duties are governed by "clearly defined" instructions, it requires a nimble mind to grasp what are in many cases paraphrases of complex legislation.

17. In suggesting that the Ministry of Labour's index of wages rates should serve as a guide, the Alliance are conscious that it is not absolutely precise. But it serves as a barometer to show what is happening to wage rates within the income brackets into which civil service clerical rates can be slotted.

18. The wages index measures month by month pay movements of approximately 13 million workers. The Royal Commission will be familiar with the mechanism employed and will know that in the main the information on which the index is based relates to manual and not office workers. The reasons for the exclusion of office workers from the wages index is not a matter of primary importance to the case now being made. The important fact is that the wages range of the millions of workers whose position is covered by the index is approximately the same as that of clerical and sub-clerical staffs in the Civil Service. The highest paid workers whose wage movements come within the scope of the index are somewhat better remunerated than clerical officers at their maximum. The essential question is, therefore, whether an authoritative index of this sort, dealing with the wages movements of some 13 million workers and extending over a range similar to that covered by the scales of clerical and sub-clerical grades, provides a reasonable guide. It is certainly more valid as a guide than is a direct comparison with outside clerical workers, which the Treasury have advocated, for the added reason that the Government do not by their own wages policy as employer seriously influence the movement of the wages index itself. They are not the predominant employer in this much wider area of employment as they are in the more limited area of clerical employment.

19. In paragraph 344 of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (1929-1931) it was recognised that the cost of living would remain an important factor in the determination of remuneration. The paragraph adds that "due effect will, however, be given to this factor if Civil Service wages fluctuate in accordance with movements in general wage levels in outside industry, which in turn are affected by marked and permanent changes in price levels". It could be inferred from this comment that the alternatives as they appeared to present themselves to the Royal Commission were between basing civil service pay on some material change in the cost of living or on a change in general wage levels. Earlier, in paragraph 344, the Commission had rejected the cost of living as the direct criterion, but had recognised its relevance to the extent that cost of living changes affected wage levels. The reference in paragraph 344 to "General Wage levels in outside industry" can, therefore, be related to the purpose served by the wages index which is the only authoritative measure.

20. In 1951 the policy of H.M. Government accepted the validity of the wages index to determine revisions due in the pay of non-industrial civil servants. An agreement was reached on the Civil Service National Whitley Council for a pay addition from the 1st January, 1952, of 10 per cent. on the first £500 of remuneration; 5 per cent. in the range of salary of £500-£1,000 and 2½ per cent. for £1,000 to £1,500. In the discussions leading up to this agreement, the Official Side stated that no agreed settlement would have been possible had the Staff Side's claim been related directly to the cost of living. In the Government's view adjustments by reference to changes in the cost of living were highly undesirable in principle and contrary to the Tomlin formula. By implication the Government were admitting that pay revisions based on increases in the wages index accorded with Government policy. The increase of 10 per cent. was derived from the percentage movement of 9·65 in the wages index between 1st January, 1951, and November of that year. This figure was "rounded up" to take account of the further increase which it was known would occur by the 1st January, 1952, when the pay addition was to operate.

21. There was a difference of view between the Official and Staff Sides as to whether the 10 per cent. increase should operate unabated up to £1,500 per annum. The Official Side's contention was that the highest paid section of workers whose wage movements were reflected in the wages index earned no more than approximately £500 per annum at that time. The figure of £500 as at 1st January, 1952, now has to be increased because the outside workers concerned are still covered by the wages index but have had pay increases subsequently. The corresponding figure today of approximately £600 per annum justifies the contention of the Civil Service Alliance that for clerical officers and allied grades referred to in this document the wages index is an appropriate measurement of pay trends among outside workers whose general economic position is similar.

22. In a statement to editors of newspapers on 3rd January, 1952, in explanation of the National Whitley Council pay addition agreement, the Treasury commented as follows :—

“The settlement is based on general movements in wages over the last twelve months as shown by the Ministry of Labour's Wages Index which has risen from 114 at 31st December, 1950, to 125 at 30th November, 1951. Since there is no comparable index for salaries, the amounts for the higher grades have been scaled down by 50 per cent. on the second £500 and 75 per cent. on the third. The settlement is based on the principle of meeting essential needs only.

“The alternative to this central settlement would have been to deal separately with a large number of sectional claims for the hundreds of classes in the Service. Virtually all the staff concerned have the right to go to arbitration on such claims and this procedure is often frustrating and chancy. It can lead to distortion of internal relativities which produces subsequent pressure for their restoration at additional cost. The results of arbitration over the field might thus easily cost more than the settlement.”

23. Earlier in this statement the Treasury had stated that the settlement covered the whole non-industrial Civil Service up to £1,500 per annum and that the classes concerned ranged from Post Office workers, clerks and typists to executives, junior professionals and administrative staffs. Particular attention is invited to the justification advanced on behalf of the Government at that time for a settlement based upon factors which the Treasury have since renounced. The settlement was based on “general movements in wages”; there was no attempt to effect or to justify comparisons between particular grades of civil servants and comparable workers outside. The appropriateness of the Ministry of Labour's wages index appears to have been taken for granted. Indeed, the statement justified the use of this index for staffs receiving more than £500 per annum, subject to a “tapering” process. The Treasury's comment that the settlement is “based on the principle of meeting essential needs only”, implied that the use of the wages index in full up to £500 per annum did no more than meet essential needs. The use of any criteria which gave less—e.g. comparisons with some clerical workers—would, presumably, have given to sections of the non-industrial civil servants something less than was necessary to meet essential needs.

24. The Treasury also referred in this press statement to the alternative to this comprehensive settlement based on the wages index. It was arbitration, and would have involved sectional claims covering hundreds of classes in the Civil Service. However desirable this might be in theory, its effects would have been open to serious objection. In fact it is impracticable for the claim of each grade to be settled separately by the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal. Such a process would extend over months, and possibly years, if a general economic change provoked claims from every class and grade. What has happened in the past is that the Treasury has contrived first to settle the main grades by negotiation, and, if this fails, by arbitration. The fate of hundreds of subsidiary grades awaits these settlements. In the result scores of thousands of civil servants wait for months, and in some cases for more than a year, before receiving reassessment of their pay based upon factors which, by the time increases are granted, may have become out of date. Indeed,

changing economic circumstances have compelled some organisations to seek a second revision of pay before the terms of the first revision have been settled. And these have been cases in which the necessity for some concession to meet the first claim was never disputed in official quarters.

25. This long delay in settling pay disputes in the Civil Service by negotiation, and if necessary, arbitration—the latter procedure being described by the Treasury themselves in their statement to the Press as being “often frustrating and chancy”—cannot be avoided if vagueness and imprecision exist as to the criteria to be employed. The Alliance do not suggest that adjusting pay can ever become an exact science. Inevitably there is the possibility of some disagreement even when the criteria are clear and well understood. But approaching the problem empirically, the Alliance are satisfied that never previously or since, in the history of civil service wage negotiations, was a settlement achieved with greater expedition and, so far as its basic principles are concerned, with more understanding and general acceptance than the 1951 “pay addition” settlement. Accordingly, as regards outside pay trends, the Alliance advocate the re-introduction of the use of the wages index as the appropriate instrument for measuring revisions of the pay of those grades of the Civil Service comprising more than one-third of the total on whose behalf they are making these representations.

26. It is not suggested that adjustment of pay resulting from movements in the Ministry of Labour's wages index should be automatic. The extent of any change recorded by the wages index at any time must be taken into account. Minor fluctuations should not lead to frequent pay adjustments. It would be a matter for negotiation when the degree of change was sufficient to justify a review of pay. As an approximate guide, but nothing more, the Alliance have in mind that alterations of the order of 5 per cent. would provide a *prima facie* case for a review of existing pay rates. The primary issue is the use of the Ministry of Labour's wages rates index as the criterion. If this is accepted detailed operational arrangements would have to be settled by the normal negotiating machinery but on a basis about which there would be no dispute.

27. The Treasury's abandonment of the wages index and their return to a policy of attempting to relate pay rates of civil servants to those of comparable workers outside is, in the view of the Alliance, anachronistic. Whatever comparisons may have been valid or invalid 25 years ago, the fact to-day is that manual and non-manual workers have been brought closer together. Privileges at one time denied to the industrial worker have now been granted. Industrial workers now enjoy conditions many of which, such as paid leave, sickness benefits and vocational pension schemes, were the exclusive privilege of office staffs years ago. The Alliance, far from deploring these changes, welcome them. But it is consistent with these changes now to contend that the wages index, which records pay movements of about 13 million workers within an overall pay range of approximately the same as that of clerical workers in the Civil Service, is applicable. Conversely, to suggest that the use of that index as a measurement would give to civil service clerks preferential or unmerited treatment is quite unsound. A skilled engineer earning £10 per week is in a similar position to that of a clerical officer earning the same wage so far as concerns the effects upon his standard of life of general economic changes, including changes in living costs. The use of the wages index is itself a disability because it involves changes in civil service remuneration following and not keeping abreast of improvements elsewhere. Nevertheless, the use of the wages index in the clerical area of the Civil Service would be practicable and reasonable both for the taxpayer and for the civil servants. It is accordingly commended to the Royal Commission as the best method in all the circumstances of keeping civil service remuneration in the area covered by the Civil Service Alliance in step with general wages trends.

28. The Civil Service Alliance wish, in addition, to offer submissions on the composition of the existing scales of pay for certain grades and to make suggestions for re-casting them where appropriate.

III. PROPOSALS FOR THE CLERICAL CLASS

29. The scale of pay of the basic grade in the general clerical class is the same as that of tax officers, assistant collectors and valuation clerks of the Inland Revenue and grade 6 officers of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. It is set out in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum. The scale of pay of higher clerical officers has recently been revised as follows. (This scale applies also to the grade of collector and valuation clerks (higher grade) in the Inland Revenue.) It is:—

Men (London)
£655 × £25—£800

Women (London)
£530 × £20—£550 × £25—£675

30. The scales of pay of clerical assistants, typing grades, machine grades and their departmental equivalents, and temporary clerks, are also given in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum.

31. The clerical officer grade of the general clerical class was created following the recommendations of the Reorganisation Committee of the Civil Service National Whitley Council in 1919. Its rates of pay have been revised from time to time as shown in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum. The assistant collectors and valuation clerks in the Inland Revenue and grade 6 of the Ministry of Labour and National Service are, in their present form, creations of the post-second world war period. Previously they were not on all fours with the clerical officers. The tax officer grade, the largest of the three departmental clerical classes in the Inland Revenue, has enjoyed clerical officer pay and conditions since 1934. Methods of recruitment for all these grades have always been similar to those of the clerical officer grade. They remain the same to-day.

32. The original intention was that the clerical officer grade—and the same comment applies to the basic departmental clerical grades—should be recruited by open competition from boys and girls of 16 to 17. The syllabus of examination was to be framed with reference to the standard of development reached at the end of the intermediate stage of a secondary school course (London Matriculation standard). Scales of pay envisaged a period of 20 years for movement from minimum to maximum in the case of men, and 18 years for women. Although the original scales have undergone many revisions during the ensuing 35 years, their general pattern has not changed. They continue to provide for entry direct from school at age 16-17 and the attainment of the maximum salary at age 36 (men) and 34 (women).

33. But the number of youths and girls recruited to the clerical class was insignificant from 1927 (when normal recruitment was resumed) up to 1937: between 1937 and 1939 it was of the order of 3,000 to 4,000 per annum.

34. In 1939, open competitions were suspended and were resumed in 1948. Thus from 1920 to 1948 recruits from that source have represented only a small proportion of the total number in the class.

35. The situation has not changed substantially since 1948. The position at the 1st April, 1951, was that the total of clerical officers was approximately 74,500. Of this number only 6,400 were boy and girl entrants. Of the remainder about 30,000 had been recruited from the open and limited reconstruction examinations and were of ages up to 35 on entry, except ex-Regular members of H.M. Forces who could enter a special section of the reconstruction examination up to age 50. There were also promotees to the class, the majority of whom were older people. In addition, there were 32,300 who had formerly been temporary clerks and were established under various post-war schemes. Of these the majority were between the ages of 35 and 60. Thus over 68,000 of the total of 74,500 members of the clerical officer grade at the date mentioned came in by methods other than open competition. They were older entrants who came into the grade at a starting salary some way up the scale. Current figures are not available to the Alliance. But it can be assumed that a later analysis would not show any marked change in the proportions of older entrants. The position in the departmental clerical classes is about the same.

36. The position before the war was not dissimilar. Examinations held between 1920 and 1926 which were open to temporary clerks brought into the clerical officer grade many thousands of older men and women. Their numbers were augmented by promotees from sub-clerical and minor and manipulative grades, the majority of whom entered at points some way up the salary scale.

37. The Alliance have drawn attention to this matter as a preliminary to submitting to the Royal Commission that the original conception of the clerical class has never been realised and that the present pay structure bears little relation to the position of the majority of clerical officers now serving and those likely to serve in the years to come. This fact was emphasised in information given by H.M. Treasury to the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal on 29th September, 1952, to the effect that only about 5 per cent. of the entrants to the clerical class from the open competition remain in the grade sufficiently long to reach their maxima.

38. The need for reform of the pay structure is made more impressive by the fact that the Official Side of the National Whitley Council have notified the Staff Side of their desire to open negotiations about future recruitment to the clerical officer and clerical assistant grades, and to propose the introduction, as a permanent arrangement, of some recruitment from outside the Service of men and women over 40 years of age to both grades. The intention appears to be to provide opportunities to these older people to begin their civil service careers as temporary clerks when they have reached the age of 40 and, after a period of service, to enable them to compete by means of written examinations for appointments to established posts in these grades. The Alliance do not desire to comment at this stage upon a plan which has been outlined informally and in a somewhat sketchy manner, except to point out that it indicates a tendency to move still further away from the original conception of a clerical class and a clerical assistant class recruited mainly from boys and girls on leaving school, to classes which will consist to an increasing extent of older men and women who acquire clerical training and experience elsewhere than in the Civil Service before they join it. Moreover, in any future scheme for the establishment of temporary clerks as clerical officers or clerical assistants those affected will also be mature men and women.

39. Various arrangements have applied from time to time to determine the starting pay of older entrants to the clerical class. Those promoted from lower grades receive an increase on promotion (added to their pre-promotion pay). At present the increase on promotion to the clerical officer grade is £40 per annum. It is applied subject to the condition that entry pay does not exceed the amount the officer would have been earning had all his service been in the clerical class. This is an important qualification because in a number of cases the increase has to be limited in order not to give the promotee more than he would have been earning if all his civil service employment had been in the clerical grade. In the case of one group of promotees—postal and telegraph officers—it sometimes occurs that they are receiving a higher rate of pay before promotion than they would have been earning in the higher grade if all their service had been in that grade. They retain the excess on a "mark time" basis.

40. Those who came into the clerical class from the post-war reconstruction examinations were given a starting rate of pay appropriate to their age at entry, subject to the maximum of the scale. Similar arrangements applied to temporary clerks established as clerical officers through the first of the post-war schemes. Later, however, temporary clerks grade III established as clerical officers entered at the 25 years age point on the clerical officer scale. Grades II and I temporary clerks were given one or two additional increments respectively above this point. Thus the majority of serving members of the clerical officer grade had from 11 years to 1 years service to render from the time they became clerical officers to the time they reached or will reach the maximum of the scale.

41. It is the view of the Alliance that those arrangements have never been satisfactory and have caused considerable dissatisfaction. They would become more inappropriate in the changed situation envisaged in the future. The fact that the starting pay point of the older entrants to the class purports to be the 25 age point on the scale is regarded as somewhat humiliating to thousands of older men and women who resent being treated as youngsters with limited experience of the clerical

profession notwithstanding the fact that most of them have served for years in clerical spheres before coming into the Civil Service as clerical officers. The submission of the Alliance is that a new and more appropriate scale should be constructed which envisages a clerical class consisting, as to the majority, of older and experienced men and women; that the minimum of this scale should take account of the fact that it would apply to persons whose clerical experience had been acquired before they became clerical officers or even civil servants, and that, for the majority, there is little prospect of advancing beyond the clerical officer grade.

42. In considering this proposal, the Alliance have taken account of the circumstances which have brought men and women into the clerical grades of the Civil Service at ages substantially above those originally intended as the normal recruitment ages of 16-17. The history of this matter during and for a similar period following each of the last two world wars is similar. The outbreak of a world war necessarily interrupted the lives of millions of members of the community. It brought many peace time careers to an end and compelled transfers to new employments. In this process men and women with long experience of clerical work in spheres outside the Civil Service were required to staff new and expanding Government Departments. As a result, a temporary clerical force of about 150,000 was recruited during and after both the first and second world wars.

43. Not all persons who became temporary clerical workers in the Government service had previous clerical experience. Some were youths and girls who left school during the war periods and took temporary employment because that was all that was available to them if they wished to follow a clerical career in the Civil Service. They came in with the hope that, when the wars ended, their original intentions might be realised. But it is a reasonable generalisation as regards the majority of the remainder that they were of the clerical type and had previously been employed as clerks in outside organisations. They brought to the Civil Service varying periods and types of experience in the profession in which they continued to serve. The Alliance wish to emphasise the contention that the efficient clerk is a highly skilled worker, who is required to have standards of intelligence and education which, allied with experience on the job, enable him to move from one sphere of clerical employment to another without any impairment of his usefulness to his employers. And when the State, like any other employer, appoint older men and women to their clerical posts, they can acquire, and should insist upon getting, accumulated experience which should be properly recognised on the scale of pay offered. In the past there has been a tendency to regard the newcomer to the Civil Service as a person whose experience is of limited value to his new employer—a person to be treated almost as a trainee for whom a long scale of pay is considered to be appropriate provided it makes some small allowance for his age and commitments. Thus, as has already been mentioned, the majority of clerical officers recruited from the ranks of temporary clerks have entered at a point in the clerical officer scale appropriate to young men and women of about age 25, whereas many of them were between the ages of 40 and 60 and had acquired years of experience as clerical workers in outside spheres of employment before they became civil servants.

44. Negotiations are shortly to commence about future recruitment to the clerical officer and clerical assistant grades (vide para. 38). It is to be presumed that effective tests of suitability will be applied. Certainly, the National Staff Side will not be a party to recruitment at this age except under conditions which ensure that these newcomers to the Civil Service are experienced and skilled in clerical work and are able to prove before they are admitted to established posts that they are capable of performing the best class of clerical work.

45. This policy of reserving posts for older persons will consolidate the trends in age distribution in the clerical officer grade which the following figures reveal, bearing in mind that there is always a heavy wastage because of the number of young women who marry and either resign or remain in temporary employment.

DISTRIBUTION OF CLERICAL STAFF BY AGE GROUPS
GENERAL AND DEPARTMENTAL

Age	Number on 1st January, 1953	
	Men	Women
Under 20	1,305	1,807
20-24	4,376	5,772
25-29	8,698	5,718
30-34	12,358	6,293
35-39	9,358	4,372
40-44	7,567	4,109
45-49	6,466	4,121
50-54	8,926	3,570
55-59	10,332	2,418
60 and over	6,396	607
	75,782	38,787

46. During 1953 it was estimated that the total number of promotions of clerical officers to executive officer and higher clerical officer posts would be 1,000. This total was not realised because large-scale redundancy developed in the Ministry of Food and a number of posts within the estimated total of 1,000 had to be utilised for the accommodation of redundant staffs. The official estimate of similar promotions for 1954 of clerical officers is 300. The promotion prospects of departmental clerical officers may vary but, in the main, the picture given by the figures relating to clerical officers is fairly representative of the position of departmental clerical officers excepting tax officers who are temporarily in a more favourable position. In the Ministry of Labour there have been no promotions at all from grade 6 since 1951 and none is likely to occur until the end of the year.

47. The redundancy situation in the Civil Service at the present time restricts the promotion opportunities of clerical and departmental clerical officers. But the estimate of 1,000 promotions from the clerical officer grade in 1953 would have been approximately correct had not heavy redundancy developed. This figure can, therefore, be regarded as roughly representing the average prospect in a normal situation. With a clerical officer grade totalling nearly 80,000 the prospects of promotion beyond that grade are extremely limited, particularly for older entrants whose seniority dates from the time of establishment.

48. To this situation the existing clerical officer scale is demonstrably unsuited. A new scale is required which will recognise that, for the foreseeable future, the majority of men and women already in the class and the majority of those who enter in future will probably be in the age range of 30-60; a substantial proportion may be in the 40-60 range. It is suggested that in this situation a new scale should be devised which would not be related to the age points on any scale intended for boy and girl entrants. The minimum of the scale should recognise that it will be applied to men and women who are not entering a new profession, but who are continuing in the profession in which many will have served for the whole of their working lives. It should recognise that this acquired experience and skill will be almost as readily available as if these older entrants had been civil service clerical officers throughout their careers and had transferred from one Government Department to another. The scale should not be too long, but should provide incentive by way of incremental progression.

49. The maximum of the scale should recognise that for a considerable number of clerical officers there will be no promotion. It should also recognise that demarcation boundaries between the work of clerical officers and executive and higher clerical officers are now less rigid than they were when they were settled after the first world war. Definitions of duties then prescribed were for a Service where the majority of clerical officers and executive officers were employed in considerable

aggregations. They cannot be applied with precision where staffs are organised in small units, as they are so extensively organised to-day in local offices of such Departments as the Inland Revenue, Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, National Assistance Board, Ministry of Labour and National Service. Considerable aggregations of work lend themselves more easily to the fairly rigid application of grading definitions. Inevitably there must be considerable overlap of functions in the smaller units. Moreover to the extent—and to-day it is a considerable extent—to which personal dealings with the public are necessary, the rigid preservation of demarcation frontiers is impracticable. It is, for example, often impossible to say whether certain tasks involved in the handling of particular cases are appropriate to the clerical grade or to the executive grade. Only when action has been completed are precise appraisements of the correct grade allocation possible. Furthermore this creation of a nation-wide network of local offices in addition to the decentralisation policy of the Government has resulted in civil servants becoming more liable to be moved from place to place than they were before the war.

50. The maximum of the clerical officer scale should take all these factors into account. The highest point on the salary scale which is the point at which many clerical officers will spend the greater part of their careers, should encourage initiative to senior members of the grade to utilise to the full their wide experience in a situation in which further promotion is improbable. The scale suggested as being suited to the real needs of the situation is one of about £460 × £20 — £640 per annum. This scale relates to existing cost of living and outside wage factors. It envisages a period of 9 years' progress from minimum to maximum. It would apply to clerical officers within the 30-60 age range. It would not supersede the present clerical officer scale for boy and girl entrants although some modification of the minimum of that scale is called for. This is dealt with in the following paragraph.

51. As mentioned in paragraph 37 of this document, only about 5 per cent. of the open competition entrants to the clerical class are likely to reach the maximum of the scale according to Treasury estimates. This is due to several causes. A number of women give up their established appointments on marriage and leave the Service altogether, or continue in employment as temporary clerks. A number of clerical officers between the ages of 22 and 28 enter the executive officer grade as the result of success at the limited executive competition; there are also wastages on account of a limited amount of promotion over age 28, and through resignations, deaths, etc. If a new scale of pay of the sort envisaged in the preceding paragraph were introduced for older entrants to the clerical class, it would be necessary to ensure that the small number of boy and girl entrants who remain in the clerical class sufficiently long proceed to the same maximum as their older colleagues. The numbers likely to be involved are small and the problem would not be a difficult one.

52. A more serious problem is the minimum of the scale. Notwithstanding the restricted amount of recruitment of boys and girls to the clerical class during the post-war period, the number of suitable candidates coming forward is proving insufficient, particularly in the London area. At present the Civil Service Commission are experimenting with recruitment by selection, and without written examination, of youths and girls who obtain the General Certificate of Education with credits in English language and four other subjects. It is understood that if the London experiment succeeds it may lead to some recruitment by selection to clerical officer posts being adopted permanently.

53. The Alliance do not suggest that the difficulties of recruitment are due solely to inadequate starting rates of pay. Other factors are present which do not come within the Royal Commission's terms of reference. But it is unquestionably the case that many outside concerns are able to offer more attractive terms, some of which are not in expressed cash terms but have a definite cash value. They include meal vouchers, assistance towards travel to work, free recreational facilities, holiday bonuses and subsidised hostel accommodation for those living away from home. For younger civil servants whose pay is within the range of 58s. to 106s. per week there is a lowly paid lodging allowance, decreasing from 25s. to 1s. per week, for which young clerical officers qualify. But even with this subsidy there is an

increasing unwillingness on the part of young people to take posts away from their home areas because of the expense and the fact that it involves parental subsidisation on an extensive scale. The Alliance are aware that this latter state of affairs existed before the war. Indeed, there were occasions during negotiations about pay rates when Treasury officials defended this system on the ground that there was nothing wrong, in principle, in parents having to contribute to the maintenance of their youngsters during the first years of their employment in the Civil Service. The Alliance do not wish to argue this as a moral issue. But they emphasise that in the more competitive situation which exists today, when youngsters of the educational standard required for the clerical class have a number of choices of careers open to them on leaving school, the clerical class will not be able effectively to compete against employers who offer, in cash and kind, terms which make it possible for the boy or girl to be able to do without parental subsidisation almost as soon as he or she starts work. And in considering the steps necessary to make the clerical class competitive a higher minimum starting pay which takes account of the liability to leave home on first appointment or at any time thereafter is essential, particularly against competitors who in many cases are able to offer permanent employment in the candidate's home area.

54. In paragraph 50 a suggestion is made as to the sort of scale which appears to be appropriate to the clerical officer grade as it is largely composed today and as it is likely to remain in the future. At present the scale of pay for youths and girls entering the clerical class is as follows:—

Age	£
16	170
17	195
18	220
19	245

Thereafter the pay of women falls behind that of men throughout the remainder of the scale. It is suggested that the rates shown above, which are subject to provincial differentiation, should be increased by £25 at all the points and that this increase should continue until the entrant reaches the minimum of the scale suggested in paragraph 50 for older entrants. From that point this latter scale would apply to both categories of entrant. The complete scale would then become:—

Age	£
16	195
17	220
18	245
19	270
20	295
21	320
22	345
23	370
24	395
25	420
	440
	460
	480
	500
	520
	540
	560
	580
	600
	620
	640

55. The Civil Service Alliance wish to emphasise their view that the settlement of an appropriate scale for clerical officers is necessary as a preliminary to determining the relative scales of pay for higher clerical officers, superintendents, chief superintendents and controllers of typists grades. It is also material in determining

the scales of pay for shorthand typists, clerical assistants, copy typists, machine grades and temporary clerks in respect of whom the Civil Service Alliance make the following proposals.

IV. SHORTHAND TYPISTS

56. The Civil Service Alliance have long held the view that an efficient shorthand typist should be able to progress to a maximum basic salary equal to that of the clerical officer. They also consider that the rates of pay in the early years of service for shorthand typists should be higher than those of clerical officers with corresponding service. The reason for this is that the shorthand typist normally acquires a specialist skill before entering the Civil Service which justifies a more advantageous rate of pay at the beginning.

57. During the war years the dearth of shorthand typists and typists obliged Departments to recruit novices and to train them. They were encouraged, after basic training, to compete for proficiency allowances for speed and accuracy (see Treasury's Factual Memorandum, paragraph 391). The effect has been to bring the pay of a grade I shorthand typist, with proficiency allowances, into close relationship with the clerical officer scale up to the age 30 point in the case of men and the age 27 point in the case of women, and to give a balance of advantage to shorthand typists in the early years of service.

58. The Treasury and the Alliance are at one in desiring that there should be a high standard of proficiency on entry to the established shorthand typist class and the improvement in the recruiting position has now made it possible to insist that establishment should be given only to candidates who have a shorthand speed of 100 w.p.m. and a typing speed of 40 w.p.m. and who satisfy the test in English, arithmetic and general knowledge.

59. In the opinion of the Civil Service Alliance there is a case for revising the basic scale for shorthand typists to allow for this higher standard of recruitment on entry and to relate it to the basic scale for clerical officers with modifications to reward improvements in skill. This would entail some revision of the proficiency allowance system.

60. At present, the London annual basic scales for clerical officers and established shorthand typists compare as follows:—

Age	Men		Women	
	Clerical officer	Shorthand typist	Clerical officer	Shorthand typist
15	£ —	£ 193	£ —	£ 193
16	170	203·4	170	203·4
17	195	229·5	195	229·5
18	220	253	220	253
19	245	276·5	245	266·1
20	270	305·2	265	279·1
21	295	340·4	280	292·1
22	320	365·2	295	305·2
23	340	383·4	310	318·7
24	360	399·1	325	331·3
25	380	414·7	340	344·3
26	400	430·4	355	357·3
27	420	443·4	370	370·4
28	440	456·5	385	383·4
29	460	469·5	395	391·2
30	475	482·5	405	
31	490		415	
32	505		425	
33	520		435	
34	535		445	
35	550		460	
36	570			

61. The Civil Service Alliance suggest that the existing scales for shorthand typists "rounded up" could continue to be applicable to new appointees but provision should be made for candidates to improve their technical skill and to encourage them to do so they should be able to progress to higher rates without change of incremental date and in accordance with the "equivalent points" principle when improved standards have been achieved. They also suggest that there should be four such rates in addition to the basic rate to reward four classes of higher skills by adding £15 per annum up to the new proposed maximum for the basic grade and, thereafter, that the two highest rates should dovetail into the clerical officer scale. The four classes of skill which could be tested by present methods would be two pass standards of typing at 50 w.p.m. (first and second class pass) and two pass standards for shorthand at 120 w.p.m. (first and second class pass). It will be appreciated that until the scales of pay for clerical officers have been determined it is not possible to state precisely what should be the comparable scales for shorthand typists. But in Appendix A to this document the Civil Service Alliance show what would be the effect if the scales proposed for clerical officers in paragraph 50 were recommended by the Royal Commission, and the suggestions made in respect of shorthand typists were also accepted.

V. CLERICAL ASSISTANT CLASS

62. It may be helpful if a brief statement is made about the origins of the present day clerical assistant class. This class originated as the writing assistant class whose employment generally throughout the Service was recommended by the Reorganisation Committee of the National Whitley Council in 1920. (Paragraphs 411 and 412 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum refer.) The class was to be exclusively a women's class and was to be recruited by examination from among girls of 16 years of age. The title of the class was changed in 1936 to the clerical assistant class. Its range of duties was extended and its pay scale slightly improved. Recruitment to the class ceased during the war. There has been a limited amount of recruitment of young girls and women to the class during the post-war period, some by written examination and some by a simplified procedure of intelligence tests. In the former cases the age range for eligibility was 16-30. In the latter case it was 15-33. Much of the work which would have been done by clerical assistants before the war has been assigned to temporary clerks grade III and to machine assistants.

63. In 1951 some 22,000 temporary clerks were established as clerical assistants. A minimum age limit of 45 was imposed and the class was thrown open to men and women. The scales of pay which, up to that time, had assumed that the class would remain closed to men and would normally be recruited from among young girl school leavers were revised to meet the new situation. They are given in paragraph 406 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum.

64. At the time of preparing this statement arrangements are in hand for admitting a further number of temporary clerks and, on this occasion, temporary executive grades to the clerical assistant class. The number admitted will be about 20,000 and the minimum age limit on this occasion is 40.

65. The official insistence upon admitting only older temporary staff to this class is understood to be based on the Government's policy of finding employment for older people (see Cmd. 8963, October, 1953), and because the present day demand for the services of youngsters is such that, in the official view, their employment on routine and repetitive clerical work would not be making the best use of them. As is mentioned in paragraph 38 there are shortly to be discussions on the National Whitley Council about future recruitment to the clerical assistant class. Their outcome cannot be anticipated but it is known that the Official Side intend to put forward proposals for the continued recruitment of older people to the class including suitable applicants who have no civil service experience.

66. When it was decided to make provision for older temporary clerks to become established as clerical assistants, it was not known that this would lead to a permanent arrangement for bringing older men and women into the clerical assistant grade and for imposing severe limitations on the entry of young girls of school leaving age. The question of the scales to be prescribed for these older clerical

assistants was considered on the assumption that this innovation would not become permanent. The prescribed minimum of the scale was, of course, irrelevant as a starting point for men or women coming into the class at 45 years of age and above. Their entry point was therefore related, with some qualifications, to what they received as temporary clerks at the time of establishment. Under the second establishment scheme now proceeding, the regulations provide that temporary clerks will enter the clerical assistant scale at their existing pay subject to the maximum of the grade II temporary clerk scale not being exceeded. There are certain conditions and restrictions attached to this arrangement which are not material at this stage.

67. The starting rate applicable to entrants over 45 years of age or over 40 in the case of the second scheme was largely regulated by their previous pay as temporary clerks. No such regulation will apply to the men and women over 40 years of age to be recruited from outside the Civil Service, if the plans referred to in paragraph 38 mature. It will be necessary to prescribe a minimum starting rate which will take account of the age and experience of these older direct entrants.

68. The Alliance suggest that the minimum should not be less than the maximum of the temporary clerk grade III which at present is about £382 per annum (London).

69. In the two schemes that have operated for the establishment of older temporary clerks as clerical assistants, emphasis was put on the limited opportunities likely to be available to them to obtain promotion to the clerical officer grade. One reason was that many existing temporary clerks had had previous chances of establishment as clerical officers and had not been successful. It was considered important that establishment in the clerical assistant grade should not be regarded as an indirect method of entry to the clerical officer grade by way of promotion in default of direct selection.

70. In considering the appropriate maximum paid, for the future, it must be assumed that outside entrants to the clerical assistant grade under any new scheme will have some opportunities of promotion to the clerical officer grade. But of the new entrants who come from outside the Service or from the ranks of older temporary clerks many are unlikely to be promoted.

71. The present maximum of £436 16s. (London) is a not very attractive maximum figure to new entrants above the age of 40, if they are of the standard which it is desirable to recruit. Moreover, the inducement of the civil service pension will be a limited one for these older entrants because their reckonable years of service for pension calculation will be relatively small. It is suggested, therefore, that the maximum of the scale should be £480 per annum (London), and progress from the starting point by annual increments of £20 per annum. The figures mentioned above are for men and require to be adjusted for women. The general considerations apply to both sexes and justify a scale of this sort.

VI. TYPISTS

72. The basic scales of pay for copy typists are broadly compared at present with those of clerical assistants. The proposals in paragraphs 68-71 would increase the maximum, the increments and the minimum starting rate for older entrants. There is no direct reason arising from these proposals for altering the basic scales for copy typists. But, for copy typists, as for shorthand typists, it will remain necessary to compensate them for superior typing skill. In Appendix B the Civil Service Alliance show the effect of introducing new scales for copy typists which would preserve the present relativity with the proposed new scale for the clerical assistant class and provide additional rates similar to those suggested in the case of shorthand typists to reflect the acquisition of similar typing skills.

VII. SENIOR MACHINE OPERATORS, MACHINE OPERATORS, MACHINE ASSISTANTS AND DUPLICATOR OPERATOR GRADES

73. The pay of these machine grades in the Civil Service has hitherto been based upon the scales for clerical officers, shorthand typists and clerical assistants. The Civil Service Alliance are not suggesting detailed proposals in respect of these grades since they assume that there is no reason why past practice should not be continued.

VIII. TEMPORARY CLERKS

74. The Alliance submit that temporary clerks should be given parity of pay with their analogues in established grades. Put in precise terms, this would involve temporary clerks grade III receiving the clerical assistant scale of pay and temporary clerks grades I and II the clerical officer scale of pay. The official view has always been that the grade I temporary clerk was employable on a range of work which could be superior to that normally performed by senior members of the clerical class, and in at least one major Department clerical officers who were employed on such work, and were interchangeable with grade I temporary clerks, have received an allowance in excess of the clerical officer maximum. But the number of grade I temporary clerks in the Service today is small and is diminishing. Therefore, the problem is mainly one of fitting grades II and III temporary clerks into the clerical officer and clerical assistant scales respectively.

75. In many areas of the Civil Service, temporary staffs already enjoy parity with their established analogues. This is true of the manipulative grades of the Post Office, temporary shorthand typists, copy typists, senior machine operators, machine operators, machine assistants and duplicator operators, technical and professional grades and, with some qualifications, the temporary executive grades. Indeed, it is the case that the clerical area of the Service is almost the only area, and certainly by far the largest area of the Service, where temporary staffs are paid lower rates for the performance of the same work as established staffs.

76. It may be contended against this submission that the claim of parity of pay for temporary clerks was rejected by the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal in 1949 (C.S.A.T. Award 114). The circumstances today are, however, markedly different from those prevailing at the time the award was given. At that time there were no male clerical assistants to whom grade III male temporary clerks could be related for pay purposes. It was recognised in the claim that, for these grades, a pay scale would have to be assumed. Then the scale of pay for women clerical assistants was also related to entry at age 16 and to the maximum being attained at age 31. The majority of temporary clerks grade III were considerably above the ages for which this range of pay was originally contemplated. Since 1950 however, new scales of pay have been introduced for clerical assistants. The grade has been extended to include males and the rates of pay for both men and women are, as mentioned earlier in this document, related to recruitment at a minimum age of 40 years. No difficulties of the sort which existed then would now arise in applying the principle of parity as between temporary clerks grade III and clerical assistants.

77. Another change in the situation arises from the rapid disappearance of grade I temporary clerks and the substantial reductions now occurring of those in grade II. The present proposal is, in the main, for the application of the clerical officer scale to grade II temporary clerks, a proposition which is fully justified by the fact that this grading is only applied to temporary clerks who perform the full range of clerical officer work.

78. The Royal Commission on the Civil Service (1929-1931) recommended in paragraph 546 that in order to emphasise the casual nature of temporary employment temporary clerks should not be conditioned to a scale of pay involving annual incremental progression. It was suggested that the very existence of scales of pay implied something more than temporary employment. The recommendations of the Commission for the introduction of flat rates of pay for temporary clerks in all Departments except the Ministry of Labour was adopted. The change did not, however, achieve the purpose it was designed to serve. Temporary clerks who, under another part of the same recommendation (para. 559) were normally to be employed for not more than eighteen months, continued to be employed year after year, and the existence of flat rates of pay did little more than provoke demands for annual increases from the temporary clerks themselves who argued, quite understandably, that they were being financially penalised by comparison with all other grades of the Civil Service, merely to satisfy a theory that had not become a fact. This recommendation of the previous Royal Commission and what actually

happened as a result of it are referred to here in support of the claim for parity of pay with established staffs. When, shortly after the outbreak of war, many temporary clerks had served for long periods and extensive recruitment of new temporary clerks was taking place for periods that necessarily were indefinite, there was a return to the more orthodox system of scales of pay and these have persisted ever since.

IX. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

79. The proposals of the Civil Service Alliance may be summarised as follows:—

1. So far as general principles are concerned the remuneration of clerical and allied classes should follow the trend of wage rates of classes outside the Civil Service as reflected by the Ministry of Labour's index of wage rates. A *prima facie* case for adjustment would arise when the index rose or fell to a significant degree.
2. The scales of pay of the clerical class should be regarded as the main trunk from which the scales for superintendents, chief superintendents and controllers of typists and higher clerical officers, should branch. The trunk should also be the guide for determining the scales for other related and lower grades. Because of the new methods of recruitment there should be dual London scales of pay, subject to provincial differentiation whilst that system is in force: one for school leavers from £195 to £640 and the other for late entrants from £460 to £640.
3. The shorthand typist should be regarded as entitled to higher rates of pay for technical skill in the earlier years of service compared with clerical officers. But this higher skill should also be equated with the cumulative experience of clerical officers so that although experienced shorthand typists have an incentive to achieve technical proficiency they may also have the possibility of reaching the same maximum as the experienced clerical officer. This condition applies already in the case of clerical officer secretaries.
4. Because of the duality in methods of recruitment, it is suggested that there be two scales for clerical assistants. A long scale of £3 to £9 4s. (London—Men) for school leavers and a short scale for late entrants of £7 7s. to £9 4s. (London—Men).
5. Copy typists, it is suggested, should receive similar compensation for typing skills held in the early years of service, as proposed for shorthand typists. An extension of the existing clerical assistant scale would facilitate the introduction of common maxima at which the cumulative experience of the clerical assistants would equate with the special skills of copy typists.
6. The Civil Service Alliance envisage a continuation of the relativities between the clerical, shorthand typist, clerical assistant and typist scales and those of senior machine operators, machine operators, machine assistants and duplicator operator grades.
7. The proposals for temporary clerks are that grade II should be assimilated to the clerical officer scale and grade III to the clerical assistant scale.

Representatives of the Civil Service Alliance will be available, if required, to amplify the foregoing submissions and to be questioned about them by members of the Royal Commission.

APPENDIX A

COMPARISON BETWEEN PROPOSED NEW SCALE FOR CLERICAL OFFICERS
WITH THE FIVE RATES PROPOSED FOR SHORTHAND TYPISTS
MEN

Age	Clerical officer		Shorthand typist				
	Open competition entrant	Late entrant	Rate 1	Rate 2	Rate 3	Rate 4	Rate 5
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
15	—		195	210	225	240	255
16	195		205	220	235	250	265
17	220		230	245	260	275	290
18	245		255	270	285	300	315
19	270		275	290	305	320	335
20	295		305	320	335	350	365
21	320		340	355	370	385	400
22	345		365	380	395	410	425
23	370		380	395	410	425	440
24	395		400	415	430	445	460
25	420		415	430	445	460	475
26	440		430	445	460	475	490
27	460	460(Min.)	450	465	480	495	510
28	480	480	460	475	490	505	520
29	500	500	470	485	500	515	530
30	520	520	485	500	515	530	545
31	540	540				545	560
32	560	560				560	575
33	580	580				580	595
34	600	600				600	615
35	620	620				620	640
36	640	640(Max.)				640	

WOMEN

Age	Clerical officer		Shorthand typist				
	Open competition entrant	Late entrant	Rate 1	Rate 2	Rate 3	Rate 4	Rate 5
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
15	—		195	210	225	240	255
16	195		205	220	235	250	265
17	220		230	235	250	265	280
18	245		255	270	285	300	315
19	270		270	285	300	315	330
20	290		280	295	310	325	340
21	305		300	315	330	345	360
22	320		310	325	340	355	370
23	340		320	335	350	365	380
24	355		335	350	365	380	395
25	380		350	365	380	395	410
26	390		360	375	390	405	420
27	405	405(Min.)	370	385	400	415	430
28	420	420	385	400	415	430	445
29	430	430	395	410	425	440	455
30	445	445	405	420	435	450	465
31	455	455				460	475
32	465	465				465	480
33	475	475				475	490
34	490	490				490	500
35	500	500				500	515
36	515	515(Max.)				515	

APPENDIX B

COMPARISON OF PROPOSED CLERICAL ASSISTANT RATES WITH THE THREE
RATES PROPOSED FOR COPY TYPISTS

MEN

Age	Clerical assistant	Late entrant	Copy typist	+ 6s.	+ 12s.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s.	£ s.	£ s.
15	3		3 6	3 12	3 18
16	3 5		3 10	3 16	4 2
17	3 10		3 18	4 4	4 10
18	4		4 7	4 13	4 19
19	4 10		4 13	4 19	5 5
20	5		5 1	5 7	5 13
21	5 9		5 15	6 1	6 7
22	5 16		6 1	6 7	6 13
23	6 3		6 7	6 13	6 19
24	6 8		6 13	6 19	7 5
25	6 13		6 19	7 5	7 11
26	6 17		7 6	7 12	7 18
27	7 1		7 11	7 17	8 3
28	7 7	7 7	7 16	8 2	8 8
29	7 14	7 14	8 1	8 7	8 13
30	8 1 6	8 1 6	8 6	8 12	8 18
31	8 9	8 9		8 16	9 2
32	8 16 6	8 16 6		9	9 4
33	9 4	9 4		9 4	

WOMEN

Age	Clerical assistant	Late entrant	Copy typist	+ 6s.	+ 12s.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s.	£ s. d.	£ s.
15	3		3 6	3 12	3 18
16	3 5		3 10	3 16	4 2
17	3 10		3 18	4 4	4 10
18	4		4 7	4 13	4 19
19	4 6		4 11	4 17	5 3
20	4 13		4 15	5 1	5 7
21	4 15		4 18	5 4	5 10
22	4 19		5 1	5 7	5 13
23	5 3		5 5	5 11	5 17
24	5 7		5 9	5 15	6 1
25	5 11		5 13	5 19	6 5
26	5 15		5 17	6 3	6 9
27	5 19		6 1	6 7	6 13
28	6 6 6	6 6 6	6 5	6 11	6 17
29	6 14	6 14	6 9	6 15	7 1
30	7 1 6	7 1 6	6 13	6 19	7 5
31	7 9	7 9		7 3 6	7 9

Examination of Witnesses

MR. L. C. WHITE, *General Secretary, C.S.C.A.*

MR. G. F. GREEN, *Deputy General Secretary, C.S.C.A.*

MR. A. N. L. D. HOUGHTON, M.P., *General Secretary, I.R.S.F.*

MR. C. T. H. PLANT, *Deputy Secretary, I.R.S.F.*

MR. E. M. THOMAS, *General Secretary, M.L.S.A.*

MR. E. E. SLACK, *Executive Committee, C.C.O.A.*

on behalf of the Civil Service Alliance

Called and examined

579. *Chairman:* Mr. White, I will begin by asking whether you would care to amplify the information you have given us about the staff you cover, and your representative capacity.—*Mr. White:* No, Sir.

Chairman: The first few paragraphs are devoted to the Treasury interpretation of the Tomlin formula. Mr. Cash, I think, would like to ask you about that.

580. *Mr. Cash:* I gather you have seen the evidence given by Sir Edward Bridges?—Yes, Sir.

581. And do you agree with that view?—Not with his view about the Tomlin formula.

582. I am not quite clear whether you are objecting to the Tomlin formula *per se*, or to the interpretation of it, or to departures from it.—In the first place, we object to the formula because it has been interpreted in different ways at different times.

583. Then you are not objecting to the formula?—I would rather put it that we have not quite understood what the formula means. But it has been interpreted in different ways at different times, not solely by the Treasury, but by ourselves to suit prevailing circumstances. We have objected more particularly to the comparison with outside rates for comparable workers. I think that is the kernel of our objection.

584. If I may carry it one step further, do you expect to get from this Commission another formula?—Yes.

585. Will that formula be equally capable of being interpreted in different ways?—We hope not.

586. But is not that true of every formula?—I think, with great respect, we could devise a formula.

587. Which would stand up for how many years?—For some considerable time to come.

588. *Chairman:* Through the whole range?—No, Sir, we are speaking on behalf of the Alliance.

589. *Mr. Cash:* You want a series of formulae, then?—I think that is necessary.

590. Would you say that the events which have occurred since 1931 have rendered the Tomlin type of formula out of date?—Yes. I do not think it is possible to have a formula for our area of the Service which can be applied to the higher grades. I do

not think it is possible to have a formula which would be appropriate to clerical workers and equally appropriate to scientific or professional workers. If a formula of that sort had been possible we should not have been here this afternoon; it would have been the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council.

591. *Mr. Thorneycroft:* May I ask about your objection to the long term trend? You know that the Treasury have changed their view, at any rate so far as the lower paid staffs are concerned, and that they are prepared to see adjustments of pay at relatively short intervals. Does that mean that your differences with the Treasury have been narrowed?—Yes. We can move more frequently with wage claims based on outside rates than during the past within the Treasury's interpretation of the Tomlin formula.

592. Your proposal is that the pay of the staff you represent should follow movements in the wages index?—Yes, Sir.

593. Suppose we reached a point where there were fluctuations such as we experienced after the first world war. What would be your attitude in regard to the operation of your own proposal?—If wages went down substantially and continuously, we should not be protected from the effects of that by any existing formula.

594. *Chairman:* Your 5 per cent. would go either up or down? You are thinking in terms of 5 per cent.?—Perhaps not quite 5 per cent., but something of that order. We should hope that we should go down as slowly as we came up.

595. *Sir George Mowbray:* But as you were indicating just now that you were hoping it would enable you to make claims more frequently, presumably the reverse would also apply?—If it fluctuated to that extent.

596. *Mr. Menzler:* Do you remember the strong pressure of the Associations to stop the operation of the index in 1930?—Yes. I have no doubt we should get it again. There is nothing that can be done to stop people trying to resist wage cuts.

597. *Sir George Mowbray:* I wonder whether I might follow up the doctrine of fair comparisons, where you feel the Treasury arguments are unsound; I am referring here to paragraph 9, where you state that the rates paid by outside

employers tend to follow rates in the Civil Service. Could you give us some examples?

—If we take local authorities, the chairman of the body dealing with the equivalent of our Civil Service (National Whitley Council is, I believe, an ex-permanent secretary of the Treasury—I do not believe that his contacts with the Treasury have necessarily been broken off altogether nor that what goes on in the Treasury does not influence what goes on there. In the case of the insurance companies, we are advised by the Guild of Insurance Officials that in their negotiations they are constantly being told about what has happened in the Civil Service, and the Civil Service is pleaded as the justification for not going too far. The nationalised undertakings employ ex-highly placed civil servants. I believe the establishment officer of the Coal Board is an ex-establishment official of the Civil Service. And because the Civil Service is the largest employer of clerical labour, all the indications we get are that what the Treasury or the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal decide has a very big influence on what happens elsewhere.

598. *Chairman*: Is that true of industry?

—No, but clerks are not very well organised in industry.—*Mr. Houghton*: I think conditions especially in the wider range of public administration, tend to respond to what is happening in the Civil Service. For it is not until the Government makes or is forced by arbitration to make, a move that the general trend is indicated. Then there is a response in large fields of clerical labour, not where they are linked with industrial undertakings and wages, but in, for example, the banks, insurance companies and public administration. So we just go round in circles. Our contention is that when the State is the biggest employer of clerical labour in the country, it must have standards of its own. But that does not mean that the State should settle its own conditions without regard to general considerations of comparison with general conditions outside.

599. Is your trouble about comparison with industry that the field is not big enough or that the clerks are not organised?

—*Mr. White*: The clerks are not organised to any considerable extent. In the engineering industry, where they belong to the Union of which I am a member, their increases tend to follow the industrial side. But in large areas of clerical employment there is no trade union organisation at all, and I do not think that if we took what we term the largest employers of clerical labour and aggregated them we should still have a majority of clerical people accounted for. I notice that Sir Edward Bridges said that in the clerical field he thinks there is a certain amount of hesitation by some large bodies, each waiting to see what the other is doing. We think they do not wait so much to see

what the other is doing as to see what the Government is doing.—*Mr. Thomas*: I was lately the assistant secretary of the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council, and we used to receive enquiries from quite small firms up and down the country (industrial firms or large stores) asking about civil service pay claims, whether we had had a rise recently and how much. These enquiries usually came from the employers, who, after seeing something done in the Civil Service thought they would do something for their own people.

600. Then you say there is nowhere, outside the Service, proper negotiating machinery. Have not the local authorities got any?—*Mr. White*: Not that there is nowhere, but that on balance we think ours is the best negotiating machinery for clerical people. We know, for example, that in the railway industry the clerical staff are very strongly organised, but the impression we get is that the adjustments of pay of railway clerks generally form part of those for railway workers generally, and presumably a good deal of regard must be had there to the adjustments which are being made to the operatives. The fact that, say, a railway clerk has an increase which has to be related to that of an engine driver or a signaller does not in our view indicate that the pay of a clerical officer in the Civil Service is going to be determined or even seriously affected by what a railway clerk gets, because the circumstances are quite different.

601. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: But you would say that the negotiating machinery in the railway service is as good as that for the Civil Service?—I would be very tactless if I did not say it was better!

602. *Chairman*: Another reason you advance about the difficulty of comparison relates to the difference in grading arrangements. Are there not similar grading arrangements on an increasing scale in other fields of clerical employment?—No, Sir, not so far as we are aware; for example, the existence of the clerical assistant grade in the Civil Service, which takes the routine work away from the clerical officer, means that the clerical officer is doing a higher stratum of clerical work. In many spheres outside no such grade as the clerical assistant grades exists, and it means that the clerk covers the whole range. Again, at the other end you get the difficulty about banks. Because you call the man a bank clerk, the Treasury will say, it does not mean he is a clerk; he may also be an executive officer as we term it in the Civil Service. Unless you get precision in grading you cannot get precision in comparative rates of pay.

603. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Could Mr. White give us his ideas of the difference between clerical and executive work?—The executive officer has to take minor

decisions to a greater extent perhaps than the clerical officer. But there is a difficulty in small units, where a clerical officer handles a whole case, part executive and part clerical. I think it would be easier to define if we took a particular Department. For example, in the Assistance Board the clerical officer does a good deal of the paper work. He can also pay visits to clients if the principles of the case have first been determined by the executive officer. So the executive officer pays the first visit, gets the general outline of the case, then the repetitive visits are paid by the clerical officer.—*Mr. Houghton*: I can give you the classic description by a one-time director of establishments in the Inland Revenue: "The clerical officer works in blinkers, the executive officer is given his head". The work which a clerical officer may do may need quite complicated expertise, but he has not the discretion or independent judgment of an executive officer. In the income tax field, if you make a claim for expenses, wholly, necessarily and exclusively incurred in the performance of your office, and claim for running expenses of a motor car, it would be an executive officer, not a clerical, who would tell you what you could have. But where the rules are specific, though complicated, and when only the rules need be satisfied, that will be clerical.

604. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Would I be right in assuming that what you desire to see is a proper scale for the basic grades? And, having established that, it would be a matter for negotiation how those doing better work should be paid?—*Mr. White*: No, Sir. Every clerical officer, provided he passes the efficiency bar, should go to the maximum, regardless of whether at any particular time a Department wants him to do the best type of work in his office. So long as he can do it and is available to do it, then he should go to the maximum. As regards the distinction between the quality of the work, we prefer to rely on grading. That of course is a matter which is dealt with by the Departmental Whitley Councils in relation to departmental circumstances, and there is a large measure of agreement as to which work is clerical and which executive, in fairly large blocks; the big difficulty arises in smaller blocks.

605. *Chairman*: We have touched on the question of internal relativities. Would you amplify your statement on that?—I would like first to say something that we have not mentioned in the documents, but it arises from the statements made by Sir Edward Bridges and his colleagues the other day. It gave me the impression that the Treasury was saying that, using the concertina metaphor and taking the clerical officer as the base, the administrative officer and the executive officer had been pressed down, and that what you have to do is to

draw them up. But that is only half the story. If you take the other half of the Civil Service, that half of which the clerical officer is at the top, he also has been pressed down, probably more than the administrative or executive officer. The clerical officer has had an increase of about 63 per cent. above the pre-war (1939) figure. If you take the senior messenger, who before the war was known as an established messenger, his increase is 90 per cent; so is the senior paper keeper's; the chief paper keeper is 86 per cent.; the office keeper is 74 per cent. Members of those grades can be promoted to the clerical class. Going to the Post Office, the postal and telegraph officer, who according to the Treasury's Factual Memorandum was known before the war as the counter clerk and telegraphist, and who can be promoted clerical officer, is 81 per cent., and the postman is 105 per cent. The shorthand typist is 91 per cent., the copy typist is 111 per cent. and, as I say, the clerical officer is 63 per cent. We did not develop much of an argument in this case about pre-war relativities, because we have been inclined to the view for a long time that the relativities of 1938, which were produced by the circumstances of 1938, are not necessarily the relativities which are appropriate today, but, if there is to be an attempt to restore pre-war relativities within the Service, then it would be quite unfair to confine the operation to the grades above the clerical. So far as the other point is concerned, we cannot ignore the fact that the executive class has a salary which is mostly outside the sphere of the wages index, and that there has been a good deal of objection to applying the wages index in that area. If it were applied in the clerical area and nothing was done in the executive, then you would get a very violent disturbance of relativities; but if, on the other hand, the higher grades' organisations are right in contending that a salaries index for their people would produce roughly the same sort of result in relation to outside comparisons, I do not think that by following the wages index at our level, internal relativities would be very seriously upset.

606. I have noticed that in making your cases at arbitration you have referred to a relativity between clerks and Post Office manipulative.—I think the Treasury have always been rather blind about this. We have never said that there should be some defined relationship between the clerk and the manipulative, but we have always called attention to the fact that the manipulative can get promotion to clerk, and that the wages of the postal and telegraph officer for, I think, about 10 years are considerably higher than those of the clerical officer. A promotee very often has to stand still after coming into the clerical officer grade, because he is earning too much money.

What we have tried to persuade the Treasury—and I am bound to be fair and say what we have tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Arbitration Tribunal—was that this was wrong; that if this is a promotion, it follows that the promotee does better work, and that the rewards of the office should be accordingly—*Mr. Houghton*: This is the impact of what has been happening outside. The industrial worker, with his trade union, economic and political power in conditions of full employment, has been able to improve his real wages as well as his money wages. When comparisons are made between industrial wages and the position of civil servants who are very closely comparable with industrial workers, for example, the postman or the post office engineer, we get the horizontal impact of outside conditions, but it tapers off the higher up you get. It is a question of what is to be the relationship of higher to lower remuneration in the public service, but unhappily little is known of salaries or conditions of many executive and managerial people outside. But my income tax men know that in outside industry the higher up you go the more reward and amenities will be given to you in non-taxable form.—*Mr. White*: I wonder if I could follow up the Chairman's question, because I did notice that Sir Edward Bridges dealt with this point in reply to question 32, and his reply seemed to assume that what we have been arguing was relativity for relativity's sake. He made no mention of the material point, which is that when you bring people into a class on promotion you find that they are already earning more than they are going to get. People who have been in that class all their life also discover them to be getting more on promotion than they themselves are getting. That creates the difficulty which we have always had between the clerical officers and the postal and telegraph officer, plus the fact, of course, that if you go to a post office counter and see a postal and telegraph officer at work, you find it very difficult not to agree that he is a clerical worker as much as is a clerical officer.

607. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I understood you to say, Mr. White, that these transferees sometimes had to stand still because they were getting too much money. You did not really mean that, I take it?—No potential or actual clerical officer can ever be getting too much money! What he is getting is more money in the grade below than he will get at the corresponding age in the clerical grade.

608. *Mr. Cash*: Are there plenty of people seeking promotion?—Yes, Sir, and for two reasons: one is that the ultimate maximum will be above that of the

postal and telegraph officer, and the other (and equally important) is that a manipulative is subject to rather difficult hours at times and shift working and so on, so there is a considerable relief in that matter when he becomes a clerical officer.

609. Can you give me some idea of the number of promotions?—About 380 a year.

610. *Mrs. Wootton*: Coming to your own proposal, is your suggestion that once suitable rates have been settled, subsequent movements should be in rough correspondence with the wages index?—Yes.

611. Are there any other factors you would want to take into account?—We do not regard the wages index, of course, as precise or completely desirable, and, if in the course of time some other method developed, we should willingly discard the index for it. What we say is that at the moment, rough and ready as it is, it is the only thing which exists for the purpose of adjusting pay in relation to the cost of living, outside wage movements and that sort of thing. Of course, there could be other factors; for example, if the work were extended in scope so that the clerical officer became a more valuable agent, that would have to be dealt with quite outside the index; or if, for example, there was a great shortage of clerical officers and you could not get them at the salaries which were being paid, particularly at the lower levels, it would probably be necessary to adjust the scale without regard to the index.

612. *Chairman*: This special aspect is already included in the wages index; for instance miners have been given extra money for reasons unconnected with the cost of living?—For reasons not solely connected with the cost of living.

613. *Mrs. Wootton*: I would like to pursue this a little further, because in your memorandum you are emphatic that you do not want to make outside comparisons with particular supposedly comparable classes. Might not difficulty in recruitment arise from the fact that the Service is paying less for, shall we say, typists than comparable employment outside?—There could be various explanations. We should have to examine the situation to see whether the primary difficulty was wages; for example, we believe that there is some difficulty at the moment in recruiting young clerical officers from school, not primarily because of wages but because there is such a long period between leaving school, taking the examination, being declared successful and being appointed, whereas there is such a demand for their labour elsewhere that they can start almost immediately. Steps are therefore being taken to try to minimise the waiting period. Then there is not the same diffi-

culty of recruitment to the executive class, because the boy or girl can see in front of him a reasonable career; they do not see this when they are coming into the clerical class. But if we found that big employers of clerical labour outside were sweeping the market because of far higher rates of pay, then we should have to say that something must be done in the interests of the Service to get the people we wanted, regardless of the wages index.

614. So in an extreme case you would be prepared to let outside comparisons come in?—Not so much outside comparisons as the consequences to the Civil Service of what is going on outside.—*Mr. Plant*: Many young boy and girl clerical officers have to leave home and at the present very low rate of pay parents have got to subsidise them, especially those who come to live in London, because there is no appreciable London allowance. Thus a very high proportion resign because they can get as good employment, if not better, in their own locality and many employers give luncheon vouchers, which of course the Civil Service does not do over the age of 18.

615. *Mr. Cash*: But the outside employer tests his rates of pay by the fact of whether he can get the people he wants, and if he finds he is not getting the people he wants he may have to think again.—*Mr. White*: I do not think in present circumstances that could possibly apply to most civil service clerks. At the end of the war there were roughly 150,000 temporary clerks and many had burnt their boats outside and were anxious for security. It followed that there was a terrific demand for establishment in the clerical class, and there was no shortage whatever of recruits. There was nowhere else for them to go. When you have collected under war conditions a large number of men and women in that way, the fact that they are keen to have a job that gives them security when there is nothing visible for them outside does not, in my view, prove that recruitment is good. But if you take the school leaver we could at the present time build up quite a case on the difficulties that the Civil Service is experiencing in getting young clerical officers.

616. Would you welcome that intake if it were a substantial intake?—We have always welcomed the intake of youngsters, but our enthusiasm for it has necessarily had to be qualified by the fact that we have in our own memberships these thousands of temporary civil servants who are making first claims on us, and unfortunately the trade union has to look after existing people and not look quite so much after posterity.

617. Posterity has not done very much for the trade unions, and the trade unions do not do much for posterity, but the

Commission will have to look further ahead. —At the moment the Government itself is going further away from the idea of large-scale open recruitment.—*Mr. Houghton*: I think there is a difficulty in judging the adequacy of the pay of a man of fifty by reference to the flow of recruitment of boys and girls coming from school at sixteen. If the Treasury pursue their proposal to have what I call middle-aged recruitment, then the test of recruitment is going to be very much more pertinent.—*Mr. White*: I think we ought to add that the youngster who comes into the clerical class believing that he will stay long enough to reach the maximum is so lacking in initiative that he ought not to have been taken in at all. Probably all the entrants from school believe the clerical class is just a corridor through which they are passing to higher things, and the maximum of the scale has nothing to do with recruitment at all.

618. *Mrs. Wootton*: That raises another point. If you are going to use the wages index, you can only use it when you are satisfied you have got your initial rate right? —*Mr. Plant*: Yes.

619. I gather from what Mr. Plant has just said that you are not satisfied with your initial rates at the moment?—*Mr. White*: But we are assuming for the purpose of developing this case that at the point at which the new rates are introduced they are about right, and that thereafter we are dealing with changes which may affect them.

620. We have got to look at both. Can you give us any help as to how to get the initial rates right?—We have suggested there should be an entirely new approach to the salary problem for the majority of clerical officers, because of the age of entry, and we have suggested that the minority who still come in from the schools should have some addition to their existing minimum rate, because it is too low.

621. We shall come to that presently, and you will then perhaps be able to tell us more about the principles behind it. There is just this further point: you said you thought the wages index would be a suitable guide for some time—have you any sort of period in your mind, say five or ten years?—I had in mind that the wages index would do until something better came along. I cannot put it any higher than that, because we cannot see any immediate prospect of anything coming along.

622. *Sir George Mowbray*: Is your formula a purely automatic one?—No, Sir. What we suggest to the Commission is that if they see fit they should recommend in favour of the wages index as the yardstick, and that the detailed method of applying it should thereafter be a matter

for negotiation between the Treasury and the Associations. In the first place we should have to decide what sort of movement in the index would justify an increase, or even a decrease. We would not start off by saying that every time the index moved by any given number of points there must be an adjustment. We should have to take into account the factors which led up to the movements, and it might be that the actual application of the index would vary from time to time.

623. Then you are introducing the factors which are moving the index as well as the index itself?—To some extent they are bound to come in.—*Mr. Houghton*: What we want, Sir, is a barometer. The Tomlin formula said: "... should reflect what may be described as the long-term trend both in wage rates and in the economic condition of the country." It added a rider that civil service conditions should not be related too closely to factors of a temporary or passing character. In general terms there seems to be no objection to that. Our problem is how to apply it in present-day conditions. And the wages index is the barometer, the index of all that is happening in what we regard as a comparable sphere of employment, at broadly the same economic level.

624. *Mr. Cash*: You ignore recruitment?—I am ignoring everything at the present moment, except what the wages weather is like, because that, it seems to us, is the only way in which the civil servant can be given a square deal in relation to other bodies of workers. He is not in an industry where a profit and loss account can govern his remuneration. He does not belong to a trade union which can threaten to strike a few days before Christmas nor to one which can exert monopolistic and syndicalistic powers over its employer. Virtually speaking, the civil servant can get nothing except by persuasion and arbitration. The community has a responsibility towards this helpless servant who is so lacking in powers of attack and even of self defence. So what is happening outside is the broad indication of what ought to be happening inside the Civil Service and our barometer. The next question is, how do we read it? Obviously we must flatten out the curve. We do not want fluctuations up and down to be too violent or too frequent.

625. *Chairman*: One difficulty about the wages index is that it covers a big range of wages; it is an average figure. Are you going to leave that out altogether?—We acknowledge that, but we know of no other barometer which we should find intelligible, much less acceptable.

626. *Sir George Mowbray*: What I asked was whether there should be automaticity at some stage up or down?—No.

627. Yet, if I may say so, if you specifically attempt to tie wages to what you call a barometer and I would call a thermometer, that is itself automatically dependent on the weather or the temperature, and unless you are bringing in some of the outside factors, I should have thought it was very hard to get away from automaticity.—When you look at a barometer you do not automatically put your overcoat on, you probably exercise your own judgment by just looking outside and saying that it looks better than the barometer says. What we want the Commission to recommend, if I may say so with respect, is that the index should be the guide. There may be other considerations to take into account at any particular time. The wage index may have moved upwards or downwards on account of some substantial content of it which may not reflect conditions over the wages front as a whole. But we want freedom to exercise our judgment on both sides as to the response that we shall make to the index.

628. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: But even as a guide, Mr. Houghton, you would be prepared to accept the implications of your proposal, whether up or down.—*Mr. White*: What I said was that if wages started to go down substantially, and kept on going down, whether we had the wages index or not...—*Mr. Houghton*: In a deflationary period we should get a cut again as we got last time.—*Mr. White*: The wages index might be a protection in those circumstances, because in the first instance the cut would be delayed, and secondly it would be regulated.

629. But I think we ought to be quite clear on this point. Your principle involves movement in a downward direction as well as upward. It would be a matter of negotiation, of course.—Yes.

630. Suppose in the last two or three years of an officer's service there were rather violent fluctuations downward; would not these have unfortunate repercussions on staff on the eve of retirement?—*Mr. Houghton*: Yes, but since the pay in the last three years of service is averaged for superannuation that would even out any effect of a reduction if there was one in, say, the last twelve months of service. And of course there are pay increases that have their beneficial effect on pension calculations.

631. *Mr. Menzler*: Supposing the index pointed to a 10 per cent. all round increase, do you envisage a 10 per cent. increase over the whole range of people for whom you are speaking today?—*Mr. White*: That is a point of great difficulty. We have in fact taken expert opinion and we are advised that, although of course it is not mathematically correct, overall it is not too far out, and we are strengthened in that

view by the fact that the Treasury themselves accepted completely the application of the wages index to the pay of civil servants in 1951 on that very basis up to £500 a year. There was never any question in negotiation with the Treasury about whether, once the salary range had been determined, the percentage should be applied universally throughout that range.

632. *Chairman*: That was rather a war-time measure, was it not?—No, Sir, 1951.

633. The Korean war?—1951-52. I think the Korean war is about the only thing that has not been mentioned since in explanation of why the Treasury did it.—*Mr. Houghton*: It was purely political, in my opinion. It was a new Government, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer wanted to do a big thing in a big way right at the outset, and he did it, but has not done it since.

634. *Mr. Menzler*: What is puzzling is this: if you break down the index, men, women and juveniles and all workers, you get very different rates, and it is notorious that junior people and unskilled people, tend to get bigger increases than more senior people, but this flat increase you are advocating would cut across the social tendencies of the times. You would be stabilising your increases, whereas outside, far from everybody going up 10 per cent., what would happen is that the increase outside would be 12½ per cent. to 7½ per cent. as you go up the scale of earnings. Does that not seem a statistical weakness of this method of a uniform percentage?—My answer is if the wages index were taken as a general guide, the next thing is to decide how much notice one takes of it. It might have to be broken down in looking at the conditions of its application, as indeed we did from time to time when we were discussing war bonus arrangements. If we were dealing with a cold war bonus or a wage inflation bonus, or whatever name one would like to give to a supplementary element in civil service pay, then of course it should be much more quickly responsive to things happening outside, but, since we are dealing with consolidated pay, one has to be more careful about changing it. These are troublesome factors I freely admit, but we do not know where else to start from, but we must start with some factor that sets the discussion going.

635. *Chairman*: What you are suggesting is that you use the wages index as a starter, and then you might have different formulae for different levels of your clientele?—*Mr. White*: We have explored this unofficially with Ministry of Labour officials because we have been conscious all the way through of the apparent weakness created by the point Mr. Menzler makes. We were told, however, that the system of "weighting" which is applied to the crude

statistics on which the index is based does away a good deal with this objection. We still admit there is the objection, applying it, for example, as it was applied in 1952. You could have ultimately rather a bad effect inside the Civil Service by just doing it that way regardless of what is happening outside but what we want is something to work on, and we think we would be greatly advanced if the Royal Commission were to say the index is the raw material on which you work for the calculation of adjustments.

636. You have discussed this with the Ministry of Labour?—We have been pursuing this for a very long time.

637. It might be worth while for us to do the same.—I think if you get any information about the "weighting" of the index, that would tend to remove some of the objections Mr. Menzler quite rightly puts.

638. *Mr. Menzler*: I have one further question. You say you know of no other method of measuring outside wages and prices and so on. Why do you prefer the wages to the retail price index?—In the first place we were told in 1951 by the Treasury that it was fortunate that we had taken the wages index and not the retail price index because that would be completely unacceptable to the Government, and we have always understood that there is a fundamental objection on the part of the Government to relating pay solely to movements in the cost of living. We have also taken account of the fact that the Tomlin Commission itself rejected any cost of living adjustment and went on to say that by relating pay to outside wage movements you did in fact take account indirectly of the cost of living.

639. *Chairman*: There are two more general questions. The first is this. You think your pay should be geared to industrial workers—would you agree that other conditions should be similarly geared?—We have always been in favour of the pay of the industrials being geared to us, and the more rapidly they approach it the more pleased we are.

640. You will also have to consider hours of work, sick leave, annual leave, superannuation?—We hope that the gap that has existed will be narrowed and ultimately disappear, but of course in the conventional trade union direction of bringing the other people up.

641. *Mrs. Wootton*: Mine is rather a fundamental question. We have talked all this time about the wages index. If there were a salaries index or even a clerical salaries index, would you regard that as preferable?—It is very difficult to say without knowing the nature of the index. We have ourselves had a good deal of discussion about the possibility of a wages

index and a salaries index existing together, but I think it would be rather premature to express an opinion until we know how the salaries index was compiled. We have a fairly good idea, so far as laymen can have, about how the wages index is compiled.

642. *Chairman*: If there was a satisfactory index, you would have no objection in principle to using it just because it related to outside clerical employment?—*Mr. Houghton*: We could not agree to a clerical salaries index because the State employment of clerks would be a predominant factor in it. Any index that we have must be sufficiently widely drawn to enable outside conditions to reflect themselves in it. A salaries index at an appropriate salary level yes, but we think the clerical officer is more allied in his general economic conditions and wages to the broad mass of the industrial workers.

643. *Mrs. Wootton*: So you would not object to using a salaries index if it was a salaries index of a general nature in an appropriate pay range?—*Yes. Mr. White*: We have been talking all the time of a salaries index and not a clerical salaries index.

644. *Yes, I appreciate that. In present circumstances when there is no such index would you think the figures of salaries pub-*

lished in the Blue Book on National Income and Expenditure would be of any use in determining clerical rates in the Service?

—*We have not had to consider the problem very deeply because the wages index does cover broadly the range we represent here, but other organisations in the Service in the salaried area have gone very deeply into this, and I have no doubt they will want to say something to the Commission about it. I think it would be a little presumptuous if I attempted to express a view.*

—*Mr. Houghton*: Some of us will be coming back when the executive class comes to the Commission, and as we cover in the Inland Revenue Staff Federation both clerical and executive staff, we have an interest in the salaries index too.

645. I just want to get clear whether you would find those figures interesting, and if not why not, and your answer is you do not find them interesting because your rates are not higher?—*We are not interested; we find greater satisfaction from the wages index.*

646. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: You would agree the compilation of any salaries index could be influenced appreciably by the indifferent organisation there is among salaried workers?—*Yes. Indeed we press for the wages index because the wages index covers well organised workers which nothing else at that level does.*

(The witnesses withdrew)

(Adjourned until Friday, 26th March, 1954, at 11 a.m.)

FIFTH DAY

Friday, 26th March 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Examination of Witnesses

MR. L. C. WHITE, *General Secretary, C.S.C.A.*

MR. G. F. GREEN, *Deputy General Secretary, C.S.C.A.*

MR. C. T. H. PLANT, *Deputy Secretary, I.R.S.F.*

MR. E. M. THOMAS, *General Secretary, M.L.S.A.*

MR. E. E. SLACK, *Executive Committee, C.C.O.A.*

on behalf of the Civil Service Alliance

Called and examined

647. *Chairman:* I gather you would like to start by giving a summary of your proposals, Mr. White?—*Mr. White:* In order to have clearly on the record for the subsequent information of the Commission our view about the wages index, perhaps I could summarise our position.

We make no claim that the index is in any sense a precision instrument. It is a record of what happens to the wages of some 13,000,000 workers. We are proposing that it should be used as a guide to what should subsequently happen to the wages of a different section of workers. But in spite of the fact that the two purposes are different, we believe that, even with its imperfections, the wages index is the only piece of machinery that exists to serve the purpose we have in mind.

We do not believe that by calculating the percentage change in the index and applying it as a percentage increase to salaries and wages within a pay range up to about £600 per annum, the result is so rough and ready as might appear on the surface. The "weighting" process applied by the Ministry has an effect which the Commission itself will no doubt be able to test by

enquiries from the Ministry of Labour. Moreover, adjustments could be made, not to the published index, but to the method of applying it as a guide to future wage changes, which could give it greater precision.

We make it clear that the use of the index would not be automatic according to any predetermined amount of increase or decrease. There would necessarily be discussions between the Treasury and the associations concerned as to whether the movement in any period had been sufficient to justify a revision of pay, and if there was anything exceptional about the main causes of any movement which made the use of the index inappropriate to that particular situation. Normally, however, the index would reflect changes in pay levels due to circumstances that were common among the workers covered by the index and those within the area of the Civil Service represented by the Alliance, and its use as a guide to pay revisions to be made in that area of the Service would be justified.

We recognise that this is a two way proposition. If there were a substantial and continuous decrease in wages reflected

by the index, a downward movement would be as much a possibility as an upward one in the reverse circumstances. We do not believe that if there were a substantial decline in real wages generally in the country the Civil Service would be immune from reduction merely because there had been no index available to the Treasury to measure increases due when the movement of outside wages had been in an upward direction. Indeed the existence of the index could serve to regulate any downward movement and would certainly delay it if it were applied in the downward direction after the change had taken place outside as it has been applied when outside wages have moved in an upward direction. We emphasise that we are dealing here with the wages index and not an "earnings index," wages and earnings being two quite separate things.

Recognising that the Government is in a different position from that of a private employer in dealing with wage claims, since the additional cost of any new increase has to be borne directly by the community as a whole, we consider it essential that there should be a precise guide to how and when changes should be effected and that it should be as intelligible to the community as to the Civil Service. The present position is chaotic, as is exemplified by the following facts. At the end of 1951, the Government agreed with the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council to an all-Service "pay addition" based on the percentage increase in the wages index during that year. In the autumn of 1952, the Staff Side made a new claim based on the increase in the index during 1952 which by the end of that year was approximately 7 per cent. The Government refused on that occasion to entertain this method of pay adjustment at all and the civil service trade union movement was fragmented. The various unions made their separate claims. As is customary, the claim of the clerks was first considered among those of the general service grades. It was for a 7 per cent. increase. The Treasury rejected the claim and offered nothing but a "rounding-up" which was to take place in the process of consolidating the pay addition granted a year earlier with basic pay. The claim was taken to arbitration and an award given which, although it substantially improved the Treasury's offer, appeared to have no clear relationship to the precise claim of 7 per cent. made, and bore all the evidence of being a compromise between the three arbitrators.

The clerical award was used by the Treasury as the basis for offers to other grades whose claims were still outstanding. In the case of the technical class the Treasury's offer was that £549 16s. should be increased to £570—an offer clearly based on the fact that the Tribunal had increased

the clerical officer's £549 16s. to £570. The offer was rejected and within the last few weeks the Arbitration Tribunal has increased the technical officer's £549 16s. to £585. Thus we have a situation in which all claims were made initially on a uniform basis, i.e. the movement of outside wages. The claim produced an increase of £20 4s. in the case of the clerical officer, and £35 4s. in the case of the technical officer both of whom were previously on the same rate of pay.

The award was given three weeks ago, nearly 18 months after the claim was initially made on behalf of the technical grades as well as the rest of the Service. The award is being regarded by the clerical officers as the first of a new round of pay claims and awards, and the Alliance organisations are being urged by their members to go to arbitration on the contention that people who were getting £550 approximately 18 months ago on the technical side are now to get £585 whilst those on the clerical side are only getting £570. It is almost impossible to persuade the clerks that this recent award is part of the round which was started by their own claim at the beginning of 1953. It is quite impossible to explain how a uniform claim for all grades based on a single consideration, i.e. the movement of the wages index, produces two different results at the same salary level.

648. You would apply any constant percentage shown by the wages index throughout the whole range?—The whole range with which we are concerned, which is up to £570.

649. *Sir George Mowbray*: Do you make any suggestions as to whether a similar percentage should be constantly applied at the higher levels?—No, Sir. We do not represent the higher levels and they have their own views, but I can say that there have been a number of discussions between the higher grades' organisations and ourselves before we came to this Commission, and it may be put to you that in default of anything better for the time being the higher grades would accept a projection of the wages index percentage increase.

650. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Your point is that when you have two men on £550, a common 7 per cent. claim results in one going to £590 and another to £570 and that is obviously an anomaly?—Yes.

651. *Sir George Mowbray*: I gather that the wages index in general should be treated as a guide to a percentage increase or decrease?—Yes.

652. And you then suggest that any particular movement in the wages index should make what I would call a *prima facie* case for fresh negotiations but not for any specific amount?—Not any specified amount.

653. *Mr. Menzler*: You remember yesterday I asked you why you preferred the wages index to the interim index of retail prices. You referred to the Tomlin Commission and the Government's observations on the occasion of the pay addition settlement. Now the objection to the use of the old cost of living index was that it imparted a degree of rigidity into the wages structure. Why does not the adoption of the wages index have a similar effect?—There are three considerations which we have had in mind. The first is that when you operate on the cost of living index the index goes down and you go down with it. In the case of wages our view is that there would first of all be considerable reductions in earnings as distinct from wages, if it became necessary to bring down the total level of remuneration, and the drop would not be reflected in the wages index. The second but most important thing is this. Before wages can come down there would have to be negotiations between employers and much stronger unions outside the Civil Service than we have in the Civil Service. To be perfectly frank about it, we would hope that this stronger force outside would put up a stouter resistance than we should be able to do. The third point is that assuming eventually the unions have to concede wage reductions, following the precedent in the reverse case we would still be somewhat behind the actual downward trend and that would in our view give us some freedom from the rigidity which the straight application of the cost of living index gave us in the period up to 1934.—*Mr. Thomas*: The rigidity in connection with the cost of living index was the automatic link between wages and that index, and I think we would say if there was a direct link between our wages and the index of wages then there would be rigidity, but we are not asking for that. We are saying you should only use it as a guide. There is then no rigidity in either case whether you are linked to the prices or to the wages index.

654. *Mrs. Wootton*: The 1952 Press statement of the Treasury at the time of the pay addition settlement says that the staff had proposed standing machinery for the next three years to give effect to automatic increases for each five points by which the wages index rose, but that "the Official Side felt that such automatic machinery which seemed to envisage ever-mounting prices and wages was uncalled for and unacceptable."

I would very much like to have your answer to that objection because a process of regulating wages by a wages index will immediately be criticised on the ground that it is the 100 per cent. foolproof recipe for inflation.—*Mr. White*: We were told by the Treasury at the time that apart from other difficulties the fact was that a new

Government had just come in with a Chancellor who had made it quite clear that one of his objectives would be to reduce costs and to stem inflation, so for the Government itself to enter into an agreement with its own employees that envisaged for at least three years a steady upward movement would be inconsistent with the Government's own declarations, and that, for political reasons as well as other reasons, that sort of approach was quite impracticable.

655. What would your answer be if the process is criticised on the grounds of being inflationary?—We do not think it would be any more inflationary than the present haphazard method, because if we do not have a wages index but circumstances emerge in which outside wages are moving up, we should, of course, hope to succeed by some other method in going up too. The fact that it is done in a regulated way would not make the process any more inflationary.

656. *Chairman*: Another aspect of this rigidity affects internal relativities. For instance internal relativities between the clerical and typing group would be fixed for all time if you used this method?—Yes.

657. And what do you feel about internal relativities between your group and specialist staff, for example, scientific assistants?—We are not so concerned here with that sort of relativity as with the relativity between the clerk earning a given sum and the outside worker earning the same, but within the area of about £600 a year there would be no disturbance of the relativity between the clerk and the specialist if this method were applied. What is not clear, of course, and the organisations will be saying something to the Commission about it, is how you deal with the similar problem at the level above £600, but we have every reason to believe that when the higher grades come before you they will expound a proposition which will certainly not leave them relatively worse off, because we have never yet known the higher grades leave themselves relatively worse off on any proposition!

658. Do you think it likely that the clerical world outside would also follow the wages index?—No, Sir. I think we must be quite definite about our views as to the clerical people outside. In the first place we do not believe that 50 per cent. are organised at all in any sort of unit. Among those who are organised there is quite a considerable question mark about some of the organisations, the house unions in the banks and so on, and until the outside clerical people can organise themselves as well as the railway clerks or the civil service clerks, I am afraid they must stew in their own juice!

659. *Mrs. Wootton*: There was one small point left over from yesterday. I think I understood you to say that you did not want to pay any heed to salary figures in the Blue Book on National Income and Expenditure because the level was too high. We were looking at this again and making a very rough calculation with the number of salary earners on census figures, and on that basis the total salary figure in the Blue Book divided by the number on the census figures gives you an average figure of about £550, which is not I think out of your range?—No.

660. Do you want to add anything to that answer you gave yesterday?—No, we think that as the wages index exists for people up to about £600 that is the handiest thing that we have and it is much more convenient. We have to remember that when we are dealing with salaried people in the under £500 area we are dealing with the very people we have been speaking about, the unorganised people, clerks and people of that sort whose salaries tend to be depressed.

661. The wages index would be more up to date?—More up to date, and, we must confess, we hope much more helpful.

662. *Mr. Hall*: I have one more point that arises out of the statement that Mr. White made this morning. As I understood the position, you take the view that the wages index measures rates of wages and that earnings may move more widely than rates. Therefore by adjusting the pay of clerical officers to the wages index they would not get the increase when earnings were higher or the decrease when earnings were falling. Therefore it might to some extent overcome this element of rigidity?—Yes.

663. *Chairman*: Could we now pass to the proposals for the late entrant. There seem to be two points on this, one, the alteration of structure, and, secondly, improved rates of pay. I wonder whether you would not obtain the same objective on structure by bringing mature entrants in at the 27 age rate?—We are against that. At the present time a large number of mature people come in at a given rate on the scale which is the 25 age point. The psychological effect is very bad. Men of 50 or 55 come into the Civil Service to be clerks for the first time and discover that they are being treated as people of 25. They are more concerned in some ways with the fact that it is the 25 age point than with the money involved because they consider themselves treated as almost apprentices in the profession in which they have been for many years.

664. Under your proposal they will in fact come in at age 27?—That is so, but it would be a scale unrelated to an age point.

665. *Mr. Hall*: On the ordinary scales there are annual increments. Would it help this psychological point if mature people came in, say, for two years at a certain rate and then had an increase so that there was a difference on paper at least in the incremental arrangements?—I do not think so, because we have to bear in mind that when people come into the Civil Service they very quickly absorb civil service procedure. If this particular category discovered they were getting an increment every two years whereas the overwhelming majority were getting one every year they would not regard it as a contribution to their feelings, but as a lack of contribution to the yearly income!

666. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Your proposal sets out the separate scale as £460 to £640. If you had a late age entrant coming in say, at age 50, would he start at £460?—That is our proposal.

667. So you could still have ground for disgruntlement when a man of 50 finds after he has settled down that he is getting so much less than someone else of equivalent age who had been in the Service?—I do not think that would be the same ground for disgruntlement. It is one thing to be disgruntled because you are coming into a profession which you have been following for years and being treated as if you were an immature person of 25, but it is a different thing to find that, at, say, 50 you are coming into that profession and are getting the same rates of pay as another man of about 40. You are both mature people, and I do not think the difference between 40 and 50 is material. We cannot carry the age pay too far and indeed, after 50 you may have fewer responsibilities, if you have the children keeping you!

668. You do not seem to apply your principle to shorthand typists?—The difficulty about doing anything about shorthand typists is this. First we have to remember that the shorthand typist has a relationship to the clerical officer, and second, that the future of the shorthand typist grade is not so clear as that of the clerical officer. We have, I suppose, about 60,000 or more clerical officers of mature age, and we know the Treasury proposes to bring in some by a new method of recruitment. It seems fairly clear that the recruitment of the school leaver is going to be very small in the future, but we cannot say exactly what is the position of the shorthand typist because they can come in at any age from 16 to 60. Under the Treasury's proposal for future recruitment of a considerable number of clerical officers, the minimum age of entry will be 40, so that the position is a good deal more precise.

669. Now, Mr. White, it is an obvious pre-requisite to the operation of your

principle that there shall be a set of scales agreed at the time that it is first applied. We were wondering on what principles you had reached your scale of £195 to £640. Are those figures based on outside comparisons?—The £195 minimum is the existing scale adjusted because we feel that more money is needed for such new entrants as we are going to get and we think that it should be about £25 up on the existing scale. When it comes to the older persons' scale, we have not been guided very much by the existing scale, although we have not of course regarded it as irrelevant. We have paid some regard to the starting pay of older people who will come into the clerical grade, not from outside the Service, but by promotion from inside and so on. We have taken into account rates of pay of other grades and we think that a scale going up to about £640 is right for what we call an ageless scale in the sense that it is not tied to any age. We have had to take account too of the fact that clerical assistants may get promotion, and therefore the scale that we have proposed will have to be of the right sort to enable them to go into it with an increase on promotion.

670. No outside comparisons have influenced you?—No.

671. *Chairman*: The minimum is really related to the difficulty of obtaining young recruits.—We think that the present minimum and the lower points are too small. We do not say that that is the only reason for the difficulty in getting recruits, but it is a contributing reason.

672. *Sir Alexander Gray*: What kind of people want to come into the Service at 50 in normal times?—I am bound to say that we do not quite know, because there has been no recruitment of this sort so far. We were very surprised when the Treasury told us of their plan and that they wanted to discuss it with us. One of the things that we asked was who are these older people who are available for an entirely new career. We are frankly apprehensive that the sort of people who might be available are the people who fail everywhere else. We have to be quite emphatic that if there is to be a scheme of this sort it should not be a sort of dustbin for the clerical failures of the commercial and industrial world. The Treasury tell us, of course, that it is part of the Government's plan for finding suitable employment for older people. As a plan that is extremely good, but they must be in our view people who are up to the standard of good class clerks.

673. *Chairman*: You did mention that you took account of other rates inside the Service. Could you define them a little more closely?—We work on the basis

to some extent of our existing scale, and we have taken the scales of pay of grades which are promotable to the clerical grade, certain Post Office grades, messengerial grades and so on. We have assumed that in the majority of cases they will all be people over 30 or so, and we have a scale here that would give the increase on promotion from the grade below and enable them to fit in.

674. You mention in your memorandum that the quality of clerical work has improved since before the war. Could you amplify that?—In the first place there is a great deal more contact between the clerical officer and the public, in Departments like the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance or the National Assistance Board. This personal contact does mean that the man who is doing the job has, as far as possible, got to see it through. He cannot, if he is dealing with a customer at the counter, cut short the interview at a certain stage and say "I am sorry, but we are getting on to executive work and I must go and fetch somebody else". It is a fact that in these local offices the clerk masters the whole of the job and carries it through. If you were to examine at the end how much was executive and how much clerical, you would find that he had been overlapping a very good deal from the trade union point of view and had been in the wrong several times!

675. *Mr. Cash*: When we come to the executive class may we not be told that owing to the shortage of clerical officers a lot of executives have to do clerical work?—I should be surprised!

676. There is a shortage of clericals.—There is a shortage of clerical officers, not a shortage of clericals because of the large number of temporary clerks. You have the temporary clerks grades I and II who can be employed on clerical officer work.—*Mr. Plant*: In a Tax Office the clerical officers at the counter never go and call the next higher grade if they are competent to deal with a job. Similarly in the Collector of Taxes Office it is the assistant collector, the clerical officer, who goes out on door to door calls serving the final notice and making the distraint and if he has a difficult distraint, he does not go back to the office to fetch the executive man. He does it himself and if he does it well so much the better.

677. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I suppose that if it can be proved that the counter clerk is spending the greater part of his time on superior work over a period, recognition can be given in the way of promotion?—*Mr. White*: If it could be shown that the volume of executive work in a particular local office was greater than provided for by the complement, the local people

would certainly ask for some upgrading, but there is bound to be a certain amount which cannot be brought into one job.

678. And the executive spends a certain amount of his time on lower grade work?—You will probably be told by the Society of Civil Servants that he spends all his time on higher grade work!—*Mr. Thomas*: Attitudes have changed as between before the war and the present time. In the days of great unemployment, the tendency was to get the people into the office, deal with them and get them out, but now anybody in a local office of a Government Department can always be certain that during the day he will get enquiries of all kinds. The clerical officer is a mine of information. He does not send the people away, he gives a little help and passes them on.

679. *Chairman*: They probably expect more and you are doing your best to help them?—Yes.

680. *Mr. Menzler*: You referred, Mr. White, to the difficulty about getting staff to come to London. Have you any comments on arrangements for removal expenses?—*Mr. White*: No.—*Mr. Thomas*: Except to say that we discuss removal expenses with the Treasury but the Treasury has never taken the view that an individual should be wholly compensated for the cost of the removal.

681. Are you aware of any outside practices that are more generous than those of the Civil Service?—Yes, in some cases you get firms buying houses for people.—*Mr. Plant*: When a bank transfers an officer he is generously reimbursed. I think I am right in saying that the civil servant loses 15 per cent. of the legal costs when he is compelled to move. We also have a number of cases of men who have got houses and are now having to sell them (because of a move) at a lower price than they gave. That is a tremendous hardship, and men are out of pocket to the tune of £200 or £300 over a period of three or four years because of several moves in which they have been involved.

682. *Chairman*: These matters are better dealt with not by pay increases but by improved removal expenses?—We are endeavouring to do that all the time, and I am not suggesting that removal expenses are ungenerous, but it is a fact that when a man is moved he is out of pocket.

683. I have one small point. Is it your impression, Mr. White, that more and more the Service is being organised into small units, and that the number of small units is increasing?—*Mr. White*: It has in recent years, but I do not know how long the process will go on—the setting up of the Ministry of National Insurance was a very big addition.

684. *Mr. Cash*: Could you tell us something about your proposals for shorthand typists?—What we have done is to put scales for the shorthand typists on the basis that the scale we propose for the clerks is sound and we have tried as far as possible to give effect to our view that the shorthand typist is as good and useful an agent as the clerical officer without the addition of proficiency allowances. We also assume that now there is not the same difficulty in recruiting shorthand typists the Government will make sure that throughout the Service she is right up to the mark. We have of course also to maintain the arrangement that in the early years of service the shorthand typist, age for age, should be slightly better off than the clerical officer because of the particular skill which she brings into the Service.

685. You are not going to pay any more regard to outside rates for shorthand typists than for clerical officers?—No, Sir, because we have to bear in mind that the shorthand typist is promotable to clerical officer. She has two opportunities of going up, either to the clerical side or the supervisory side in her own sphere, and we must always regard her as a potential clerical and executive officer.

686. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Do you know, Mr. White, if outside shorthand typists on appointment are subject to as difficult a test as in the Civil Service?—*Mr. Green*: This is a field where market conditions for the job apply. During the war and immediately following the war, the available material was of very low grade in the Civil Service and outside, and so the Treasury took the raw material and trained them up. Then they found, to their consternation, that outside industry attracted them more because of the other conditions of service; and so outside industry benefitted from the fact that they had had State trained operatives made available to them. It is only recently that the commercial training schools have opened again, fully staffed, and they are providing young people who have the basic technical requirements for entry both into the Civil Service and to outside industry. The Treasury are now stiffening their demands on initial entry into the Civil Service in a temporary capacity, and no one who has not acquired the grade I standard will be admitted as an established typist or shorthand typist in future. In addition they have to undergo a small scholastic test. The situation in the Civil Service has hardened so far as proficiency on entering is concerned. I am of course in no position to say that the same thing is not happening in industry and commerce, because the commercial colleges, for example, prepare their pupils to a given standard and even take steps to help them into jobs in industry and commerce. To some extent they give a certain guarantee

that the material they are offering is up to the standard which outside industry and commerce will require. Then, of course, many of these outside firms now have their own training schemes. They follow the example set by the Civil Service so that their specialist requirements receive attention. So on the whole I would say that, the market having changed to the benefit of the employers, whilst higher standards are being exacted in the Civil Service, they are being exacted by outside firms as well. In effect, the market requirement for conditions of employment is following the old fashioned law of supply and demand.

687. You propose there should be five grades for shorthand typists. Is that not rather high?—This is our dilemma. In the early years of their service shorthand typists obviously have something more to offer than the young clerical officer straight from school. They have an additional skill, which in the recent past has been very highly valued. In the Civil Service we have built up on a basic rate and, in addition, to keep shorthand typists and typists, to get them up to a certain standard of proficiency and to keep it, a system of proficiency allowances has been introduced. We think that there is a limit to which you can take proficiency allowances as a basic element in the wage structure. If you are insisting on entry on certain standards of proficiency we think it is much better that you should offer a scale of pay; but if you recognise that, in order to keep people up to the mark you have to provide some sort of incentive, then it is better to have differentiated rates than to have these few shillings a week added by way of allowances. By and large, the tradition in the Civil Service is one of hostility to *ad hoc* allowances for special merit. We are conditioned to scales which reflect by annual increments improved proficiency and the added value of experience. We think that is not too bad a system. But practically, our difficulty has been to marry the shorthand rates to what we consider to be the comparable clerical officer rates—and without reducing wages—to equate the shorthand typist more with the clerical officer. The shorthand typists enjoy the added value of their skills in the early years of service when they are doing straightforward shorthand and typing duties; but those who do not leave the service for marriage or other reasons have a yearning to become fully fledged clerical officers. At the moment, they have two opportunities open to them; they can become promoted to clerical officers, in which case the State loses their skill, or to clerical officer secretaries—when they have the pay and status of clerical officers but use their skills. We are met with an insistent and incessant demand from our typists and shorthand typists that they should in fact be regarded as clerical

agents, with additional skills. Of course, we have to square that contention with the view of the clerical officer who says that up to a certain limit he is learning the job, but when he has passed that limit he is very superior indeed.

If the Commission were to suggest a reduced number of grades we would not be opposed to that suggestion, because it was not our aim to maximise the number of rates; but there is the practical problem that, unless you are prepared to be generous and to increase the actual cash value of the allowances at the present time, to reduce the number of rates and to realise our objectives would mean taking money away from people.

688. Why do you feel it would take four standards above the basic to reflect that generosity that you are anxious to see applied?—It is an old fashioned idea that if a revolutionary suggestion is too revolutionary people may not accept it readily, and you have to provide easements to prepare the ground. For myself, I should be prepared to see the four steps of £15 which would represent a fourth standard of proficiency reduced to three at £20.

689. Perhaps I might be allowed to round this off. Assuming the presence of these four scales above the basic, I suppose you would provide for four tests? What would they be?—Two for copy typing, both at 50 words a minute, one with a given percentage of error and the other with a lower percentage; and two for shorthand, both at 120 words per minute, one with a given percentage of error and the other with a lower percentage.

690. I think you will agree that, on the face of it, to have five scales for more or less identical grades does seem a lot.

691. *Chairman*: One advantage of the proficiency allowance is the fact that it is rather easier to take it away.—It is a good theoretical point, but in practice I think no Department, once having conceded the allowance, would consider taking it away.

692. Is it permanent?—Yes, so long as the person who receives the allowance continues on those duties. The presumption is that once she has reached a certain standard of proficiency she will maintain that standard whilst she is on the job.

693. *Mr. Burman*: I am a little worried as to whether there is a conflict between the purely manual skills represented by the proficiency tests and the semi-clerical skills. Is there not an element of clerical skill which you are trying to take care of in these rates?—I think there is.

694. Are you trying to slip in a reward for the skills apart from the purely typing

and shorthand skills?—No. We had in the past grades of clerk typist and clerk shorthand typist where the work did consist of so much clerical work and so much shorthand or typing work. You still get many offices up and down the country where the typist or shorthand typist is actually only employing her skill for part of the day. The other part she is engaged on clerical functions which could be performed by a clerical assistant or clerical officer.

695. One knows that one can have a shorthand typist who is superb in the technical skills but who mentally is not so helpful as the one who can remember various things, find things out and help the person who is dictating in so many ways.—One would not dare to go to any meeting of shorthand typists and typists in the Civil Service and make that assertion!

Mr. Burman: I quite agree. I was wondering whether you were trying to get something into these tests along those lines.

696. *Chairman:* Where does the clerical officer secretary fit into these grades? Would she be on rate 5?—Yes.

697. *Mr. Thorneycroft:* I believe I am right in saying that at the present time shorthand typists and typists are recruited on a temporary basis only. Do you feel that that deters candidates?—That has to be seen.

The Treasury are trying to cash in on what they consider to be the abundance of good material; so they first of all want to see how the new entrant makes out on the job before offering establishment. The period of temporary service is only six months, and then if the candidate has the necessary qualifications she should take the examination and receive a civil service certificate. I do not think your fear will be justified, because there is something about the security of civil service employment which still attracts a fair ration of the available material.

698. We have heard in another connection that the quality of many of the shorthand typist applicants is not what it used to be. Is that attributable to the fact that the appointment, in the first place, is only on a temporary basis?—This is a new scheme which the Treasury is introducing for future long term recruitment. If the quality in the past has not been up to the pre-war standard which the Treasury was able to exact, the Treasury itself has taken steps to train up to a satisfactory standard of proficiency, those entrants. I would say by and large these steps have been successful and that the standard of performance is good over the Service as a whole.

699. *Chairman:* Mr. White, I think we should pass on to the next part of your memorandum.

700. *Mr. Burman:* What is the argument against paying temporary clerks the same rate of pay as the established clerks, bearing

in mind there must be a difference in superannuation and other conditions?—*Mr. White:* I think the main argument used at the time we went to arbitration was that the established man is selected with a greater degree of care than the temporary. The temporary man comes in through the Employment Exchange with no test, in most cases, as to his efficiency, and therefore it would not be right necessarily to give him the same rate of pay as the established man. The other point was that the State has an obligation to somebody who is coming in to make the Civil Service his career. It has not got the same obligation to somebody who is coming in quite temporarily. Therefore, in dealing with a man whose career is to be in the Civil Service, you have to provide long term scales; whereas in the case of the temporary, if you give him a reasonable rate for the job whilst he is there that is all that you need do.

701. Is there any difference between the late entrant and the temporary?—Yes. The temporary clerk who becomes a late entrant clerical officer, comes in by selection schemes, so that it can be said, subject to a lot of qualification (age limits, quotas and so on), that the best of them get through.

In the case of the new scheme the Treasury has in mind, we understand that it is intended to bring them in on a temporary basis for the express purpose, at the end of one year, of putting them through some kind of test to find out their suitability for establishment and to sack those that are not established. As regards those who are there now, we have got to remember one or two things. First of all, in the Civil Service, you can be called a temporary for many years. Nothing short of eternity would justify the Treasury in appointing anybody as more than a temporary. We have temporary clerks at the present time who have been in the Civil Service 10, 12, or more years, and they are quite obviously in a different position from the people brought in in the future expressly for the purpose of establishment. People employed as temporaries in the past and those employed now are employed on the understanding that the job is temporary and gives no claim whatever to security.

But of course we have got ourselves into a new difficulty in recent years because the Government's plan for providing employment for older people has meant minimum ages of 45 and 40 for establishment as clerical assistants. All temporary clerks under 40 are ineligible on the Government's contention. Now really in the present manpower situation it is all wrong that these younger people should be employed on this sort of work. But the Government does not follow the logic of it by getting rid of them. It continues to employ them on precisely the same work but in a temporary capacity, and we have reached the extraordinary position now that the greatest

ambition of a large number of men and women under 40 years of age, who have been in the Civil Service some years, is to achieve the age of 40 years in order to be able to qualify for the most routine job in the Civil Service. That is what it comes to.

702. *Sir Alexander Gray*: How do you explain taking people from an executive grade into the clerical assistant grade?—The very disturbing thing is this, that although we assumed that this provision would be used only in exceptional circumstances, there are literally thousands of people who served as temporary executives who have applied to come in under this scheme. It has even been extended to include senior and higher temporary executives.

In the Ministry of Food, for example, a large number of people were brought in to be food executive officers and assistant food executive officers, and so on, and they remained for years and years. Now that the Ministry of Food is closing down, except for headquarter and regional offices, these people who have been in the Service for ten years or more can see no prospect whatever of getting anything like a reasonable job outside. Rather than face the uncertainty of the future they are prepared to take this sort of job and lose pay substantially, not only at the beginning, but throughout the rest of their service. I think one of the problems that is going to face us when these people do come in is what the Departments who have to take them are going to do about them. If they were going to be established as clerical assistants in the Department where they had previously been serving, it might be possible, over a fairly brief period, for them to get back, if not all the way, some of the way they have had to come down. Otherwise I think the very fact that a man has occupied a higher job and done superior work, far from it being an advantage, would be a definite handicap. So I think they are going to create a problem, but they do want the jobs. We have even had in the Ministry of Agriculture—they have all sorts of queer titles—applications that rodent inspectors should become clerical assistants. There is no guarantee, actually, that they can read or write, because their occupation is among rats. In the Ministry of Food it is the same thing; there are all sorts of queer titles that we have never heard of before. Even animal slaughterers or assistant animal slaughterers wanted to come into the scheme. It is actually a very serious commentary on the situation that has been created in the Civil Service in the past fifteen years that there are so many people of this sort, with great skills in their

own spheres, who see no possibility of doing anything better for themselves in the future than to become routine clerical workers in the Civil Service.

703. *Mr. Menzler*: Do they come in at the rate for the age of 25?—No, at a special rate.

704. *Mr. Cash*: What would your remedy be to this problem?—I think when you have kept people for so many years in this uncertain situation, the position is beyond remedy. I think the Tomlin Commission—if I may say something rather the reverse of what I had to say of the Tomlin formula—the Tomlin recommendation in regard to the position of temporary clerks employed generally was a sound one; that you had to take a certain number of people in for casual work, but the more it became clear that the work was going to continue, then you did not keep them and—except for the Ministry of Labour—the provision was that a temporary would have to go normally at the end of eighteen months. He had built up no claim and no expectations. But of course it did not work, and it did not work for this reason; that sympathy with the temporary developed in the office and they said: "Well, he is all right, he is a good fellow, we can still find him some work to do"; so they kept him on.

Another part of the remedy was only to give him a flat rate of pay, so as to imply quite clearly that he had no expectations of a civil service career. We agreed to a flat rate, but within two years we were forced to go to the Treasury and demand increments for these people because they were being badly treated. Then, of course, the expansion took place and the temporaries were wanted, until the problem, which was supposed to have been solved in 1932 by the establishment and the disappearance of the residue, was still with us in 1941.

705. *Chairman*: We have the same trouble at the universities, and we have not found any solution there either. May I finish by thanking you very much. I must say that during part of the discussions I have felt very much like an amateur bowler bowling to a professional batsman; but we have appreciated very much the way you have amplified your case.—Could I make this position clear? We have confined this memorandum to pay; but of course there are other matters within the Commission's terms of reference—for example, hours and leave, and provincial differentiation. We have not dealt with them here because we hope we may again be coming before the Commission.

706. We hope to see you again on behalf of the Staff Side.—Thank you, Sir.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Civil Service Union on Principles Governing the Pay of the Main Grades of Messengers and Women Cleaners.

1. The Civil Service Union desires to submit evidence to the Royal Commission under clause (a) of the Commission's terms of reference in respect of the two main classes referred to in Appendices R. and S. in the Introductory Factual Memorandum on the Civil Service submitted by H.M. Treasury.

2. The two main classes referred to are messengers and women cleaners and the evidence the Union wishes to submit for consideration by the Commission is in regard to the principles which govern the pay of these classes of civil servants.

3. These principles are the same as govern the pay of all civil servants and were laid down in 1931 by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, the Chairman of which was Lord Tomlin.

4. The principles laid down by this Royal Commission have never provided a clear guide and have led to constant disputes arising as to the correct interpretation of the principles laid down. In regard to the two classes for whom the present representations are being made, the Union submits that the Treasury have used the Tomlin principles in such a way as to depress the weekly wage of the members of the two classes to a level which has, for years, been a matter of great concern to the Union members. The Union also submits that the Treasury, by interpreting the principles in such a manner, have produced a situation which we feel sure was never intended by the Royal Commission which enunciated the principles.

5. In opposing pay claims made by the Union on behalf of its members, the Treasury rely on that part of the Tomlin principle which runs as follows:—

“Civil Service remuneration should reflect what may be described as the long term trend, both in wage levels and in the economic condition of the country. We regard it as undesirable that the conditions of service of Civil Servants when under review should be related too closely to factors of a temporary or passing character”.

The Civil Service Union submits that the interpretation of this principle by Treasury has led to opposition to pay claims made by the Union and aimed at securing a level of pay by which the members of the two classes could enjoy reasonable minimum standards of life.

6. As will be seen from the Appendix in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum, the pay of the classes to which this document refers is as follows:—

Messengers: £6 2s. 6d. to £6 7s. per week.

Women cleaners: 2s. 2½d. per hour.

This Treasury document gives details of the pay of the classes back to 1935-6 and the fact that the pay of messengers has increased, since 1939, at the maximum by 145 per cent. and by 111 per cent. at the minimum has been advanced by Treasury as illustrating a very satisfactory level of pay. The increase in the rates of women cleaners over the same period has been similarly viewed.

7. The Union submits, firstly, that the percentage increases have been gained only after and in face of Treasury opposition based on the Treasury interpretation of the Tomlin principles. Secondly, the fact that these percentage increases produce the present day inadequate rates of pay, only goes to show clearly the disgraceful rates of pay of the classes in 1939.

8. In order to illustrate the Treasury's attitude regarding the interpretation of the Tomlin principles, we would refer to the situation in 1949 in which year the Union was forced to resort to arbitration in order to secure an increase of pay for the class of women cleaners. The claim for increased pay made by the Union was based on the two main factors (i) to meet increases in cost of living and (ii) comparison with rates of pay of similar workers outside the Civil Service.

9. In support of (i) above, the Union submitted specimen budgets compiled by its members but these have not been reproduced.

In support of (ii) above, the Union submitted the following evidence in its written submissions to the Arbitration Court:—

EXTRACTS FROM WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS PRESENTED TO THE CIVIL SERVICE
ARBITRATION COURT, 1949

"Comparison with rates of pay for similar employment"

(a) *Outside industry*

The following rates of pay are quoted as proving the justification of the claim that the present rates of Government Women Cleaners fall below the rates in industry outside the Civil Service.

(i) *Local Authorities*

Women Cleaners employed by Local Authorities have their wages fixed by negotiations on the National Joint Council for Non-Trading Services (Manual Workers). The rates are on a weekly basis and are for a 44-hour week. They are at present under discussion and an increase has been claimed.

	Weekly rate		Hourly rate	
	s.	d.	s.	d.
LONDON	79	6	1	9½
ZONE "A"	75	0	1	8½
ZONE "B" (rural)	72	9	1	7½

(ii) *Industrial Firms*

	Hourly rates London	
(a) Newspapers and general printing offices ...	2s. 3d.	
(b) Unilevers	1s. 10d. on entry 1s. 11d. after 1 year 2s. 0d. after 5 years	
(c) Harrods, Ltd.	1s. 10d. to 2s. 0d.	
(d) Selfridges, Ltd.	s.	d.
(e) Lloyds Bank	2	0
(f) Boots, Ltd.	2	3
(g) Timothy Whites, Ltd.	1	11
(h) Odeon Cinemas	2	6
(i) J. Lyons & Co.	2	11
(j) Retail Co-op. Societies	2	1½
(k) West End Theatres	1	10
(l) Standard Motor Co.	2	0
	2	1½

During discussion with Treasury officials they quoted rates of pay in hospitals which it was claimed stand at 1s. 8½d. per hour. Investigation has proved that this rate of pay is prevailing in London hospitals but all hospitals are understaffed due to the impossibility of recruitment at this rate of pay and cleaning work is being performed by other members of the staff (Probationer Nurses and Ward Maids) to the detriment of efficiency. The Ministry of Labour and National Service are now drafting in foreign labour to make up deficiencies.

The Ministry of Labour and National Service cannot supply women in London for cleaning duties at a rate of less than 2s. per hour and the general rate of pay for casual cleaning in houses even on the outskirts of London is, in some cases, as high as 3s. per hour.

Among the poorest paid in this class of employment are the cleaners engaged in Railway Hotels where the rate is 1s. 6½d. per hour. However, at least one meal is provided daily and, in addition, the women enjoy not only free travel to and from work but free passes for use at all times including holiday travel. Reckoning the meals at 1s. 6d. per day and the fares at 10s. per week, which cannot be regarded as extreme, the actual hourly rate is 1s. 11d. per hour. Here again, very serious understaffing is prevalent due to the low actual money earnings.

(b) Rates paid in Government Industrial Establishments

Part-time Women Cleaners employed in Government Industrial Establishments have their rates of pay fixed by the Miscellaneous Trades Joint Council and the present rates were agreed as from 1st June, 1947. They are subject to discussion at the present time and increases have been claimed by the Trade Union side of the Council.

*Present rates**LONDON*

								<i>Per hour.</i>
								s. d.
Up to 18 hours	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1 9½
Over 18 hours and up to 36 hours	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1 9

PROVINCES

Up to 18 hours	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1 8½
Over 18 hours and up to 36 hours	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1 8

Full-time (44 hours per week) Women Cleaners employed in Government Industrial Establishments have their rates of pay regulated by the "M" rate and the present weekly rate for 44 hours is 85s. per week—equal to 1s. 11½d. per hour.

(c) Rates paid by Government Contractors

The policy of engaging Contractors for the cleaning of Government Departments was introduced to meet the shortage of female labour. The practice was not looked upon with favour by the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council and a Sub-Committee was appointed by the Joint General Purposes Committee of the National Staff Side. The Committee's Report contains the following paragraphs:—

T.C.26/38—23rd December, 1938

Report of Sub-Committee on Cleaning Duties appointed by the General Purposes Committee of the National Staff Side

6. The Staff Side urged that, where the volume of cleaning was so large as to warrant the full-time services of one or more women cleaners, there was no reason why in general the cleaners should not be employed directly by the Department; and the Official Side agreed, after discussion, to recommend to Departments that in such cases direct employment should be the rule, on the understanding that the change-over would be gradual and would take place as and when suitable opportunities arose, and that a limited number of exceptions to meet special circumstances might be entailed. This agreement was without prejudice to the cleaning arrangements in premises hired on an "all-in" basis, or to cleaning by a caretaker where this was part of a contract of services.

8. The Committee accordingly report agreement on the following matters:—

- (1) That the experiment in cleaning by contract, as at Great Westminster House, will not be extended without a prior opportunity for the expression of Staff Side views (paragraph 4 above).
- (2) That direct employment will be the normal practice when the volume of cleaning would necessitate the employment of one or more cleaners, subject to the provisos indicated in paragraph 6 above.
- (3) That as regards cleaners who are engaged by the Departments who are not covered by the agreement at (2) above, the form of employment may be left to Departments provided that annual and sick leave privileges accrue as set out in paragraph 7 above.

Evidence shows that paragraph 1 of the agreement has not been strictly adhered to and cleaning by contract tended to increase during the war due to difficulty of obtaining sufficient direct labour owing to the wartime shortage of female labour. Recently the War Office, a Department which employs many Women Cleaners, wrote on the question of Contract Cleaning to the Staff Side Secretary of that Department and the following are extracts from the letter (Appendix D).

9. Para. 2.

"The reason why we are now having to turn to contract cleaning is that reductions of staff that have been forced upon us have involved a very considerable reduction in the establishment of our Women Cleaners and further reductions are due to take place by 1st April, 1949, so that it has become impossible for us to clean all the buildings we occupy with the small number of cleaners we are allowed and, at the same time, to keep within the official basis of allocation referred to in para. 145 of Working Conditions issued with Treasury Circular 4/48, namely, that the standard per part-time cleaner is 3,000 sq. ft. for (presumably) a 30-hour week".

Para. 3.

"Furthermore, we propose to clean the premises at Stanmore and Chessington by contract, as we understand from those already in these places that the prospects of getting sufficient direct labour are exceedingly remote".

The significance of these two paragraphs is to be seen by a study of the rates of pay being paid to Women Cleaners by Contractors engaged in the cleaning of Government Buildings. In the main three Contractors are employed in and around London, viz., Great Metropolitan Cleaning Co., the All-England Cleaning Co., and the Great Westminster Cleaning Co., and the following rates are paid in the respective Departments and localities:—

Name of Department			Locality	Hourly rate
				s. d.
Air Ministry	...	...	Stanmore	2 6
Ministry of Food	...	...	Stanmore	2 6
Ministry of Transport	...	...	North Gate Mansions, N.8	2 3½
Ministry of Education	...	...	Stanmore	2 3
Central Office of Information.			Montagu Mans., Baker Street, and Longley House, Baker Street, W.	2 1½ +3 0
				per week for fires in the winter
Treasury	...	...	Whitehall	2 1
Treasury	...	...	Palace Chambers, S.W.1	2 1
Treasury	...	...	Storeys Gate, S.W.1	1 11
Ministry of Labour	...	...	Portman Square	2 1
Ministry of Labour	...	...	Grosvenor Square	2 1
Ministry of Labour	...	...	Watford	2 0
Board of Control	...	...	Rutland Gate, S.W.	2 0
Ministry of Supply	...	...	Adelphi, W.C.2	2 0
Ministry of Works	...	...	Onslow Gardens, London	1 11½
			Regents Park	1 11½
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries			Regents Park, and Gresham Street, E.C.	2 6
Women employed by direct labour in House of Commons...				2 0

This by no means exhausts the list but is sufficient, it is submitted, to show the great disparity between the two rates of pay. Further, it supplies the answer to the War Office difficulty in finding "sufficient direct labour" for performing the cleaning necessary at Chessington and Stanmore. Other Government Departments with offices in these areas have also met with the same difficulties and have got over them by engaging Contractors to do the work. There is presumably no difficulty felt by the Contractors in finding a sufficient labour force and this is due to the rates of pay offered".

10. During negotiations the Treasury had offered to increase the then hourly rate of 1s. 7½d., rising to 1s. 8½d. after two years' service, to 1s. 8d., rising to 1s. 8½d., an increase of ½d. per hour. The Union, on behalf of its members, rejected this derisory offer and submitted its claim for 2s. an hour to the Arbitration Court which, after hearing the case, awarded an increase of 2d. per hour.

The rejection of the Union's claim and the offer of ½d. an hour aroused great public interest and the Appendix to this document gives extracts from two national newspapers commenting on the Treasury attitude.

11. The factual case given above occurred in 1949 and is not an isolated one and it is evident that disputes of this kind between Treasury and the Union are due to the Treasury's interpretation and application of the Tomlin principles.

To further illustrate this point the following is an extract from a Treasury letter dated 15th November, 1950, replying to a claim for an increase in the pay of messengers:—

“ 1. *Messengers*

Your claim on this head was based on

- (a) the general rise in the Ministry of Labour's Index of Retail Prices since the present rate was settled;
- (b) the rise since 1st October, 1950, in the cost of London Transport fares in particular;
- (c) overtime reductions since March, 1949.

As to (a) and (b), as I think you are aware, Civil Service wages are not now—and have not for many years been—directly related to movements in the cost of living. While we do not, of course, deny that the cost of living must be a factor in influencing the remuneration of civil servants, it is not a factor which should, in our view, determine it directly. I realise that you do not accept this view but for our part we have no option but to reiterate it. That being so, we cannot see that there has been any change in circumstances since March, 1949, which would justify us in meeting your claim wholly or in part.”

12. From this letter it will be seen that Treasury did not deny the Union's claim that there had been a general rise in the cost of living, indeed, such a denial would have been useless in face of the Ministry of Labour's index of retail prices.

What, in fact, the Treasury were postulating was that the application of the Tomlin principles prevented them from agreeing to the increase of pay claimed by the Union. The period covered for which the Union was claiming increased pay was from March, 1949, to November, 1950, and during this period the Ministry of Labour's index of retail prices showed a rise from 109 in March, 1949, to 116 in November, 1950.

Over the same period the index of rates of wages compiled by the Ministry of Labour showed a rise of six points, from 107 to 113 for men and a seven point rise for women from 109 to 116.

13. The effect of such increases in the cost of living on civil servants in receipt of the weekly wage enjoyed (*sic*) by the messengers and paperkeepers is disastrous. The Union has on many occasions demonstrated the appalling conditions under which these civil servants are compelled to live due to inadequate wages but Treasury resist all claims made because, it is submitted, the principles of the Tomlin Commission do not permit wage increases on the basis of the Union's claims.

14. The Tomlin Commission in para. 344 of their Report stated:—

“The main conclusions reached on the bonus system are, therefore, as follows:—

- (i) That the remuneration of civil servants should cease to be varied automatically in accordance with changes in the cost of living figure;
- (ii) That the practice should be abandoned of attempting periodic comprehensive reviews of the remuneration of all non-industrial civil servants on the basis of a single formula.

It is not intended by (i) to suggest that the cost of living will not remain an important factor in the determination of remuneration. *Due effect will, however, be given to this factor if Civil Service wages fluctuate in accordance with movements in general wage levels in outside industry which, in turn, are affected by marked and permanent changes in price levels”.*

15. The Union draws attention to the italicised words of the paragraph quoted and would wish to make it clear that as a principle this stands unchallenged. The Union, however, submits that this principle is not operated in regard to the messengers and women cleaners in such a way as to produce the effect which, the Union submits, was the intention of the Report.

16. Firstly, in order that "general wage levels in outside industry" shall be "effected by marked and permanent changes in price levels" it is necessary that the workers in outside industry shall be organised into trade unions which will be responsible for negotiating such wage levels as will compensate for movements in price levels.

Secondly, the whole intention of the principle is vitiated if the interpretation of the principle leads to opposition to wage claims and that opposition is based, not by reference to "general wage levels in outside industry", but by reference to such analogous grades as can be found which suffer, for one reason or another, the lowest rates of pay.

The Union submits that Treasury have interpreted the principles of the Tomlin Commission in such a manner as to base the wages of messengers and women cleaners on comparison with the lowest pay possible. Further, that to support this method of assessing pay, Treasury invoke the Tomlin Commission principles.

17. In opposing wage claims made for and on behalf of the messenger class, Treasury have based their case on the following comparisons:—

- (i) Messengers employed by boards of nationalised industries.
- (ii) the rate paid to messengers employed in Government industrial establishments which rate is based on the "M" rate (minimum wage rate for unskilled labour).
- (iii) rates of pay of manipulative grades employed in the Post Office.

18. Similarly, in opposing wage claims made for and on behalf of the women cleaner class, the Treasury have used the following comparisons:—

- (i) women cleaners employed in hospitals.
- (ii) Part-time women cleaners in Government industrial establishments.

19. The Treasury insist that in using these comparisons they are applying the principles of the Tomlin Commission, e.g., the long term trend of wages in outside industry.

The Union submits that none of these comparisons used comply with the principles and only two of the comparisons can be said to relate to wages in outside industry; in the case of the messenger class, the boards of nationalised industries; in the case of the women cleaner class, the hospitals.

In the first instance comparison is made with a handful of people and, in the second, comparison is made with an analogous class which, due to lack of trade union organisation and therefore lack of negotiations, inevitably follow the rates paid to women cleaners in Government establishments.

20. The further comparisons used by Treasury are classes of industrial or non-industrial civil servants, the pay of which is negotiated by the appropriate trade unions with Treasury.

The Treasury, by insisting on these comparisons, are, firstly, securing that the rates of pay of the messenger and women cleaner classes are linked with the lowest and most depressed wage rates in outside industry; secondly, are linking the rates of pay of both classes with wage rates which they themselves negotiated. This creates a vicious circle in which the messengers and women cleaners flounder in a vain attempt to gain, by negotiation, the maintenance of pay rates at an economic level.

21. Examples of this procedure can be found in every case which the Union has presented to Treasury over the past ten years or more. Replying to the case for

messengers, Treasury will quote rates paid in nationalised industries and like organisations which employ a mere handful of labour in comparison with the Civil Service. Contesting claims made on behalf of women cleaners, the Treasury will quote hospitals which employ a reasonable number but there is no organisation of these women and their rates of pay follow those negotiated by the Union for the Government women cleaners.

22. Further, we draw the attention of the Commission to the following reference contained in their written submission to the Arbitration Court in 1949:—

“As regards the industrial field, the Treasury invite the attention of the Tribunal to their Award No. 74, this being the last time that the rates for messengers were before them. At that time, i.e., June, 1943, the agreed inclusive rate for male adult unskilled labourers in London was 78s. Messengers in Government industrial establishments received a 3s. lead on the rate, making 81s. Award No. 74 gave a rate for non-industrial messengers of 73s. 6d., i.e., 7s. 6d. a week less than industrial messengers.

“At the time of the September, 1946, Settlement the London minimum rate for unskilled labour was 91s. and the rates for industrial messengers were thus 94s. It may therefore be argued that by agreeing a rate of 95s. to 100s. for non-industrial messengers the Treasury regarded the non-industrial messenger as worthy of a lead over his industrial counterpart. Any such argument entirely overlooks the important fact that the wages of non-industrial staff are based on long-term trends. It was expected that the minimum industrial rate would not remain indefinitely at 91s. but would be increased to something nearer 100s., and it was with this expectation in mind that the Treasury felt able to pitch the non-industrial messenger rate as high as it did. The Treasury expectation has been verified. The minimum industrial rate is now 100s. as from 1st April, 1948, and the industrial messenger thus receives 103s. It was partly because of this increase that the Treasury offered to raise the non-industrial messenger rate to 100s., rising to 103s. This offer seemed reasonable on the basis of Award 74”.

23. We draw attention to the Treasury reference to the “agreed inclusive rate for male adult unskilled labourers”; to the reference to the statement that “messengers in Government industrial establishments receive a 3s. lead on this rate” and, further, to the statement “It was expected that the minimum industrial rate would not remain indefinitely at 91s. but would be increased to something nearer 100s. The minimum industrial rate is now 100s. as from 1st April and the industrial messenger thus receives 103s.”.

24. The fact that Treasury were able to forecast the trend of the minimum industrial rate which would lead to a new rate for industrial messengers whilst appearing to indicate intelligent anticipation is, when seen against the facts, only foreknowledge of the inevitable. This minimum industrial rate is negotiated by a Sub-Committee of the Miscellaneous Trades Joint Council and the Official Side of the Sub-Committee comprises Treasury and representatives of such employing Government Departments as are affected.

25. The position produced by years of operation of the Tomlin principles has brought about rates of pay which are a disgrace to the Government as an employer of labour and, in the messenger service, has produced a situation which makes it almost impossible to attract and recruit to the class the type of man on whom the efficiency of the messenger service can be built.

26. In 1947 the Civil Service Union put before Treasury proposals on pay and conditions of service of the messenger class and, in the written statement supporting the claim, the view of the Union was outlined as follows:—

“The Union deplors the attitude to Messengers now current in the Civil Service amongst certain members of the higher grades, and endeavours to create a real status and future for all Messengers and Paperkeepers. It is unreasonable and untrue to decry Messengers as a class, as being mere ‘tea-makers’; as being

ignorant and uncouth people who are always willing to accept a tip. For the good of the Civil Service as a body, in its public relationships, and for the efficiency of Government Departments as a whole, we feel that reorganisation should be vigorously tackled and an attempt made to create an effective and responsible body of Messengers that will respond to Departmental needs and requirements. The Treasury should aim at retaining and recruiting the very best of our ex-Servicemen to fill vacancies in the Messenger grade and should aim at a standard at least as high as that maintained by the Banks. We regard this as essential for the general efficiency of the Service. We feel that in the recruitment of Messengers some regard should be paid to a minimum educational standard, and to the general type and appearance of the entrant. There should be a re-definition of the duties of the grade and a reorganisation of the present structure of the Messenger service, these steps to run parallel with the provision of reasonable conditions of service and prospects of advancement”.

27. In the Establishment Officers' Circular promulgating the agreement Treasury said:—

“The organisation of the Messengerial and Paperkeeping grades has been reviewed with the dual object of improving alike the standard of recruitment and the standard of efficiency of the services concerned. A study of criticisms of the current standards has indicated that the problem is broadly a twofold one, the solution of which calls for

- (a) improvements in the conditions of service for Messengers so as to attract recruits of good quality, coupled with better standards of supervision which will at the same time, in conjunction with corresponding improvements in the Paperkeeping grades, afford them improved prospects of advancement, and
- (b) a closer study of the practical organisation of the Messengerial services (possibly including 'inter alia' consideration of the possible need for a clearer definition and allocation of functions) in conjunction with the development of training schemes, both being directed to the achievement of a higher standard of service commensurate with the requirements of the public service as well as with the improved conditions of service”.

28. This new agreement gave enhanced promotion prospects to the class, provided limited career prospects and was considered by all as a great step forward. The Union was disappointed at the rates of pay because the £5 a week minimum wage had not been secured but, nevertheless, making use of the agreement every effort was made to increase the efficiency of the class as a whole. The Union encouraged its members to take full advantage of the training facilities provided and by spoken and written word conveyed to its members the need for an efficient messenger service.

29. The Union takes the view that the messenger class constitutes an integral and important part of the Civil Service and, as such, it is necessary to maintain it in the highest possible state of efficiency. We have frequently pointed out that the general public's first contact with the Civil Service is usually the messenger and it is necessary that this first contact should not be of such a nature as to create an impression of inefficiency.

30. The results accruing from the 1947 agreement lasted, unfortunately, for a short time due to the failure of Treasury to place the pay of the class at a level upon which the recruitment of the right type of man could depend.

In regard to the duties performed by the women cleaners, there is no need to stress their great importance in relation to the health and efficiency of the whole of the Civil Service.

The following table illustrates the manner in which the pay of the messenger class has fallen behind:—

	Movements in messengers' pay (London maximum)	Index of wages	Index of retail prices	Index of earnings*
	Sept. 1946=100	June 1947=100	June 1947=100	Apr. 1947=100
1949—March ...	103	108	109	113
1950—December	109	113	116	122
				(October)
1951—October ...	118	122	129	135
1952—January ...	121	126	132	141
				(April)
October ...	127	130	138	145
1953—January ...	127	132	138	151
				(April)
October ...	127	135	140	—

* This Index is compiled by the Ministry of Labour at half-yearly intervals only.

31. These figures reflect the result of the Treasury's attitude based on the interpretation of the Tomlin principles. The Tomlin Commission's view was that the cost of living factor will be accounted for "if civil service wages fluctuate in accordance with movements in general wage levels in outside industry which, in turn, are affected by marked and permanent changes in price levels".

Reference to the Table above makes it clear that earnings of workers in outside industry are adjusted to movements in price levels by means other than increases in basic rates of pay. This possibility of securing adjustment in the light of price levels is denied to civil servants in general because such factors which would lead to the adjustment are considered not appropriate in assessing civil service pay.

32. The Treasury, by ignoring this trend in industry and invoking the Tomlin principles in support of its use of basic rates of the lowest paid workers only for comparison, produces a result which, in the Union's submission, overturns the principle laid down by the Tomlin Commission for dealing with the cost of living factor.

The Civil Service Union is not seeking to obtain for its members in "non-productive" employment all the benefits of "productive" employment in outside industry, but would argue that all the factors which go to maintain earnings at an economic level in outside industry should be given due weight in the assessment of the pay of messengers and women cleaners.

33. The interpretation and operation of the Tomlin principles which are used by the Treasury produce an overall depressing effect at all levels in the Civil Service. In the higher income groups this can, and does, lead to dissatisfaction but in the area for which the Union is making this submission, the Treasury attitude brings about not only dissatisfaction, but real hardship which should not be tolerated.

34. Whatever else may have been intended by the recommendation of the Tomlin Commission, it was surely not intended that the pay of the civil service messengers and women cleaners should be assessed by the comparison with the basic rates of lowest paid workers in outside industry.

Mention was made in the Tomlin Commission Report of the principle of the Government as a "model employer" and it was the view of the Commission that this principle was not incompatible with the basis of assessment envisaged in the recommendations.

The Union view is that the use of the Tomlin Commission principles by Treasury in respect of messengers and women cleaners produces a situation in which the Government achieve the status of "below average" rather than the "model employer".

35. The Civil Service Union, on behalf of its members, requests the members of the Royal Commission to embody in its Report a recommendation which will make clear its views regarding the present Treasury interpretation and application of the Tomlin principles to the messenger and women cleaner classes.

The Civil Service Union requests the Royal Commission to give consideration to the basis upon which the assessment of the pay of the two classes is, in future, to be made with a view to correcting the present unsatisfactory methods employed by Treasury.

36. The Civil Service Union submits that such a basis of assessment is vitally necessary if living standards for the members of the classes are to be regarded as satisfying ordinary decent human needs and that such a basis of assessment is also vitally needed if the efficiency of the services provided by both classes is to be at a level consistent with the needs of the British Civil Service.

APPENDIX

PRESS COMMENTS ON TREASURY ATTITUDE TO WOMEN CLEANERS' PAY CLAIM, OCTOBER, 1948

EXTRACT FROM THE "DAILY MIRROR", 30 NOVEMBER, 1948

THE WIDOW'S MITE

By Cassandra

"It's a quarter past five in the morning, sleepy head, and you get up right now. There are grey hairs in that head of yours for you'll never see fifty again. So come on—get out—get up!

Now put on the kettle. It's dark, but you draw the blinds. Fog. What, again? You wash, you dress, you heat the teapot.

You put out the cup, the saucer, the spoon, the sugar and the milk. In with the tea. Now the boiling water. Wait a couple of minutes the tea's ready, and life begins at number thirteen Brook Drive in the Borough of Lambeth, South East eleven. Long before the dawn.

* * * *

The name is Costa—Mrs. A. E. Costa.

Six years ago your husband died and you get the first important qualification for being an office cleaner—you are a widow. And you need the money like hell.

You work for the Government in Whitehall. To get there, you catch the tram at Lambeth for the Embankment, which costs you fivepence return. Six days a week. Six fives are thirty and thirty pence is half a crown.

Now up to the Admiralty.

You've got to be there by seven and you'll start to scrub. A world of pails and brushes and soapy water. And the Cold, hard floor. Yards of it—seemingly acres of it. When things are rough the natives of London say that you 'are on the floor'. Well, maybe this is it, but why does it have to come round six days a week?

You are on your hands and knees. You see life from chair-leg level. You get to know the underside of desks and all about waste paper baskets and the exciting scenery of skirting-boards. Did God forget to upholster kneecaps, for stone floors don't seem to give very much . . .

And human hands get rough and sore and coarse with scrubbing and scrubbing and scrubbing.

You start at 7 a.m. and you finish at midday. Five hours a day on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, and for it His Majesty's Government pay you two pounds ten shillings and sevenpence halfpenny—less deductions. Net cash received, two pounds, five shillings and ninepence.

* * * *

These women—these widows, for it's remarkable how many of them have been forced to begin life again as office cleaners after the death of their husbands, earn 1s. 8½d. an hour.

They have asked for another 3½d. an hour, bringing their money up to two bob an hour.

The Treasury have stifled their sense of outrage, pawed over their coffers—our coffers—and have offered them an extra farthing an hour. A farthing!

Do you hear that, Mrs. Costa?

Another sevenpence halfpenny every pay day for you, my dear. All of it. Seven and a half pennies from Heaven. The price of an extra pint of milk, which you won't be able to get, and a threepenny-bit for you to go hell-raising on.

Out of the same national till the Treasury pay the chairman of the Coal Board, the Electricity Authority and the Airways Corporation £8,500 apiece. They may even deserve it. But what have you done, Mrs. Costa, and all the other Mrs. Mopps who are slogging away before the grey dawn, to pick up courage and ask for the widow's mite? Back to your pails, ladies—don't you know that cut-price life begins at 5.15 a.m.?"

EXTRACT FROM THE "MANCHESTER GUARDIAN", 17TH DECEMBER, 1948

THE MITE

"The Whitehall charwomen who are asking for more pay have a great deal of public sympathy. They—and other office cleaners—are a cheerful, kindly body of women who do a miserable job well. Sometimes, in fact, one has the impression that here again is nature copying art, that they try hard to live up to George Belcher's drawings, and to base themselves on Mr. Kavanagh's 'Mrs. Mopp' in order not to disappoint us. People here are delighted by the poems they have sent Sir Stafford Cripps, and their grievance and its attempted appeasement by the offer of a farthing-an-hour increase has produced a most moving article by 'Cassandra' which the Civil Service Union has reprinted from the 'Daily Mirror'.

Mrs. Jean Mann said in the House this afternoon that women M.P.s were shocked by the offer of a farthing increase. Apparently it would cost the Government £225,000 to raise the women's pay from 1s. 7½d. an hour to 2s. Even then the rate would be sixpence less than the London housewife pays her 'daily woman', and some commercial firms give more. Office cleaning is not a job which women choose. It is one they are driven into by poverty, most frequently caused by the loss of a husband. There is a feeling that the Treasury is taking it out of the widows".

Examination of Witnesses

MR. L. H. MOODY, *Assistant Secretary*
MISS K. L. EDWARDS, *Assistant Secretary*

on behalf of the Civil Service Union

Called and examined

707. *Chairman*: Mr. Moody, is there anything you would like to add to your statement about the staff you cover or your representative capacity?—*Mr. Moody*: No, Sir. I would only apologise for the absence of our General Secretary today, as unfortunately it is impossible for him to attend.

708. I take it from your written account that there is a fundamental dispute between the Union and the Treasury, not so much about the Tomlin formula as about the Treasury interpretation of it?—That is correct.

Chairman: Mr. Cash, would you like to open the questions?

709. *Mr. Cash*: If the Tomlin formula were interpreted in the way you wish, would it then be satisfactory?—Yes. We accept the principle that civil service pay should have relation with outside pay, and I think that the basis of our disagreement is in assessing the true level of outside pay. We have taken the view in recent negotiation that the level of earnings in outside industry has its effect on the level of basic wage rates, and unless account is taken of movements in earnings it is not possible to get a

true reflection of wage movements, so that if the pay of our people is related solely to basic wages rates without taking account at all of movements in earnings, we reach the position where their pay is at an abnormally low level. In our view the Tomlin principles meant that outside pay as a matter of course would reflect movements in the cost of living, as outside trade unions would negotiate their rates to take account of such movements, and if civil service pay was related to outside pay then the cost of living would be taken into account indirectly. But in our view the pattern of wage movements has changed since the war in that earnings—the pay which the individual outside actually receives at the end of the week, as distinct from his minimum rate—have taken on a particular significance which is indicated by the figures we have submitted of the differences between movements in earnings and movements in wage rates. Whilst it may have been true at the time of the Tomlin Report that basic wage rates had a greater significance, we do not feel that they have that significance now. We feel therefore that we ought to be entitled to make reference to movements in earnings, but the Treasury takes the view that under the Tomlin recommendations they are only permitted to take note of movements in basic wage rates.

710. *Chairman*: Do you mind defining the difference between earnings and basic wage rates a little more specifically?—The Ministry of Labour have defined it as well as I could. They talk of a number of factors, including increases in rates of wages, increases or decreases in the number of hours worked, and the proportion of hours paid for at overtime rates, week ends, night shifts, extensions of systems of payment by results in some industries and increased output by the workers affected. It is the last point which is most important. In outside industry there is scope for payment by results, production bonuses and so forth, which could not apply in the Civil Service. We are not suggesting that civil servants should have the benefit of that productive employment, while not in productive employment themselves. What we are suggesting is that the existence of these systems of supplementing basic pay has its effect on movements in basic wage rates. If this factor were not present then the picture of movements in basic wage rates would be different.

711. *Mr. Burman*: Mr. Moody, you have mentioned three different indices here, wages, retail prices and earnings. Are you suggesting that you would like to choose any one of these indices, or try and arrive at a formula which takes all three into account?—We would not suggest that it is possible to formulate a rigid formula to take account of all points. But we feel

it ought to be proper for us to point to other factors than movements in basic wage rates like the movement in the "M" rate, which is the factor which in the Treasury's view is the most important in assessing messengers' pay. We are only suggesting that in making reference to these other factors, in drawing the conclusions which we might wish to draw from the difference, for instance, in the movement of basic wage rates and in the movement of earnings, we should not be ruled out of order by the Treasury on the grounds that it does not fit within the Tomlin recommendations.

712. But the index of earnings is liable to fluctuate fairly rapidly. We have not had any substantial recession in the last fifteen years or so, but if there is a recession in industry then piecework incentives, overtime, and so on will drop fairly rapidly and we may get wide fluctuations in the index of earnings. You would accept that fluctuation, would you?—I think the Union would wish to assume that such a drastic economic change is not likely in the near future. We would have to accept, however, that a recession in outside industry would have its effect on earnings and possibly on basic wage rates. We might suffer as a result.

713. How much of the earnings of messengers is due to overtime, and so on? Is that a significant factor?—I have no accurate figures on overtime but I would not say it is particularly significant. We take the view that the overtime factor is equal for messengers and for comparable grades outside the Service. We do not claim that if outside grades had the benefit of long hours of overtime that should be taken into account in assessing messengers' pay, because messengers quite clearly would derive the same advantage if they were to work the same number of hours.

714. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: You want the Commission to recommend that when you are negotiating the Treasury should admit the validity of your seeking to base a comparison between your people and those outside (a) on the wage index and (b) on earnings, is that right?—Yes. The importance we place on earnings is in the reflection they have on basic wage rates. We are talking all the time, of course, of increases in the level of earnings, not in the level of earnings themselves. We think there has been this change in the pattern of wage movements outside owing to the greater significance of bonus and piecework earnings, and that but for this factor the movement in basic wage rates would have been different, because the movement in basic wage rates has not compensated for increases in the cost of living.

715. You think that if earnings of all kinds within normal working hours had been excluded for the time being, the wage index would have been higher than it has been?—Yes.

716. But you would not wish to be tied even as a guide to the wages index itself?—No, not in a formal way.

717. In your negotiations on behalf of your people you would like to be free to argue on the wages index plus this element of earnings?—Yes

718. I take it you are speaking now particularly in respect of your basic grade, the messengers?—Yes. Perhaps I ought to say that the Union as a matter of policy is not completely opposed to the principles of the Tomlin recommendations. In the case of its other grades it is prepared to accept that these recommendations form a basis of negotiation. The problem there is not so acute, because with messengers we are dealing with people at the lowest rate of pay and if there is an incorrect interpretation of the method of assessment the effect is much worse than for those on a higher rate.

719. But there is a relativity between the rates of the supervisory grades and those of the basic grades. If on the sort of argument you postulate you got what you wanted for the basic grades, how would you deal with this relativity then?—There should of course be some differential between senior and basic grades but it is not easy to lay down hard and fast rules on what it should be. The only thing I would say on that is that a succession of flat rate increases has had the effect of devaluing the differential. If we could settle the messengers' pay on a satisfactory basis we would wish to argue the senior grades' pay on the basis of a correct and proper differential.

720. So you would confine your arguments about the comparison with outside rates and earnings to your basic grade and, having settled the rates for them, you would then seek to get suitable differentials for the higher grades?—That, in effect, is what has happened in the main up to now, except of course that we would not expect to negotiate revised differentials at each pay claim, but only from time to time. I see no objection to the procedure in the last two pay increases, where a flat rate increase negotiated for the lower grades, the basic grades, has been applied to the higher grades, without arguing about differentials.

721. How frequently would you expect to bring the rates of the basic grade under review?—That is a very difficult question to answer, because we think the pay of the basic grades needs review in terms of movement in the cost of living. That is the chief concern from our point of view.

722. Would your people wish to go forward for a review of your basic grade rates when there was some appreciable movement in the wages index?—I find it difficult to answer that as a matter of

policy. Our aim has been to endeavour to protect our people against increases in the cost of living and our experience has been that when there have been movements in the retail prices index there have been movements in the wages index. We have not met a situation where there has been movement in the wages index without some comparable movement in the retail prices index, so I find it difficult to answer that we would necessarily submit a claim because there had been a movement in the wages index, in isolation.

723. Is what you have in mind that if for any reason you reach a stage where you feel that a review of the rates for your basic grade is due, you want to be free in arguing that case to point to movements in the wages index and in earnings outside, and to be free to open negotiations as and when you feel it proper to do so, without having any set period, so there would be no automatic move on your part *vis-à-vis* the wages index outside?—That is correct.

724. *Chairman:* You have seen the Treasury evidence. Mr. Moody?—Yes.

725. You notice they are inclined to change their view about the long term trend. I suppose that meets with your approval?—I would like to know more what is in the Treasury's mind on that. It may sound acceptable to have frequent review, but the Treasury's attitude might be frequent review tied rigidly to some specific factor, for instance, to movements in the "M" rate in the case of messengers, and that we would oppose. We have no wish to be tied rigidly in that way, and if that is what the Treasury means by frequent review, we would not approve.

726. That point was not mentioned. I think they simply felt that it was reasonable that reviews should be made at the lower and middle end of the scale rather more frequently than has been the case in the past, and rather more frequently than higher up.—Clearly, Sir, if that is the sole intention, we would agree. We would not disagree that lower grades should have their pay reviewed as necessary, and if it were frequently necessary we would agree that should be appropriate.

727. *Mrs. Wootton:* I gather that you are not very anxious to get too closely tied to any particular index. Do you accept the Treasury view that there should be comparison with some outside rate, but think they have chosen the wrong outside rate in the "M" rate?—That is correct.

728. In that case can you give us any idea what sort of outside rates would be appropriate, in your view?—That is difficult because the Treasury is itself the largest employer of the grade in question. One of the difficulties in assessing messengers' pay is to find a larger employer or a

number of employers outside employing a comparable number of people on the same sort of work. I think our view would be that the rate of pay of messengers should be assessed on the basis that they are unskilled. . . .

729. Is not that what the "M" rate sets out to do?—Yes, that is true. I think I need to be careful here in not saying something which might be a criticism of other bodies, but we would not necessarily agree that the "M" rate, fixed in the way it is, has resulted in a rate of pay which we would consider fair, even for unskilled labour in Government industrial establishments. Of course, one of our chief objections to the "M" rate is that if we are tied too rigidly to it our pay negotiations are in the hands of other bodies over which we have no control whatsoever.

730. Would you like to tell us a little more about that, first of all exactly what the "M" rate does represent, and what are the objections to it from your point of view?—The "M" rate is assessed as an average minimum rate for unskilled labour in the range of 98 industries. Whilst it may be a fair mathematical formula, we would not agree that it reaches a fair conclusion, mainly because of the factors we have already mentioned. The minimum rates which are used in assessing the "M" rate are of course the agreed negotiated rates, but how far they reflect the actual earnings of the people in those industries we are not at all sure. If in assessing the "M" rate account is not taken of that factor, as it is not taken in assessing the pay of our messengers, then we feel it is bound to reach what is an unfair and unrepresentative reflection of wages in outside industry.

731. Would you react more favourably to something like the "M" rate corrected for changes in earnings?—Yes, as one factor to which reference could be made, but we would not wish to be tied to anything specific of that nature.

732. *Chairman:* Mr. Moody, messengers have in fact just had an increase of 7s. 6d. as from the 1st December, 1953?—That is correct.

733. That seems to be a reasonable answer to any rise in the cost of living recently. What was the basis of the increase?—I cannot speak with any authority on the reasons why the Treasury eventually agreed to a figure of 7s. 6d. A great many arguments took place in negotiations. I think it is possible—I would not wish to commit the Treasury in this—that it was the likely future movement in the "M" rate which may have led them towards the figure of 9s. we had claimed, though not for the same reasons that we had claimed it.

734. It looks as if that increase of 7s. 6d. was as reasonable a deal over the period October, 1952, to November, 1953, as any alternative criterion would have given you?—Quite, but it does not necessarily follow that the criterion which influenced the Treasury in this case would exist in future cases, whilst the criteria which we were anxious to use might exist. The only thing I can say with certainty about the recent negotiations on pay is that the Treasury quite definitely did not accept our evidence on earnings, would not agree that evidence we produced in the form of budgets on the inadequacy of pay was valid, and did not accept a further argument put up by us that if the Tribunal in 1949 fixed a lead of 3s. in excess of the "M" rate it did not necessarily follow that the lead should remain at 3s. when the basic rate increased. They were at great pains to confirm that they did not accept that argument.

735. But would you agree that in this particular instance you have had a pretty fair deal?—Yes, Sir, except that I would say that the claim was quite deliberately modest. When the Executive was considering a claim for these people, many figures were discussed, but the figure of 9s., whilst I admit arbitrary, was considered to be the very least required to bring a London messenger's maximum pay up to a level where he could enjoy a reasonable standard of life.

736. But the 9s. took at least as much account of the fact that your basic rates in your opinion required review as of the fact that there had been a considerable increase in the cost of living over the period?—Yes, we were trying to make up lost ground.

737. In your paragraph 6—this is just to get the record correct—you say "... the pay of messengers has increased, since 1939, at the maximum by 145 per cent. and by 111 per cent. at the minimum"—have you not got those figures the wrong way round?—Yes, Sir, you are quite right.

738. *Mr. Menzler:* Would you say, Mr. Moody, that those increases are in keeping with the general average increase in wage levels in the country at large, of about 120 per cent.?—As far as concerning increases of basic rates, yes.

739. *Mr. Thorneycroft:* That average includes a variety of percentage increases, some of which would be less than the figure quoted by Mr. Menzler and some more.—Yes, that is true.

740. *Chairman:* Would you claim that, the lower in the scale, the larger should be the percentage increase, tapering off?—Yes, perhaps. I would say as a general principle that it is more urgently necessary that the pay of the lower paid people should keep

pace with the cost of living than that of the higher paid, though I would agree that it is desirable that the higher paid people should also keep pace.

741. *Mr. Menzler*: We have been looking at your Table on page 13, where your base line is the 1947 settlement.

Would the figures not have shown a different trend if you had started before 1945 and looked at what has happened since then?—The base date of September, 1946, has a particular significance, because it was the operative date of an agreement the basis of which was the reorganisation of the messenger field, with the purpose of increasing its efficiency. If I may quote from the E.O.C. of that time, No. 12/47: "A study of criticisms of the current standards has indicated that the problem is broadly a twofold one, a solution of which calls for (a) improvements in the conditions of service for messengers so as to attract recruits of good quality". I will not proceed with the rest of it, but you see that agreement was built round discussions on the question of reorganising and increasing the efficiency of the messenger service. It was felt at that time that it was necessary to increase the pay to £5 per week at the maximum to attract the right sort of recruit. We therefore feel that it is a significant base date as a starting point. It is the point at which we agreed that the messenger service required reorganising, and if we start from there and see whether the standard set there has been kept up, we are getting the whole picture.

742. With the aid of this recent 7s. 6d., what would your first column be at the present time?—It would be 134.5.

743. As compared with the wages index of 138?—At December, 136.

744. So you have caught up on the wages index?—Yes.

745. *Mr. Hall*: I would like to ask a question on your paragraphs 25 to 30, read in conjunction with paragraph 7, where there is a reference to rates of pay immediately before the outbreak of war. Is the point that, in your union's view, the pay award in September, 1946, corrected the low level of pay going back to 1939, whereas in the Treasury view it anticipated some benefit which might have come later?—Yes.

746. Your subsequent difficulties are really a difference in interpretation between the two Sides on the significance of the award of September, 1946?—Yes. The Treasury wish to take as its base date March, 1949, the Tribunal award, and we wish to refer to September, 1946, which the Treasury says is no longer a valid argument.

747. In their more recent award of 7s. 6d. they were basing themselves on the decision of the Tribunal in 1949 and not on the position of September, 1946?—Yes.

748. *Sir George Mowbray*: In paragraph 7 there are two submissions on the part of the Union, first of all that the percentage increase has been gained only after and in face of Treasury opposition based on the Treasury interpretation. Is the complaint there that they have only been gained after opposition, or that the opposition has been the wrong interpretation of Tomlin?—I think the latter.

749. You would concede that it is proper for the Treasury to oppose?—Yes, quite.

750. Then there is the expression "disgraceful rates of pay in 1939". Is it a correct assumption that those were, for good or ill, freely negotiated in 1939, and that they were, speaking generally, at a reasonable level for broadly comparable work, at that date?—I am afraid I cannot speak with authority on what took place in 1939, but we certainly would not regard the rates as being at all on the high side at that date. We take the view that since the pay at the moment is in our view poor, or at least at the time we negotiated the last increase it was poor, a claim that it had increased by 145 per cent., if taken back the other way, must result in a rate of pay which was extremely poor. And we would not consider that the rates from January, 1939, £2 10s. to £3, were at all high, even compared with the general position in outside employment.

751. *Mr. Menzler*: When you make that outside comparison, do you take into account superannuation rights?—That question has been raised by the Treasury, but I would not consider that superannuation is so large a factor as is assumed. In the first place, as far as the messenger class are concerned, there is a minimum entry age of 38, except for registered disabled persons, so that the maximum reckonable years that the messenger can earn in normal circumstances is 27. So it is a less important factor for him than for other grades. But in any case I think that from the Government's point of view it is desirable to be able to rely upon some continuity of service in its employees, and if the State wants that it must necessarily offer the employee some incentive to maintain continuity. Superannuation is therefore to a certain degree at any rate to the Government's advantage as well as to the employee's. I think it would be true to say that where outside employers have found the need for continuity of service they too have introduced superannuation schemes, which are becoming more widespread.

752. Supposing you take it that Civil Service superannuation rights are worth from 8 to 10 per cent. as an addition of

pay, taking a low figure. That is material, is it not, when you are making comparisons with outside industry, where superannuation rights do not generally exist or are not as generous as that?—Yes, that is a point, but when you are talking of the pay of people at the lowest levels it is not of much assistance to them to know that in addition to what they are receiving in their pay packets they are getting something which is purely hypothetical to them, which does not buy goods, does not help them in their day-to-day problems and, as far as the messengers are concerned, is certainly not of so great importance as for other grades. Very few messengers voluntarily retire before they are 65, and to what extent they enjoy their superannuation rights after they retire I would not care to guess.

753. They probably share the general good health of the community.—I would not say that is true, Sir, if I may make the point. The messenger field has been regarded as a field of entry for disabled persons, and I think it would probably be true to say that they are more prone to sickness than other grades.

754. *Mr. Cash*: On the other hand, they have pensions already.—Yes. That is a point which has concerned the Union. There may be a tendency in a field which is open to disabled persons to think of pay as being something which is added to a pension. We have never had that indicated by the Treasury, but if the point were made we should disapprove of it.

755. *Mrs. Wootton*: Are your observations in paragraph 7, where you use the word "disgraceful" about the 1939 rates, and also your remarks about superannuation, intended to apply to women cleaners as well as to messengers?—*Miss Edwards*: I think we would definitely agree about the "disgraceful". As for superannuation, very few women cleaners can be employed full-time, and therefore only a relatively small number can ever enjoy superannuation. They do enjoy to some extent the benefit of gratuity, but when a woman is going out on a cleaning job, which is not a job which appeals to anyone as a career but to which they are usually driven in the need to earn a little extra money, it is very little use to say to her: "We are offering you a relatively low rate of pay, but if you stay in the job for seven years you will get a small sum of money when you leave". That is one of the greatest difficulties as regards cleaners, that although we want them to have reasonably good conditions we feel that the Treasury attach too much weight to the value of those conditions when they assess the rates of pay at such a low level. A woman naturally will feel that she wishes to retain a job which offers advantages in the conditions of service, but that will not be sufficient to induce her to stay if what she is going to get at the end of the week

is not really going to assist her in the way she hoped it would. She is naturally drawn more to the higher rate of pay for the short term employment than to the lower rate of pay with what are regarded as reasonable conditions.

756. *Chairman*: What is your view on the proposition that women cleaners' pay should be fixed by comparison with outside rates?—Our view is broadly the same, that all the relevant factors should be considered, but we have felt over the years that the tendency of the Treasury is to look for comparison with the lowest rates of pay rather than with the middle rates. We have never suggested that the highest rates obtainable outside for casual cleaning should be regarded as the relevant ones, but we do feel there is a tendency to look at the very depressed classes, for instance, the hospital cleaners, where the rates are even lower than ours.

757. Is there any large field of cleaners you can suggest as a reasonable comparison?—I do not think I can actually point to one in particular, but there are of course a number of cleaners employed in, for example, gas and electricity boards and the National Coal Board, and the tendency there is for pay to be very much higher and for the conditions to be reasonably good and on a level with civil service employment. Those rates have a tendency to be brushed on one side. We feel that all these rates should be examined, that not too great an emphasis should be placed on superannuation and gratuity and points of that description, and that one of the main factors should be the recruitment of the right type of person. At the present moment there are difficulties in recruitment to the Government service. There are a great number of vacancies in many of the larger Departments, and some of the women who are employed at the present moment are not the type of woman that either the Department itself or we as a Union or the other women would wish to see. In fact I have been told, and we told the Treasury this the other day in our pay negotiations, that in one or two Departments they have even dispensed with the need for references in a desperate urge to get women cleaners at all costs, and that of course is not a good thing, because the decent type of hard working woman that we used to get in the Government service, and who used to stay—I am not going to say she used to stay for the rate of pay, because we have already said that was disgraceful, but she was usually a widow and she had no alternative but to go out on that sort of work—that type of woman will not stay if she is working side by side with a woman who is bringing the whole standard of the job down. These women are very jealous of that standard, and we have some extremely good women among them

who have put in long years of service, and they do not wish to see the service degenerate in any way. They themselves are anxious for what they call a reasonable rate of pay, one that will be sufficient to attract a woman in and then, together with the conditions of service, to keep her once she gets there, and they feel that the only way is to have a slightly higher rate of pay. We are merely asking for a reasonable rate, coupled with these reasonable conditions of service.

758. You do not think we are up against a national shortage of women, but that the Civil Service is not getting its fair share?—I do agree that there is to some extent a national shortage. I think the tendency is these days for very few people to want to do a hard physical job unless it is a last resort, but there is quite a large market of women, particularly to do part-time work, which is what the Government want. It fits in with their household requirements, with the arrangements for the children, and of course the comparative security of the job is bound to appeal to them, but the fact remains that if you have a rate of pay which is not in any sense competitive—and when I say competitive, I will not repeat again that we do not expect that the Government will be able to pay the highest rate—you will not either get the right type of woman in or, once she has come in, keep her.

One of the difficulties is that it is a job where people tend to float. In the pre-war days, after the 1914-1918 war, the almost regular condition of service was that a woman should be a war widow, and as there was very little other work that a woman of that type perhaps could do, she tended to stick at the job whether or not it suited her or paid her sufficiently. Since that time, happily, there are insufficient widows to go round, and therefore the job has been thrown open to any type of woman who is prepared to come and do the cleaning. You now get the younger woman with children coming in, and where there is not quite the same pressure on her to retain the job she is naturally inclined to say: "Where shall I get the greatest advantages at the end of the week"—and she is not going to be held by a promise of a gratuity at the end of seven years, or any of these other things, unless the rate is a reasonable one.

759. *Mr. Cash*: Would you make any vital distinction between London and the provinces?—I have not any figures, but I would say that there is a shortage of Government cleaners in quite a number of the provincial areas. In Manchester, just quoting offhand, I had reason to take up with one or two Departments a shortage of complement, and when I pressed them to engage other cleaners the reply I got was that the Ministry of Labour was just unable

to supply them, and I have no doubt that was because of the rate that was obtaining, which of course would be provincially differentiated. I think there is a general shortage of cleaners in the leading Government Departments throughout the country. The War Office at the present time has a notice on its notice board saying they want 40 cleaners and appealing to the present cleaners to help them to get them. The great disadvantage is that while this recruitment position obtains, the existing women are carrying a very heavy burden in trying to keep the cleaning under control, and the tendency is for a woman, especially when she is getting a bit older, to say: "I might just as well go somewhere else where I can get more money, I shall not stop here any longer", and she goes, and adds to the general confusion.

760. Do you find that, for the reasons you have already explained, it is more the young married woman who comes in now rather than the widow, as it was after the first world war?—At the present moment there is a mixture of all types and ages.

761. Is your impression that they regard this as their whole job so far as earning is concerned?—There again it is a mixture. There are a number of widows who are still on the 10s. pension, some widows who are I suppose on a higher pension and some people who have another small job; but there are quite a number of them who have just this one job. In London the majority of the cleaners are on 30 hours, and if you have a home and relatives or children to look after it is difficult to work another job in, unless it is a very small one. Although it is impossible to generalise, I should say that the majority of cleaners have just one job.

762. One difficulty which must be experienced outside the Civil Service is the four journeys a day as against two journeys a day.—In London; but in the provinces there are still four journeys a day.

763. *Sir Alexander Gray*: If there is a scarcity of cleaners, I suggest it is possibly because that type of people are not there. Would you say it is true that because of social insurance, widows' pensions and all the rest of it, there is not the same supply of that kind of labour as there was 25 years ago?—I should say there is not the ready supply. In the old days you had a waiting list of people coming for these jobs, and even queuing up for them.

764. *Sir George Mowbray*: You have referred specifically to the hospital rates, and to the nationalised boards' rates. Do you feel that local authority rates would be a proper comparison with civil service rates? They are negotiated by the National Joint Council of the Local Authorities, as you know.—I think again it is a rate which should be borne in mind. It is at the moment being borne in mind very consider-

ably by the Treasury, but I do not know whether it is proper for me to refer to negotiations which are at the present moment under way. When we went to arbitration in 1949 the local authority rate happened to be higher than our rate, and the award which was granted to us at that time did give us a rate which put our pay on the same level as local authority. There was no attempt on the part of the Tribunal to say that we were given this award because we should have parity with local authorities. We maintain that it is simply a factor with the other factors to be considered. We are not satisfied that it is a high enough rate, and I have reason to believe that the local authorities themselves are unable to get the type of cleaners they want, or sufficient cleaners, with the rate fixed at the present level.

765. *Mr. Cash*: What do you think the civil service rate ought to be?—We think there should be an increase of 2d. per hour to 2s. 4½d. That, in fact, is a very average figure, in outside firms. In many undertakings, for example, the Gas Board and the National Coal Board, they pay 2s. 6d. and 2s. 6½d. We are not asking for that; we are saying that 2d. an hour would be sufficient to satisfy the women with their conditions of service and would help us to find a better type for the job.

766. *Chairman*: The case is being argued now, is it?—Yes.

767. One of the troubles in this whole range is the relativity with the Post Office manipulative workers which you mention, and the immense number of people there who may be affected. Could you amplify the use made by the Treasury of that comparison?—*Mr. Moody*: I personally have had experience only of the last wage negotiations, and no more was made of it there than just to mention the Post Office manipulative grades. It is generally felt that the rates of pay of the Treasury messengers have some relevance to the manipulative grades in the Post Office. What the Union does not agree is that one rate should be used in arguing against another, when the Treasury is the responsible Department for negotiating both rates (for although the Post Office manipulative rates are negotiated with the Post Office it is clear that the Post Office must act with Treasury authority).

768. Whichever Union is in advance is going to use the argument itself, is it not?—We have not made a practice of using the Post Office manipulative grades as an argument.

769. It is far more important from the Treasury point of view whether the Post Office people are liable to quote your rates of pay as an argument on the other side, because that is where the big battalions lie.

—Yes, that may be a valid argument from

the Treasury's point of view, but we would not accept it as being a reasonable argument against reasonable rates of pay for our people.

770. There should be some relativity between the cleaner in the Post Office and the cleaner in the other Departments of the Civil Service?—Yes, that is reasonable, but we have never come to a point of agreement between the three parties, the Post Office Union, ourselves and the Treasury, on a distinct and rigid relativity between the two. We are prepared to argue our pay claims on their merits.

771. You have not put in any specific new proposals for messenger or cleaner rates. I take it you do not want to and that you are more concerned with general principles?—Quite.

772. You mention the possibility of recruiting messengers of the wrong type. Are you seriously worried about the quality of a very large proportion of your clients?—That is a very difficult question to answer. We think—and this is without directing criticism to any particular groups—that it is the case that some of the people who are recruited in the grade are not necessarily of the same calibre as some of the older types.

773. It is really rather the same sort of thing as was said about the cleaners? There has been a certain deterioration of quality?—Yes, we would say that is true. When one meets the older type of messenger, he is affable to people he meets, mild-mannered and pleasant; on the other hand, it is easy to find another type whose attitude is quite different.

774. Is the Service still as attractive to the ex-Regular as it used to be?—I have no data on that, so I cannot give you a direct answer.

775. The standard of the ex-Regular, I should think, is probably going up, and if he is just as keen to come into the messenger service as he used to be there should be some evidence of that.—I really have not the evidence to answer that question, Sir.

776. Is there anything you would like to add to what you have said, or have you had a fair spin?—I think we have had a fair spin. I can only sum up the Union's view that what we are after in effect is that we should have some freedom to move within the general provisions of the Tomlin recommendations; that if we can produce evidence which we think is valid in substantiating a wage claim, it should not be ruled out because the Treasury takes the view that it would not fit within the framework of Tomlin.

Chairman: Thank you very much for coming.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Monday 26th April 1954, at 11.30 a.m.)

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S.O. Code No. 73-28-5

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

6

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

SIXTH DAY

Monday, 26th April, 1954

Staff Side of the Civil Service
National Whitley Council Witnesses



LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1954

PRICE 1s 3d NET

List of Witnesses

MR. L. C. WHITE, *General Secretary, Civil Service Clerical Association*

MR. E. C. REDHEAD, J.P., *General Secretary, Society of Civil Servants*

MR. S. MAYNE, *General Secretary, Institution of Professional Civil Servants*

MR. H. GILLENDER, *Honorary Deputy Secretary, Association of First Division Civil Servants*

MR. R. A. HAYWARD, *Deputy General Secretary, Union of Post Office Workers*

MR. T. R. JONES, *Secretary, Civil Service National Whitley Council (Staff Side)*

on behalf of the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

SIXTH DAY

Monday, 26th April, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E.,
F.R.S.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum on Hours and Leave submitted by the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council

This document deals with—

- (a) office staffs ;
- (b) other non-industrial civil service grades.

(a) OFFICE STAFFS

1. The term is used in this document, as it is used in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum on the Civil Service, to describe those grades whose hours and leave were settled by the Civil Service National Whitley Council in 1920, as well as departmental executive and clerical grades and professional, scientific and technical grades to whom similar conditions have been applied. Collectively they are the grades who, before the war, were conditioned to a 42-hour week in London and a 44-hour week in the provinces.

Situation before 1939

2. As is explained in paragraph 87 of the Factual Memorandum, the National Whitley Council of Reorganization Committee recommended in 1920 that hours of attendance should be seven a day in London and the provinces and that a half holiday should be granted each Saturday except when the state of business rendered this impracticable. The Official Side would not accept the recommendation as regards provincial staffs and imposed on them, by administrative decision, a 44-hour week consisting of eight hours a day, Monday to Friday, and four hours on Saturday.

3. The pre-war leave entitlements are set out in detail in the appropriate sections of the Factual Memorandum. On the face of it they look generous and, compared with the conditions outside the Civil Service in the period between the wars, they were favourable. By 1939, however, conditions outside, with the extension of holidays with pay to industry and the widespread adoption of the 5-day week, had gone a long way to reduce this relative advantage.

War-time changes

4. These arrangements regarding hours and leave continued without any material change until the war when, as recounted in paragraph 89 of the Factual Memorandum, the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council recognised the necessity, under war-time conditions, for an increase in working hours and a restriction in leave allowances. The measure of the sacrifice made voluntarily by civil servants during the war may be judged by the fact that, following a special meeting of the National Whitley Council in May, 1941, the already lengthened working week which, in addition to drastically curtailed leave allowances, had been accepted in 1940, was increased to 51 hours and all Departments asked to re-assess their staffing needs on this basis in order to effect the maximum savings in manpower. Until 1947, in the case of many grades, the excess hours were worked without any financial compensation.

5. The Staff Side's concurrence in these emergency arrangements was met by a positive and definite assurance that pre-war practices, except where it might be agreed otherwise, would be restored.

6. The Staff Side are confident that no greater sacrifice in the form of working longer hours and accepting reduced annual leave in war-time has been made by any comparable body of workers. Nor do they think any parallel exists in outside comparable employment for the continuance for so long after the war of lengthened hours, introduced solely to meet a war situation. On the contrary there is good ground for believing that outside the Civil Service working conditions in this respect have shown steady and marked improvement over pre-war.

The Post-War situation

7. In July, 1945, as the result of a fresh survey of manpower needs, the Treasury asked Departments to aim at a standard working week of 48 hours. This was followed by a further downward move in February, 1946, when Departments were asked to reduce weekly hours to 45½ as soon as circumstances permitted. At the same time easements were made in restrictions upon leave entitlements until, as stated in paragraph 91 of the Factual Memorandum, allowances up to 36 days per annum were restored in full in 1947, those above 36 continuing to be restricted to that figure.

8. In October, 1945, and February, 1947, the Staff Side represented that a standard working week for the whole Civil Service should be abandoned and that overtime should be performed only if required by the state of the work in any Department. The Official Side refused to accept these representations on the ground that the national manpower situation required an overall reduction in civil service staff which could not be achieved if the Staff Side's proposition were accepted. They did agree, however, that the standard working week could be reduced from 48 hours to 45½ hours in 1947. Subsequently, when discussing hours which should prevail during 1950, the Official Side agreed that hours could be reduced to 44 a week although they stipulated that such a reduction could not be made solely to avoid dismissals of temporary staff on account of redundancy.

9. Discussions have been initiated by the Staff Side from time to time in an endeavour to reach a settlement which would put a term to the present stopgap arrangements. Proposals put forward by the Staff Side have included suggestions for introducing a 5-day week or a 10½-day fortnight. A summary of the Official Side's proposals concerning future hours and leave and a 10½-day fortnight, put forward in 1949, is in paragraph 93 of the Factual Memorandum. As is stated in the following paragraph of the Memorandum, nothing came from these negotiations.

The Pledge for restoration of pre-war hours and leave

10. The Staff Side emphasize that the hours prescribed for office staffs in 1920 were agreed between the Official and Staff Sides of the National Whitley Council, except as regards provincial staffs. On no occasion between 1920 and the outbreak of World War 2, was the appropriateness of these hours of attendance authoritatively questioned. The increase made with the staff's willing concurrence

during the war was expressly designed to meet war-time needs. It was not the result of any suggestion that, under normal conditions, the hours of attendance needed revision. The continued working of longer hours since 1945 has been due to manpower difficulties. It is a wholly reasonable assumption, therefore, that but for the war, the seven-hour day with a Saturday afternoon holiday would have continued unchallenged for office staffs in London.

11. It is therefore fundamental to the consideration of future hours and leave that there must be an unqualified recognition of the fact that office staffs have, in the terms of the Government's undertaking, the right to the restoration of the pre-war 42 or 44-hour week, except where it may be otherwise agreed between the Official and Staff Sides. Attention must also be drawn to the fact that in London the actual pre-war gross hours were normally $38\frac{1}{2}$ per week. A Saturday afternoon holiday as provided by the National Whitley Council agreement of 1920 was always allowed when the state of work permitted—as it customarily did. Only when attendance beyond 42 hours per week became necessary was it the practice to forgo the Saturday half-day.

12. The following extract from a letter from the Official Side of the National Whitley Council dated 12th June, 1947, indicated the Government's unqualified acceptance of the obligation to restore pre-war practice as regards hours and leave and, at the end of paragraph 3, confirmed that the "practice" in this context included a return to the usual arrangements existing before the war about the Saturday half holiday:—

Treasury Chambers,
12th June, 1947.

"1. You will remember that in 1942, a letter was sent to the National Staff Side containing an undertaking on behalf of the Government the effect of which is to create an obligation to restore pre-war hours and leave in the non-industrial Civil Service at a date not later than the end of February, 1948.

2. The Government fully adhere to the principles in regard to the restoration of pre-war hours and leave embodied in this undertaking. At the same time the present economic circumstances of the country oblige them to take into consideration the possible effect of implementing this undertaking on the date which was contemplated in 1942. A critical stage has been reached in the reconversion of the country's economy from war to peace, and the paramount consideration must be to avoid any act that might result in drawing from productive industry manpower that is vitally needed for increased production. The restoration of pre-war hours and leave now would inevitably increase the Civil Service's demands on the country's limited manpower resources, and the Government feel that they cannot escape the obligation to avoid such a situation arising. They have therefore reached the conclusion that the proper course to take in the national interest is to decide that the date for the full implementation of the pledge should be postponed for a period.

3. I am, therefore, instructed to propose that there should be a 'moratorium' for the two calendar years 1948 and 1949 during which the standard working week for all non-industrial Civil Servants 'conditioned' to 42 hours or 44 hours would remain at the present emergency level of $45\frac{1}{2}$ hours. It would be open to either side at any time before the end of the 'moratorium' to make fresh proposals in regard to hours and leave to come into operation either before or after that date; failing agreement on any such proposals the obligation to restore pre-war conditions would, of course, revive at the end of the 'moratorium' period. I am to add that in the case of staff conditioned to a 42-hour week the pre-war 'practice' would include the usual arrangements made before the war in respect of attendance on Saturday afternoons."

13. The Staff Side consider that there should be a return as soon as possible to pre-war hours, emphasizing in this connection the Official Side's acceptance in the Treasury letter quoted above, that this involves a return to the half day holiday on Saturday. They recognize that the process of reducing hours will have to be gradual. Some overtime will continue to be unavoidable but it is likely progressively

to decrease. They desire to place the greatest possible emphasis on the unqualified commitment to the Civil Service which will not have been honoured by H.M. Government until a return to pre-war practice, as defined in the Official Side letter quoted above, has been achieved. The sacrifices made by the Civil Service during and since the war in the matter of working hours and leave, have been referred to in paragraph 6 of this memorandum, as has the belief that hours and leave outside the Civil Service have in recent years shown a steady and marked improvement. Any suggestion that the willingness of civil servants to work longer hours during and after the war should result in the imposition of a permanent longer working week, would conflict with the outside trend and be a breach of faith on the part of H.M. Government.

14. The Staff Side must now refer to the financial consequences to the staffs of a return to pre-war hours. It would be true to say of office staffs in the Civil Service that, owing to the working of continuous overtime since the outbreak of war, only a minority, over a period of many years, have drawn their basic rates of pay. For overtime grades, therefore, overtime pay has become a quasi-permanent part of their earnings; and in 1947, as a result of the introduction of extra duty allowances, a similar situation has been created among certain grades who have no normal entitlement to overtime payment. It is recognised that these additions to basic pay have been in compensation for excess hours and that the reduction and ultimate disappearance of regular overtime would normally involve the loss of these additional earnings in their present form. It is indisputable, however, that the regularity and extent of these additions have affected the consideration of wage and salary claims in recent years. The fact that basic rates whose improvement was sought from time to time were supplemented by these additional earnings has inevitably influenced the settlements reached either by negotiation or arbitration. Undoubtedly there would have been a greater resistance to the depreciation of pre-war standards among all grades in the Service had not overtime and extra duty allowances acted as cushions. In these circumstances, the Staff Side submit that consideration must, in equity, be given to some increases in basic pay, not as compensation for the loss of overtime and extra duty earnings, but because the existence of these earnings has had the effect of keeping basic rates lower in terms of pre-war equivalents than would otherwise have been the case.

Provincial Hours

15. As is mentioned in paragraph 2, the Reorganization Committee of the National Whitley Council on which both Official and Staff Sides were represented recommended in 1920 that hours of attendance should be uniformly seven a day and that a half holiday should be granted each Saturday except when the state of business rendered this impracticable. The longer working week in the provinces was imposed by administrative action. The National Staff Side have always held the opinion that this is unjust. Provincial staffs suffer differentiation in pay because of their location. They understandably resent a further differentiation in regard to working hours, regarding it as a second penalty attached to civil service employment outside the London area.

16. The view of the Official Side of the National Whitley Council in 1920, in contrast to that of their representatives on the Reorganization Committee, was that a 7-hour day was adequate for staffs in London but not for provincial staffs. Whatever justification there may have been for that view when the 44-hour week in the provinces was introduced, changes subsequently have deprived it of its validity. The theory was that a provincial civil servant was free to choose a convenient place of residence which involved him in no more travelling to and from his office than he was willing to undertake for his personal convenience. Today, civil servants, in common with the rest of the community, have to live where they are best able to find accommodation suited to their needs, regardless of resultant disabilities in terms of travel costs and length of journey to the office. In the large towns and cities, this may involve travelling on a scale comparable with that of London staffs. Furthermore, in recent years the Government has

pursued a policy of dispersal of administration from the more congested parts of provincial cities to their outskirts. Because of this and the extensive building of Government industrial establishments in relatively isolated parts of the country where there is not adequate housing accommodation, many members of the staff are compelled to live long distances from their work. The earlier generalisations about the relative travel burdens of London and provincial staffs have ceased to be true.

17. The Staff Side are aware of a number of examples of outside organisations which do not differentiate between London and provincial staffs in the matter of hours. They are:—

- Local Government
- Banks
- Insurance companies
- National Coal Board
- British Gas and Electricity authorities.

The Staff Side have also been given, in confidence, the names of several large industrial undertakings which make no distinction in regard to working hours between London and provincial staffs. They assume that the Commission will establish the facts by their own enquiries. Accordingly the Staff Side submit that the recommendation of the Reorganization Committee of the National Whitley Council (1920) should be applied to provincial staffs thus bringing civil service practice into accord with that extensively followed outside.

Criticism of leave scales

18. The National Staff Side are aware that the annual leave arrangements of civil service office staffs have been the subject of ill-natured criticism. The peace-time leave allowances of the grades covered by the term "office staffs" are shown in the appropriate sections of the Factual Memorandum. As is mentioned in paragraph 3, in comparison with those in outside employment they were relatively more favourable when introduced in 1920 than they had become by 1939. They range from 18 days in the case of the sub-clerical grades aged 18 and above, to 48 days (restricted to 36 at present) for the administrative and controlling executive grades. Certain of these leave scales may still appear to be on the generous side, but they must be considered in relation to the following facts:—

- (a) that Saturday absence counts as a full day's leave ;
- (b) that leave allocations have to cover absence for a variety of reasons which in outside employment would generally be covered by concessionary leave additional to annual leave ;
- (c) that officers entitled to the higher allocations were not always able, owing to the exigencies of the work, to take their full leave allowance.

At the lower levels of the Service, taking account of (a) and (b) which apply to all grades, the leave entitlements cannot be considered to be particularly generous compared with those in private employment.

19. At a time when it is apparent from its recruiting difficulties that the Civil Service offers a less attractive career than before the war, it seems particularly undesirable to minimise one feature in which the Civil Service has some advantage over industry. Leave standards in the Service were fixed over thirty years ago and since they were first established the whole tendency in outside employment has been to improve annual leave arrangements. For industrial workers annual leave has either been introduced for the first time or very much improved—sometimes both—during this period:

The Five-Day Week

20. In recent years there has been a marked trend in outside employment to reduce or re-arrange working hours to increase opportunities for rest and relaxation. In the Staff Side's view there is an overwhelming case for some modification of the present Saturday attendance rules in the Civil Service. Indeed it is contended

that this reform is long overdue. The development of the 5-day week in outside commercial and industrial establishments is reflected on the industrial side of the Civil Service where it has been very extensively introduced. This change has been applied to non-industrial civil servants employed in the same establishments. Approximately 27,000 non-industrial staffs are affected in the Admiralty, Air Ministry and Ministry of Supply. In addition, some 65,000 staffs have a 5-day week in the Post Office Engineering, Supplies and Factory departments. Apart from this the position of civil service office staffs in regard to Saturday attendance has remained unchanged and they are now one of the few large groups of office workers who have remained unaffected by the prevailing trend. The Official Side's response to proposals for a 5-day week for non-industrial civil servants produced an offer of a 10½-day fortnight under conditions referred to in paragraph 93 of the Factual Memorandum. These proposals would, if adopted, have involved sacrifices of annual leave which, in the view of a substantial section of the staffs, would not have been compensated for by the value of the concession offered. Leave entitlements of 48, 36 and 24 days were to be reduced to 40, 30 and 21 days respectively. In addition, future entrants under age 25 in grades whose leave allowances would become 30 days were to be restricted to 24 days. Moreover, these reductions in leave allowances were less favourable than those that had already been imposed upon office staffs working a 5-day week in Government industrial establishments. In the case of those staffs the following table shows the reduction in leave allowances in return for the 5-day week:—

36 days reduced to 30 days
30 days reduced to 25 days
24 days reduced to 20 days
21 days reduced to 18 days
18 days reduced to 16 days
14 days reduced to 13 days

21. In the view of the Staff Side, the 10½-day fortnight would not go as far as is possible or desirable in many areas of the Service. There the introduction of the 5-day week would present no serious difficulties and would result in substantial economies—financial and material—including the time and energy of thousands of civil servants who travel long distances to and from their offices in order to put in a relatively short attendance on Saturday mornings.

22. It is the Staff Side's view that the 5-day week should be extended to the non-industrial Civil Service; that the hours of office staffs should be compressed into a 5-day week wherever this can be done, and into a 10½-day fortnight if for any reason in any area of the Service the 5-day week is not practicable. It is recognised that neither the 5-day week nor the 10½-day fortnight may be possible in special but very limited areas of the Service. Nor would it be possible for the rest day or half day to be taken in all cases on Saturday. The National Staff Side suggest that the Royal Commission should make a positive recommendation in favour of the 5-day week, leaving the 10½-day fortnight as a less desirable alternative to be negotiated where the change to a 5-day week cannot be made immediately.

23. The National Staff Side are of the opinion that the introduction of a 5-day week should have no effect upon leave allowances of the staffs concerned other than the direct arithmetical adjustments rendered necessary by shortening the effective week, viz.: 48 days would be reduced to 40, 36 to 30, 30 to 25, 24 to 20 and so on. It is also considered that no case was made out by the Official Side in 1949 for restricting the entitlement of leave of civil servants under 25.

Temporary staffs

24. In certain areas of the Civil Service temporary staffs have less favourable conditions as regards hours and leave than their analogues in established grades. The Staff Side consider that the parity which already exists within many grades between temporary and established staffs should become universal.

(b) OTHER STAFFS

25. This section of the memorandum is concerned with the position of grades of non-industrial civil servants whose hours of attendance and leave arrangements are less favourable than those of office staffs.

Unjustified discrimination between office staffs and others

26. The unions representing these grades are responsible for the conduct of negotiations affecting their hours and leave. Those unions are, however, part of the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council and the Staff Side as a whole can see no justification for applying to the grades concerned conditions less favourable than those of office staffs on broadly comparable pay scales. They hope that the Commission will recommend that there is no case in principle or on merits for the continuance of the more unfavourable terms.

27. This submission may, within its general framework, be supplemented by others from constituent associations of the Staff Side on sectional aspects of the problem.

Examination of witnesses

MR. L. C. WHITE, *General Secretary, C.S.C.A.*

MR. E. C. REDHEAD, J.P., *General Secretary, S.C.S.*

MR. S. MAYNE, *General Secretary, I.P.C.S.*

MR. H. GILLENDER, *Hon. Deputy Secretary, F.D.A.*

MR. R. A. HAYWARD, *Deputy General Secretary, U.P.W.*

MR. T. R. JONES, *Secretary, Civil Service National Whitley Council (Staff Side).*

On behalf of the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council
Called and examined.

777. *Chairman:* Thank you for coming here this morning. May I start with this point? Question 174 of the Treasury oral evidence makes it clear that in their view the Commission should tackle their tasks in the following order; first, we ought to lay down principles of pay; secondly, lay down appropriate hours and leave; and thirdly, rates of pay in relation to the first two. Would the Staff Side agree with this method of procedure?—*Mr. White:* When you are considering hours and leave you have to consider other things as well and all have to be taken together. Among other things are career prospects of the job; there are several things, of which hours are only one.

778. Would you like to give us a little more information on that, by sending in a note?—We could do that.

779. Thank you very much. Have you attempted to make any estimate in terms of extra money or manpower of the combined effect of all your proposals?—No, Sir; we have no means of doing that.

780. *Mr. Thorneycroft:* Mr. White, in paragraph 3 of your memorandum, in the second sentence you say:

"By 1939, however, conditions outside, with the extension of holidays with

pay to industry and the widespread adoption of the 5-day week had gone a long way to reduce this relative advantage."

Would you like to amplify the phrase about the widespread adoption of the 5-day week prior to 1939? Had you in mind industry, or do you know of the extension of the 5-day week prior to 1939 to the salaried professions?—We had in mind office workers, more than industrial workers.

781. Have you any bodies of clerical workers you can cite in support of that?—We know that among insurance companies, for example, there was a considerable development of the 5-day week. We know also of many offices in the City where they had perhaps half their staff in on Saturdays. There was a trend which we noted during the years before the war.

782. That trend has continued since?—Definitely, yes.

783. And in adopting the 5-day week, is it within your knowledge, in relation to the examples you have cited, that within the 5 days the same total hours of work have to be given as before?—We would not say it was general by any means.

784. In other words, there has been a general reduction in working hours?—There were reductions in many cases. I could add that one of the things that civil servants have noted particularly is that on Saturday mornings those of them who travel by train and bus have the most comfortable journey of the whole week, because there are very few competitors.

785. What happened in those cases when overtime had to be worked?—We have no information which would suggest that the civil service overtime arrangements are necessarily followed outside, although we know that in some cases overtime is given by way of tea money, and in other cases there is some recognised rate. But we do know that in a number of cases, as an experiment, the staffs were given one Saturday off in two, and that they were later given every Saturday off, and there was no addition to the working hours for receiving the 5-day week.

786. *Lady Albemarle*: Did you carry out a survey on this trend you mention, or did you deduce it just from individual experience?—We have never carried out any definite survey.

787. It was just from your experience of people talking about other people?—Yes.

788. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Is this tendency more marked in London than elsewhere?—We think it is definitely more marked in the larger cities.

789. Is it equally marked in Birmingham or Glasgow?—We think there is a considerable tendency in the larger cities.

790. As strong as in London?—Possibly not quite so strong.

791. *Mrs. Wootton*: Are we still speaking about pre-1939?—I am bringing the thing up to date now.

792. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Is it not true that in order to get the 5-day week in industry there was a reduction in the luncheon hour and tea breaks?—It would have been a pretty long luncheon hour before the change if they could have had the 5-day week by reducing it.

793. My knowledge tells me that the 5-day week was effected in industry by cutting out breaks and by having, in some cases, earlier starting hours or later finishing hours?—I would not dissent for a moment from the fact that there may have been cuts in the luncheon hour, but that could only have been a relatively small contribution towards the Saturday morning off.

794. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 13 your submission says, in the first sentence:

“... emphasising in this connection the Official Side's acceptance in the Treasury letter quoted above, that this involves a return to the half day holiday on Saturday.”

Is not that the position at the present time?—We have a half day holiday on Saturday, but we are having that holiday in our own time as it were. Before the war we were having a holiday in London in official time. You will see at the end of paragraph 3 of the letter quoted the writer says:

“I am to add that in the case of staff conditioned to a 42-hour week the pre-war practice would include the usual arrangements made before the war in respect of attendance on Saturday afternoons.”

The usual arrangements were that on Saturday afternoons the London staff had a half day out of their working hours. If of course we had to work longer hours either on Saturday or during the week, nobody could qualify for overtime payment until he had actually worked 42 hours. But in fact normally when a man finished on Saturday morning in London, he had worked 38½ hours, not 42; so the difference between 38½ and 42 was the actual holiday. We take the last sentence in paragraph 3 to mean that the pledge to restore pre-war conditions also covers the pledge to restore that pre-war arrangement.

795. In paragraph 10 you say:

“On no occasion between 1920 and the outbreak of World War 2, was the appropriateness of these hours of attendance authoritatively questioned.”

I have been looking up the official reports and I find this in the Geddes Report:

“... the lower grade staff has... a shorter day than obtains in outside employment and (this day) might well be reviewed.”

The Select Committee on Estimates in 1922 said:

“Your Committee are of opinion that the hours of attendance are too short... They cannot think that 34½ hours or 33½ hours should be considered to constitute a fair day's work in the Civil Service in London.”

In 1923 the Anderson Committee, said:

“For the routine clerical classes, the normal attendance should be 8 hours, including three quarters of an hour off for lunch.”

The Tomlin Commission, although it did not recommend any change in the hours or leave allowances, did say that leave was already on a generous scale. In view of that, would you qualify the statement about the hours of attendance never having been authoritatively questioned?—We have in mind here that the hours of attendance were never questioned by any Official Side. We are talking about the agreement of 1920; and from 1920 onwards there was no attempt by the Official Side to alter it.

796. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: At any time between 1920 and the outbreak of World War 2 did the Staff Side raise the appropriateness of the provincial hours?—We are bound to say our predecessors who went before the Tomlin Commission were very remiss about this. But the situation is now more in our favour because, as we show elsewhere in this document, there has been a good deal of change in the location of provincial offices in the last few years, as a result of dispersal and the opening up of considerable establishments in isolated places. The amount of difference between travel in the provinces and travel in London now is certainly not as great as it was before the war.

797. Is it the opinion of your Side, Mr. White, that there is a requirement now for more mobility in the Civil Service?—Yes.

798. Do you find that that requirement can be prejudiced by this differentiation between London and the provinces in respect of hours?—Both in respect of hours and in respect of pay.

799. *Mrs. Wootton*: Have you specific evidence on the increase in travelling in provincial offices?—We could take Harwell as an example. A few people are provided with houses on the site. Everybody else has to travel from places like Reading, Abingdon or Didcot. All that involves travel. Before the war such Government offices as there were in most of the small towns and cities, were in the centre. But now as regards cities—Manchester is a case in point and I think Leeds is another—it is Ministry of Works policy to put Government buildings as far as possible on the periphery. Of course, if one happens to live on that side of the city, one is fortunate, but if one lives anywhere else there is more travel. Then again, there is the big Ministry of National Insurance office at Long Benton, near Newcastle. Even the Newcastle people have to travel, but in fact a very high proportion of the Long Benton staff do not come from Newcastle at all; they come from all over Durham.

800. Have you collected statistics on this?—No, we have not.

801. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Have you evidence to suggest that this differentiates unfairly against the Civil Service as compared with industrial workers, because it is a fairly general thing for new industrial undertakings to be built away from the centre?—There is this difference, that Government offices are staffed very largely by transferees from other places. In the present housing difficulties they have to get houses wherever they can and they cannot necessarily select somewhere handy. To that extent I think it does operate rather harshly against civil servants.

801A. *Mr. Burman*: That would be to some extent temporary, would it not?—That is a question of how long the housing shortage continues.

802. When you suddenly put up a big new establishment in a new district you have got to transfer; but in five or ten years' time, as wastage occurs and so on, you will then get local staff presumably.—Except that the local staff would not be any better off. For example, in a place like Harwell, the only local staff you can recruit by ordinary civil service methods of examinations would be those who happened to pass and also to live near to Harwell; and there could not be very many of them.

803. Would it be fair to say the Staff Side want hours comparable with similar outside occupations in the district wherever they may happen to be, without particular regard to what was the procedure of the Civil Service before the war or in 1920?—We go back to the point that in 1920 the Official Side of the Reorganisation Committee of the National Whitley Council—and it was a very powerful and authoritative Official Side—agreed with the proposition that provincial hours should be the same as London hours. The main National Whitley Council disagreed with them, throwing their colleagues overboard in the process. We say that the Reorganisation Committee was right and the full National Whitley Council Official Side was wrong, and that whatever hours are laid down for London should also apply to the provinces.

804. But at one time we are talking about what happened in 1920 and another time about the contemporary position.—We are saying that in general there is no marked difference between the degrees of travel endured by the generality of provincial civil servants and those in London, and so the hours should be the same.

805. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You mean the amount of time taken up by travel?—Yes.

806. But what about the conditions of travel? In London the civil servant has to compete with a multitude of other establishments. In the country, where you have got a Government establishment, they are not so competing. The stress of travel is much more considerable in London.—But of course in these large cities where the Government offices have been put, there is also a great deal of competition among other workers in that area.

807. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Is your case that in 1920 the Reorganisation Committee recommended that provincial and London hours should be similar, and that whatever

justification there was for that recommendation 34 years ago has become intensified by developments in the intervening years?—Yes.

808. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Would you not agree that Harwell was rather an exceptional case?—No; the tendency has been for many years to put Government establishments outside the large cities. Then of course there is the Air Ministry, where the number of aerodromes has expanded tremendously since 1920, and the degree of isolation is tremendous. As a matter of fact, some of the redundant clerical officers in the Ministry of Food have been offered posts in the Air Ministry in certain places, not shown on any map at all!

809. I should have thought you were trying to prove too much. Perhaps I should not say so, but merely by looking at maps one can see the amount of travel in London must be much greater than elsewhere because of the size of the area over which people are scattered. The question of the periphery arises in London too.

810. *Lady Albemarle*: I suppose it has not been considered that, as you have a three-tier system in pay, you might possibly have a three-tier system in hours?—No, because we do not want a three-tier system in pay!

811. It would be more logical?—It would be rather difficult, because a place that is very small and in the third tier for pay would probably be in the top tier for travel; and you would have to take into account not where people worked but where they lived, because they cannot live where they work.

812. But of course you still do have Mr. Lloyd Williams' point that it is not only the distance of travel but the stress of travel conditions. In the third tier presumably, although you might find your house a good distance away and have to travel a long way, you probably would not have the same stresses as you would in the big towns like Manchester, Birmingham or London?—It would depend on what is involved in the journey. In some of these isolated places the actual stress of the journey, in terms of getting transport (if you do not provide your own) and the distance you have to go are greater than the distance that many Londoners have to travel.

813. *Chairman*: The physical stress of travel may take the place of mental stress?—Definitely.

814. *Mr. Menzler*: The 42 hour week in London is an actual working week of 38½ hours, is it not?—Yes, it is less the meal hours.

815. What are the 44 hours in the provinces?—It is a real 44 hour week. By 1 o'clock on Saturday the civil servant has worked his 44 hours. If he is unwise enough to take Saturday morning off, although he only actually gains 3½ hours, he is debited with a whole day's leave. We tried for 25 years to put that right, quite unsuccessfully.

816. Do you agree there is another form of provincial differentiation against the provincial worker with regard to the Saturday afternoon?—Yes.

817. Which means that the difference in working hours is between 44 and 38½ and not between 44 and 42?—Yes.

818. *Mrs. Wootton*: The Treasury said they carried out a survey on this and found that the average hours worked were shorter in London in outside firms. Do you have any comments on that?—We do mention that; we give examples in the document where there is no distinction between London and the provinces. We have been given other recent information, but we cannot disclose it.

819. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I was wondering why you were not as tactful in this list of yours as you were in respect of the comparison on negotiating machinery which was made at another meeting! Why have you omitted the railways?—We have put in everything we got from the sources which gave us liberty to publish. I am bound to confess—I hope you will not take this badly—we did not approach the railways!

820. *Chairman*: How far do you think regard should be had to outside practice in this respect?—The difficulty, in so far as the Treasury are concerned, is that they want to select the practices that are advantageous to them and exclude the practices that are not. There are many considerations we have to take into account when taking outside practices as a guide to pay, hours or anything of that sort. We would say that the present arrangements are based as it were upon a moral contract of service between the Government and the civil servants, and that if there is any variation to the detriment of the civil servant in the matter of hours or leave, that is disturbing the whole contract and the contract itself has got to be reviewed both from the point of view of what you take away and what you have to give in compensation. I noticed, for example, that in a reply Sir Edward Bridges gave to the Commission he seemed to be implying that if we had a 10½ day fortnight the staff would save a certain amount of time on Saturday mornings because they would not have to travel. I got the impression he thought that the Government would be justified in taking account of that, although it was his own time the civil servant would be saving. I think that is quite wrong. I think if there

is to be any adverse change whatever in hours or leave it has got to be looked at as a worsening of the general conditions, which have to be compensated for. We take the view that the first thing is for the Government to carry out the pledge to restore pre-war hours and leave; and thereafter if there are any changes to be made, they must be the subject of negotiations.

821. *Mr. Burman*: Have the Staff Side got any suggestions as to what should be fair working hours?—We say that before the war the hours were reasonable, both from the point of view of the staff and the taxpayer.

822. That is to say the 38½ hour working week for London?—Yes.

823. What would that represent in terms of hours of work per day, working on the 5-day week?—About 34½ or 34¾ actual working hours a week or about 7 hours a day.

824. And that in your view would be comparable with outside employment?—With commercial offices, insurance offices and so on, outside.

825. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: But not with industry in a general sense?—Not in a general sense, no.

826. In other words you are advocating a 38½ hour week for London, including lunch breaks. How do you conceive this in terms of the five-day week?—We should have to agree what are to be the conditioned hours, and those conditioned hours would have to be compressed within the five days instead of six. If, for example, 42 hours in London were to be the conditioned hours, then the 42 hours would have to be compressed between Monday and Friday.

827. *Chairman*: Do you agree it is desirable in principle that conditioned hours and hours actually worked should be the same?—Definitely.

828. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: May I ask if three quarters of an hour is a proper statement of the total meal time period?—I believe it is still the regulation time laid down in the Reorganisation Report, with discretion to extend up to an hour. I would not like to mislead the Commission by saying that I think all London civil servants restrict themselves to three quarters of an hour.

829. *Lady Albemarle*: Did the 1949 offer not represent a marked improvement on the lunch hour to seventy minutes a day?—No.

830. In asking for the fulfilment of the pledge, you are also prepared to go back to 45 minutes a day?—I think the 70 minutes which the Treasury offered was for all breaks, including lunch, and possibly some other breaks taken during the day. You ask would we go back

to three quarters of an hour; before the war, it is true that was the regulation lunch time, but in reality it was generally one hour.

831. Should these breaks be the same in London and the provinces?—I think they should be now, because a large proportion of civil servants in the provinces have to have their lunch at home.

832. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Would it not be fairly usual for the lunch to be provided within the vicinity of the establishment, if not by the establishment itself?—It varies quite a lot. If you have a big Government office, you can assume there is a canteen.

833. *Lady Albemarle*: You do feel that 70 minutes for everything, lunch and the other breaks, is what is now the right length of break?—That is roughly what happens.

834. As we understand it, before the war there was this lunch interval of 45 minutes, and no other breaks were allowed. We are not talking about what happened, but the arrangement on paper. You yourself have talked about the contract. Was that 45 minutes the contract?—We took the view that 70 minutes in London was not compensation for anything, but merely regularising what had been going on for a very long time.

835. But it altered the hours worked, because the contract was a 45 minute break in a 38½ hour working week.—With authority in London to extend to one hour where necessary.

836. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: This reduces the actual working hours to the order of 33?—Yes.

837. And this is, if I understand it correctly, what you are suggesting as a proper working week in the London area, having in mind the general industrial situation.—I would rather put it this way. That is what the Government is committed to do in the first place. If it can be shown that this is not in accordance with outside practice, it becomes a matter for consideration, but the pledge is there.

838. *Lady Albemarle*: Is the Government committed to the 38½ hour week with the 70 minutes breaks or with the 45 minute breaks?—The Government is committed to the 45 minute break in London, with power given to the heads of the offices to extend to an hour where necessary.

839. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: And the 45 minute interval has in many cases at their discretion been extended to an hour. Is it within your knowledge, Mr. White, that even in the Civil Service members of the staff have not put down their pens immediately the normal finishing time arrives, but that some of them have finished the

job they have in hand and did not charge overtime for it?—That frequently happens, because men do not finish jobs on the dot. In most Departments, even before the war, no overtime was paid unless there was a minimum of about half an hour, and it had to be authorised in advance. But if a job took a man ten minutes or a quarter of an hour extra that was time he gave.

840. To the extent that that would occur, it was in some measure a *quid pro quo* for the extended lunch interval?—Yes.

841. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I think this is of importance. Are you implying that this picture is confined to the Civil Service?

842. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: My point was to make it clear that the working time in many instances did not finish at the normal finishing time.

843. *Chairman*: Mr. White, you have mentioned the Government pledge, as an important part of your argument. We might take the view that our job is to find out what should be the actual hours worked and under what conditions, and only to look at the pledge afterwards in that light.—What we say is that the Government cannot evade its pledge because it has set up a Royal Commission.

844. *Mr. Burman*: May I take it that your argument is that, because the Civil Service enjoyed certain hours before the war, those hours should necessarily apply for all time, regardless of outside conditions?—That would be a matter for negotiation.

845. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I gather that you think the pledge ought to be restored and thereafter there should be negotiations, so that, if the Government cared to enter into negotiations immediately after restoring the pledge, that would be all right, but there ought to be at least a week after the thing is restored.—Yes. Of course the pledge did say that pre-war hours would be restored unless they were varied by agreement. If they cannot get agreement with us as to any proposed variation, then the first duty of the Government is to restore pre-war hours, so that at least we can negotiate as equal partners from there.

846. *Mrs. Wootton*: In your paragraph 14 you refer to the effect on negotiations of extra duty allowance and regular overtime. You say it is indisputable that the regularity and extent of these additions have affected the consideration of wage and salary claims in recent years. At the end of that paragraph you use what I would like to call a rather subtle argument, that if the hours are restored consideration must be given to these extra payments, not actually as compensation for the loss of overtime, but for the fact that this has kept down the basic rates. Have you any further evidence as to how this has been used to

keep down the rates of pay? Has it been quoted in arbitration proceedings or anything like that?—In negotiations and arbitration proceedings it has been mentioned, quite properly, that the hours of civil servants today include in London normally three and a half hours' overtime, and there is no doubt that has had an effect. Indeed, I believe in the administrative class pay claim the Chairman of the Tribunal actually enquired what would be the effect on extra duty allowance of a certain award. I would say this, that among the staffs themselves, who naturally measure what they get not in terms of basic pay but in terms of what is in the envelope, the degree of pressure for more pay, which has been considerable anyhow, would certainly have been much greater if it had not been that the shock was taken away by overtime and extra duty allowance.

847. Do you have a note of the cases where this has actually been quoted in arbitration cases?—We could certainly give you that. I do not want to mislead the Commission about this. It has never been argued, to the best of my knowledge, in arbitration that certain basic rates of pay should not be given because the recipients are earning overtime as well, but it has been brought into discussions.

848. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You see in arbitration one finds that the battle resolves itself around the question of whether we should consider earnings or basic rates. The employers usually argue that the earnings are good; and the trade unions say: "You must not regard earnings because one man may earn a high wage and another man may not; the average may be very high, but that may be because a small minority work excessive hours and a considerable number may be earning nothing more than the basic wage. It really is speculation." You know that these are the arguments which are put forward?—We know first of all the minds of our own people, and we know that a little extra money has tended to lessen the pressure which would otherwise have been put upon us for increases of pay. It is true to say that earnings over pre-war have gone up more rapidly outside the Civil Service than wages have gone up; and we can say quite definitely that owing to this considerable amount of additional pay, which is widespread over the Service, basic rates of pay have not been regarded as so important as gross rates. Indeed, we have reached the stage where because civil servants, on taking their Christmas holidays, find they are not getting any overtime for Christmas Day, Boxing Day and the day after they think they have had a cut in pay because they celebrated the festive season!

849. Tell me, Mr. White, coming back to paragraph 14, if you did succeed in getting the basic hours reduced without any

increase in the basic rates, that would not be acceptable?—It would create a very difficult position; and I rather gather the Treasury themselves regard it as so serious that before this Commission they spoke in terms of doing it gradually.

850. We know outside that in industry when they reduced the hours from 48 to 44, what they did do was to consolidate the bonuses. Are you suggesting here that, if you should get a reduction of hours, then what should happen is that they should consolidate the overtime in it and the extra duty allowance?—Something of that sort. We could not say the precise sum which should be consolidated with basic pay; but on the assumption that the Commission itself would be recommending scales of pay for the main grades, we would say that those new scales of pay should take into account loss of earnings as a result of the abolition of overtime.

851. *Chairman*: Did the revised scales you put to us on behalf of the Alliance take account of this factor?—They were based on conditioned hours as they are now.

852. To round off this argument; is it your proposal that 38½ hours should be worked in London and the provinces within a five-day week, or is it a 42-hour week?—The proposal as regards London is that we must have the 38½-hour week back, in accordance with the Government pledge. So far as the provinces are concerned we argue that they should now be given parity with London, and as that meant 42 hours gross, 38½ hours actual, it would apply to the provinces as well.

853. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: On the question of overtime, I suppose it is a pretty safe presumption that there will always need to be worked a certain amount of seasonal overtime. Would I be correct in assuming that you would expect that normal overtime rates should operate in respect of that overtime?—Yes.

854. Would you like to tell us what would be the justification for having multiple rates for overtime?—We have always taken the view that if a person's hours are normally 42, or anything of that sort, and exceptionally we have to call on him for extra duty, the degree of inconvenience, and very often the degree of additional expense involved, calls for something over. Very often, if the call is rather sudden, there is a certain amount of placating to be done domestically, which is expensive!

855. That is what I had in mind. You did say earlier on in reply to a question that in effect you felt overtime as such should be eliminated altogether. I deduce from that that you regard overtime as a penalty for staff being required to work

longer than normal hours?—I would not quite put it as a penalty, because after all, if a Department is faced with an urgent job, it has no alternative but to use overtime. I would rather put it that it is to give to the person required to work overtime in exceptional circumstances some compensation additional to the normal.

856. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: It is a premium on his leisure time?—His leisure time is being paid for a little more heavily than his ordinary working time.

857. *Chairman*: Do you agree with the Treasury that extra duty allowance should be abolished?—*Mr. Mayne*: Yes. We think the normal working hours should be the conditioned hours. It is not that we think people should continue to work excessive hours and not be compensated for it, but that the working of excessive hours continuously is in itself a bad thing.

858. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: It is a fixed sum, the extra duty allowance?—It is a fixed sum in specific circumstances. However long an officer may be required to work, he will not get more than 8 per cent. (if he is in London). Of course one would not reckon to deal with officers at the extra duty allowance level on an ordinary overtime basis anyway. I think that would be a view common to the Treasury and to ourselves.

859. *Lady Albemarle*: Could you supplement that? Presumably if the conditioned hours were working hours and extra duty allowance done away with, you would still have the case of the man who had to work very long hours and if he was out of the ordinary overtime arrangements, he would get no money at all.—That of course is true; but again at that level one recognises that there are bound to be occasions on which the necessities of the work require overtime and where the conditioned working week can never, strictly speaking, apply.

860. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Dealing with a person who may be called upon to do this extra duty, is it appropriate to condition a man of that status to fixed hours?—The answer is that it does not really matter because the amount of work that is falling upon him is patently beyond the level that was envisaged when he was appointed. This was as familiar a feature before the war in the Civil Service where, from time to time, and sometimes over long periods of time, particular officers or particular groups of officers had to work well beyond the normal hours. But it would still have been true to say, I think, that each class as a whole would have been working to something of the order of its conditioned hours. The difference between then and now is that the class as a whole is working substantially beyond its conditioned hours. The value of the conditioning is that it

gives you a rough idea of what the norm ought to be.

861. Do high level officers have to sign an attendance book and do they object to that?—*Mr. Redhead*: There is not a great deal in that. In many cases it is largely by way of example to those below them.—*Mr. Gillender*: The actual procedure seems to vary with the Department.

862. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: In your paragraphs 18 and 19 you appear to accept that leave conditions in the Civil Service are favourable in relation to industry, although you say that for the lower levels they are not particularly generous by comparison. Then you go on to suggest that a change in the conditions would tend to minimise the advantage to recruitment. Have you any evidence to suggest that the annual leave scales do constitute a substantial aid to recruitment?—*Mr. White*: Not by themselves. You simply take it as one of the conditions which the potential civil servant has to consider. Any slight advantage in the matter of leave might help to make up his mind, but it is not a very substantial factor in respect of the lower grades.

863. You mention in respect of the lower grades that the leave conditions are not particularly generous relative to outside employment. Can one deduce from this that you think the leave conditions of the higher grades are more favourable?—I would like to qualify my reply. I do not think they have much effect so far as recruiting the lower grades is concerned. I agree in the case of the higher grades that length of the leave is quite a factor, because, as *Mr. Mayne* has explained earlier on, the conditioned hours are by no means the hours to which the higher grade people must in fact condition themselves. They know that in certain circumstances they may have to work very long hours with normally no financial compensation at all; and if the prescribed leave is on the favourable side that is a factor to be taken into account. On the other hand, if the leave is short, and all the other disabilities there, it tends to discourage people from coming into the administrative class.

864. *Mr. Menzler*: When you refer to the higher grades working very long hours, you mean the people over about £1,200?—Yes.

865. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Is there any sense of hardship in the minds of these people in not getting the amount of leave they are supposed to get?—Of course the reduction in leave now is limited to the very top people. Everybody who is entitled to 36 days or below is given what he is entitled to, and the number of people above that who have been reduced is relatively small. But we certainly have heard quite

a lot of criticism. It has been very keenly felt, particularly as during and since the war the higher grades had to work excessive hours with no financial compensation at all, and their leave had been reduced. Although the number is small the feeling is quite acute.

866. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Could you give any real justification for the favourable annual leave conditions in the Civil Service as compared with industry?—We would say about industry that for those people who are on roughly the same rates of pay as the lower grades of the Civil Service, their leave is insufficient. Any sign that their conditions are being brought up to the level of the clerical grade is welcome. So far as the higher grades are concerned, the factor of long hours without financial compensation is a very considerable one; and to give people the right to 48 days, even if they cannot take it, is not only a good gesture but does mean that if at any time, because the pressure of work slackens, they can take their 48 days' leave, they can take it with a good conscience.

867. *Mr. Burman*: I should have thought, *Mr. White*, in the higher grades in outside industry and the professions there was a very great deal of extra time worked. I know one hears of people taking work home in those grades, and there is seldom any financial recompense for that extra time. Have you any evidence in that direction?—Not in that direction; but one does hear of course—I do not know how true it is—of the long weekends these big executives in commerce and industry are able to take. Perhaps it is unfair to take that as evidence; it is hearsay. But certainly the higher civil servants have had to work very long hours almost continuously in the last ten years, and few of them have been able to get even 36 days. I think the mere fact of reducing the allowance, even if it was only a notional reduction, would create a very bad impression.

868. *Chairman*: The 48 days' entitlement goes down to the higher executive officer grade, does it not?—*Mr. Redhead*: Yes, but only after 15 years' service in a grade entitled to 36 days.

869. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: These long weekends—if they exist in any case—certainly do not go down as far as that in industry. And I am a little intrigued by the suggestion that civil service employees, even at the highest levels, do in fact have a much greater amount of extra work to do. Have you any real evidence of this?—*Mr. White*: The point I am making, speaking exclusively of the Civil Service, is that before the war very few of the higher civil servants took their full leave, and since the war none of them have taken

it. But it was there as a right, and exceptionally they could take it. It would in fact save nothing to the taxpayer by making a notional reduction, and it would be a very bad gesture in view of the amount of unpaid extra duty which the higher civil servants have been working for many years.

870. What you are suggesting is that holidays outside the Service should come up to the civil service level rather than the reverse?—Yes.

871. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: You must see that the Civil Service is a model employer!

872. *Mr. Burman*: It is an interesting point, because there has always been the feeling in industry that the top civil servants get quite unjustifiably long leave, and yet you have just said that the top civil servants reckon that the industrialists, with their weekends, get more. It would be most interesting if we could get an agreement of opinion on it, but I do not expect we ever shall.—I would like to make it quite clear that when I spoke about the weekends of the top people in industry, I was speaking for myself. I have no authority to speak for top civil servants; no doubt they would be far more discreet.

873. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Periodically you speak as if you hoped in the future that things would become normal. Do you in fact foresee a time when the top of the Civil Service will not be overworked?—No.

874. That being so, if the top civil servants will never in fact get 48 days, do you not think it produces a bad impression outside to have it advertised that they get 48 days when in fact they never do?—I think if all civil servants took no leave at all and worked 24 hours a day, there is a section of the Press and a section of the critics outside which would still find a good deal to complain about. The understanding people would realise that in the highest level in the Civil Service if exceptionally a man can take 48 days in a year he is not being put in an exceptionally favourable position. After all, we have to address ourselves to the informed section of the public and the Press, and not to attempt to get on our side those who do not want to be informed.

875. *Lady Albemarle*: I gather that you would have to accept an arithmetical cut if you had a 5-day week or a 10½-day fortnight?—That does not involve a cut. For example, if the clerical officer were given the 10½-day fortnight he would still be able to get his four weeks' leave.

876. There is just one other point I wonder if you would amplify a little. The Treasury gave evidence about some compensation for the saving of time if you got

every Saturday off. Your answer to that was that if the hours were not altered it would be the man's time which was saved and you did not see any need for compensation.—If we compress the same working hours into five days instead of six, the State would lose nothing. The man who did not have to travel on Saturday would save a little of his own time, but it is his own time he would save, not the taxpayers'.

877. But when you take a day off on Saturday now you have to count it a whole day. There would be that advantage gained.—The Treasury proposed in 1949 that we could take off six Saturdays, or something of that order, a year and have them counted as half days; the rest would be counted as days. Of course this arrangement is particularly unfair in the provinces because the man has worked 41 hours by Friday night and he only has three to work on the Saturday to meet his 44; so that if he takes a Saturday off he is only excusing himself three hours' work, but he is debited with eight hours' leave.

878. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: But he gets a full day's pay for the Saturday?—Yes.

879. *Lady Albemarle*: The Treasury also say that before the war a good many of the people with the higher leave allowance took a great deal of their leave on Saturdays.—I think they said that it was the only chance they had of getting it.

880. Would not that still be true, and would it mean, if they still had the equivalent of the 48 days and, with the five-day week, did not have to take their Saturdays as part of their leave, you would be giving them an absolutely unrealistic figure? The public would think they were getting more leave than they actually were.—It would be unrealistic; but at the same time presumably the 48 days would have to be reduced to express it in terms of weeks instead of days.

881. Would your proposals in effect not mean that the people with the higher leave entitlement would get longer holidays than before the war, because they had used so much of them in half days?—I do not think they would be able to. I think the circumstances of their job would make it impossible.

882. Yet you feel that the value of it being on paper, even if they can never take it and even if it is something to be shot at by the public, is so great you would still like to see it.—I think that to take it away—it has been taken away under wartime conditions, but with a pledge that it would be restored—would be very bad.

883. Are we confusing here the pledge and what are the proper and ideal conditions of work? Can you divide the two?

You have got it clear in your mind that either the pledge must be honoured or there must be negotiations between you and the Treasury. The Commission are trying to look at the general picture, and they would really like your opinion, irrespective of the pledge, whether it would be reasonable to give a leave entitlement which these people could never take in any case, and which in the eyes of the public would look as if they were having it whereas in fact they never were.—Before the war, so far as I am aware, the 48 days' leave was never challenged by the Treasury. It was not very frequently taken, but it was there exceptionally if it was possible to take it. I think that is precisely the position today. If the 48 days stands, in the main it will not be taken, but it will be available exceptionally; and since it has existed for 34 years unchallenged except under wartime conditions, it would be a bad gesture to take it away, and to take it away when the higher division people have got the pledge of restoration. You could not quite dissociate it. You could not say it would have happened anyhow, even if there had not been a war. They would connect the two.

884. There still is this point that no one probably ever took the full 48 working days before the war. A part of that was always made up in Saturdays which counts as a whole day.—*Mr. Gillender*: I have asked my colleagues to find out what took place before the war, but it is difficult to make definite statements. I think the general position was that, owing to the pressure of work, in only very few years was it possible for anyone to take 48 days. But very often it might happen that after three or four years in a very busy job an officer would get transferred to another job where life was a little less arduous, and perhaps then he would have the opportunity to take six weeks' holiday during the summer.

885. And the rest still probably made up on Saturdays?—Yes.

886. The point I am trying to make is, if you got the 5-day week and Saturday never counted as a day's leave, would it really be a hardship—presumably you understand the people better than I do—if the holiday was expressed in a realistic form.—*Mr. White*: I think that rather assumes that if you reduced it from 48 to what the maximum is now, 36, the voices of the critics would be stilled. They are just as voluble about 36 days as they are about 48. Anything more than a fortnight's leave a year for the heads of the Civil Service would come in for a good deal of criticism by all those people who never get more than a fortnight themselves.

887. On the other hand it does seem hard to leave people to be shot at for a thing they never take, and it does seem very

unlikely that any civil servant, if he did not have to take occasional Saturdays as whole days, would ever be able to take 48 working days.—But the 48 days themselves would be reduced.

888. There would be no occasion for taking Saturday as a whole day.—There was the provision the Treasury made in 1949 that not more than six Saturdays could be taken as half days; so to the extent that they took more than six in a year they would still be debited as whole days.

889. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You have several times used the phrase that 48 days could be taken exceptionally. What do you understand by exceptionally?—Supposing, for example, a higher grade officer had to take reduced leave for several years and was really under the weather—not in the sense that he was sick, but in the sense that he really felt a complete change and break would do him a world of good—he could take a full quota of his leave that year.

890. But that comes perilously near sick leave.—Not necessarily; in fact, I would put it this way, that a person who would not want sick leave because he had no actual positive sickness and would carry on at work, might take a rest, knowing very well he was not going beyond the statutory 48 days.

891. I do not remember anybody getting 48 days' leave, but I should think the only person who could get 48 days' leave would be a man who could be spared.

892. *Chairman*. I think we have carried this question as far as we can go. Would you like to elaborate your objection to the 1949 offer of a 10½-day fortnight?—The main objection was because of the actual cuts in the leave, as distinct from arithmetical adjustments.

893. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: What is the justification for the arithmetical adjustments?—As a matter of fact there is no scientific argument for them because if we have the 5-day week or a 10½-day fortnight, and we compress into that the same amount of work as in the 6-day week, the civil servant is putting in as much time and doing as much work. If we wanted to be absolutely logical—and many of our people did want to be absolutely logical in 1949—we would say we are entitled to the 24 days' leave that we have now, because every working day between Monday and Friday would be a working day and a bit.

894. *Mr. Menzler*: To what extent could this five-day week you are advocating in fact be applied.—We think in some cases the 5-day week would be more convenient than the 10½-day fortnight. For example, if we assume the five-day week

in one week runs from Monday to Friday, and the five days in the next week were from Tuesday to Saturday, there would be a long week-end every other week. In some offices, where there is a good deal of pressure on Saturdays now because of the operation of the five-day week outside the Service, and where the offices have to close down on Saturday afternoons, it would be possible by this arrangement of the five-day week to keep open all day Saturday. That would be a convenience to the administration. So, instead of the five-day week being difficult, we think in some cases it would be more workable and more in line with the needs of the public than the present arrangement.

895. And the staff who would have to come in on Saturday afternoon would be given a half day off during the week?—Under our proposals for the 10½-day fortnight there would be a part of the staff in on one Saturday and another part on the next Saturday. Under our five-day week proposals there would be a clean break, not necessarily on a Saturday, each week; but we would hope that the arrangement could be so made that if the break were taken on a Saturday in one week the day off next week would be on Monday to make it a long week-end. It could not always be done, but it would often be possible.

896. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: But Saturday is the busiest day?—Not necessarily. At the present time most people know if they have business to do they must get there before half-past twelve so we get this accumulation at many offices on Saturday morning. But if the office were open all day we would not get the same concentration within the first two or three hours. It would spread it over.

897. *Chairman*: What do you think of the Treasury proposal that there might be a new formula for leave applied to all grades in the Civil Service?—This is the first we have ever heard about it. The Treasury have had discussions with us from time to time but they kept this very secret. We know nothing about the details and I rather gathered the Commission know nothing of them. I understand the Treasury have promised to submit a memorandum on the subject: presumably they are now working out the details themselves. As a theory it has something to commend it, but from our point of view we obviously would have to look at the whole operation. For example, they suggest length of service being a factor. Is that to be length of service in a particular grade or total length of service in the Civil Service? If it is total length of service then we could get a situation in which a promoted officer with a lot of service in the grade below would come into a higher grade and immediately be getting more leave than people

who have been in the same grade for many years. The seniority which before the war tended to indicate age and length of experience does not do that to anything like the same extent now. I told you when I was here before of the Treasury's proposal to recruit people to the clerical class between 40 to 60 years of age. What about the fellow who comes in at 59? Is he to be regarded as in the same position as a youngster coming in at 16 or 17? The thing is so vague in its present form that we would like to see much more about it before we give a view. The only thing we can say is that if this is a device for reducing overall the total amount of leave to be allowed, we would not like it any more in this form than in any other form.

898. On the existing relativities, do you think it justifiable that the new entrant executive officer aged 19 should be entitled to 36 days, while a clerical officer after a long period of service is only entitled to 24 days?—I will ask Mr. Redhead to answer!—*Mr. Redhead*: Our answer would be that even the lowest aged entrant into the executive class is just as much entitled to his 36 days as anyone else in the grade, if for no other reason than that one has to have regard to the calibre of the direct entrant. It is just at this level you require the man who can devote some leisure time to the study and cultural pursuits which are necessary for the preservation of that calibre and the production of the type which is required for higher executive duties: leave and leisure are important considerations.

899. *Mr. Burman*: As regards the necessity for extra leave for cultural development in its widest sense, has the question of sabbatical leave been considered in the Civil Service for the higher grades?—*Mr. Mayne*: Yes, there was a report towards the end of the war on training—the Assheton Report—in which there was a recommendation for sabbatical leave in the Civil Service. In practice there is a certain amount of it, in certain forms. The Commonwealth Fellowships are an example; they go to three or four civil servants each year. There is the course at the Imperial Defence College where, roughly speaking, one administrator and one professional officer get a year at a time, which is in the nature of sabbatical leave.

900. It is rather more training than leave?—The amount of individual sabbatical leave is very small, but there have been cases of arrangements being made. In the nature of the circumstances of the post-war period that sort of thing has had to be rather limited.

901. But it is allowable; it would not count out of their leave?—No, not annual leave.—*Mr. Gillender*: It is nearly

always tied up with some specific work connected with the Department. An individual scientist for example would not be allowed to take a year off to go and study archaeology if he were not doing it in the Service.

902. *Chairman*: It is rather like study leave in universities?—Yes.

903. But it would be appropriate for him to apply rather than be directed?—*Mr. Mayne*: Yes, I think that is quite right.

904. Would you tell us what grades are referred to in paragraph 25 of your memorandum?—*Mr. White*: The manipulative grades and engineering grades in the Post Office, a number of technical grades, certain minor grades and so on. This docu-

ment of ours is concerned with those grades whose leave is provided for by the National Whitley Council agreement. The other grades are really out of this, but we take the view that merely because they are not covered by the National Whitley Council agreement it is not to be inferred that they are not entitled to the same leave allowances; but it is a matter for themselves to bring before the Commission.

905. Would you like to elaborate this section of your memorandum?—We would prefer to leave it to the organisations concerned, because they know their requirements much better than we do.

Chairman: Once again, may I thank you very much for coming.

(The witnesses withdrew)

(Adjourned until Monday, 24th May, 1954, at 11 a.m.)



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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

7

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

SEVENTH DAY

Monday, 24th May, 1954

Association of First Division
Civil Servants Witnesses



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Professor of Statistics, University of London
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Servants*

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

SEVENTH DAY

Monday, 24th May, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE
MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.
MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.
SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.
MR. N. F. HALL

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E.,
F.R.S.
MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.
SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.
MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Association of First Division Civil Servants

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Association of First Division Civil Servants represents persons in the Home Civil Service who are:—

- (i) members of the administrative and statistician classes; or
- (ii) members of the museum grades of the rank of assistant keeper and above.

The Association has 2,964 members of whom 2,484 are members of the administrative class. The Association of H.M. Inspectors of Schools and the Association of Inspectors of Schools, Scottish Education Department, which have between them 620 members, are affiliated to the First Division Association.

2. The Commission will be familiar with the general characteristics of the administrative class, the importance of its work and the place it occupies in the structure of the Civil Service. Chapter 13 of the Treasury's Introductory Factual Memorandum gives details of the composition of the class, some account of its duties and an analysis of pay and structure in recent times.



3. In this memorandum we first indicate some of the general considerations which bear on the determination of administrative class salaries. After some reference to the effects of economic changes in the years since 1938, we give an account of the information we have gathered about salary trends in outside occupations and, on the basis of this information, suggest the salary scales which, in our view, would be appropriate at the present time. In a final section we record some of the difficulties encountered in the past in adjusting administrative class salaries and make proposals about the principles and methods which should be followed for their adjustment in future. Notwithstanding the smallness of the administrative class, we feel justified in suggesting that the Royal Commission should give special attention to this problem. We believe that the experience during the last 15 years demonstrates the inadequacy of existing arrangements, whereby responsibility for initiating proposals for changes in rates of pay has been held to lie solely with the staff associations. In our view, both the long run interests of the State and the special nature of the relationship between the Government and its senior employees call for a more positive approach. We do not propose to submit evidence about hours and leave, superannuation, provincial differentiation or arbitration arrangements; on all of these, evidence is to be given by the National Staff Side.

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

4. The Commission are invited by their terms of reference to consider whether any changes are desirable in the principles which should govern pay in the Civil Service. Principles, in whatever form they may be expressed, are required to provide the agreed conventions within which discussion and negotiations on salary questions can take place. The desire to have a workable formula is shared by staff associations and the Treasury; it would serve to reduce to a minimum the heat and controversy which otherwise tend to be generated in matters of this kind. The appointment of the Commission provides the opportunity for an objective re-assessment of salaries at the present time which will give to each of the relevant factors its proper weight. It is this consideration that we have had chiefly in mind in preparing this memorandum.

5. The principles which govern civil service pay, if stated generally, must amount to a series of propositions to which varying degrees of emphasis need to be given according to the circumstances of each class under review. Thus for certain classes the importance of the recruitment and retention of an adequate staff may be given prominence as it was by the Asquith Committee; comparisons with outside occupations will be more important for some classes than for others, and the Tomlin Commission adopted them as the touchstone while referring also to long term trends; the desirability of keeping up the professional and social standing of the administrative class, and indeed of other classes, and the public esteem of the whole Service have a bearing on the question; and stress may also be laid on internal considerations of structure leading to expressions of concern at the concertina effect now apparent as a result of the adoption of short term expedients over a number of years. All these considerations are relevant; the fundamental question is the order of importance they should have in relation to any class. However sound principles may be in the abstract, it is as a practical instrument that their worth needs to be judged.

6. The reward now earned by administrative officers for the performance of work, which has certainly not declined in volume or complexity since before the war, is substantially less than that which their counterparts earned in 1938. Elsewhere in this memorandum we attempt to assess the extent of the disproportionate loss they have suffered compared with other members of the community who were similarly circumstanced before the war. For the present it is sufficient to say that this fact affords *prima facie* evidence that either the present principles or the methods of applying them are defective or both.

7. We do not propose a system by which there can be frequent minor adjustments in the salaries of the grades we represent. We think it desirable, however, that a clearly defined procedure should be adopted which will permit changes in circumstances to be taken into account with reasonable promptitude and will avoid the

necessity for very large increases in salary at any one time to overtake accumulated arrears due to delays in reaching a settlement. Any principles and methods involving the computation of trends in outside occupations will entail a degree of delay. Such a time lag can be accepted in normal circumstances when there is no such disparity as now exists.

8. We subscribe to the principle that the State should pay enough to recruit and retain an efficient and contented Service. We do not, however, regard this principle as having any short term relevance to administrative class salary levels. The administrative officer gives of his best because of the high standards of the group of which he is a member. Any effect on his efficiency due to inadequate pay would be slow to show itself. Members of the class have remained in the Service despite a progressive and disproportionate reduction in their standard of living. Tradition, loyalty and other intangibles have counted for a great deal in this. These are reinforced by pension rights of increasing value as the years go by, which are forfeited if an officer leaves before the age of 50. A failure to recruit and retain the administrative class would show that wrong policies had been applied in extreme fashion over a number of years. By the time this failure was manifest far reaching damage to the public service would have been done. Any tendency in that direction would be likely to show first in the course of recruitment, where we have noticed a decline in the number of successful candidates with first class honours degrees. Before the war there were always more successful candidates with first class honours than others, but since 1948 there have been fewer. We do not know the reasons for this change and for the deficiency of really outstanding candidates which the Civil Service Commission have noticed and on which they have already given evidence. Whatever the reasons may be, we do not doubt that the low levels of pay for the administrative class have contributed to reduce its attractiveness as a career for the best type of graduate.

9. Many traditional relativities have grown up in the Service. We are sure that too great reliance has been placed upon these relationships, leading to self-perpetuating error, the creation of an over-rigid salaries structure and a growing gulf between the Service and the outside world. The existence of these traditional relationships has made it more difficult than it would otherwise have been for the Treasury to deal with specific claims on their merits. Relativities between grades of a class are clearly important as the reflection of responsibilities within the class. Relativities between classes rest on a less solid foundation and may be said to afford a measure of their relative esteem in the outside world at the time when they were fixed.

10. We attach very great importance to the establishment of machinery for the resolution of any dispute affecting the salaries of the higher grades of the class. We are sure that it would materially assist the public good if open and unreconciled differences of opinion on these questions could be avoided in future. The National Staff Side is to give separate evidence on this point.

11. To ensure a continuing parallel between changes of remuneration inside and outside the Service must be a matter of very real difficulty, even when service pay has been appropriately settled at some given time. Our proposals are designed as a positive attempt to find a solution of this difficulty.

III. THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CHANGES

12. The real value of the national output is currently computed to be some 10-15 per cent. more than before the war, while the money value of the gross national product of the country has increased by over 185 per cent. Since 1938 there has been a more or less continuous rise in prices and the purchasing power of the £1 today is no more than 8s. 10d. in terms of the pre-war £1. As part of the process of economic adjustment during and since the war, major changes in relative income levels have occurred. Prices of consumer goods and services have risen by 126 per cent. Over the same period wage earnings of adult males have increased by 174 per cent., and average salaries by 125 per cent. In so far as these figures, coupled with the incidence of taxation, show a broad trend towards greater equality in the community considered as a whole, we have no title to claim exemption,

and it is no part of our case that the administrative class should be sheltered from these changes. Over the same period, however, the salaries of administrative officers have increased by only 50-60 per cent. and we think it wrong that the relative standards of the class should have been so disproportionately reduced.

13. The position is most readily demonstrated by a table. We set out below pre-war and present London salaries and salary scales for male administrative officers and the average increase over the same period for all salary earners.

	Salaries		Percentage Increase	
	1938	1954	Bottom of scale	Top of scale
	£	£		
(i) <i>Administrative class Civil Service</i>				
Assistant principal:				
including extra duty allowance	—	508-924	85	48
excluding extra duty allowance	275-625	470-855	71	37
Principal:				
including extra duty allowance	—	1,242-1,570	55	43
excluding extra duty allowance	800-1,100	1,150-1,570	44	43
Assistant Secretary ...	1,150-1,450*	1,600-2,100	39	45*
Principal assistant secretary ...	—	—	—	—
Under secretary ...	1,450-1,650†	2,500	not applicable	52†
Deputy secretary ...	2,200	3,250	48	
Permanent secretary ...	3,000	4,500	50	
(ii) All salary earners ...	—	—	125	

* In 1939, the top of the scale was increased to £1,500. The increase between 1939 and 1954 is 40 per cent.

† In 1939, the scale was abolished and the salary was increased to £1,700. The increase between 1939 and 1954 is 47 per cent.

14. In broad terms, since 1938 all money incomes of the administrative class have risen by about one half and their real incomes have been reduced by about 30-40 per cent., an experience which has not been shared in the same degree by the generality of persons who were, in 1938, in occupations which placed them in comparable income groups. The pay of the administrative class has evidently failed to follow the general trend. The relative position of its members in the hierarchy of incomes and their real standard of remuneration have in consequence been depressed. The existing procedure for determining administrative class salaries has shown itself to be insufficiently responsive to the needs of the times.

15. We now turn to an examination of the increases in salaries and earnings in outside occupations from which can be deduced the order of increase in the salaries of the Administrative class now required to bring them back into line.

IV. CHANGES IN THE REMUNERATION OF OUTSIDE OCCUPATIONS

16. It seems reasonable at first sight to attempt to determine appropriate salaries by comparison with the pay of particular outside occupations. Two types of comparison may be considered for the purpose: either with specific occupations whose resemblance to a civil service grade is very marked; or with a wide variety of occupations which taken together have a sufficiently broad similarity to a civil service grade to warrant their being taken as a guide. Neither type of comparison has in practice been sufficiently exact or reliable to provide a criterion for determining administrative class salaries. We have in fact been unable to obtain very much specific evidence about the earned incomes of persons in other walks of life which can be regarded as comparable with the administrative class.

17. Most of the published information relates to salaries in public or semi-public bodies, some of which follow the civil service pattern of remuneration; in others we know that there are still unresolved disputes about the appropriate level of pay. Much of this information cannot therefore be taken as a reliable guide. We have accordingly concentrated on getting data about the salaries earned in business organisations. This information is hard to collect and what we have secured is set out in Appendix I. We recognise that it covers but a small number of the organisations from which information would have been valuable, even though information over a wider field by itself would equally not have enabled us to reach firm conclusions. It does, however, show the high levels of salaries reached in business, and it gives some indication of the general salary structure and the kind of differentials which are employed. It would have been most useful in interpreting this information to have had some additional information about normal career expectations. We have found that in general normal career expectations cannot be said to include attaining to a position of managerial responsibility such as falls to the senior grades of the administrative class. We cannot therefore place great reliance on this specific evidence; its unsatisfactory nature throws into relief the need for much more systematic comparisons over a wide field. We make proposals in paragraph 41 for making good this deficiency in the future.

18. For present purposes we have therefore made use of more general evidence about movements in salaries and earnings to show the present level of salaries appropriate to the administrative class and the degree of under payment which now exists. We take the pre-war salaries as a starting point. It is true that in 1948 the Chorley Committee expressed the opinion that in 1939 a substantial increase of salaries in the highest posts of the Civil Service was already overdue but, subject to that qualification, it may be said that in those days the higher Civil Service offered a way of life comparable in its attractiveness to business and the professions; the administrative class was beyond doubt recruiting sufficient people of the right calibre to maintain its high standards of efficiency. The salary scales then in operation were recommended by a Royal Commission in 1931 when incomes and prices were lower and in a period of greater stability in incomes than in recent times; they represented a considered judgment on the rates required to attract the kind of person needed for the administration of the country.

19. No lesser qualities are now required for the administration of the country than before the war. The Chorley Committee drew attention in 1948 to the fact that there was no comparison between the strain and pressure under which senior civil servants then worked and "the professional amenities associated with their work", as the Asquith Committee put it, in 1920. The high level of employment and the increasing disposition in industry to recruit the kind of person also recruited to the professions have intensified the competition for ability of the sort needed in the administrative class. In order to man an expanded class with persons of equal ability to those recruited before the war, its relative attractions must be maintained and its salaries must move in sympathy with remuneration offered in the outside world.

20. The relative attractions of a civil service career have been reduced by more than is suggested by mere movements of incomes. Schemes for superannuation and family protection have become much more common outside the Service and, because of the heavy burden of direct taxation on high salaries, much more generous, particularly for the higher salary ranges. In these matters the civil servant is no longer in a specially favourable position. High taxation, too, has increased very significantly the benefits derived from expenses met by the employer, which, though incurred in connection with employment, also have a tangible effect on the employee's living standards. The fact that it may be difficult to gauge the extent of these changes with precision does not make them any less real or make the disparity any more acceptable to the administrative officer.

21. To obtain a measure of the change since before the war in the remuneration of persons with earned incomes similar to those of the administrative class, we enlisted the assistance of Mr. R. G. D. Allen, C.B.E., Professor of Statistics in the London School of Economics. Professor Allen's estimates are given in the

form of two memoranda attached as Appendix II and Appendix III. His approach to the problem and the broad effect of his conclusions are summarised below; he will be willing to amplify them in oral evidence to the Commission.

22. Two kinds of data are available and are dealt with separately. Appendix II uses published official statistics to arrive at an estimate of the increase which has occurred in the average incomes of self-employed professional persons since immediately before the war. In Appendix III income censuses prepared and published by the Board of Inland Revenue are used to compare salaries in 1936-37 with salaries in 1949-50; official estimates of salaries (presented in the Blue Books on National Income and Expenditure) are then used to compare average salaries in 1949 with average salaries in 1953.

23. The method used is to take from the income censuses for each of the two years under review the number of men receiving salaries greater than certain specified amounts. (The statistics of incomes of women are unsuitable for this analysis for reasons which are explained by Professor Allen.) This information can be used to estimate within fairly close limits the salaries of men with various positions in the hierarchy of incomes when the incomes are arranged in order of size. We can, that is, estimate the income of the man receiving the second, tenth, thousandth, etc., largest salary in each of the years. By allowing for changes in the numbers of men earning salaries we can, between the years, compare the salaries of men occupying equivalent positions in the hierarchies. Changes in salaries can then be shown for men with various levels of salary in 1936-37.

24. If relative salaries in different occupations and jobs, and the composition of the salariat were precisely the same in 1949-50 as in 1936-37, the percentage increases so recorded would be precisely the measures of the changes in salaries for men in given situations and the hierarchy of 1949-50 would be a facsimile of that of 1936-37. If a social revolution had occurred over the period and managing directors of large companies had sunk to the bottom of the scale and clerks had risen to the top, the recorded percentages would tell precisely nothing about salary changes. The truth lies between these extremes: no doubt there have been many minor reshuffles in relative economic esteem, but no complete upheavals. The distribution of salaries reflects the distribution in society of abilities (and opportunities) of many different kinds, and in a stable society this distribution and the relative values of different abilities change slowly. The recorded increases are, therefore, an approximate measure of the general movements of salaries.

25. In making his estimates from the income censuses, Professor Allen brought within the field of comparison all persons with salaries above specified levels because the published data do not allow occupations to be distinguished. This is a defect which can be over-stressed. It does not invalidate the method for the purposes in view, nor is it as serious as the defects to which we have drawn attention in paragraphs 16 and 17 in the method of selective comparison with particular occupations.

26. For a measure of the relevant salary changes after 1949 Professor Allen relied upon evidence of changes in average salaries covering all salary earners. This is subject to the criticism against the use of averages which is advanced in paragraph 25 of the Treasury's first memorandum of evidence. Professor Allen guards against this by making an allowance, based upon past experience, for the different movements of salaries of different amounts in 1949. The criticism of the use of earnings (which are the basis of all Professor Allen's estimates) rather than salary rates seems to us to have no foundation. While the distinction between rates and earnings has validity in some contexts, for present purposes earnings are the truly relevant basis of comparison. For administrative civil servants earnings and rates of salary are identical. Nor should it be overlooked that the figures of outside earnings understate the position to some extent: they do not include any allowance for the perquisites which are frequently accorded outside and which by the nature of our work could never be given to any civil servant.

27. Using Appendix II, the conclusion is drawn that the average earnings of self-employed professional persons had about doubled by 1953. Appendix III, which covers salaries, reaches the conclusion that the kind of person earning a salary of around £1,000 before the war can be expected to have doubled his salary by

1953. Persons earning higher salaries have secured smaller increases: for example, a pre-war salary of £2,000 may be expected to have risen by 80-85 per cent. There is nothing in the specific evidence considered in paragraphs 16 and 17 and Appendix I to show that these conclusions are of the wrong order of magnitude.

28. We therefore think that they afford a fair basis for settling the order of increases in salaries which should now be granted to the administrative class. We recognise that a statistical analysis of this kind cannot give a precise measure of the appropriate increases and of the appropriate present salaries. Precision on these matters seems to us to be unattainable, but we firmly believe that conclusions may be drawn from the general evidence of sufficient reliability to indicate beyond dispute the kind of change that is now required.

V. PROPOSALS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS SALARIES

29. The general evidence shows that salaries between £800 and £1,500 a year in 1938 have increased by 100 per cent. or more. Principals and assistant secretaries were in that salary range before the war, and we consider that an increase of that order is called for; such specific evidence about outside occupations as we have supports the view that such an increase would be in line with what has been obtained in outside occupations in earnings alone.

PRINCIPALS

30. We propose that the salary scale for a principal should be from £1,600 to £2,200, which is twice the pre-war scale. We should perhaps mention, however, that Treasury policy since the war has been such that assistant principals may expect to enter the grade at the age of 30 or very soon after, whereas before the war the average age of promotion was somewhat higher. The Commission may consider that this is a factor which should be taken into account when fixing the minimum for the grade, but any adjustment suggested with this consideration in mind should not overlook the large proportion of officers promoted to principal from other classes, e.g., senior executive officer, at a much later age.

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

31. Twice the pre-war salary scale for assistant secretaries would produce a scale from £2,300 to £3,000. This would give a differential of only £100 between the principals and assistant secretaries. Taking account of the responsibilities of the two grades, we consider this inadequate. We accordingly propose that the assistant secretaries' scale should begin at £2,400 and end at £3,000.

HIGHER GRADES ON FIXED SALARIES

32. We regard it as very important that there should be a substantial differential between assistant secretaries and under secretaries, and similarly between under, deputy and permanent secretaries, in order clearly to mark the differences in responsibility of these grades. The size of these differentials must depend to some extent on the salary considered appropriate for permanent secretaries. A figure of £6,000, which is far below the top salaries given to management in many large business organisations, would be comparable with the range of salaries considered appropriate at the top levels of many public and semi-public bodies. For this reason we regard a figure of £6,000 for permanent secretaries as desirable on career grounds and justifiable on grounds of public policy. It would be in tolerable relationship with what we know of outside salaries at comparable levels. A salary of £4,800 for deputy secretaries and £3,800 for under secretaries would then provide a realistic salary structure with differentials which adequately reflect the difference in responsibilities of the grades.

ASSISTANT PRINCIPALS

33. On the salary scale of the training grade of assistant principal the statistical analysis gives no guidance, for it cannot be used to show movements in salaries between £300 and £600 in 1938 nor to isolate salaries appropriate to a particular stage in a career. Such information as we have been able to collect about the remuneration of graduate entrants in business suggests that, although the annual increases in the salaries of assistant principals are probably insufficient to enable

them to keep pace with graduates outside, the starting salary including extra duty allowance of the assistant principal is not seriously out of line with the average paid to graduate entrants to other occupations. We consider it important that any assessment of an appropriate scale for assistant principals should not be based solely upon a comparison with average graduates outside. We believe that an improved scale for assistant principals is required to attract the best type of graduate and that in determining the extent of this improvement regard should be paid to the need to bring the assistant principal scale into the right relationship with that of principals.

34. We show in tabular form the salaries we propose for male officers in London:—

	<i>Proposed scale</i>
Principals	£1,600—£2,200
Assistant secretaries	£2,400—£3,000
Under secretaries	£3,800
Deputy secretaries	£4,800
Permanent secretaries	£6,000

VI. PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR ADJUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS SALARIES

35. The substantial increases in administrative class salaries suggested in the immediately preceding paragraphs are a measure of the defectiveness of existing methods for the settlement of salaries. The serious delays in adjusting salaries in recent times have not only caused widespread discontent among the administrative class; they have also diminished the relative attractiveness of the career of an administrative officer. The method we have followed in arriving at our proposals for current rates of pay can be employed equally effectively and relevantly to their adjustment in time to come.

36. One important reason for the delay in adjusting administrative class salaries has been the difficulty of applying the Tomlin recommendations. The methods we have used in the earlier part of this memorandum represent a commonsense application of those recommendations, even though at the time those recommendations were made the use of such methods was not contemplated. In stating their principles, the Tomlin Commission gave no information about the way in which they had applied them, nor did they recommend any method of collecting information or any guide on its interpretation. There has therefore been fruitful ground for dispute during negotiations in considering the application of the principles; this has happened even where there was no desire on either side at the time to join issue as regards the practical outcome of the discussions. Different views of the meaning of the recommendations have even been advanced by the same people at different times. The practical result has been that the Tomlin recommendations have become more remarkable for the lip service paid to them than for their practical value. It is indeed possible that they have contributed towards the difficulties of negotiations.

37. We regard it as important in the light of this experience, not only that the principles for determining pay should be re-stated, but that the procedure to be followed in applying them should be clearly set out. Procedure and method are at least as critical as the principles themselves.

38. It is natural to attempt to determine civil service pay by comparison with outside occupations, but, as we indicated in paragraphs 16 and 17, it is difficult to discover comparisons which are both feasible to make and reliable or significant when made. A point of comparison can be taken as competition for similar recruits. This gives a field which includes the universities, the Armed Forces, the learned professions and some parts of commerce and industry. If the comparison is with similar levels of responsibility, the field includes the whole range of large scale commerce and industry, the larger local government bodies, and the Armed Forces. A comparison with people occupying a similar social position is only feasible if income is taken as the sole criterion. The work of the administrative class is in fact unique. There is in effect no comparable work, though there are

large numbers of people who are comparable with the administrative class by reason of their attainments, abilities or responsibilities. This situation provides the justification for the kind of broad comparison which we attempt.

39. Our view is based on experience in pay negotiations. The post-war settlements of principals' and assistant principals' salaries, for example, have invariably followed settlements for other classes. We and the Treasury have invoked whatever evidence might be at hand about salaries in outside employment, but the settlements reached have followed a pattern already laid down in the context of another grade or grades. There has been no comprehensive and accepted application to the administrative grades of the Tomlin principles.

40. We believe that the use in the future of the method and approach adopted in Section IV of this memorandum and worked out in detail in Appendices II and III will provide a solution to the problem set out in paragraph 38. The analysis of movements in earnings over a period is its essential feature, and this can be applied to any period that may be selected. If certain additional information were regularly available, the analysis would be based on even firmer foundations than the one already made by Professor Allen. Incomes charged to tax under P.A.Y.E. are analysed both geographically and by type of economic activity. If these incomes were also analysed by ranges of income, this would have the advantage of providing directly information about the distribution of earned incomes and obviate the need to deduce this from the data on the distribution of total income given in the income censuses. This information could be used to make a comparison between one year and another to show the general movement of salaries at different levels by comparing pairs of incomes of corresponding persons as explained in paragraph 23. The changes in these pairs of incomes would indicate the order of magnitude of any change which had taken place. Minor changes would not be measured in this way, but major changes such as would afford a legitimate ground for considering a revision of administrative class salaries would be easily demonstrated and measured. It should also be feasible to supplement information on salaries by an analysis of the information available to the Board of Inland Revenue on professional earnings. There is clearly more work to be done in improving the technique of analysis, and we should be happy to co-operate with the Government Departments concerned in this work.

41. We do not suggest exclusive reliance on this approach. There has, however, always been a serious lack of adequate evidence about earnings in outside occupations and we think it important to ensure that, despite the difficulties, much more evidence of this kind should be available in the future and that what is made available should be systematically handled. We are expected to take the initiative in any revision of administrative class salaries, but we have found—understandably enough—that outside employers and other bodies cannot be persuaded to supply us with the evidence we need in sufficient quantity or detail. There are limits to the amount of time and effort which outside employers and bodies can devote to the provision of information of importance to a small class in the Civil Service, and many employers are reluctant to pass on confidential information to a staff association. Such information is necessary for a balanced judgment in this matter. In the past, when negotiations were proceeding, the hurried collection of whatever evidence most easily came to hand, and its presentation without clear understanding of, much less agreement on, its relevance, has only served to confuse the issues. It would be of great advantage to both sides to place on the Treasury responsibility for the systematic and periodic collection of information about salary movements in outside occupations. They are better placed to secure adequate information, and we believe that agreement could be reached about the kind of information which should be collected.

42. One important constituent of the required information would be concerned with pensions. In this field some of the relative advantages enjoyed by the civil servant in times past have been appreciably reduced, if not eliminated. Information about pension arrangements in outside occupations is already available to the Government because for tax purposes the Board of Inland Revenue have to approve superannuation arrangements. We do not suggest that this information should be published, but we consider that there should be no insuperable difficulties in making general conclusions derived from it available to both sides.

VII. CONCLUSION

43. We consider that the present unsatisfactory position in regard to administrative class salaries has been largely brought about by the use of inefficient techniques. We have described in sections IV and VI the techniques which we suggest should be operated in future. We consider that the normal process for the adjustment of administrative class salaries should begin with an analysis of general movements in earnings, that the conclusions drawn from this analysis should be checked against the widest possible range of specific evidence, and that the salaries of the class should be adjusted in the light of those conclusions with due regard for the differences between the responsibilities of the grades in the class. We do not rule out other changes in salaries made necessary by changes in the value of jobs, in conditions of service, in the salaries of other grades and so on.

44. To a certain extent the State as employer can count on the goodwill of its servants and their specialisation in their profession by paying them less than the market rate over a number of years. We do not think the efficiency of those in the Service at the moment has declined because of this, but we have grave fears for the future.

45. We are not by the nature of our calling easily given to impatient protest at the indifference of the successive Governments whose advisers we are. We have nevertheless a strong sense of frustration and injustice at the delayed and inadequate adjustments of administrative class salaries which have been made. We believe this to be unfair to the officers themselves and potentially damaging to the public interest. It is vital that the opportunity should be taken now to assess *de novo* the remuneration of the class as a whole and the way in which it should be adjusted in future.

12th May, 1954.

APPENDIX I

SALARY STRUCTURE IN BUSINESS UNDERTAKINGS

In this Appendix we set out such information as we have been able to obtain about salary structures in business undertakings. As most firms asked us to withhold their names, we have thought it preferable to withhold all names.

2. No single test of evaluation can be applied to this information. In order to arrive at a reasonable assessment of relative responsibilities, we have tried, wherever possible, to establish the level at which there is regular contact between the organisations for which we have information and grades of the administrative class. Our enquiries have left us with a firm impression that, while there seem to be very few comparisons possible with the principal grade, there are many points of comparison with the assistant secretary grade. This appears to be the level at which regular contact is usually maintained. The range of salaries in outside occupations at this point is very wide in our sample—from £2,000 to £5,000—but the most frequent contact between assistant secretaries and outside organisations is maintained with persons earning between £2,500 and £3,500. As far as we can discover, large outside organisations do not regard people earning salaries of less than this amount as doing the equivalent of administrative work in the sense that they can take and implement decisions affecting the general policy and well-being of their organisation.

3. We have had information from two sources about starting salaries for graduate entrants, both of them large and important concerns which regularly recruit a number of graduates each year. One concern has an age scale, beginning at £500 at age 23 and rising by £50 for each year over that age, and the other pays First Class Honours graduates £600 at age 24 and after age 26 places them at £750 or £800.

4. One concern said that any man of merit should reach a salary range between £1,890 and £2,500 before the age of 40, and the other concern claimed that a "steady" man should reach £1,800 at that age point and a brilliant man ought to be earning between £3,000 and £4,000 a year. At age 33, this latter concern would expect to pay a steady man £1,320 and a brilliant man £1,600. A bonus varying according to dividend is also paid by this concern to people over 30.

5. Almost all the organisations we approached were reluctant to give us information about their top salaries, claiming that the assessment of such salaries must depend on the personal qualities of the person concerned to a very great extent. Such information as we have found shows the high levels reached in this way. We understand, however, that, even in comparatively small firms, it is usual to pay senior management officials salaries in the range of £5,000-£15,000. These salaries may well be compared with the Post Office, whose turnover is over £250,000,000 and whose staff is over 330,000, and whose director general is paid £4,500 a year and whose next three senior officials are paid £3,250 a year.

	Salary	Allowances
1. Nationalised Industry		
Chairman	£7,500	£1,000
Deputy chairmen (2)	£5,000	£500 each
Members (full-time)	£5,000	£500 each
Members (part-time)	£500	
Directors general (personal salaries)	£3,000—5,000	
Administrative grade 1	£2,000—2,500	
Administrative grade 2	£1,545—2,000	£100 (London)
Administrative grade 3	£1,195—1,545	£52 (London)
Administrative grade 4	£945—1,320	
Administrative grade 5	£820—1,060	
2. Nationalised Industry		
Chairman	£8,500	£2,250 for whole central authority.
Deputy chairmen (2)	£5,000	
Members (part-time)	£1,000	
Chairmen of area boards	£4,000	£1,500 for each Board
Deputy chairmen of area boards	£3,500	
Members (part-time) area boards	£500	
Chief officers	£3,500—4,000	
Deputy chief officers	£2,500—3,000	
3. Nationalised Industry		
Chairman	£6,000	£1,000
Deputy chairman	£5,000	£500
Chairmen of area boards	£4,500	£500
Deputy chairmen of area boards	£3,500	£400
Members (full-time) area boards	£3,000	
Members (part-time) area boards	£500	
Secretary and heads of departments	£2,000—3,000	

	Salary	Allowances
4. <i>Nationalised Industry</i>		
Chairman	£8,500	£4,000 for whole central authority
Members (full-time)	£5,000	
Public relations officer	£6,000	
Comptroller	£5,000	
Secretary	£4,000	
Chief regional managers	£4,250—4,500	
Chief research officers	£3,800	
Chief officers (e.g., commercial)	£2,800—3,250	
Assistant chief regional managers	£2,500	
Regional officers	£3,000	
Assistants to regional officers	£1,750	
5. <i>Manufacturing Firm</i> (400 employees)		
Senior managing director (general administration and financial and commercial policy)	£4,500+	
Junior managing director (technical policy and technical and sales administration)	£4,500+	
Commercial manager (accounts, financial control, budgeting and costing)	£2,200—3,000	
Sales manager (sales, market research, etc.) ...	£1,500—2,200	
Company secretary (statutory duties and personnel management)	£1,500—2,200	
6. <i>Shipping Company</i> (employees—1,000 ashore and 5,000 at sea)		
Managing director	£6,000—7,000	
General manager	£4,500	
Assistant general managers (3)	£3,000 or £2,750	
Accountant	£2,500	
Marine superintendent	£2,500	
Heads of passenger department and freight department	£1,500—2,000	
7. <i>Oil Company</i>		
Area manager	£1,800—2,500	Expense account, free car and accommodation. Pension of £800—£1,100 at 55.
Director	£6,000—7,000	
Manager	£4,000—5,000	
Deputy manager	£2,000—4,000	
Deputy manager	£2,000—4,000	
Assistant manager	£2,000—4,000	
8. <i>Electrical Equipment Manufacturers</i> (1,500 industrial employees and 500 staff)		
Directors (full-time) (5)	£4,000—7,000	Most of these senior staff have full use of a car which may be used for all private purposes. All members of the staff are expected to entertain reasonably generously in the Company's interest. Non-contributory pension scheme; retirement at age 65 with half-average salary during last 10 years of service plus half-pension for a widow: qualifying period for 50 per cent. salary pension is 15 years.
Assistant sales manager	Over £2,500	
General works manager	£2,000—2,500	
Senior manager (relieves directors of certain work)	£2,000—2,500	
Sales manager	£1,500—2,000	
Secretary		
Doctor and welfare and personnel departments		
Transport manager		
Branch sales managers (9)		
Export sales manager	£1,000—1,500	
Joint works managers (3)		
Works manager		
Engineers and chemists (development, design and technical) (3)		
Accountant	£1,000—1,500	
Advertising and publicity manager		
Assistant sales manager		
Accountant		
Branch sales managers (2)		
Engineers and chemists (development, design and technical) (3)		

APPENDIX II

CHANGES IN THE INCOMES OF INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PERSONS, 1938-52

1. It is not possible to prepare for the earnings of independent professional persons the same kind of analysis of movements in incomes which has in an accompanying paper been prepared for salaries. The necessary data are not available in the income censuses taken and published by the Inland Revenue.

2. An estimate can, however, be made of the movement in the average of these earned incomes based upon the official estimates of national income prepared by the Central Statistical Office.

3. The aggregate income of independent professional persons is given (before depreciation allowances are deducted) in National Income and Expenditure 1946-52 (August, 1953). The data are shown back to 1946 only. For a comparison with 1938 earlier estimates need to be taken from the National Income White Paper of 1951 (Cmd. 8203) and these are for income after depreciation and on a somewhat different coverage. The two series are here spliced together (with the average of 1946-48 used for splicing) to permit a comparison over the whole period from 1938:

	Cmd. 8203		National Income and Expenditure 1946-1952		
	1938	Av. 1946-48	Av. 1946-48	1949	1952
Aggregate income, £mn. ...	84	148	197	226	243
Percentage of 1938 ...	100	176	—	202	217

4. No information is available on the numbers of independent professional earners included in these aggregates. Even if the numbers, on an equivalent full-time basis, increased by $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. between 1938 and 1952, in proportion to the total occupied population, then average earnings of independent professional persons was in 1952 more than double the level of 1938. It is most improbable that the increase in numbers exceeded the growth in the total occupied population. It seems more probable that those groups in which numbers have grown are about balanced by other groups in which there has been a decline, e.g. medical consultants who are now largely salaried and not independent earners. Altogether, it is to be expected that the numbers of independent professional earners were little, if any, higher in 1952 than before the war. Some confirmation of this is provided by the confidential information from Inland Revenue, referred to in the following paragraph. Average earnings of independent professional persons in 1952 can be put at well over double those in 1938.

5. This conclusion is supported by confidential information supplied by Inland Revenue about the movement of independent earnings, in the main non-medical professions, between 1937 and 1949. To the movement shown by this data must be added the further increase from 1949 to 1952 and the corresponding increase in the earnings of general practitioners and other medical professional groups. When this is done, it would appear that this evidence is in substantial agreement with the conclusion of the previous paragraph.

R. G. D. ALLEN.

11th November, 1953.

APPENDIX III

CHANGES IN SALARIES, 1938-52

1. **Introduction.** There is a wealth of data on wage earners but relatively little on salaries. What data exist are scattered and very uncertain in reliability or comparability; they provide only the most insecure of foundations. An attempt is made here to bring together the data, from a variety of sources, both official and private. The inadequacies of the statistics are not disguised. On the contrary, when estimation shaded off into guesswork, alternative assumptions are made explicitly, so that some idea may be obtained of the likely range of error involved. This is not to say that the final results of the analysis are unreasonable or unlikely to gain acceptance. However shaky the data are, on a strictly statistical basis, the statistician's judgment or intimate knowledge of the material still has some validity. The results of the present analysis will seem to most to be of the right order of magnitude. They are unlikely to be seriously challenged.

2. **Number of salary earners.** The only reliable source of detailed figures is the Census of Population and this gives estimates only for 1931 and 1951. In addition, some careful estimates of total numbers in the years up to 1938 have recently been made by Agatha Chapman. Table 1 summarises the information.

TABLE 1
NUMBERS OF SALARY EARNERS

	Nos. (millions)			Per cent. Increase 1938 to 1951
	Census 1931	Chapman 1938*	Census 1951	
<i>Including shop assistants:</i>				
Total	4.44	4.81	6.04	25½
Males	2.78	3.01	3.17	5
<i>Excluding shop assistants:</i>				
Total	3.48	3.78	5.11	35
Males	2.27	2.47	2.87	16
Females	1.21	1.31	2.24	71

* Totals as given in Chapman, *Wages and Salaries in the United Kingdom 1920-1938* (1953). Distribution between males and females estimated from proportions in 1931.

The group of salary earners is a wide one, ranging from the typist and clerical grades to the top technical, executive and managerial posts. As generally defined in the past, the group has often included shop assistants. A convention now becoming accepted is to include shop assistants among wage earners and to omit them from the salary earning group; the Central Statistical Office has adopted this convention in the latest publication on *National Income and Expenditure* (August 1953). Table 1 shows the numbers of the salariat in two ways, with and without shop assistants.

The main feature of the period from 1938 to 1951 is the rapid expansion in women salary earners and the slower growth in the male salariat. (The number of male shop assistants actually declined over the period.) This is a well known development, though the incidence of the changes is not always appreciated. For example, the additional women in employment in the post-war period are not to be found in the factory trades (cf. Penrice Bulletin of London and Cambridge Economic Service, September, 1952); they have gone partly into wage earning jobs in the service trades and particularly into salaried occupations. The result is that the structure of the inflated group of salary earners in 1951 was completely different from the pre-war pattern. In conjunction with differential movements in rates of pay, this makes it very difficult to handle information on changes in salary earnings since 1938.

3. **Average salary earnings.** Estimates of the aggregate income of the whole group of salary earners, excluding shop assistants, are available for the period since 1946 in the latest calculations of the national income by the Central Statistical Office. They can be related to the numbers, excluding shop assistants, shown in Table 1. Agatha

Chapman in her recent book gives an aggregate salary bill for 1938, which includes shop assistants and which corresponds to the figure of 4.81 million salary earners in Table 1. From Chapman's material, however, it is possible to make a close estimate of the part of the aggregate going to shop assistants and hence to obtain a figure in 1938 comparable with the post-war data.* The information is set out in Table 2.

TABLE 2
AGGREGATE AND AVERAGE SALARIES

	1938	1949	1952
<i>All salary earners:</i>			
Aggregate salaries, £mn.	922½	2,120	2,755
Numbers, millions	3.78	5.00	5.15
Average salary, £ per year	244	424	535
1938 = 100	100	174	219
<i>Males only:</i>			
Average salary, £ per year	276	488	616
1938 = 100	100	177	223

1938: from Chapman, *Wages and Salaries in the United Kingdom 1920-1938* (1953).

1949-52: aggregates from *National Income and Expenditure 1946-1952* (1953); numbers estimated from Table 1.

Shop assistants are excluded. Directors' fees are included; employers' contributions to (or payments from) pension funds excluded throughout.

Average salary for males only estimated as described in text.

The complication introduced by the rapid growth in the female salariat since 1938 is now apparent. Salary rates and earnings have increased more for women than for men, but it still remains true that they are lower for women. Consequently, the larger proportion of women in the post-war group of salary earners depresses the average earnings. The average for the whole group has risen less than that either for males only or for females only. An estimate has, therefore, been inserted in Table 2 for average earnings of males only. It is assumed that female salary rates in 1938 were about two thirds of male rates, and that the corresponding proportion in 1949-52 was 70 per cent. This assumption and the changing numbers of men and women (Table 1) permits a calculation of the male (and female) average earnings corresponding to the overall averages shown in Table 2. It then appears that the increase in average salaries from 1938 to 1952 was slightly higher for men (123 per cent.) than for all salary earners (119 per cent.); the increase for women (134 per cent.) was higher still.

It is to be noted that uncertainty about the absolute numbers of salary earners, or about the absolute size of the salary bill, is not at all necessarily damaging in this calculation. All that is required is the change over time in numbers and in the average salary. The data used in Tables 1 and 2 may be biased in their absolute magnitude, but at least they are reasonably comparable over the period considered, and the numbers are a reasonable match to the salary bill in each case.

4. *Differential changes in earnings since 1938.* The war and early post-war years saw a massive re-distribution of income, even before the incidence of taxation and social services is considered. All the pre-war differentials—between salaries and wages, between men and women and between more skilled (or higher paid) and less skilled (or lower paid)—were drastically reduced. Between 1938 and 1952, average wage earnings increased by 160 per cent., higher than the increase in salary earnings shown in Table 2. Rates of pay for women increased more than for men, both for wage earners and for salary earners. All the evidence shows that the rates and earnings of less skilled wage earners increased more than that of the higher skilled workers, and the same is true of the lower and higher salary groups. In any category, e.g. typists or clerks, the lower paid have gained since 1938 at the expense of the higher paid.

* The numbers of earners estimated by Chapman for 1938 make some allowance for unemployed and part-time workers; no such allowance is made in the post-war figures. The difference is not great for salary earners, though it is appreciable in corresponding figures for wage earners. Hence the increase in average salary shown here for 1938 to 1949-52 is a slight understatement.

The figures of Table 2 makes allowance for the male/female differential, but not for the differing increase in earnings of the lower and higher paid. The increase of 123 per cent. from 1938 to 1952 in male salary earnings remains an average. It is known that the increase is greater for lower paid grades in any group, and hence that the increase tends to taper off with rising salary throughout the whole range of salary earners. But to estimate the extent of the differential is impracticable, at least from available data of a comprehensive kind. An indirect approach is necessary.

5. Comparison of salaries, 1936-7 to 1949-50. Inland Revenue has taken income censuses, on an adequate sample basis, for assessments made both in 1937-38 and in 1949-50 (Cmd. 6769 and Cmd. 8436). The details available permit an approximate, but reasonable comparison to be made between salaries earned in 1936-37 (and assessed in 1937-38) and those earned in 1949-50 (and assessed in the same year).

The comparison can only be approximate because of some, generally minor, limitations of the data. Wage earners are included with salary earners (because they cannot be separated in Inland Revenue data in 1949-50) but this difficulty is largely avoided by taking only the higher incomes, over £500 in the pre-war and over £800 in the post-war year. Earnings of wives are excluded in both years, but subsidiary earnings (pensions, etc.) assessed under Schedule E are included in 1937-38 and excluded in 1949-50. The effect of this difference is rather complicated but, on balance, it probably means that pre-war salaries are slightly overstated in comparison with post-war, i.e. that the increases shown below are slightly too low. Further, though the assessments of 1949-50 must relate in practically all cases to salaries earned in that year, the 1937-38 assessments relate in the main to 1936-37 incomes but include some 1937-38 earnings. Again, since 1937-38 salaries were a little higher, there is some tendency to overstate 1936-37 salaries and to understate the increase over the period 1936-37—1949-50.

The main difficulty in handling the data lies in the fact that the Inland Revenue table show numbers of salary earners (and aggregate salary earned) distributed not by ranges of salary income but by ranges of total income, including both unearned income and earnings assessed under other schedules than Schedule E. This makes it impossible to derive any information on ranges of salary income for single women; the salary element in total income becomes (on the average) quite small in the higher income brackets since most single women only get into these brackets if they have unearned income. It also makes it difficult to handle the data for (single and married) men—but not impossible (except perhaps in the highest income brackets) since the proportion of salary income to total income is generally high enough for some separation to be attempted.

The problem is to start with a distribution of numbers of salary earners by total income (as provided by Inland Revenue) and to derive an estimate of the distribution of numbers by salary income. One method of estimation is shown in Fig. I where all distributions are given in cumulative form (numbers of incomes over £x) and plotted on double-logarithmic scales so that a Pareto line can be fitted. The distribution by total income is first plotted and then shifted to the left by an amount equal to the non-salary income (as given by Inland Revenue) in each range of total income.

The fit of Pareto lines—to be used later for interpolation—is fairly good in Fig. I, except that there is a "bulge" in numbers for total incomes around £2,000 and salary incomes around £1,500. The "bulge" is to be seen in the pre-war year, but it is much larger in the post-war year. It is undoubtedly due to understatement of income near the surtax point. However, the effect of the "bulge" in a cumulative distribution is confined to the income range in which it occurs; it disappears beyond the range. Hence, in the interpolations below, the Pareto lines are used rather than the original data, to eliminate as far as possible the effect of understatement of income around the surtax point.

The general appearance of the income distributions of Fig. I is in agreement with expectations. It illustrates very well that the inequality of salary incomes was less after the war (the 1949-50 Pareto line being steeper) and that other income, particularly property income, was of decreased importance (the 1949-50 distributions by total and by salary incomes lying closer together).

An alternative, but not completely independent, method of estimation leads to the distributions and Pareto lines of Fig. II. The method is to take each range of total income separately, to distribute the number of salary earners uniformly over a range of salaries with centre corresponding to the average salary (given by Inland Revenue) and to sum the result into a distribution by salary income. The Pareto lines of Fig. II are slightly less steep than those of Fig. I, but in the central range of incomes there is not much difference.

6. Estimates of equivalent salaries, 1936-7 and 1949-50. The distributions of Fig. I (or alternatively Fig. II) can be used, by interpolation, to give pairs of equivalent

salaries in the two years. Equivalence is defined so as to equate salaries which are exceeded by the same proportion of salary earners in each year. This is the criterion of keeping up with the Jones, the Jones being the whole group of male salary earners. For example, if 20 per cent. of salary earners have salary incomes above £x in 1936-37 and 20 per cent. above £y in 1949-50, then £y is taken as the equivalent in 1949-50 of £x in 1936-37.

The difficulty is to fix the total numbers of salary earners, and hence the proportions, in the two years. Total numbers are not shown in Fig. I (or Fig. II) because these are truncated distributions which cannot be carried down to the lowest incomes. The method of getting round the difficulty is to estimate, not total numbers themselves, but the percentage increase in the total between the two years. This permits numbers, rather than proportions, to be used. For example, if total numbers increased by 10 per cent., then 50,000 incomes over £x in 1936-37 and 55,000 incomes over £y in 1949-50 are equivalent.

There remains the problem of estimating the percentage increase in total numbers, i.e. in estimating the increase in its size and in defining the group of Jones. The figures of Table 1 show that the increase in male salary earners from 1938 to 1951 was 17 per cent. if shop assistants are excluded. This figure relates to 1951 compared with 1938, but to match the income figures we require the growth from 1936-37 to 1949-50. The rate of growth in numbers before the war appears to have been as high or perhaps a little higher than in recent years. Hence the growth over the two periods can be taken to be much the same, and the estimated increase for 1936-37 to 1949-50 can be put at 18 per cent. for all male salary earners, excluding only shop assistants.

We should not take too wide a group of Jones for the present comparison. We shall confine it to men earning more than £500 in the pre-war period. The increase in numbers in this smaller group cannot be precisely estimated. The large growth in the numbers of women is mainly an addition to the salariat, but there is some tendency for men to hand over to women jobs at the bottom of the salary scale and perhaps to take slightly higher paid posts in the salariat.* Apart from this, there appears to be little reason to think that there has occurred any substantial change in the structure of the male salary hierarchy. There have been certain changes in public policy which have tended to bring about a greater than average increase in the numbers of certain classes of salary earners, e.g. the staffs of local authorities and teachers. But these salary earners are to be found widely spread throughout the salary hierarchy. There has been some transfer of medical consultants from fee earners to the salariat, but their numbers are so small as to be unlikely to affect significantly the percentage increase in the group considered. It has been said that the expansion in the number of scientific and technical workers may well have brought about a proportionately greater expansion at the top of the salary scale, but this is unlikely to have been the result. People so qualified are to be found in a very broad salary band, and the expansion has been made possible by a rapid recruitment of young people, including post-war graduates. It follows, therefore, that the increases in these numbers are likely to be found both below and above the critical income figure of £500 pre-war. The introduction of new policies and new techniques has brought about an increase in the number of higher administrators and higher paid technical and research staff; but equally it has brought about an increase in the numbers of executive staff, costing clerks, draughtsmen, laboratory assistants and junior qualified staff.

Moreover, the facts which are available strongly support these general considerations. Pre- and post-war salary distributions are given by the charts based on Inland Revenue data. These charts show, as was to be expected, that the distribution of salaries, like that of other incomes, has become more even. Smaller proportions of the numbers covered by the two income censuses are shown to have large incomes in 1949-50. In 1936-37, 14,852 men (out of 405,809) had salaries over £5,000 p.a. In 1949-50 no more than 20,543 (out of 507,875) had salaries more than the same figure despite the change in the value of money, and only 14,637 had salaries greater than £6,000. In 1936-37 there were 138,188 men drawing more than £1,000 and 321,125 in 1949-50. As a result of differential movement in salaries and the greater employment of women in the lowest paid salaried occupations, more men were in 1949 to be found within the lower middle ranges of the entire salary hierarchy and at the bottom end of the scale which we have taken, for our particular consideration, from the income census. This is quite the reverse of what one would expect had the increase in the numbers employed been proportionately greater in the jobs carrying high remunerations. Had this occurred, the

* And there had probably occurred some substitution for juveniles.

proportionate increase in numbers over the period could be expected to show itself in a change in the slope of the curves contrary to that shown. There would have been a larger increase in the numbers drawing large salaries than in those drawing the smaller salaries covered by the censuses.

For these reasons the proportionate increase in the size of the salariat earning over £500 in 1936-37 is estimated to be much the same as that for the entire male salariat (excluding shop assistants). In round figures, with allowance for some relative movement from the lowest paid to rather higher salaried posts among men, as a result of the greater employment of women (and for the increase in, for example, the medical salariat), the growth in the more restricted group of Jones is estimated at 20 per cent. Alternative figures are also given for a rise of 25 per cent. which appears to make more than adequate allowance for the inevitable uncertainties in a calculation of this kind.

Table 3 sets out for certain 1936-37 salaries the equivalent salaries of 1949-50 on the basis of the two figures taken for the increase in the numbers of salary earners having more than around £500 p.a. before the war. The equivalent salaries are obtained by interpolation on Figs. I and II.

TABLE 3
EQUIVALENT SALARIES, 1936-37 AND 1949-50

					1936-37	1949-50	
					£	(i) £	(ii) £
Fig. I	...	...	...	...	800	1,310	1,295
					1,100	1,725	1,700
					1,500	2,245	2,210
					2,000	2,880	2,840
Fig. II	...	...	...	...	800	1,280	1,260
					1,100	1,690	1,665
					1,500	2,215	2,180
					2,000	2,845	2,805

(i) 20 per cent. increase in numbers of relevant salary earners.

(ii) 25 per cent. increase in numbers.

7. Comparisons between 1938, 1949 and 1953. The increases of Table 3, though obtained for income tax years, can be taken as close approximations to the increases over calendar years from 1936 to 1949. They can be averaged, lacking any positive choice, over the two methods of interpolation (Fig. I and Fig. II), but the effect of the two assumptions on changes in total numbers can be kept separate.

It was noted in para. 5 that these increases are likely to be somewhat too small because of the nature of the original Inland Revenue data used. This understatement can now be offset by cutting down the period of comparison from 1936-1949 to 1938-1949, and maintaining the same increases for the shorter period. There was a small increase in salaries, on the average, from 1936 to 1938—both years being short of full employment—but it was estimated by Agatha Chapman (in the book cited above) at no more than 2 per cent. for all salary earners. The increase may be even less if only the higher salaries are taken, for many, if not most, higher salary scales were unchanged in 1936-38.

There remains the task of bringing the increases up to date, of extending the period from 1949 to 1953. Fortunately, many of the difficulties met in attempting to bridge the gap from 1938 to 1949 disappear in considering the period after 1949. In particular, the redistribution of incomes, or the reduction in differentials (noted in para. 4 above) had largely worked itself out by 1949. In general, there were no further important changes in the differentials between 1949 and 1953. Since 1948 or 1949, movements in wages, salaries and prices have been very much more in step than over the war period. There has also been little further change in the main differentials, e.g. between rates of pay for men and women and for the more skilled and less skilled. Table 2 above shows that, on the average, salaries increased by 26 per cent.; similar figures for average wages show an increase of 22½ per cent. from 1949 to 1952. Wages and salaries alike have increased further since 1952; the Ministry of Labour index of wage rates for men

has risen from an average of 129 in 1952 to 135 in August, 1953 (June, 1947 = 100) and a growth of the same order can be assumed for salaries. The increase in average salaries from 1949 to 1953 can be put at 30 per cent. at least.

The only uncertainty is whether higher salary earners, in any one category or in the whole group, have had smaller increases in rates than lower salary earners in 1949-53 as in earlier periods. The reduction of differentials tends to take place in the early stage of a rise in money incomes and the differentials tend to widen again as time goes on and as adjustment is made to new price and income levels. There is therefore a lag effect. The probabilities are that this lag effect has begun to operate for salaries just as it can be demonstrated to have worked for other workers, i.e. to widen the differentials. However, even if after 1949 the Jones continued to lose ground to the rest of the salariat at the same rate as between 1938 and 1949, which is possible but unlikely, the rise in the Jones' average salaries would have been not 30 per cent. but 22½ per cent. Again, as in previous estimates, it is appropriate here to make alternative assumptions, which can be put at (a) an increase of 30 per cent., and (b) an increase of 22½ per cent., in higher salaries from 1949 to 1953. The first assumption corresponds to the application of the average increase to the higher salariat group. Assumption (b) allows for a further and equal deterioration in the differential between lower and higher salaries.

Application of the increases from 1949 to 1953, to those already taken (from Table 3) as appropriate to the period 1938 to 1949, gives the final results set out in Table 4. An average has been struck between the interpolations of Fig. I and Fig. II, but the results are presented on the basis of the two figures for the increase in numbers of salary earners between pre-war and post-war years combined with two figures for the increase in higher salary rates from 1949 to 1953.

TABLE 4
EQUIVALENT SALARIES, 1938 AND 1953
(percentage increase 1938 to 1953)

1938 salary	(i) (a)	(i) (b)	(ii) (a)	(ii) (b)
£				
800	110	98	104	93
1,100	102	90	96	85
1,500	93	82	87	77
2,000	86	75	81	72

(i) 20 per cent. increase.
(a) 30 per cent. increase.

(ii) 25 per cent. increase in total numbers of salary earners, 1938-49.
(b) 22½ per cent. increase in average salaries, 1949-53.

8. Conclusion. We regard the results under Column (i) (a) of Table 4 as our best estimate of the change in equivalent salaries. Column (i) (b) shows the effect of the assumption that the differential against higher salaries has continued to widen since 1949 as over the period to 1949. The remaining two columns show the effect of assuming as large an increase in numbers as 25 per cent.

Hence, for salary earners to maintain their positions in the hierarchy of all salary earners, a pre-war salary in the range from £800 to £1,100 would need to be increased by about 100 per cent. over the period from 1938 to 1953.

R. G. D. ALLEN.

8th April and 3rd November, 1953.

FIGURE 1
MALE SALARY-EARNERS
(SINGLE AND MARRIED)

DISTRIBUTION BY: 1936-37 1949-50

TOTAL INCOME — — — — —

SALARIES (ESTIMATED) — — — — —

NOTE Small numbers of wage-earners included
Wife's earnings excluded
Subsidiary earnings (Schedule E) (expansions)
included 1936-37
excluded 1949-50





FIGURE II
MALE SALARY-EARNERS
(SINGLE AND MARRIED)
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTIONS BY RANGES OF SALARIES



Examination of Witnesses

MR. R. J. VILE, *Chairman, Association of First Division Civil Servants*

MR. J. M. WOOLF, *Honorary Secretary, Association of First Division Civil Servants*

MR. J. STAFFORD, C.B., *member of the Executive Committee of the Association of First Division Civil Servants and*

PROF. R. G. D. ALLEN, C.B.E., M.A., D.SC. (ECON.), *Professor of Statistics, University of London*

on behalf of the Association of First Division Civil Servants
called and examined

906. *Chairman*: Paragraphs 1 and 2 deal with membership and the representative capacity of the F.D.A., and the duties of the class. I notice that you have an extraordinarily high membership.—*Mr. Vile*: Yes, 2,484 out of 2,808.

907. How long have you been going as an Association?—We started in 1919. We almost folded up during the last war but we have kept going and we have had a committee in being all the time since then.

908. Is there anything you would like to add to this point about representation?—Yes, Sir, there is one thing. Since the announcement of your appointment as a Royal Commission was made we have been considering amongst ourselves as an Association what kind of evidence we should give. The secretary and I have been round to practically all our branches and we have, I think, brought the great bulk of our members into the consideration of what we should say. There are two exceptions to that. In the first place, we have not expected our members who are in establishment divisions to take part in our discussions. Secondly, we have permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries in our membership and we have not expected them to take any part either. So those categories of members are not associated with what we have said and we have sought no authority from them for it.

909. In paragraph 5 you mention various factors relevant to the assessment of pay scales. Would you care to indicate the order of importance in which you would place these for the administrative class, or to comment on the Treasury view that fair comparisons must be the most important for all classes?—I think it is safe to say that in general terms we would not quarrel, except from the point of view of drafting, with what is said in paragraph 26 of the Treasury memorandum as the first principle. We have said something remarkably like it in our own paper. Indeed, we regard that almost as self evident. Our difficulty arises over what they put down as the second principle, and what we have preferred to call the method rather than the principle. What has embarrassed us as an Association for a long time has

not been the principles but the methods used to apply those principles, and I would much rather deal with the problem in terms of practical method than in terms of principle. As we see it you have two tasks, which are different from the task which we have as an Association in pay negotiations. You have to establish what statisticians would call a "bench mark", or what I would call a starting point, and then you have to say how the pay scales thus established should be kept in line subsequently. We hope you will be able to acquire the evidence we have never been able to get about specific outside occupations to establish the "bench mark" beyond dispute. But when you come to subsequent adjustments this kind of comprehensive review is not a feasible operation once a year. It requires an enormous amount of correspondence, analysis and judgment, and people will tell you things as a Royal Commission which they certainly would not tell us, and which more often than not as far as we can discover, they will not tell the Treasury in the course of ordinary pay negotiations. What we as an Association are looking for is something which will give us enough material in the course of adjustments to check on the general analysis and income distribution to show that it is not wildly out of line. If at any time we have to establish a new starting point we then contemplate a much wider and more comprehensive review such as you can make.

910. The factors you mention in paragraph 5 are recruitment and retention, comparison, long term trends, professional and social standing, public esteem, and relativity. Is it comparison you would put first amongst these, whilst taking all the others into account?—Yes, we like to start with fact rather than opinion, and in so far as you can get facts they relate to specific outside salaries or the income distribution. The other factors as we see it, all lead up to the conclusion that it is the facts you must go for first.

911. *Mr. Hall*: There is a point on paragraph 6, where you talk about "... the performance of work, which has certainly not declined in volume or complexity since

before the war . . .". Sometimes one hears the opinion expressed that dilution of the Service may have taken place as a result of expansion, and that accelerated promotion has resulted in the levels of responsibility in the Service now as compared with before the war being somewhat less. Do you wish to comment on that?—I think that kind of remark is akin to the remark that "children are not what they were". Certainly, and I can only talk from my own experience, when we examine the work done by our predecessors 20 or 30 years ago we cannot see any difference in the level of responsibility which they exercised in their age and that which we exercise now.

912. *Chairman*: The work of the first division really has increased immensely in quantity but in quality is pretty much what it was 20 or 30 years ago?—Yes.

913. *Mr. Hall*: What about the development of the under secretary grade, which has not precisely replaced, but appears now where there used to be, principal assistant secretaries before the war?—What the under secretary now does is, I think, to a large extent something that was not done before the war, when to a large extent the deputy secretary and the permanent secretary had to do not only the work which they now do but also to exercise the oversight of assistant secretaries. Principal assistant secretaries did not supervise assistant secretaries but came in from time to time. As a piece of organisation it just would not stand up to any kind of real test, and so the grade of under secretary was introduced.

914. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Were the actual bodies of the under secretaries the bodies of the principal assistant secretaries but with the functions altered under the transformation?—Yes, they were given direct and unqualified oversight which they did not have before.

915. *Mr. Cash*: In paragraph 7 you refer to the promptitude with which you can move away from your "bench mark" as you call it, and the necessity for avoiding any large increases in salary at any one time to overtake the accumulated arrears. There is, of course, a possibility, is there not, of salaries moving in the other direction in the next 10 years?—The best advice which we can get on the subject is that that kind of change is most unlikely, and that salaries in outside occupations do not move downwards very easily.

916. How fast would you wish to move away from your "bench mark"?—We would like to have a "bench mark" which stays valid for as long as possible. The one thing we have not liked about the post-war period has been the necessity to make frequent pay claims because of the substantial outside changes.

917. *Chairman*: The Treasury think that frequent review of high level salaries is unwise though you may have to review more frequently at a lower level. Would you agree about the first?—It is entirely a question of the degree of change outside. We do not want to go on record as advocates of constant change. On the other hand, we think it wrong that there should be an ideological consideration which says that no matter what degree of outside change there has been, there should not be a change here because there has been one within the last three years. I do not think there is ever likely to be any practical difference of opinion between us and the Treasury on this.

918. One difficulty about the Treasury suggestion is the effect on internal vertical relativities. That would be a problem, would it not?—It has been a problem already, Sir. You get a man of great ability who has risen very near the top of the Service and finds that economically he is no better off than he was twenty-five years ago. Unless there is some measure of general change in the salary structure of a class it takes the joy of promotion out of a man's life. That applies to other classes besides the administrative.

919. In paragraph 8 you say that by the time that the evil effects of underpaying the administrative class became manifest, far reaching damage to the public service would have been done. Would you care to amplify that?—Yes. Once we are in the Service as established administrative people we stay in because we enjoy both intellectually and emotionally the friendship of our colleagues and the work we do with them, so that the level of pay does not drive us out or keep us in once we are in, and we are still quite happy to go round the universities on behalf of the Civil Service Commission whenever they ask us and encourage other people to come in, because we know it is a good job and an interesting one, and because unless we have the best people in the class we cannot get our work done. As we see it, the amount of money we are paid does not immediately affect the people who are in and it does not immediately affect the people who are thinking of coming in, because we are happy and one thing we do not grouse about is our job.

What has worried us is that as the years have gone by our own opportunities for keeping up with our own particular class of "Joneses" grow less and less. We become more and more, as it were, inbred. We cannot afford to do all sorts of things that we used to be able to afford to do and our feeling is that the bright young man at the university looking round the world is beginning to notice this more and more, and to say to himself:—"I want to go on doing the things that my education

has taught me to do here but that does not look an awfully good career in which to do them". It is a pity, but it is a very long process. I do not think it happens quickly, but although we have been careful not to state it explicitly, we think it has happened already. Our feeling is, judging by the people who are now coming into the Service and joining the Association and with whom we talk, that we may be recruiting much more the type of university graduate who does not expect an awful lot out of life because he did not have an awful lot before he joined the Service, and that may explain why we are not doing quite as well as we have done in the past. But there is very little worth while evidence in this field.

920. Other factors besides pay comes into this, do they not?—Yes. I have been wondering myself whether the lack of active political interest in the universities, which everybody is now commenting on, may not have something to do with the lack of interest shown in the administration of the country.

921. *Lady Albemarle*: There are more applications for the administrative class than there used to be. If your assumption were correct you would expect there would be a general falling off in applications. What you mean is that you do not get the same number of really top grade people? You can hardly say that that reflects your assumption?—Yes, I was thinking of it on the lines that where you have a lot of political interest in a university, of what I remember in my own time there, it is normally the more brilliant and enterprising people who run the clubs and do all the work. That does not seem to be happening to the same extent now: those people whatever they are doing are doing other things. The clubs still go on, but that particular type of man does not do it to the same extent.

922. It is the few exceptional ones you are referring to?—Yes.

923. *Chairman*: There is a tremendous increase in competition from outside for these particular men, is there not? In a time of full employment businesses are very fully aware of the value of the graduate and you begin to get competition which did not exist before very much?—Yes, that is so.

924. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You point to the falling away of first class honours people and the increase of second class honours people. Are there not other reasons for that? Is it possible that the standard of a first is rising?—We have not heard that it is. It may be.

925. Secondly, is it caused by the method of recruitment? As I understood it, the new system of selection after interview and the week-end, and all that kind of thing,

was partly devised from a suspicion that an academically too bright man might not be good for you, and you opened a door for second class honours people. Is that not a possibility?—Yes.

926. Thirdly, do you not think it is affected by the number of vacancies?—The figures as I have them do not show that. We have taken the figures for 1936, 1937 and 1938 when we recruited 52, 50 and 52 people for the administrative class and we got 44, 33 and 33 first class honours people. In the three years from 1950 to 1952 we recruited 40, 61 and 64 and we got 16, 20 and 26 first class honours people. That seems to us to be a greater change than would be justified even with all the difference in circumstances.

927. And you attach importance to a first class degree?—We must, yes.

928. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You find that some first class honours men are looking for careers which enable them to follow a particular cultural interest which they have?—We have found it almost impossible to discover what happens. We have talked to the appointments boards at London, Cambridge and Oxford, but they have not been able to help us very much. They would have to follow it up for fifteen or twenty years really to know what is happening, and their records do not allow them to do it as I understand the position.

929. *Chairman*: Speaking from university experience, one of the troubles is, of course, that the number of first class candidates has not increased in proportion with the number of entries. There is very little increase we find at that end, and also at the other end, but the great bulk is in the middle.

930. *Mrs. Wootton*: You said you were perhaps getting the people who do not expect to get much out of life because they had never had much in life. Could you amplify that at all?—Perhaps I can just quote one personal case that came my way of an assistant principal who had recently joined the Service, who looked at the kind of salaries we were seeking and said:—"Well, I do not buy books, I find the public library suits my needs perfectly". We hope he will change, but that is the sort of thing that has rather alarmed us. Admittedly, on an assistant principal's salary he cannot buy very many books, but we should hope he would not only be able to but also want to later.

931. Could you develop paragraph 9? You are a little cool in that paragraph about relativities. Are you thinking there of horizontal relativities between classes?—Yes.

932. Including relativities between the specialist classes and the administrative class?—Yes.

933. Would you like to develop your views as to the unimportance of relativities? We have had a good deal of evidence stressing the importance of relativities?—Yes, from what I have seen most of it stresses the importance of the relativity with the administrative class, and we are regarded I think as the sacred cow whose every movement must be watched. Perhaps I can divide it into two parts, the executive class and the professionals.

The professionals as we see it have got a much simpler method of comparison with outside employment over a very wide range, and if, following the general principle which we think should be followed, the comparison is first with relevant facts outside, it may well be that some professional groups will be able to make a much bigger claim than we could make for grades which are now regarded as about on the same level, and if that can be done we would see no reason why they should not have their claim awarded. They do not have to be tied to us. I would go so far as to say that all this trouble about doctors may owe quite a lot to the desire somehow to keep them tied to us. I do not think that can possibly be regarded as right or justifiable in itself. On the other hand, there are a number of professional groups who try hard, I think, to better their position in the outside world by clinging to us like limpets, so you get what I will call a dual attitude on the part of professionals; those who think they will do best by relativity and those who in fact know they will not.

Our feeling is that if you look first at the facts of the outside world and the level of esteem in which that profession is held you should get the right answer. We do not attach an awful lot of importance to the old and at one time almost sacred principle that the administrator must always earn more because he gives orders to a man. I think you have got to follow what occurs in outside employment, and if the normal pattern there is that your professional is rewarded much more than your administrator, then there is no earthly reason why that should not happen in the Service.

934. That is very important, is it not, that you would be prepared to let the very highly paid professional specialist go ahead and leave your people behind, even if you were working side by side?—It happens already inasmuch that I believe the Chief of the Imperial General Staff earns far more than the permanent secretary in the War Office.

935. It happens but is very seldom so willingly acknowledged as you have acknowledged it just now.

936. Mr. Willis Jackson: Do I understand you correctly that you do not think

it proper for comparisons to be drawn between classes, as for example, the higher grades of the scientific class and the administrative class? May I perhaps put it in this way? I have analysed the numbers in the scientific class receiving £2,500 or more and they totalled 59 out of a scientific class of 3,721 which is about 1·6 per cent. In the administrative class the number receiving £2,500 and over is 319 out of 2,594 which is 12·3 per cent. Now I doubt whether this represents the esteem of the scientific class relative to the administrative class in the present day world. How would you feel if the scientific class were to make a case on fair comparisons for a marked improvement in their remuneration at the higher levels relative to your class?—Our feeling is that it is up to them to make their case. We see no reason why there should be an automatic bar on their case because they happen at certain levels to want more than we want.

937. To what extent should I be right in arguing that the senior men on the scientific side are very largely administrative people, administrative no doubt in a different way from administrators at a high level on your side? Would you feel it proper that they should be regarded at the higher levels as part of the administrative class and be transferred to it, or would you argue that there should be horizontal relativity between the two classes?—This is not an easy question to answer shortly, if I may say so. As I understand the work which is done within the scientific class, it is not administration in the sense that we know it as the work of the administrative class. Administration is capable of a number of meanings, and perhaps I ought to say what I think of as the administrative class. We are, first and foremost, the servants of our Ministers and our purpose in life is to advise our Minister of what he should do publicly. That is the governing consideration of all we do and our thoughts are always directed to the Minister and his policy. Now, when you come to the scientific class—what I have seen of it admittedly as an outsider—the work of the directing scientist in a Government organisation is not directed in that way towards the policy of the Minister. It is directed much more to the professional and scientific questions of policy which arise, and on which for example the Minister is not likely to be closely questioned in the House of Commons.

A Minister requires advice not only from the expert in a particular field. A Minister's administrative advisers must be able to understand the advice and recommendations of a particular expert. Unless we as the Minister's advisers can understand that advice in the light of our advice

nobody can know what is the relative importance of one particular job in the light of all the other work that is to be done. This is not just a scientific question, important though scientists are. We are the handmaidens of every vested interest or particular skill in the community. Everybody eventually comes to us and wants to spend money or to use people, and we have to advise the Minister on how what is available can best be spent. It does not matter how bright a particular expert's idea may be, you may well have to say that there is not enough money this year or next year to do anything about it, or you may have to go back to him and say—"If you only have a quarter of what you want, can you get started now, and can we take ten years over the job instead of four?" Somebody has to ask those questions, and you can only ask them if you have some understanding. You cannot leave it to the vested interest itself to decide what it should spend.

938. What you are saying is that the scientific administrator, if I may describe him in that way, must go through an administrator on your side to express an opinion to the Minister?—No. Can I put it this way? I can only talk from my own experience, but if the director of a scientific organisation decides what in order to complete his work he wants an installation put up at "X" he then has to have that costed, and when he has got all his plans right he then has to see from the administrative people whether that amount of money can be found, and the question of how much money there is and what it should be spent on is never a question that can be decided by one claimant. You have to have some reasonably impartial body of men who sit with blank faces and listen to all claimants and eventually reach a judgment.

939. I think I should not pursue the matter this morning, but I am interested that you appear to regard this kind of service as justifying the differences in complement and in salary at the higher levels of the two grades.—It is a question of how much work there is to be done. I do not think it is possible to reach any ideal complement. What Parliament wants the Service to do the Service then goes and performs, and that governs the kind of structure you then get.

940. *Mr. Burman*: Is it entirely a question of how much work there is to be done? The impact of the high scientific officer has changed the whole position, has it not, for where matters are purely administrative, purely a matter of giving advice, it is very difficult to find a yardstick as to whether advice is in the long run good or bad. All the administrators are good. Occasionally you get an outstandingly brilliant one, but it is comparatively

rarely that anyone can say:—"So and so is one of the best brains we have had for years." But now we are coming into abstruse scientific problems it is not quite the same. We can say that there are only two men in the world who are capable of solving a particular problem, and if we want them we have to pay what they think they are worth, not a scale or salary which is fixed with relation to outside things. It applies particularly to the big technical establishments. How are we going to resolve this problem of the individual on the scientific side, as opposed to the administrative side? I know it is heretical to suggest that we should not pay all the people at the top level the same, but in point of fact are we going to be able to go on doing that for ever?—May I distinguish then between the man who makes the Service his career and the man who is wanted for a special job which may last for a fair time, say five years. I think the first man has to fit in to the structure of salaries for the Service no matter how brilliant he is. If you want a man in for a job for a short time there are all sorts of ways of getting him to come. You do not necessarily have to pay him a salary. Some of the best advice which the Government gets from the outside world is given by people who just sit on advisory committees and draw an allowance which compensates them for the disturbance to their life.

941. *Chairman*: There is another aspect of this, and that is the question of transfer from the professional to the administrative class. Would you agree that this is becoming increasingly important?—Yes.

942. *Mrs. Wootton*: Could we come back to the other side, the people who I think you said cling to you? Would you like to get rid of them too? In particular would you like to see the upper structure of the executive class not mainly determined by what happens to you?—I think the answer to that is to agree, although just saying that is only a part of our view. What we think should be done is to settle what a career structure should be by a comparison with outside employment, and from that to see what kind of job structure is appropriate. If the Society of Civil Servants were to do that, they would not necessarily arrive at the conclusion that the chief executive officer must be in the middle of the principal scale. They have arrived, I think, at that conclusion and clung to it tenaciously because of what has been called the "concertina." Without the concertina I see no reason why that should be so important. The classes must meet somewhere but I see no necessity for such a close relationship as we have had in the past. May I just go back to what I said about looking towards the Minister on

our part, because the executive class, as I see it, in their work have to look much more downwards, as it were, instead of upwards. They have got responsibilities for the other members of the class whereas we do not attempt to supervise large blocks of executive work.

943. You are really disposing of traditional horizontal relationships pretty thoroughly?—I think the executive relationships have been pushed to the limit; that the C.E.O. is not the equivalent of a principal; that in fact you cannot turn a C.E.O. on to principal's work just like that and that it is wrong to expect to do so. The C.E.O. is a first class recruiting ground for principals and there should be a much greater difference between the two grades, because in fact they do very different work.

944. You are saying, first, that there should be a greater difference because they have different comparisons outside and second that that ought to be the governing factor and not their relationship to one another.—Yes.

945. *Chairman*: We have seen posts which were at one time occupied by a C.E.O. and at another time by a principal.—Some very odd things have happened, Sir!

946. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraph 10 you talk about the establishment of machinery for the resolution of any dispute affecting the salaries of higher grades and classes. What kind of machinery have you got in mind?—The National Staff Side are going to give evidence on this point, and I would rather not anticipate what they are going to say.

947. *Mr. Burman*: In paragraph 11 it seems to be implicit that first of all service salaries should be appropriately settled at some point of time, and then that some means should be found to ensure a continuing parallel inside and outside the Service. Is it really desirable that there should be a continuing parallel? In view of the fact that the Service has a much greater part to play in the economic life of the country, is it perhaps desirable that the Service should try and set an example to outside employment?—It depends what sort of example you have in mind. The kind of example we have had to set is one of virtual penury and that has not exactly endeared itself to us. The only other way in which we could set an example would be to try to achieve more than we have suggested. We do not want to do either of those things. We feel that the kind of work we do is a pretty constant factor in the life of the community. The fact that Government is spreading its tentacles throughout the community does not seem to us to give us a greater importance

which should be reflected in terms of money. We think that our function, that of advising Ministers, has remained what it was. We are quite content to regard our function and our work as something pretty constant and not something that ought to be revalued as time goes by.

948. So you feel that you should act as a stabilising influence and that considerable emphasis should be placed on stability?—If I can over-simplify it, our feeling is that if our status is assessed at point X in the distribution of incomes, then it should remain at about that point, that that is regarded as our status in society, and that it should not be substantially changed.

949. *Sir George Mowbray*: To what extent do you feel that if the degree of change in incomes outside has been large, there could be some sort of automatic formula whereby it would be generally agreed by both sides that the time was ripe for an adjustment in your salaries to keep you at the right level?—We have never been very keen on anything automatic because none of the evidence which we regard as relevant is so clear and unmistakable in its implications that you could devise any automatic application of the conclusions to be drawn from it. There has to be discussion and some form of judgment used on whatever evidence is produced. I am sure it would be wrong to seek any kind of automatic increase.

950. *Mr. Hall*: Would you draw a distinction between some mechanism that might automatically result in an agreement that negotiations should now proceed, as compared with one that indicated the order of magnitude of a change?—That, if I may say so with respect, is theoretically a very nice idea. In practice I should be disinclined to adopt it because the one thing which we have always treasured is our ability to walk into the door of the Treasury any day of the week and say:—"We want to discuss this". I do not think we would want to restrict ourselves to any particular kind of outside movement before we were allowed to go and talk. I do not want to talk for the Treasury here but I am quite sure that they too prefer the freedom of negotiation which we enjoy, even though they have to turn us down so frequently.

951. *Sir George Mowbray*: But you do say that a clearly defined procedure should be adopted. Your clearly defined procedure seems to be entrance to the Treasury gates whenever you wish to go there. Is that the clearly defined procedure in practice?—Yes.

952. And is that the one you have in mind for the future?—There are two things to say. The use of income distribution as a guide does not enable you to

measure what we call minor changes, so that we would not be going for, say, a two per cent. rise. What we have in mind as a significant change would be one of the order of five per cent., and we would not otherwise think it worthwhile to start a discussion with the Treasury.

953. Does not that bring you back to the question Mr. Hall asked just now, that at a certain stage there should then be more or less automatic agreement that fresh negotiations might be started?—This depends upon the speed of change. If I can go back over the past three years when the speed of change was fairly great and we had the central pay settlement at the beginning of 1952, it was then quite clear to the Staff Side that it would be a good thing to have a *modus vivendi* by which we went back to the Treasury when another five per cent. rise occurred in the wage rates index. We do not at the moment see that kind of change affecting us as frequently as that. If it were a question of five per cent. per year, then to say five per cent. and to accept that as a yardstick might be a very good thing, but we do not see it happening as quickly as that. We see it much more in terms of possibly three to five years, and it may be a matter of judgment at any time whether you want to go in the third, fourth or fifth year. We do not see ourselves, as it were, released by the passing of the magic number five. We might consider it much better to wait for another year and see then. We do not want to be forced into negotiations unless we want to go into them.

954. Mr. Willis Jackson: You mentioned earlier that salaries outside do not readily fall, but suppose they were over a period to fall by five per cent., would you then propose to walk in the Treasury door, or would the procedure have to start in another way?—I have no doubt we should be invited. It would have to work both ways.

955. Chairman: You are in fact asking in your memorandum for more Treasury initiative in raising the issue, are you not?—Yes.

956. Mrs. Wootton: You used some expressions two or three times which seemed to suggest a new criterion. I think you spoke of "status" of your members in a community, and in your memorandum more than once you used the word "esteem". Are you suggesting that the right criterion is that you should have your proper status or position of esteem in the community—that being really a social test rather than an economic one?—Yes, I think the difficulty we feel is that of dissociating the social from the economic. As I see it in general terms, in the community ability as it increases gets more money, and we find it increasingly difficult to keep up with people with

whom we went to school or to the university, and with the best will in the world it is not funny to go on through the years being the poor friend in the community.

957. Mr. Hall: Would you include in your considerations the desirability to keep tuned up to do your best service by means of contacts, of entertainments and so on? Would you say that was really valuable in order to do your particular duty—something rather wider than purely social?—I think so. It is not just a question of wining and dining.

958. The contact of minds trained and developed to the same level as your own at the same age and carrying, in a different environment, not dissimilar types of responsibility? That is necessary to maintain the quality of the work you do in the Service?—Yes.

959. Mrs. Wootton: Could the distinction be put in this way? If you are not able to maintain your contacts or the position you expect to have in the community, that is a source of distress to you and perhaps lowers the efficiency of the Service but if in fact first rate people get recruited in spite of those drawbacks, the economic arguments for an increase are gone and the harsh view of the market says that you put up with it. Would you accept there is a distinction there?—I am not an economist, but I suspect that simple rule. In any large organisation you build up loyalties and interest which, shall we say, mitigate the harsh rule of the market.

960. You are miserable perhaps, to put it in exaggerated terms, but as long as there is no scarcity you have to put up with it?—Let me put it this way. What we are discussing now is not what we regard as the way to determine our pay. What we are discussing is what we feel about what has happened in the past, and we are not suggesting that because we feel disgruntled the measure of our pay should be the measure of contentment which is produced by increases.

961. Mr. Burman: In paragraph 17 you remark that in general normal career expectations cannot be said to include attaining to a position of managerial responsibility. I am rather surprised about that, because within the salary ranges we are talking of I should have thought that in industry there is a very great degree of managerial responsibility. Could you elaborate that remark?—In industry some types of person have wide responsibility in the sense that they can commit their firm or organisation to buy or sell a very large amount of merchandise, and that, in one sense of the word, is managerial responsibility. On the other hand, they cannot, and are not expected to, take

decisions about the policy of the firm as a whole, which is the kind of managerial decision that we meet here when we talk about the administrative class. In civil service terms it would be the executive class, taken by and large, which would buy and sell, and the administrative class which would decide on the general financial policy and the structure of the company.

962. You also mentioned in this paragraph that several public bodies and semi-public bodies follow the civil service pattern. How many of those are there? —We were thinking first and foremost of the Transport Commission which even goes so far as to call some of its people by the same terms, and from my dealings with those people they seem to have the same kind of responsibility. Then there is the Coal Board which has changed, but when it started off it was thinking very much in terms of a straight civil service pattern.

963. The hospital service, the police, universities—is there the same type there at all?—Not very much.

964. Not deliberate, but does in fact the civil service pay reflect on bodies like that? —That really is a question that you should put to the Treasury.

965. *Mrs. Wootton*: Would it be right to say that you do not object in principle to the criterion of outside comparisons, but you find there are difficulties in applying it?—Yes.

966. I can see two sorts of difficulty, one that you cannot find any comparable work, and the other that when you find comparable work nobody will tell you what the people do it are paid. Which of those difficulties stands most in your way?—In strict theory there is no comparable work because there is only one set of Ministers.

967. That is very strict.—Yes, but it has a lot of meaning, because you can always argue that no administrative officer ever does anything of his own volition and he always does it in somebody else's name, which you do not get outside. What we are driven to is to place much more reliance on a comparison of ability. It is very difficult to get comparable work when you attempt to determine whether the responsibility in an outside job is equivalent. We have argued for a very long time about a very large number of jobs, and we have never reached an agreement on any of them. It is only ability on which we have ever among ourselves been able to reach any kind of agreement.

968. You think that is more easily measurable?—It is open to less objection in individual cases.

969. Would you say there were any levels in the administrative class at which comparisons were particularly easy or particu-

larly difficult?—I think that the top and the bottom are the easiest. The assistant principal is relatively simple to compare with the best type of graduate going into business. Similarly, the permanent secretary is relatively easy to compare with the top people in other large scale organisations. It is in between that you can argue for many, many months.

970. *Mr. Burman*: Would you attach much importance to the risk factor in outside employment as compared with the Civil Service?—Far less importance than formerly. At we see it, there has been a very great change in the outside world. People have organised themselves into all kinds of associations. They tend to preserve their identity as organisations and to go on existing in fair and foul weather alike. We do not see an enormous amount of change among the people with whom we have to deal in the ordinary course of business.

971. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: The security of comparable people in industry is not dependent to more than a small extent upon membership of an association, but on the economic state of the country. This involves a risk to which you are not subjected?—I think in so far as the last 15 years have been any guide we have a degree of risk which is not all that far removed from the degree of risk among the kind of people I am thinking of in industry. It is, I think, pretty rare in industry to set about a deliberate policy of cutting down your staff, to have a deliberate policy of winding up large blocks of business, but that is a continuing process in the Civil Service. Some people in the administrative class will find that their offices have been abolished as part of that process, and they will be out of the Service. Great pains are taken to avoid it, but it cannot always be done.

972. *Mrs. Wootton*: Can you give us any idea how often this has happened to established persons in the administrative class? —I think the Treasury might be able to answer that.

973. *Chairman*: You say, Mr. Vile, that normal career expectations in outside organisations do not include attaining to a position of managerial responsibility. How does industry manage to get good graduates if it does not offer them scope for management?—Our difficulty has been to get out of a new entrant to a large industrial firm exactly what he expects to achieve as a "norm". One man we spoke to quite recently said that he was not quite sure what would happen but—"If I am pretty good I will be all right". One firm we went to said—"There is a change point in our structure at which the kind of work does approximate fairly closely to administrative work in the Service. If the man is good he will get to that point and pass it

by the age of 40; if he is not awfully good he will never get to that point but he will still earn a substantial income anyway and we can use him because we are a large organisation."

974. Does not that happen in the Civil Service too?—We can be fairly sure that a man will retire as an assistant secretary although we have some grounds for believing that over the next ten years that situation may worsen materially.

975. Your claim is that the assistant secretary has definitely got managerial responsibility?—Yes.

976. *Mr. Hall*: The career expectation of graduates going to the Civil Service, is better than in industry?—You can say with more certainty what your career expectation should be in the Service. In business you cannot say, but if you have ability you go much further.

977. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: But the man entering business must have something more than ability. He must have a certain amount, one might say, of courage in that what he may achieve is not clear to him.—Courage shows itself in a number of ways. If you are to do your job properly in the Service you have to be prepared to meet anybody at any time and discuss almost anything. You may be wanted to go and take the job of secretary to a group of eminent people you have never met before, discussing a subject about which you have no expert knowledge. I do not think there is any lack of courage on the part of people entering the administrative Civil Service.

978. *Mr. Cash*: A young man knows if he goes into business there are some very rich plums at the top which he may or may not reach. He may have a very good idea of his own abilities and hope to get them. In the Civil Service there is a ceiling beyond which for all practical purposes he will never proceed. That is really what it comes to?—Yes.

979. *Sir Alexander Gray*: And unless he is very bad he will get there?—Of course he has to do the job in order to get there.

980. *Chairman*: In paragraph 19 you refer to the increasing disposition in industry to recruit the kind of man also recruited to the professions. Have you any evidence on this?—No specific evidence.

981. In paragraph 20 you refer to the growth of superannuation and tax free benefits provided by outside employers. Would you care to amplify those points at all?—The growth of superannuation schemes is public knowledge. That represents the bringing up of outside employment to something like our standards.

982. Most of them are contributory, are they not?—Yes.

983. And yours is non-contributory, which is a big difference.—It depends. One informant told us that after tax allowances had been made the cost to the employee of a contributory scheme was under 4 per cent., which is not awfully significant on £2,000 to £3,000 a year.

984. I think at some stage you suggest that it might be desirable to get particulars of superannuation schemes from the income tax people?—Yes.

985. We are rather inclined to think the best way to get them is straight from the employers themselves.—That is for you, Sir. We suggested this because we knew the Inland Revenue have all the information together.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

986. *Chairman*: Coming to Professor Allen's memorandum, would you tell us something about the difficulties in any solution and why you selected this method?—*Professor Allen*: Yes. I would like to talk on two topics. One would be to say something about what I am trying to do and how to interpret the results, where I should talk rather more personally than professionally perhaps since it is a matter of interpretation and the underlying philosophy; the other is to say something about the particular techniques that, as a statistician, I have had to adopt.

As to the first, the idea I had was to get some kind of yardstick in a purely practical and statistical sense against which we could test any changes in salaries or other incomes that occurred over a period of time; but the yardstick has to be defined, and in defining it, you have to have some concept in mind and, even more important, when you proceed to use it you have to have a conceptual basis on which to work. I have given some thought to what it was I was trying to do and what I would propose if anyone was rash enough to ask me to use the results. I think I am prepared to stick my neck out a little—my personal, if not my professional neck! Say we have got a group of executive salary earners. We have their numbers at two dates, pre-war and postwar. We have the distribution of their incomes from top to bottom or from bottom to top. Suppose we read down from the top to the bottom or up from the bottom to the top and pick out the proportionate points at each period, e.g., a quarter from the top, I call these corresponding incomes in the sense that someone who earned that income was a quarter way down, and is still a quarter way down the scale in this particular group. You can do this at any point you like.

The question is what it can mean. The last thing that I would pretend would be that over a period anyone who used to have, say, £1,000 a year "must" or "should" have—or any other term like that—£2,000 now. That is just nonsense and not my intention at all. I am not using the words "should" or "must" in that sense in any way at all. The question is, what is it we are doing? At this point I think the simplest thing to explain what I have in mind is to distinguish between the posts that are in this hierarchy and the people who occupy those posts. You have your group of executive income earners at two dates. You have them arranged in descending order of income. There are posts that correspond and persons that correspond, but they are not the same thing at all. The hierarchy of jobs, of course, does change over a time but I think the main feature is the surprising smallness of the change. You do get new professions coming in and old ones petering away but over time jobs remain pretty constant. The people, of course, are changing all the time. Even over five or ten years people are coming in and going out, moving up and down the scale all the time, getting old or dying off.

Now what does this hierarchy mean? I think it means that in terms of people, it can be very broadly, but significantly, associated with a hierarchy of ability. Though the people are changing I also believe that over time—if ability is a concept you can measure—the range of incomes in the group does correspond with the range of abilities. You have to qualify that to the extent that abilities become specialised, since then it is the market value of these abilities that gets into an income distribution. But in the long run I do not believe there is much specialisation of ability.

The other feature is rather more important and that is the non-market factor. A man may prefer to be an archaeologist or an archivist at a low income rather than become a chemical engineer at a higher one. So the correlation between ability and this hierarchy is not by any means perfect but it is there. I think what we are doing is basically to compare hierarchies of ability, and that the yardstick should be used broadly in terms of ability, with qualifications and the other non-economic factors always in mind.

Suppose you are comparing two periods and that you find that £2,000 corresponds to £1,000 you can then say that, broadly speaking, these are incomes of people of the same ability. So if you pay £1,500 compared with £1,000 you are getting on balance someone of lower ability. I would use my yardstick to talk rather generally about what you have to do to get

people of the same general level of ability. This is perhaps a long term concept because it may be objected in a short run that what a man gets is not very closely related to his ability. You may have the case of a man who is in an occupation which used to be paid well and is not now, but does not get out. He is frozen because he is specialised. But even in the short run there are movements "on the margin"—to use an economic phrase. I could produce a not too extravagant example which would show you how you can change from a clergyman to a film star. If the film star is getting most and the clergyman is getting least, you can connect one to another by a number of steps. Some people who act for the Old Vic might become film stars. People who might be content with City jobs go on the stage. People who might sit the civil service exams, go to the City. People who might become schoolmasters take the civil service exams. Finally, people who might be clergymen take to schoolmastering instead. So in the end you can say that in the fairly short run there might be people who would otherwise be top civil servants who become business tycoons. Contrariwise, there might be people coming up in the Civil Service who might otherwise have been clergymen or teachers. So I think that the concept does work even in the short run by these marginal adjustments.

Having got my yardstick—say £1,000 pre-war equals £2,000 now—I would be prepared to go quite a little way in using it in this direction. If you said of a principal, for example, that his job is the same now as it used to be prewar when he got £1,000, I say that you need to pay £2,000 now to get a man of the same ability—unless you have increased the value of some of the other conditions of employment or amenities. You have got to increase the benefits other than pay if you are going to get an increasing difference in income. Putting it the other way round, if you said you proposed to pay £1,500 where you paid £1,000 before the war, I would stick out my neck and say that you must be prepared to accept people of less ability than those you had before the war. I do not know how to assess the other factors: I am only giving you the broad economic one. That is my general concept.

Now as to the technique that I adopted to achieve this yardstick, it is a purely professional matter. I can leave a lot of small matters of statistical detail over because inevitably whenever you are applying a statistical technique to achieve a given object, the data are more or less inadequate and you have to make do with what there is. The data you want here are

quite ordinary. All you need is to define your group to see how many there are and to get the distribution from top to bottom of incomes of this group. But in fact you do not have data like that. What the Inland Revenue publish is not exactly what you want, and therefore you have to adjust it by your techniques. There are three points where the Inland Revenue data are not in the form I want. The first is that the distribution of incomes is given not in fully detailed form but only in groups and rather broad groups. This means you have to interpolate to find numbers and incomes in between. It is a fact that with ordinary distribution of incomes in ordinary capitalist societies, if you take the number of people who earn more than a given sum, that number goes down proportionately as the income rises, and therefore in using double logarithmical plotting all I am doing is to interpolate on a proportionate basis and not on a straight basis. If you do not like it you can interpolate some other way. I am only interpolating between two rather close points and the answer does not vary very much, but the double logarithmical plotting is, I think, the best one.

The second point is that I do not know the numbers in the group because the Inland Revenue data start with salaries and finishes with wages. Therefore it is necessary either to make an assumption or to get some additional information as to how many people there are. I admit I do not know the numbers and I use two alternative measures to show how much difference it makes if you vary the assumption about the numbers. I only need the increase in numbers from one time to another. The reason I want that is that I want to go halfway or quarterway down the hierarchy and I can only know I am going halfway down if I know the increase in numbers between the two periods. I am perfectly prepared to vary these measures one way or another within reason.

The third point is the one that causes me most trouble. The Inland Revenue in the first instance give the distribution of salary earners, not by their salary income but by their total income. The problem is to get round that difficulty. If the Inland Revenue produced a salary distribution I should not have to do anything.

Can I get you to look at Figure I, quoting some actual figures? Take the 1936-37 distribution of male salary earners, distributed by total income in the form of what is called a cumulative distribution, that is, the number of people who earn or have a total income above a certain amount. The dotted line or curve starts at around £500 in 1936-37. If you look down at the horizontal scale you will find something like 300,000 salary earners with more than £500. So you come down and by the time

you have got, shall we say, to £2,000 reading up the curve, you will find about 50,000 with more than this income. That is the straight Inland Revenue data, taking their figures as they stand. The question is how to get a distribution of numbers by salary income and not by total income. It is not helping us to know there are 50,000 with more than £2,000 total income. We want to know those with more than £2,000 salary. Now in 1936-37, taking the £1,500 to £2,000 group, the total average income in that group was £1,720. Of that, on the average, £1,012 was salary and £608 was other income. Now taking the £1,720 point on the horizontal axis I go up till I hit the curve and get 66,000 people. I therefore say that according to this interpolation there are 66,000 with a total income above £1,720. Now I make my only assumption namely, that the same number of people, 66,000—though not of course the same people—have a salary income of over £1,012. All I am assuming is that if someone has dropped down someone has taken his place. That means, coming back to the curve, that having found my point above £1,720 on the total curve I move horizontally, keeping to the 66,000 and put a point in representing £1,012 salary. Those are the points that are shown on the salary line and that is what I mean by saying I move the curve to the left, by knocking out the £608 from the £1,720 and getting £1,012. I am making the simple, and, I think very reasonable, assumption that there are the same number of people above the average salary level as above the average total income level. That is what I do in Figure I. I use the logarithmic form for interpolation. I use the assumption about shifting for getting from the total distribution to the salary income distribution, and finally I have to use my assumption about the percentage increase in numbers so I can jump from one curve to the other. But I was sufficiently interested to see whether my assumption about shifting the curve was good enough to try another method which was very nearly independent of it and which led to the other salary distribution shown in Figure II.

The idea behind this other distribution was to take the ranges of total income and spread the people who were recorded in the range of total income according to an assumed distribution of salary income. That is, to take an example, there were so many people with a total income of £700 to £800. The average salary income in that group was known to be £576. The highest must be £800. So with an idea of what the spread should be and with the average in mind I spread those people from £350 to £800 in salary uniformly. I could have spread them in any other distribution I liked. I added up the results, got what I show here and it produced very nearly the

same answer. There were various other dodges I could have adopted, but I think I should have got very much the same distribution of salaries in the end.

To conclude what I am saying on this point, none of this would be necessary if the Inland Revenue data had been full and complete. I am only doing this to get at my yardstick which I have defined, but I have to adopt these devices to get it in view of the lack of information.

987. *Mr. Burman*: May I ask a question on the points Professor Allen raises at the beginning of his statement? One would have thought that, in industry and commerce but not perhaps the administrative class of the Civil Service, over the last twenty years there has been an increase in the managerial grades with relation to the total employed in industry, first because of technological developments and second because of the increased splitting up, development and specialisation of managerial skills, which has meant an increase in personnel carrying the sort of salaries that are under discussion at the moment.—I do not think it would very much. There are many factors that may upset the significance of my relation between ability and an income distribution within a group. It would be possible to imagine such a large technological change with salary earners much more numerous than they were (and doing quite different things) that introduced into their ranks would be all kinds of people doing different things before. In that case this method would break down because I could not assume that the abilities of these people were in any way correlated with incomes now as they were before. I can stand a 10 to 20 per cent. increase in numbers, and a good deal of shifting around between one industry and another, because ability does not change so much. The one thing that does change is the individual.

988. *Mrs. Wootton*: Could it not happen that the structure of the salariat might be changed, rather as Mr. Burman was describing, by a considerable increase in technical jobs or jobs requiring executive ability, so that you would get a great many more jobs of that kind before you came down perhaps to your first quarter? I understood you to say that you were not disturbed by that possibility?—I would be over 50 years but not over 10 years.

989. Because the nature of industry is such that the change is not as quick as that?—I do not think technological change is as fast as that, and to a certain extent you are using the same people in any case.

990. Is that necessarily true? Could it be possible that you had a good deal of ability much lower down on the scale which, for some reason or another, had

never made its mark and, as you get new openings and perhaps better training, you would increase your fund of ability?—

That tempts me to run another of my favourite horses—the first class and upper second. You have expressed the view, with which I agree, that there seem to be no more first classes and upper seconds, despite the large increase in university entrants, from which I deduce either that standards have fallen—and I do not believe they are falling—or that the universities have attracted in the past in their smaller entry practically all the first class people there were around. I do not see any other explanation. I think it is the second.

991. We are not necessarily talking of the high level ability represented by university first class, but of a change in the salariat which might occur at the level of second class or even third class.—Yes.

992. I gather from your answer that this sort of change would not disturb your yardstick in a period of 10 years, say, but it might need to be re-fashioned in a period of, say, 50 years.—Yes.

993. That is what I want to get, how frequently you would have to stop and start again.—It does not disturb me since I am reading down from the top. As you go further down to the clerical and wage earning level it gets a little more fuzzy. At the top you are talking about the kind of people who would get a first or an upper second or at least a lower second.

994. Or at any rate do well enough to get into the administrative class?—Not necessarily academically. All kinds of faculties are concerned.

995. *Chairman*: One major change you do mention is the entrance of women. That is really an argument in your favour?—Yes.

996. *Mr. Burman*: I wonder whether we are right in considering only first class or possibly second class at university level. Training schemes in industry have developed so tremendously during the last 15 to 20 years that a number of first class brains are coming straight from public schools and grammar schools and not going through the university. I doubt whether that would be significant in total numbers but it is rather interesting to take the number of men at the top in industry who have not even been to a university let alone got a first class honours degree.—I was using first and upper second to indicate one particular point. The lower seconds have increased, more are coming through university and there are presumably still more who could.

997. *Mr. Hall*: Would Professor Allen think that his short run changes might be more significant if there was something operating strongly to induce people to

change from unearned to earned income, having regard to the very large number of small firms in this country. Would it upset the top end?—You are thinking of people driven into the salariat by heavy taxation on their inherited income or on their previous method of earning income as an *entrepreneur*?

998. As a matter of policy you might find it more beneficial to give yourself a large income as a managing director and a smaller income by way of dividend?—Yes. Those changes do occur, but I still believe in the validity of my theory in a relatively short run. I will give you another example—the forcing of medical consultants into the salariat group out of the fee earning group by the introduction of the National Health Service. The numbers involved are so small that it does not really affect the structure of the salariat. The number of consultants in the country—of the order of 10,000, I suppose—does not affect a structure that goes down to 200,000 very quickly.

999. Compared with civil servants in the administrative class it is quite a large number as is the number of small businesses in this country?—Yes.

1000. *Mr. Cash*: There are also the people whose income depends upon land, who in the last 25 years have all, wherever possible, joined the salariat because of taxation. Is that not so?—Yes.

1001. That is quite a large number?—The salariat has grown not only in absolute numbers but relatively and I was trying to guess the figure. I do not think it has grown in such an unbalanced way as to throw out my assumption that the range of abilities is very different in the lower levels.

1002. *Chairman*: How far might the results of the Allen method be invalidated by other changes in the structure of salariat, age structure and so on?—*Mr. Vile*: I think you would want pretty substantial changes. Even so, as I said this morning, the esteem of other professions and jobs can vary greatly. But we see no reason why the esteem for our job should vary. The armed forces and scientists have increased greatly in public esteem over the last ten years or so if not longer, but that seems to be no reason why we should be depressed.

1003. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Are you depressed? In public esteem, I mean?—I think so.

1004. *Lady Albemarle*: Is it not difficult to measure people's ability without market-ability coming into it, because, although a man may be worth in a certain job so much, surely that same ability in a different job would not necessarily command the same amount? You have certain gifts and

there is no complete ability which can apply itself with equal success to a great variety of jobs.—*Professor Allen*: I would certainly say the highest ability, of course, is rare, but also it is not particularly specific. The very able man could become a permanent secretary, a physicist or a bishop if he started applying himself early enough to the appropriate training. One needs to distinguish between ability and the training you acquire. I would also say the kind of ability I have in mind is not really one of an entirely objective sense. It is the kind of ability that gets on in the present economic system of the world. That is a man who is able enough to spot the kind of line he is going to do best in is an able man, more able than a man academically equally clever.

1005. Is not training an element in assessing remuneration?—Yes, and in a sense I think you would have to discount from the salaries of those who have a long and expensive training the cost of that training. That is not only return on the ability but on the money that has been spent on the training. There are some occupations—perhaps medical consultants are the best example—where the training is about ten years in length and very expensive and the salary that results in the end is partly a return on the cost of training.

1006. But are we not mounting up more and more imponderables?—Yes, but I do not think you can avoid it.

1007. *Sir Alexander Gray*: On the question of ability, ability is there from the beginning, but you do not pay for it as such?—No. I was using the word ability in this sense. You are now paying, say, a principal £1,500 as compared with £1,000 before the war to get equally able men on that job. In the course of time you will have to pay them £2,000 instead of £1,000, or they will go elsewhere.

1008. *Lady Albemarle*: But how many other professions which would appeal to them does that ability command. How do you measure the degree of versatility?—That was the point of my marginal moves—clergyman to film star in twenty moves.

1009. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Professor Allen seems to be supporting the point I was making this morning very strongly. He is no believer in specialist ability. This seems to introduce the possibility that a good scientist can become a good administrator, as indeed many of them do. Therefore I find it difficult, as I mentioned this morning, to justify a distinction between this kind of a man and another who enters *ab initio* as an administrator. What seems to be quite clear is that the latter is never going to be a good scientist.—Speaking

entirely personally and not on behalf of the F.D.A. or any other group of civil servants, I regret very much the tendencies I see for those who take the administrative examinations to be arts graduates, and not scientists. Some of the best civil servants have been mathematicians. I should regret very much if the administrative classes failed to attract the same number of mathematicians and scientists as they have done in the past—that is a personal opinion, no more. When it comes to comparing a professional class where the scientist is acting as a scientist and when he is using his scientific training as a training for general administration, I begin to differ a little.

1010. *Mr. Burman*: Can I try and state another point as I see it and then ask you to comment on it? You take 1939 as a datum point at which presumably the administrative grades of the Civil Service were reasonably satisfied with their terms and conditions *vis-à-vis* the world outside. With that assumption Professor Allen now evaluates the differences and produces a new set of figures. That gives us, if we accept it, a new salary structure at this point in time. How do you propose that the position should be re-examined in the future? By a series of Chorley-type investigations or by a series of Allen-type investigations? And do we then take the new datum point or the old 1939 one?

—*Mr. Vile*: This, I think, turns on the availability of facts at any time. If the world were perfect and we could get a sufficiently wide sample of true salaries from which to draw unassailable conclusions, we might not need to use Professor Allen's general approach at all. As we see it, you can never get to that perfect position. All you can get is a range of specific evidence of some validity, but you can never be quite sure how much. If you are to test it, you can only test it against the kind of approach that Professor Allen has used. In other words, by itself it can lead in all sorts of different directions according to your prejudices, and we could not regard it in itself as a reliable guide. Taken with this more general approach we think you can then rest yourself on a fairly solid foundation. We have tried to show that what we have been able to discover about outside salaries within our limited resources is not inconsistent with what Professor Allen's method has shown. We would not put it any higher than that because the kind of sample we have produced does not really get you very far. We think in the future that much more must be done to get what we call specific evidence about salaries. We indeed think an obligation should be laid on the Treasury to do that. In that way we shall have throughout the years, using the two methods, about the best combination we can get to establish the adjustment

of salaries which is required at any time. As I said earlier, when it is a question of establishing the benchmark I think a very special effort has to be made in the realm of specific evidence. You have to go much further than you can every two or three years.

1011. *Chairman*: The last benchmark was really the recommendation of the Tomlin Commission and with that you sound fairly satisfied?—Yes, Sir, though not at the time.

1012. That really is your present version of the benchmark?—We see no reason to take any other.

1013. If you are to use this other method you will require more help from the Inland Revenue than you are getting at present, in that their statistics are not very well calculated for this particular use?—Not the way they put them.

1014. *Lady Albemarle*: Could I just ask whether you were not satisfied with the Chorley Committee?—Our difficulty about Chorley was that it sat, as it were, behind closed doors. The evidence it took on salaries was not communicated to us. We did not know in the first place what it acquired in the way of evidence. In the second place we had no knowledge of the working of their minds in judging the value of that evidence. Had we known we might have been perfectly satisfied.

1015. You might have been satisfied about the results rather than the method, but presumably Chorley was meant to be a benchmark?—One can only assume so. I just do not know.

1016. *Mr. Cash*: Would Professor Allen's method apply only to the administrative class?—As I understand it, it cannot be applied to the other general classes in the Service as a whole. As far as the professionals are concerned, again as I understand it, they do not need to have recourse to such a method. Their comparisons are much easier to establish with the outside world.

1017. *Chairman*: Would you say the method could be applied with equal validity to all other occupations which were within the same income brackets outside the Service? You would get an extreme rigidity of structure, would you not, if that were done?—*Professor Allen*: That is a point to which I have given a good deal of thought. A yardstick, say 100 per cent. for convenience, is not a thing you apply as a ready reckoner to convert everyone who got £1,000 before the war to £2,000 now. It is the average, but it does apply as an average over the whole range of salaried occupations from clergymen to film stars.

My point is that you have still got in applying this yardstick to make up your own mind what it is to which you are applying it, what kinds of jobs and what kind of people you are trying to relate to these jobs. Some of the jobs may have got more important—film stars, for example. Others may have become less important, say, masters in primary schools. In some cases it should be more than a 100 per cent. increase and in others less. But you cannot have some more without others being less, and some less without others being more. Let us assume you have three jobs in which £1,000 was paid before the war. One job has become more important. You pay more than £2,000 for this job, and less than £2,000 for the others. My method does not avoid your making up your mind about relative evaluation.

1018. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You have great difficulty in getting the information you want about outside comparisons but there are certain professions where in fact the salaries are known. Take, for instance the case of county court judges. How does all you say apply to these? Would you say that with county court judges, their £1,000 should turn into £2,000?—I would if you could assure me that the £1,000 he got before represented his true worth at that time, but I cannot do it without that. This is a limited yardstick but it has been applied with general practitioners in medicine, where Spens gave the pre-war position as being too low. He raised it and now there has been applied a yardstick to pre-war.

1019. *Chairman*: It has been suggested to me that the Civil Service is an ideal place for the technique of job evaluation. Does that strike terror to your heart?—*Mr. Vile*: I am not quite sure how it would be applied.

1020. It has been said that your jobs are very carefully described and there would be very good subjects for this technique which is being used in certain sectors of industry.

1021. *Mr. Cash*: May I just take up one minor point. You refer to the bulge at the point at which surtax becomes a liability, and you say that undoubtedly that is due to understatement of income near the surtax point. Could you tell us where you get the word "undoubtedly" from?—*Professor Allen*: A little presumptuous, I think. In my mind it is 'by far the most likely cause for divergence of one point.

1022. Would the Inland Revenue support you in that view?—I think they would.

1023. In my experience of the Inland Revenue when an individual is approaching the surtax point they take special care to see that he does not avoid his liability. I should have thought that would have had

the exactly opposite result.—A man earning a salary of £1,500 does his best to keep his other income below £500, more so than if he was earning £1,000. But here we are, of course, in the realm of conjecture.

1024. All I know is that the Inland Revenue always take special pains to see that it does not happen at that particular point.

1025. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: How far is Professor Allen's method based on average earnings?—In Appendix III the attempt is to base it upon the whole distribution of earnings from the top to the bottom, and only to the extent that the information is given in groups, like £1,500 to £2,000, do I have to use the average for that group. Appendix II is only on averages.

1026. Averages are a very unsafe guide?—Yes, that is why I try to avoid them. My yardstick, of course, is an average in itself!

1027. *Chairman*: Professor Allen, you use Blue Book figures for comparing 1949 salaries with 1953. Have you any views whether there has been a widening of differentials over this period? We have the impression that from about 1949 to 1953 the concertina effect has slackened off outside the Service, that there has been a tendency to reverse it.—I do have views upon that based upon what evidence I can get. My guess would be that around 1948 or 1949 the concertina was still being compressed. For example, in building workers they kept adding a penny to both skilled and unskilled rates. In the last year there has been a change. For example, engineers, shipbuilders, railwaymen have all got about 6 per cent. and not 9s. in the last year—that, I think, is very significant.

1028. Now we get on to the actual scales proposed. In paragraph 30 it is proposed that the salary scale for a principal should be £1,600 to £2,200. Can you quote any outside evidence to support a case for giving a graduate at age 30, after one automatic promotion, a rate of £1,600 running to £2,200?—*Mr. Vile*: One difficulty here is to fit the scale structure of the Civil Service into what we know of outside conditions. But I should say that the top of the scale is not open to criticism, and as you have got to have a scale it has got to meet all sort of different requirements. At least half the principals in post at the moment, if not slightly more, were not promoted from assistant principal but from other classes, well beyond the age of 30 in most cases.

1029. Would this not be taken care of by the rules about starting pay on promotion, providing for entry further up the scale?—That depends on the point in their

existing scale that they have got to. It would cover at the moment a C.E.O. who would go practically to the top of the principal scale, but it would not cover the H.E.O. We thought about this quite a lot. At one time we thought that it might be reasonable to take a rather lower starting point for the principal because of these people who are promoted at the age of 30. That, I think, has something to commend it; but the principal is an important post in the Service and a man who takes it at the age of 30 has to discharge some pretty heavy responsibilities, and on reflection we felt that to introduce age pay, even in this modified form was not fitting for this kind of responsibility. It should be the rate for the job and nothing else.

1030. *Mr. Lloyd Williams:* The H.E.O. maximum at the moment is £995, and if he is promoted to principal the jump would be to £1,600. It is an enormous jump?—Yes. Of course at the moment it is not as big as that.

1031. *Mr. Hall:* A substantial improvement?—Our view is that if a man is worthy of promotion to this grade then he is pretty good, and if he is pretty good he should get what the grade is worth.

1032. *Mrs. Wootton:* I am very puzzled by this. I understood Mr. Vile to say in reply to the question whether the starting rate was too high that it is difficult to fit these rates to what you know. I thought you had arrived at this rate via the Allen method, and the Allen method was a device for fitting your rates to what you know of the world. Is that not right?—Yes.

1033. I do not see why you need have any difficulty in defending your rate on the grounds of its being inappropriately high.—The question, as I understood it, was is it too high for a man who is only 30.

1034. *Chairman:* After one automatic promotion.—It is not automatic.

1035. *Mrs. Wootton:* I gathered from what we have been told that these rates were adjusted to the abilities of the persons occupying these posts, and that according to the Allen calculations—if I may so describe them—you have a way of relating changes in those jobs to changes outside, and that that is how you have got at your figure given in paragraph 30. Is that right?—Yes. As far as the age is concerned there has been a change in that in general terms before the war a man was 32, 33, 34, when now he can be 30 or 31.

1036. *Chairman:* The salaries proposed for the assistant secretary and higher grades in paragraphs 31/32 would alter the percentage differentials proposed by the Chorley Committee. Is there any particular

reason for this, or does it just happen as a result of the application of the Allen formula?—This is not, of course, the application of the Allen formula to the higher grades above assistant secretary, because the straight application of the Allen formula would give you lower figures than this.

1037. But there is an alteration of percentage differentials. That does not worry you at all?—There did not seem to be anything sacrosanct about the Chorley differential.

1038. *Sir George Mowbray:* In the same way as there did not seem to be about the Allen formula for this purpose?—What we felt here was that we had to provide a structure which really gives at the top of our class a salary which reflected the kind of responsibility which is carried there compared with the responsibilities carried all the way down.

1039. *Chairman:* That leads to my next question—about the difference in responsibility between principals and assistant secretaries. Is it here that the management element comes in?—Yes. One thing which did happen in the post-war period was that the responsibilities of assistant secretaries were increased, and they are now greater than they were before the war and recognised as such.

1040. *Lady Albemarle:* Do I understand that you think that the Allen method should be used to fix one point, so to speak, and, having fixed that point, you would then do what you think fit in relation to the rest of the class? The Allen method would show a tapering, but you then want to have a look at the internal relativities and degrees of responsibility within a class?—Let me put it this way. As far as the bulk of the class up to under secretary is concerned I think the method should be used together with as much specific evidence as you can get. When you get into the range of permanent and deputy secretaries other considerations do come into play. I do not think we would ever find any Government willing to consider those salaries in isolation, and I do not think we would ever wish to suggest that they should; and what really we are after here—it comes back very much to what the Treasury has already told you—what we are after is not frequent changes at that level but a salary structure which will enable us to respect our superiors.

1041. *Mr. Cash:* In Appendix I you refer to a concern which has an age scale, beginning at £500 at age 23 and rising by £50 for each year over that age to say £850 at age 30, and another which pays first class honours graduates £600 at 24 and after age 26 places them at £750 to £800. That evidence you disregard in the

structure you are now proposing?—If the principal always became a principal at the age of 30, then I think your question would be a fair one.

1042. There is a good deal of difference between £850 and £1,200?—But, of course, it is the responsibility that the man has to carry when he is a principal.

1043. But, as I understand it, the whole of your evidence is directed to finding a basis upon which the administrative class can be compared with outside employment. You begin by saying the work is not comparable; you continue by saying that job evaluation does not appeal to you. You bring in Professor Allen to give us figures of one kind; in Appendix I you give us evidence of another kind. Then you finally produce a structure which does not, to my muddled head, relate to any of those figures at all. In Appendix I you go on to say this:—

“We understand, however. . . .”

You have obviously made some enquiries on your own part apart from Professor Allen—

“ . . . even in comparatively small firms, it is usual to pay senior management officials salaries in the range of £5,000 to £15,000. These salaries may well be compared with the Post Office, whose turnover is over £250,000,000 and whose staff is over 330,000, and whose director general is paid £4,500 a year. . . .”

Could you tell us where you get that information about comparatively small firms paying salaries of £5,000 to £15,000 a year?—I am in a difficulty there in that we were told at the beginning of last week that we could not use before you the evidence that we had about that.

1044. *Mr. Hall*: Do you mean by “small” about 10,000 employees?—Smaller than that in terms of staff earning over about £400 a year.

1045. You would not mean small in the Ministry of Labour terms?—*Mr. Stafford*: Not small in the sense of employing less than 10 people, but small in the sense of employing less than 500 people.

1046. *Sir George Mowbray*: Could you simplify your paragraph 38, which I confess I found somewhat difficult to follow? You start off, as I understand it, by indicating that there are difficulties but not impossibilities in discovering comparisons. Towards the end you state that there is in effect no comparable work at all, which appears to indicate that you feel it is impossible. You then say at the very end that you justify your method as a kind of broad comparison.—*Mr. Vile*: In many ways I sympathise with you very much about this paragraph. What we think is

important is to have a comparison which can be made without undue difficulty from time to time and which is significant. Now if you take the comparison at the point of recruitment, it gives you a small range of comparison in which you can draw a significant conclusion. You can say that graduates get, say, £600 to £900 in the first three years outside and that is significant. It is immediately significant in considering what an assistant principal should get in the first few years of his career. Beyond that the significance diminishes rapidly. If you take similar levels of responsibility you find that the arguments go both ways in comparison with any specific outside job. You can argue either that the outside job is more responsible or it is less responsible. So that there is no work which you can take as your criterion of comparison because it is always possible to argue that each individual job in itself is not strictly comparable. Comparison on recruitment only takes you a very short way and you are driven back, as we saw it, to the comparison of attainments, abilities or, in a very broad sense, responsibilities, on the assumption that the responsibility follows the ability.

1047. Having regard to the difficulty, though the possibility, of making those comparisons, would you say that at the present moment the administrative class is underpaid by comparison with current rates of remuneration in the fields which you are quoting?—As far as we can discover, yes.

1048. But with no very sure basis?—Yes, the amount of specific evidence we have is limited, and if you rely entirely on specific evidence that is all we can say. People just will not tell us things.

1049. *Mrs. Wootton*: You propose that the Treasury should collect information about salary movements outside. Do you envisage its being made available by them to staff associations like your own?—Yes.

1050. *Mr. Cash*: At the present moment the staff associations cannot get this information because of the feeling of secrecy which surrounds it. But if it is merely going to pass through the Treasury the same difficulty may arise, may it not?—We were not thinking of the Treasury merely as a post office, but that they could acquire the information with the names of the firms attached to it and could then take the names off. They might go further and treat the information either statistically or in some other way which we knew about and had agreed in principle, so that when we got the information it did not identify the sources from which it came.

1051. *Mrs. Wootton*: Supposing this information is freely obtainable and the Allen formula is used as you wish—who

do you envisage taking the initiative? At present it is with you?—At present it is with us. There have been times when we could have wished for the Treasury to take the initiative in the past, and if this were a more perfect world I should like to see that done a little more frequently in the future.

1052. Would you like it even in this world as it is? Is that what you want for the future?—I cannot see it happening.

1053. *Mr. Burman*: Is it a satisfactory method, (Mr. Vile)? It must be most embarrassing and invidious for a permanent secretary to advise the Government on the one hand that trade is bad and to keep wages and salary costs down, and at the same time advise that he and all his colleagues are grossly underpaid. It seems an irreconcilable position even in view of the undoubted ability of the administrative class to put forward advice on these matters. Should there not be some outside body?—We have got very accustomed to doing this.

1054. Are you really taking it like that? Supposing you considered it *ab initio*, would you really want the same method? I am not trying to put words in your mouth.—This is a question which has exercised us for a long time as an association trying to look after our own members' interests who have to do this job. It is also a question on which all roads lead to Rome in the end, because the Government in the last resort have to decide what it will do about pay, which means that a Minister has to decide something, which means he has been advised on its implications, which means we have to be there to advise him. You can devise all kinds of negotiations for getting a recommendation to a Minister, but you cannot, no matter what you do—unless you give somebody the power of binding the Government—you cannot get away from our having to advise the responsible Minister on what he should do. That being so we do not see any great virtue in trying to interpose an outside body; because in the end the same sort of questions will be put by the Chancellor to this permanent secretary. We cannot help it.

1055. The whole tenor of our discussions has been to the effect that the administrative class has suffered relatively to the other classes over the years, so it does not look as though the present method has been awfully satisfactory. I am rather pressing this because to an outsider it seems so extraordinary that you have no concrete proposals for amelioration.—We cannot get away from ourselves. There have to be administrative people in the Treasury to advise the Chancellor, and their advice is bound to carry the usual weight with the Chancellor.

1056. *Mr. Hall*: I have been very interested in Mr. Vile's reply. I quite agree with a great deal he says. There is one possible variant. Supposing the Crown charged a High Court Judge with the responsibility from time to time of calling the attention of the Minister to the situation existing. Would that not somewhat modify this embarrassing position of the permanent secretary of the Treasury advising his Chancellor in this matter?—Yes. But there would still be all the ordinary work which would have to be done in the ordinary way.

1057. It is of great importance that the climate in which the negotiations are carried out should be propitious. My concern, and I think Mr. Burman's too, is with the atmosphere in which it is done.

1058. *Chairman*: In paragraph 33 you seem to be saying that the Civil Service should attract into the assistant principal grade more than their fair share of the best people from universities. Is that a fair statement, and do you think it is right that you should get more than your fair share? The First Commissioner when he came before us was careful to say he was endeavouring not to get for the Civil Service more than its fair share. You would not agree to that?—I am sorry, Sir, do we say we want more than our fair share?

1059. You say "We need to attract into the Civil Service a good proportion of the best people from universities."—There is no judge sitting parcelling out this supply of ability. What we feel, I think, is that the situation we are now in is not getting enough of those people into the Service.

1060. Have you any actual proposal to make on the assistant principal scale?—No, we have not.

1061. Are your scales related to pre-war conditioned hours and if so would they need adjustment to take account of any lengthening in these hours?—We do not clock in and clock out. If Parliament chooses to sit all night, and our Minister has to be there, then we are there.

1062. So you are not really concerned with pre-war conditioned hours?—It does not really make much difference. What we have to do we do, and it does not matter how long it takes.

1063. What are your views, as an Association, about a salaries index, supposing one were to come into existence?—The only one I have heard of is the one the Ministry of Labour have in mind; but whilst no doubt it would be valuable, I do not think it would cover the whole field we want covered.

1064. It would be another supplementary method?—I am not sure how it would

fit in. They have not got very far with it at the moment.

1065. I do not know whether you would care to go through the list of salaries in Appendix I and suggest what would be the civil service counterpart of the posts quoted? Do you feel capable of doing that? Do they fit with your scales?—No, Sir, they do not. I regard your invitation rather as “Will you put your head into the lion’s mouth?” I think from our experience we would say a permanent secretary exercises greater responsibility than the chairman of a nationalised industry, and that the chairman in fact is probably on a par with the No. 2 in a Department, and in looking at the chairman’s salary and allowances, if you then make allowance for the fact that he is not permanent and pensionable it would seem to us roughly to fit in with what we recommend at the top level; but I do not think you can work it out in that way.

1066. What about manufacturing firms?—On these firms generally our members who provided the information gave us some idea of their contacts with the firm and how business was normally done. And their view was, for example on No. 5, that the senior managing director would normally deal with an under secretary when he was in regular contact with a Department,

although he might, if he thought it important enough, deal with an assistant secretary for some months. It is very flexible, [his relationship].

1067. I think there is not very much in this question of correspondence between an assistant secretary, for instance, or an under secretary and somebody else.—That is all we can do. The people who have given us this information say they cannot hope to equate what they do in the Service with what these people do in their business. When we circularised our members we said “If you can, will you answer this question: what would you have to pay a man from one of the outside organisations with whom you deal in order to employ him as an assistant secretary or under secretary?” and we did not find any of our members who were willing to answer that question.

1068. *Mrs. Wootton*: In view of what you have said, I take it you do not really want us to make any use of the figures in Appendix I?—We do not think they are very much use by themselves. Appendix I as once written before we were told that we could not use certain evidence was a very much better document.

Chairman: It remains for me to say thank you very much for your patience. And, Professor Allen, we are particularly grateful to you for coming along as a volunteer and helping us.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Tuesday, 25th May, 1954, at 11.30 a.m.)



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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

8

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

EIGHTH DAY

Tuesday, 25th May, 1954,

Society of Civil Servants
Witnesses



LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1954

THREE SHILLINGS NET

List of Witnesses

MR. E. C. REDHEAD, J.P.,
General Secretary, Society of Civil Servants

MR. E. C. SYMS,
Chairman, Society of Civil Servants

MR. J. L. WILLIAMS,
Deputy General Secretary, Society of Civil Servants

MR. C. T. H. PLANT,
Deputy Secretary, Inland Revenue Staff Federation

MR. G. G. PALMER,
*General Secretary, Association of Officers
of the Ministry of Labour*

MR. E. M. THOMAS,
*General Secretary, Ministry of Labour
Staff Association*
on behalf of the Society of Civil Servants

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

EIGHTH DAY

Tuesday, 25th May, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE
MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.
MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.
MR. N. F. HALL

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.
SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.*
MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT
MRS. BARBARA WOOTTON

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

* SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY was in attendance during the morning session only.

Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Society of Civil Servants (Executive, Directing and Analogous Grades)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Society of Civil Servants is a national organisation of approximately 38,500 members representing all grades of the general executive class described in Chapter 16 of the Treasury's Introductory Factual Memorandum, and, outside the Inland Revenue Department and the Ministry of Labour and National Service, a number of departmental executive and analogous grades whose functions, pay and general conditions of service are similar or related to those of the general executive class.

2. Associated with the Society in this statement are the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, the Association of Officers of the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Labour Staff Association representing the following departmental executive grades whose conditions are similarly based upon those of the general executive class:

INLAND REVENUE STAFF FEDERATION

Tax officers (higher grade) } Chief Inspector of Taxes Branch.
Inspectors of taxes }

Analogous grades in Accountant and Comptroller General's Branch (Collection Service) and Valuation Branch (i.e. collectors of taxes and staff in the Chief Valuer's Department).

ASSOCIATION OF OFFICERS OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR

Ministry of Labour grades 2, 3 and 4 and cadets;
Grade 5 jointly with Ministry of Labour Staff Association.

MINISTRY OF LABOUR STAFF ASSOCIATION

Grade 5 jointly with Association of Officers of the Ministry of Labour.

3. This statement is confined to consideration of matters within (a) of the Commission's terms of reference in respect of the general executive class and its related departmental analogues.

4. The Society and the other organisations named in paragraph 2 above are all members of the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council for the Civil Service and will therefore be parties to the evidence submitted to that body on other matters of wider and more general character which come within the Commission's terms of reference.

II. HISTORY OF THE EXECUTIVE CLASS

5. The general executive class, broadly as now constructed, came into being in 1920 as the result of the recommendations of the Reorganisation Committee of the National Whitley Council. Based upon the accumulated experience of all the various enquiries into the Civil Service from 1853 onwards, and being the work of those who on both Official and Staff Sides were intimately acquainted in practice with the work of a wide range of Departments, the Committee's appraisal of the needs of the Service and the proper classification of its functions rested upon sound and knowledgeable foundations. Moreover, the Committee's basic conceptions, adopted in practice, have stood the test of time and enabled the Service to take the strain, not only of the second world war but of the immense growth of responsibilities in the field of social, economic and financial legislation, and to discharge its duty to the public efficiently.

6. It is important, therefore, that the Reorganisation Committee's conception of the function of the executive class in relation to the structure as a whole should be fully appreciated. The following is the relevant extract from paragraphs 16-17 of the Committee's Report:

"16. The administrative and clerical work of the Civil Service may be said, broadly, to fall into two main categories. In one category may be placed all such work as either is of a simple mechanical kind or consists in the application of well-defined regulations, decisions and practice to particular

cases; in the other category, the work which is concerned with the formation of policy, with the revision of existing practice or current regulations and decisions and with the organisation and direction of the business of Government.

"17. For work so different in kind it is clearly necessary to secure more than one type of agent. Qualifications adapted to the performance of the simplest kind of work would be unequal to the discharge of the highest kind of work; and it would be impossible to justify the employment on simple mechanical duties of persons capable of performing the highest duties. After the most careful consideration, we have agreed that, in order properly to provide for the work falling within these two main categories, it will be necessary to employ not less than four different classes, viz:—

- (A) A writing Assistant Class for simple mechanical work.
 - (B) A Clerical Class for the better sort of work included in the first main category defined above.
 - (C) An Executive Class;
 - (D) An Administrative Class
- } for the work included in the second main category defined above."

It will be observed that the main line of division is here drawn between the routine and clerical work on the one hand and executive and administrative work on the other that the executive class function is directly linked and associated with that of the administrative class. Thus, as indicated in paragraph 268 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum, in practice there is not only a close inter-relation between executive and administrative classes but, in some instances, it is difficult to distinguish between one and the other.

7. As originally conceived the executive class consisted of the executive officer, higher executive officer and senior executive officer grades and above these a small number of superior executive posts on higher salaries which, although then lacking a common nomenclature, eventually emerged as the present general class grades of chief executive officer, senior chief executive officer and principal executive officer.

8. Although originally a relatively small class, consisting approximately of about 3,000 officers, by the vast extension of the field of Government business the executive class has become numerically much larger and its scope and character have been very considerably widened. Marked impetus was given to this expansion by the war of 1939-45. In 1947, by an agreement of the National Whitley Council (Treasury Circular 5/47), the importance and proven value of the class was mutually recognised and provision was expressly made for a further extension to "all branches where there is work to be done within the Reorganisation Committee's definition of executive work". The main features in this agreement are set out in paragraph 275 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum. It will be seen that the effect was not to change the functional character of the executive class but on the one hand to rationalise the position of the hitherto "so-called super-clerical structure", by merging it with the parallel executive structure, and on the other hand to identify the executive class even more closely with the administrative class by providing for the regrading of certain administrative posts as senior executive officer or chief executive officer.

9. Thus the grades of the general executive class, or their departmental equivalents, are now to be found in every major Government Department performing duties of tremendous range, complexity and importance. The nature of these functions and duties, together with reference to illustrative examples, is explained in succeeding paragraphs.

III. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

10. The Report of the National Whitley Council Reorganisation Committee, 1920, described the executive class as follows:—

"To this class we would assign the higher work of the supply and accounting departments, and of other executive or specialised branches of the Civil Service. This work covers a wide field, and requires in different degrees the qualities of judgment, initiative and resource. In the junior ranks it comprises the

critical examination of particular cases of lesser importance not clearly within the scope of approved regulations or general decision, initial investigations into matters of higher importance, and the immediate direction of small blocks of business. In its upper ranges it is concerned with matters of internal organisation and control, with the settlement of broad questions arising out of business in hand or on contemplation, and with the responsible conduct of important operations."

11. The growth of the Civil Service and the creation of new Departments with large local office organisations has greatly widened the scope of the duties performed by the executive class. These are summed up in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum as "the day-to-day conduct of Government business within the framework of established policy". Thus the organisation and direction of much of the work of Government Departments and the maintenance of a high level of managerial efficiency rests upon the executive grades. This function has acquired special significance with the development of the welfare state, and the creation and retention of public goodwill is a new and important responsibility. For the average citizen, the Civil Service means those officers whom he or she meets in the administration of the social services, where claims are made and benefits provided in great variety. The executive class is now playing a vital role in social administration in addition to its key position in public administration. In several Departments the executive class is closely involved with the industrial and economic life of the country.

12. Its task, however, is not confined to carrying out existing policy. Members of the class submit proposals for changes in regulations and legislation in the light of experience, and in administrative divisions assist administrative staff in the formation of future policy. It is stated in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum that "it is not always possible to draw a clear-cut distinction between policy work and executive work". In a number of Departments there is interchangeability at principal (administrative) and chief/senior executive officer level. This is a practice which in the view of the Society should be extended to all areas of the Service where the work is of a mixed character, and which should be accompanied by greater opportunities of advancement from the executive class to the administrative class. This difficulty of distinguishing between policy work and executive work (which is not generally attempted in outside industry) is reflected by the close relationship between the scales of pay of the senior grades of the executive class and corresponding grades in the administrative class. It is the view of the Society that this relationship should be maintained and that salary movements at this level of the Service should keep in step as well as reflect trends in competing occupations outside the Service.

13. The present range of work is so wide that only a broad description is possible. A description of the work of the class is contained in the pamphlet "Posts in the Civil Service for University Graduates" published by the Civil Service Commission (pages 27-32) and in the "Choice of Careers" booklet No. 32 (H.M. Stationery Office). The structure of the class and the duties of the grades are summarised in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum (paragraph 268). A description of some of the principle categories of the work of the executive class is given in the following section. A number of specimen duties are contained in Appendix A.

14. These brief summaries can only give a glimpse of the wide range of Government business conducted by the executive class. Its value to the State lies in its versatility which has enabled the class to assume new and exacting responsibilities and in discharging them to win public confidence. These responsibilities include many highly specialised duties which require intensive training and study to reach the high professional standard expected of the expert.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES OF WORK OF THE EXECUTIVE CLASS

Supervision and management

15. The executive class is engaged in supervision and management at all levels in the Government Service. In almost all major Departments, the direction of large blocks of business is carried out by the higher grades of the executive class. In a number of Departments the entire management may be entrusted to the executive class, including Departments up to the size of H.M. Stationery Office with a staff of 5,000 and the Savings Department of the Post Office with a staff of 13,000 which are administered and managed entirely by executive grades. In certain very big Departments the part played by the executive class in management may be adjudged by comparing the small number of administrative class staff with the total staff of the Department. In Departments such as Inland Revenue and the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, for example, a small cadre of administrative class staff handles the policy questions arising, leaving the direction of very large blocks of departmental business entirely to the higher ranks of the executive class and its departmental counterparts.

16. Turning to the middle grades of the executive class, special mention is made of the management of local offices in view of their important role in the post-war development of the social and industrial services. The manager of a local office in the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, the National Assistance Board or the Ministry of Labour and National Service is normally a senior executive officer or higher executive officer (or departmental equivalent) according to the size of the staff and the degree of responsibility involved. The manager is responsible for fulfilling the functions of his Department in the area assigned to him and gives decisions on all matters within the legislation and regulations governing the work of his office. He is also responsible for the supervision of the staff of his office including the annual appraisal of staff for promotion purposes. In the Ministry of Supply and the Service Departments, the managerial responsibility may cover large numbers of industrial staff. A senior executive officer in an Admiralty dockyard, for example, may be responsible for the management of a thousand or more industrial staff engaged on supplying essential services to the Royal Navy.

17. The supervision of clerical work is carried out by the basic grade of executive officer and the number of supervisory executive posts of this nature has greatly increased as a result of the transfer of higher clerical officer duties to executive officers. Executive officers may also supervise large numbers of machine operators or minor grade staff employed on repetitive routine work. The management of the smaller local offices also devolves on executive officers.

18. In regional offices and at headquarters the executive class is employed on a wide range of establishments work, involving the administration of a vast code of directions to Departments on staff conditions of service. Establishment work now includes specialised functions of management upon which the executive class is being employed to an increasing extent, and of which only a brief description is possible.

19. Questions of staff numbers, grading and organisation structure have traditionally been handled by the administrative class. The executive class is now taking part in this work at senior executive officer and chief executive officer level and, in some small Departments, the work is solely in the hands of the executive class. Preparatory work leading up to decisions on these questions is in almost all Departments undertaken by higher executive officers and executive officers. Since the last war, increasing reliance has been placed on staff inspection surveys and organisation and methods enquiries as aids to efficient management and this work is undertaken by senior executive officers and higher executive officers. The same period has seen the development of staff training and staff welfare arrangements and both these activities are assigned mainly to the executive class. Finally, recognition of the importance of general office efficiency has led to the appointment in most Departments of "controllers of office services" responsible for the control and co-ordination of all the general office services, i.e. registry services, typing service, messenger service

and communications generally, the provision of accommodation and equipment, etc. The grading of controllers of office services varies from senior chief executive officer to higher executive officer according to the size of the Department. In a large Department, the controller's staff may number upwards of a thousand.

Administrative work

20. Members of the executive class assist the administrative class in the formulation of policy. In administrative divisions the preparation of briefs and draft memoranda for consideration and decision at a higher level is undertaken by executive grades. The presentation of factual surveys is based upon the day-to-day experience of the executive class in carrying out existing policy and is supplemented by proposals for changes in legislation and regulations. The servicing of inter-departmental committees and conferences involves the preparation of briefs for senior officials, the minuting of proceedings, and the subsequent follow-up action to ensure that decisions are carried out. The development of new functions affecting industry and the public has greatly increased the value of first-hand experience in the formation of policy. The application of existing policy fosters within the executive class qualities of judgment which enable the grades concerned to advise upon and influence policy decisions. In this area of the Service, executive and administrative functions are mingled and clear-cut distinctions between policy work and executive work cannot be made.

21. Chief executive officer posts are equivalent to those occupied by principals and in certain Departments the two grades are freely interchangeable, both reporting to assistant secretaries. In administrative divisions senior executive officers work direct to assistant secretaries on "near principal" work which is comparable to that of a principal but not quite as complex or carrying the full responsibility of the "normal" principal post; in practice, however, it is far from easy to draw a firm dividing line.

22. Higher executive officers assist the principal in charge of a branch or section of a division. The higher executive officer prepares draft replies to Parliamentary Questions and Ministers' correspondence, draft briefs for inter-departmental discussions and meetings with outside bodies. He obtains the views of other branches of the Department on matters under consideration and must be thoroughly acquainted with policy decisions taken at a higher level. He may serve as secretary to departmental committees and supervises the work of subordinate executive and clerical staff. The higher executive officer may frequently deputise for his principal at committee meetings, interviews with trade associations, etc., may deal on his own initiative with complicated matters, and, although his is not the final responsibility, plays an active part in the formation of policy.

23. The basic grade executive officer may "devil" direct for a principal, or more frequently, will act as an assistant to a higher executive officer. He will assist in the preparation of material for committees and briefs for senior officials, undertaking necessary research. Although his is a lesser responsibility his work demands a full understanding of the relevant departmental policies and the reasons which lie behind them.

24. Members of the administrative class are not usually employed outside headquarters offices, and in regional organisations the responsibility for administrative control of the local office organisation and specialist functions is generally in the hands of the executive class. Regional controller and deputy controller posts are normally filled by members of the executive class (principal executive officer and senior chief executive officer grades respectively). These posts combine administrative and executive functions and are an example of top management posts of the highest responsibility.

25. In addition to executive staff who assist administrative staff in the formulation of policy or who are engaged in administrative duties, members of the class generally are required to submit proposals for changes in regulations and legislations in the light of experience. The senior grades in particular are thus engaged in the shaping of future policy under the control of the administrative class.

Contract and supply

26. The executive class is responsible for the purchase and supply of a vast range of stores and for the placing of contracts for building and civil engineering works. Agreements covering a wide range of services are also arranged.

27. The preparation of contracts requires knowledge of contract law and practice and may involve consultation with the Treasury Solicitor. Tenders must satisfy technical requirements, and must be examined to ensure that the needs of the public service are met at a reasonable cost having regard to such factors as time required for performance of contract, extent of competition, tenderer's reservations, etc. The modification of contracts on account of technical developments or other changes during the course of their execution must be negotiated and settlements reached where the Department becomes legally liable for extra payment. The inspection of work and goods supplied under contract to ensure conformity with requirements is arranged.

28. The executive class is responsible for the receipt, custody, maintenance, issue, transport and store accounting of all types of stores required by the Service Departments, Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Works, Post Office and other Departments. The Departments concerned maintain and administer storage depots and transport fleets. They provide for the collection, delivery, examination and receipt of supplies from contractors; custody, preservation and regular turnover of stocks; issue, packing and despatch; disposal of scrap material; accounting, estimating statistical work and stocktaking, etc. The organisation of labour such as storehousemen, stevedores, packers, drivers and the engagement of casual labour may also be involved.

Accounting and auditing

29. The executive class in accounts branches supervises and is responsible for the efficiency of a clerical staff which writes payable orders, invoices and receipts, posts daybooks, makes arithmetic checks and produces totals and analyses. The executive staff devise and operate the whole accounting procedure to meet the administrative and technical needs of each Department. Accounts produced may be cash accounts, or cost, manufacturing, store, trading profit and loss accounts and balance sheets as appropriate. Additionally, figures for framing Estimates are prepared. Executive staff themselves attend to the higher duties, finalising accounts, examining the more difficult bills, etc., to ensure their compliance with all the terms of relevant financial arrangements whether commercial or statutory, handling cash where values are large, bills of exchange, foreign currencies and major banking transactions. On the finance side, executive staff negotiate and settle actual terms of financial undertakings, and prepare estimates and explanations. On the audit side, executive staff supervise arithmetic checking by clerical staff, and themselves examine the propriety and appropriateness of transactions, ensuring that accounts have been compiled in accordance with recognised departmental policy and practice and the requirements of Parliament.

Interpretation and application of law and regulation

30. The Departments and branches in which this category of executive work is performed are so numerous and their activities so diverse, that a general description is not possible. The definition is applicable to the administration of tax law in the Inland Revenue, to the application of the terms of Orders and Royal Warrants and to the carrying into effect of laws and orders with regard to widows', orphans' and old age pensions, and other forms of social insurance in the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance and the Assistance Board. The Customs and Excise Department, the Registry of Friendly Societies, the Principal Probate Registry and many other Departments provide the executive class with specialised work of this interpretative character. The exercise of controls and the issue of licences in Departments such as the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government involve the execution of policy and the detailed application of powers conferred upon the Minister, as do rationing and price control by the Ministry of Food, and the control, determination and payment of grants and subsidies by the Ministry of Agriculture. Not only has this type of work to be

done on the spot in local and regional offices to which the public turn for advice and assistance, but it figures largely in the headquarters offices to which are thrown up questions of particular difficulty necessitating reference to precedent or which may affect cases elsewhere. Members of the executive class submit suggestions for new and revised regulations and the simplification of machinery in the light of experience. These duties involve considerable correspondence and interviews with the public, accountants, the legal profession, other Departments and the Treasury, including the preparation of cases for legal proceedings and appearance in court on behalf of the Department.

Statistical work

31. Compared with pre-war the volume and range of statistics compiled by Government Departments and the extent to which such Departments and non-Government users depend upon this statistical data has increased very considerably. The executive class of the Civil Service is one of the most important users of these statistics and, at the same time, carries the main responsibility for compiling them. Members of the executive class employed on this work select, assemble and indicate the significance of statistical data as a basis for policy decisions. This calls for a detailed knowledge of sources and the ability to interpret and assess the limitations of the statistics. In a number of Departments the statistical work is largely concentrated in special divisions or sections (although the main users of statistics are outside such sections).

32. There are two closely related aspects of statistical work. On the one hand there is the machinery for collecting and compiling statistics, and, on the other, the "policy" aspect of deciding what statistics should be compiled and how they should be used and interpreted.

33. The collection and compilation of statistics is an executive/clerical function and a typical section is headed by a chief executive officer with senior executive officers, higher executive officers and executive officers in support. The chief executive officer fulfils the role of office manager in the widest sense, including the general organisation and planning of the work. The supporting executive staff is responsible for arranging smaller blocks of work and for interpreting, in individual cases of varying complexity, the general instructions governing the work.

34. In the second aspect of statistical work executive grades act as supporting staff to chief statisticians or assistant secretaries and to statisticians or principals, and the executive work in this case is more akin to administrative-executive work. Some of the work is technical and requires a good knowledge of statistical methods, but much of it deals with the statistical aspect of policy questions being considered in the administrative branches of the particular Department. The relationship between the executive and the statistician grades is similar to that existing in administrative-executive sections, between executive and administrative grades.

Specialised duties

35. The pamphlet "Posts in the Civil Service for University Graduates" quotes the following examples of the more specialised duties in the general executive class:—

"Executive Officers may be secretaries to the Regional Boards for Industry; Assistants to Psychologists; Recorders of purchase tax; Keepers of Food statistics; hotel managers in the Carlisle State Management District; Hospital secretaries under the Ministry of Pensions; in the printing or duplicating or binding services in the Stationery office; experts on foreign exchange rates; the equivalent of solicitors' managing clerks. They may investigate claims and authorise awards for National Assistance; they may specialise in the Films work of the Central Office of Information; they may help to assemble land use surveys or population surveys for the Ministry of Local Government and Planning."

36. In a number of Departments, especially the Defence Ministries, members of the executive class are required to serve overseas and are subject to frequent transfer involving disturbance of family life.

The Departmental executive classes

37. Members of the various Departmental executive classes are recruited through the same competitions as entrants to the general executive class but do not normally move outside that class or that Department. The following brief outline of the work of the Departmental executive classes is contained in the pamphlet "Posts in the Civil Service for University Graduates". The references are in general to the basic recruitment grade and do not cover the full range of work of the classes concerned.

"The Admiralty Supply Departments are responsible for provisioning ships, bases, and shore establishments with fuel, engineering stores, aircraft spares, weapons, explosives, food, clothing; there is thus close contact with the Royal Navy and its officers and occasional service at naval bases overseas. *Assistant Auditors in the Exchequer and Audit Department* (under the Comptroller and Auditor-General) examine public accounts and report on the way in which Government Departments spend their money; a training course in accountancy is given. *Actuarial Assistants in the Government Actuary's Department* work out National Insurance schemes, pension schemes, population statistics, life assurance calculations, etc., for Government Departments, and for Commonwealth and Colonial Governments; they must become Fellows of the Institute of Actuaries. *Audit Examiners in the Ministry of Local Government and Planning* are trained to become District Auditors, who audit the accounts of Local Authorities in order to satisfy the Minister (and the public) that these accounts conform with Parliament's instructions and reveal the authorities' correct financial position; they charge any unauthorised spending or loss caused by negligence or misconduct to the elected member or official concerned, and the only appeal is to the Minister or the King's Bench. *Immigration Officers* under the Home Office are posted at ports and airports to control the movements of aliens entering or leaving this country, and may refuse to allow an alien to land; they need a knowledge of languages. *Assistant Examiners in the Estate Duty Office, Inland Revenue* assess and collect death duties; the work involves a good deal of contact with the legal profession, and, as the staff need a thorough knowledge of general law they have to obtain after entry a University degree in Law or be called to the Bar. *Assistant Examiners in the Bankruptcy and Companies (Official Receivers) Service of the Board of Trade* investigate the affairs of private companies in compulsory liquidation and of bankrupts; they are trained in bookkeeping and accounts, need to know some commercial law, and may have to appear in Court."

There are also a large number of analogous grades represented by the Society to which there is not open competition recruitment, but whose pay is closely related to that of the general class.

38. There are in addition substantial numbers of departmental executive staff in the Inland Revenue and Ministry of Labour and National Service whose pay is very closely related to that of the general class. These grades are represented by the Inland Revenue Staff Federation and the Federation of Ministry of Labour Staff, who are associated with and support the evidence given by the Society. A brief description of the executive work in these two Departments is given in the following paragraphs.

INLAND REVENUE (CHIEF INSPECTOR OF TAXES BRANCH)

Executive class work

39. At 1st January, 1954, there were 782 higher executive and 5,102 executive officers serving in the Chief Inspector's Branch, distributed amongst 658 income tax district offices throughout Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The organisation of the branch provides for the attachment to each district office of normally one higher executive officer (H.M. inspector of taxes) and a varying number of executive officers (tax officers higher grade) according to the size of the district. In addition to the higher executive officer, there is at least one other H.M. inspector of taxes, fully trained on accounts work, and often more than one, again according to the size of the district.

40. It must be stressed that generally at both levels of the executive class in the branch, the work is of a complex technical nature, involving a comprehensive knowledge of the provisions of the Income Tax and Finance Acts. The internal departmental instructions on these extend into several large volumes, which the executive and higher executive officer is required to know.

41. The everchanging legislation on income tax involves consequential amendments of departmental instructions to put it into practice. In addition a mass of case law has now been accumulated on interpretation of income tax law with which the executive and higher executive officer needs to familiarise himself to the extent that this abuts on to the range of work he covers. It can be said that when policy has been decided by the administrators or by legislation, the executive classes are the eyes and ears of the administrative class. They draw attention to significant developments or aspects of administration and are responsible for the working of particular rules and regulations.

42. In view of the involved nature of the work in the taxes branch, the Board of Inland Revenue instituted a few years ago a 2-year training scheme for executive officers. Higher executive officers, on promotion, are subjected to a training course of approximately 15 months duration.

43. Wide discretionary powers rest in the hands of executive officers and higher executive officers in the branch. They determine the statutory and non-statutory reliefs etc. to which, under the Acts, a taxpayer is entitled. They also decide, subject to the right of appeal, for or against a taxpayer's claim for relief on the facts he produces, including for example, claims for expenses allowances, often of large amounts involving considerable figures of tax, and for personal reliefs of a delicate and confidential type. Personal contact with the public in such claims is very frequent. The executive officer and higher executive officer must be capable of arguing his case clearly and concisely, and in a manner which will result in the taxpayer's acceptance of his liability to tax. Tact and explicitness are necessary in the job of securing the taxpayer's goodwill towards probably the most unwelcome of the Government's imposts.

44. At higher executive officer level it can be said briefly that the duties combine the organisation and management of a large group of executive and junior officers, coupled with the performance of case work of the most contentious types. These include liabilities to tax of an intrinsically difficult nature to compute; the more difficult type of taxpayer who displays antagonism in the settling of his liability; the settlement of certain classes of back duty cases, including those involving penalties; exemptions of directors etc. expenses under Chapter 2 of Part VI (Income Tax Act, 1952). Other higher executive officer duties are the signing of repayment orders to the public, and the signing of and final responsibility for assessments under Schedule A and Schedule E. The organisational and management duties include, inter alia, responsibility as reporting officer for annual reports on all staff junior to himself.

45. At executive officer level, the duties can also be divided roughly into supervision and case work. So far as supervision is concerned the executive officer is required to be able to undertake the supervision and organisation of a group of junior officers. He is responsible not only for the day-to-day supervision of the work of the clerical officers but also for their training at the desk on the wide range of income tax district work appropriate to them.

46. As a case worker the executive officer handles the contentious cases not regarded as involved enough to require higher executive officer attention. On this work the executive officer has to exercise discretion and judgment in determining the reliefs which are due and, in frequent contacts with taxpayers, explain understandably the complexities of the rules and regulations surrounding the Income Tax and Finance Acts.

47. Examples of his work include complicated expenses claims already mentioned; property maintenance claims; separate assessment of husband and wife; double taxation relief; determination of "residence" position (where the taxpayer has been or is abroad); determination of title to income; bankruptcy cases, and a variety of others.

48. A further minor but nevertheless important facet of the work at executive officer level in the branch is the handling of the simpler accounts cases under cases I and II of Schedule D, which at the discretion of the district inspector can be devolved to executive officers. This work embraces contact with qualified accountants on points of doubt in settling liabilities.

MINISTRY OF LABOUR

Functions in Local Offices

49. The Employment Exchanges are of three grades—Grades 3, 4 and 5—each under the control of a manager of corresponding grade. The general functions are as follows:—

Within each Exchange there are separate departments for men and women, and where the responsibility for dealing with boys and girls has not been taken over by the Local Education Authority there is a separate department at the Exchange for young persons. The range of work covered is roughly the same for all grades of Exchange although there is considerable variation in volume. It includes:—

- (i) maintaining registers of people seeking work and placing them in suitable employment or arranging for them (where eligible) to receive vocational training;
- (ii) filling vacancies notified by employers; carrying out the provisions of the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, 1944, to help men and women handicapped by disability to obtain or hold suitable employment;
- (iii) making payments in certain circumstances to transferred workers and others for lodging allowances, etc.;
- (iv) maintaining detailed employment and other records and preparing statistical returns;
- (v) advising and assisting on problems of workers' welfare outside their places of employment;
- (vi) advising industrialists about the location of new enterprises—from the labour point of view;
- (vii) in some exchanges giving vocational guidance to young persons under 18 and placing them in suitable employment;
- (viii) carrying out the provisions of the National Service Acts for the registration (and, in selected Exchanges, the medical examination) of men for military service, and associated duties;
- (ix) agency services for the Ministry of National Insurance and the National Assistance Board including the taking of proof of unemployment, the computation and payment of unemployment benefit and national assistance;
- (x) agency services for other Government Departments, including the issue of travel identity cards and forms of application for British passports (for the Foreign Office) and repayment of income tax to unemployed persons (for the Board of Inland Revenue); issue of ration books and welfare foods (for the Ministry of Food).

In addition work on an *ad hoc* basis such as carrying out interviews for the Household Expenditure Survey.

Headquarters and Regional Offices

50. The functions cover a very wide range including:—industrial relations; industrial safety, health and welfare; factory inspection; overseas relations, etc.; youth employment and disabled persons; training in and for industry; employment services and policy; military recruitment; staff conditions of service and training; finance.

V. DEVELOPMENTS IN PAY AND STRUCTURE

51. Paragraphs 272-274 and 277-282 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum summarise the changes that have taken place in the pay of the executive grades since the Tomlin Commission Report. The salary scales which subsequently came into effect in 1936-37 (paragraph 273 of the Memorandum) being still in force in 1939 this latter date can be accepted as an appropriate starting point for the purpose of the present review.

52. It will be noted from paragraph 274 of the Treasury Memorandum that the effect of war bonus consolidation in 1945 was to commence a process of narrowing the differentials between the successive grades of the executive class by "tapering" the increases, a process which was repeated in both the 1947 and 1951 revisions and again in the general Service pay additions agreement of 1952 (paragraphs 157-158 of the Treasury's Memorandum) and only halted and partially rectified by the Award of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal which became operative as from 1st January, 1953 (paragraph 280 of the Memorandum). The accumulative result of this process has been a marked disturbance of the former relative position both of grades within the executive class itself and between the class as a whole and other civil service classes. The nature and extent of these disturbances and the degree of the relative depression of executive class pay standards to which further reference is made in paragraph 116 below, is demonstrated by the Tables appended thereto.

VI. EXPERIENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS

General

53. It is essential that it should be appreciated that the post-war executive class salary revisions which have been the product of negotiated settlements have not been the outcome of completely free negotiations but have been conditioned throughout by external and other factors unrelated to the merits of the case. Adverse national economic circumstances have been a compelling factor in all post-war settlements, conditioning the Treasury's responsiveness to the merits of claims and imposing a measure of restraint upon the Society. Moreover, there has never in fact been any illusion on either side of complete mutual satisfaction that these agreements fully met all relevant considerations to date. Evidence of this is to be found in the fact that in the pay additions agreement of 1952 the process of "tapering" increases was the subject of expressed objection by the National Staff Side in its reservation to that agreement as recorded in paragraph 101 below.

54. When in 1947 the Society lodged a comprehensive claim for improvements based in part upon a revaluation of the work it was only following protracted negotiations spread over many months that an agreement was eventually concluded during a period of growing national economic difficulty and on the eve of the publication of the Government's White Paper on Personal Incomes (Cmd. 7321) announcing a policy of wage restraint. This agreement, whilst according some measure of improvement fell far short of the Society's objectives, both sides in the negotiations being conditioned by the prevailing circumstances of economic stress of which the White Paper was the corollary.

55. Under the continuing pressure of the increase in the cost of living the Society in 1949 lodged a claim on behalf of all the grades it represents for a general increase of 15 per cent. This was met by an appeal from the Treasury that in view of the prevailing economic circumstances, and the Government's emphasis on the need for continued restraint in the matter of personal incomes, the Society "without prejudice" should for the time being refrain from pressing the claim. After careful consideration the Society reluctantly acquiesced.

56. In 1950 the Government announced its intention to begin to put into effect the increases recommended for the higher grades of the Service by the Chorley Committee in 1948 (Cmd. 7635). In the light of this development the Society felt justified in submitting a comprehensive claim for the executive grades. After protracted delays, negotiations broke down so far as the executive officer, higher

executive officer and senior executive officer grades were concerned. Meanwhile, however, the First Division Association had concluded an agreement with the Treasury for a revised salary scale for the principal grade of the administrative class, and the Society was in consequence able to argue that the salary scales of the chief executive officer and senior chief executive officer grades should be revised to take account of disturbed relativities caused by this settlement. New scales for these two grades were agreed at the end of 1950. The principal executive officer grade was already within the ambit of the Chorley Committee recommendations.

57. Despite the improvement in the scales of the top three grades of the executive class, the Treasury was not prepared to re-open negotiations in respect of the three lower grades until the promulgation of the Award of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal in respect of a concurrent claim on behalf of clerical officers. Shortly after this Award, however, resumed discussions resulted in an agreement for a revision of these three outstanding scales, although this agreement again fell short of the Society's objectives. It will be appreciated that, by first determining the scale of the principal, with resultant consequential for the chief executive officer and higher grades, the Treasury had created a barrier beyond which it would have been impossible, in the conditions then operating for the Society to move the maximum of the senior executive officer scale. It would be true to say that this has been the situation in which the Society has generally found itself during its negotiations. Representing as it does the middle grades of the Service, it has seen its claims deferred until such time as the pattern has been determined at both the lower level of the clerical officer and the higher level of the administrative class, and has then had to attempt to fit the salary scales of its own members into the gap between the two.

58. The position of the executive class in the salary structure has thus been largely determined by settlements reached in other areas of the Civil Service. If a "perspective" view of civil service remuneration is taken it will be seen that the sectional settlements in 1947 and 1951 when combined with the central war bonus and pay additions agreements failed to preserve reasonable relativities.

59. The executive class salary scales which are now operative up to the chief executive officer grade came into effect as from 1st January, 1953, as the result of an Award of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal in September, 1953 (paragraph 281 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum). That these scales still reflect a serious disturbance of previous relativities will be seen from the Tables appended to paragraph 116 below.

60. It is relevant to recount the circumstances which preceded the aforementioned Award as affording confirmation of the earlier contentions that post-war claims on behalf of the executive class have not received objective treatment on their merits but have been deferred, by a process of protracting negotiations until a general pattern has emerged from the result of settlements elsewhere in the Service.

61. The claim which eventually led to the Tribunal's Award was lodged by the Society on 14th January, 1953. Although of a more fundamental character than others it was one of a series of sectional claims tabled at about the same time by other staff associations following the rejection by the Official Side of the claim of the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council for a further pay addition (paragraph 159 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum). A meeting with Treasury representatives to discuss the claim was not secured until 25th February. In addition to illustrations of the disturbances of relativities within the Service, the Society submitted facts and figures of outside comparisons obtained from an independent survey undertaken by the "Economist" Intelligence Unit to which further reference is made in paragraphs 154-162 below. The Society invited the Treasury to examine this latter evidence with particular care and if on first examination not satisfied as to its basis, the adequacy of the information it contained or the validity of the conclusions based upon it, to join with the Society in asking the Unit for such additional information and explanations as might be regarded as necessary to reach a sound and acceptable assessment of its relevance. It

is noteworthy that at no time subsequently was this invitation taken up. This first meeting with the Treasury concluded with an official assurance that the claim and supporting evidence would be given careful and objective consideration after which a further meeting would be arranged.

62. Despite repeated reminders the Treasury was not ready to discuss the matter further until two and a half months later. Meanwhile the Civil Service Clerical Association had taken a claim to arbitration on behalf of clerical officers. The Tribunal's Award in that case became known on 5th May, 1953, on which day the Treasury intimated its readiness again to meet the Society's representatives on 8th May. At this second meeting, although completely rejecting the fundamental aspects of the Society's claim, the Treasury took note of the Tribunal's intervening Award in respect of the claim on behalf of clerical officers (which was based on the limited grounds of the movement in the wages index during 1952) and to the extent that this occasioned a further relative depression of the pay of executive officers, made an offer to apply to such of the latter as were within the salary limits of the clerical scale (i.e., not exceeding £500 basic) broadly the same measure of increase, viz., approximately £20 per annum. This, although affording no increase at the higher range of the executive officer scale or to the grades above, was stated at the time to be the final and considered assessment of the merits of the claim. Both in respect of its character and its timing it appeared to the Society to be divorced from the merits of the case and to be deliberately confined to cash increases awarded by the Arbitration Tribunal at comparable salary levels in respect of an entirely different claim based upon quite different contentions.

63. The offer was rejected by the Society for the following reasons:—

- (a) it made no attempt to deal with the fundamental problem of disturbed relativities posed in the claim, far less to solve it,
- (b) by reason of its inadequacy it would actually have worsened the previous relativity of executive scales compared with the clerical, and
- (c) even within its limitation to considerations of the movement in outside rates during 1952, by restricting the proffered increase to those in receipt of not more than £500 per annum basic, and denying any improvement to those above this point, it was inadequate and went even further in the direction of "telescoping" than previous "tapering" had done.

The matter was accordingly referred to the Arbitration Tribunal.

64. At this stage, by reason of circumstances beyond the control of either party, a further delay occurred because it was impossible to secure a hearing of the case by the Tribunal until September. This enforced interval, however, provided opportunity for yet another example of the Treasury being impelled, not by the merits of the case presented but by decisions in other cases. In August the Arbitration Tribunal issued an Award in respect of the works group of professional classes which, despite Treasury resistance, gave virtually "untapered" increases of the order of about 3 per cent. on inclusive pay to all grades up to an inclusive salary level of approximately £1,536. Thereupon, although the case had already been referred to and was awaiting hearing by the Tribunal, the Treasury made a second offer to the Society in respect of the executive grades. This broadly followed the pattern of the Tribunal's Award in respect of the works group. The claim of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants out of which this Award arose, had been based, like the earlier case of the Civil Service Clerical Association, on the limited ground of the rise in outside rates of pay during 1952. Its application to the executive grades therefore failed similarly to deal with the fundamental problem of disturbed relativities posed in the Society's claim and was accordingly rejected.

65. At the Tribunal hearing of the Society's case on the 21st September the Treasury made no reference to its first offer but invited the Tribunal to endorse the second offer. By its eventual Award the Tribunal gave increases to the executive grades which at the higher levels were double, or more than double, those which would have accrued from the Treasury's second offer. These increases were made

retrospective to 1st January, 1953, although the Treasury had expressly urged that if the Tribunal's judgment of the claim exceeded the Treasury's final assessment of its merits such a degree of retrospection would be "inappropriate". Only by the Tribunal's adjudication, therefore, were the executive grades saved from a repetition of the penalty of protracted delays in negotiation imposed by the settlements in 1947 and 1951.

66. Inadequate although the Tribunal's Award has been fully to redress the relative depression of executive class pay standards, the extent to which it exceeded even the Treasury's second offer serves to demonstrate the even greater degree by which the latter fell short of an objective assessment of the merits of the case.

67. It is difficult in this recital of events to perceive, any more than on previous occasions, the observance and application by the Treasury of any discernible principle in respect of executive class pay claims. Expediency would seem to play a much larger part in official calculations. To the extent that this may perhaps have been due to a general policy of "wage restraint", either publicly avowed or tacitly pursued, it will be obvious that such a policy carries a particular penalty for civil servants in being directly imposed, whereas in wider fields of employment it can be little more than an exhortation.

68. When the response to claims is conditioned, limited and progressively changed by successive arbitration awards in other cases, which present quite different features, it not only underlines the absence of any clear principles, and the lack of objective consideration of such claims, but represents an unfortunate and undesirable use of the Arbitration Tribunal, not as an instrument for resolving genuine differences but as a mere wage fixing body.

The higher grades

69. Although both logic and equity would seem to demand that the adjustments of pay at the lower levels resulting from the last Arbitration Award should be projected into corresponding adjustments of the scales of the higher grades of the executive class (the senior chief executive officers and principal executive officers) up to the time of preparing this statement the latter have not been so adjusted. They remain at their 1950 basic level plus the 1952 pay addition (paragraph 282 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum).

70. In common with the treatment of all other higher grades of the Service the Treasury at first firmly declined to contemplate any improvements above the level of £1,600 per annum in advance of the Commission's consideration of the matter, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer assured the House of Commons that the ordinary machinery of negotiation would continue to function during the Commission's deliberations. It is only latterly, as the result of strenuous efforts by the staff associations concerned and a direct appeal to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, that the possibility has emerged of some slight relaxation of the official attitude in this regard but no conclusions have yet been reached. The present remuneration of the grades concerned is above the limits specified by the agreement governing the availability of reference to the Arbitration Tribunal. That agreement, however, permits the defined limits of arbitration to be waived if the Treasury consents, but such consent has been withheld. This experience demonstrates even more clearly that in the official mind the determining factor is not the merits of a case but the compulsions of enforced reference to arbitration. The result, in present circumstances, so far as the senior chief executive officer and principal executive officer grades are concerned, is still further to accentuate, to an absurd, illogical and anomalous degree, the disturbance of relativities with the executive class itself. For example, a chief executive officer on his new maximum of £1,550 (including London extra duty allowance) if promoted to senior chief executive officer will receive a promotion increase taking him immediately on promotion to the "frozen" maximum of the higher grade (i.e. £1,562 including pay addition). Although in so doing he may immediately be in receipt of a higher remuneration than a senior chief executive officer who has already been in the grade for three years his net reward for the assumption of the higher responsibilities will only be £12 per annum—and then only if the promotion is within the London area. If the promotion is one from London to the provinces he will, as the result of provincial

differentiation and a lower rate of extra duty allowance, lose substantially in terms of actual total remuneration. It is not surprising that in these circumstances Departments are experiencing increasing difficulty in finding candidates ready to accept such "advancement". Obviously this is detrimental not only to individuals but to administrative interests.

71. Officers in posts above the principal executive officer grade which carry salaries over £2,000 per annum—those listed in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum as "Heads of major establishments"—are similarly affected by the Treasury's initial refusal to contemplate any improvement of higher grade salaries. In these cases there has been no improvement since the Chorley Committee's recommendations of 1948 were applied, salaries above £2,100 basic being outside the scope of the pay addition agreements of 1952.

Arbitration

72. Although in the view of the Society the remuneration of its members should be regulated by the opportunity of effective negotiations and a genuine mutual endeavour to satisfy clear and equitable principles, it is submitted that the facts outlined in the foregoing paragraphs demonstrate the need for some permanent form of arbitration machinery, or independent review, to which recourse could be had in respect of disputes or differences concerning matters affecting the higher grades of the service. So far as the executive grades are concerned no good reason is seen why the whole of the executive class should not be brought within the ambit of the existing Arbitration Tribunal. The desirability and advantage of being able to take a comprehensive view of the class as a whole will be obvious. If, however, the existing machinery should be judged inappropriate for the higher grades the Society would still urge that some other suitable machinery of the kind should be devised. Such a step would be wholly consistent with the recent public advocacy of the permanent secretary to the Ministry of Labour that arbitration should be accepted by employers and trade unions generally as a means of resolving all disputes.

Departmental executive classes

73. Reference has already been made to the fact that apart from the general executive class there are a considerable number of departmental executive classes and grades whose salary scales are based upon, or derived from, those of the former. They range from the major departmental executive structures in the Inland Revenue and Ministry of Labour and National Service, represented by the staff organisations associated with this submission, to a multiplicity of smaller classes and grades represented by the Society in a number of different Departments.

74. In some instances the salary scales are identical with those of the general executive class. In some cases there are refinements and adaptations of the general class scales. In others the scales are those of the general class plus an additional element in recognition of some feature of the work or special requisite qualification peculiar to the Department concerned. Examples of the latter are to be found among the auditor grades of the Exchequer and Audit Department and the immigration officer grades of the Home Office.

75. The Society recognises that in certain areas of the Service there are sound and equitable reasons for these variations from the main pattern. The Exchequer and Audit Department, for example, is the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, who is responsible for auditing and certifying the accounts of Government Departments. Officers of the Department examine the books of account and financial records of the individual Departments in order to satisfy themselves that all transactions involving the expenditure or receipt of public money are carried out within the terms of their Parliamentary and Treasury sanctions and are correctly accounted for. Matters arising out of this examination are included in the annual reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General which are printed and presented to Parliament. The staff of this Department are recruited from the executive examination, but are required to obtain the special qualification and training needed for this work by means of internal and external courses designed to meet the special needs, followed by examination by the external body. The Society is fully satisfied

that work of this character, for which the attainment of special qualifications is essential, can justifiably be regarded as "executive plus", and that this should be recognised in the salary scales of the staff concerned. Nevertheless it is considered that it would be advantageous and would make for administrative clarity, if many of the smaller departmental grades within the Society's own field were merged with the executive class. As matters now stand departmental executive grades have to wait upon a settlement of any pay revision in the general executive class, as determining the main pattern, before their own salaries can be adjusted. Imposed upon the primary delays experienced in respect of the major claim, as outlined in paragraphs 54-65 above, the departmental grades invariably experience a further period of protracted delay while separate consequential claims are negotiated with their respective Departments. Following the 1947 executive class pay settlement some departmental "consequentials" were not settled until more than twelve months later. A similar experience of months of delay ensued in many cases following the 1951 revision and even in respect of the latest revision of general class scales, which were announced in October, 1953, and put into payment in November and December, less than half of the departmental "consequential" claims which were immediately tabled by the Society in respect of more than 180 different grades, had been settled five months later, i.e. fourteen months after the initial major claim was originally lodged. Examples are not lacking of departmental grade revisions consequent upon one major settlement being still unresolved when the main general class scales were already the subject of further review because of changing conditions.

76. This double time lag which circumstances impose upon the departmental executive grades arises from the continued rigid adherence to the concept of departmental autonomy in respect of departmental grades. In fact, in the vast majority of cases the ultimate result is clearly and necessarily governed by the nature of the settlement in the general executive class and, in any event, no Department can conclude a settlement, or even make a proposal in response to a departmental claim, without prior Treasury approval. In these circumstances departmental autonomy is virtually a fiction but the motions of protracted negotiation have to proceed with the Departments who are not free agents and negotiating access to the decisive centre, the Treasury, is denied.

VII. EXPERIENCE OF THE PRESENT PRINCIPLES DETERMINING PAY

77. Chapter 10 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum sets out the relevant paragraphs of the report of the Tomlin Commission from which the so-called "Tomlin formula" is derived. It is this "formula" which has since supposedly regulated civil service pay. The core of the formula has generally been accepted to be the statement contained in paragraph 308 of the Tomlin Commission Report, that

"Civil Service remuneration should reflect what may be described as the long term trend, both in wage levels and in the economic condition of the country".

78. In saying that this has since "supposedly" regulated civil service pay the expression is used advisedly. In fact, at least so far as executive class salaries have been concerned, it has proved a matter of the utmost difficulty to find any satisfactory means of measuring the requirements of the formula, far less to provide any degree of satisfaction that those requirements have in fact been met. These difficulties were apprehended by the Tomlin Commission itself, for in the same paragraph as that quoted above it was stated,

"We agree that the closeness with which comparisons can be made varies. It is a simple matter to compare the rates paid to fitters in the Royal Dockyards with those paid to fitters in outside employment. It may be more difficult to make comparison in the case of, say, an executive officer"

but, the Report continued,

"We are satisfied, however, that broad general comparisons between classes in the Service and outside occupations are possible and should be made".

79. Nevertheless the difficulty of obtaining reliable information of outside salary movements, even in fields broadly comparable to the executive class, has persisted ever since. There exists, as a standard of measurement, no official, authoritative index of salaries in any way comparable to the Ministry of Labour's index of rates of wages and, it is fair to add, at no time has the Treasury manifested any particular anxiety to seek one. In negotiations with the Society the Treasury, despite its presumably greater facilities, has not on any occasion brought forward anything more than a very few, isolated, and therefore inconclusive, examples of alleged comparability. In the negotiations which preceded the Arbitration Award of last year it did not produce a single outside comparison of any kind and, as previously stated, ignored the invitation to probe and examine in closer detail the evidence produced by the Society in this connection.

80. The Society, in its own efforts to make a contribution to what would appear to have been intended by the Tomlin Commission to be a mutual obligation, has been repeatedly frustrated. Apart from examples drawn from broadly comparable occupations in other public services, which represent only part of the area that ought to be surveyed in seeking to satisfy the Tomlin formula, very little information has in the past been obtainable. Business and commercial employers, including some of the largest and most representative, decline to reveal information concerning the salaries they pay to their staffs. Indicative of the reluctance of employers in this regard is the fact that the Trade Union Congress, which has been pressing the Minister of Labour for the establishment of a salaries index, was last year informed that the British Employer's Confederation declined to co-operate. In connection with its claim of last year the Society communicated with the British Institute of Management, the Office Management Association and the Institute of Personnel Management, all with completely negative results, either because the organisation was unable to furnish relevant information or was debarred from doing so by reason of obligations of confidentiality.

81. Apart from the persistent difficulty of obtaining reliable basic information of outside comparisons matters have been complicated at different stages by varying official interpretations of the Tomlin formula.

82. In the 1947 negotiations the Treasury rested itself upon the broad and general contention that it had to be guided "by long term wage and economic trends" and that "material for comparison with outside bodies had been collected but did not suggest that the general level of civil service executive scales was wrong". Except for one specific example, the aptness of which was challenged, none of the material upon which the Treasury relied was produced for critical examination by the Society. The official emphasis in these discussions was upon a conception of the Tomlin formula as requiring that regard had to be paid to the general trend of broad comparisons with outside levels of remuneration.

83. In the 1950-51 negotiations the Treasury refused to accept as an admissible factor any consideration of the rise in the index of rates of wages and fell back on the contention that comparisons must be made with outside rates for comparable work. Although tendering no evidence of such comparisons of its own ascertainment the Treasury, as stated in paragraph 99 below, invited the Society to submit evidence of comparisons with broadly comparable workers outside, within a wide income band of £150-£850 per annum, in such occupations as banks, insurance companies and local authorities and over a period extending from 1939. Such comparisons, it was stated, would be accepted as "Tomlin evidence" for negotiating purposes. The Society's response to this invitation, from its own limited resources, was acknowledged to be "useful information" but did not evoke any similar contribution from the Treasury. The onus of producing such evidence has always been left upon the Society.

84. In the National Whitley Council negotiations resulting in the pay additions agreement of 1952 the Official Side accepted the rise in the index of rates of wages as the basis for a general improvement of civil service remuneration but scaled down the increases above £500 per annum on a basis which was officially admitted to be quite arbitrary and unrelated to any positive and reliable information as to the improvements in outside remuneration at comparable levels.

85. More recently, at the hearing of the Society's case by the Arbitration Tribunal last September, the Treasury representative developed a new thesis. By this the Tribunal was invited to discount the Society's evidence of the long term trend in broadly comparable outside occupations and to accept the view that the right method of assessment was to find the outside counterparts of the executive grades under consideration and to compare their current rates of pay with those of the Service equivalents. The Treasury spokesman expressly urged the Tribunal to "forget the past". This, of course, not only brushes aside the acknowledgment of the Tomlin Commission itself of the difficulty of finding a true outside counterpart of the executive officer, a difficulty which all subsequent experience has confirmed, but runs directly counter to the Tomlin concept of a "long term trend" in a field of "broad general comparisons". To seek thus to abandon this aspect of the Tomlin formula and to start *de novo* on a new concept, itself of questionable validity and practicability, is to ignore and to deny redress for the damage already occasioned by the neglect of the Tomlin formula and its requirements in the past.

86. Undeterred by the Tomlin Commission's warning of the difficulties of direct comparisons, and all previous experience, the Treasury nevertheless sought to dispose of the Society's case, and to establish the conclusions which it suggested could be derived from the application of its new concept, by referring in general terms to the results of some belated enquiries of its own which were not undertaken until after the case had already been referred to arbitration. The results of these enquiries were presented in terms of aggregate figures purporting to show how many of the firms who had replied to a questionnaire appeared to be paying more, the same or less than the current civil service rates of pay to their equivalents of the civil service executive officer, higher executive officer and senior executive officer grades.

87. Apart altogether from the merits of the method of taking "current rates" as a criterion instead of a long term trend, a matter which is discussed in further detail later, it should be noted that what the Tomlin Commission acknowledged to be difficult in the way of precise comparisons the Treasury had, with complete equanimity, left to the firms with whom it communicated to decide for themselves. The firms had been furnished with a broad general statement of the duties of each of the Service grades concerned and left to determine for themselves without independent check or verification which categories of their own employees approximated thereto. The replies upon which this evidence was based and the identity of the firms concerned were not before the Tribunal at the hearing. Nor had the Society any opportunity for prior critical examination and verification of the evidence.

88. Setting aside what the practical experience of the Tomlin formula has been it remains to be observed that even if there had been the means of reasonably measuring its requirements, and those requirements had been satisfactorily met, it would still involve the penalty of a considerable time lag in applying to the Civil Service the degree of improvement experienced in the level of outside remuneration. The necessity of following a long term trend outside necessarily involves having to wait until that trend has manifested itself and until its nature and degree have been established. At the best, therefore, the Civil Service must, on this basis, always lag behind. When to this inevitable delay is added the further delay of protracted negotiations spreading often over many months, and official resistance to anything but a current date for the application of the eventual settlement, the penalty is greatly increased. Not infrequently the evidence adduced in support of a claim is outdated before an eventual settlement is reached and applied.

89. In the submission of the Society, the experiences outlined above point to the need for a clearer definition of the principles which should govern civil service remuneration. The Society's views as to what those principles should be are set out in the following section.

VIII. PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN EXECUTIVE CLASS PAY IN FUTURE

Introduction

90. There is no single principle which can be used to fix the pay of executive grades. The Civil Service as a part of the community is bound to be affected by outside conditions, especially in a period when there is a much closer relationship between the public and the public servant. Pay developments in the Service must march in step with the trend of wages and salaries in the community generally. Civil service pay should not be allowed to fall behind the outside level if the Service is to maintain a high professional standard.

91. Within the Service itself "a suitable relationship between the pay of the main categories" must be established and maintained if the rewards for higher responsibility and maximum performance are not to be devalued. The value of the work performed may require to be reassessed from time to time. The widening range of State activity may extend and increase duties of certain classes so as to make pay revisions and the review of internal relativities desirable.

92. Recruitment to the Civil Service at the various educational levels is a requirement which the Government must meet both in its capacity as employer and as the provider of education. The Civil Service must be able to compete with outside occupations in the labour market and remuneration must be regulated so that the required standard of efficiency can be maintained. It may be necessary not only to adjust pay in order to maintain a satisfactory standard of recruitment but also to provide a salary structure (and a career) which will attract and retain candidates of the right calibre.

93. While an abstract principle might be introduced which would aim at ensuring that civil service pay is sufficient to provide an efficient service, it is clear that there are several criteria which enter into the determination of the pay of the various categories. These factors are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs and if considered against the background of previous experience should enable guidance to be given to those responsible in future for fixing the pay of executive grades.

Outside comparisons

94. The difficulties which have occurred in making valid comparisons between remuneration inside and remuneration outside the Service have been stated in paragraphs 78-80. The Society is satisfied that close comparisons between the executive class and outside occupations cannot be made. Nevertheless it is accepted that the pay of the executive class cannot be determined in isolation and that a fair relativity should be maintained between the rates of pay of executive grades and those in outside industry as a whole.

95. It is the view of the Society that a fair relativity with the remuneration of the community generally can only be maintained if in fixing the pay of the executive grades the following conditions are observed:—

- (1) *Trends*: When deciding how the current remuneration in the Service compares with the levels prevailing in the country generally it is important to determine whether changes in civil service remuneration in the previous few years have reflected the general trend of remuneration levels in the country as a whole (see Report of Royal Commission on the Civil Service 1929-31, paragraph 316).

96. In practice any such review should cover a wider range of pay movements but the principle with which the Society is concerned can be illustrated by a single example. In negotiations on executive class pay it has been customary to take into account the remuneration of bank employees. The average maxima of the basic grade of bank employees at the 31st December, 1953, was £743. The maximum of the executive officer scale at the 31st December, 1953, was £800 from which it could be contended that no adjustment is due to the executive officer on the basis of this comparison. If regard is paid, however, to the trend of remuneration levels over a period of years among bank employees a completely different conclusion is reached. The average percentage increase at the maxima among basic grade

bank employees in 1953 as compared with 1939 was 96 per cent. The percentage increase in the case of the executive officer was only 52 per cent. This comparison of trends in the two occupations shows that in fact the executive officer has fallen substantially behind the bank employee. It is clearly inappropriate to attempt an absolute comparison at a current date without examining the trends which have contributed to the current remuneration. In 1939 the salary maxima of the basic grade of bank employee (average £380) compared more closely with the civil service clerical officer (£350) but because of more favourable salary trends the bank maxima have been raised more closely to the executive officer maximum. A close comparison of duties is not practicable and it might be variously contended that the duties of a bank employee compare with those of a civil service executive officer, clerical officer, of Post Office counter staff. In the view of the Society the responsibilities of executive officers substantially exceed those of the basic grade of bank employees. In practice close comparisons cannot be made and in other occupations the difficulty of attempting a comparison might be considerably greater. Unless grading of work can be equated pay cannot be equated either.

97. Both from the standpoint of preserving a fair relativity with outside remuneration and for the purpose of practical application it is submitted that only broad general comparisons can be made and that these must be based upon trends over a few years. It is suggested that in determining the standard of remuneration in the Civil Service the Royal Commission should consider whether changes in service remuneration in the last few years have reflected the general trend of remunerations levels in the country and that future adjustments should be made on this basis subject to any special factors which may apply in respect of particular grades.

98. Reference has already been made to the absence of any official index of salaries or authoritative statistics regarding salary trends. In the absence of a yardstick of this character, but having regard to the need to keep track of trends in outside remuneration it is suggested that evidence regarding the movement of salaries in various bands should be accepted in negotiation and arbitration. If for example it could be shown that the trend of salary adjustments within the band £800-£1,000 had in a period of (say) three years been more favourable outside the Civil Service than inside, the pay of executive grades at this level of remuneration would be brought up to the outside level.

99. The following extract from the notes of a meeting held at the Treasury on 15th December, 1950, to discuss pay claims lodged by the Society, indicates that at that time the Treasury, recognising the difficulty of making exact comparisons, were prepared to examine the Society's claims by reference to movements in salary bands:—

"Mr. Winnifrith . . . He agreed that it was difficult to make exact comparisons in this field, but the Society might try to prove that their salaries in the span of £150-£850 (1939 rates) had lagged behind the salaries of broadly comparable workers in, for example, the Banks, Insurance Companies and Local Authorities. The Treasury would accept such comparisons as Tomlin evidence in this context and for negotiating purposes including a re-examination of the full claim in respect of Executive Officers. This attitude was, of course, without prejudice to any line which the Treasury might wish to take should the Society decide to have recourse to Arbitration."

This method of reviewing and adjusting civil service remuneration should operate satisfactorily in a period of comparative stability.

100. (2) *Pay adjustments to reflect frequent fluctuations in price levels.* In a period when the cost of living is rising fairly rapidly the pay of civil servants should be dealt with on an all-Service basis (e.g. 1952 pay addition—see Treasury Factual Memorandum, paragraphs 157 and 158), so as to provide a speedier means of compensating them for increases in the cost of living.

In these circumstances interim increases should be negotiated on an all-Service basis by a bonus or pay addition. Such additions to pay would be consolidated with basic scales when the next revision of pay was made in the light of trends outside the Service in the intervening period.

101. (3) *Tapering*: The "tapering" process which has been a feature of cost of living settlements, notably in the war-time bonus operations and the pay additions agreement of 1952 should be discontinued, unless it can be demonstrated by reference to trends in outside occupations that similar treatment has been adopted in compensating workers generally for increases in the cost of living.

This process has been referred to previously, and the cumulative effect upon pay differentials has been described. This practice fails to take account of the redistribution of income which is achieved by high taxation and thus imposes a double penalty on the middle and higher grades in the Service. Indeed, inflation alone, even without the additional impact of taxation, would have done much to redistribute income. In the view of the Society there is no justification for an arbitrary scaling down of the increases given to the grades concerned as compensation for increases in the cost of living. The Staff Side of the National Whitley Council recorded its own dissent in the pay additions agreement of 1952:—

"The acceptance by the Staff Side of the reduced percentages of benefit in the second and third ranges of pay detailed in paragraph 1 above does not imply their agreement in principle that the continual tapering away of Civil Service salaries in this manner is justified."

102. The absence of official statistics showing the movement of salaries at this level make it impossible to prove how cost of living compensation in outside occupations has been granted but it is the Society's belief that generally the relativity of the middle and higher salaried grades with the wage earners is being maintained. If bonus or pay addition increases are negotiated in future it is contended that the same percentage adjustment should be made above the limit of the pay range covered by the Ministry of Labour wages index, as below it. On consolidation, when scales are next reviewed in the light of trends outside the Service in the intervening period, these interim increases would be taken into account in determining the new inclusive scales.

103. (4) *Economic factors*: If civil service remuneration is related to trends in outside occupations over a period, time lags will occur in bringing civil service pay up to the outside level. The plea of economic difficulties which has not prevented improvement in the one case ought not to be used to prevent it for civil servants just because in the meantime the economic condition of the country may have worsened.

Experience has shown that Government employees may be more vulnerable to the economic policy of the Government than is the case with outside employees. The disposition of Governments to "set an example" to industry by practising restraint in its own Service may inflict a double penalty on its own employees. Not only is there delay before negotiations can be commenced because of the need to measure outside trends, but there has been a tendency to deny what is already overdue because of the current economic situation.

104. In taking the long view the State, which does not raise its scales of pay in prosperous times, should not have regard to immediate conditions if scales are being reviewed when times are not so good. If civil service remuneration is adjusted to reflect outside trends the changes to be made will take into account the economic condition of the country which will have influenced outside pay movements. It would inflict a double penalty on civil servants if economic difficulties are allowed to prevent an improvement of their remuneration which has to follow at a distance. Civil service remuneration should rise to the same extent as the general movement of remuneration outside the Service whatever the economic condition of the country at the time of review.

Back-dating pay settlements

105. Because of the time lags which will necessarily occur before claims for the revision of civil service scales can be submitted and owing to the protracted nature of negotiations civil servants may be denied for long periods the increases given in outside occupations. The operative date of a negotiated settlement should take account of these factors and should not be later than the date upon which a claim

is lodged. It is customary for the Treasury to oppose any substantial measure of retrospection when concluding a pay settlement and it would be unusual for a negotiated pay revision to be back-dated more than three months before the completion of negotiations. This operative date may well be over six months later than the date upon which the claim is lodged and will take no account of the period over which the movements in remuneration outside the Civil Service have taken place. It is difficult to make a firm proposal which would take account of the time lags which will necessarily occur before a claim can be submitted but this should be taken into account in determining the operative date.

Value of work

106. Reference has been made in paragraph 91 to the value of work factor among the criteria which enter into the determination of the pay of the various categories. Any reorganisation of the Service generally or departmentally is likely to change duties and responsibilities of certain grades so that apart from or complementary to movements in outside remuneration the pay of these grades may require revision. In some instances the changes which flow from any measures of reorganisation will develop gradually over a period and may be influenced by outside events. Thus, the extended use of the executive class (T.C.5/47) which aimed to make greater use of the executive class and to unify and simplify the former structures has been given greater significance with the creation of new Departments. The structure of a new Department, such as the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, is based upon the widest use of the executive class. It is a feature of ex-headquarters administration which has increased tremendously in recent years that control, organisation and management is laid upon executive grades who are responsible for the administration of Government business in the regional or local office area. In this way the function and importance of the class has developed steadily to a point where a re-examination of its position in the Service should be made in the light of this modern trend in administration.

107. Further changes may take place in the functions and responsibilities of the executive class from time to time and if these are of a fundamental character the relationship with other categories may be affected. Any principles which are introduced for the determination of the pay of executive grades in future, must therefore for their practical application recognise that changes in the value of work may require changes in pay and possibly changes in relationship between the main categories.

Recruitment and career considerations

108. The methods of entry to the executive class are stated in paragraph 269 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum. Apart from departmental promotion, most openings for executive officers are filled from competitors between 17½ and 19 years of age at the advanced level of the General Certificate of Education. The executive class thus has to compete with outside occupations for candidates who have reached an advanced academic standard in grammar schools. The Civil Service is in competition with commercial and professional occupations which have traditionally attracted candidates of this educational standard. In recent years the nationalised industries and private industry have added their own demands upon the school leavers at this educational level. The opportunities open to boys and girls leaving school in a period of full employment and with manpower shortages in many professions are considerably greater than before the war.

109. In many occupations outside the Civil Service the same degree of security and pension provision are now available, and pay and prospects are often better, especially for the entrant who is capable of going right up to the top. The senior grades in the Civil Service are relatively worse off than they used to be and the salary structure does not offer career prospects which are as attractive to school leavers as formerly. It is essential that conditions of service should be such as to ensure the recruitment of a fully qualified staff so that the high standard of administration for which the Civil Service is traditionally renowned and which is vital to the carrying out of Government business may be maintained.

110. The Society attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of a high rate of recruitment at the advanced level of education. Open competition recruits have shown qualities of adaptability and versatility in meeting changes of duties of a widely differing character. Transfers to quite different work within Departments and inter-departmental transfers, which are quite a common feature of the present day, have demonstrated the ability of these entrants to fulfil the requirements of the general executive class. Where intensive training for specialised duties or for the work of certain departmental classes is necessary, these candidates possess the necessary intellectual and personal qualities. They have demonstrated their suitability to fill higher posts involving the control of staffs who have longer experience of the Service and who are older in years. It is in the best interest of the State that recruitment from this source should be fully maintained on a highly competitive basis.

111. This source of supply will increase in importance if clerical class recruitment continues to fall short of requirements. The filling of a high proportion of executive officer vacancies by promotion from the clerical officer grade can only continue for so long as the standard of entry to the clerical class is maintained at a satisfactory level. Recruitment to the clerical class at later ages is contemplated as a means of making up the deficiency in the number of open competition candidates. Such measures are unlikely to produce entrants who will be qualified and young enough to reach the senior grades of the executive class. In these circumstances the intake at the advanced level of education into the executive officer grade may need to be increased and all necessary measures taken to maintain a high standard.

112. Undoubtedly there are various factors affecting recruitment to the Service and resignations from it, but pay and prospects must always be a most important consideration. In weighing up the extent to which pay influences recruitment, there are various aspects of the question involved. The school leaver may be influenced most by immediate starting pay and by the maximum of the scale without realising how long it may take to reach the top of a very long scale. When he reaches the "marrying age" without receiving a marrying rate, he will realise that the maximum is a long distance prospect. The parent will study the long term prospects more closely and may advise the youngster to consider some other career. The schoolmaster may draw attention to more exciting opportunities with good pay and brighter prospects in industry and commerce.

113. In fixing the pay of executive grades, regard must therefore be paid to the need to compete in the labour market with outside occupations which may offer better prospects. The pay upon recruitment is only one factor and the whole salary structure must be arranged in such a way as to attract and retain the services of candidates of a high standard.

114. Promotion prospects are every bit as important as pay and in a large scale organisation, such as the Civil Service, there should be a clear recognition that promotion is wide open right up to the top to any man at any level who can give evidence of ability to make the grade. Advancement from the executive class to the administrative class should be a normal, rather than an exceptional, opportunity and the Service should be able to satisfy candidates for entry into the executive class that it not only has the means and the will to spot talent but also to train and develop it.

Internal relativities

115. It is not enough that civil service pay should maintain a fair relativity with outside rates. Relationships between different grades and classes within the Service are of great importance because of the inter-dependence of the various parts. The status and authority of the various grades and their ability effectively to discharge the responsibilities assigned to them will depend very much upon the maintenance of a fair pay relativity between them. Any violent disturbance of internal relativities which is not justified by balancing changes of responsibility will create great dissatisfaction in a public service where the grade structures interlock and to which recruitment of the right types is influenced by career considerations.

116. The disturbance of internal relativities in the Civil Service is shown in the following tables.

TABLE I

	Maxima		Percentage Increase
	Pre-War	Present	
	£	£	
CLERICAL CLASS			
Clerical officer	350	570	63
EXECUTIVE CLASS			
Executive officer	525	800	52
Higher executive officer	650	995	53
Senior executive officer	860	1,230	43
Chief executive officer	1,050	1,510	44
Senior chief executive officer	1,200	1,660	38
Principal executive officer	1,450	2,100	45
ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS			
Principal	1,100	1,570	43
Assistant secretary	1,500	2,200	47
Under secretary	1,700	2,600	53
Deputy secretary	2,200	3,250	47
Permanent secretary	3,000	4,500	50

TABLE II

	1939			1953		
	Maximum	Differential		Maximum	Differential	
	£	£	Per cent.	£	£	Per cent.
Clerical officer	350	—	—	570	—	—
Executive officer	525	175	50	800	230	40
Higher executive officer	650	125	24	995	195	24
Senior executive officer	860	210	32	1,230	235	24
Chief executive officer	1,050	190	22	1,510	280	23
Senior chief executive officer	1,200	150	14	1,660	150	10
Principal executive officer	1,450	250	21	2,100	440	26

TABLE III

	Percentage of executive grade maxima over clerical officer maxima (i.e. percentage of differential between each grade and clerical officer maximum)	
	1939	1953
	Per cent.	Per cent.
Executive officer	50	40
Higher executive officer	86	75
Senior executive officer	146	116
Chief executive officer	200	165
Senior chief executive officer	243	191
Principal executive officer	314	268

117. The position of the executive class in the salary structure has been largely determined by settlements reached in other areas of the Civil Service particularly at the administrative and clerical levels. The executive grades have been squeezed between the floor and the ceiling constituted by these two classes without consideration of the need to maintain reasonable relativities within the executive grades and between the classes. This disturbance of internal relativities and the narrowing of differentials between the various grades has reached a stage where, if the process is not reversed, supervisory and managerial efficiency may be impaired. Management is a profession in which there is a danger that if the incentive to higher responsibility is steadily reduced, those concerned may unconsciously tend to lower their performance of the duties correspondingly. This disturbance of relativities is additional to the redistribution of incomes already effected by inflation and direct taxation. Unless this process is reversed and attention given to this question of internal relativities the lowering of the standard of living of those concerned must inevitably be accompanied in the long run by a lowering of professional standards with adverse effect upon the quality of the Civil Service.

118. It is, no doubt, for this reason that the Commission has been asked by the Government when considering the rates of pay at present in force for the main categories to bear in mind the need for a suitable relationship between the pay of these categories. This is to recognise that the comparison with outside rates must be supplemented by the need to maintain reasonable internal relativities. Evidence obtained for the Society by independent experts (for detailed reference see paragraph 162) shows that while in comparable occupations outside the Civil Service there had been a marked narrowing of the differentials between grades up to 1947, there has been a subsequent widening back almost to the pre-war structure. Many firms have, since 1947, adopted a deliberate policy of widening the differentials between each grade of staff. Similar steps in fixing the pay of executive grades would thus be in conformity with outside trends as well as in the interests of the Service and fair to the individual members of the executive class. This consideration of the relationship between the grades and classes should be supplementary to consideration of whether changes in service remuneration in the last few years have reflected the general trend of wage levels in the country. Evidence is put forward in paragraphs 116 and 160 that executive grades have lost ground in both respects.

(1) RELATIVITIES WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND CLERICAL STRUCTURE

119. The majority of Government Departments are now staffed with members of administrative, executive and clerical classes. Reference is made in the Treasury Factual Memorandum (paragraphs 275 and 276) to the extended use of the executive class within this structure. The relationship between these three classes is, therefore, of first importance because together they constitute the basis upon which Government business is organised. The position of the executive class within this structure is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

(a) RELATIONSHIP WITH ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS

120. The prime relationship is with the administrative class. Reference has been made in paragraph 20 and in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum to the difficulty of distinguishing between policy work and executive work. This distinction between executive and administrative work is not generally attempted in outside industry and (except for recruitment purposes) is not necessary to the organisation of the Civil Service. The functions of administration and higher management merge at many points and a great deal of executive work is concerned with the formulation of policy. The maintenance of separate classes should not be permitted to obscure this close relationship and the indivisibility of top management in the Service. The pay relativity must reflect the interlocking of the two classes at several levels. The internal relativities between grades of the administrative class and executive grades fall to be examined in the context of a modern Civil Service in which the functions of the executive class have been vastly extended to include

important relations with the public. In this examination the role of the executive class in social administration is now as relevant as its key position in public administration. Grades from the senior executive officer upwards bear a horizontal relationship with the principal and assistant secretary grades in the administrative class because they call for roughly the same degree of responsibility. The higher executive officer grade has a vertical relationship with the principal grade to which it may be directly responsible in administrative divisions.

(b) RELATIONSHIP WITH CLERICAL CLASS

121. The relationship with the clerical class is a vertical one. The work of the clerical class is described in paragraph 345 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum. The vast amount of clerical work which is indispensable to the efficient discharge of the wide range of Government business is organised and supervised by executive grades. The planning of this work and its execution involves the executive class in the drawing up of detailed instructions implementing the regulations or statutes administered by the Department. The training of clerical staff in their duties and in the general work of the Department is carried out by executive grades. The immediate control and direction of clerical work is in the hands of the basic executive officer and is referred to in more detail in paragraphs 134-135. The relationship between the executive officer grade and the clerical class is, therefore, an important matter involving the question of differentials between supervisory grades and grades engaged upon routine work or work which is covered by well defined instructions. It will be seen from the tables in paragraph 116 that the differentials between the executive officer and clerical officer have been narrowed over a period during which the duties of the executive officer grade have been extended by the transfer of responsibilities formerly carried out by the higher clerical officer on a higher scale of pay.

(2) DETAILED RELATIVITIES WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND CLERICAL STRUCTURE

(a) CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND SENIOR EXECUTIVE OFFICER—PRINCIPAL

122. Chief executive officers are often employed in administrative divisions on work very similar to that of principals in the administrative class. In some Departments the two grades are interchangeable and the Society favours the extension of this arrangement in cases where the work is of a mixed character and cannot be classified as policy work or executive work. The chief executive officer has a lead of £110 at the minimum as compared with the principal but his maximum is £60 lower. The chief executive officer scale is one of six points and the principal scale one of 10 points. The chief executive officer is normally the summit of achievement for the executive entrant and will be attained at a fairly late age. Few will reach this grade and only the very exceptional will go beyond. The principal in the administrative class is the basic grade and is the training ground for those who are destined to reach the highest ranks of the Service.

123. It is, therefore, appropriate to have a shorter scale with a higher minimum for the chief executive officer with longer experience of the Service and who will normally be older than the entrant to the principal scale. In the view of the Society the right relationship would be for the chief executive officer scale to span the top half of the principal scale and for the maxima of the two scales to be identical. The maximum of a scale is the full assessment of its real value and as the responsibilities of these two grades are officially recognised as being similar, the maxima should be the same.

124. The senior executive officer is the main managerial grade of the executive class. In headquarters offices he may be the head of a branch responsible for a particular block of Government business; in the ex-headquarters department he will be the office manager responsible for the administration of the Ministry's work in his area, including the control of a large office staff. Senior executive officers may also be employed on highly specialised duties. These managerial and specialised duties are comparable in responsibility with those of the principal in the administrative class, although different in character.

125. In administrative divisions senior executive officers may work direct to assistant secretaries on "near principal" work. This term is intended to imply work administrative in character but not quite as complex or carrying the full responsibility of the "normal" principal post. In practice it is far from easy to draw a firm dividing line and a senior executive officer operates within an administrative division as a member of the basic grade sharing in much of the work which is done by the administrative class as a whole. In the view of the Society this similarity in the level of responsibility should be reflected in a closer pay relativity. The right relationship would be for the senior executive officer scale to span the lower half of the principal scale and for the minima of the two scales to be the same. The senior executive officer and chief executive officer scales together would thus run in parallel with the principal scale. This relationship would conform with the statement in the Treasury's Factual memorandum (paragraph 268) that "... in many cases jobs are done by chief and senior executive officers which are of the same broad level of responsibility as that of principals".

(b) PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND SENIOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER—
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

126. It is suggested that a similar relationship should be established at a higher level between the next two executive grades (senior chief executive officer and principal executive officer) and the assistant secretary grade in the administrative class. These two grades are referred to in paragraph 268 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum where it is stated that the principal executive officer (deputy accountant general) may be employed on "executive assistant secretary" duties. These grades are engaged in administrative work in regional organisations (regional controller and deputy controller posts) and in some Departments assistant secretaries have been appointed to posts which are normally filled by principal executive officers and which are only partly concerned with policy work. In headquarters offices the two executive grades occupy directing posts (e.g. contracts, supply, finance, etc.) which are equivalent in responsibility to normal assistant secretary posts, involving control of and responsibility for all day-to-day work done in the division. It has already been mentioned that the chief executive officers and principals are recognised as performing similar work and it has been suggested that the maxima of these two scales should be identical. The minimum of the senior chief executive officer (assistant accountant general) scale should, therefore, be higher than the principal maximum and the right relationship would be for the senior chief executive officer scale to span the lower half of the assistant secretary scale. The maxima of the principal executive officer ("executive assistant secretary") and the assistant secretary (administrative class) should be identical and the principal executive officer scale should span the top half of the assistant secretary scale. The senior chief executive officer and principal executive officer scales together would thus run in parallel with the assistant secretary scale. Only the very exceptional members of the class will reach these highest posts and will normally do so late in their careers. Having regard to these factors and to the position of the two grades in the structure, the Commission may feel that it would be appropriate to introduce fixed salaries for the principal executive officer posts and possibly for the senior chief executive officer posts. If fixed salaries are considered to be desirable, it is suggested that the salary for the principal executive officer should be linked with the maximum of the assistant secretary scale and the salary for the senior chief executive officer should be linked with the mid-way point of the assistant secretary scale.

(c) HEADS OF MAJOR ESTABLISHMENTS—UNDER SECRETARY

127. These posts which are normally on a fixed salary are at the top of a hierarchy, e.g. accounts, supply contracts, finance, etc. The establishments concerned are staffed by members of the executive and clerical grades and have no administrative officers. The posts include accountant general, director of contracts, controller of supplies, etc.

128. The heads of establishments are engaged on highly specialised work, but in addition may have responsibility for the administration and control of a large organisation employing several thousands of staff. For example, the director of savings (salary £2,250) has final responsibility for the whole of the Savings Bank

and National Savings Certificate business of the Post Office and for stocks and bonds on the Post Office register. He has under his control 13,000 staff. The clerk to the Special Commissioners (salary £2,100) is responsible to the Board of Inland Revenue for the administration of surtax, upon the assessment and collection of which (and on certain other duties) 1,650 staff are engaged. The clerk's advice will substantially influence any policy decisions regarding fresh or amending legislation. The heads of contract divisions are responsible for the purchase of plant, machinery, equipment, etc. involving the expenditure of vast sums of public money.

129. The fixed salary of a few of these posts (£2,500) is the same as that of the under secretary in the administrative class, reflecting the same broad level of responsibility. In the view of the Society none of these posts should be paid at a lower salary than that of the under secretary and similarity of responsibility should be matched with the same pay. The majority of posts are on salaries below this level and there are a multiplicity of salary rates for posts which are on the same broad level of responsibility. These should be brought up to the under secretary salary.

130. In a number of Departments under secretaries are being employed in posts as heads of major establishments which are at the top of the executive structures in which no administrative staff are employed (e.g. under secretary finance and accountant general; under secretary contracts). The filling of the highest posts in executive establishments with officers from the administrative class causes great resentment among senior members of the executive class with long experience and outstanding qualifications in the highly specialised work involved. The extended use of the executive class at the lower levels of the Service has not been accompanied by a re-examination of grading and structure at the higher levels. There are many posts which have little policy content, but which are administrative in a top management or directive sense and which are at present wrongly classified. It would be in accord with the report of the Reorganisation Committee, 1920, and with the wider use of the executive class since the last war, if the posts at this level of the Service were now reviewed with the object of bringing them within the executive structure at the same salary level as the under secretary.

131. The senior grades of the executive class dealt with in the preceding paragraphs have a horizontal relationship with the principal assistant secretary and under secretary grades in the administrative class because they call for the same level of responsibility.

(d) HIGHER EXECUTIVE OFFICER

132. The higher executive officer has a vertical relativity with both the senior executive officer and the principal. In the managerial sphere the higher executive officer may be described as the assistant manager, operating as the main support both in headquarters offices and in local offices to the manager (senior executive officer). He may be responsible for the control of large blocks of staff and for dealing with matters of greater difficulty referred to him for decision. In offices with a lesser number of staff the higher executive officer will be the manager with complete responsibility for the administration of the business of his Department in his area. In administrative divisions the higher executive officer gives direct support to the principal and assists him in policy work, deputising for him at interviews and committee meetings. The first impact of policy work is felt by the higher executive officer who will be responsible for preparing minutes and memoranda for consideration and decision at a higher level. The higher executive officer grade is also widely used in posts of high individual responsibility and on many specialised duties. The grade is aptly described in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum as a "general purpose" grade.

133. The scale of pay of the higher executive officer should reflect the pivotal position which he occupies in the Civil Service and should preserve an appropriate vertical relativity with the principal and senior executive officer grades. It is suggested that a gap of two increments between the principal/senior executive officer minima and the higher executive officer maximum would establish a fair relationship providing that the length of the scale remains unchanged.

(e) EXECUTIVE OFFICER

134. The executive officer is the basic grade of the class and is employed in almost every Government Department, on duties requiring "qualities of judgment, initiative and resource". He will be engaged in the examination of cases not fully covered by regulations and the immediate direction of small blocks of business. The executive officer is now used for supervisory duties, previously performed by the higher clerical officer grade (scale £655-£800), a job which calls for efficient organisation and ability for handling subordinates.

135. The immediate control and direction of the clerical work in the Civil Service is carried out by the executive officer as the section leader of a group of staff doing work which is within well defined regulations. He may be required to give decisions on points of difficulty in addition to dealing personally with more complicated cases. He is responsible for referring matters of higher importance to his superior officer after making initial investigations. The executive officer grade, therefore, provides the link between the clerical class and the management. He is the first line supervisor and may in smaller offices be the manager, fully responsible for the administration of the Department's business in his area. There is thus a vertical relativity with the clerical class below and with the higher grades of the executive class above. A gap of one increment between the maximum of the executive officer and the minimum of the higher executive officer would satisfactorily reflect the vertical relativity, upwards. The relativity downwards with the clerical class is more difficult to settle because of the different sources of recruitment, at differing ages, to the executive officer grade. The executive officer who is called upon to supervise groups of clerical staff, ought not to receive less pay than the grades under his supervision. This condition has to be considered together with the recruiting arrangements for the grade which include the entry of candidates of school leaving age at the advanced level of education. These factors are dealt with more fully in paragraphs 141-148, where question of the length of the scale is also discussed.

(3) RELATIONSHIP WITH PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL GRADES

136. In addition to the relativity with the administrative and clerical classes there is also a relationship with the professional, scientific and technical grades with whom the executive grades work in close association in certain Departments, such as the Ministry of Supply, Post Office, Ministry of Fuel and Power, Service Departments, Ministry of Works, etc. The executive grades are responsible for establishments' work and administrative duties in factories and other establishments mainly employing members of the professional, scientific and technical grades together with large numbers of industrial staff. The senior officers of the various classes may be responsible to a superintendent and for the effective discharge of their functions it is necessary for purposes of day-to-day working to have some recognised relationship between grades exercising roughly equivalent responsibilities. The great difference in the duties of the classes make close comparisons difficult but in the Ministry of Supply, for example, it is officially recognised that a senior executive officer (£1,030-£1,230) is roughly the equivalent of the manager (engineer I—senior grade, works group (£1,375-£1,575)) and a higher executive officer (£830-£995) is broadly equivalent to the assistant manager (engineer II—main grade, works group (£1,000-£1,320)).

137. The measurement of the disturbance of relativity between professional, scientific and technical grades and the grades of the executive class is complicated by the reorganisation of the professional classes in 1946. In some instances, of course, the present day classifications did not exist in 1939. For example, prior to 1946, the remuneration of architects, engineers and surveyors varied from Department to Department and as between the professions. Uniform rates were not introduced until that year, as part of the scheme of reorganisation by which the works group of professional classes was set up with its three grades of basic, main and senior. Nevertheless, it is still possible for the purposes of comparison to

identify specific Departmental posts which, although now included in or related to the works group classification, existed in 1939. Examples of the disturbance of relativity between these grades and grades of the executive class are included in Appendix B.

138. In addition to establishments in which these classes are in daily contact, members of the executive class in various branches of Departments (e.g. contracts, supply, finance, etc.) have a close working relationship with professional, scientific and technical grades. An appropriate relationship between the classes must be established and maintained if the various grades are to function with the necessary authority and without the present feeling of strong resentment which members of the executive class are experiencing because of the excessive gaps which have been allowed to appear between the pay of equivalent grades.

139. In so far as the improvement of professional and technical salary standards has been the outcome of special enquiry into specific cases (e.g. the Gardiner Committee in respect of the works group), it must be emphasised that the terms of reference were limited to matters relating to the particular grades in question. Consideration of salary relativities with other civil service grades was neither called for nor included in the scope of the enquiries. Nor have such factors had any apparent bearing upon the ultimate recommendations. So far as salaries have been concerned the enquiries have in the main been directed to consideration of the shortage of candidates of the requisite external, professional and technical qualifications; of how to ensure for the Civil Service an adequate share of those who possess such qualifications, leading, consequently, to a comparison of the salary scales of the relevant civil service professional and technical grades with their counterparts outside the Service (a comparison which in the nature of things can more readily be made than in the case of executive grades). There has been no comparable, independent investigation of executive class pay standards.

140. It is not practicable to define precise pay relativities between the executive class and the professional, scientific and technical classes, grade by grade, in the same way as is suggested in paragraphs 122-131 so far as relativity with the administrative class is concerned. Functions interlock, however, at many points and a fair and acceptable relativity should be established. What is required is to establish a broad salary relationship between the classes which will more fairly reflect the relative responsibilities and narrow the excessive differentials between equivalent grades. Revised scales, based upon trends in outside occupations and upon the close relationship at the higher levels with the administrative class, should ensure a satisfactory relativity with these professional categories.

(4) SHORTENING THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER SCALE

141. A brief description of duties has been given and reference has been made in paragraphs 134-135 to the relationship of the executive officer grade with the higher grades of the executive class and with the clerical class under its supervision. Specimen duties are contained in Appendix A.

142. It is a long standing grievance of members of the executive officer grade that the scale is too long and that the full range of responsibilities are assumed several years before the upper range of the scale is reached. It is also a complaint that executive officers are required to control and supervise the work of clerical officers whose salaries are in many instances substantially higher than theirs.

143. The length of the present scale fails to take account of the vast changes in the functions of the grade since the Report of the Reorganisation Committee in 1920 which contemplated that entrants to the grade "should be regarded as members of a training grade". The expansion of the class and the assumption of new duties during the war and since have changed the grade into a basic one engaged on all work appropriate to the executive class and in addition, on the supervision of clerical staff. The reorganisation referred to in paragraphs 275 and 276 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum resulted in the regrading of about

5,500 higher clerical posts as executive officer posts, the latter grade thus absorbing duties previously performed by a grade with a short scale and a considerably higher minimum (£655-£800). The table in paragraph 270 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum shows that in 1952 65·5 per cent. of all vacancies were filled by promotion. For these entrants a short scale is appropriate and but for the regrading of higher clerical posts a high proportion of these promotees would have received the higher starting pay of £655 on promotion from clerical officer. The lower part of the present scale is suitable only for entrants from the examinations with no previous civil service experience. It is submitted, however, that recruitment requirements do not necessitate the excessively long scale now in existence and that it should be shortened by at least four years. In addition, provision should be made for officers who have the necessary experience and who are required to carry out the full responsibilities to receive the rate for the job by being transferred to the upper range of the scale, thus assuring them of a salary which is not less than that of the clerical officer at his maximum. Members of the grade are called upon to fulfil the full duties of the grade long before they reach the maximum of the scale and may receive promotion to the higher executive officer grade when only at a mid-way point on the lower scale.

144. A shortening of this scale would be in accordance with outside practice. In competing occupations scales are generally shorter and the attainment of the maximum rate is more directly related to the assumption of full responsibility. In some professions (e.g. banks) higher increments are granted after a few years' experience and when family responsibilities are increasing. The following information regarding outside practice may assist the Commission:—

Bank employees—Lloyds Bank

As from 1st January, 1952, Lloyds Bank introduced new scales of pay and there has since been a measure of consolidation of cost of living addition with the basic scale. Entry is into grade C and at age 26 the bank official receives an increment of £100 because the bank regards 25-26 as the "marrying age". Lloyds bank clerks who enter grade C will be considerably ahead of executive officers at the same age points from age 26 onwards. For example, at age 30 an executive officer receives £620 whereas a bank clerk grade C receives £726 5s. inclusive of cost of living addition and London allowance. An executive officer reaches his maximum of £800 at age 37 and a grade C Lloyds bank clerk reaches his considerably higher maximum of £875 at age 39.

Other banks

Revised remuneration of employees of other banks has been introduced from 1st January, 1952. It is a common feature of the new arrangements that higher increments are granted at the marrying ages. The following table shows the new practice and the amount of remuneration (inclusive of 10 per cent. cost of living addition) received in each case at age 30 as compared with the executive officer:—

Increments

Age	Executive officer	Barclays	District	Martins	Midland	National Prov.	West-minster
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
24	30	40	30	30	30	30	35
25	25	50	50	50	45	50	45
26	25	50	70	80	75	50	75
27	25	25	30	35	25	65	30

Remuneration inclusive of cost of living addition and London allowance

Age	Executive officer	Barclays	District	Martins	Midland	National Prov.	West-minster
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
30	620	666	688	704	666	682	688

Insurance officials

A leading assurance company has an age scale for a recruitment grade giving increments of £35, £60 and £40 at ages 26, 27 and 28 respectively. A recruit to this grade will, at age 30 receive £680 10s. per annum, inclusive of cost of living addition, compared with £620 in the case of an executive officer. The maximum of £841 inclusive is reached at age 36. The lower executive officer maximum £800 is reached at age 37.

145. The majority of young people entering the executive officer grade are required to take posts away from home and with the existence of upwards of 3,500 separate local offices subsequent transfers of the officer and his family to a new station are normal, and in some areas of the Service, a frequent feature of civil service life. This mobility factor is one which has to be taken into account when determining the pay of all the grades but it is of special significance when settling the scale of the recruitment grade.

146. It is important that the scale of the recruitment grade in the executive class should provide a satisfactory standard of living for family responsibilities and that civil service incremental theory should be adapted to meet practical needs in a period of high living costs. The present scale (19 years) fails to fulfil these conditions.

147. Incremental scales are designed to provide a progressive additional payment in recognition of the increasing value of a service which grows with experience and the increase in knowledge and skill. The maximum of the scale must be closely related to the point at which the value of the service reaches its peak and the full responsibilities of the grade are exercised in the widest sense. If the attainment of the maximum rate is delayed beyond this point, the purpose of incremental progression is lost and the individual officer is paid less than his real worth. While the basic scales of recruitment grades may necessarily be longer than scales of the higher grades, it is fundamentally unsound that such scales should be constructed so as to create a feeling of real injustice among those whose work responsibility and family responsibility are not fairly compensated.

148. In determining the length of the scale, having regard to the need to provide suitable starting pay for the various categories of entrants, it is suggested that the following measures should be considered:—

- Shorten the scale by at least four years by increasing the increments:
- Higher increments at, say, ages 24-25;
- Competition entrants (who enter on age pay) should, on reaching age 26, receive not less than the clerical officer maximum.

(5) TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE GRADES

149. As stated in footnote (iii) to paragraph 267 of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum temporary executive officers are known as temporary assistants. These receive a salary scale identical with that of established executive officers except that the maximum (London, male £745) is two incremental points short.

150. All higher grades of temporary executives (e.g. senior temporary assistants equivalent to established higher executive officers) receive parity of pay with their permanent counterparts. The Society submits that there is no justification for perpetuating the differentiation in respect of temporary assistants but that they should be accorded parity of pay with their established analogues as already obtains, not only in the higher temporary executive ranks, but in many other spheres of the Civil Service.

151. Temporary assistants are engaged upon precisely the same range of duties as established executive officers. The reason which led the Tomlin Commission to urge that it was inappropriate for temporary employees to be on scales of pay involving incremental progression is not applicable in the changed circumstances that now obtain. Their employment has not been of a casual nature for in fact the vast majority who are still in post have served for upwards of ten to twelve years in their "temporary" capacity.

IX. EVIDENCE OF OUTSIDE TRENDS

152. The relationship between the classes proposed in the preceding section is complementary to the maintenance of a fair relativity with outside rates of pay. It has been suggested in an earlier section that in reviewing current standards of civil service pay the Commission should consider whether changes in the pay of the main categories have reflected the general trend of remuneration levels in the country. If the Commission's review should establish that civil service pay has fallen behind pay movements outside, then it would be proper to bring Service rates of pay into line, bearing in mind the need for a suitable relationship between the pay of the main categories.

153. Reference has been made to the difficulties encountered by the Society in endeavouring to fulfil the requirements of the Tomlin formula. It is not therefore possible to present a comprehensive picture of wage and salary movements, but in the hope that it may assist the Commission, evidence obtained by the Society is summarised in the tables following paragraph 160 below. The Commission will, no doubt, wish themselves to collect further information regarding movements in rates of pay outside.

154. Table IV summarises information collated by the Society. Table V is based upon an investigation carried out for the Society by the "Economist" Intelligence Unit, a body of independent experts. The method adopted by the Unit in its investigation is outlined in its reports to the Society, viz.:—

- (a) A description of the general nature of the duties of the relevant civil service grades had been taken as a base.
- (b) Each organisation had been contacted personally, with the object of determining a representative department, the personnel of which could be legitimately compared with the main divisions with which the Society's enquiry was concerned.

155. In practice, the Unit stated, civil service nomenclature was found to be an unsuitable guide to the determination of comparable grades in private industry and that simpler definitions used fairly widely throughout private industry, had been adopted, viz. clerical, section leader, assistant departmental manager and departmental manager, the last three named being broadly equivalent to executive officer, higher executive officer and senior executive officer respectively. Even these definitions alone, however, were not found wholly satisfactory insofar as the responsibility of the departmental manager varied widely both between one organisation and another and within a single firm. The Unit therefore sought to discover by personal discussion with representatives of the firm concerned a "mean" department where the responsibilities of its personnel would be comparable with the civil service grades under examination and, by inference, with the representative department chosen in other firms. In practice it was found that in the majority of cases,

but not all, the accounts department provided the most satisfactory representative department. The chosen departments of the samples finally selected were those where it was possible to avoid highly specialised jobs peculiar to particular industries and where the work undertaken admitted to valid comparison with the work of civil service grades, the routine supervision of staff, the type of decision taken, etc. being broadly comparable.

156. To this explanation the Unit added that it would be obvious, owing to the variety of types of organisation contacted that, despite the care taken to obtain representative salary figures *any comparison of the absolute level of salaries between private industry, the public boards and the Civil Service could at best be extremely arbitrary, that there was undoubtedly room for quite a large margin of error in the comparison of absolute salary levels or salary maxima, but whatever the margin of error on the comparison of absolute salary levels it would not invalidate the following important results:—*

- (a) *the percentage increases in salary between 1939 and for each grade of staff, and*
- (b) *the differential between one grade and the next in each of those years, which would show the extent to which those differentials had narrowed or widened since 1939.*

157. The Unit contacted 50 firms, nationalised industries, public boards, etc., in order to secure a good cross section of occupations throughout British industry. About 30 of these firms co-operated in providing information on salary levels. From the information furnished the Unit concluded that the most accurate and useful analysis could be obtained by taking six representative firms, engaged in different industries, which had been able to furnish all the information requested. These six firms are considered by the Unit as representative of firms paying similar salaries and as reflecting most accurately the "general trend" and the current situation.

158. Symptomatic of the reluctance of business firms to publicise their staff salaries, to which reference has already been made, the Unit informed the Society that the information had only been forthcoming on an undertaking that the identity of the firms concerned was not disclosed and it was therefore debarred from giving the names, even to the Society. They were therefore designated anonymously as A, B, C, D, E and F. It was later ascertained, without associating any particular company with any specific letter in such a way as might virtually serve to identify it and thus constitute a breach of confidence, that these firms included a large oil concern, two large companies dealing with chemical products, another dealing with rubber products, one of the largest insurance companies and a textile firm.

159. Although not able to give a complete breakdown of the numbers of staff involved in each grade, in grand total the Unit states that the number of staff included in its survey was between 8,000 to 10,000. As it appears that about half of these were clerical workers the salary figures given in the following paragraph would relate to between 4,000 and 5,000 staff broadly comparable to civil service executive grades.

160. The Unit stresses that its findings in the six selected firms, details of which are given in the following tables, relate to male staff only and, with one exception, to the London area only. The figures are those of basic salaries only, including such cost of living allowances as have become a semi-permanent feature of the salary scale (i.e. comparable with civil service pay addition), but no account has been taken of overtime, occasional bonuses, expense accounts, travelling concessions, car allowances, canteen facilities, luncheon vouchers or the like.

TABLE IV
INFORMATION REGARDING OUTSIDE TRENDS OBTAINED BY THE SOCIETY OF CIVIL SERVANTS

Outside Occupation	Salary Maxima					Per-centage increase
	1939	1940	1952	1953	1954	
BANKS						
<i>(a) Basic grade</i>						
Barclays	360	—	—	710	—	97
Lloyds	360	—	—	875	—	143
Midland	385	—	—	710	—	84
National Provincial	410	—	—	710	—	73
Westminster	390	—	—	710	—	82
<i>(b) Managers</i>						
Manager A	—	692	1,329	—	—	92
Manager B	—	638	1,381	—	—	116
Manager C	—	764	1,582	—	—	107
Manager D	—	763	1,697	—	—	122
Manager E	—	740	1,325	—	—	79
INSURANCE COMPANIES						
Company A	400	—	—	—	841	110
Company B	360	—	—	736	—	104
Company C	355	—	—	684	—	93
Manager 1	—	650	1,164	—	—	79
Manager 2	—	711	1,312	—	—	85
Manager 3	—	651	1,294	—	—	98
Manager 4	—	542	879	—	—	62
Manager 5	—	758	1,230	—	—	62
Manager 6	—	717	1,309	—	—	82
L.C.C.						
Principal assistant (a)	900	—	—	1,332	—	48
Principal assistant (b)	780	—	—	1,168	—	50
Senior assistant	650	—	—	1,027	—	58
First class assistant (a)	500	—	—	862	—	72
LONDON TRANSPORT						
Senior clerical assistant	450	—	—	—	783	74
PORT OF LONDON AUTHORITY						
Clerical officer I	420	—	—	—	706	68
Senior clerical officer	500	—	—	—	837	67

TABLE V
INFORMATION REGARDING OUTSIDE TRENDS FURNISHED BY THE "ECONOMIST" INTELLIGENCE UNIT. HEAD OF SMALL SECTION (executive officer)
Maximum of Annual Salary

Company	1939	1952	1954	Percentage increase over 1939
A	£ 706	£ 800	£ 800	13·3
B	360	825	900	150·0
C	300	550	Not available	—
D	500	880		94·0
E	360	625		94·4
F	345	900	900	160·9
Average A to F (except C) ...				102·5

ASSISTANT DEPARTMENTAL MANAGERS (higher executive officer)

Maximum of Annual Salary

Company	1939	1952	1954	Percentage increase over 1939
	£	£	£	
A	890	1,020	1,020	14·6
B	460	1,050	1,150	150·0
C	450	700	Not available	—
D	600	1,045	1,150	91·7
E	600	975	1,050	75·0
F	500	1,300	1,300	160·0
Average A to F (except C) ...				98·3

DEPARTMENTAL MANAGERS (senior executive officer)

Maximum of Annual Salary

Company	1939	1952	1954	Percentage increase over 1939
	£	£	£	
A	964	1,180	1,180	22·4
B	675	1,420	1,600	137·0
C	650	1,000	Not available	—
D	700	1,155	1,275	82·1
E	825	1,450	1,600	93·9
F	750	2,000	2,000	166·7
Average A to F (except C) ...				100·4

161. The relevant comparisons of the average percentage increases shown in the above tables are as follows:—

	Percentage increase at the maximum over 1939
Head of section (or section leader)	102·5
Executive officer	52
Assistant departmental manager	98·3
Higher executive officer	53
Departmental manager	100·4
Senior executive officer	43

162. The Unit's report on the changes in differential between grades is contained in Table VI below. *The most significant feature is the marked widening back of the differentials almost to the pre-war structure. This development reveals a deliberate policy of restoring the incentive to promotion and additional responsibility.*

TABLE VI

INFORMATION FURNISHED BY THE "ECONOMIST" INTELLIGENCE UNIT OF CHANGES IN THE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE GRADES INCLUDED IN TABLE V.

Company	Departmental manager	Assistant departmental manager	Differential as percentage of higher grade	Section leader	Differential as percentage of higher grade	Clerical	Differential as percentage of higher grade
	£ per annum	£ per annum		£ per annum		£ per annum	
A { 1939 ...	964	890	7.7	706	20.7	669	5.2
1947 ...	867	743	14.3	620	16.6	559	10.0
1952 ...	1,180	1,020	13.6	800	21.6	690	13.8
1954 ...	1,180	1,020	13.6	800	21.6	690	13.8
B { 1939 ...	675	460	31.9	360	21.7	250	30.6
1947 ...	950	740	22.1	575	22.3	400	30.4
1952 ...	1,420	1,050	26.1	825	21.4	625	24.2
1954 ...	1,600	1,150	28.2	900	21.8	660	26.6
C { 1939 ...	650	450	30.8	300	33.3	150	50.0
1947 ...	800	600	25.0	450	25.0	290	35.6
1952 ...	1,000	700	30.0	550	21.4	364	33.8
1954 ...				Not available			
D { 1939 ...	700	600	14.3	500	16.7	325	35.0
1947 ...	850	750	11.8	650	13.3	450	30.8
1952 ...	1,155	1,045	9.5	880	15.8	600	31.8
1954 ...	1,275	1,150	9.8	970	15.6	660	32.0
E { 1939 ...	825	600	27.3	360	40.0	296	17.8
1947 ...	1,100	800	27.3	500	37.5	426	14.8
1952 ...	1,450	975	32.8	625	35.9	500	20.0
1954 ...	(1,600)	1,050	34.3	700	33.3	525	25.0
F { 1939 ...	750	500	33.3	345	31.0	210	39.1
1947 ...	1,375	970	29.5	810	16.5	445	45.1
1952 ...	2,000	1,300	35.0	900	30.8	500	44.4
1954 ...	2,000	1,300	35.0	900	30.8	500	44.4
Average A to F							
1939 ...			24.2		27.2		29.6
1947 ...			21.7		21.9		27.8
1952 ...			24.5		24.5		28.0
1954 (except C)			24.2		24.6		28.4

163. In making comparisons with remuneration outside the Civil Service, account should be taken of the extent to which bonuses, expense accounts, luncheon vouchers, etc. augment basic pay in many companies. For example, many firms provide free or subsidized meals for their employees. A survey of the practice of large employers in industry by the Institute of Personnel Management showed that in 1952 the average charge to the staff was about 1s. 0d. to 1s. 3d. for a subsidized three course meal. The report stated that there was a definite trend towards an even greater reduction of the cost to the employee. Information supplied recently to the Society shows that a considerable number of firms issue vouchers of 3s. 0d. or more to all employees. That this practice is now widespread is shown by information given to the Society to the effect that one firm of caterers in the City of London accepts luncheon vouchers from 67 different firms. Branches of certain large catering firms are open at lunch time exclusively to serve voucher

holders only. Such arrangements represent a valuable tax free addition to basic pay and together with travelling concessions assume greater importance than hitherto when making comparisons between rates of pay inside and outside the Service.

X. PURCHASING POWER OF EXECUTIVE CLASS SALARIES

164. Evidence has been produced in the preceding paragraphs to show the extent to which the salaries of executive grades have failed to keep pace with outside trends. The serious reduction in the standard of living of members of the executive class is revealed by the following tables which show the purchasing power of executive class salaries in 1953 as compared with 1938 and 1946. The tables also show the salaries which would be necessary to restore 1938 and 1946 values. The fall in the value of the £ sterling is one of the reasons which have led to the Select Committee on Members' Expenses etc. to recommend an increase in the annual payment to Members of Parliament.

1938 Purchasing power of £1 sterling in December, 1953 = 44 per cent.

Grade	1953 Salary	1938 Purchasing power	1939 Salary	Salary necessary to restore 1938 value
E.O.	800	352	525	1,193
H.E.O.	995	438	650	1,477
S.E.O.	1,230	541	860	1,955
C.E.O.	1,510	664	1,050	2,386
S.C.E.O.	1,562	687	1,200	2,727
P.E.O.	2,000	880	1,450	3,295

1946 Purchasing power of £1 sterling in December, 1953 = 70 per cent.

Grade	1953 Salary	1946 Purchasing power	1.1.47 Salary	Salary necessary to restore 1946 value
E.O.	800	560	625	893
H.E.O.	995	697	750	1,071
S.E.O.	1,230	861	965	1,379
C.E.O.	1,510	1,057	1,160	1,657
S.C.E.O.	1,562	1,093	1,320	1,885
P.E.O.	2,000	1,400	1,600	2,286

165. It will be observed from these figures that in terms of real value the maximum of the higher executive officer is today less than the pre-war maximum of the basic grade of executive officer and even that of the senior executive officer. In other words, the reward of two successive promotions above the basic grade, and for the additional responsibilities that accompany such advancement, has been almost entirely whittled away. Such promotions have, in fact, failed to assure to the promotee even the preservation of the standard of living that he would in pre-war days have enjoyed as an executive officer.

XI. DETERMINATION OF THE FUTURE RATES OF PAY OF EXECUTIVE GRADES

166. In considering what changes are desirable in the rates of pay at present in force for the executive grades, the Commission is invited to take fully into account the suggestions put forward by the Society in this memorandum:—

- (1) Whether changes in pay of the executive grades have reflected the general trend of wage levels in the country (paragraphs 94-102; see also paragraphs 152-163 *re* evidence of outside trends).

- (2) The value of the work to the State (paragraphs 5-9 and description of duties and responsibilities—paragraphs 10-50).
- (3) Recruitment and career considerations (paragraphs 108-114).
- (4) Internal relativities (general—paragraphs 115-118)—
 - (a) Relativities within the administrative, executive and clerical structure (paragraphs 119-121).
 - (b) Detailed relativities within the administrative, executive and clerical structure (paragraphs 122-135).
 - (c) Relationship with professional, scientific and technical grades (paragraphs 136-140).
- (5) Shortening the executive officer scale (paragraphs 141-148).
- (6) Equal pay for temporary executive grades (paragraphs 149-151).

167. In recent years the pay of executive grades has been supplemented by extra duty allowance payable to those who are regularly working more than conditioned hours. The standard working hours are $45\frac{1}{2}$ weekly. The total earnings of the grades concerned are shown in Appendix E of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum. This extra payment has tended to obscure the serious inadequacy of the basic scales and total earnings have come to be regarded as real remuneration. If the Commission decide to bring actual hours of work into line with conditioned hours, then the loss of extra duty allowance should be taken fully into account in fixing the normal rates of pay.

APPENDIX A

EXAMPLES OF DUTIES PERFORMED BY MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE CLASS

Management

1	Senior executive officer...	...	...	Manager of local office, Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
2	Principal executive officer	...	...	Regional controller, Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
3	Grade 3 officer (departmental grade)...	...	...	Manager of Employment Exchange, Ministry of Labour and National Service
4	H.M. inspector of taxes (departmental grade)	...	...	Local Tax Office, Inland Revenue Department

Administration

5	Higher executive officer	...	...	H.M. Treasury
6	Higher executive officer	...	...	Board of Trade
7	Chief executive officer	...	...	General Post Office
8	Principal executive officer	...	...	Director of Export Services, Board of Trade

Contracts

9	Senior chief executive officer	...	...	Assistant director, Ministry of Supply
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Supply

10	Senior chief executive officer	...	...	Superintending naval store officer, Admiralty
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Accounts and Audit

11	Senior executive officer...	...	...	Inland Revenue
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Interpretation and Application of Law and Regulation

12	Higher executive officer	...	...	Customs and Excise Department
13	Executive officer...	...	...	Inland Revenue

Statistics

14	Executive officer...	...	...	Ministry of Food
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Special Duties

15	Executive officer...	...	...	Visiting officer, National Assistance Board
16	Chief executive officer	...	...	Command secretary, War Department

MANAGEMENT

1—SENIOR EXECUTIVE OFFICER—MINISTRY OF PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE—LOCAL OFFICE

The manager in a National Insurance Office is the civil service counterpart of the bank manager or the insurance company manager. His grading will vary according to the size of the office. The example quoted is a senior executive officer. Such an officer will have staff varying from 34 to 100.

His broad responsibility is to see that the local population receive their due under the various Insurance Acts.

This includes the payment of :—

- Sickness benefit
- Injury benefit
- Maternity benefit
- Disablement benefit
- Pensions (including retirement and widow's pensions)
- Family allowances
- Death grant

The local office is also responsible for :—

- Ensuring the payment of contributions
- Investigating cases of non compliance with the Acts
- Enquiries relating to classification and insurability
- Card exchanges

The manager must know the capabilities of his staff and see that they are trained so that he can switch their duties to meet sick absences and work fluctuations.

The manner which staff adopt towards the public is bound to be influenced by the manager. It is his duty to see that the public is dealt with courteously and efficiently.

He can only exercise control if he is familiar with all Acts and Rules dealing with the various types of benefit. He has, however, to take a special interest in financial control. This he exercises by directly controlling the finance office and making a daily percentage check of all benefit payments. He also takes a personal interest in cases involving the fraudulent receipt of a benefit or the failure of an individual to pay the appropriate contribution required by the National Insurance Acts.

Like the executive officer who serves as local insurance officer, the manager has power of adjudication on claims. He is regarded as the Ministry's representative locally and as such attends meetings of the local advisory committee.

In a joint local office where the experiment of merging with the Ministry of Labour is carried out his responsibilities are even wider. In addition to his other duties he is expected to maintain good relations with employers in the district and to do everything possible to facilitate placing of suitable workers in jobs notified to his office. He must attend meetings of the local employment committee and may also attend meetings of the local employers' federation, the Rotary Club and similar bodies.

He may also serve on committees dealing with youth employment and the placing of disabled people in employment and he must do everything within his power to ensure that Government policy in placing elderly workers, ex-convicts and various special categories is carried out. He must pay particular regard to the need for skilled workers in industries engaged on work of national importance.

MANAGEMENT

2—REGIONAL CONTROLLER—(PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER) MINISTRY OF PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE

A regional controller in the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance controls a region with anything from 50 to 150 local offices dealing with the local administration of:

- (a) war pensions;
- (b) benefits under the National Insurance (including Industrial Injuries) Acts; and
- (c) family allowances.

The staff controlled in a region varies between 1,000 and 3,000.

The controller, where necessary through his staff at the regional office, exercises the following functions:

1. supervises and controls the organisation, co-ordination and efficiency of the work in the local offices;
2. advises the local offices on the interpretation of headquarters instructions and ensures uniformity of treatment;
3. advises on difficult cases submitted by local offices;
4. keeps headquarters divisions informed about the general effect in the region of carrying out the Ministry's policy;
5. subject to approval of headquarters and the Ministry of Works deals with the opening of new offices and the closing or removal of existing offices;
6. subject to the existing policy laid down by headquarters controls the staff of the region by
 - (a) the determination and calculation of the complements of the regional office, local offices and war pensions offices;
 - (b) survey of the work and staffing needs of all offices under his control;
 - (c) the transfer of staff within the region;
 - (d) arranging for the necessary training of staff either at the regional training centre or within the local offices, and
 - (e) the keeping of the necessary staff records.
7. supervises the arrangements for local advisory committees appointed to advise on questions bearing on the administration of the Acts and also for local appeal tribunals;
8. in conjunction with the senior medical officer makes arrangements for the medical boarding of war pensioners and industrial disablement pensioners, and also the Medical Appeal Tribunal.

Periodical conferences of regional controllers and senior headquarters officers are held at the headquarters of the Ministry. At these meetings controllers are given information on policy and keep in touch with the situation in the Ministry as a whole. They also keep headquarters aware of the conditions in the regions and of the manner in which the work is being carried out by local offices and generally take part in the formation of the Ministry's policy on the conduct of work in regions and local offices.

MANAGEMENT

3—GRADE 3 OFFICER—(EQUIVALENT TO SENIOR EXECUTIVE OFFICER)—EMPLOYMENT EXCHANGE MANAGER, MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE

The Exchange manager is responsible to the regional controller for the whole work of his office and for the proper employment of the staff allocated to him. He must follow standardised procedures and keep in line with departmental employment policy which changes according to the economic and industrial state of the country. He has full discretion in the organisation of his office and the allocation of duties.

The basic managerial work is the organisation of the functions of the office described in paragraph 49. Most of these functions have some managerial content even if it only means checking certain work including the proper accounting of the large sums of cash handled weekly.

The more specialised duties of the manager are to build up good relations with employers, to ascertain their labour needs and relate these to national employment policy and so organise vacancy work in the office to fill the needs in accordance with priorities. He must advocate employment policy in public, e.g. recently by expounding and explaining policy regarding the employment of the older worker. He must give publicity to the Exchange services and ensure that the specialised services of the Department, such as industrial rehabilitation and training for employment, are known of and used by those likely to benefit from them. He meets other managers regularly to discuss policy and in this way experience is brought to bear on and to influence departmental policy.

He is the secretary to the local employment committee and takes part in the specialised work of the disabled advisory committee in his own area.

A large (actual) grade 3 office has in addition to the manager the following staff—grade 4 officers, 5; grade 5 officers, 38; grade 6 officers, 134; other staff, 83; total 261. In medium sized offices the grade 3 manager might have 16-17 executive staff and over 80 clerical and other staff.

MANAGEMENT

4—H.M. INSPECTOR OF TAXES (EQUIVALENT TO HIGHER EXECUTIVE OFFICER)
LOCAL TAX OFFICE, INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT

At least one inspector of taxes is allocated to each of the 658 Income Tax districts situated all over Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The duties of an inspector of taxes in one of these local offices, subject to the overall control of the district inspector in charge (normally H.M. senior inspector of taxes—approximately senior chief executive officer), entail:—

1. Organisation and management of staffs varying in total between 20 and 100, composed of executive, clerical and sub-clerical grades. This embraces allocation of district work, control and discipline of staff, training, welfare, responsibility for completion of programme, interpretation of instructions, acting as certifying officer on annual reports on staff, and recruitment of temporary staff.
2. Since the reorganisation of the branch in 1948, the following additional duties are now performed by inspectors of taxes:—
 - (a) Signature and scrutiny of letters to the public.
 - (b) Signature of reports to various head offices.
 - (c) Opening of post from head office.
 - (d) Signature of repayment orders.
 - (e) Signature of assessments under Schedules A, B and E.
 - (f) Control of official bank account.
 - (g) Authorisation of discharge and stand-over orders without limit.
3. The inspector of taxes is also responsible for a variety of complex casework, for example:—
 - (1) Directors expenses and benefits in kind (Chapter 2, Part VI, Income Tax Act, 1952).
 - (2) Other expenses claims above executive officer level.
 - (3) Back duty cases (Secs. 29 and 30, Income Tax Act, 1952) including those involving penalties.
 - (4) Involved residence cases, and double taxation relief cases.
 - (5) Interviewing contentious taxpayers.

The examples only illustrate a small percentage of the cases of considerable complexity which are regarded as requiring the attention of an officer senior to executive officer, and which necessitate a thorough knowledge of the income tax and finance Acts and the case law relating thereto.

ADMINISTRATION

5.—HIGHER EXECUTIVE OFFICER—H.M. TREASURY

The normal function of a higher executive officer in the Treasury is to act as an assistant to an administrative principal. A typical example is to be found in the social services division which is responsible for advising Treasury Ministers on the policy and finance of the social services, including housing and education.

A higher executive officer in this division, working to an administrative principal, deals with Government expenditure on the public education system, the universities, the Arts Council, U.N.E.S.C.O., museums, galleries and libraries and grants to learned bodies. The work involves both a knowledge of the services concerned and an understanding of broad economic trends, of Parliamentary Supply and Bill procedure, and of financial control of central and local bodies. The higher executive officer examines all proposals from the Departments and bodies concerned for new developments and expenditure, including their annual Civil Estimates (totalling over £300 million). After consulting with other Treasury divisions, when necessary, and the Department concerned, he decides whether a proposal should be referred to higher authority (in which case he makes a recommendation as to the action to be taken) or whether it is a matter on which he himself can properly make the decision. He drafts letters, briefs and answers to Parliamentary Questions, and is secretary to an independent committee dealing with works of art.

ADMINISTRATION

6.—HIGHER EXECUTIVE OFFICER—BOARD OF TRADE

The higher executive officer in a commercial relations and exports department section, is responsible for preparing draft replies to Parliamentary Questions, Minister's correspondence and other correspondence at the higher official levels. Draft briefs are also prepared for inter-departmental discussions and for discussions with representatives of the foreign governments at higher (including ministerial) level. In most sections, the higher executive officer will also prepare the briefs for bilateral trade negotiations and will usually act as secretary to the discussions. These briefs cover not only the factual background but also propose the attitude to be adopted on the matters under discussion. They may also suggest further items for discussion.

The officer sends requests to overseas officers to make representations official or unofficial to the Governments of the country they work in. Where the requests are related to minor matters the higher executive officer would sign but requests on major matters would be submitted in draft for approval and signature at higher level.

The officer conducts correspondence with firms and trade associations in the United Kingdom, and with overseas officers, about the regulations affecting import trade in the countries concerned. This is mainly factual, but includes the formulation of statements of the policy both of the foreign government and of our own. Arrangements are made for the presentation of evidence against tariff increases proposed in the foreign country, including advice to trade organisations on the contents and presentation of their briefs. Factual economic information about the countries with which the section deals is collected by the officer and supplied to the trade, to other Government Departments and internally in the Department.

ADMINISTRATION

7.—CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER—ESTABLISHMENTS BRANCH—HEADQUARTERS
GENERAL POST OFFICE

Working directly to the assistant secretary in charge of establishments branch (G) there are two chief executive officers and three administrative principals. They enjoy similar delegated authority for communication with the Treasury and staff associations and for the purpose of granting concessions to staff associations where Treasury authority is not involved. During periods of absence these five officers share each others work without regard to grading.

The chief executive officer, chosen for illustration, deals with the following subjects.

Grading of work in the manipulative field, i.e., postal, counter and writing, telegraph, wireless and telephone grades (but not engineering grades), including creation of allowances for special work or responsibilities. Supervising complements in the manipulative field. This involves determination of standards, and actual authorisation of specific posts the creation of which is reserved to headquarters.

Hours of work of manipulative grades and supervisors. This involves dealing with claims for reductions of gross and net hours, for five attendance weeks, and the like.

Annual leave and privilege holidays of all manipulatives and other supervisors and engineering grades up to assistant engineers.

Pay of certain small grades, e.g., hostel grades, caretaker operators, matron, etc.

His duties include representing his branch at meetings where the assistant secretary does not attend. These meetings might be conferences of regional staff controllers or postal controllers or telecommunications controllers. He would be responsible for explaining his branch's policy or, perhaps, putting forward new proposals and hearing the controllers' views. Another committee he might attend is the Standing Committee on estimates. Here he would defend the estimated expenditure arising from his branch's policy.

When his subject is involved in a dispute it is necessary for him to attend the Civil Service Arbitration Court, as one of a team of official witnesses.

The General Post Office attaches great importance to joint consultation which it faithfully practices. The chief executive officer may from time to time act as chairman of joint working parties, on which staff associations are represented, when subjects, such as grading of certain telegraph work, are being considered. He will also receive deputations from the headquarters of staff associations to discuss issues which whilst important are not held to warrant the attention of the assistant secretary.

Finally, he may be required to sit on headquarters promotion boards for promotion to executive officer and higher executive officer.

ADMINISTRATION

8.—DIRECTOR OF EXPORT SERVICES (PRINCIPLE EXECUTIVE OFFICER) BOARD OF TRADE

The director of the export services branch of the commercial relations and exports department of the Board of Trade is responsible for a staff of 250 executive and clerical officers. The function of management is, therefore, an important part of his work.

The branch provides exporters with overseas commercial intelligence, assists them in finding agents, supplies them with status reports on traders abroad and so on. In exercising these functions it works in close collaboration with administrative branches of the Board and other Departments dealing with general policy questions. The director is frequently called upon to advise and give an opinion on problems or developments under consideration in the policy Departments. He attends meetings, departmental and interdepartmental, and with the representatives of organised industry, together with assistant secretaries of other interested branches, sharing equally in the discussions.

The export services branch works in concert with the Trade Commissioner Service in the Commonwealth and commercial officers of the Foreign Service.

Export promotion policy, as laid down at under secretary level and above, is inevitably very general in character. The implementation of this policy, therefore, gives rise to innumerable problems. The director will suggest solutions and is responsible for implementing decisions taken. In this field he works directly to the under secretary. The director deals on his own initiative with requests from Government representatives abroad at assistant secretary and under secretary level, for guidance upon the line they should take on individual export promotion problems and procedural questions.

The needs of exporters change from time to time and it is necessary to devise new ways of meeting them within the framework of the Board of Trade and the overseas services. The director is expected to formulate proposals either on his own initiative or in response to demands from industry.

The director interviews the higher officers of companies who seek assistance, information or advice on overseas export problems. He also confers with the officers of trade organisations who ask for market information to be provided specially for their industries and so on. He addresses meetings of associations, export groups, etc., on the export services of the Board of Trade.

CONTRACTS

9.—ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF CONTRACTS—(SENIOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER) MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

The assistant director is in charge of branches which, in the course of a year may issue contracts worth tens of millions of pounds.

He personally has at present power to negotiate, sign and settle contracts up to £100,000.

The pre-war limits were £5,000 in the War Office and £20,000 in the Air Ministry. While the basis of Government purchases is by competitive tender, for at least 50 per cent. of the contracts (by number), the nature of the articles purchased is such that competition is either not available or impracticable. The assistant director of contracts must be satisfied with and be able to justify the reasons for non-competitive purchasing.

Price negotiations in a large proportion of non-competitive cases are handled by the assistant director of contracts personally.

Once a contract has been placed, it is the duty of contract officers of all ranks to see the terms are fulfilled. A good proportion of the time of an assistant director is spent considering cases in which the contractor either disagrees with the interpretation of the terms of a contract or endeavours to obtain some benefit to which he is not, apparently, entitled by the terms of his contract. Consideration of these cases must be thorough and searching since very considerable sums of money may be involved. It is quite usual for amounts of £50,000 or more to depend on the correct assessment of the merits or demerits of one claim.

He has to deal with the directing personnel in industry and often in addition with the accountants, solicitors, engineers and selling organisations. He does not have to be an accountant, solicitor or engineer but requires a working knowledge of accountancy and contract law as well as some appreciation of the technical and engineering difficulties involved.

He is expected to be able to act if necessary and to the fullest extent in the absence of his immediate superior—the deputy director. He commits the public to considerable expenditure and is expected to get fair and reasonable settlements in all cases although he may be faced by the cleverest, toughest and most skilled negotiators in industry. He has no powers to force a contractor to accept anything and must negotiate all contracts or agreements on the basis of a contract freely entered into by two willing parties.

An assistant director of contracts is generally accepted as an equal by the directors and top executives in industry and expected to be able not only to put the Government case but ready to appreciate the difficulties of the other side.

SUPPLY

10.—SUPERINTENDING NAVAL STORE OFFICER (SENIOR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER) (H.M. DOCKYARD—CHATHAM)

The naval store department at a Home dockyard is responsible for

- (a) the receipt, custody including preservation, and issue of general stores, electrical stores and fuel as required to maintain H.M. ships and establishments attached to the port and for the dockyard programme of repair and construction;
- (b) the supply of such stores to other specified users, e.g., yards abroad, Commonwealth navies, N.A.T.O. powers;
- (c) the estimation, in conjunction with professional departments where necessary, of requirements of such stores and control of issues;
- (d) the operational control and maintenance of naval motor transport attached to the port;
- (e) the control of rail traffic within the dockyard and liaison with British Railways;
- (f) loading and discharge of Royal Fleet auxiliary store carriers and agency work for all Royal Fleet auxiliaries visiting the port;
- (g) the organisation of fuelling programmes and the operation of fuelling craft;
- (h) the sale of surplus or unserviceable equipment, scrap metal, etc.;
- (i) discharge of commercial colliers and distribution of coal and coke to ships and shore establishments;
- (j) the operation and administration of store carrying yard craft, hiring of commercial lighters where necessary and scrutiny of accounts for such hirings.

The superintending naval store officer has a direct operational responsibility to the admiral superintendent of the yard (usually a vice-admiral) and a functional responsibility to the director of naval stores, Admiralty. He is personally responsible to those authorities for all that goes on in his department. The size of the naval store department varies with the particular functions of the dockyard concerned but the following statistics concerning the yard at Chatham are typical.

Value of stock held	...	...	...	...	£10m. approx.
Total covered accommodation	...	...	...	...	1,050,000 sq. ft.
Number of active stock items	...	...	...	...	80,000 approx.
Industrial staff	...	...	...	...	1,100 approx.
Non-industrial staff	...	...	...	...	248
Motor vehicles	...	...	...	...	140
Rail trucks	...	...	...	...	375

In addition, Chatham is responsible for a major oil fuel depot which not only stores some thousands of tons of oil and meets fleet requirements, but undertakes considerable work on behalf of major oil companies.

The activity of the organisation can be measured by the following figures:

Value of receipts from contractors	£7m. per annum approx.
Total tonnage shipped	65,000 tons per annum approx.
Total tonnage loaded into Royal Fleet auxiliary store carriers by labour under supervision of the superintending naval store officer ...	57,000 tons per annum approx.
Tonnage of coal issued	49,000 per annum

The superintending naval store officer must be highly skilled in industrial and personnel management. He is directly responsible for the maintenance of staff relations within his department, is Chairman of the Departmental Whitley Committees and a member of the Official Side of the Yard Whitley Committee. He must be acquainted with statutory rules, etc., concerning the employment of labour.

He must have a wide knowledge of materials and equipment and of modern techniques in materials handling, preservation and stowage. He must be well acquainted with stores accounting procedure, methods of stock control, and office mechanisation. He must be acquainted with the rules governing the carriage of goods by road, rail and sea and with the practical aspects of ship loading and discharge. He is responsible for ensuring compliance with Customs Regulations concerning shipment from and into the United Kingdom.

As transport officer he has to maintain and run a fleet of motor vehicles to meet the naval requirements of the port and to ensure their economic employment. He must be acquainted with current road traffic regulations and is responsible for ensuring that drivers and vehicles comply. He has on his staff a technical officer to advise on technical matters.

As the authority on supplies and transport, the superintending naval store officer is required to advise the naval staff on logistics. He is a member of the Port Mobilisation Committee and the Command Motor Transport Committee.

As resident manager of a department he must be prepared to handle any emergency situation which may arise at any hour such as the organisation of the store carrying service which maintained supplies to the Isle of Sheppey during the floods, the salvage of valuable stores from fire or the breaking down of a burning coal stack.

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

11.—SENIOR EXECUTIVE OFFICER—AUDIT DIVISION—ACCOUNTANT AND COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S OFFICE—INLAND REVENUE

The duty of the audit division is to conduct audit operations designed to discover (and incidentally to deter) any fraudulent activities on the part of officers of the Department or members of the public in relation to the receipt and payment of tax and other moneys.

At the present time, the work consists mainly of the following operations:

- (a) the examination at the employer's premises, and in Revenue offices, of records and documents relating to emoluments paid and tax deducted under P.A.Y.E.;
- (b) the audit of claims to repayment of Income Tax and to payment of Post War Credits;
- (c) the audit of departmental records relating to the local collection of Income Tax.

Each senior executive officer is responsible for a section of the headquarters work and for a number of audit centres. The staff supervised varies from 35 to 55.

Besides referring to the senior executive officer any case of difficulty in principle or procedure, his staff are required to submit to him all cases of serious irregularity, whether or not fraud is suspected. In cases of this type thrown up by the P.A.Y.E. audit, the senior executive officer decides whether punitive action (by way of criminal proceedings or the recovery of penalties) is appropriate. If so, he submits to higher authority; otherwise he gives instructions for such local action as may be required to put matters right. In examining these cases he is concerned to see that all relevant facts have been ascertained and, where appropriate, that the evidence for legal proceedings has been assembled. This work involves the exercise of acumen and judgment; it does not lend itself to close and exhaustive definition in instructions, particularly as the essential facts are derived from employers' records and personal statements of great diversity in character and form.

Action on similar lines is taken in cases of irregularity in the other fields of audit.

One of the senior officers is responsible for drafting general instructions, and amendments thereto, setting out the current requirements of the law and giving practical directions and suggestions for carrying out the various duties.

The senior executive officers must be familiar with the relevant Acts and Regulations and with the departmental organisation and procedure relating to the working of the P.A.Y.E. system, and to the allowance of claims: must understand the accounting system in local collection offices and must have a working knowledge of commercial accounting methods.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF LAW AND REGULATION

12.—HIGHER EXECUTIVE OFFICER—VALUATION BRANCH CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

The primary duties of the higher executive officer grade in the Valuation Branch lie in the formulation of assessments for both import duty and purchase tax purposes, and the supervision and training of executive officer staff engaged in the collection and presentation of the necessary evidence.

Preliminary investigations into the accuracy of values declared by traders are usually undertaken by local staff. When preliminary inquiries are complete, the higher executive officer undertakes critical examination of the evidence in reports from local customs officers and the executive officer concerned with the case, and a consideration of legal agreements, e.g. in connection with royalty payments, use of trade names, etc., trading accounts, detailed costings and relevant correspondence between, e.g. importer and foreign supplier with a view to determining an assessment, which is then notified to the trader. In cases of disagreement the assessment must be explained to the trader or his solicitor or accountant at an interview, if requested. Ultimate disputes as to value are heard before referees appointed by the Lord Chancellor and the initial preparation of the Department's case is usually undertaken at higher executive officer level.

In cases of considerable complexity involving detailed examination of an importer's accounts and documents, e.g. where importer and supplier are closely associated or where substantial underpayments of duty are suspected, a higher executive officer accompanied by an executive officer undertakes a thorough investigation at the premises of the firm concerned. This work entails substantial knowledge of commercial practice and accountancy. In such cases interviews with directors of firms, technical experts, accountants, and solicitors are involved. Higher executive officers must thoroughly know the trades with which they deal.

Importation of such goods as motor cars, yachts, aeroplanes, cameras and second-hand machinery involves individual appraisal of value, which is more difficult when the goods are second-hand. The higher executive officer concerned with such goods must, by consultation with the trade and by use of trade papers and guides, build up sufficient knowledge to enable his valuations to stand up to expert criticism.

In purchase tax valuation, trades or well defined parts of trades frequently apply through their trade associations for a "standard" value for purchase tax to be applied to all their members. The preparation of a value acceptable to both the association and the Customs is usually a protracted and difficult business involving several interviews with a representative body from the association before agreement is reached and is largely the responsibility of the higher executive officer.

The higher executive officer is responsible for cases involving under-payments of duty or the repayment of duty on grounds of over-valuation at importation and may authorise repayment of duty overpaid up to £100 in respect of any particular claim. He is responsible also for the drafting of any general instructions and amendments thereto, which it is necessary to issue to the Customs service as a whole.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF LAW AND REGULATION

13.—EXECUTIVE OFFICER—CONTROLLER OF STAMPS OFFICE—ADJUDICATION SECTION—INLAND REVENUE

Under Section 12 of the Stamp Act, 1891, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue may be required by any person to express their opinion as to the stamp duty chargeable upon a document. Adjudication is compulsory in the case of gifts. The presence of the Adjudication stamp precludes any question being raised as to the sufficiency of the stamp.

The work of an executive officer involves the assessment to duty of documents presented for adjudication. Such documents may vary from a simple deed of gift to a complicated deed of arrangement altering the terms of a will or earlier settlement. In the case of trust funds it will be necessary to calculate the value of various types of interest, e.g. life interests, reversionary interests and contingent interests. Typical cases presented for

adjudication are settlements, partnership deeds, dissolutions of partnerships and agreements for sale of businesses. Where shares in a company not quoted on the Stock Exchange are involved, it is necessary for the executive officer to examine the balance sheets and accounts of the company and make an estimate of the value of the shares. An executive officer is also required to make estimates of the value of other interests such as goodwill of businesses and copyrights. Much of the work of making these estimates involves negotiation personally and by correspondence with solicitors and accountants.

Responsibility for determining the liability to duty and explaining the assessment to the solicitors concerned normally rests with the executive officer who would consult a higher executive officer in an unusually complicated case or if the assessment is not accepted by the solicitors. An executive officer may also be required to conduct interviews with solicitors in connection with any of his cases.

The work requires a knowledge of the Stamp Act and amending Acts, the Law of Property Act, Administration of Estates Act, and of such Acts as confer special exemptions from stamp duty, and also of the relevant cases decided in the courts.

STATISTICS

14.—EXECUTIVE OFFICER—MINISTRY OF FOOD

The statistics and intelligence division in the Ministry of Food consists of a headquarters centre, and statistics outposts attached to commodity divisions (e.g. cereals, sugar, oils and fats, meat and livestock divisions). These outposts are in the charge of a senior executive officer or a higher executive officer.

The duties at an outpost are to provide statistical information on a particular commodity to the centre, and also to do statistical work for the commodity division to which it is attached.

Routine statistical returns are concerned with stocks, production and consumption of the particular commodity. Returns are received from manufacturers at regular intervals and these are summarised, usually by a clerical officer. The executive officer, who will have attended a course on the principles and practice of statistics, interprets the figures. He then composes the final report for the higher executive officer who forwards it to the centre.

Statistical statements are prepared monthly and six monthly giving final figures of production, stocks and consumption and an analysis of consumption by different users, e.g. domestic consumers, manufacturers, exports, services.

Import programmes are required at frequent intervals, forecasting future imports, by quantity and value, by country of origin. The executive officer is responsible for collecting a large part of the information necessary to compile these returns.

The executive officer also drafts weekly and monthly commentaries on the particular commodity for submission to the centre.

The statistics outpost performs the following work for the division to which it is attached:

- (a) Figures for incorporation in answers to Parliamentary Questions;
- (b) general intelligence on crop prospects;
- (c) forecasting of future consumption;
- (d) analysis of location of stocks.

The executive officer is responsible for the preparation of all returns and summaries for submission to the higher executive officer in charge of the outpost. He is also in direct charge of all clerical staff and of the allocation of work among them.

SPECIALISED DUTIES

15.—EXECUTIVE OFFICER—VISITING OFFICER—NATIONAL ASSISTANCE BOARD

An executive officer visits applicants for assistance including those requiring supplementation of retirement and old age pensions, sickness benefit and unemployment benefit. Applicants for legal aid, free welfare foods, assistance towards spectacles or dentures, surgical and prescription charges, fares to hospital and National Service Grants are also visited.

At the home visit all the necessary details must be obtained and recorded. Welfare action must be initiated where necessary involving direct contact with bodies such as blind institutions, local authority welfare officers, W.V.S. probation officers, hospital almoners and medical authorities, Red Cross, N.S.P.C.C. and S.S.A.F.A. officials, etc.

Brief examples are: arranging for "home" and other help and making adequate monetary allowances where necessary; proper care for the lonely person; advice to widows with children; ensuring that old people on their own have someone to turn to in emergency with direct approach to the Board; direct contact at Board's offices with callers (of which there are now several hundred thousand each month).

Following the visits, the needs of the applicant are assessed and payments authorised, subject only to a sample check by a senior officer. The scale tables enable the amount of assistance to be calculated but discretionary powers may be exercised to ensure that the sum paid is fair and reasonable in the varying types of cases.

Non-contributory old age pensions are invariably the subject of many and varied "follow-up" actions, the executive officer requiring a knowledge of businesses, stock exchange shares, invested capital, etc., the same officer being the one who *authorises* the amount of pension to be paid.

Additionally, he has full supervisory duties over clerical and sub-clerical officers.

A recent broadsheet by P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning) included the following reference to the work of national assistance officers:—

"The job of most national assistance officers consists largely of case work and involves a great deal of individual responsibility. They have to win the confidence of the individuals they deal with, inquire tactfully into their personal circumstances and decide in what way and by how much an applicant should get assistance."

SPECIALISED DUTIES

16.—CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER—COMMAND SECRETARY—WAR DEPARTMENT

Command secretaries are usually of assistant secretary rank. In the West and the East Africa Commands, however, the post is occupied by a chief executive officer. These two commands are smaller than the others although the General Officer Commanding in Chief is a Lt. General and a General respectively.

A Command secretary represents the permanent Under Secretary of State in the command to which he is appointed. He is an integral part of the machinery of administration in the command and has to keep in close touch with all questions of general policy. He is at the service of the General Officer Commanding in Chief and his staff and also of the commanders and staff of all formations within the command with the object of assisting these officers to the best of his ability and experience in their administrative duties and of eliminating as far as possible reference to the War Office. In addition to advising the military authorities on all matters of financial policy and the control of expenditure and stores he raises on his own initiative any matter of administration or finance which in his opinion merits attention.

His concurrence is required for the writing off of losses of cash and stores within defined limits and he may also concur in minor items of expenditure not covered by regulations.

He is responsible for the audit of all public accounts for cash and stores in the command and test stocktaking of stores and local inspection of accounts and records in all installations within his geographical area.

Other branches of the command are responsible for placing contracts for supplies, stores, works and other services. The command secretary is available to give them advice. In addition he is responsible for the review of all contracts after they have been placed to ensure that there have been no procedural irregularities and that local powers for the placing of contracts are exercised in the best interests of the public. He may concur in certain minor departures from regulations relating to contract procedure and in the passing over of the lowest tender in the public interest. He may also authorise dispensing with competition within defined limits.

He is responsible for all questions of policy affecting civilians employed in the command. He settles issues within his delegated powers or submits recommendations to the War Office. He represents the command on local joint bodies of employers and must satisfy himself that rates of pay and conditions of service are suitably related to those of other employers. He must ensure that suitable arrangements are made for welfare, training, grading of posts, promotion and consultation with staff representatives. He advises on such matters as recruitment, best use of manpower, etc.

East and West Africa Commands cover very large geographical areas. (East Africa for example includes Mauritius 1,600 miles from Nairobi and the Seychelles.) Conditions vary widely throughout the various territories within the commands and each presents

its own difficulties with regard to accommodation, supplies, transport and labour. Civilian establishment work is complicated by the various races (European, Asiatic and African) which each present their own peculiar problems. The command secretary must also keep in touch with the various territorial Governments and be familiar with their policies insofar as they affect his duties. He is a long way from London dealing often with questions which have no parallel elsewhere and must therefore exercise his own discretion in the solution of many problems.

APPENDIX B

EXAMPLES OF DISTURBANCE OF RELATIVITIES BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND TECHNICAL POSTS

A.—Regional Organisation, Ministry of Fuel and Power

The implementation of recommendations of the Committee on the organisation, structure and remuneration of the works group of professional classes (the Gardiner Committee), has had a disturbing effect on pay relativities within the regional organisation of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, producing a pattern which is a distortion of the functional relationships between the executive and technical grades.

The following plan indicates the character of the normal regional structure, and the salary figures show the change in relativities which has taken place between 1951 and the present date, a change which can be attributed entirely to the Gardiner Committee recommendations, although other salary alterations have taken place during this period.

Regional director, £1,750*			
Regional Chief executive officer (S.E.O.)	Regional coal officer (S.E.O.)	Regional fuel engineer	Area electricity examiner
1951 ... £900-1,075	1951 ... £900-1,075	1951 ... £1,050-1,270	1951 ... £750-1,000
1954 ... £1,030-1,230	1954 ... £1,030-1,230	1954 ... £1,375-1,575	1954 ... £1,000-1,320
Higher Executive officer	Deputy regional coal officer (H.E.O. plus allowance)	Fuel engineer	
1951 ... £715-865	1951 ... £815-965	1951 ... £750-1,000	
1954 ... £830-995	1954 ... £935-1,100	1954 ... £1,000-1,320	
Executive officer	Assistant regional coal officer (H.E.O.)	Assistant fuel engineer	
1951 ... £250-700	1951 ... £715-865	1951 ... £475-750	
1954 ... £290-800	1954 ... £830-965	1954 ... £675-1,000	


* Basic salary, attracting pay addition.

The three senior regional posts share equal responsibility in their respective spheres but general control is vested, in the absence of the regional director, in the chief executive officer (S.E.O.). Nevertheless, not only has the gap between the maxima of the two executive heads and the regional fuel engineer been widened from £195 to £345, but these executive grades now actually receive a maximum of £90 less than the maximum of the fuel engineer who is on the next lower rung of the technical side and who works under instruction from the regional fuel engineer.

Acting as fuel efficiency secretary the executive officer is directly responsible to the regional fuel engineer. His duties include organising educational work in fuel technology at all levels (i.e. from boilermen to works engineer) and he is consequently in direct contact with the heads of engineering departments, university and local authorities. He is secretary to a number of committees and in certain circumstances directly responsible to the regional chief executive officer. On the other hand, the assistant fuel engineer works under the fuel engineer, the second in the chain of responsibility on the technical side. It is fair to say that at the very least the responsibilities of the executive officer are not less in degree than those of the assistant fuel engineer but the latter's basic salary maximum, subsequent to the Gardiner Committee's recommendations, became £200 more than that of the executive officer, and that lead is still maintained.

B. Royal Ordnance Factories, Ministry of Supply—

The organisational structure in these establishments, with some minor variations in individual cases, is normally of the following character:—



The responsibilities of the principal clerk are equal to those of the manager. Each reports direct to the superintendent and there has throughout been tacit acceptance that they occupy, in their respective spheres, posts of comparable levels of responsibility. Similarly, higher executive officers are commonly regarded as of comparable status to assistant managers and executive officers to shop managers. This approximate parity was recognised in terms of salary in 1939, as shown by the particulars given in the next paragraph. Furthermore, it has been expressly acknowledged by the Ministry of Supply, in discussions with Society representatives, that while it is not possible to equate exactly members of different classes with different functions and responsibilities for purposes of day-to-day working, the Department officially regards a senior executive officer as roughly the equivalent of an engineer I (i.e. a manager) and a higher executive officer as broadly equivalent to an engineer III (i.e. an assistant manager).

There has been no appreciable change in functional relationship or in levels of responsibility since 1939, but the respective salary scales have undergone a marked disturbance of relativity as indicated by the following table:—

1939				1954			
				<i>Basic salary</i>			
				<i>£</i> <i>£</i>			
Manager	...	...	700- 850	Manager (Eng. I)	...	...	1,375-1,575
Principal clerk	...	...	700- 860 or	Principal clerk—	...	...	
(S.E.O. or S.E.O.	...	...	800- 960 or	(S.E.O.)	...	...	1,030-1,230
plus allowance)	...	...	850-1,010	(C.E.O.)	...	...	1,260-1,510
Assistant manager	...	...	550- 700	Assistant manager (Eng. II)	...	...	1,000-1,320
Senior clerk (H.E.O.)	...	...	550- 650	Senior clerk (H.E.O.)	...	...	830- 995
Shop manager	...	...	400- 550	Shop manager (Eng. III)	...	...	650-1,000
Executive officer	...	...	150- 525	Executive officer	...	...	290- 800

Prior to 1946, the higher executive officer in such a branch would have reported direct to the head of the branch, a staff engineer with a salary maximum of £1,250. Although both the assistant staff engineer and the executive engineer had higher salary scales than the higher executive officer with his basic maximum of £650, nevertheless the higher executive officer was generally regarded as comparable in status with the assistant staff engineer. At that time the engineer grading and salary structure was as follows:—

Staff engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£1,050-£1,250
Assistant staff engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£750-£950
Executive engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£650-£750
Assistant engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£325-£575
Inspector	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£350 salary maximum

Since 1946 there has not only been a revision of the salary structure in the engineering field, but also a change in nomenclature of the lower grades of the structure without any change of function or responsibility. The structure is now as follows:—

Staff engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£1,500-£1,750*
Assistant staff engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£1,375-£1,575
Senior executive engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£1,000-£1,320
Executive engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£650-£1,000
Assistant engineer	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	£680 salary maximum*

* Basic salaries, attracting pay addition.

It will be appreciated that, from the point of view of salary scales, the higher executive officer (maximum £995), now has four engineering grades in a superior position to himself, where previously there were only three. The old style inspector, formerly level in salary with the clerical officer, is now very little below the executive officer, and a salary claim for this grade is under consideration. Inevitably, the position of executive grades within the structure of the branch has been weakened to an extent which makes it difficult, if not impossible, adequately to maintain the prestige and authority of the executive class.

D. Naval Store Department—Admiralty

In the headquarters of the naval store department certain technical officers are employed to give advice and assistance to executive grades to whom they are subordinate. The following details show the radical change which has taken place between 1939-40 and the present day.

Two technical assistants (personnel) work to a naval store officer (the departmental name for senior executive officer) in the Royal Fleet auxiliary personnel section. In 1939 the salary of the one subordinate officer in post was £575 (maximum), against the maximum of £965 (including house allowance) of the naval store officer. Today the subordinate officers receive a salary of £1,596 (maximum) against the inclusive maximum of £1,337 of the naval store officer.

The technical assistant (fuel) similarly works to a naval store officer. In September, 1940, the Admiralty paid £600 for this post which is now remunerated at £1,500. The officer concerned is on superannuation from an oil company. If it had not been possible to obtain an officer enjoying a pension it is probable that the Admiralty would have been obliged to pay more. The comparable salary movement of the naval store officer responsible for directing the technical assistant's work and for taking decisions in the light of his advice is from £965 (1939 maximum) to £1,337 (1954 maximum).

Examination of Witnesses

MR. E. C. REDHEAD, J.P., *General Secretary, Society of Civil Servants*,
 MR. E. C. SYMS, *Chairman, Society of Civil Servants*,
 MR. J. L. WILLIAMS, *Deputy General Secretary, Society of Civil Servants*,
 MR. C. T. H. PLANT, *Deputy Secretary, Inland Revenue Staff Federation*,
 MR. G. G. PALMER, *General Secretary, Association of Officers of the Ministry of Labour*, and
 MR. E. M. THOMAS, *General Secretary, Ministry of Labour Staff Association*,
 on behalf of the Society of Civil Servants

Called and examined

1069. *Chairman*: Is there anything you would like to say before we start our questions, Mr. Redhead?—*Mr. Redhead*: Yes, Sir, I would like to make two comments. Since we submitted our written evidence, events have overtaken us in two particulars to which, to avoid confusion, I think I should refer. The first is that the salary scales of the senior chief executive officer and of the principal executive officer, in common with other higher grades, have been adjusted in a manner of which I think you have been informed by the Treasury. That of necessity means not only corrections to the Treasury's Factual Memorandum, but affects the tables that we have given on page 40 of our own memorandum. I would be very happy to hand in a substitute page for that, which gives you the figures up to date. It follows, of course, that paragraphs 69 to 71 will now have to be read in conjunction with this new development. It does not alter the substance of our general contention, but the facts and figures need to be amended.

The second point of clarification is that we refer in Appendix B of our document, example A, to an example of disturbance of relativities as between the executives and the technical engineering grades of the regional organisation of the Ministry of Fuel and Power. I ought to explain that the Ministry's industrial fuel efficiency service, to which that refers, has, as from the 1st May this year, gone over to a private company; it no longer forms part of the Ministry, and the technical officers have gone on secondment to the private company and are no longer responsible to the regional controllers of the Ministry. The example still illustrates the sort of disturbance that has occurred, but it is no longer current, in the sense that there is no longer a functional relationship.

1070. Thank you, Mr. Redhead. May I start with a question about your membership and representative capacity? Is there anything you would care to add on either of those points?—*The Society itself*, Sir, covers the general executive class and a number of departmental classes. Our total membership in that field is approximately 38,500. I think my three colleagues of the other associations can speak with more knowledge as to their own representative

capacity in their own field.—*Mr. Plant*: For the Inland Revenue staff in this field, in the Inspectorate of Taxes we have about 5,000 executive officers, and 1,000 in the executive field above. In the Collector of Taxes and Valuation branches where they have not got the executive class as such but similar salary scales for departmental grades, the number involved is about 2,000.—*Mr. Palmer*: In the Association of Officers of the Ministry of Labour we have sole recognition for what are known as grades II, III and IV, which are roughly analogous to the chief executive, senior executive and higher executive officers. In respect of the executive officer, we hold joint recognition with the Ministry of Labour Staff Association. Our joint executive membership at the moment totals just over 5,000.

1071. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In your paragraph 5 you speak of the immense growth of responsibilities in the Civil Service. Has that growth been matched by a proper increase in the staff complements?—*Mr. Redhead*: It would be fair to say it has been reflected. It is not without significance, I think, that it has been accompanied by a growth of the proportion of the executive class to the whole of the non-industrial Civil Service, which pre-war was a little over 5 per cent. and is now over 10 per cent. The growth has not been merely one of quantity but of character and scope as well.

1072. Would it be correct to say that, particularly perhaps during the war, posts were upgraded or new posts created on a scale which amply reflected the growth of the work?—Certainly there was a degree of such upgrading. It would be very difficult to assess whether it was adequate. A good deal of it was improvised.

1073. Then I think the Society seeks to suggest that because new types of work have been assigned to the executive class it follows that the range of work covered by individual members of the class has also increased?—It would certainly be true in a number of Departments whose functions have widened in consequence of post-war and wartime legislation, and liability to be switched from work to work is much wider than pre-war.

1074. But even so is it not the case that many of the members of the executive class will spend the greater part of their careers on one particular line of work?—It is a tendency which may develop in certain places, but I think the administration shares with the Society a desire to introduce the greatest possible measure of fluidity even within Departments. We have ourselves urged, and the Treasury have expressed their willingness to try to arrange, a greater degree of inter-departmental fluidity. Even within a given Department an officer may be transferred or promoted to work of an entirely different character to that on which he was previously employed. Serving in two sections of one Department can be as diversified as a transfer from one Department to another.

1075. You would subscribe to that policy as desirable?—We would.

1076. But on the basis of actual experience during recent years, has it been the normal practice for a member of the executive class to spend the greater part of his career on one particular line of work?—

Mr. Williams: I should say that the trend has been the other way, Sir, because if one takes any particular Department these days, work is so diversified that it is very unlikely that an officer will remain on that job. If one takes a contract officer's work, for example, he may well on one occasion be dealing with aircraft and on another occasion be dealing with equipment of a complicated kind. He may be switched to supply work, and so on, and on promotion it is almost inevitable in a large Department that he will move from one branch to another. In the Inland Revenue, for example, he may be serving in the Special Commissioners' Office dealing with surtax, but on promotion he might go to the Office of the Controller of Stamps. So on the whole I think there is more flexibility today.

—*Mr. Plant:* I would like to underline that, dealing particularly with the departmental classes in the Inland Revenue. The responsibility there has undoubtedly increased during and since the war, because of expansion and because people now have to encompass a much wider range of duties—profits tax, and general accounting—in addition to normal income tax law and practice. On the Collector of Taxes side figures are available to demonstrate the increased responsibility. The total gross receipt of income tax for last year was £1,988 million; compared with pre-war that is a fantastically increased figure.

1077. The rate of tax has gone up?—The rate of tax under P.A.Y.E. has gone up. The number of employees now is 19,700,000, and it is more difficult to assess and collect tax today than it was pre-war. But as to whether the executive officer has had sufficient reward for extra responsibility, I can say that we had

in the Collector's service an executive grade prior to the war in charge of small collection offices. We have still got it today in charge of small offices, but in places like Leigh, in Lancashire, which was comparatively unimportant before the war from the point of view of collection of tax, today they collect £4½ million, and there the man on the executive officer scale is in charge of this quite important unit of collection, with increased responsibilities over and above pre-war.

1078. Yes. I thought Mr. Redhead made it clear in reply to my question that he and his colleagues were not persuaded that measures of improvement had amply reflected additional responsibilities.—We are not.—*Mr. Syms:* Of course, in the immediate pre-war period, from at least Munich onwards, there was considerable transfer of civil service staffs between Departments, largely to supply and defence Departments. The war period and the post-war period have shown again the need for considerable transfers. But as compared with the period between the two wars, when there was no sign of the approaching 1939 war, there is more transfer now.

1079. *Lady Albemarle:* I wonder if I might take up a point on what Mr. Plant said, because what has been worrying me is not only the variety of work of executive officers but the variety of responsibility. It did seem to me from visits we have paid that there was a tremendous range of responsibility covered by the one grade, and in settling a scale it would be very difficult to reflect that responsibility with fairness to both ends. You might be underpaying certain people carrying a very great deal of responsibility if you were paying what in outside employment would be a fair wage for the type of responsibility which other executive officers would be carrying.—*Mr. Redhead:* One of the factors in introducing executive officer grading for posts which were formerly higher clerical was to make use of the greater degree of flexibility of such officers. It must not of course be construed that if an officer in his executive capacity is engaged at one period of time doing higher clerical duties, that that is the sum total of his responsibility; he will in fact be moved about and he has a liability for transfer to work of a different character.

1080. Yes, but in actual fact is it not true that many executive officers would be extremely useful but only in a limited sphere?—The whole purpose has been to create in the executive grade a grade of flexibility and to preserve a common standard of high level. The expectation of any executive officer, whatever duties he may be currently performing in a given Department, is that he shall nevertheless be available for work of an entirely different kind.

1081. *Chairman*: You refer in paragraph 8 to T.C. 5/47, and the merger of H.C.O. and E.O. work. It might be argued that that merger involved a certain dilution of executive class work.—There were many former higher clerical officer posts which were recognised as being in fact not supervisory clerical posts at all, but covering duties that were indistinguishable from those which fell to the executive officer, and that was very much in mind in making the change that was proposed—and proposed, if I remember rightly, by the Treasury itself. There was an attempt to bring about a tidier structure. With that a number of supervisory posts were swept up, although it was still laid down in T.C. 5/47 that where there were higher clerical officer posts predominantly of a supervisory character over large blocks of clerical work, it would be proper to continue them as higher clerical, and higher clerical officer posts persist to the number of about 2,500.

1082. You would contend, then, that the executive class is not employed on clerical work more than it was in pre-war days, as a result of T.C. 5/47?—Yes.

1083. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraph 12 you say that in a number of Departments there is interchangeability at principal and chief/senior executive officer-level. Is not the senior executive officer rather on near-principal work?—The chief sphere of interchangeability is as between the chief executive officer and the principal, but there will not be lacking examples where a senior executive officer is likewise to a degree interchangeable on work of principal character.

1084. But it would be unusual?—The chief emphasis would be on chief executive officer interchangeability.

1085. *Chairman*: We did actually see cases where we were told a post was occupied at one time by a chief executive officer and at another time by a principal.—It is fairly widespread throughout the Service now.

1086. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You say in the same paragraph that advancement from the executive to the administrative class should be normal rather than exceptional, as it is at present. It must be exceptional, must it not? You really can only transfer to administrative work an executive who has been mainly engaged in work of an administrative character, or the bright young man whose mind is not yet set in the mould of executive work?—I would not agree, Sir, that it was only the member of the executive class who has had administrative experience who should be contemplated for promotion to the administrative class. It is our view that many of our executive people have the calibre and the potentiality

for administrative work, although they may never be engaged upon it. It is largely a matter of accident that a man happens to find himself employed on work that gives him that type of experience. When you say "Should it not be exceptional?" I am bound to say that it is so. In 1952 promotions to principal from non-administrative classes numbered only sixteen.

1087. *Lady Albemarle*: But as a proportion of entry to the principal grade?—About 20 per cent. of the promotions.

1088. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: At what stage should there be a transfer from executive to administrative?—*Mr. Williams*: Our current view would be that transfer ought to be as young as possible, and there is agreement between the Society and the Treasury that the higher executive officer grade should be considered for promotion. We feel that there is every advantage, if the man displays administrative talent, for him to get into the administrative class at an early age, so that he does not find the principal grade is the ceiling of his career but has an opportunity of moving right through the class. I think there is an acceptance of that point of view officially; it is just a question of finding the right material.

1089. *Lady Albemarle*: Could I follow that up, because perhaps you will be able to clarify a point? In paragraph 114 you say that promotion should be normal, not exceptional. But you do not really envisage a creaming off of all the best executive talent into the administrative, or of only those who seem to show particular aptitude for administrative work. You would still wish the really good executive officer to have a good career within the executive class?—*Mr. Redhead*: That fairly represents our position. What we would say is that we consider the potentially good candidates for the administrative class are much more numerous than those who have in fact secured such advancement of recent years.

1090. Yes, but what is confusing is that you say it should be normal rather than exceptional. If you say it should be normal it looks then as if it is only the people who are sub-normal who are to have the good executive posts!—"Normal" is applied to the process, rather than to the question of individuals.—*Mr. Williams*: I would like to underline what *Mr. Redhead* has said. We have regarded it as being exceptional in many Departments for there to be machinery for picking up people for promotion into the administrative class. More recently, as a result of discussions, Departments have been reminded of the need to look for administrative talent within the executive class, so our thesis is that the process of searching for administrative talent and advancing it should be normal rather than exceptional.

1091. *Mr. Burman*: In paragraphs 110 and 111 you refer to the large intake into the executive classes from the clerical classes. Your suggestion is that there should be fluidity between the administrative and the executive classes in the same way as between the executive and the clerical classes?—*Mr. Redhead*: Yes. I think it would be true to say that we should take the view that there ought to be more reliance upon recruiting suitable candidates from the executive class to the administrative.

1092. How does recruitment from the executive to the administrative grades work?—It differs a good deal in practice from Department to Department, and it differs also at different points in time. During the war years, under force of necessity, there was perhaps a heavier reliance upon recruitment by promotion from the executive grade than is now current, or indeed was the case before the war. The machinery is frankly non-existent in some Departments.

1093. How is it done, by nomination, by saying so-and-so is a good man?—*Mr. Williams*: The Departments are left very largely to define their own procedure. It will vary as between a large one and a small one, but normally in a large Department what I understand to happen is that, if there are vacancies to be filled by promotion to the administrative class, an announcement will certainly be made in the departmental news circular, and executive class members with certain eligibility qualifications and experience would be invited to apply. Then on the basis of reports by their reporting officers, they would be put to a board and chosen.

1094. The initiative would come from above, and not from the members seeking promotion?—*Mr. Redhead*: In some Departments there would be no machinery for invitation, though it is fair to say that the Treasury has from time to time drawn the attention of Departments to the consideration of class to class promotion.

1095. And you are satisfied that that is in the best interests of the Service?—We would say in the light of experience that heavier reliance upon promotion from the executive class to the administrative during the war period has not shown any loss in the value and calibre of the administrative class, and we would think the evidence shows that they are capable of bearing the burden. The administrative class gains enormously by this type of late entrant.

1096. *Chairman*: It is rather important to safeguard direct entry to the administrative class?—I would not deny that for one moment.—*Mr. Syms*: The need for the university trained man to come into the Civil Service is, of course, there all the time. It is a question of working out the

balance, but the trend in the Civil Service over the post-war years as compared both with pre-war, and to a greater extent as compared with during the war, is for there to be very few promotions from the executive to the administrative class. There is, of course, also the limited examination comparable to some extent, though not so extensive in the academic sense, with the first division administrative examination, but that entry is also becoming narrower and narrower.

1097. What do you think about the recruitment of graduates to the executive class?—*Mr. Redhead*: It is a very small percentage at the moment. We do not resist the idea. We think there is room for the graduate to come into the executive class and we have never felt any grounds for resisting it or wishing to change the provision that has been made.

1098. You would not feel that it ought to increase very much?—No, Sir.

1099. In paragraph 114 you refer to the "high professional standard of the expert". Could you define a little more fully what you mean by the word "professional" there?—It is perfectly true that for the majority of executive duties nothing which is normally regarded as a professional qualification is required, that is to say an external qualification, but it is our view that by reason of the nature of the work, the technique that has to be developed and learnt on the job, in fact the executive officer has a professional status. He develops that as much as grades which require an external qualification.

1100. *Mr. Burman*: May I come in on that? In paragraph 107 the categorical statement is made that management is a profession. Is that really so?—I think it is arguable as to what definition you place upon the word "professional", but in the broadest sense we would quite strenuously take the view that our people are in a profession.

1101. *Mrs. Wootton*: You are not using it in the sense of a profession which requires definite qualifications and which can be practised inside and outside the Service?—No. In fact it is because the technique is peculiar in most cases to the Civil Service and has not got its counterpart outside that it does not call for external qualifications. In certain cases officers are encouraged to take external qualifications as an assistance to them in the performance of their particular type of executive job, but normally it is not a requirement. I should perhaps add in respect of Government accounting which falls upon the executive class in bulk that there you develop by internal experience and by internal tests and qualifications, or external examinations in the case of the

Exchequer and Audit Department, a definite civil service profession of Government accounting which is held quite strenuously to be as important in its professional status, although different in character, as the professional accountant in commerce or the accountant in local government.

1102. There is an important distinction there, because management if it is a profession can obviously be practised in a number of industries, and perhaps the Civil Service as well.—Yes.

1103. *Sir George Mowbray*: I was wondering whether Mr. Redhead could help us a little bit on paragraphs 45 to 50. The whole section together with Appendix A gives us in some detail a description of the categories of the work of the various grades, and one does see fairly frequent use of phrases such as "responsible for", "assistant to", "supervise" and the like. Could you help us by giving us in general terms some idea of the responsibility being undertaken by the various grades?—It is extraordinarily difficult to generalise because of the wide diversity in the nature of the work, but may I just quote an example that readily occurs to me, the senior chief executive officer who will be found as an assistant director of contracts in the Ministry of Supply. Such an officer will be responsible for determining contracts with outside firms; he will have authority to sign on his own responsibility contracts up to £100,000 and in certain cases even more; he will have within his purview total orders, perhaps, for aircraft of £200 million. In the case of non-competitive contracts it would be in his power to decide upon prices in actual contract with the contracts manager or director of the firm with whom he is dealing. You will find similarly posts of chief executive officer and senior chief executive officer in the regions where, though theoretically subject to administrative control of his headquarters in London, officially the man is encouraged to consume his own smoke, to act very much on his own responsibility, and indeed must do so, because access to administrative control except in the widest sense is not readily available to him. The regional organisation has increasingly placed a measure of personal responsibility upon executive agents, the degree of which will naturally vary from grade to grade. You will find executive officers in some Departments exercising a very considerable degree of responsibility on their own, but I find it extremely difficult to give you an answer which would fit every conceivable case.—*Mr. Plant*: With regard to the executive officer let me come back to the collector of taxes at Leigh who is paid the same as the executive officer. He is an agent who has isolated responsibility. He is the man who decides whether or not

distrain should be carried out on the goods of a man who has not paid his tax. He is the man who decides, without reference to head office, whether summary proceedings should be taken. It is true he always has to go to the inspector of taxes to see that the man has had all the allowances due and no complaints are laid with the inspector as to the assessment of tax, but the collector has the final responsibility in collecting his tax. We have a grade slightly lower than senior executive officer—it is between the higher executive and senior executive officer and called the senior collector—in charge of our biggest collections, and in the City we have collection offices which collect over £100 million of tax a year. They have also got the isolated responsibility for deciding whether or not you have to give a man time to pay and at what particular time you have to exert final pressure.

1104. *Lady Albemarle*: Do you really think that all entrants to the executive officer grade should be capable of carrying the sort of responsibility that this executive officer equivalent in the Inland Revenue at Leigh carries?—Yes, I do because if you are going to be promoted to this grade you have to be.—*Mr. Redhead*: There is a conscious attempt to maintain the standard of all methods of recruitment to the executive officer grade, and that I might say is one which the Society very strongly supports. We have the most earnest desire to maintain the standard of the executive class at all levels.

1105. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Coming to paragraph 53 of your memorandum you say—"... revisions which have been the product of negotiated settlement have not been the outcome of completely free negotiations." Is that peculiar to the executive class?—No, Sir. I would not say that it has been peculiar to the executive class. It has been I think a fairly common experience.

1106. In industry?—I would not presume to speak for industry, Sir.

1107. Settlements have always been hedged around by factors not related to the merits of the claim?—I imagine Mr. Thorneycroft could deal with that perhaps better than I!

1108. You are not claiming that the executive class are the victims?—I am not saying that we are peculiar in that particular experience but I state it as a fact.

1109. You have the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal.—Yes.

1110. And 99 per cent. of the executive class have access to that?—That is so. We have unfortunately been forced to have recourse to it much more frequently of recent times than was our experience before. We would much have preferred to

follow our traditional policy of seeking to get the right answer by talking across the table, by fair and equitable laying down of all the cards on the table and arriving at a decision that would be reasonably justified, but unfortunately our experience has forced us more and more into the Arbitration Tribunal.

1111. The Tribunal is not available to the higher grades in the executive class?—No, Sir, not for the senior chief executive officer grade and upwards.

1112. You have no standing conciliation machinery or independent adjudication?—No.

1113. You are seeking some kind of machinery?—We can see no strong reason why the whole of the executive class should not be brought within the machinery of the existing Arbitration Tribunal, but, if it were thought that that was inappropriate for the higher grades or had repercussions in respect of other classes to whom it was thought inappropriate, we would still take the view that some form of machinery ought to exist for the higher grades. I think this case will be developed by the National Staff Side and I would prefer that it should be. It is a collective matter which does not only concern ourselves.

1114. *Chairman*: In paragraph 57 you suggest that your claims have been deferred until the pattern of the higher level of the administrative class has been determined. That did not actually take place in 1947 or 1953, did it? Your case was settled earlier than that of the administrative class.—It did not happen in 1953, no. The normal pattern was disturbed a little there, but certainly we have always had to wait upon settlements in the clerical field and below before we could get movement for the executives.

1115. Either one or the other?—Yes.

1116. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: When ultimately you have got a settlement for your people in relation to what has been done for the clericals has your settlement had operative effect from the same date as that for the clericals?—No. In 1951 the settlement of the clerical class by Arbitration Award was from 1st October, 1950. We naturally felt, as the Treasury based what they were prepared to do for us on it, that the same operative date would apply, but they refused to contemplate an operative date earlier than 1st January, 1951, and gave the explanation that there was the question of cost and the Estimates. It had nothing whatever to do with the merits of the case.

1117. Can you recall there ever having been a case where you have lodged a claim on behalf of your people before the Association representing the clericals has

lodged a claim for their people and you have had to wait for the clericals to be disposed of before your claim was dealt with?—I cannot recall an example of that character. What has usually happened is that the claims have gone in more or less simultaneously.

1118. From what you say your experience has been that not only have your people suffered in the matter of time lag in getting settlement of their claims but also when getting settlements have had them operated from a date subsequent to the operation of the award in respect of the lower grade?—That was true in 1951, but not true in 1953. I think it is only fair to say that the operative date of the 1953 settlement was determined by the Arbitration Tribunal. What we do know is that the Treasury resisted the idea that there should be the same operative date as the Tribunal had already given for the clerical classes and urged that if the factors which we had urged as relevant to our case were taken into account, the operative date ought not to be the same as the clerical but some later date.

1119. *Chairman*: I gather from your evidence that your experience on this resistance to the ante-dating has been pretty common, it is almost a principle in the Treasury not to have it?—I would hesitate to apply the term "principle" but it has certainly been a fairly common practice!

1120. In paragraph 75 you suggest that more departmental grades should be merged with the executive class. Can the process be carried much further?—Yes, I think it could be. We have in a number of Departments departmental executive grades which do not form part of our executive class. In the Ministry of Labour represented by my colleagues here today and the Inland Revenue Staff Federation there are discernible classes with complete hierarchies corresponding broadly to the general executive class, but in other Departments there are a number of purely grade structures with no complete hierarchy of their own. They cannot be dignified by the name of a class, and we see no good reason why they should continue to be departmental grades. We think there would be every advantage from every point of view if they were brought into the ambit of the general service class.

1121. *Mrs. Wootton*: In paragraph 85 you refer to the reference to comparisons with current rates of pay in outside jobs, and I think you give us the impression in paragraph 85 that you were rather disturbed by the practice of using current comparisons. Could you tell us if what you dislike is the principle, or is it merely the difficulty of getting information about

the rates for comparable work?—Fundamentally it arises from the fact that one just cannot find in our judgment the counterpart to the executive officer. We think the thesis that the Treasury is now advocating of trying to apply outside comparisons by reference to the outside counterpart of what is the current rate is completely impracticable and all experience in our view justifies that feeling. Indeed to be perfectly honest I think the Treasury themselves have taken much the same view, inasmuch as until our last settlement in 1953 no serious attempt on their part was ever made with outside comparisons of that character at all. When they were made they were made belatedly and were made only after the case had been referred to the Arbitration Tribunal; and then on the most unsatisfactory basis, as we see it, of leaving it to the firms themselves to decide who were the counterparts to the executive grades.

1122. It is really an objection in principle?—Yes.

1123. There was another aspect of it that was raised in connection with clerical salaries, and that is that in the clerical field the Government is one of the largest employers and therefore outside rates tend to follow or be influenced by Government rates. Would you say the same thing applies to your membership?—We should say far less force in our case than with the clericals. We do not say that the Government is the largest employer of the broad type of workers with which we are concerned.

1124. *Sir George Mowbray*: Could you clarify your attitude to the Tomlin formula for us?—We would definitely prefer that measurement should be in relation to trends in the field of broad comparisons and this we conceive to have been the purpose of the Tomlin Commission. The Tomlin Commission after all frankly recognised and acknowledged in specific terms that it was difficult to make comparison in certain cases, and named the executive officer as a specific example of difficulty. They went on to say that nevertheless broad comparisons can, and in their judgment should, be made. Our complaint has been that we have not seen any real evidence of mutual desire to follow even that requirement of the Tomlin formula, but what we ask the Commission to do is to see how far executive scales have failed to follow the broad trend of comparisons in that field. From that point onwards, having got that fixed, whatever new principles you may think appropriate for the Service for particular classes could operate automatically.

1125. In other words you are generally in favour of some form of formula such as Tomlin?—We do not object to the fundamental purpose of it in so far as we should

not get seriously out of step on the basis of broad comparisons. All we do say is that it is quite impossible to pin this down to strict counterparts outside.—*Mr. Williams*: What we are anxious about is that any such formula should take into account movements in salary levels because of the difficulty of picking out a particular job and saying that that is an executive job by comparison with the Civil Service. If you take into account movements in levels of salary we think that is a fair criterion by which to adjust the remuneration of the executive class.

1126. Salaries in the broadest sense I take it?—*Mr. Redhead*: Yes.

1127. *Lady Albemarle*: That brings us on to section VIII where you lay down certain principles which you think should govern executive class pay in the future. Paragraphs 90 and 91 lay down two different principles and it is possible that under certain conditions those might be in conflict. I wondered if you could tell us to which of those two principles we should give the most weight?—I think we are bound to say that the weight to be given to different factors in our judgment will vary from time to time. We have stated at the outset in the paragraph to which you refer that we think it is impossible to contemplate any one principle for the determination of executive class scales and we have attempted thereafter to set out the various factors which we think must be taken into account and should be taken into account, but it is impossible to say what weight would be given to any one of them at any given time. Circumstances of recruitment, for example, may vary from time to time, and for that reason the weight given to that factor would vary accordingly.

1128. You do not feel that there should be too great a rigidity in internal relativities?—*Mr. Williams*: We think it is very difficult in respect of the middle ranges of the executive class to base your determination wholly on outside comparisons. You must be able to take the general movement as an indication of what should be done, but on the whole we think that is more easily done at the lower levels in the Civil Service and perhaps fairly well done at the very top levels. We are quite sure, for example, that you will be able to determine the remuneration of the permanent secretary or the deputy secretary by reference to higher executives in industry. It is when we come to the middle structure that we encounter the acute difficulty of making a comparison with outside. It is at that point that the question of in-service relativities emerges.

1129. *Chairman*: If that is correct, it is very difficult to get away from this waiting on what is done at the administrative and

clerical ends of the scale. If you have to find out first outside comparisons for them and then settle your scales by internal relativity I do not see how you can avoid that.—It may well be that the Service has to be dealt with as a whole, and that is very clearly why the Royal Commission has been asked to address itself to this problem. The difficulty has arisen through our having to take bits of it to arbitration and having *ad hoc* settlements whereas what we need to do, or what I hope we would do henceforward, would be to tend to look at the structure as a whole.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

1130. *Mr. Burman*: Can I clarify one or two points which came out towards the end of this morning's session. I take it you agree there are two fundamental problems underlying this question of pay; first, getting the pay right now, and secondly seeing it is kept right in the future?—*Mr. Redhead*: Yes.

1131. So far as the second point is concerned you would accept a certain degree of comparison with outside trends over the general field of salaries as affording a fairly good guide for keeping the rates in step with the outside world. That brings us back then to the first point, how we are to settle pay for this particular class, when it is held between the upper milestone of the administrative class and the nether one of the clerical class. Have you any suggestions on that?—We think, first of all, you have to take account of the position as it now is, comparing it, with the best judgment you can exercise, with such information as you may have available to you as to the trends that have occurred over the period we are suggesting. You will have taken note of our contention that executive class scales and other scales in the Service have failed to respond to the general movements in remuneration outside. We think that is the first point that has got to be determined. Get that right, and thereafter we would think it right to apply outside comparisons on the basis of broad trends of remuneration. We think it is essential, having taken that as our starting point, to have regard to the in-service relativities, in view of the distinct characteristics of the gradings to meet Service needs. Having looked at trends in the broad way, determined as it were the lower and upper levels of what is required by the movements outside, then one has to have regard to what is the proper differentiation and the relativities within the broad comparisons.

1132. That would, in your view, be preferable at the start, rather than to consider the executive grades *in vacuo*, so to speak?

—We think it is impossible to consider them *in vacuo*; we are bound to have regard to the internal relativities, relativities of class to class and within the class itself.

1133. *Chairman*: Is it true to say you do not think there was much seriously wrong with the 1939 scales, but that we should consider now whether responsibilities since that date have changed? Is that a fair statement?—Broadly. We would have some hesitation about top levels as they existed in 1939. They, in turn, were perhaps somewhat influenced by the scales applicable in the administrative class. Now it has been officially accepted, it was part of the official acceptance of the Report of the Chorley Committee, that something was overdue at administrative level at the outbreak of war. But in the main we make our starting point that review is necessary from 1939 because the 1939 scales were those that were, broadly speaking, fixed subsequent to the Tomlin Commission. The Chorley Committee did not regard it as appropriate to their field to seek to undo what the Tomlin Commission felt to be the right answer at that time.

1134. *Mr. Burman*: In your evidence you mention several difficulties in comparing the executive grades with people outside; but you do bring in a number of examples. You are simply using those as pointers?—As pointers of trend. We have given the specific example of bank clerks, a field of known figures of salaries, something from which we can derive some conclusions about a trend, but we do not admit there is an analogy between the executive grade and bank clerks because, as we point out, the analogy used to be between clerical officers and bank clerks. Now the bank clerks have crept up to a degree and have become a temptation to the Treasury, at any rate, to use them as being comparable to the executive officer, which we do not admit.

1135. *Mr. Cash*: You mention an increase of 96 per cent. in the bank clerk basic grade, while you say the executive officers have only had 52 per cent. increase; but, of course, apart from the difficulties you have already expressed, there is the point that there has been an introduction of mechanisation into the banks to a very substantial extent, followed by the introduction of women. You are dealing with male bank clerks, are you?—Yes.

1136. And therefore the actual job has changed quite a lot in the last 15 years. The other difficulty is the question of what other benefits the bank clerk has, for example, in relation to pension rights, which are as a rule on a contributory basis.—There are also other benefits and privileges which are not present in the case of the Civil Service.

1137. You come back ultimately to this, that whoever you pick outside there are so many ifs and ands and buts, that when you come to assess your trend by way of percentage, all you could hope to do would be to add a thousand different occupations up and divide the result by a thousand, and say: "This is an average trend".—We are not suggesting for one moment that we should measure trends by reference to one particular example. It must be over as wide a field as one can obtain.

1138. I suppose you must pick the bank clerk by reason of the Treasury's attitude, as otherwise it is not a very fortunate comparison from your angle?—We picked bank clerks particularly because they illustrate the precise difficulty of following the Treasury's own line; the temptation is to pick out somebody who is outside and say that he is comparable because he has now a comparable income, but we say that that is fallacious.

1139. You are still, however, basing your trend, in so far as you rely on it, to keep the thing right in future years, upon comparisons with outside?—Yes.

1140. Therefore you will have to pick and choose what those comparisons are going to be?—We would say that all available evidence which would demonstrate what the trend has been was fair evidence to take into account. The real difficulty has been the shortage of really reliable evidence over the whole field.

1141. Is it true to say that what the Tomlin Commission rightly or wrongly recommended was sabotaged largely in practice by the 1931 financial crisis?—Yes, I think that is true.

1142. And you are now taking 1939 which, as a matter of fact, is not a frightfully good year to choose, because of Munich.—We have taken that but the 1939 scales were in being earlier than 1939. We have taken 1939 because it is during the period subsequent to 1939 that disturbance and distortions about which we are chiefly concerned have occurred.—*Mr. Williams*: There have been special features since then, the war bonus during the war, which was on a tapering basis, and the pay addition subsequently which was on an arbitrary tapering basis. Those are, if you like, transient conditions, and we go back to 1939 because that was the last normal stable period. We should say now that the higher grades of the executive class ought to be looked at more closely in relation to the administrative class horizontally; but apart from that 1939 was a more normal situation than we have had since.

1143. You mention here and there in your memorandum the incidence of taxation. Of course, taxation as we all know to our cost, is very different today from what it was in 1938 or 1939; but I would

rather like to know, *Mr. Redhead*, whether you would say, in principle and without committing yourself too far to detail, that it was the duty of the State so to measure the burden of taxation to the individual as to render it unnecessary for you to take the incidence of taxation into calculation at all; or are you going to say we must take some account of that and the State must take some, and the two together will add up to the right answer?—*Mr. Redhead*: I think my answer must be that we have not sought to rely upon any consideration of what the effect of taxation has been, because we recognise that it is a common factor over the community as a whole. For that reason we have not drawn it into our comparisons. For instance, when we allude, purely for the sake of example, to the real loss in money values of executive class scales in a later paragraph of this statement, we deliberately do not take account of taxation. If we did take account of taxation the result would be much more acute; but we have left it out of account because we accept the view that taxation, being a common burden commonly applied, is not relevant for us in this context.

1144. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Have you at any time used increased taxation as one of the factors in a claim?—No, Sir.—*Mr. Thomas*: The Treasury have used in reply the decrease in taxation.

1145. About the bank clerks, *Mr. Cash* was quite right in referring to what has happened in the banks in the way of mechanisation, but is it not true to say that that mechanisation had been introduced in very large measure in 1938 and 1939?—*Mr. Redhead*: I cannot speak with any authority on the banks. I had the impression that mechanisation was introduced quite largely in industry, local government, and also to a degree inside the Civil Service.

1146. There had been a lot of it, I think I am right in saying, by 1938 or 1939?—I think that is perfectly true

1147. You have cited the banks as a comparison, but your purpose in doing so is nothing more than an example of the way in which the concertina is being opened in respect of pre-war differentials?—That is true. May I add, if I may, that I think perhaps there has been a little misleading emphasis upon this question of comparison with the bank clerks. I think I ought to make it abundantly clear that bank clerks were not the only examples we quoted when, for instance, we went to the Arbitration Tribunal, they were just one of several. We could ascertain some firm and reliable figures with regard to them, but it would be quite untrue to say we related ourselves exclusively to bank clerks.

1148. *Lady Albemarle*: In comparable jobs—getting away from banks—would you look at the minimum or the maximum or at the mean of the scale in making your comparison?—It is very difficult when you are making outside comparisons to have regard to the minimum. There is not the same insistence as you have in the Civil Service on entry at the minimum, and after a short period of training a recruit to an outside vocation may find himself put on a much more substantial rate of salary—in our impression very much more than a man of comparable age would receive in the Civil Service.

1149. Do you think then we ought to look at the maximum?—Yes, it is the career expectation of the individual.

1150. *Chairman*: Is it your view that Blue Book figures are of no use in determining salary trends?—No, we would not say that. We would regard them as a factor to be taken into account in measuring the general trend. Indeed, we would take the view that any useful information of an authoritative kind of that character should certainly be taken into account.

1151. What view would you take of salaries being related to a salaries index, and revised automatically whenever the index moves a certain number of points?—I should feel a certain amount of hesitation in answering that question now, because I should want to know on what basis the index would be drawn up. One would have some doubt about an index of average figures without getting a clear indication as to the trend in real terms.

1152. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Do you feel that a salaries index would be influenced to your possible disadvantage by the well known indifferent state of organisation amongst the salaried workers?—I think it is possible it would be. We are not saying that a salaries index, if drawn up, is not one of the factors to which attention should be paid, but we would hesitate in placing undivided reliance upon it.

1153. *Mr. Cash*: Supposing the index was, as Mr. Thorneycroft suggested, if anything a little depressed in its figure, that would not worry you very much if the same index was used five years later? All you would be interested in would be the upward or downward trend?—We should have a bad starting point.—*Mr. Williams*: The State must in any case be among the first flight of employers.

1154. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Would you like to look at your paragraph 100—"Pay adjustments to reflect frequent fluctuations in price levels"? Would you say that any bonuses or pay additions such as you propose in that paragraph should be based on the Ministry of Labour wages index or on the interim index of retail prices or

neither of them?—*Mr. Redhead*: In the absence of any more reliable guide for the purpose of this type of adjustment in times of violent fluctuating price levels, we would say the wages index should be applied.

1155. You would be quite happy about that, although your field of income is above the average wage rate?—Unless there was very substantial evidence that tapering, of which we have complained in the past, applied outside, we would want the wages index measurement to be applied all the way up, although we frankly admit it is arbitrary. But speaking only within the context of this type of adjustment, which is something exceptional and over and above our long term view of measurement of trend, we say that in the absence of anything of a comparable validity to the wages index above the field in which that operates, we think the wages index measurement should be applied. It is arbitrary, it is rough and ready, but we know of no other alternative by which to measure.

1156. It is another instance of measuring the trend?—It is; but of course of a purely temporary character within the concept we put forward. In thinking of trend measurement we suggested say three years; we would not say necessarily it should be automatic every three years, but we think a measurement of three years would not be an unreasonable one. However, if in the meantime, during that three years, there has been some fairly substantial change in the price levels, occasioning a sudden upsurge of remuneration generally, the Civil Service ought not, and the executive class in particular ought not, to have to wait for its three-year review before having an adjustment in respect of a rapidly rising cost of living. We admit it must be *ad hoc*, it must be rough and ready, but it would be taken into account when the trend was next reviewed.

1157. Money values for the executive class being affected in precisely the same way as money values for other workers?—Precisely.

1158. *Mrs. Wootton*: Do you prefer to use the wages index rather than the index of retail prices? The former, after all, measures changes in wage movements, and the latter measures the actual changes in prices entering into the cost of living.—Yes, we do. It is difficult to get out of the tendency that has been developed, of course, following the Tomlin Commission. We have become established in the tradition now that the cost of living, as such, should not be taken as the criterion. One accepts that as being based upon the view that the Service, in particular, should not be related as regards compensation to a rise in the cost of living when perhaps others outside

have not the advantage of having their general level of remuneration being similarly respondent. We ask only that what has been given in broad compensation for that factor outside should accrue to the Civil Service; and that is why we rely on the wages index rather than the cost of living index.

1159. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Are you sure that the wages index reflects only fluctuations in the cost of living?—No, and indeed I think generally we should be very happy at any prospect of getting the cost of living figure applied.

1160. In some industries they have a sliding scale bonus to deal with variations in the cost of living. Wages go up if the cost of living goes up, and they come down if the cost of living comes down. The wages index reflects the fluctuation in the cost of living.—To an extent, I freely admit; there are other factors that come into it, obviously; but what we are seeking to do is to relate ourselves to what we conceive to be the purpose of the Tomlin formula, that broadly speaking civil service remuneration should keep in step with outside employment.

1161. *Mrs. Wootton*: Have you looked at this from the point of view of past history to see whether, if you had been able to follow the wages index since it was invented, you would have been better off than you have in fact been?—I am afraid we have not tried to test it in that way.

1162. Perhaps you would like to look at that aspect before you commit yourselves to the future.

1163. *Chairman*: The Treasury now take a rather different view about the long term trend in times of rising prices and frequent wage adjustments. Would you agree with them?—It is a little difficult to follow the Treasury's line of thought with regard to fluctuations. As recently as 1951 they were perfectly prepared to go on continuing to have regard to the long term trend in the broad band of incomes, and they put that proposition to us. They threw the onus on us of showing what changes there had been between 1939 and 1951 in the band from £150 to £850. That is the real difficulty about this change of front.

1164. *Lady Albemarle*: Do you think it reasonable there should be a difference between the lower levels and the higher levels in the frequency of change?—I think, speaking very generally at the moment, there is more pressing need to have regard to short term fluctuations at lower levels than perhaps at higher levels.

1165. Could you indicate where the line should be drawn?—Not without more contemplation. I should hesitate to fix a point.

1166. *Mr. Hall*: I would like to go on to paragraph 102, where you have the very interesting sentence that "Generally the relativity of the middle and higher salaried grades with the wage earners is being maintained." Has Mr. Redhead got any evidence he could give us to support that point of view?—That statement is largely based upon the evidence produced for us by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The Unit have used only six samples drawn from 30 which they collected. They sought information from some 50 concerns and only 30 co-operated, and they came to the conclusion that a certain number of those were not so useful, because of incomplete details. But nevertheless they do tell us that in the whole field of the 30 the same general trend exists as is manifest in the 6 examples chosen.

1167. Perhaps I may ask a further question in connection with the words "the relativity is being maintained". Some people have an impression that the relativities outside were not being maintained up to about 1950, and that possibly since 1950 they may be being reinstated.—Again that is broadly confirmed by the Economist Intelligence Unit evidence to us in the field in which their survey covered, which would tend to show there was a narrowing of the differential up to about 1947 and thereafter there has been a widening almost back to the pre-war position. Again they say that was a fairly common feature over the whole field of the 30 concerns.

1168. I might move on to paragraphs 108 and 109. This is quite a different subject. You refer to the recruitment considerations for your grade. I expect you have seen the figures given to us by the Civil Service Commission. I read their evidence to suggest that the current rates of pay were really rather attractive to school leavers of 18 or 19, so I wonder whether there is a case for higher starting rates for the basic grade?—I think I am bound to say here that we obviously cannot in the light of the Civil Service Commission's evidence resist the assertion that at the moment there is no difficulty in recruiting an adequate number of fully qualified candidates of the requisite calibre for the executive class. The figures speak for themselves. On the other hand, we think it is possible to take too complacent a view about the present situation, and we would ask the Commission to bear in mind this not unimportant factor. It is our view, not so much that the executive class scales of pay and conditions are so attractive, as the fact that there are rather more school leavers who are coming into the Service at this level, because of the encouragement that has been given in the schools to youngsters to remain at school longer. It is the policy in grammar schools today to urge young people to complete their

grammar school course and, if their aspirations are in the direction of the Civil Service, to take not the clerical examination but the executive class examination. It is that factor which has resulted in the apparently reasonably satisfactory situation for the executive class for the moment, and it is that same factor which is responsible for a fall in the candidates for the clerical class. We now have in front of us Treasury proposals for a new form of entry into the clerical class, something which has never happened before, direct recruitment of workers from 40 to 60 years of age. I think we are bound to draw attention to this fact, that at the moment something like 16 per cent. of the total intake of the executive class comes from open competition. Over 80 per cent. comes by one channel or other from the clerical class. We take the view that there has already been a lowering of the standard for admission to the clerical class; the pass mark in the examination has been lowered. We cannot be otherwise than apprehensive at the recruitment of people aged 40 to 60 into the basic clerical grade, having regard to the fact that the clerical class is a reservoir for so large an intake into the executive class. We have a very strong feeling that if the number of fully qualified candidates of the requisite calibre expected from the clerical class is going to show a falling off, as the current admissions into the clerical class would indicate, then there would be a tendency to rely more upon the open competition entrants for the executive classes. In that case there may well arise a situation in which the views of the Civil Service Commission with regard to the satisfactory recruiting to the executive class will undergo a very rapid change. We are bound to draw attention, in that connection, to the fact that there is a falling off in the number of candidates. There has been a drop of 1,500 in the last two years, and the number of qualified candidates has dropped by 400. We are not saying there is any current difficulty about recruitment; we do not rest ourselves upon any argument of that kind. What we are saying is that recruitment considerations must be a very important factor for the future. We utter a word of warning against the complacency which might otherwise be derived from the present situation.

1169. A second point arises from that. Ought we to watch whether recruitment to the clerical class has been affected indirectly by the expectation of promotion to the executive class which must now exist?—Yes.

1170. That would be a factor which a candidate contemplating sitting for the clerical class examination would take into account?—Certainly.

1171. And the fact that, with that large promotion prospect, the intake of the clerical class is now falling off, is also a factor which should be watched looking at the classes as a whole?—Certainly.—*Mr. Plant*: There were 80,000 clerical officers in the field, but only 300 received promotion this year.

1172. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You think that the vacancies in the executive class filled by promotion from the clerical class will show a decline in the future?—*Mr. Redhead*: Yes, Sir. We think that is a likelihood having regard to the difficulty of recruitment to the clerical class at the present moment and the contemplated steps which all suggest a lower standard of recruitment at that level. We cannot expect to maintain the same calibre of recruitment into the executive class from that channel.

1173. You do not object to this practice of promoting from one class to another?—We have not in general seen any reason to resist that at all. It would be most unbecoming on my part to do so, because I was a promotee from the clerical class myself! So long as the general standards maintained have been of such a character as to leave us with no hesitation on our part as to the acceptability of clerical promotees into the executive grade, we have not objected; but we think this warning is necessary, that we regard it as imperative that the standards should be maintained.

1174. I think it was suggested that candidates for the clerical class might be increased if the school leaving age were raised to 16?—I think the raising of the school leaving age, to the extent it has already happened, has had precisely the opposite effect. The children are being discouraged from taking the clerical examination in order that they can complete their secondary school education. As I have instanced, in grammar schools there is a definite policy to encourage youngsters now to take the examination at the executive class level. I have been invited by numbers of headmasters and head mistresses to go and talk to the school leavers and their parents with the object of showing them the advantages of waiting to come into the executive class rather than the clerical.

1175. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: There are one or two questions about internal relativities which I would like to put to you. I would like to know first of all, when you are speaking of internal relativities, if you have in mind mainly the vertical relativities?—We have both, Sir.

1176. You have the horizontal relativities as well?—Yes.

1177. In that connection would you agree that in considering horizontal relativities the sort of work that is being performed by different sections on the horizontal is a

factor which ought to be considered?—Not only the kind of work, but the level of responsibilities.

1178. If you read the Treasury evidence you see that they argue that the doctrine of relativities is not an unmix'd blessing and that it could conceivably lead to an undesirable rigidity. Despite what they have said, you feel as you have just expressed yourself about horizontal relativities?—Yes.

1179. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Some of these horizontal relativities are traditional, for example that between Post Office clerks and those elsewhere?—I would not be as conversant at that level as with the executive class. When I am speaking of horizontal relativities I am thinking much more of the upper executive grades with parallel structure in the administrative class, upon which I have already commented as regards the degree of practical responsibility.

1180. *Chairman*: There is that, and there is the relativity with the professional classes. That is an entirely different problem?—Yes, it is an entirely different problem. We do not attach the same degree of importance to relativities where the professional and technical classes are concerned, because we recognise there are rather different factors that come into that. We are rather more concerned with the normal executive-administrative set up where there is the traditional and established relationship between the two classes.

1181. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: You do claim in paragraph 140 that a fair and acceptable relativity should be established between the executive class and the professional, scientific and technical classes.—It would be very difficult to put it in more specific terms than that.

1182. May I put it this way. Would it, in your view, be in the best interests of the Service that relativities of that nature should be established for all time?—We do not think it is possible to establish relativities for all time in that type of comparison.

1183. Is that because you cannot legislate for posterity in that sense because of the inevitable changes in patterns of work and so on that must arise?—Yes; that factor, and—to be perfectly frank—one must have regard to the fact that there is a certain degree of emphasis perhaps upon professional and technical qualifications, because of the nature of our times and in a period of shortage. We can readily appreciate that that means, in order to get a fair and necessary share of those people for civil service requirements, you have to follow what is followed in times of shortage, and attract people of that kind by the rates of remuneration. We do not hold too rigid views on that.

1184. If the Service is to be maintained at the requisite quality it must have regard to changes in relativities in the outside commercial world in determining the rates that are appropriate to the professional classes?—It has already done so, and I think it is inevitable that it should. Our anxiety is that it should not get too badly out of scale, particularly where there is a relationship as between executives and technicians. Inside the Service some of the examples will show the absurdity that has arisen.

1185. In paragraph 136 on page 49 you say:—

“The great difference in the duties of the classes makes close comparisons difficult but in the Ministry of Supply, for example, it is officially recognised that a senior executive officer (£1,030-£1,230) is roughly the equivalent of the manager (engineer I—senior grade, works group (£1,375-£1,575))”.

There is an appreciable difference between those salaries. I wonder whether you could say if at any time there has been parity between the salaries of those people who are said to be broadly comparable or equivalent to each other?—I think my answer must be to refer you to an example that we have quoted—page 91, example B. Over the page from 91 you get the figures for comparison as they were in 1939 and 1954, and you will see that the manager who, in 1939 was on a scale of £700 to £850 was bracketed with the principal clerk, as he was described—the S.E.O. with or without an allowance on a scale of £700 to £860 or £800 to £960. In the next column under 1954 you get the comparison to which we have made reference in paragraph 136.

1186. *Chairman*: This has been brought about by the shortage of these professional people?—The Gardiner Committee based itself on that fact but it is an example of a case where we feel the disparity has got out of scale.

1187. *Mrs. Wootton*: Yesterday we had the First Division Association, and they said they were prepared to be quite light hearted about relationship with the professional classes even if in some cases it meant that administrative class staff were responsible for the work of a professional civil servant who was actually earning more. I may have misrepresented them; you would not go as far as that?—I would not use the term “light hearted”.

1188. That is my word, they put it differently.—*Mr. Williams*: This is a question of balance. There cannot be a rigid relationship between the executive classes and the professional classes. It is possible to have a more fixed relationship, not necessarily absolutely rigid, between the executive classes and the administrative classes because we work within the same

structure and the working relationship is much closer. But, on the professional side, it becomes out of balance when the disturbance gets beyond a certain point. We feel that the disturbance has got too much out of balance; but we do not think you can establish a rigid formula and then follow it in that case. We think, on the other hand, in relation to the administrative class, especially at top levels, we do not vary very much. Those relationships can be established, and unless substantial re-organisation of the Service takes place, they could be maintained, because they are in fact working relationships, not just traditional ones.

1189. *Mr. Burman*: May I refer to your paragraphs 122 to 126, where you make the suggestion that the chief executive officers and senior executive officers should be parallel with principals in the administrative grade, and correspondingly principal executive officers and senior chief executive officers should be parallel with assistant secretaries. It is a concept that is rather strange to those outside the Civil Service that you can make a clear dividing line between policy makers and those who execute the policy. We normally find that executives are contributing towards the policy by throwing subtle changes of accent on things which go towards formulating the policy, and that seldom, if ever, can policy be formulated wholly at the top and executed downwards. I see from your evidence you say a member of the executive class is in sole charge of a Department of 13,000, and yet some of the junior administrative grades can be quite recently from a university and have little experience in formulating policy. Could you give me your views on this interchange of policy and execution at this sort of level?—It is true, as you say, that this attempt to divide the two functions, executive and policy making, is not commonly to be found in outside employment. It is equally true to say that the distinction has become considerably shaded in regard to the top levels of the executive class. We have already instanced the interchangeability which exists in practice as between the chief executive officer and the administrative principal in many Departments. We find executive heads of establishments, out on their own, with complete major responsibility. We give the Savings Bank Department as an example—in that case he has to perform all the policy functions, short of what one might describe as the political policy decisions which are determined centrally, in relation to the management of what is a very huge business. In that sense he is quite indistinguishable from the policy maker you would find in a comparable commercial business. It is for that reason that we have tried to draw what seems to be a sensible practical relativity based on

degrees of responsibility as between the top executive grades and what we conceive to be the parallel administrative grades. But it is extraordinarily difficult to say where executive work finishes and administrative work begins. In fact, the fusing now is of such a character that there is a bit of each, both at the top of the executive class and at the bottom of the administrative class, and the confusion is such that we think there is a case for doing precisely what is suggested.

1190. Would the head of a Department such as you have mentioned put forward a memorandum recommending quite a radical change in policy on his own initiative?—Yes, certainly. *Mr. Williams*: It would be on his advice almost entirely that the necessary action would finally be taken. We instance, for example, the Clerk to the Special Commissioners of Income Tax, who deals with surtax. Apart from managing a large office of highly specialised men he has to give decisions on all business arrangements there, and on any initiative which might be taken, whether by the Inland Revenue Department or the Chancellor in altering surtax legislation, his advice would be tendered. That advice may, of course, be declined at ministerial level, or altered, but he would very definitely be participating in policy formation.

1191. *Mr. Hall*: May I ask a general supplementary. Words like "top management" or "directive posts" are rather new in this context to the Civil Service. I wonder whether you have any opinion as to whether there is a trend for posts of this kind to develop?—Yes, certainly. Regional organisation has meant a considerable expansion of this type of function. It follows that when a regional organisation is set up the regional controller or his deputy is very much out on a limb. He is exercising very big powers of management, in some cases over a very large area—to give an instance, up till recently the Ministry of Food—and it is a sphere of activity which is most definitely widening with that new type of organisation and, indeed, new functions of Government Departments.

1192. Is the same kind of thing happening in headquarter offices?—Yes, a certain degree of that has happened. Managerial functions have widened with the new functions.

1193. Under your proposals the mean of the chief executive officer scale would be higher than that of the principal?—Yes.—*Mr. Syms*: It is also a shorter scale.

1194. You are proposing to equate the top of the scale rather than the mean?—Yes, because there is such a fusion

of executive policy making—policy interpretation rather than policy making—at these levels. A chief executive officer will advise through to the assistant secretary and then up the scale to the secretary on amendments to a Bill that that particular Department has before the House. Sometimes a senior executive officer reporting direct to an assistant secretary would do the same. At the same time the chief executive officer and sometimes a senior executive officer would be responsible just as a principal is for the executive administration of the work of the branch. With the growth of governmental business this has become even more the case—a fusion of administrative with executive type work at these levels. That is why we suggest a correlation of scales with the senior executive officer at the bottom and the chief executive officer at the top.

1195. Your main point is the point you made previously, that the real expression of the value of a post is the maximum and not the mean?—Yes.

1196. *Chairman*: In the same paragraph you refer to the question of fixed salaries. Have you any general views on the question of scales versus rates?—*Mr. Redhead*: We think that for career grades, certainly up to the level of chief executive officer, scales are appropriate. We do think there is a serious case for the principal executive officer grade and perhaps the senior chief executive officer having a fixed rate.

1197. And you regard them as a suitable field for extending the principle of broad banding?—Yes, certainly.

1198. In paragraph 132 you refer to the higher executive officer. Presumably you regard the main relativity as with the senior executive officer or executive officer rather than with the principal?—*Mr. Williams*: A joint one, Sir. The main relativity on the managerial side of the executive class will certainly be with the senior executive officer because normally the higher executive officer will be the assistant or deputy manager. He may have charge of the office if it is a smaller one. But in addition higher executive officers are found in administrative positions, and work directly to principals in almost every Department. Therefore the vertical relationship is both to the minimum of the senior executive officer and to the minimum of the principal scale.

1199. In paragraph 133 you suggest a gap of two increments between the senior executive officer minimum and higher executive officer maximum as appropriate. Could you tell us why you selected that particular figure?—Quite frankly, Sir, it is a somewhat arbitrary figure because one has to take account of the large number

of grades that we have to fit within the structure. I am sure the Commission will have been very conscious of the six grades in the executive class, three of which run in parallel with only two on the administrative side. That is, frankly, a very great problem. We would like to see a greater gap between the scales than the couple of increments we propose here, because people are not getting enough on promotion, and in fact on being transferred on promotion in the provinces they do in every case lose money. But having regard to the structure we think it doubtful whether more than two increments will be feasible. That will remain to be seen.

1200. The trouble is shortage of room?—*Mr. Redhead*: Yes, shortage of room to manoeuvre.

1201. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: May I ask a question on paragraph 130 where you say there are many posts which have little policy content, but which are administrative in a top management or directive sense and which are at present "wrongly classified"? I wonder whether at any time you have taken steps to get the posts correctly classified?—We have tried since the promulgation of T.C. 5/47 to do our utmost in this particular regard. We have been concerned to try to seek the implementation of these paragraphs of the circular by Departments, but we did meet with a very considerable degree of resistance locally. I think, because of the not unnatural conservatism of those who held the posts and their reluctance to yield them to another class, perhaps a little fear that because of the difference in salary scales there would be some loss of status in being reggraded in an executive capacity. Certainly we have met the opposition not only of departmental Official Sides but of our colleagues of the appropriate staff associations—in many respects one and the same people; but so moved were we by the feeling that we had made very little progress in regard to this question of T.C. 5/47, which I am bound to say owed its initiative to the Official Side itself, that we went back to the Treasury and sought to prevail upon them to use their good offices with the Departments to exercise pressure for something to be done on these lines. The Treasury, abiding by the traditional view that Departments are autonomous in matters of this kind, could not intervene, even though they were parties to the National Agreement from which it flowed. That is the real reason why we have not made any progress there, but there have been considerable strenuous battles.

1202. That interests me. When you are so emphatic as to say that certain posts are wrongly classified, it means one or other of two things—(a) that you are setting yourselves up as the arbiters to determine

what is a correct classification, or (b) there is some recognised yardstick for determining the classification. Or do you really mean that in your view they are wrongly classified?—We do not pretend—in fact we are obviously not in a position—to determine these things for ourselves. They may be determined by process of agreement. It rests on our view, which is derived from the opinion of those of our people who are on the spot and who know in practice what the respective posts are and what the contents of those posts are.

1203. *Mr. Cash*: What is your Society's position *vis-à-vis* such people as factory inspectors, inspectors of the Ministry of Education and other inspectorates? Do you represent them?—No.—*Mr. Syms*: It is the Institute of Professional Civil Servants or First Division Association.

1204. Are those people whom you would consider wrongly classified?—*Mr. Redhead*: No, not in that sphere at all.

1205. *Mrs. Wootton*: In stressing the desirability of a proper relativity between the executive and the administrative classes you did not mean we should draw the inference that you were not equally concerned that there should be a proper relativity between the executive and the clerical officer class?—*Mr. Williams*: That relativity arises in a rather different form. The relativity with the administrative class at the top level of the executive class will be a horizontal one, because they are working in parallel on the whole, or working as a team. The relativity with the clerical class will be of greatest significance at the lowest level of the executive class where the executive officer is the immediate supervisor of the clerical officer and may, and in fact very often is, getting less pay. There it is a question of vertical relativity, and of the differential to reflect the supervisory responsibility.

1206. If you are going to get a balanced structure providing reasonable relativities, you cannot possibly disregard the relationship between the scales for clerical officers and the scales for executive officers?—*Mr. Redhead*: We cannot disregard it.

1207. In fact I think you do make reference to this in paragraph 121. After all, if you are going to have a wages structure you have got to get the bottom right, have you not?—Yes.—*Mr. Williams*: We would want it so that the executive officer, if he is supervising clerical officers, and if he is a mature man, should be receiving more pay.

1208. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I have before me some comparative figures showing the rates for clerical officers and those for executive officers, in 1939 and at the present time, showing what the actual changes have

been during the war years and up to now. But according to these figures it is only on the last few points of the scale that the position of the executive officer has been worsened. Would you agree with that?—That is so.

1209. And that he appears actually to have improved his position at certain points, is that so?—That is so. But we have to qualify that point, of course, by the further comments we make about the supervisory duties of the executive grade.

1210. *Chairman*: There is a horizontal relativity at the top end of the scale between higher clerical officers and executive officers?—Yes, that is right.

1211. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: You stress your concern for the position at the maximum of the scale?—Yes.

1212. In your paragraph 123 you make a statement that the maximum of a scale is the full assessment of its real value. I think I know what you mean; but because there may be a doubt about it, would you tell us what you do mean by that?—*Mr. Redhead*: That is the figure which is assessed to be the top rate that can be paid for the full duties of the grade. Our judgment, therefore, is that it must be the final measurement of the full value of the executive officer performing the full range of duties appropriate to his grade.

1213. *Chairman*: It is the maximum which is important, rather than the mean?—Yes, especially when one bears in mind that the greater proportion of executive officers are, in fact, towards the upper reaches of that scale and are destined to remain so.

1214. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Can you say what proportion it is, over a reasonable period, of executive officers who get promoted before they get to the maximum?—I have not any precise up to date figures of that at the moment. We did quote to the Arbitration Tribunal the number of total members of the grade who were at the last four points of the scale. We have not got up-to-date figures, although the Treasury did supply them at one stage.

1215. *Lady Albemarle*: If you would give us those figures it would help; I imagine the outlook for the next few years will be less rosy?—Yes.—*Mr. Williams*: We can quote now the promotion rate at the moment from executive officer in 1953 on figures supplied by the Treasury only last week.—*Mr. Redhead*: There is a very sharp decline; something less than 400 promotions to be contemplated in the current year from the basic executive officer grade to higher executive officer. The total number in the basic grade is over 23,000.

1216. *Mr. Cash*: You say that you would like a high maximum and a short scale, for the executive officer. Is it not

the case that the scale must be a fairly long one in view of its dual function because it is dealing both with recruitment and with promotion?—It is true that the scale has to serve the needs of different types of entrants—those who come from the open competition and are conditioned to age pay up to 25; those recruited by limited competition from the clerical class, and those promoted at a later age from the clerical class. The position is this: while your open competition entrant comes in on the lower reaches of that scale on the appropriate age pay he will, within a reasonable measure of time, be called upon in most instances to perform the fullest scope and highest character of duties of his grade, and that will mean that he will be doing those duties very long before he has any anticipation of reaching anything like the maximum evaluation of the work of that grade. And, furthermore, as we pointed out elsewhere in the document, he will be exercising at a mature age supervisory functions over the clerical officer who, in many cases, will be actually in receipt of more money than he is as the supervisor. We feel that can be remedied by a shorter scale.

1217. Is it fatal that a man with a smaller salary should oversee the work of a man with a slightly larger salary? It happens in the outside world every day of the week.—Not fatal, but I should not say it was comfortable.

1218. There is no great feeling of discomfort?—There is bound to be because the man is recruited at a higher educational level with a difference—as my colleague has pointed out to me, the difference may be as much as £100 between the supervisor and the supervised.

1219. You are almost saying, but not quite, that you want one scale for the promotee and one for the examination entrant. You do not go quite as far as that?—No, it is not possible so to divide it.

1220. But that is really what you are trying to do, to make a middle class between the two.—There are so many entrants into the executive class at different ages and through different channels, it is quite impossible to make a clear cut scale of that character.

1221. The scale has been considerably shortened since 1949 already?—By four points; it is still 19 points.

1222. And now you are asking for another four years' shortening. Is there any merit in the four years?—Only that we think it would produce a scale that measures up to the needs and would meet that difficulty to which we allude of the executive supervising clericals with greater remuneration.

1223. You mentioned that the banks have regard in their scales to increments

at the time of what is called "the marrying age." Do you suggest that the Commission should have regard to that factor?—We suggest that regard must be paid to both the calibre of the work performed by members of the executive grade, and to the commitments and responsibilities that they have.

1224. You are referring here to the marrying age.—We do not feel at the moment that the remuneration, because of the length of the scale—affords at what we would regard as marrying age a reasonable rate of remuneration for the mature executive officer.

1225. *Chairman*: You have in fact taken some account of the incidence of family responsibility?—*Mr. Williams*: Plus increasing maturity—and responsibility in the grade. That, I think, is equally important. We cited the bank clerk where I think in his case there is a definite link with the marrying age. Our main purpose for suggesting it in the executive scale was first that it is one way of shortening the scale, but secondly that it met the point about the officer who has been in the Service five or six years or so and is then called upon to supervise clerical officers, so some acceleration at that point might very well fit the needs of the situation—matching family responsibility as far as it is relevant, but in the main matching grade responsibility after that period of service.

1226. Would that be, shall I say, public property that that increment was granted for that reason? What effect would that have on the outside world?—*Mr. Redhead*: It is not entirely unprecedented. It happened when the clerical officer had an accelerated increment at what was pronounced to be the marrying age.

1227. *Chairman*: What do you mean by your provision for transfer to the higher part of the scale mentioned in paragraph 143? You say:—

"In addition, provision should be made for officers who have the necessary experience and who are required to carry out the full responsibilities to receive the rate for the job by being transferred to the upper range of the scale. . . ."

—We have in mind that the higher rate of increment should make provision to meet that need.

1228. Are you intending to do it through your new scale or are you expecting to have in addition merit increments inside the scale?—No. We think the new shorter scale would achieve that purpose. It is met in certain spheres I believe by special merit increments but we are not suggesting that as something superimposed on the existing scale.

1229. You refer in paragraphs 149 to 151 to temporary assistants. Could you tell us how the differentiation in pay has been

justified in the past?—The justification, as far as we have hitherto understood, is that they are temporary! We have not followed the logic of that.

1230. It is not claimed that they are not as good quality?—No, that has not been suggested to us, except perhaps a slight indication that the method of their recruitment was of such a character that it did not give an absolute assurance. But time has gone on and people have been retained for upwards of ten or twelve years, which amounts to official confirmation that they are of the right calibre otherwise they would not be kept on. Therefore they have established the case for comparable scales.

1231. *Mrs. Wootton*: We have discussed many aspects of the remuneration of executive, professional and technical people, but there is one point I would like to hear your opinion on, and that is whether it could not be argued that the executive class offers a better career than the experimental officer class?—*I think at the moment that is probably true.—Mr. Syms*: I do not know, I think it varies between Departments. In my own Department we have quite a lot of experimental class entrants who have the avenue open right the way through to scientific officer, principal scientific officer and so on. I would say the prospects of promotion there for the experimental class are better than the executive class.—*Mr. Redhead*: We have had no occasion to examine it. Probably some diversity would be apparent at once.

1232. In view of that, would you go so far as to say perhaps the present relativities between the scientific and technical classes and yourselves are about right?—No, we would not take that view.

1233. *Mr. Hall*: We get a lot of suggestions as to what should be borne in mind in determining scales but we have not yet got it in figures. I do not know whether Mr. Redhead and his colleagues can give us a rough idea of what the executive class scales should be in pounds?—We have tried to address ourselves to what we conceive to be your major primary purpose, that is to determine principles, and to have regard to giving the right relativities. We have tried to suggest here what is in our mind the right relativity, the first thing to which we must attach importance. Having suggested a broad band of relativity at the top level of the executive class with the administrative class, it follows, if we have to give any figures, that we have to presume to say what the administrative class scale should be—upon which we are not competent to speak. You have already had, yesterday, evidence from another association in that particular regard backed up by such evidence as you will be able to form your judgment upon. If it is the desire of the Commission that we should now, having made our submission to you

as to what we think is the right basis of relativity, translate that into terms of figures, then we should be happy to put in a document to you.

1234. May I ask a question on the problem of outside comparisons—paragraphs 152 to 162—based largely on the Economist Intelligence Unit investigation. We touched on them a little earlier. We appreciate the effort made to get this information for us, but as it has worked out would Mr. Redhead think the basis on which this had to be based was rather narrow for its purpose?—*I would agree it was narrow in the sense that only six sample firms are taken in this particular analysis, but I would beg of you to remember that the information we have from the Economist Unit is that they selected these six from thirty from which they had obtained information. The others were not discarded because they represented an entirely different picture. They assured us they represent very much the same picture, but they could not make, because of differences in grading, organisation, structural machinery, the sort of straightforward graphic comparison that could be made with these six particular examples. That is the sole reason why they limited themselves in the fashion they did. They do emphasise their survey was over thirty different concerns.*

1235. The average of those supported the broad picture?—That is their assertion to us. We cannot offer more than the number of firms in the evidence of the Economist Unit, because it must be appreciated that they in their turn have not been able to identify their names to us, though I will inquire whether they would be willing to reveal to the Commission in confidence where they have obtained them from.

1236. Would it be possible for us to have the full material—not for publication?—That I should have to consult the Economist Unit about. In some of these cases they have obtained the information from firms under seal of confidentiality, with the clear understanding that they were not even to be transmitted to ourselves and, indeed, we do not know the names of these firms. We know they are in certain categories but that is all we know. If it is your wish I am prepared to ascertain and advise you.

1237. It might be worth while trying. If we get it we should treat it entirely in confidence.—*I appreciate that, but we are entirely in the hands of the Economist Unit.*

1238. The figures for 1954 that are given here have a pretty wide variation among themselves both absolutely and as regards the percentage increase. There may, of course, have been other factors besides the cost of living operating possibly changes in the nature of the duties?—*It is possible.*

1239. I do not know if we could get any further information on that from the Economist Unit?—We shall be very happy to ask them.

1240. I do not know whether you would like to give us your view how the current figures out of this analysis compare?—Again we accept the view that it is a relatively small cover for any purposes of comparison of current rates. In that respect we would urge the warning the Economist Unit uses itself—the great error that is likely to arise from relying upon absolute salary figures. Indeed, these demonstrate no more than a trend which is what we say should be the factor taken into account in determining service remuneration.

1241. You really base your case on the last underlined sentences of paragraph 162?—Yes. That is a very important factor which arises from the Economist Unit findings.

1242. *Chairman:* In paragraph 163 you refer to bonuses and similar payments. How much weight do you think that the Commission should give to such considerations and how should they be compared with advantages such as security of employment afforded by the Civil Service?—The measure of security of employment, of course, has been growing increasingly in outside concerns. It is very difficult to say what weight you should attach to the sort of privileges and considerations which we know to exist outside, because of the difficulty of obtaining comprehensive information as to how extensive they may be. The Economist Unit tells us they have completely disregarded all considerations such as expenses accounts, special concessions, luncheon vouchers, bonuses and the like—and even our bank clerks, as I saw from a press cutting the other day, have just had a bonus payment of another 3 per cent. on top of another 10 per cent., all of which are features and factors not to be found in the Civil Service. It is extraordinarily difficult to say what weight should be attached to it. What we do know is that there is a growing tendency for this extra hidden remuneration to accrue to people in outside occupations. When we discover catering establishments in the City of London almost exclusively given over at lunchtime to holders of luncheon vouchers, and we hear that they may be anything from 2s. 6d. at the lower ends of the scale of workers up to 5s. for people of the higher levels—bearing in mind that these are not subjected to taxation given in the form they are—one naturally feels that there is a factor to be taken into account,

but how much weight to attach to it is very difficult to say.

1243. It is one of the many factors?—Yes. I would add, of course, that in certain other types of employment there are certain privileges to be obtained in the way of reduced expenses in certain directions. We believe that even our bank clerks again can secure certain advantageous terms in the matter of house purchase not open to the civil servant; that those in the insurance world would likewise have certain privileges in their direction. We are not aware of any privileges of that kind that accrue to the Civil Service.

1244. *Mr. Hall:* Has it been found possible to take career prospects into account in considering these figures provided by the Economist Unit?—The information furnished by the Unit would not enable me to assess it. It would need a much more comprehensive review than even the Economist Unit has carried out.

1245. They have not been asked?—No, it would have been a much too formidable task in the time they had to do it.

1246. In paragraphs 164 and 165 there are some interesting figures given about the fall in value of the purchasing power of the executive class. I wonder whether you would agree that, broadly speaking, this pattern has been common in the salariat generally?—I think it has been a fairly common experience that this reduction of real money values has occurred throughout the salariat. On the other hand, we feel it has been perhaps more acute in the Civil Service than in the generality of fields with comparable income levels outside. This view has some measure of support, we are grateful to note, from the Treasury itself, too.

1247. *Chairman:* You refer to a possible change in hours and loss of E.D.A. Is it your view that, if E.D.A. were abolished, all the scales must be increased by 8 per cent. in London and 3 per cent. in the provinces?—We think the factor of the loss of E.D.A. which has become an accepted part of remuneration certainly must be taken into account in fixing any new basic remuneration. I do not go so far as to suggest it should be arbitrarily introduced, it would be impossible to do that, because there are other factors to be taken into account in assessing what the new rates should be.

1248. Provincial differentiation being one of them?—Yes.

1249. Have any of you gentlemen anything further to say? Then I finish up by saying thank you to you all for coming here. Thank you very much.

(The witnesses withdrew)

(Adjourned until Thursday, 27th June 1954 11.30 a.m.)

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ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

9

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

NINTH DAY

Thursday, 3rd June, 1954

Post Office Engineering Union
Witnesses



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on behalf of the Post Office Engineering Union

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

NINTH DAY

Thursday, 3rd June, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE
MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.
MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.
SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.
MR. N. F. HALL

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SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.
MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum on Pay submitted by the Post Office Engineering Union

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Section I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING PAY

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TOMLIN FORMULA

1. The broad principles which govern civil service pay are set out in Chapter 10 of the Introductory Factual Memorandum. It will be seen that they are in an oblique form; and there has proved to be a scope for difference of opinion about how they should be applied in particular cases. The Union submits that in practice the "Tomlin formula" has proved to require critical examination from three points of view.

(i) How far is it clear?

2. Ambiguity arises from the fact that the Tomlin Commission put forward two different standards of comparison to be taken into account when fixing civil service pay, without saying anything at all about the relationship that they should bear to each other. The two standards were (i) comparison with wages in broadly similar occupations, and (ii) comparisons with wages as a whole. First, the Commission refers with approval to the statement in Award No. 1325 of the Industrial Court. This statement refers explicitly to the need to maintain:

"a fair relativity as between [Post Office] wages and those in outside industries as a whole, and as between the various classes within the postal service"

and yet in commenting upon it, the Commission held that:

"If there is such fair relativity as is indicated in that Award between the rates of pay of the class of civil servants under review and comparable outside rates, it may be assumed that a satisfactory staff will be recruited and retained."*

* The underlining of the above quotations has been inserted by the Union.

3. Having commended the statement of the Industrial Court for something it did not say, the Commission went on to insist that when the pay of any section of civil servants was under review, broad comparisons with outside workers were possible and should be made, adding that:

“in effecting such comparisons what mattered was the long term trend, both in wage levels and in the economic condition of the country”.

Elsewhere, in arguing in paragraph 344 that the cost of living should not directly determine pay, the Commission said that:

“Due effect will, however, be given to this factor if Civil Service wages fluctuate in accordance with movements in general wage levels in outside industry which, in turn, are affected by marked and permanent changes in price levels.”*

4. Clearly, there is ambiguity here—and on an important point. Relativities between wage rates in different industries constantly change; it is, therefore, usually the case that wages in any particular industry, or in any group of associated industries, or of any functional staff grouping cutting across many industries, do not precisely and continuously change with wages in industry as a whole. Which movement ought the wages of a group of civil servants to follow? The absence of a clear statement of the relationship that should exist between the wage level as a whole and wage rates in particular “comparable” outside occupations, when settling the pay of a group of civil servants is, in the Union’s opinion, a grave weakness of the “Tomlin formula”.

5. There is an element of ambiguity, too, in the reference to the “long term trend”. This phrase was employed by the Tomlin Commission to point the contrast between the sort of wage adjustments which it favoured and the twice yearly adjustments on cost of living grounds which were operating when it was at work. The official understanding of the phrase has in fact been limited to relatively short term movements, e.g., in prices and outside wages which have preceded the negotiations in question.

(ii) How far is it fair?

6. The “Tomlin formula” as it has customarily been interpreted has not appeared to civil servants to be fair; especially has its operation in the economic conditions of the last few years caused among civil servants a recurrent and widespread sense of its inadequacy. This derives really from two features of the formula:

7. (i) The time lag. The general effect of the formula has been that the civil service wage changes can take place only after outside changes (whether general or particular) have already been effected. In a period of steadily rising prices this has meant that civil servants can claim no direct compensation for cost of living increases, but must wait until they can justify their claims on the basis of increases which outside workers have secured. So there has been—almost continuously since 1939—a sense that civil servants were one move behind in the efforts of trade unions to protect the real value of the members’ wages. The more rapid the rise in the price level has been, the keener has been the feeling (especially of the less well paid grades) against being always “at the end of the queue”.

8. (ii) The reference to the “economic condition of the country”. This phrase has been used to argue that civil servants should in some circumstances not receive even those increases which they could claim on the basis of comparisons with outside workers. Thus, the fact that between June, 1948, and June, 1950, the general wage level, as measured by the Ministry of Labour wages index, had increased by nearly 4 per cent. (and the cost of living by 5 per cent.), did not lead the Post Office to the conclusion that any wage increase at all was allowable for Post Office engineers in June, 1950, because it was argued the economic condition of the country was not such as to permit an increase. In this view, of course, the Post Office was backed by the Government White Paper on Personal Incomes

* The underlining of the above quotations has been inserted by the Union.

(Cmd. 7321). Nevertheless, wages in outside industry had increased to nearly the same extent as had prices, so that the real value of these wages was very nearly maintained while the real wages of the Post Office engineers (and of other civil servants) declined.

9. Indeed, throughout the period of wage restraint, following the issue of the White Paper, the argument about the economic condition of the country was used strongly—and often effectively—against civil service claims. The Government appeared to consider that as an employer it had a particular responsibility for operating wage restraint rigorously so far as its own employees were concerned. There was strong and widespread resentment at this situation; and it is to be hoped that in any new formula no specific reference to “the economic condition of the country” will find a place. If civil service wages depend at all on outside wages, no such special reference is necessary; since in present circumstances—and in such circumstances as are foreseeable in the future—the economic condition of the country is already taken into account in ordinary outside wage settlements.

10. Experiences like this suggest to civil servants that they are likely to get the worst of both worlds. When prices and outside wages are rising, civil servants lag behind; if, however, the economic situation were to change, and rapid falls in prices took place accompanied by actual wage reductions, there can be no guarantee that civil service wages would be the last to be reduced. The fear of civil servants is that their wages would be among the first to be reduced—as an example by the Government of the course that other employers should follow and other wage earners accept.

(iii) How far is it socially adequate?

11. The Tomlin Commission reported at a time when the Civil Service covered a smaller proportion of the employed population and when trade unions were weaker than now. It made its points on pay principles in part by quoting—with apparent approval—a series of pronouncements, made from 1910 onwards, and covering therefore a period when the Civil Service was still smaller and trade unionism in the Service and outside it still weaker than in 1931.

12. It even gave approval to one quite deplorable pronouncement—that of the Anderson Committee of 1923—that there was “only one principle . . . the employer should pay what is necessary to recruit and retain an efficient staff”. It is, of course, obvious that failure to recruit and retain an efficient staff suggests that something is wrong with the terms of employment; the inverse principle however—that pay is quite satisfactory if complements are kept reasonably up to strength—is a very inadequate basis for determining civil service (or any other) pay. Indeed, the trade union movement has grown up because men and women have refused to accept the principle that an employer has no obligation except to buy his labour in the cheapest market and need pay wages no higher than he is compelled to pay by the needs of recruitment.

13. Not only this aspect but the whole of the “Tomlin formula”, as it has been customarily interpreted by the Treasury in recent years, precludes the possibility of the Government as employer giving any positive stimulus to that trend towards higher living standards for the employed population which ought to mark a progressive industrial society. It is true that the Civil Service has set a good standard in respect of permanence and pensionability of employment (improved in recent years as a result of National Whitley Council discussions and the representations of staff associations), but this has probably been—as is argued later—more because of the special character of the public service than because of any desire to give a constructive lead (and it has to be borne in mind that there have always been at any given time a proportion—more or less substantial—of civil servants who were “temporary” or “unestablished” and to whom the benefits of permanence and pensionability were not extended). But in respect of rates of pay the trend of the Treasury has been to recede gradually from any social responsibility as a large employer.

14. The Fair Wages Resolution mentioned in paragraph 300 of the Tomlin Report, and the undertaking quoted in the same paragraph, illustrate that in 1909-1910 when trade union organisation was far weaker and collective agreements

covered a far smaller area, the Government as employer was not expected to be neutral or to pay only what it was compelled to pay by the pull of the market. It was then positively on the side of the good employer and of the observance of the union rate. At that time it could be said by the McDonnell Commission to be an "accepted principle with all parties" that the Government should be a "model employer".

15. The Tomlin Commission repudiated the conception of the Government as a model employer, because of the difficulty of defining that term, but it was still accepted in principle and without question that the Government should not fall below the levels set by good outside employers. The Treasury's conception of its obligations on this basis did not always coincide with the conception of the trade union movement, and Mr. Ernest Bevin once remarked:

"It is not fair to say that the Treasury follow the best employers. They do not. The Treasury follow the basic agreements, a far different thing from the practice of the best employers. The Treasury have never been willing up to now—we hope to improve them, with a little pressure—to become a model employer". (House of Commons: 13.2.1946.)

16. Now, however, the Treasury appear to be contemplating a further stage in the decline. In their evidence they did not mention even the good employer as providing the guide. When questioned on this, however, they explained this as due to the fact that the Treasury thought there were no employers now but good employers; and it was reassuring to the Union to read Sir Edward Bridges' statement "we certainly do not want to suggest that the Treasury should base itself on employers who are not good employers".*

17. It may well be that, as the Tomlin Commission said, the phrase "a model employer" is vague and indeterminate, but the Union does not accept that the Government as employer has no obligation at all except that of following other good employers. If, for example, it is argued that a particular rate of pay does not in all the circumstances provide a living wage, the Government ought to be prepared to meet that argument on merits and not rest solely on the defence that they are no worse than outside employers.

18. This decline has happened at a time when publicly owned enterprises have been growing and have been accepting as employers a distinct social responsibility. The National Coal Board, for example, has regarded it as part of its task to improve in every way the conditions of workers in the coal industry and their prospects of advancement. It is hardly surprising that Post Office engineering staff, whose function of providing a service is so like the function of some of the nationalised industries, should wish that their employer too had some social obligation when they reflect that although their output per head since 1946 has gone sharply up, their real wages have fallen.

19. Strangely enough it is recognised that in one field, at any rate, the Government ought to settle a matter of principle affecting pay—the issue of equal pay. Nobody has argued that on that point the public service ought merely to follow what is done outside. This has been because trade unions in the public service have made an issue of equal pay, and because the grading and structure of the public service assign men and women equal work to a greater and clearer extent than in the outside field of employment. Equal pay it is said—quite rightly—is such a major social question that it ought to be resolved on grounds of principle in the public service, and a lead one way or the other given to outside employers, rather than a lead awaited from outside.

* But it is disturbing to find earlier the statement of Sir Thomas Padmore:

"I would have thought, if I may say so that it would be a very odd thing for the Government to say in relation to any particular category of its employees: 'We will not look at the outside rate because it is not fair, and it is not fair because the people concerned outside are not properly organised and cannot strike a fair bargain with their employers'. The doctrine of fair wages, as we have always held it in the Civil Service, has been the doctrine not that wages outside were in the main fair, but that it was fair to pay to Crown servants something which was, by and large, the same sort of thing as they would get in other employment." (Paragraph 57.)

This appears to conflict seriously with Sir Edward Bridges' pronouncement.

20. Within a civil service of its present size and diversity, however, there arise other issues of social significance—ought any man to be employed at a rate below a living wage, ought there to be a marked and rapid change in the valuation set on technical work, ought productivity to play a part in wage negotiations, and so on. The “Tomlin formula” precludes the Government as employer from making even as independent a judgment on these matters as a large outside employer can.

AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA: TWO PRELIMINARY POINTS

21. No simple automatic formula will provide a basis for the settlement of civil service pay. The Service is so large, so complex and so diverse, and the background of national circumstances may so vary from time to time, that any body of principles must be comprehensive and flexible. Too simple a formula may encourage a rigidity in civil service pay which in the long run will advantage neither the staff nor the public.

(i) The importance of collective bargaining

22. Whatever formula is recommended by the Commission must be a guide to collective bargaining and not a substitute for it. The Union respectfully hopes that the Commission will think fit in their recommendations to lay emphasis on the importance of maintaining and strengthening the system of collective bargaining in the Civil Service. It has been our experience as a union—carrying on its negotiations almost exclusively with the Post Office—that this system has been under strain in recent years. We have expressed our concern to the Post Office on this subject; we drew attention to the advice given to both sides of industry by the Minister of Labour as exemplified by the following extracts from a speech in the House of Commons on the 3rd March, 1954:

“Each industry ought to look at its negotiating machinery to see whether, in the light of its own experience and that of other industries and that which we have gathered over the years in the Ministry of Labour, anything can be done to improve that machinery. . . .

“What I want to see is the further improvement, solidly attained, of this collective bargaining system. The more questions that are settled by negotiation the better for all of us and when, after every effort has failed to bring about peace by negotiation, then the area of dispute may yet well be narrowed and that narrowed area can be submitted to voluntary arbitration and disposed of in that way. The more often that happens in such cases the better”.

23. We have expressed this concern about the attitude of mind which the Post Office appeared to bring to negotiations—at any rate on the engineering side—mainly on the ground that since 1948 the Union and the Post Office have not settled a single major pay claim by agreement. Each has had to be referred to the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal. The Post Office seeks to defend itself by contending that the Union has made excessive claims. The fact remains, however, that on every single occasion the Court has awarded more than the Post Office was prepared to offer (and on all occasions but one has awarded substantially more—as is illustrated in Appendix 3).

24. To some extent negotiations on behalf of departmental grades—as opposed to Treasury grades—are throughout the Service bedevilled by the strictness of the control exercised by the Treasury over Departments in pay matters. To quote the Committee on Public Accounts in summarising a Treasury memorandum:

“The Treasury exercise complete control over all Departments in the salaries and numbers of their staff”.*

Since the Post Office is by far the largest employer of staff who are organised in departmental grades it is naturally the Department most affected by this control. While it is argued by the Post Office that the need to keep in step with the rest of the Civil Service prevents them from responding to the representations of the trade unions in the way they would if they were masters in their own house, the Union's view is that in fact the Post Office fails to secure for its staff terms as favourable as the Treasury has conceded elsewhere in the Service.

* Fourth Report from the Committee on Public Accounts, 1950-1951.

25. As a result of the detailed Treasury control virtually every point has to be referred back for approval. This, of course, means delay and has contributed to the present unsatisfactory state of collective bargaining on the engineering side of the Post Office. Worse still, however, it means that the Union's representatives regularly have the frustrating feeling that they are endeavouring to discuss wages with people who have no real authority to bargain and that the real decisions are made by people whom they never encounter face to face. The Union has suggested that a Treasury representative should take part with the Post Office team on appropriate occasions; but this idea has been rejected as the Treasury had substantial objections and felt it "could save but little time".

26. The Union hopes that the Commission will place emphasis on the importance of collective bargaining in the Civil Service, and will take account of the Union's view that—at any rate on the engineering side—the Post Office could, with advantage, take a more constructive attitude towards negotiations.

(ii) The special features of civil service employment

27. Further, any principles governing civil service pay must take account of the special features of civil service employment. Two of these features are permanence and pensionability; and the Post Office in wage negotiations has frequently sought to make these two elements in civil service employment an argument for casting Service rates of pay somewhat lower than the rates of comparable work outside. This argument is sometimes put in the extreme form that the actuarial value of the civil service pension is some 15 per cent. of civil service pay.*

28. The Union submits to the Commission that in fact, when comparisons are made with outside pay, the permanence and pensionability of civil service employment ought not to be regarded as justifying service rates being fixed below the outside rates. In support of this view the Union submits the following considerations:

29. (i) The Tomlin Commission did not recommend any account being taken of these factors when comparisons with outside rates were made. This fact is brought out by the Treasury in their memorandum of evidence to the present Commission, although they—rather boldly—imply that the Tomlin Commission must have intended that such conditions as these should be taken into account.

30. (ii) Since the Tomlin Commission reported, there has been a wide extension of permanence and of pensionability in employment generally in the country. When that Commission was at work, unemployment and insecurity of employment were the most marked features of life for the working population; since then a great change has taken place. For the last fifteen years there has been full employment; all parties are pledged to "the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment", and it is a commonplace that the relative attraction of civil service security has lessened as other employments have become less precarious. Large private concerns have come increasingly to appreciate the value of guaranteeing security of employment to a high proportion of their employees. Even in the most notoriously insecure industries measures have been taken to give as firm a guarantee of employment as possible; the guaranteed week in the building industry, and the decasualisation of dock labour are two examples which come readily to mind of what has been a marked and general tendency throughout industry. The rapid extension of pension schemes has been one aspect of this movement. No comprehensive information yet seems available about this; but such information as can be assembled shows conclusively how widespread pension schemes now are and how rapidly they have grown. "The Times Review of Industry" in March, 1954, in an article on group pension schemes said:

"About one third of the employed population of Britain are members of formal pension schemes and these schemes are now so common that it is easy to forget that, apart from the public superannuation schemes, most of them have been started since the war".

* The Post Office has quoted at various times actuarial value varying between 13–15 per cent. The Union understands that the Treasury has advised the Royal Commission that in the case of the Union's grades the correct figure is 10 per cent.

A survey of the pension arrangements in force in industry which has recently been carried out on behalf of the Institute of Actuaries and the Faculty of Actuaries* has led to an estimate that 6,300,000 people are now covered by pension schemes at their places of employment, although it is stated that this figure "must be regarded as being no more than the best guess we can make in the circumstances". This estimate, however, corresponds closely with the one made by "The Times Review of Industry", referred to above.†

31. (iii) The view which is now put by the Treasury on service pensions recognises that times have changed, but puts emphasis on the non-contributory nature of the civil service scheme. For example, Sir Thomas Padmore put the matter as follows to the present Commission

"So far as concerns superannuation, before the war a pensions scheme, on civil service lines, was comparatively rare outside. Now it is probably more common than not. It follows, therefore, that the difference in favour of the Civil Service is much less than it used to be. There is, however, one difference in favour of the Civil Service, that is that our scheme is non-contributory and a good many outside schemes are contributory to the rough extent of 5 or 6 per cent. That is something which you can evaluate fairly closely". (Paragraph 93.)

This argument quite omits reference to the fact that the Treasury has itself claimed it as an advantage to the public service that civil service superannuation should be non-contributory. When the Tomlin Commission recommended that civil service pensions should be contributory the Treasury in a statement put the view that the recommendation should be rejected on the grounds that:

". . . The introduction of a contributory system into a service in which pensions are at present granted on a non-contributory basis would be attended by special difficulties in the long transitional period; that a superannuation system which includes a provision on the lines recommended in the event of voluntary retirement would be less effective as a motive to continuous service than the existing system; and that, judging by the experience of other schemes, the scheme suggested would, contrary to the views of the Royal Commission, in the long run involve substantial work, expense and difficulties of administration".

32. It will be clearly seen from the above that the Treasury rejected the Tomlin Commission's proposals partly, if not mainly, because the pressure upon civil servants to remain in continuous employment would be removed if a contributory pension scheme were introduced. Stability of staff is a point to which the Treasury has always attached great importance. It has consistently set its face against the idea that individuals should pass into, and out of, the public service according to the decisions of the moment; and has always regarded the civil service superannuation scheme as a valuable deterrent to a casual attitude towards civil service employment.

33. The permanence of civil service employment and the non-contributory nature of its pension arrangements also have their value as weapons of discipline in the Service. Civil servants generally, from the highest grade to the humblest, have a particular kind of responsibility as public servants. Almost all have custody of public property, access to official information, some power of influencing decisions which affect individual members of the public, or some scope for "showing preference" if they can be induced to depart from a strict impartiality. For the main-

* By a research group specially appointed. The report is called "The Growth of Pension Rights and their Impact on the National Economy".

† Still, because of the difficulties involved in the field, estimates do vary. Professor Titmuss, of London University, for example, who is making an independent study of the social aspects of the growth of superannuation schemes, thought ("The Times", 29th and 30th December, 1953) that "close on five million people are now covered apart from the three million benefiting from public service schemes. At a guess, perhaps 50 per cent. of the total male labour force in civil employment in Britain (excluding agriculture) have now been granted certain guaranteed rights or claims on the future production of the community". He also thought that about 500,000 employees a year are coming under private retirement schemes.

tenance of confidence in the public service there must be no doubt of the integrity of its members. In part this integrity depends on selection, training, morale and sense of duty; and in part it has been ensured by making the public service an employment to which a man is encouraged to devote his life, and in which he may expect, subject to good behaviour, permanence and a pension. Any serious breach of the code of the Service may involve for the individual, the penalty (which in the case of a man nearing retirement is extremely heavy) of dismissal with loss of pension rights. Moreover, no law forbids a strike in the public service; but such action would be regarded as a disciplinary offence and might involve individuals losing their pensions. The Union is not here concerned to discuss how far such an attitude on the part of the authorities is proper; it is merely concerned to state the position and to add that there cannot be any doubt of the effectiveness which such threats have had.

34. (iv) Permanence and pensionability are two features of civil service employment which constitute some attraction (an attraction which is relatively less than it was twenty years ago), but against them must be set other features of civil service employment which are less attractive. This was the view of the Bradford Committee of 1904 who said:

“The advantages attaching to the right to a pension could perhaps be properly regarded as a set-off against the disadvantages attaching to service under the State”.

For example, the Civil Service is a graded Service. Advancement for the individual depends not only on his individual ability and zeal, but on the occurrence of vacancies. Often to make real progress the individual depends on vacancies occurring in a succession of grades through which he must pass. There have been periods when whole grades have suffered the frustrating stagnation of lack of promotion—for reasons quite beyond the control of any individual. In many parts of the Service too the man who wishes to make progress—even at relatively low levels—must be willing to remove his home and take his promotion in quite a different part of the country. Again—to take another disadvantageous feature of civil service employment—a man who enters a civil service career often spends time and effort accumulating knowledge and experience for which he cannot find easily a market outside the Service. This applies, indeed, to many members of the Union's grades who have acquired considerable knowledge of the telephone service on the technical side; there are only a very limited number of opportunities for using that knowledge to any substantial degree outside the Post Office, and it has been said, with some truth, that these individuals have invested their lives in the telephone service. Such disadvantages attaching to civil service employment are found in a similar way in other large organisations; but the fact that a man who has gained experience in some fields in the Civil Service cannot easily seek other buyers for his skill and experience—as a chartered accountant or a civil engineer or a skilled engineering toolmaker can—suggests that the permanence and pensionability of civil service employment are features of the work against which less attractive characteristics must be offset.

AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA STATED

35. In the preceding pages the Union has advanced its criticisms of the present principles governing the fixing of civil service pay. Looking at this problem as it is bound to do in the light of its own experience and from the point of view of the grades it represents, the Union considers that some principles along the following lines would be fair and practicable.

- (i) The work of civil service grades should be valued by reference to the following factors:
 - (a) The skill, experience, responsibility, training, general and specialist knowledge required, and the need to maintain adequate differentials.
 - (b) The pay for similar work in outside industry, bearing in mind the need for Government employment to maintain a standard of pay not inferior to that of the best outside employers.
 - (c) The productivity of the workers concerned.

- (ii) Once the appropriate rate of remuneration for a grade has been fixed by reference to these factors, and until a change in one or other of them justifies a review, the real value of the rate should be maintained.

36. The formula suggested distinguishes between two aspects of civil service pay adjustment—(i) the fixing of the rate, and (ii) the adjustment of the rate, once fixed, in the light of changes in the cost of living. It may not always be possible to distinguish between the two, since a given claim may be based on the arguments that the rate itself should be amended—because, for example, of changes in the work—and that in any case the old rate is inadequate because the cost of living has gone up. Nevertheless, it is useful to stress that there are these two distinguishable aspects of civil service pay negotiations.

(i) The fixing of the rate

37. The Civil Service covers a great range of grades and types of work. If civil service pay is to be satisfactory, both to the staff and to the public, there should not be too much internal rigidity. Especially should there not be too much rigidity as between the different main groups or hierarchies; although there is probably a better case for preserving more carefully the differentials (once they have been properly established by negotiation) between the various grades within one hierarchy. To take a specific example, there ought not to be regarded as being a permanent relativity fixed between the basic grades in the Post Office engineering, the Post Office manipulative and the Treasury clerical hierarchies. There should be scope for the relationship to vary as necessary over a period of time as salary scales are fixed in accordance with the principles set out in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), each of which calls for some additional comment.

(a) *Skill, experience, responsibility, knowledge and differentials*

38. A main reason that the Union has introduced the terms "skill" and "specialist knowledge" into its statement of principles is that it thinks at present insufficient attention is given to these features in assessing the pay which a grade should receive. It is, of course, always difficult to assess in any exact way just how much specialist or technical knowledge or skill a person has—though a rough and ready measure has traditionally been provided by apprenticeship schemes or certificates of proficiency. This is not always a sufficient indication of skill acquired, however, and should be supplemented by taking account of the length of the training period required to make men proficient.

39. To an increasing extent, the economy of the country depends for its future growth on an adequate supply of trained, skilled manpower (using the word "skilled" in a broad sense). This trend is reflected in the Civil Service; the increasing complexities of Government administration on the one hand, and of technical developments affecting Government employees on the other hand, have put specialist knowledge at a greater premium, from the point of view of efficient organisation, than ever before.

40. Yet the Union is not convinced that the pay scales reflect this fact adequately. The importance of this is long term and frequently, therefore, not considered at any one time as of immediate consequence. But the Union takes the view that unless the pay of civil servants is linked more closely with the knowledge they require, and the time and effort they have taken to acquire it, the time may well come when men will not think the trouble involved is worth the candle, and will either not take the trouble, or having taken it, may come to the conclusion that the incentive is insufficient to warrant them employing their knowledge with the greatest efficiency.

41. The conception of responsibility must also be a wide one. Often it appears to be narrowed in the Civil Service to responsibility for the oversight of staff. This is an exceedingly important responsibility (and the Union would not contend that it is at present valued any too highly in the Civil Service); but account should also be taken of the responsibility for property, for safety of others and for the maintenance of an essential public service.

42. The need to maintain differentials and to expand them is now increasingly recognised in British industry generally; in making the reference here the Union has in mind the need for adequate internal differentials, especially within each hierarchy. Later in this submission the Union elaborates this point in respect of its own members. It is, however, worthwhile to emphasise that within the Civil Service advancement through a succession of grades often demands a willingness to move to a new place of work—sometimes involving heavier daily travel, but very often involving actual family removal.

43. While putting this emphasis on the various factors which should be considered and on the need for adequate differentials, the Union considers—although it has not incorporated the point in its formula—that no adult grade ought to receive a rate of pay which does not represent a living wage. Naturally there will be scope for argument about what constitutes a living wage, and the Union does not put forward any precise figure. At the moment, however, there is no obligation on the Government as employer to pay a living wage if it can defend its rates by outside comparisons. As will be indicated later, the Union doubts whether some of the present rates for its lowest paid grades can be regarded as providing a living wage. For the Royal Commission to endorse the principle of a living wage for all adult grades would provide a safeguard for the lowest paid which the Union would regard as valuable and as very fitting in Government employment.

44. In applying this first principle, moreover, some regard must be paid to comparisons within the Service. If one particular section of the Service has depressed rates of pay in relation to others, in the sense that a given degree of responsibility, knowledge and experience receives a lower rate of pay in that section than in others, a sense of injustice is bound to result. There will be pressure for outlets of advancement to the better paid sections, even though such advancement may not from the point of view of the Service represent the most useful employment of the individual advanced. Most serious of all—morale and zeal may well suffer in the worst paid section because of treatment which appears unjust.

(b) The relation with outside rates

45. In the second sub-paragraph the Union deals with the question of the relationship between civil service and outside rates. The tenor of the Union's contention is that the two Sides in negotiation should have a little more scope for initiative and flexibility in pay policy; but the Union is certainly not willing to see this interpreted as freedom to cast their rates of pay at a lower level than heretofore. The Union, therefore, earnestly hopes that the Commission will recommend quite clearly that Government employment should maintain a standard of pay not inferior to that of the best outside employers.

46. This principle of following outside rates can, however, be followed only in a broad way. There are groups of staff for whom it is hard to find any precise and satisfactory outside analogues. The principle of following outside rates tends to be artificial if applied to very small groups of staff in the Civil Service; for them it is more realistic to determine an appropriate rate by applying internal relativities. What the Union has in mind is that within each of the main hierarchies in the Service those key grades or groups which are fairly large and can be fairly closely compared with some outside workers should provide the basis for settling rates, and that other grades and smaller subsidiary groups should be discussed in the light of the rates so determined.

47. It is important, too, that comparisons with outside industry should be on the basis of the rates actually paid there by good employers. There is often a considerable difference between the agreed minimum rates for particular industries and the rates actually paid.

(c) Productivity

48. There is no need to emphasise the importance which all responsible opinion attaches to higher productivity over the whole field of industry as a foundation for higher living standards. The Union—with others representing Post Office staff—have played their part, along with the Post Office administration, in operating Joint Production Committees; but a much wider, keener and more valuable interest

in productivity could be secured if rank and file workers were convinced that increased productivity really benefits them. The benefits of increased productivity will include a healthier national economic position, and should, at any rate in theory, bring benefits to all workers in the way of lower prices. Increased productivity, however, involves for the worker the willingness to change familiar routines, to co-operate in the adoption of new techniques, and to face the risk of redundancy (which in the Civil Service will not normally mean discharge, but may mean the deferment of promotion); these things are not likely to be easily accepted if the benefits derived from increased productivity are abstract and remote. If, therefore, increased output can be advanced as material arguments in claims for increased wages, the whole productivity movement will be stimulated and advanced.

49. The Government have, indeed, themselves emphasised the relationship between output and wages. For example, Mr. Harold Watkinson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, speaking in the House of Commons on the 29th April, 1953, said:

"... the point I am bringing to the notice of the House is the conclusion of 'The Times' leading article, which said: 'However undesirable a general wage increase, there is generally a case for increased payments related strictly to increased output'. It could not have put the Government's policy better. We maintain that in these circumstances, with a Budget that puts no new taxes for the first time since the war, wage increases should be related to increased output... we say that as far as earnings are related to output and efficiency, then the sky is the limit. And why not? That is in the national interest..." (House of Commons: 29th April, 1953.)

50. Naturally such a conception has its difficulties; and the Union does not know of any encouragement from the Treasury for bringing this point into wage negotiations. (It is remarkable that in 1954 the Treasury could produce its memorandum of evidence discussing the principles on which the pay of some three-quarters of a million men and women should be determined without mentioning the word "productivity" from beginning to end). There are some sections of the Civil Service whose work lends itself to rapid increase in output per head; there are others whose work does not lend itself to such increase, or is from its nature impossible satisfactorily to measure. But if once the principle is accepted—as it should be—that changes in productivity can be introduced into wage negotiations, these problems can be solved.

(ii) The maintenance of the rate

51. The criteria mentioned should, in the Union's view, be used in assessing from time to time the value of the work of any given section of civil servants. Such assessments will occur infrequently—unless there are very rapid developments indeed in the character, organisation or external circumstances surrounding any particular class of work. Once an assessment has been made the real value of the wages or salaries so fixed should be maintained, at any rate to the extent that the real value of wages and salaries generally in the country are being maintained. The Union would not argue that real values should be maintained by fixing a relationship between pay scales and an index of consumer prices (because this could very well lead to unnecessary fluctuations in wage rates such as occurred during the 1920s under the old cost of living bonus scheme); but that wages, at any rate up to the £600 a year level, should be reviewed in the light of changes in the Ministry of Labour's index of wage rates. (This should not, in the Union's view, be the sole factor to be taken into account in maintaining the real value of civil service pay, since it might be necessary at some time to take into account the fact that this index measures only minimum and standard wage rates and not actual wage rates in industry, and that it is possible in certain periods for prices to leap so sharply ahead of the wage rates index for several months or more that some anticipation of the movements of this index should be allowed for in adjusting civil servants' wages. However, while these qualifications to the use of the wages index as a reference need to be borne in mind, the Union would agree that at any given time this index should be the major determining factor in maintaining the real value of civil service pay).

52. Should any changes in civil service scales based on changes in the wages index be on a percentage or a flat rate basis? In the past the Treasury has argued that increases in the wage rates index should be passed on to the wages of civil servants in so far as these increases can be translated into actual money amounts, and not in the form of percentage increases. In the Union's view, the whole point of giving a basic valuation to the work of any section of civil servants is to establish the relationship which should exist between the pay of that section of civil servants and other sections of civil servants and similar workers in outside employment. If this is accepted as being a reasonable point of view, then it follows that this relationship, or these series of relationships, should be maintained in periods of changing prices by means of percentage changes in pay scales.

53. Bearing all these factors in mind, therefore, the Union hopes that the Royal Commission will agree to the need to maintain, by reference to movements in the wage rates index, the purchasing power of the pay of civil servants once it has been correctly valued over any long term period.

Section II. PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN THE PAY OF THE CATEGORIES OF STAFF REPRESENTED BY THE POST OFFICE ENGINEERING UNION

54. The Union does not suggest any special principles to cover the staff which it represents, but wishes to amplify those aspects of the proposed principles which have particular application to them.

THE WORK OF THE GRADES REPRESENTED BY THE UNION

55. As a preliminary, however, certain features of the work performed by the grades represented by the Union require emphasis.

56. The grades which the Union represents are set out in Chapter 27 of the Introductory Factual Memorandum, and are employed on various aspects of the construction, installation and maintenance of the telephone system; although both the motor transport and supplies grades serve the requirements of the postal organisation—and, indeed, in certain respects of other Government Departments, too*—as well as of the engineering Department.

(i) Contact with the public

57. No other organisation is, to quote the Bridgeman Committee of 1932, "in such continuous, varied and intimate contact with the lives of the public" as is the Post Office. It provides two universal and indispensable services—the post and the telephone. The members of the engineering grades are brought into close contact with the public in the course of their duties. The individual Post Office engineer who visits a home to negotiate a wayleave, to instal or repair an instrument, to assist in preventing radio or television interference—or who deals with the subscriber who uses a neighbour's telephone to report that his own is out of order—is the embodiment of Post Office service in the same way as the counter clerk, the telephone operator or the postman. If he is clumsy or discourteous or ill informed, the reputation of the Post Office suffers.

(ii) Small teams without continuous supervision

58. Generally speaking the members of the Post Office engineering and allied grades work in small groups. The outside installation, construction or maintenance gang, the staff responsible for maintaining an automatic exchange or a repeater station, the staff engaged on test and inspection work (examining the equipment supplied to the Post Office by contractors)—indeed, almost all those doing the characteristic Post Office engineering jobs operate as members of fairly small groups, or even individually. Often they will be without any continuous supervision and guidance; often too they will need to work as a team notwithstanding the fact that several grades may be represented in a small group.

* The factories Department, although within the Post Office, serves primarily the engineering side, but it has on occasions done work for other Government agencies—notably in connection with the development of the Medresco hearing aid.

59. It follows from this that although the Union covers what are described as the rank and file grades, it is frequently the case that a considerable amount of supervision is carried out by the Union's grades. For example, the duty schedule of the technical officer grade includes the supervision of the work of technicians; technicians I on external work direct technicians IIA and technicians IIB subject only to occasional visits; and the mechanic in charge grades in the motor transport organisation exercise complete day to day supervision of most motor transport establishments with occasional visits by technical assistants.

(iii) A graded service

60. The engineering service is divided into a number of grades, and progression from one to the other is not automatic. Normally, indeed, it depends on the individual satisfying the requirements of a promotion procedure based on exhaustive appraisal of his qualities and performance. Advancement, moreover, depends normally on vacancies being available and individuals, although qualified and suitable for the performance of the duties of a higher grade, may find themselves held back by the absence of vacancies.

(iv) Skilled and technical nature of the work

61. Most numerous, and occupying a central position in the Union's field, are the skilled engineering grades—the technical officer, technician I, technician IIA, technician IIB and youth-in-training grades. These grades are almost entirely responsible for the actual work of installing, maintaining and repairing the public telephone service. The importance of this work to the community is brought out by the fact that the General Post Office telephone network not only serves residential subscribers and the business and industrial community, but is also vital to police and fire brigade services, to radio and television transmission and to national defence.*

62. The official definitions of duties of three of the grades—none of which are reproduced in the Introductory Factual Memorandum—will indicate what is expected of them. The definition of the duties of the basic skilled grade of technician IIA is as follows:

"Technicians IIA will be employed on skilled duties which, while not sufficiently important to justify technical officer or technician I grading, yet demand a knowledge of technical diagrams and electrical and mechanical principles, or carry responsibilities sufficient to warrant recognition by the award of an allowance."

For the technician I grade the definition runs:

Grading as technician I is given "for the additional responsibilities associated with the control of technicians II, with the chargshep of important non-technical officer equipment, works controls, stores, etc., and with the maintenance, installation, testing or demonstrating of non-technical officer equipment necessitating a higher degree of skill than that proper to the technician II grade". It is given "to a technician in control of a group of at least three other staff (including youths or labourers) employed upon internal or external construction or maintenance duties or in section stores or in mechanics' shops. No upper limit is laid down for the number of staff controlled, as the size of a group will depend upon the organisation of the work and upon local circumstances. Remote control by reason of too large or scattered groups should, however, be avoided. Reasonable groups of fitters number about six men, and jointing groups five pairs. The group controlled should be employed on similar duties, i.e. switch-board fitters should not normally be grouped with subscribers' fitters. Exceptionally, however, control may be for disciplinary purposes only".

The technical officer grade—the highest paid of the engineering grades which the Union represents—has the following definition of duties:

"Technical officers are officers fully qualified and competent to construct, install, demonstrate, test or maintain telecommunications equipment of a highly

* To quote the preface by the team leader to the Productivity Team Report on the Maintenance of Automatic Telephone Exchanges: "The telephone service provided by the Post Office is of importance not only to the economy of the United Kingdom, but also to its defence; communications for the defence services are provided by that same organisation".

intricate character calling for a considerable degree of theoretical knowledge, officers employed on planning and estimating duties, or on responsible duties in connection with contractors' works. Technical officers may, in addition to their technical duties, be called upon to supervise technicians, or carry out duties normally proper to the technician grades."

It was this grade which was described by the present Assistant Postmaster General as follows:

"These technical officers are a very highly skilled and an extremely loyal body of men. They make an essential contribution to the telephone service both in peace and war. They have every reason to be proud of the specialised position that they hold. . . ." (House of Commons: 31.7.1953.)

Some further broad description of the functions of the grades may assist the Commission.

63. They are, for example, responsible for the maintenance and servicing of all the telephone exchanges in the country,* which include both automatic and manual exchanges, with differing types of equipment in very many of them. Moreover, the equipment in these exchanges is constantly being changed, developed and extended. The bulk of the maintenance of these automatic exchanges falls upon the technical officer grade, although some of it is also done by technicians IIA; and at manual exchanges sometimes by technical officers, but generally by technicians I. Apart from this, however, the minor engineering grades are responsible for constructing, installing, maintaining and repairing the lines, both underground and overhead, which connect one exchange with another, and so one subscriber with another—that is to say, for the whole telephone network. The grades mainly concerned with this work are technicians I, technicians IIA and technicians IIB, though there are a few technical officers also engaged upon it. The technical officer grade is also, in the main, responsible for the transmission equipment of the telephone system; that is, the equipment which ensures that long distance telephone messages are received clearly and at a sufficient volume.

64. In addition to these main duties of the engineering grades, there are some blocks of specialist work that have to be undertaken. These include: radio work—the operation and maintenance of the Post Office radio stations up and down the country; radio interference work—the investigation and suppression of interference on radio and television sets; testing work—the testing and inspection of equipment supplied to the Post Office by private contractors together, of course, with the power to accept or reject that equipment for public use; and research and experimental work—this is work carried out at the Post Office laboratory at Dollis Hill on the development of new techniques for use in the telephone service.

65. It will be clear from the above very brief description that the work undertaken by the engineering grades represented by the Union is highly responsible technical work vital to the maintenance of the telephone service. Technical qualifications and considerable skill are required of the great majority of the members of the grades which undertake this work, and—as is shown later—substantial training is required by the engineering grades before they can undertake with full competence the work that has been described. In addition the work calls for individuals with the personal qualities required to maintain and enhance the reputation of the Post Office, and responsible enough to work with relatively little supervision.

THE POST OFFICE AS AN EMPLOYER

66. If work is valued in accordance with the formula proposed by the Union there ought not to be marked disparity between the pay for work requiring a similar degree of skill, experience, responsibility and knowledge in different parts of the Civil Service. Some of the Post Office staff are members of Treasury grades, whose conditions are determined by negotiations undertaken centrally between the Treasury and the staff associations concerned; but the bulk of Post Office staff are in grades which are peculiar to the Department and fall mainly into either the manipulative or the engineering hierarchy. So far as the engineering grades are concerned, the Union holds the view that their pay and conditions are not

* Except those in the Hull municipal system.

commensurate with the value of their work by the standards set in the Treasury grades. This is so whether one makes a comparison with the non-technical Treasury clauses—i.e. the clerical officer and clerical assistant—or with the members of the Treasury technical classes. It may well be that the evidence of other Unions put before the Commission will confirm the contention that the Post Office falls behind other Departments of the Service in the standards of remuneration of its staff; but certainly it is the Union's view that this is true of the engineering grades.

67. The Post Office itself customarily emphasises that it must keep in step with the rest of the Service; but it is hard to understand why, on some points, the Post Office has been unable to concede to its staff conditions as favourable as the Treasury has directly conceded elsewhere in the Service in comparable circumstances.* The effect on the Unions of negotiating with Post Office representatives who must refer everything back to the Treasury has already been mentioned; but that is only one element in the disadvantage under which the Union feels the Post Office staff in departmental grades are placed.

68. The other element of disadvantage is that the Post Office provides services to the public for payment; and is expected not only to cover its costs, but to yield a surplus to the Exchequer. Moreover, the Post Office is not free to concentrate on the services or the areas which might prove to be commercially the most profitable; it has had to use a large part of its resources for the defence programme, and for the development of communications in the rural areas. In spite of these requirements, however, the Post Office generally speaking provides a good service at low cost. If one takes the telephone side, the charges which the public pays have risen since 1939 nothing like so much as the general price level has risen. In part, prices to the public have been kept down in the post-war period because the real wages of telephone workers have fallen. The Post Office surplus, however, has also fallen from £24.1 million in 1946-1947 to £4.9 million in 1952-1953. When the surplus was high the Post Office would not accept that fact as an argument for higher wages; but now that the surplus is low the Union will not be surprised if the Post Office introduces that fact implicitly as an argument against higher wages; indeed, the Postmaster-General has already dropped the hint that "he had reached the point when he felt he could not justifiably raise Post Office charges to the public any further".

69. The wages of Post Office staff—so the Bridgeman Committee concluded—ought to be determined by the same principles as those of other civil servants. This Committee examined in detail, and rejected, the idea that because of the commercial nature of the Post Office's operation there should be greater "elasticity" about the payment of Post Office engineering and manipulative staff than applied to other civil servants. It is plainly fair that if Post Office staff cannot use a high surplus as an argument for increasing wages, the Post Office should not in their turn use the fact that the surplus is low as an argument against increases in wages justified by arguments which apply elsewhere in the Civil Service. Paradoxically, it seems that the fact that they are employed by a Department earning a revenue has been a disadvantage rather than an advantage to Post Office staff.†

THE VALUATION OF TECHNICAL AND SKILLED WORK

70. The war and the post-war economic situation of Britain have heavily emphasised the importance of technical work, and the need to attract a high proportion of the talented to scientific and technical fields if Britain is to pay her way in the world. For this purpose specialised technical education has been expanded; but the attraction of the most suitable men and women to such work will in part depend on its appearing to offer prospects of a reasonable standard

* Two examples are the refusal of the Post Office to accept the principle which had been agreed elsewhere in the Service of a special allowance for shift workers (the Union had to secure this principle by recourse to arbitration) and the low payment for technical work compared with that made in the Treasury technical classes (a point more fully developed later in the evidence).

† The question of telephone charges and finances is dealt with more fully below in paragraphs 111-114.

of living. The House of Commons Select Committee on Estimates investigated during 1952-1953 the provision of technical education, and remarked in their Report:

"Your Committee were impressed with the unanimity of view about the vital importance of technical and commercial education in the economic struggle with which the country is faced in the world today. It is undoubtedly recognised that Britain's competitive power in the world markets and the higher productivity of her industries are, to a great extent, dependent upon the degree to which technical and commercial knowledge and skill and wider education and opportunities can be within the reach of all".

71. An equally important aspect of the problem is the need to give to the skilled and technical workers not only adequate rates by comparison with the specialist non-technical worker, but also an adequate lead over the unskilled worker. It is generally commented at present that the skilled worker has tended to lose ground by comparison with the unskilled. In view of the conditions which existed at the beginning of the present century, nobody could fail to rejoice at the advance which the trade union movement has effected in the status of the unskilled worker, and in the greater security and higher standard which he and his family now enjoy. These standards are still meagre in the case of Post Office staff whose work is unskilled; and barely afford a living wage. While there should continue to be progress in the standard of the unskilled, there is need at the same time to increase the lead of the skilled craftsmen and technical worker.

72. The trade union point of view has been admirably expressed by Mr. Ellis Smith, M.P., General President of the United Patternmakers Association, in a letter in "The Times" of the 16th April, 1952. He wrote:

"Britain's economic position demands that urgent attention should be given to the wages, conditions and status of the highly skilled engineers. The Chancellor of the Exchequer recently said that 'we shall have to increase output in engineering as quickly as possible in order to supply our defence needs, our exports, and home capital requirements'. . . . During the past 37 years we have seen a steady worsening of the skilled engineering worker's position relative to others and also to the general workers engaged in the engineering industry. . . . We have reached the position where the skilled engineers' differential rate over general workers in Britain is 16 per cent., in the United States 55 per cent., and in Russia 80 per cent. Unless there is an early change, the skilled men will be justified in taking any action they decide upon to remedy their relative position. In the past our parents made great sacrifices for us; this has not been appreciated by the country in general. In modern times a boy at the age of 16 is selected from among others because of his promise. He then has to obtain a good general knowledge and afterwards a specialised knowledge of geometry, mathematics and the use of tools. He has to be ingenious, adaptable, able to concentrate, and must take a pride in his work. Later he must be efficient and must work hard with speed. To qualify for this life's work he must serve an apprenticeship of at least 5 years, while attending day and evening classes. The praises of these men were ringing during the first and second world wars; and now again it is time they were reflected in wages, conditions and status".

73. The same theme has been touched upon by industrialists. The point was crisply put by Mr. J. W. A. Radford who, as a spokesman of industry (deputising for Sir Frederick Handley Page) at a conference on the grammar school and industry in January, 1952, said:

"What industry wanted was the youngster with a sense of vocation who was prepared to put on overalls and be a good craftsman".

Frequently it is said that lads prefer—or are persuaded by their mothers to prefer—"white collar" jobs; and it is implied that this is due to some senseless snobbery. The reason "white collar" or "clean hand" jobs have been sought after is that in industry in the past work involving the use of manual skill and technical ability has been poorly paid and often pitifully insecure. It is the

memory of those facts and not snobbery which makes mothers prefer to see their sons seeking a "white collar" job. In the view of the Union it is vital for the future of Britain that posts involving manual and technical skill should neither be, nor seem to be, at a disadvantage in pay, status, prospects or permanence with clerical and administrative work; and that the Civil Service should certainly not lag behind in revaluing technical and skilled work in this way.

74. Authoritative independent opinion on this subject is well exemplified by "The Times Review of Industry", which in May, 1952, said:

"It is, of course, an over-simplification to suggest that the labour needs of one industry can be met by a transfer of workers from another. The engineering and aircraft industries are desperately short of skilled men and there is no immediate prospect of these deficiencies being made good. There are not enough skilled men in the country".

After discussing various changes that could be made in industrial practice, the editorial went on:

"All these changes, however, pre-suppose that an adequate supply of intelligent youths will always be ready to take up skilled apprenticeships, and it may well be that the time is close when this assumption cannot be made. The unskilled wage rate in the engineering industry is now 86* per cent. of the skilled fitter's rate. The intelligent youth must surely ask himself whether that modest advantage is adequate recompense for five years of hard work, evening classes and apprenticeships rates of pay. Indeed, he is not certain of getting even this slight benefit, for there are many instances of semi-skilled machine operators earning more money by piece-rates than the skilled engineers on whom they depend for setting up. A survey made by the United States Bureau of Labour Statistics of wage rates in 1945-1947 showed that American skilled workers' rates generally were 155 per cent. of unskilled rates; a differential of this size has been unknown in Britain for many years past. There is little doubt that the process of levelling up wages by granting general cost of living wage increases has gone too far and that, in the interests of securing enough skilled men, it ought to be reversed. Britain's future must depend to a large extent on her ability to export engineering products in large quantity, and it would be stupid and dangerous to threaten it by not paying to the skilled workers a wage roughly commensurate with their present value to the country".

75. In this connection it is of interest that the team which under the auspices of the British Productivity Council, visited the United States to study the maintenance of automatic telephone exchanges noted that the skilled maintenance craftsman received a higher rate of pay than male clerks on some of the most skilled clerical duties, and commented:

"This is a notable difference from pay scales in the British Post Office, where the relationship between comparable engineering and clerical pay scales is the reverse".

76. The importance of an adequate lead for the skilled over the unskilled has been emphasised in discussions of the position of the railways and the engineering industry in recent years. This is significant, because the Post Office for their part have always emphasised comparisons with the railways and the engineering industry when discussing the wages of the Union's grades. In 1948 the first post-war Court of Inquiry into a dispute on wages in the engineering industry, directed attention to the need for adjusting differentials "to existing conditions or practices", and earlier still, in 1947, a Court of Inquiry on a wages dispute in the railway service had urged the need for:

"A comprehensive examination of the grading of Railway workers with a view to a more accurate assessment of the relative value of the different types

* The maximum of the Post Office engineering labourer's rate is, by comparison, 82 per cent. of the maximum of the technician IIA and, of course, a higher percentage of the other points on the technician IIA's scale.

of work performed", and for "the re-arrangement of intergrade margins, so that adequate incentive is given for acceptance of higher responsibility on promotion". (Cmd. 7161, paragraph 100.)

Actually, because other considerations seemed at the time to be of more immediate importance, the recommendation of this Court of Inquiry was for a general increase of 7s. 6d. per week (paragraphs 110 and 111); nevertheless, as the 1951 Court of Inquiry into a wages dispute on the railways disclosed, it had been hoped that the 1947 flat rate increase which was awarded

"would mark the last of the general flat rate advances . . . and that future wage adjustments would be mainly in the direction of improving the differentials between the less and more skilled grades". (Cmd. 8151, paragraph 207.)

77. However, there followed after 1948 a period of steadily, and at times rapidly, rising prices which militated strongly against percentage increases in wages in industry. The dilemma was stated, in what have been called "classical terms", in a later paragraph of the Report of the 1951 Court of Inquiry:

"One moral . . . that we would draw from this tangled skein of negotiations . . . is the impossibility of reconciling, in a period of rising prices and cost of living, the natural desire to cushion the lower paid workers as much as possible against reductions in their standard of living, with the need for improving the relativity between the lower and higher grades". (Paragraph 213.)

More recently, however, the retail price index has remained relatively stable, so that it was possible for the railways to agree to a percentage increase in wages for railway staff in January, 1954, and for the Court of Inquiry on the dispute in the engineering industry, which reported in March, 1954, to recommend that a percentage increase in wages should be agreed between the parties. This recommendation was, in its essentials, in fact worked into the agreement that has been recently concluded.

PRODUCTIVITY

78. The Union would ask the Commission to take the view that productivity is certainly an important factor in arriving at any determination of the wage rates applicable to the Post Office engineering grades. It is true that these grades are not productive workers as such, in that their output cannot be measured in physical units. There is, therefore, no single index of the work they do that is entirely adequate in measuring this work. Nevertheless, it is possible to get a broad idea of the work that is done by the engineering grades by looking at the number of telephones that are maintained per head of the engineering staff. It is true that an index compiled on this basis measures the change in the amount of equipment in service per head, whereas, for example, the indices of productivity which apply to industry measure directly the changes in the amount of goods produced. Nevertheless, the index that the Union is producing is valid because what the Post Office engineering department produces is a service, and the amount of this service offered or produced is reasonably well measured by the amount of equipment installed for the ready use of subscribers. The bulk of the maintenance of the telephone equipment has to be carried on whether or not the telephone calls are made.

79. The team which visited the United States to study the maintenance of automatic telephone exchanges included in their report a passage which bears on the point.

"In bargaining over wage levels, the U.S. worker expects an increased share in the profits of the industry in proportion to productivity. In some recent claims for higher wages the Unions pointed out that the overall Bell system profits rose from 212 million dollars in 1946 to 406 million dollars in 1952, representing an increase in profit per worker from 420 dollars to 702 dollars. The fact that such claims can be taken into consideration in wage negotiation is an important incentive that is not accepted in the British Post Office, whose finances are largely controlled by the Treasury and by parliamentary vote. The wages of its staff are governed by the formula contained in the report of the Tomlin Commission set up by the Government in 1929. This required

that remuneration in the Civil Service shall reflect the long-term trend in wage levels for "broadly comparable" classes in outside employment, and in the economic condition of the country, and states that in public employment the test of profit or loss is normally absent. Although not competent to consider all the political issues involved in wage negotiation, the team feels it is its duty to point out that the discussion of profits in relation to wage claims and the resultant direct interest of the workers in the efficiency of the system is a valuable incentive to increased productivity of the staff".

80. The Union recognises that there is a genuine difficulty in deciding how far the argument of increased productivity should be applied to ancillary workers. In its own field, however, it is of the view that any arguments based on productivity in the engineering department as a whole should certainly be extended to the workers in the supplies department, who play a vital part in providing the installation, construction and maintenance staff with the requirements of their work and who are as directly involved in the increased productivity of the telephone service as are, for example, the storekeepers who handle the materials between the supplies department and the men engaged on the actual job.

81. In presenting its "value of work" claim for the engineering grades at the beginning of the present year, the Union argued not only that past increases in productivity should be taken into account, but said further:

"... we should be prepared, as part of the settlement of the claim, to get down immediately with the Department to discussions about improvements in productivity, so that the Department might be assisted in meeting the claim. It is perhaps appropriate to recall that in 1947 the Union and the Department concluded an agreement on a shorter working week of which one clause was to the effect that the Union, through joint production machinery, would endeavour to ensure that output was maintained despite the reduction in hours. A joint review begun in 1949 showed that in fact output had been maintained despite the reduction in hours. While, of course, a claim for increased pay is not quite comparable with a claim for reduced hours, we would earnestly hope that the Union's present claim might be approached in a similar spirit of co-operation between the two sides".

The Union was invited to develop its ideas on this point and did so in a memorandum reproduced as Appendix 5.

THE NEED FOR A LIVING WAGE

82. The question of the standard of living which current Post Office engineering wage scales afford is an important one for the Post Office Engineering Union. As can be seen from a study of the Tables on pages 114-115 of the Introductory Factual Memorandum presented by the Treasury, well over 50 per cent. of the staff represented by the Union belong to grades which even at their maximum receive a wage of not more than £8; and a substantial number of the adult male staff represented by the Union have pay rates between 124s. 6d. and 140s. 0d. a week.

83. These rates are, of course, exclusive of any overtime or allowances that may be earned and, of course, a fair number of Post Office engineering staff in fact add to their earnings by these means. However, it is doubtful if the proportion which do so exceeds one in two in any average week. The Post Office is at present collecting current information about the number of staff who work overtime, but whatever the figures show the exact position to be, the fact will still remain that many of the staff which the Union represents—in all grades—have to maintain themselves and their families on the basic wage for a normal working week. It is, of course, the function of a basic wage, in all normal circumstances, to provide the means for this necessary maintenance.

84. As has already been said there is no obligation on the Government as employer to defend its rates of pay for adult staff as offering a living wage, and the Union is not at present attempting precisely to define a living wage. It does, however, conceive it a part of its duty to put to the Commission evidence on the standard of living which present rates afford for the lower paid grades.

(i) Two specimen budgets

85. The Union at one time considered carrying out a survey of expenditure of a cross section of its members, but gave up the idea because of the great technical difficulties of the task, which in any case did not appear to be absolutely necessary in order to illustrate the main point the Union is making. Instead, the Union asked the Labour Research Department to take a wage of £8 and £6 11s. 0d. a week in London, and to see how far this would go in meeting the expenses of everyday living for an average family with two children. The report of the Labour Research Department, and the Union's comments on it, are set out in Appendix 4.

86. This method of illustrating the meaning of wage rates is open to possible objection. It is abstract, and there is room for difference of opinion about the way the available money is laid out. But a study of the budgets suggest that whatever detailed modification may be made the budgets do not allow the husband or wife, however diligent, to raise a family other than under extreme financial duress. In saying this the Union has in mind not only what is in the budgets but what is omitted from them and the extreme, indeed almost artificial, assumptions on which they are based. Among these assumptions are:

- (a) There is no allowance at all for waste through food going bad or through any careless or uninformed buying.
- (b) There is already a stock of clothes, made up of winter and summer wear, to which the items in the budget can be added.
- (c) The home has been completely furnished and all household appliances bought.*
- (d) The husband is capable of repairing all electrical and mechanical faults in the house, and in the household appliances, and of carrying out efficient plumbing, shoe repairs and general house maintenance; and that the wife repairs all clothes.

In addition, the children are assumed to be 10 and 7 respectively and thus not yet at their most expensive ages.

87. The omissions from both of the budgets include the following:

For the children, there is no allowance for sports clothes, toys or further education; it is also difficult to see how they can be adequately fed while on holiday. There is no winter coat for the boy, nor raincoat for the girl, nor gumboots (or goloshes) nor handkerchiefs for either.

For the family, there is no provision at all for annual holidays. There are no contributions to any insurance policies. There is no provision for a winter coat for the husband, nor for a raincoat for husband or wife. Such things as pillow cases, hand towels, tea cloths and table cloths are excluded, as are all expenses arising from the sort of repairs referred to in (d) of paragraph 86 above.

These are only the more important and obvious omissions (which are, however, discussed in greater detail in section 2 of Appendix 4). It follows, therefore, that whatever views may be held about the importance of the various items included in the specimen budgets, there are so many assumptions on which they are based, and so many major omissions, that however the items may be juggled with, it is

* How important this assumption is can be judged from the fact that in constructing a budget at the "poverty line" in their book "Poverty and the Welfare State" (1951), Rowntree and Lavers, for a couple with two children living in York, made an allowance of 6s. a week, reproducing in justification the comment of B. S. Rowntree in making a similar allowance, of a smaller amount, in 1936:

"This item for saving has been included in the necessary expenditure in the case of young married couples, for it is a rare occurrence for a young couple to start their married life with a house so fully furnished as to meet even the minimum requirements of a family. My cost of living standard only allows for the maintenance of a fully furnished house. It allows nothing for the purchase of furniture and bedding or for other similar expenditure of a non-recurring nature". ("Poverty and Progress", page 31.)

Rowntree and Lavers in 1951 fixed arbitrarily the age at which married couples cease to be 'young' for the purpose of this allowance at the 30th birthday of the chief wage earner.

not possible to regard the wages determining them as other than barely adequate to provide a decent minimum standard of living, and in the case of wages around the £6 10s. 0d. level, definitely inadequate.

(ii) The Rowntree minimum

88. Alternatively this question can be approached by use of the well known minimum budget which Seebohm Rowntree has used to define the poverty line. This budget allows only a very stringent standard of living which "we fully recognise . . . is a good deal below what is desirable";* any household which cannot afford it is considered to suffer from primary poverty—that is to say, due to shortage of income the household has to go short of the necessities, even if nothing is spent on non-necessities.

89. In 1950, from their survey of poverty in York, Rowntree and Lavers determined the poverty line as being at £4 6s. 4d. for an employed man with a wife and two children. This figure related to the price level as it was in October 1950, and was exclusive of the sums required for rent and national insurance, as also of the receipt of a family allowance. Rowntree's 1950 figure can be brought approximately up to date by increasing it in the same proportions as (1) the Ministry of Labour's interim index of retail prices has increased and (2) the London & Cambridge Economic Service's separate indices of retail prices have increased.† With the latter index it is possible to make a more refined calculation by applying the increases in the separate groups of commodities to the appropriate portions of the Rowntree budget and, further, to make one calculation assuming that no money is spent on beer and tobacco, and another assuming that the full sum that could be spent on this (in terms of the allowance made for this and other items in the Rowntree budget‡), is in fact so spent. The cost of the Rowntree budget at the beginning of this year, using these indices (which are explained more fully in Section 3 of Appendix 4) therefore becomes

	£	s.	d.
1. Ministry of Labour index (January 1954)	5	5	—
2. L.C.E.S. index—no beer or tobacco (December 1953)§	5	7	—
3. L.C.E.S. index—maximum beer and tobacco (December 1953)§	5	6	3

Adding the Labour Research Department's estimated average London rent for a working class family (25s. 1½d.) to these figures, as well as the national insurance contribution of 5s. 9d., but deducting the 8s. 0d. family allowance for one child, then in London the Rowntree poverty line for a family of four at the beginning of 1954 was in the region of £6 7s. 10d. to £6 9s. 10d.—and possibly more because London prices are likely to be higher than the provincial prices of the Rowntree budget, on which the above calculations are based.

90. For a family of five the Rowntree poverty line, which was £5 0s. 2d. in October 1950, would have cost at the turn of the year—working along the same lines as above—something between 121s. 11d. and 124s. 4d. a week, exclusive of rent, national insurance and family allowances which, on the basis of the average London rent referred to above, make a net addition of 17s. 10½d. a week.‖ With further children, of course, the net cost continues to rise, the present rate of family allowance being quite insufficient to cover their cost.

* "Poverty and the Welfare State", 1951, page 59.

† The indices for the different groups of commodities covered by the Ministry of Labour's index have only been calculated since January, 1952. The L.C.E.S. index, however, has consistently calculated indices for three groups of commodities—food, drink and tobacco, and clothing, household durables and miscellaneous goods, regarded all as one group.

‡ In their October, 1950, budget Rowntree and Lavers allowed 6s. 8d. for "beer, tobacco, presents, holidays, books, travelling, etc."

§ At the time this document was prepared the group indices of the L.C.E.S. index which have been referred to were not available for a date later than December, 1953.

‖ It is of interest, incidentally, that in an independent survey of the cost of the Rowntree budget in March, 1953, in Durham, carried out by Mr. Kaim-Caudle, staff tutor in economics at Durham University, the estimate of the cost that Mr. Kaim-Caudle arrived at was very close to the one estimated by the Union above and, the changes in the retail price index over the intervening months being almost negligible, can be considered to support the Union's estimates. Mr. Kaim-Caudle's conclusions and figures are referred to more fully in section 3 of Appendix 4.

91. From the above approximate figures and calculations the Union is not trying to draw any precise conclusion as to whether the grades earning 130s. 0d. a week or thereabouts are on, just above or just below the poverty line. But the Union has hoped to establish, beyond any doubt, that many of them with families of two or more, perhaps only one or more, are very near this poverty line and that, consequently, the specimen budgets analysed by the Labour Research Department tell no far-fetched story, but are absolutely authentic in the general picture they reveal.

SECTION III. THE UNION'S PROPOSALS FOR THE GRADES IT REPRESENTS

INTRODUCTION

92. For the grades which it represents the Union has at present detailed pay proposals either in negotiation or about to be put into negotiation with the Post Office. In the case of the motor transport grades the proposals have recently been the subject of an arbitration hearing; for the engineering grades a claim (in support of which the Union has supplied detailed evidence) is under consideration by the Post Office; and in the case of the factories and supplies grades the details are being formulated. Naturally these claims have to be argued largely with reference to those principles determining civil service pay which at present hold the field.

93. The present set of claims and the basis on which they should be put forward were announced in outline at the Union's annual conference in June, 1953. They have been described as "value of work" claims to distinguish them from claims intended to take account of the changing value of money. In other words these value of work claims are intended to fix a proper rate rather than to maintain a rate which has previously been fixed. It is coincidence that all these value of work claims are "on the go" at the time the Royal Commission is sitting, but for various reasons which are more fully set out below the Union considers the grades it represents are entitled to a somewhat higher position in the general civil service pay scheme and an improved relativity with classes in the Treasury structure.

94. What the Union proposes to do is to state its claim for the engineering grades and explain the main grounds for it. In putting this to the Royal Commission the Union can base its arguments somewhat more broadly than in putting it to the Post Office since it is not confined to arguments which have hitherto been regarded as acceptable in civil service pay negotiations. The Union is developing its arguments most fully in relation to the engineering—as distinct from the allied grades—because it feels that this course will put to the Commission the broad issues in the clearest way. A further section, however, completes the picture by indicating that the arguments submitted in respect of the engineering grades have force too in the case of the allied grades.

95. The claim for the engineering grades which the Union has submitted to the Post Office and which it now places before the Commission is as follows:

							London	Provinces		
							£	£		
Technical officer	...	...	...	...	...	...	515	495		
							540	520		
							565	545		
							590	570		
							615	595		
							640	620		
							s.	d.	s.	d.
Technician I	...	...	...	...	...	...	205	—	197	—
							170	—	165	—
Technician IIA	...	...	...	...	...	...	175	—	170	—
							180	—	175	—

							London		Provinces	
							s.	d.	s.	d.
Technician IIB	...	...	...	...	...	...	160	—	155	—
							165	—	160	—
							170	—	165	—
Labourer	...	...	...	...	...	...	140	—	136	—

96. The claim was based on outside and civil service rates of pay as at 1st January, 1953, and does not take into account any changes in general economic conditions since that date. This is an important point, because general wage and salary increases since the war have tended to go in rounds, and civil servants, Post Office engineers included, have consistently received their increases towards the end of any given "round" in industry. Thus, the 1953-1954 round of wage increases in industry has now nearly finished, and civil service pay has yet to be revised in the light of the new wage and salary levels established. The Post Office engineering grades will also have their wages revised because of this latest round of wage increases in industry, but the Union has refrained in the following evidence from quoting the 1953 wages of its grades against the new 1954 wages of those in other occupations since, if the Union did so, it would be difficult for the Commission to obtain a correct understanding of the pay relativities that exist on the basis of stable economic conditions.

97. Six major considerations are advanced in support of a higher pay rating for the engineering grades.

- (i) Since 1931 the work of the grades has grown more complex and productivity has increased but real wages have gone down. These tendencies have also been marked if comparisons are made only over the period since the second world war.
- (ii) The basic reorganisation of technical work applied in the Civil Service generally in 1948 with the result that the pay and status of technical and associated workers was enhanced has not yet been applied in the Post Office.
- (iii) The training and qualifications required for the grades are not adequately recognised by present pay scales.
- (iv) Comparisons where they can be made with other work inside and outside the Service support the proposed new scales.
- (v) Differentials between the engineering grades have narrowed and are now inadequate.
- (vi) Existing incremental scales are in general too elaborate and in justice to the members of the grades should be shortened.


THE ENGINEERING GRADES: WAGES, OUTPUT AND CHARGES SINCE 1931

(i) Comparative wage movements since 1931

98. In its study of the levels of pay in the Civil Service, the Tomlin Commission said, "it is important to determine whether changes in Service remuneration in the last few years have reflected the general trend of wage levels in the country as a whole". No doubt the present Commission will be interested in this question, and the Union, therefore, illustrates the comparative movement in wage rates in outside industry, and in the average maximum wages of the Post Office engineering grades, in Figure A. This Figure shows a clear and marked divergence between the movement in the average maximum wages of the engineering grades and that in wages generally in industry.

99. Nevertheless, Figure A does not reveal the full extent of the "lag" of the wages of the engineering grades. The main reason for this is that the official wage rate indices, on which the Union has relied for the portrayal of the movements in the general level of wages, reflect movements in minimum rates only, and do not take into account the considerably greater movement there has been since 1938, and again since 1948, in the level of *actual*, as distinct from minimum wage rates in industry. Testimony to this was given in a detailed examination of post-1938

FIG. A
COMPARATIVE MOVEMENTS IN THE GENERAL WAGE LEVEL AND THE AVERAGE MAXIMUM
WAGES OF ADULT POST OFFICE ENGINEERING GRADES
(1931 = 100)



wage trends made by Mr. G. Penrice in the "Bulletin of the London & Cambridge Economic Service" of September 1952. He examined the trend of earnings and wage rates, taking the Ministry of Labour series for each, between October 1938 and October 1951, and concluded:

"It is often stated that extra payments over standard rates have become common practice since 1938 and therefore, wage indices are too low. The above analysis suggests that this may well be so. This need not necessarily mean that extra payments are paid for the work to which standard rates are supposed to apply but that generous allowances above standard rates become more general for workers who perform more than the minimum or who are in a slightly different occupational group. In this way the standard rates which form the basis of the index number may become less representative than formerly. . . .

"The conjecture that a major factor in the unexplained residual is a general downward "bias" in the collectively bargained standard rates is supported by the result of comparing wage indices and earnings for the separate industries given in the London & Cambridge wage rate index. . . . It is hard to explain this . . . except in terms of a powerful common factor applying to nearly all industries, and much the most likely is a general tendency for rates actually paid to have risen more than the negotiated 'standard' rates as a result of the acute labour shortage. . . .

"The Ministry of Labour's index for principal industries may well have a downward bias in pre-war to post-war comparisons, and it seems possible that the wage index should be fully 5-10 per cent. higher from 1948 onwards".

A further authoritative opinion on this subject was expressed in the "Bulletin of the London & Cambridge Economic Service" of March 1954, where Professor R. G. D. Allen, in an article on "Prices and Wages" said:

"Earnings have increased rather faster [than wage-rates] since 1948 and substantially more rapidly since 1938, and for two outstanding reasons. Wage rates take no account, unlike earnings, either of overtime pay or of the receipt of wages above the quoted or 'standard' rates. . . . The prevailing rate of pay for the job rose above the quoted wage rate in the war and post-war period. However, even when they have become rather conventional, the nationally quoted wage rates are still used for bargaining, because it is understood that increases in them are carried over to the higher rates actually paid.

"Consequently, the effective rates of wages obtained in a normally worked week—as opposed to the full time week—have increased more since 1938 than is shown by the wage rates index. This is quite apart from upgrading, long hours and other such factors which raise the amounts earned in particular periods".


100. One example of this divergence between minimum and actual wage rates can be derived from analysis of the earnings in the engineering industry, which have been published by the Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation from time to time over the last six years. By taking the earnings figures of engineering fitters in a normal working week in January 1948, and again in a normal working week in June 1953, and deducting the amounts in them resulting from overtime work, it can be estimated that the actual weekly wages (for a 44 hour week) of fitters have increased by 39 per cent. and 40 per cent. (for toolroom and non-toolroom fitters respectively) as against an increase in the agreed London minimum rate for the grade of 31 per cent. Similarly, the actual weekly wage of the engineering labourer has risen by 36 per cent., against a 33 per cent. increase in the agreed London minimum rate.

(ii) Real wages since 1931

101. The increase in the general level of wages, as indicated in Figure A, was of the order of 149 per cent. between 1931 and 1953, over which period the rise in the level of retail prices was slightly less. There was, therefore, a small, perhaps only nominal, increase in the real value of the generality of wage rates as measured by the index between 1931 and 1953. But the real value of the average maximum wages of the Post Office engineering grades was not sustained over those years, as is shown in Figure B. Examining the position of the grades individually it will

FIG. B
REAL AVERAGE MAXIMUM WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY OF POST OFFICE
ENGINEERING GRADES SINCE 1931

1931 = 100
(PRODUCTIVITY EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF A 3-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE)



be seen from Table 1 below that only the labourer, and part of the technical officer grade, have had any noticeable gain in their standard of living over the last 23 years.

TABLE I
MAXIMUM LONDON WAGES OF ADULT ENGINEERING GRADES AT 1ST JULY 1931
AND 1ST JULY 1953 IN TERMS OF AVERAGE 1931 PRICES

Grade	Wage at 1st July 1931	Wage at 1st July 1953, at average 1931 prices	Index, 1st July 1931 = 100
	s. d.	s. d.	
Labourer	49 6	54 6	110
Technician IIB	68 0	64 8	95
Technician IIA	71 7	66 7	93
Technician I {ex S.W.I.	83 1	73 3	88
{ex S.W.II	80 6	73 3	91
Technical officer {ex S.W.I	83 1	85 0	102
{ex S.W.II	74 3	85 0	114

102. The graphs illustrating the figures are to be found in Figures 4-8 of Appendix 6. The London & Cambridge Economic Service index of retail prices has been used in making the above calculations.

(iii) Productivity since 1931

103. In Figure B, the movement in the level of average maximum real wages is contrasted with the productivity of the minor engineering grades over the years since 1931, as measured by the number of telephones maintained per head of the staff concerned. The reason that the Union has chosen this particular index to measure the productivity of the minor engineering grades has already been explained in paragraph 78. The increase in productivity so measured was, up to 31st March, 1953, 31 per cent. In Figure B, however, the productivity trend has been calculated in terms of a three year moving average and it has, moreover, not been plotted for the war years. This has been done because quite extraordinary variations in productivity took place, almost from one year to the next, in the period a little before the war, and during the war itself. The pre-war fluctuations were due to the fact that in 1936 the Post Office started upon a large scale expansion of the telephone service in the rural areas* and nearly doubled its labour force in three years. The apparent changes in productivity during the war years (not shown in Figure B) were due to the artificial depletion of the labour force, the continued installation of new telephones, and the severe curtailment of normal maintenance practice.

(iv) Changes in the work of the engineering grades

104. The whole of this period has been one of rapid development and change which has increased the complexity of the work of the engineering grades. The number of telephones in service, for example, increased from just under 2,000,000 in 1931 to just under 6,000,000 in 1953, and this was accompanied by the laying of over 20,500,000 miles of wire,† almost all of it underground. With this physical expansion there have occurred the changes associated with the transfer from a manually operated to an automatically operated service. As will be seen from Figure D, it is since the early 1930s that these changes have largely taken place. Thus, whereas in 1931, 26.2 per cent. of telephones were automatic, in 1953 the percentage was 73.6. This switchover towards a more efficient and dependable service has, of course, thrown an increasing responsibility upon the men who install and maintain it.


* Thus, the capital expenditure of the Post Office in the four years 1935-1936 to 1938-1939 was £63.8 million, whereas in the previous four years it had only totalled £31.3 million—there being relatively stable prices, of course, over all these years.

† From 9.4 million to 29.9 million at 31st March 1931 and 1953 respectively.

FIG. C

COMPARATIVE MOVEMENTS OF THE MAIN TELEPHONE CHARGES AND RETAIL PRICES SINCE 1931 (1931 = 100)

(ANNUAL AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES TELEPHONE CHARGES AS AT 1st JULY IN EACH YEAR)



105. An automatic telephone service requires equipment which is very much more complex than that of a manual service, and for many years much of the automatic equipment was necessarily experimental and subject to developments in the light of its use in practice. Consequently, there has been over the last twenty to thirty years not only a large scale introduction of quite new equipment based on new principles, but also a constant shifting and changing in the variety of types of this new equipment, so that there are at present in different exchanges, and even sometimes in the same exchange, equipments of differing character and complexity which require quite separate training to be properly understood and maintained. The development of automatic telephony as well as the development of long distance transmission techniques has also had its effect on the engineering staff concerned with the construction and installation of the cables, so that whereas, for example, there were three types of lead covered cable in 1930, there are now over twenty, all of which vary considerably in construction and require different techniques in their installation and jointing, as well as for some of them markedly higher standards of precision and workmanship.


106. There have been other developments in the service which are not less striking, even if narrower in their application. One is that of the shared service. The principles of this were known before the war, and a limited number of lines were installed on the shared service basis; but since the war, to cope with the demand for telephones, the Post Office has developed its shared service connections on a large scale; whereas in 1946 there were 5,000 telephones on shared service connections, in 1953 there were 590,000.

107. The engineering department has made large strides with developing the efficiency of its trunk services on which, more than any other part of the service perhaps, the efficient functioning of industry, not to speak of Government and defence, depends. In the early 1930s, trunk lines commonly carried 12 speech channels, but after successive developments, both in the quality of the cable, and of the amplifying equipment, the new (mostly post-war) coaxial cables can carry 500 speech channels and at the same time improve the quality of the reception of the calls themselves.

108. These developments—and many others including those in such fields as radio, television transmission, radio and television suppression and underwater telephonic communication—have had their impact on the work of the engineering grades, an impact which, naturally enough, has brought about a widening of the scope of the work, and an increase in its complexity, as is explained more fully in Appendix 2.

109. The expansion of the telephone service itself has brought about new methods of administration. There was initiated in the late 1930s (and completed since the war) a fundamental reorganisation of the Post Office, the basic aim of which was to devolve authority and responsibility. This policy originated from the recommendations of the Bridgeman Committee in 1932. It was only just before the first regions were set up as a result of this policy that the rapid expansion of the service brought about the establishment of special field planning groups particularly concerned with estimating future demand in particular localities, and making preparations for meeting it by the correct laying and layout of cables. Actually, about 40 per cent. of the capital expenditure of the Post Office is devoted to local line cables and, consequently, it is in this field that important new methods have been introduced—to bring about economies, and to give greater flexibility in the distribution of local lines. Thus, particularly since the war, there has been introduced a new system of what are called cabinets and pillars, which are essentially small junctions of a new type for networks of local lines; they have brought in their train new methods and new cables which have required to be mastered by a large proportion of the staff engaged on external work.

110. These are only some of the main effects that the expansion and change in the nature of the telephone service have brought about in the work of the engineering staff. The character of these changes can be appreciated more fully from a knowledge of the training requirements of the engineering grades, as they are now and as they have expanded over the last twenty years, and this is dealt with more fully in a later section.



(v) Telephone charges since 1931

111. Finally, the Union shows in Figure C the comparative movements in retail prices, and in the major Post Office telephone charges. It is quite apparent that telephone charges have been held down in relation to general prices, so that there has been a very substantial relative cheapening of the telephone service to the public since 1931. Indeed, the extent of this relative cheapening is approximately shown in Table 2 below where, taking mid-1931 as 100 for both retail prices and telephone charges, the 1953 level of the latter is expressed as a percentage of the 1931 level of the former.

TABLE 2

DECLINE OF TELEPHONE CHARGES RELATIVE TO RETAIL PRICES 1931-1953

Telephone charges	Mid-1953 telephone charges expressed as a percentage of retail prices on basis that both equalled 100 in 1931
	Per cent.
Local calls (subscribers' unit fee call charge)	62.5
Trunk calls	61.7
Exchange line rentals	47.4

112. Over the years since 1931 as a whole then, there has been a fall in the real wages of the grades in question, an increase in productivity and a relative reduction in the cost of the telephone service to the public.

(vi) Comparisons 1946-1953

113. The same general picture emerges if one takes not the whole period since 1931, but the period only since the end of the second world war. In August, 1946, there was put into effect the engineering department reorganisation which marked a post-war peak in the remuneration of the engineering grades, since from then the value of their wages has fallen both relatively and absolutely; relatively because the movement in the average maximum wages of the engineering grades has again lagged behind the movement in the general wage level—a 34 per cent. increase since August, 1946, as against a 39.5 per cent. increase (in minimum rates), and absolutely because the real maximum wage of every grade has fallen. In Table 3 is set out the 1946 maximum wages in London, and the present maximum wages in terms of average 1946 retail prices (there being no reliable index of the monthly level of retail prices in 1946).

TABLE 3

MAXIMUM LONDON WAGES OF ADULT ENGINEERING GRADES AT 1ST AUGUST 1946 AND 1ST JULY 1953 IN TERMS OF AVERAGE 1946 PRICES

Grade	Wage in August 1946		Wage in July 1953* (at average 1946 prices)		Index, 1st August 1946 = 100
	a.	d.	s.	d.	
Labourer	98	0	84	6	86
Technician IIB	114	0	103	6	91
Technician IIA	120	0	106	6	89
Technician I	130	0	117	6	90
Technical officer	155	0	136	0	88

* To nearest 6d.

114. Again, this fall in real wages has been accompanied by a fall in the relative cost of the telephone service. Since 1946, for example, there has been no increase in trunk charges (indeed, these charges have not been increased at all since 1943) and the cheap rate call period has been lengthened by half an hour; an increase of

30 per cent. in the cost of local calls up to 4d.; of between 30 and 35 per cent. in exclusive exchange line rentals, depending on area; and of between 7 and 25 per cent. in shared line rentals, again depending on area. (These figures exclude the increases in the rentals of business small users, which have been quite a lot smaller than those cited.) There has also been an indirect increase in charges because of the recent reduction in the number of free local calls. So despite an increase of over 1·6 million in the number of telephones in service, and an increase in the annual number of calls of 700 million, between 1946-1947 and 1952-1953 the gross income of the telephone service has increased by only 38 per cent., while the retail price index has risen by nearly 50 per cent. Moreover, this relative cheapening of the service has not been bought at the expense of quality. This is shown by Table 4*.

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF PLANT FAILURES PER 100 CALLS †

Year	Director exchanges	Non-director exchanges
1946-1947	8·0	3·7
1947-1948	7·6	4·3
1948-1949	7·4	4·0
1949-1950	6·7	3·8
1950-1951	5·6	3·3
1951-1952	5·2	3·4
1952-1953	4·5	2·9

† The figures are those shown by sample tests on the service provided.

115. The increase in productivity in the Post Office engineering department is notable even by comparison with the increase in the country generally. This comparison can only be made since 1948, since that is the year from which the present production index of the Central Statistical Office starts. To take first the actual physical development of the telephone service, and compare this with the productive development of industry, Tables 5 and 6 should be compared.

TABLE 5
MAIN INDICES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TELEPHONE SERVICE SINCE 1948

	On 31st March		Indices of development taking 1948 = 100
	1948	1953	
Telephones	4,652,704	5,927,000	127
Exchange connections	2,867,513	3,591,000	125
Trunk speech channels	14,528	18,860	130

TABLE 6
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION SINCE 1948

	Annual averages	
	1948	1953
All industries	100	120
Manufacturing industry	100	123

* And alluded to in one respect by Mr. D. Gammans, the Assistant Postmaster General, when he spoke of the "remarkable" reduction in the percentage of lost calls since the end of the war. "The Post Office definition of a lost call is when the caller tries to get through but, for some reason, does not succeed. In 1946 the percentage of such calls was 12 per cent., admittedly high. We have now got it down to 2½ per cent., and I hope we shall get it lower. The reason for the reduction is better trained staff and better maintained equipment". (House of Commons: 14.5.1954.)

116. The next two Tables—Tables 7 and 8—show the relative increases in output per head of the numbers employed in the respective classifications.*

TABLE 7

INDICES OF PRODUCTIVITY OF THE STAFF OF THE POST OFFICE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

	On 31st March	
	1948	1953
Telephones	100	118
Exchange connections	100	116
Trunk speech channels	100	120
Originated effective inland calls (year ending 31st March)	100	109

TABLE 8

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY SINCE 1948

	Annual averages	
	1948	1953
All industries	100	113
Manufacturing industry	100	114

Thus since 1946 real wages have fallen while productivity has increased substantially and telephone charges have risen less than the general price level.

* In measuring the productivity of the telephone service the total staff in the engineering department has been taken—but excluding those not specifically concerned with the inland telephone service, such as motor transport staff, etc.—since while the employment figures collected by the Ministry of Labour under the classification “manufacturing industry” relate both to the total number employed, including employers and self employed, as well as to the number of employees only, the employment figures collected by the Ministry for some of the industries coming within the category “all industries”, only relate to the total number employed. It has been thought better, therefore, to use the figures of total employment throughout in measuring the increases in productivity. The number of engineering staff so counted on 1st April, 1948, was 62,164; on 1st April, 1953, it was 67,121—an increase of 8·0 per cent. The number employed in manufacturing industry increased from 8,137,000 in June 1948 to 8,746,000 in June, 1953, while the number employed in industry rose from 10,784,000 in June, 1948 to 11,432,000 in June, 1953—increases of 7·5 per cent. and 6·0 per cent. respectively. In measuring the increase in the annual average productivity between 1948 and 1953 it is, of course, preferable to measure the annual average increase in production with the annual average change in employment in the industries concerned. However, this is not possible because the new employment series now compiled by the Ministry of Labour starts in June, 1948 and cannot be carried back to cover the first five months of that year. Consequently, in measuring the changes in industrial productivity, the Union has compared the annual average of production in 1948 and 1953 with the total employment in the industries concerned in June of each year. It is possible to take the average monthly employment during 1953 in these industries, of course, to measure the change since June, 1948: this produces average figures of 8,789,000 in manufacturing industry, and of 11,462,000 in industry, showing increases of 8·0 per cent. and 6·3 per cent. respectively. Since the productivity increases cannot usefully be shown beyond the nearest whole number, however, they do not differ as a result of this method of calculation from the figures given above in Table 8.

THE ENGINEERING GRADES: THE NEED TO REVALUE TECHNICAL WORK IN THE POST OFFICE

117. The Union has already advanced the view that the long term interest of the country requires a revaluation of technical and skilled work. To some extent this revaluation has begun in the Civil Service ; but it has not been so fully applied in the Post Office as elsewhere.

118. After the second world war the Treasury in consultation with the Institution of Professional Civil Servants undertook a reorganisation of scientific, professional and technical grades which raised their pay and status. The agreed report of the National Whitley Council Committee on the post-war Civil Service (published on 4th April, 1949) said :

"A comprehensive review of the scientific, professional and technical classes has been made during the reconstruction period and a reorganisation effected comparable in significance with the 1920 reorganisation which followed the 1914-1918 war. As a result the status of these classes was greatly raised, and the chaos of departmental classes rationalised by the introduction of a series of general service classes (with related departmental variants) and linked departmental classes".

119. A study of the rates of pay fixed at the time of the reorganisation of technical staff—for example, those for the technical grades in paragraph 313 of the Introductory Factual Memorandum or those quoted in paragraph 335*—show that not only was there a common pattern but that the scales for the new Treasury classes corresponded at the maximum with the scales operative in 1947 for the already existing Treasury classes—i.e. the clerical officer, higher clerical officer and executive officer (see column (6) in Appendix E and column (6) of Appendix J). Thus Treasury technical class IV rose to the same maximum as a clerical officer and technical class II to the same maximum as an executive officer (or a higher clerical officer) and technical class I to the same maximum as a higher executive officer.†

120. The Treasury in their evidence before the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal on a claim made by the Civil Service Clerical Association in October 1949 emphasised how deliberate was the improvement in the relative position of technical staff :

"The Civil Service Clerical Association have argued that the position of Clerical Officers has been depressed in relation to that of other workers in the Service, particularly professional, scientific and technical staff who have, so the Association maintain, received more out of post-war reorganisation than clerks. This is true, but these reorganisations were deliberately intended to improve the relative pay and status of the workers concerned. What is more, the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, which represents these grades, continues to maintain that their status is still inferior. It is obviously impossible for the Government to keep a proper balance if a deliberate improvement in the position of Class A in relation to Class B is to be used at once as an argument for improving the pay of Class B". (Award No. 113.)

A similar observation was made by the Treasury in September, 1953, when arguing before the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal against a salary claim on behalf of the executive classes. The Treasury maintained then that it was true that the executive classes had been depressed in relation to professional workers in the Civil Service, but that this had resulted from the recommendations of independent committees, and the Treasury saw no reason to remedy a position that had been contrived as a deliberate policy.

121. The 1946 reorganisation of the Post Office engineering department was, however, not part of this general revision of the status of technical workers in the Civil Service, and was not conceived by the Post Office as part of it (even though in the Treasury Circular explaining the setting up of the technical classes

* Reference throughout this paragraph is to the Treasury's Introductory Factual Memorandum.

† Although the scales for the technical grades were operative from 1st January, 1946, the actual agreements were calculated in 1947-1948 and on the basis of the clerical/executive scales current at that time.

exclusion of the Post Office telecommunications technical grades is attributed to the fact that a separate reorganisational review has been carried out in that field). Like the postal reorganisation which took place at about the same time, it was based on internal needs and changes in the Department.

122. The reasons advanced by the Post Office for the reorganisation of 1946 were two—that the reorganisation would get rid of a cumbersome system of duty allowances which had grown up over the years; and that it would improve the career prospects of the men in the engineering field—that is, for those who would be able to enter the technical officer grade. Consequently it was only the men who made up the new technician (now technical officer) grade who secured any relative advance in the 1946 Post Office engineering reorganisation and even they did so almost accidentally, inasmuch as the pay of the new grade was determined almost solely in relation to the pay of the grade immediately below it—i.e. the present technician I grade.

123. Thus there did not enter into the Post Office engineering reorganisation of 1946 the deliberate relative improvement of pay and status of technical work, nor the reassessment of scales by comparison with clerical/executive scales, which were both features of the subsequent Treasury reorganisation. The basic post-war reorganisation has indeed yet to be undertaken in the Post Office engineering department. However, following the creation of the Treasury technical classes the Union worked upon a set of proposals for carrying out a similarly basic revision of the pay and structure in the Post Office engineering department, which it eventually put to the engineering department in the summer of 1951. These proposals are generally known to the Union and to the Post Office as the Union's Policy proposals. However, little substantial progress on them has proved possible with the Department so that more recently, at the beginning of 1954, the Union submitted to the Department its value of work claim which, based upon the present grade structure, argues that the pay of the engineering grades represented by the Union is considerably below what it ought to be, in view of the value of work they perform.

124. Included in that claim were arguments based on a deliberate revaluation of the work of the engineering grades in view—among other factors—of the scales of the Treasury clerical/administrative grades. It is plainly unreasonable that the standard of pay of the Post Office engineering grades should be such that the technician IIA receives less than a clerical assistant, and that the technical officer—the highest paid grade below the actual supervisory level—receives substantially less than the clerical officer in the Treasury structure. As is argued more fully later the technical officer in the Union's view, because of his training, selection and qualifications, merits a scale more closely resembling that of those grades—such as traffic officer and sales representative—whose scales have been based on the clerical officer with a lead to take account of specialist qualifications required.

THE ENGINEERING GRADES: TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS

125. Post Office engineering grades require considerable training, skill and technical knowledge. These requirements were summed up in the second and third paragraphs of the Third Report of the Post Office Training Committee, which was published in July, 1946. It was there said:

“The provision by the Post Office of an efficient telecommunications system necessitates the employment of an engineering force fully conversant with the specialised equipment upon which the operation of the system depends and fully capable of performing the manual processes connected with the provision and maintenance of this equipment. There is no field from which the Engineering Department can readily recruit staff having the specialist knowledge or manual dexterity required to undertake the work for which that Department is responsible, and the need for staff training of a vocational character has long been recognised. To meet this need the Engineering Department has built up over a period of years comprehensive schemes of

training and has established Central and Regional Training Schools at which instruction is provided covering all phases of the Engineering Department's activities. Training in the maintenance of automatic telephones, repeaters, carrier, voice frequency and other transmission systems for which extensive demonstration equipment has to be provided, and training which demands instructors with specialised knowledge of the more complicated work of the Engineering Department is provided at the Central School, while practical training for internal and external construction and maintenance duties, such as overhead construction, jointing and plumbing, and the fitting and maintaining of subscribers' installations, is undertaken in the Regional Schools. As new apparatus is developed and introduced, fresh courses are devised to provide the staff with the necessary instruction. Central and Regional Training School courses are arranged specially for the instruction of entrants through the Probationary Assistant Engineer and Probationary Inspector Examinations, and the need for refresher instruction for supervising officers is also catered for.

"In addition to the vocational training courses mentioned above, the Engineering Department under its schemes of technical evening classes and correspondence courses arranges for workmen grades to receive externally technical vocational instruction to enable them to understand the theory underlying the electrical and mechanical processes on which they are employed. The training requirements at the Central and Regional Training Schools are kept under periodic review by means of departmental training conferences which are attended by higher Engineering Officers who are engaged on regional and central training, and action is taken on the conference recommendations to ensure that the school courses are arranged to meet the demands of the work and the needs of the staff".

126. These paragraphs set out the general principles: how have they applied in detail?—this survey sets out the general ground that has to be covered, but in order to give the Commission an idea of the character of the specific training the engineering department runs, that is to say of the vocational training courses, the Union would like to make the following detailed comments.

127. Entry into the engineering grades can be into the youth-in-training grade, the labourer grade, or either of the technician IIB or technician IIA grades. The latter three grades recruit only adults, and though there has been some recruitment by this method since the war, the normal method of recruitment is through the youth-in-training grade. As a general policy, the Post Office has always endeavoured to recruit youths-in-training with secondary school education, and has strongly preferred those who have obtained a General Certificate or an earlier equivalent. Each member of the four grades, from technicians IIB upwards, has to undergo at some time or other in his service career some part of an extensive training programme; though, of course, the training is more extensive for technicians IIA, technicians I and technical officers than for technicians IIB. A few examples may help give the Commission an idea of what is involved. For example, to become a plumber/jointer—normally a technician IIA—a man would have to attend, in addition to his training as a youth-in-training (which itself includes 13 weeks of courses), courses on the following subjects:

Underground construction—initial	...	...	(5 weeks' duration)
Underground construction—advanced	...	...	(3 weeks' duration)
Underground maintenance	...	...	(4 weeks' duration)
Fault location—local lines	...	...	(2 weeks' duration)
Coaxial cable-jointing	...	...	(3 weeks' duration)

These courses entail 17 weeks' attendance at Post Office training schools, spread over a number of years.

128. Another example is that of the technician IIA responsible for fitting and testing subscribers' telephones. The courses it is necessary to attend before this job can be undertaken are (again, in addition to training as a youth-in-training):

Subscribers' apparatus installation—initial	...	(4 weeks' duration)
Subscribers' apparatus installation—advanced	...	(3 weeks' duration)
Subscribers' apparatus installation, intermediate	...	(4 weeks' duration)
House exchange systems; installation and maintenance		(2 weeks' duration)

These courses occupy 13 weeks, spread over a number of years.

129. The training necessary for the performance of technical officer duties is naturally longer than that required by technicians IIA. For example, a technical officer maintaining an automatic exchange in a provincial area would, in addition to his youth-in-training course, need to have qualified on these subjects:

Basic automatic		(7 weeks' duration)
Non-director automatic		(either 3 or 4 weeks' duration)

Usually two courses on unit automatic exchanges (each course lasting 4 weeks) with the possible addition of a private automatic branch exchange course which, depending on the particular type of exchange, could last from 2 to 6 weeks. These courses together cover a period of between 20 and 25 weeks.

130. Technical officers on transmission duties, to give a different example, would undergo courses on the following subjects:

Pre-basic transmission*		(2 weeks' duration)
Basic transmission		(6 weeks' duration)
Carrier principles and carrier system no. 7	...	(8 weeks' duration)
Coaxial terminal—telephony		(6 weeks' duration)

Excluding the pre-basic transmission course, these courses cover a period of 20 weeks, and including it, 22 weeks.

131. These courses consist, for the most part, of lectures, demonstrations, tutorials and practical work—with the emphasis heavily on the first three. For example, on the basic transmission courses, lectures, demonstrations and tutorials take up 60 per cent. of the time, and 70 per cent. of the time on the carrier principles and carrier system no. 7 course on which, incidentally, there are no less than fifty lectures. For all the courses, previous experience of the equipment concerned is necessary and, following any course, there is a period, which varies, of practical work under supervision. An example of this further period of practical work can be taken from the carrier principles and carrier system no. 7 course. The engineering instruction dealing with this course says, in the final paragraph:

"The training given on this course requires consolidation by experience in a Carrier Repeater Station. The difficulties in carrying this out are appreciated, but if the maximum benefit is to be obtained from the School training, students should spend a minimum of one month, and preferably three months or more, on the installation, testing or maintenance of 12 and 24 circuit equipment, under supervision." (Engineering Instruction, Staff, Training, B 303.)

132. Apart from this field work under supervision, field training is more or less continuous in the early years of service, and is a powerful and necessary supplement to the lecture room training which has been indicated above.

133. But the training so far described is not the end of the matter; for knowledge once acquired requires keeping up to date. Something like 50 engineering instructions a month are issued by the engineering department, nearly all dealing with

* This course can be by-passed by those who pass a special test in pre-basic transmission if they are going on the basic transmission course.

different, or new, or revised techniques which Post Office engineers have to master in the course of their duties. Consequently, not only are new courses introduced, but there are refresher courses available. The point was made in paragraph 34 of the First Report of the Post Office Training Committee, published in August 1944. Here it was said:

"With an organisation like the Post Office which is constantly developing, it would clearly be wrong to assume that all that is necessary is to give the new entrant a thorough grounding in his work and thereafter to leave him to his own devices. Officers must be kept up to date in their knowledge of the work, and for this purpose we think that some form of refresher training is essential. This kind of training has already been carried out with some success for some grades, but we should like to see a much wider development".

Since this Report there has, indeed, been a wider development. The introduction of refresher courses, plus the introduction of new courses to deal with new techniques, has led to the creation of 51 new courses at the central training school since 1946. The great majority of these, however, are new courses dealing with new techniques.

134. The number of students attending the central training school indicates the growth in this field. The figures for representative years are set out in the Table below:

TABLE 9
COURSES AND STUDENTS AT THE CENTRAL TRAINING SCHOOL IN SELECTED YEARS

Year	No. of courses	No. of students
1924	2	29
1931	37	968
1945-1946	298	4,074
1951-1952	369	6,967

In fact, over recent years, in any twelve month period, over one in eight of the engineering staff attends at least one course at the central training school. And when the number of students attending regional training courses is also added* over one third of the engineering staff attends at least one course every year. Even these figures do not present the full picture, since in 1951-1952 the actual numbers trained only accounted for 79 per cent. of the training demand. There can be few industries or professions which are expanding and developing so rapidly as to call for training of this scope and on this scale.

135. Even so, the Union has so far limited itself to describing the vocational training arrangements in the Post Office. Over and above these there is further technical education which is required by the Department, and for which there are special arrangements. The Department places great emphasis on the need for technical study. The courses which the Department recommends are those which are set by the London City and Guilds Institute. About these courses, and the need for them, there was the following comment in the Third Report of the Post Office Training Committee which has already been referred to:

"Third year courses were introduced into the Department's Technical Class scheme in 1924 to meet the growing need for wider technical knowledge on the part of Workmen. The developments which have been made in telecommunications equipment during the last 20 years, and the introduction and expansion of new transmission systems and apparatus, have raised the standard of knowledge required by Workmen, and it is becoming increasingly necessary for Workmen to progress to the final grades (i.e. the fourth and fifth year courses)

* In 1951-1952, for example, there were 1,252 courses at regional training schools attended by 18,865 students.

of their theoretical studies if the full implications of the technical operations involved in the construction and maintenance of intricate and costly Departmental plant are to be fully comprehended. Inclusion in the Department's Technical Classes scheme of fourth and fifth year courses is, therefore, deemed to be necessary for the efficient performance of a Workman's day to day duties".

For the information of the Commission, the successful completion of the third year course merits the Ordinary National Certificate in the particular subject, and the successful completion of the full five year course merits the Higher National Certificate. Since the date of this Report (1946) there has been a continual development in the complexity of the work done by the engineering grades. This was attested to by a joint committee which sat at the end of 1951 under the chairmanship of the present deputy engineer-in-chief to examine certain aspects of skilled work in the Post Office engineering department. Of the technical officer grade in particular this Committee said:

"We agree that the process of development in the Post Office necessarily leads to a measure of complexity in certain fields with a consequential general effect on telecommunications techniques. In addition, the volume of more complex work has steadily increased. Technical Officers are required to contend with changes which occur in their immediate sphere of work both by acquiring new mechanical skills and by making themselves familiar with the theory and purpose of new circuits and equipment".

Quite consistent with the needs of the developing telephone service, therefore, the Post Office engineering department, in an engineering instruction of the 7th August 1952, says:

"(a) The Department attaches considerable importance to the furthering of the technical education of Engineering and Drawing Office grades. Although extensive training is given at the Department's Central and Regional Training Schools, particularly in the practical aspects of day to day work, it is highly desirable that this should be supplemented by theoretical technical studies. To this end the Department provides facilities for the study of Telecommunications Engineering, National Certificate, Associate Membership Examination of the I.E.E., and Engineering Degree Courses under conditions which are described below. These courses are arranged in co-operation with local education authorities and, for grades other than trainees, are followed at evening classes.

"(b) Many of the larger technical colleges and institutes already hold evening classes covering the courses, but it is desired to induce other educational authorities to provide similar facilities, particularly in the smaller towns. Regional Directors are expected to make arrangements, wherever possible, with local educational authorities for suitable evening classes to be held. If a technical college or institute is not available it may be possible to arrange for classes to be held at a secondary school, provided that a laboratory or other similar accommodation is available for practical work." (Engineering Instruction, Staff, Training, I 0002.)

It is, of course, true that not all the qualifications mentioned in (a) are required by the Union's grades. The courses most appropriate to these grades are, in the view of the Department, the City and Guilds of London Institute courses in telecommunications engineering. To take these courses requires considerable study—at the very minimum $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours a week for each separate subject taken each year. Normally not less than three subjects* are taken, so that a minimum of $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours study has to be put in every week. To attain the Intermediate Grouped Course Certificate, which is a preferred qualification for promotion to the technical officer grade (and is regarded as being of comparable standard to the Ordinary National Certificate) requires three years of such study, much of which must necessarily be done in practice in a man's own time.

* The range of subjects that can be taken includes, for example, telecommunications principles, mathematics for telecommunications, telephone exchange systems, telegraphy, radio, line plant practice, line transmission.

136. The Union has developed its comments on the training of the grades it represents at such length as above, because it feels that this is a most important indication of the value of the work of the engineering grades which the Post Office can expect. The amount and character of the training of these grades is not to be found amongst other grades in the Civil Service outside of the technical, scientific and professional classes, and when the training and knowledge required by Post Office engineers is compared with the training and knowledge required of very many other grades in the Civil Service whose pay is roughly the same as that of the engineering grades, or higher even, then the Union believes it becomes clear that the pay of the engineering grades should, in fact, be substantially raised.

THE ENGINEERING GRADES: THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE DIFFERENTIALS

137. Since 1931 there has been a distinct narrowing of differentials in the Post Office engineering field—a trend which would have been still more pronounced if since 1946 the Union had not with some success resisted the efforts of the Post Office to effect all increases of pay on a flat rate instead of a percentage basis. The changes in differentials are illustrated by Figures 9 and 10 in Appendix 6, but they can be summarised as follows.

TABLE 10

RELATIVITIES BETWEEN THE MAXIMUM LONDON RATES OF CERTAIN GRADES IN 1931 AND 1953

Lead of	1931	1953
	Per cent.	Per cent.
Technician IIA over labourer	44.7	22.1
Technician IIA over technician IIB	5.5	2.9
Technician I over technician IIA	{ 15.8* }	10.0
Technical officer over labourer	{ 67.6* }	55.7
	{ 49.9† }	

* S.W.I.

† S.W.II. with 'B' allowance

‡ S.W.II. with 'C' allowance

} See Appendix 1 for the explanation of these old allowances.


The decline in the differential of the technician IIA over the labourer is illustrated graphically in Figure E.

138. A technician IIA at his maximum earns only 29s. 0d. a week—£75 a year—more than does a labourer; and he cannot achieve this lead until he is at least 27 years of age. If he is younger his lead over a labourer's rate will be smaller; at 24 for example, although he may be regarded as trained and able to carry out the full range of technician IIA duties he receives only 19s. a week—£49 a year—more than the untrained (and, perhaps, younger) labourer.

139. The technical officer at his maximum, which he cannot reach until he is 33 and has spent not less than five years on the grade (and frequently more years training for it), receives a lead of £3 9s. 11d. a week over the labourer's maximum rate. (This advantage of £179 a year is reduced to £155 by taxation if the men compared are both single.) If the technical officer is younger the lead is, of course, much smaller. At 27, for example, it is £1 17s. 0d. and at 23 the technical officer, who may be on pool duties and so liable to undertake a wide range of responsible duties in maintaining an automatic exchange, will have a lead of only 19s. 6d. over the labourer and will actually be receiving only 4s. 0d. more than a technician IIA of the same age.

140. The Union's proposed scales would improve differentials generally; and two points require special mention. The first is the differential between technician IIA and technician IIB—the narrowness of which has caused a good deal of discontent since the war. Members of the technician IIB grade are to a considerable extent called on to assist technicians IIA. The present differential at the maximum

FIG. E
PAY DIFFERENTIALS SINCE 1931
WAGES OF TECHNICIANS IIA AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGES OF LABOURERS
(MAXIMA OF LONDON SCALES)



is 4s. 6d. in London and 8s. 0d. in the provinces.* It should, in the Union's view, be 10s. 0d.—thus restoring the real value of the 6s. 0d. differential created at reorganisation in 1946.

141. There is also to be considered the differential between men responsible for the work of gangs in the field. The pay differential here concerned is that between the technician I (who exercises the responsibility of chargeship) and the technician IIA. The differential that the Union is proposing, of 25s. 0d. in London, is designed roughly to restore the pre-war differential existing between these two grades which was, in 1939, not less than 11s. 0d. But the Union also has in mind the need to create a differential between the maximum pay of the technician I and the technician IIA which allows the technician I in all ordinary circumstances to enjoy a lead over the pay of a technician IIA for a normal week's work. The position at present is that it is possible for technicians IIA working under technicians I to earn, by means of allowances, a higher weekly wage than can a technician I who is not able to earn the same allowances. Thus, the Union is seeking to apply a principle to which it believes that the Post Office itself subscribes. Certainly this would seem to be the implication of the submission made by the Post Office, though in a different context, before the Arbitration Court on 15th and 16th January, 1951, when it was said that the Postmaster General would regard it as proper that where:

“allowances are paid to rank and file grades for performing part-time supervision, there should be a gap between the maximum pay plus allowance of the rank and file grades, and the minimum pay of the corresponding first-line supervising grade.”

The Union considers that this is a principle which ought not to be too restrictively applied. While not necessarily contending that all allowances which can be earned by members of a lower grade ought to be taken into account the Union considers that allowances, even if not for part-time supervision, should be reckoned if they can be earned by the members of the lower grade but not by members of the higher. Similarly the Union does not consider that the application of this principle should be limited to first line supervising grades; it should apply no less to staff who, while not first line supervisors in the strict sense, have to exercise the important responsibility of chargeship.

142. In this connection it is of interest to note the reply of the Treasury witnesses to general questions put to them on this subject by members of the present Commission. In particular Sir Edward Bridges expressed the view that:

“the differentials for skill and more responsibility in the middle of the Service have got too small.”

The Union contends that this is certainly so in the engineering grades.

THE ENGINEERING GRADES: PAY COMPARISONS OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE SERVICE

143. In the following paragraphs the Union compares the pay of the individual engineering grades with the pay for broadly comparable work outside the Post Office engineering department. These comparisons are with 1953 wage and salary levels, for the reasons explained in paragraph 96 above, though they are referred to in the present tense for convenience.

(i) Labourer

144. The three industries which cover the bulk of the labour force with which comparison of Post Office engineering grades have been made are building and civil engineering, engineering and electricity supply. For building and civil engineering the labourer's rate is 141s. 2d., and for electricity supply it is 145s. 9d. For the engineering industry the minimum London rate for a labourer is 121s. 5½d., but very many workers receive above this agreed minimum. If the average earnings for labourers are taken and a deduction made for overtime, the average pay of an engineering labourer for a 44 hour week is 138s. 3d. Apart, therefore, from arguments based on a living wage there is substantial justification for raising the wage of the labourer.

* Just how inadequate these are in view of the fall in the value of money can be gauged, perhaps, from the fact that in 1920 this same differential was fixed at 3/-.

(ii) The technician grades

(a) Outside comparisons

145. The Union is using the phrase technician grades to cover the three grades technician IIB, technician IIA and technician I. With the technician IIA, as the basic highly skilled grade in the telecommunications service, there are many outside comparisons which, in a broad way, can assist in deciding upon the valuation to be placed on the technician IIA's work. The maximum pay for a technician IIA in London is 160s. 0d. a week. Against this should be seen the agreed London minimum rates for a 44 hour week in the following industries:

Industry				Grade of worker		Weekly wage	
						s.	d.
Electrical contracting	...	...	...	Electrician journeyman	...	176	-
Electrical cable making	...	...	...	Plumber/jointer	...	171	5
Electricity supply	...	...	...	Electrician	...	176	-
B.B.C.	...	...	...	Fitter	...	176	-

146. An even more direct comparison is that between the pay of technicians IIA who fit subscribers' telephones, and the pay of men doing almost identical work for the private telephone companies. The London rate of pay of such men is 4s. 0d. an hour, or 176s. 0d. a week, in the leading firms—for example, Reliance Telephones Limited, Modern Telephones Limited and the Dictograph Company.

147. Another of these telephone companies is Telephone Rentals. This company has a different organisation from that existing in the Post Office engineering department, as a much sharper line is drawn between the construction and maintenance sides of the work. Nevertheless, the comparisons that can be made are not valueless.

148. On the construction side there are two grades which carry out work broadly equivalent to that done by the technician IIA. These are wiremen erectors and senior wiremen erectors,* now paid 176s. and 189s. a week respectively in London.

149. On the maintenance side there is one grade that can be compared with technicians IIA. That is the grade of skilled district man.† The pay of this grade is in the range of 182s. to 198s. in London.

150. The further conditions of service at Telephone Rentals are a 44 hour week (which may, however, be of 5 or 5½ days), a contributory pension scheme, three weeks' leave, increasing with length of service, and training courses for all staff. There is, further, a shared profits scheme in operation which, the Union has reason to believe, has in the years since the end of the war frequently added 10 per cent. to basic pay.

151. From these figures the Commission will readily appreciate that the rates of pay in the Post Office engineering department are substantially lower than are the rates which apply to similar workers in many leading industries.

152. However, the Union has so far cited only minimum agreed rates of wages, but the Commission will probably be aware that it is now an outstanding feature in industry generally for earnings to be very considerably higher than wage rates.

* A wireman erector's duties are—

“normally to be employed to cable and erect all equipment and connect any normal installation”

and those of a senior wiremen erector are—

“normally to be employed to cable and erect all equipment (including special facilities), and connect any installation”.

† A skilled district man is—

“normally employed on fault prevention work, but may be called upon to carry out fault correction work as necessary”.

This fact is illustrated in one way by the periodic surveys of earnings made by the Ministry of Labour. The Commission will note from reference to these figures not only that the average weekly earnings of adult men in "all manufacturing industry" were 196s. 7d. for a 47.9 hour week (and for "all industries" 189s. 2d. for a 47.9 hour week) and the relationship of these figures to the earnings of the engineering grades, but that when the earnings of adult men in a selection of comparable industries are set down, it is seen that the earnings of the engineering grades, whether technical officers are included or not*, come a very long way down the list, whether weekly or hourly earnings are considered.†

153. In drawing the attention of the Commission to the comparative earnings of the grades represented by the Union and of workers in other industries, the Union is aware that such comparisons cannot be hard and fast, and that it is difficult to draw detailed conclusions from them, because of the very many separate factors which go to make up weekly earnings. Notwithstanding this qualification, however, the Union considers that the earnings figures for the various industries do show in a general way that Post Office engineers are underpaid in relation to what can be earned in outside industry for broadly comparable work, and this is a situation that needs to be remedied. In putting forward this view, the Union is strongly influenced by the fact that the earnings of comparable workers in various industries are not only made up as a result of payments by result schemes, or by overtime working, but that a most important element in them is that the actual wages paid for a 44 hour working week in industry are considerably higher than the minimum agreed rates laid down as being appropriate in industry and its various branches. Thus, in the telephone companies referred to (other than Telephone Rentals, which has a profits sharing scheme), payments of a 1d. or 2d. an hour, equivalent to 3s. 8d. and 7s. 4d. a week respectively, above the rate are commonly made. The same occurs in the electrical contracting industry and throughout the whole of the engineering and allied industries. As a "Financial Times" industrial correspondent commented recently, in an article on the wages structure in the engineering industry—"Financial Times" of 2nd January, 1954:

"The fact is that actual wages earned have little relation to the basic wage structure of the industry. Employers competing with one another for scarce labour have offered inducements which produce in practice a pattern of earnings quite different from the pattern of wage rates".

The recent Court of Inquiry into the wages dispute in the engineering industry discussed, in its conclusions, the same point. The Court reported that:

"We attempted to ascertain the proportion of men in the industry who receive only the minimum wage rates. The Federation furnished figures from an enquiry made in May 1950, since when, we were assured, the proportions should not materially have changed. The enquiry related to some 90,000 Skilled Fitters and 80,000 Labourers; overtime premiums were not included in the enquiry, which covered merit, lieu, compensatory and other bonuses, and we understood the results to be representative, both of the industry as a whole, and of the various categories of workpeople therein. It appeared that about 3 per cent. of the skilled Fitters and 13 per cent. of the unskilled Labourers were receiving the minimum wage appropriate to their class. In addition there were a considerable number whose rates were within a few shillings of the minimum rate".

154. The Union has tried to estimate what the average weekly remuneration is for certain grades of worker in the engineering industry for a basic 44 hour week.

* Technical officers should properly be excluded from these comparisons because the equivalent of technical officers in outside industry would not be included in the earnings returns of the Ministry of Labour.

† The two Appendices referred to, of course, only give the earnings of selected industries, of which the bulk can be compared in a general way with the Post Office engineering department. The list includes all the broadly comparable industries. There are, however, 100 other industrial classifications covered in the Ministry of Labour's earnings survey which are not included in the two Appendices. In 70 of these 100 industries the earnings of adult men are higher than the earnings of the engineering grades, excluding technical officers.

In its negotiations with the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, the Engineering and Allied Employers National Federation has submitted figures of average earnings of various categories of worker in the engineering industry at selected dates over the last five years. It has already been explained (in paragraph 100) that from these figures it is possible to get an approximate idea of the level of actual weekly wages in the engineering industry. Taking, therefore, the two categories of engineering worker with whom it has, in the past, been customary to make broad comparison with the technician IIA, it can be calculated that their actual average wages for a 44 hour week in June 1953 were:

					s.	d.
Toolroom fitter	...	...	...	...	217	5
Non-toolroom fitter	...	...	...	...	182	8

These figures relate to time workers only. Clearly, therefore, the actual level of wages in the engineering industry, as in many other industries, is much higher than is indicated by reference to the minimum agreed rates operating in these industries. Authoritative opinions confirming this view have already been quoted by the Union in paragraph 99, so that it seems to be a fact that is now really beyond questioning.

(b) *Internal comparisons*

155. Comparisons with other grades inside the Civil Service, and even inside the Post Office, confirm the view that the work of the technician grades of the engineering department is undervalued. Naturally detailed comparisons cannot be drawn with grades whose work is fundamentally different, but a consideration of the experience, skill, responsibility and training required at the various levels in the technician grades permits some very broad comparisons to be made with other civil service grades.

156. The closest comparison that can be made with any other non-technical grade in the Civil Service is with the grade of telephone operator. The telephone operator manipulates the manual or auto manual switchboard. The technician IIA, on the other hand, needs to have a full knowledge of operating methods and, in fact, has to have all the knowledge and skill of the telephone operator with the possible exception of that required for records and certain procedure details. In addition, the technician IIA has to be able to instal, wire, test, maintain, locate and clear faults on the switchboard, and its associated equipment. Yet the maximum pay of a technician IIA is below that of a male telephone operator, and the maximum pay of a technician I is only just above it—the present maximum pay of a male telephone operator being, in London, 170s. 0d. (A female telephonist's maximum wage, converted to the male equivalent by the Treasury's $\frac{4}{5}$ ths formula, is 165s. 0d.).* For these reasons, the Union considers it reasonable to claim for the technician IIA a lead of 10s. 0d. over the pay received by men whose main duty, important though it is, is that of operating the switchboards.

157. The same impression of the inadequacy of the technician rates is conveyed by a check against the rates for routine clerical and ancillary clerical duties. The maximum for a male clerical assistant engaged on the simplest clerical processes† is 168s. 0d. per week. There is a rate of 166s. 0d. for male copy typists, and for male shorthand typists the maximum reached by incremental progression is 185s. 0d. (or 205s. 6d. if full proficiency allowances are earned). A male machine assistant engaged on simple machine operations also progresses to 168s. 0d., and a male machine operator on rather more complicated operations to 185s. 0d. These maxima are, it is true, reached after a longer incremental progression than is normal in the case of the technician grades; but on the other hand they are rates for a 42 hour week in London, and 44 hours elsewhere, both being inclusive of meal times.

158. There are also comparisons to be made between the duties of the clerical officer grade and some of the duties of the technician I grade. Those technician I duties which the Union thinks can be compared with clerical officer duties are, for

* The Union is, of course, still referring to rates current at the beginning of 1953.

† See paragraph 404 of the Treasury Introductory Factual Memorandum.

example, those of routing officer, survey and wayleave officer, section stock store-keeper, advice note distribution, major works control, and maintenance control officer. All of these duties combine considerable technical requirements with a large measure of clerical work of a type similar in many respects with that performed by the clerical officer grade.

159. The Union considers that these comparisons between the technician I and clerical officer duties are quite fair and valid, and that the maximum pay of the technician I grade, which is at present 176s. 0d. a week in London or £459 a year, can only be regarded as incongruous beside the £570 a year, which is the maximum London pay that can be earned by the clerical officer. The Union's proposed rate of pay for the technician I of 205s. a week, or £534 a year, can, in the light of the above figures, be considered no more than reasonable.

160. Apart from anything else, these few comparisons cited above help to bring out the point that many members of the technician I grade have a close and responsible contact with the public. If anything, this contact has increased since the end of the war, both in the rural and built-up areas. Certainly the public at large is now more aware of the responsibilities of a telephone engineer than before the war; the mere increase in the number of telephones has caused that. Moreover, with public knowledge widening, and the possibilities of publicity ever increasing, an even greater sense of responsibility and tact has been required of telephone engineers—particularly, perhaps, from those technicians IIA or technicians I—who actually enter private homes to fit or repair telephones.

(iii) Technical officers

161. For the technical officer grade, the Union's pay proposals are based not only on the general considerations set out, and on the quality of the work undertaken but on the comparisons between the pay of the technical officer grade and other grades with which it is reasonable to make comparisons. The technical officer is of necessity one of the most highly trained grades employed in the Post Office. Upon the grade rests the main responsibility for ensuring that the more technical work of telecommunications is smoothly developed, rapidly installed and efficiently maintained.

162. Entry into the grade is strictly regulated. Practically no man can enter the grade without four to seven years' experience of Post Office telecommunications practice; in the vast majority of cases much longer experience is called for. Specific pre-promotion training on technical officer duties lasting, on average, eighteen months, follows the selection of technical officers-in-training.

163. As the pre-requisite for selection, technical qualifications of a high order are required. Preference is given to those who have obtained a City and Guilds Intermediate Certificate in Telecommunications, or its equivalents, thus indicating in the most direct fashion that the technical standard demanded is on a par with that which obtains in other fields of technical and semi-technical work for grades receiving salaries in the £600 to £800 range. This preference for men with certificate qualifications has, in recent years, been a marked feature of departmental practice, and thousands of technicians have been encouraged to engage in technical studies in the expectation of raising their chances of promotion to the technical officer grade, although it is true to say that there has been some shift recently in the attitude of the Post Office engineering department to the need for technical officers to actually hold the Intermediate Certificate or its equivalents. The question, however, has a complex background, and the main point that the Union wishes to emphasise is that the Post Office should grant rates of pay that are in line with the training, knowledge and qualifications that are needed to do the work, as well as to compensate for the steadily increasing complexity of this work.

164. The comparisons with other rates of pay to which the Union would like to draw the attention of the Commission are both outside and inside the Civil Service, although the fact that the technical officer grade, due to the character of the work it is required to perform, and of the organisation into which it fits,

is unusual—in being a technician grade requiring technical knowledge and aptitudes as well as craft skill, and having partly, but not mainly, supervisory functions—introduces some difficulty into making straightforward comparisons.

165. Outside the Civil Service, the nearest grade with which the Union thinks the technical officer grade may broadly be compared is the technical assistant grade in the B.B.C. The work of this grade is mainly to spot and locate, but not to diagnose, faults which occur during broadcasts and, in this sense, the technical assistant grade is responsible for advising on the technical quality of programmes. Thus, the technical knowledge which the technical assistant grade is required to have is needed more to allow a technical assistant to take different courses of action with a programme should a breakdown occur, than to actually carry out the necessary repair work. However, in addition to the technical and the engineering knowledge required by the technical assistant grade, some artistic knowledge and interest is also looked for. Nevertheless, the Union is quite confident that on any comparison the work performed by the technical officer grade is of a considerably higher technical standard and of no less responsibility. This conclusion is further substantiated by the amount of training required by the two grades—that of the technical officer being the greater.

166. It is also worth looking briefly at the work of the C-minus grade in the B.B.C. since this is the lowest grade which actually diagnoses and clears faults. The C-minus grade is responsible for carrying out routine maintenance both by itself and also, in some instances, with the assistance, and direct supervision over, technical assistants. It is true to say that the great majority of the members of the C-minus grade carry out supervision of some kind or another, though it would not seem, by and large, that the supervision is so extensive as appears quite frequently in grade III of the Treasury technical classes. In order to reach the C-minus grade, either a B.B.C. examination must be taken, or else exemption must be obtained through the possession of qualifications of approximately degree standard.

167. Thus, though the qualifications of the grade of C-minus engineer are higher than those required by the technical officer, much of the work actually done is of no higher technical standard or responsibility, and in some cases is even lower, than that required of technical officers and, indeed, at points at which the technical officer from the Post Office meets the grade C-minus engineer from the B.B.C., it is to be found that they are doing work of more or less the same skill and responsibility. The Union will instance as an example of this the television teams which go round the country televising various events and functions. These television teams consist, apart from the operational staffs, of a number of grade C-minus engineers, assisted by a smaller number of technical assistants, who do work on the B.B.C. side of maintenance on lines and equipment which is very much the same as that done on the Post Office side by technical officers and even, in some cases, by technicians IIA.

168. Though the comparison between the work of these B.B.C. grades and the technical officer grade is not direct, the Union has no doubt that in relation certainly to the pay of the technical assistant grade, which at present reaches a maximum of £575 a year, the pay of the technical officer grade is less than it should be. The maximum pay of the grade C-minus engineer is at present £685 a year. It is relevant to say that in the specialised field of radio, in which both the B.B.C. and the Post Office operate, work similar to that carried out by the Post Office technical officers is performed in the main by technical assistants, and in part by grade C-minus engineers. In the radio field, however, it is not only in relation to the B.B.C. that the Post Office underpays its radio officers for alongside the technical officers on radio work, who can reach a maximum London wage of 204s. a week, or £530 a year, work ex-members of Cable and Wireless Limited who, as technical assistants grade I, can earn a maximum wage of 275s. 6d. a week, which is equivalent to £715 16s. 0d. a year. The two grades do identical work.

169. The same picture, of the undervaluation of the work of the technical officer grade, can be derived from a study of the pay of certain grades inside the Civil Service, and even of grades inside the Post Office. There are three Post Office

grades with which the Union thinks broad comparisons can be made in terms of knowledge and training required and responsibilities. These three grades are the traffic officer grade, the sales representative grade and the draughtsman grade.

170. To take first the traffic officer: he needs a working knowledge, but no more, of the underlying principles used in telephone exchanges; he will need to understand grading principles in order that the correct grade of service can be provided; he must appreciate operating technique and consequent staffing requirements. But these requirements are certainly no greater than required from a technical officer whose knowledge of telephone exchange working must be complete, who daily takes charge of correct technical operation of all the equipment involved. Yet the traffic officer's salary is set at a maximum (in London) of £602 6s. 0d. a year (including pay addition).

171. As to the sales representative, he needs to know the facilities provided by various types of line, plan numbers and switchboards; and to have to acquaint himself with the likely development in the area for which he is responsible. He also has to contact the public to discuss their needs, and to have the personality to be able to do this successfully. The technical officer, according to his particular duty, needs to cover some, or all, of these functions in the course of his duties and, in particular, is the Post Office representative whenever technical difficulties of a special kind are encountered. (The everyday faults and difficulties are handled more often than not by technicians IIA.) Yet the sales representative receives the same London maximum as that of a traffic officer—£602 6s. 0d. a year (including pay addition).*

172. The last example of the three referred to is that of the draughtsman grade. The Post Office draughtsman prepares high quality drawings of departmental plant and equipment, but he does so on the basis of information and sketch plans provided by technical officers and other of the engineering grades. That is to say, particularly in the planning groups of the Post Office the designs are done by the engineering grades referred to before being handed to the draughtsman. Whilst the draughtsman is by no means overpaid for the high quality work he performs, the Union cannot help but conclude that the technical officer, whose wealth of knowledge, skill and experience, although exercised in a different field, compared with that of the draughtsman, is underpaid. The draughtsman is now receiving a maximum London salary of £670 a year.

173. There is another field in the Civil Service in which work is performed similar to that done by the technical officer grade, but which is paid more highly. This is in the Home Office where there is a grade of senior wireless technician, which carries out work of a similar order to that carried out by technical officers on radio duties or on radio and television interference duties. This is borne out by the qualifications required for the grade which were set out by the Treasury in its submissions before the Arbitration Tribunal in the case concerning the Home Office wireless technicians in December 1951:

"Candidates must have had experience of supervising and directing general wireless installation and repair work, and of the keeping of technical records and job cards. They must possess a sound theoretical and practical knowledge of wireless engineering with at least three years' practical experience in the construction and maintenance of wireless equipment, including Very High Frequency communication apparatus. They must also know how to use a lathe and other workshop equipment. Possession of a City and Guilds Certificate in Radio Communication Grade I or Radio I will be an added qualification."

174. Since in the technical officer grade, generally speaking, longer experience is required as well as more training, higher qualifications and greater technical knowledge, the Union contends that the pay of the technical officer grade should exceed that of the senior wireless technician. At present the maximum pay of the senior wireless technician in London is £624 a year.

* Both the sales representative and traffic officer grades have their salary scales under negotiation with a view to an increase in line with other increases that have been gained in the Civil Service recently.

175. In the main, however, the bulk of the technical work in the Civil Service that is comparable, broadly, with the work of the technical officer grade is to be found in grade III of the Treasury technical classes.* The Union has previously drawn the attention of the Post Office to this fact, and has cited examples of close comparability. The work of the technical officers of the engineer-in-chief's test and inspection branch compares with that of grade III (and grade II) test and inspection officers employed by the Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of Supply and Ministry of Works; the technical officer clerk of works in the engineering department who handles contracts valued up to £35,000 on internal, and £50,000 on external works with the Ministry of Works grade III clerk of works who handles contracts valued up to £20,000; and certain other technical officer duties with the grade III engineering assistants in the Ministry of Works. Other comparisons have been made between grade III staff employed by the War Office and by the Ministry of Civil Aviation.

176. It is, of course, true that it is now stipulated that anyone wishing to become established in Treasury technical class grade III must pass an examination of intermediate group course standard or else have a certificate of competence—which is rarely given. Many staff who are already on the grade, however, perform their duties satisfactorily without having attained such an examination standard, which suggests that for the actual performance of duty the certificate is desirable but not indispensable. This is the view which the Post Office has taken since the war of the value of the intermediate group course certificate in relation to the performance of technical officer duties. Certainly experience suggests that when they are available, possessors of the certificate are given distinct and, indeed, often overriding preference for entry to the grade, and the percentage of members of the grade who hold this, or some higher qualification, is tending to rise.

177. What the Union concludes from its review, therefore, is that though the different grade structure existing in the Post Office—arising from the nature of the work—makes direct comparisons with the Treasury technical classes somewhat difficult, there is a broad similarity between the work of technical officers and technical class III officers, and that a scale of pay for technical officers much closer to the technical grade III scale is justified.

THE ENGINEERING GRADES: THE SHORTENING OF INCREMENTAL SCALES

178. It will be seen that the Union proposes a reduction in the length of incremental scales in the case of technicians IIB, technicians IIA and technical officers. The Union has taken into account the fact that it is normal civil service practice for rates of pay to take the form of a scale based on annual increments; but considers that even in the light of civil service practice a substantial shortening of present pay scales for its grades is justified.

179. It bases this contention on the general arguments that the appropriate rate should be paid reasonably soon after a man takes up the duties of a grade, and that the length of the incremental scale should bear some relation to the time which it takes an individual to become proficient in the full range of duties of the grade which he will be expected to perform. The unfairness of the present arrangement from this point of view is most clearly brought out by considering the technical officer grade. As has already been made clear, an entrant to that grade must already have served on one, two or three other grades and must have reached a definite standard of proficiency. Once he has become a technical officer he is liable to employment on any of the duties proper to the grade; thus he may find himself employed beside a man who, having progressed to the maximum, is receiving £3 a week more although employed on identical duties. Naturally a scale must make some allowance for the accumulation of experience on work proper to the grade concerned; but in a grade such as that of technical officer it seems to the Union that a six point scale would provide adequate recognition of the value of accumulated experience, and would on the other hand not have the appearance of penalising an individual who is able enough to gain a place on that grade at an unusually early age.

* The London scale of grade III of the technical classes is £540 (at age 26) to £670.

180. Certain detailed arguments apply to individual grades. In the case of the technician IIB, a direct entrant who is over the age of 25 already reaches the maximum rate of pay after two years' service; and there seems no valid reason for precluding young men who enter the grade from the labourer or youth-in-training grade from reaching the maximum pay in a similar period—especially as a promotee from either of those grades has to have a certificate of qualification testifying that he is capable of carrying out the full range of duties of a technician IIB.

181. Similar considerations apply to the technician IIA grade. Indeed they apply with particular force since, in fact, the overwhelming majority of staff on that grade have entered it from the technician IIB or youth-in-training grade. The latest figures about the recruitment of technicians IIA available to the Union relate to the year 1952 and show that of entrants to the technician IIA grade during that year only 62 were recruited direct—while 878 were advanced from youth-in-training and 2,149 from technician IIB. Nevertheless the direct entrants of over 25 on entry could receive the maximum pay after two years on the grade, while a younger man promoted within the Post Office would have to wait longer, progressing up the age points. Like entrants to the technician IIB grade, entrants to the technician IIA grade must pass a trade test indicating that they are qualified to perform the full range of duties of the grade.

182. The Post Office have indicated that they have a degree of sympathy with the Union's claim. The last occasion on which this issue of the length of scales was before the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal was in 1951 when, in a general claim on behalf of the engineering, motor transport and supplies grades, the Union proposed a general shortening. On that occasion the Post Office official spokesman referred to the claim for a shortening of scales as follows:

"The Union indeed has at no time developed in discussion with the Post Office its views on the specific changes to which I have referred. In other words, the parties have not, on these particular matters, come to the point of disagreement and the Postmaster General feels bound, therefore, to invite the Tribunal to leave them out of account in the present proceedings. But, in so proposing, he would like to make it clear that he is not unwilling to consider the Union's proposals in this relation on their merits, possibly as an integral part of the current discussions on recruitment and organisation."

In 1953 the Union presented proposals for the shortening of the existing scales, and in view of the statement quoted above was surprised to find that the Post Office insisted that the claim for shorter incremental scales could be considered on its merits not against the then existing maxima of the scales, but only if on other grounds—e.g., cost of living or value of work grounds—a claim for an increase in the average wage of the staff concerned could be sustained. The Union finds it difficult to reconcile this attitude with a reasonable interpretation of the statement made by the Post Office representative at the 1951 arbitration hearing. In the course of the discussions, however, the Post Office representative did say:

"... that the Technical Officer scale was a long one. Had there been justification for giving a further increase in pay to Technical Officers, he would have seen no objection to its being done wholly or in part by shortening the scale. But he said there was no justification for such an increase at present."

183. It did not prove possible to make any progress on these negotiations and accordingly the Union incorporated its proposals for shorter scales in its "value of work" claim.

THE ALLIED GRADES

184. The allied grades which the Union represents belong to the Post Office factories and supplies departments and to the motor transport section of the engineering department. The relationship of their work to that of the engineering grades has already been referred to in paragraph 56 and an account of their function will be found in the Introductory Factual Memorandum (paragraphs 470-2 and Appendix Q2).

* From the agreed notes of a meeting held on 13th August, 1953.

185. Each of these groups of allied staff is small compared with the numbers of the engineering grades and the Union would not contend that as a matter of principle there should necessarily be hard and fast relativities between them and the engineering grades, irrespective of changes in the nature of the work of the grades respectively over a period of time. Nevertheless since the work of some of these grades is closely affected by the changes in the telephone service it is likely that as the complexity of the work of the telephone service grows their work as well is likely to grow more varied and complex. In so far as any pay adjustments are designed to maintain the real value of a rate once established the allied grades ought, of course, to be treated like engineering grades at comparable pay levels.

186. In general, however, the Union is content that the pay of the allied grades should be determined in accordance with the general principles that the Union has already suggested. At the same time it must be borne in mind that as has already been suggested external comparisons may be harder to find and internal relativities therefore likely to acquire more weight in dealing with relatively small groups of staff than with large; and naturally it may be necessary in the case of the supplies, factories and motor transport grades to draw attention where appropriate to comparisons with the engineering grades if it seems that similar degrees of skill, responsibility and so forth are required for the work of an allied grade to those required for an engineering grade.

187. In practice many of the trends which have displayed themselves in the wages of the engineering grades have also been marked in the wages of the allied grades. Wage levels are in a number of cases such that it is doubtful whether they afford an adequate living. There are many lowly paid grades in the supplies department in particular. Watchmen receive a maximum wage of 131s. 0d., guards and packers and porters of 136s. 0d., and storemen of 147s. 0d. (all London rates). In the motor transport section there are labourers who earn a maximum wage of 131s. 0d. and garage assistants who earn a maximum of 137s. 6d. For these grades as for the engineering grades there should be a floor below which their pay should not fall. Again for most of the allied grades there has been a decline in real wages since 1931. Thus although the total nominal earnings of a top rated London telephone mechanic are a little over double what they were in 1931, the real value of these earnings has fallen by 15.5 per cent. and to restore their real value would require an increase of over 34s. 0d. in present nominal earnings. In the supplies department the packer and porter grade is the only one of which real wages have increased since 1931—and that mainly because in 1950 the grade received a 5s. 0d. allowance for undertaking duties of a superior character to those that they had hitherto been doing. The real wages of the storeman grade have roughly been maintained, but those of the warehouseman have declined by 12 per cent. over the full twenty-three years. The decline in the real wages of the motor transport grades however has been particularly serious; the value of the wages of the mechanic A grade is 16 per cent. less than it was when the motor transport organisation was set up in 1932, and the value of the wages of the mechanic-in-charge grades has fallen to approximately 80 per cent. of what they were then. This decline in the real value of the wages of most of the grades represented by the Union in these ancillary departments has additionally not only been absolute but has been relative to the general movement of wage levels in the country as a whole. If anything therefore the remuneration of the allied grades represented by the Union has declined absolutely and relatively to a greater extent than has that of the engineering grades.

188. There is too a marked similarity in the trend towards declining differentials. A warehouseman's pay is now only 12 per cent. higher than that of a storeman's whereas it was 24 per cent. higher in 1931; and the maximum pay of a mechanic A is now only 21 per cent. higher than that of the lowest motor transport grades whereas it was 41 per cent. higher in 1931. A similar decline has taken place in the differential enjoyed by the three mechanic-in-charge grades over the pay of the mechanic A. These trends are illustrated in the Figures and also graphically in Figures 11-13 of Appendix 6.

189. It emerges clearly from the above considerations that not only are the grades in the ancillary Post Office departments connected with major developments in Post

Office work, particularly on the engineering side, but that in practice their wages and conditions have followed fairly closely the trends in wages and conditions of the grades on the engineering side. While not purporting to give at all an exhaustive examination of the pay position of the various allied grades the Union offers certain general comments related to the claims on value of work grounds which it has submitted to the Post Office for these grades.

THE SUPPLIES GRADES

(i) The work of the supplies department

190. The Post Office supplies department handles all the stores required for the Post Office. It is responsible not only for anticipating the future demand for all the equipment, including new types of equipment for the Post Office engineering department and for the manipulative side of the Post Office, but for selecting and sending items returned from telephone areas to the Post Office factories for repair, to allow these items to be put once again to full efficient use in the field. It has a section in which broken or damaged items of equipment sent in from telephone areas are repaired or restored or renovated and then sold to the public. The number of items handled by the Department is today over 53,000, a figure which has grown from between 30-35,000 in 1931. Another indication of the growth of the Post Office supplies department in importance is that the departmental warehousing area, excluding office accommodation, has grown from over 1,050,000 square feet in 1934 (a 1931 figure not being available) to more than 2,800,000 today. The value of the supplies held by (or handled by) the supplies department is estimated at over £22,000,000 for the engineering and postal stores, plus many scores of millions of pounds for the security items, though, of course, it is not these that take up the space.

191. Clearly, therefore, the Post Office supplies department is an integral part of the telephone service (as of the postal service); and the men who work in it really form part of a team which is responsible for the smooth and efficient running of the telephone service.

192. The duties of the Post Office supplies department grades comprise, generally, the maintenance and recording of stocks, issues and receipts of stores items handled by the Post Office supplies department, the examination of certain of these items and the breaking down of recovered items for the purpose of separating materials for sale or further use. The vast number of items stocked by the department range from the most delicate apparatus and instruments used in the telecommunication services to the tools and component parts required for their installation and repair, all denominations of money and postal orders, postage stamps, savings stamps, insurance and excise stamps, the full range of stationery and forms, and all uniform and protective clothing, as well as numerous quantities of documents emanating from other Government Departments for issue through the Post Office. It will be appreciated, consequently, what is involved, and the fact that the supplies grades have to be familiar with this diverse range of material which passes through their department.

(ii) The grades represented

193. The main grades represented by the Union in the supplies department are the packer and porter, the storeman and the warehouseman. The basic grade is that of packer and porter, who carry out, as their title implies, the major part of the carrying and packing of the goods from one section of the stores to another, with above them the storeman grade, which is responsible for, among other things, checking packages as they pass to and fro from vans, issuing stores and checking the issue of stores. Above them is the warehouseman who is a stock officer in the main and who, therefore, is largely responsible in practice for a section of stores, the value of which can range up to many thousand pounds and who arranges the stock in its correct positions, prepares stock returns, calls attention to the need for replenishing stock and is, in general, responsible for the stock he has under his control, and for seeing that his section does not run out of supplies.

(iii) Considerations relating to the pay of the supplies grades

194. There can be no doubt that the pay of the supplies grades has fallen below its proper level. In part this may be due to the difficulty of drawing adequate and accurate comparisons with outside rates. The size of the Post Office supplies organisation alone makes it difficult to draw adequate comparisons with outside workers—since outside organisations with a supplies department of comparable size are few, if any exist at all. Moreover the varied forms of organisation and the differences of titles used in the case of large outside supplies departments add to the difficulty of finding outside comparisons which are really relevant—except perhaps in the case of the basic grade of packers and porters whose analogy with outside workers performing packing duties is fairly close.

195. Above that level, in the case of the storeman and warehouseman grades, it seems wiser and fairer to follow the guide provided by clerical rates of pay within the Service. This view is further supported by the fact that the actual work of the supplies grades is intermixed with that of clerical staff. And naturally therefore comparisons are made between the pay of supplies staff and pay of staff of comparable responsibility and duties in the Treasury clerical and sub-clerical grades.

196. For the storeman a good guide is provided by the clerical assistant grade; indeed a particularly close analogy with storeman's duties is provided by the Post Office departmental grade of sorting assistant which has a scale deliberately modelled on the clerical assistant scale but slightly below it at each point. The sorting assistant grade is at present exclusively female; but it is understood that discussions are going on between the Post Office and the appropriate staff associations for the grade to be opened to men. If this is done the scale which may be expected to be introduced will rise to a maximum of about 165s. By reason of experience and knowledge of stores items which the storeman is expected to acquire it would be reasonable to claim a higher maximum than the male equivalent of the sorting assistant rate; but instead of doing this the Union has preferred to express the advantage over that rate which it thinks justifiable by shortening the scale instead of raising the maximum. The claim for such a scale for storemen is further strengthened by the inadequacy of the present lead of the storeman over the packer and porter.

197. The real value of the warehouseman's wage has declined; so has the differential which he previously enjoyed over the storeman. In its earlier arguments on the subject of differentials in relation to the engineering grades the Union has, it believes, made out a case for adequate differentials and proper rewards for the work calling for experience and the exercise of responsibility. In its proposals for the pay of the warehouseman grade, the Union has naturally taken note of the need to give the warehouseman a proper reward for the responsibilities he bears above those of the storeman.

THE FACTORY GRADES

(i) The work of the factories department

198. The main function of the factories department is to receive from the engineering department, via the supplies department, all faulty telephonic and telegraphic equipment and apparatus, and to return it to them, through the same medium, in a condition to function as new. Normally the decision to repair any piece of apparatus is determined by economic considerations. The value of the items repaired in the factories department is normally assessed in terms of the rate book value; that is the cost to the Post Office of a new piece of equipment: the same as that being repaired. The Post Office considers that it is normally worthwhile repairing an item of equipment if this can be done at a total cost of less than 66·6 per cent. of the current rate book value.

199. In the financial year 1952-1953 the rate book value of all items repaired in the factories department was £4,018,800, but the repairs themselves were made at a total cost of £2,023,600 (or 50·35 per cent. of the rate book value). On this

basis the saving to the Post Office was £1,995,200.* As during the year 1952-1953 the average number employed in the factories department was 3,381 the saving to the Post Office was £590 per employee.

200. The department manufactures apparatus in restricted quantities and machine made parts for its own use. It also undertakes the development of production models of equipment of new design. Where various types or quantities of new apparatus are not suitable for manufacture by commercial undertakings, full use is made of the factories department. Such construction is also carried out when it is felt necessary to test the cost of production and to keep a check on the prices charged by commercial undertakings. A limited amount of installation of equipment in telephone exchanges is also performed by factories department staff.

201. With the growth of the telephone system and the decline in the use of the telegraph system, the bulk of the work undertaken by the factories department is performed by the grades of telephone mechanic and assistant telephone mechanic. The repair and construction of the more complicated apparatus is undertaken by telephone mechanics, and the less complicated by the female grade of assistant telephone mechanic. Junior mechanics, male and female, manufacture and repair the simpler items. Youths-in-training, as their title implies, are a training grade.

(ii) Telephone mechanics

202. The title of telephone mechanic gives little indication of the range of work performed, the degree of skill required, or the different crafts practised. The wide range of work performed makes it difficult to find adequate comparisons in outside industry; whereas the craftsman in industry generally has to perform work in his trade in which the basic principles show little variation, the work of a telephone mechanic has no such similarity. In a range of work given to him over a period may be included such items as the repair of dials, coin collecting boxes, stamp vending machines, etc., which is mainly mechanical work, together with the repair of automatic transmission equipment, where the required knowledge of mechanical work is reduced to a minimum but where a full knowledge of wiring and circuits, and of the function of the electrical components contained therein, are absolutely essential. Therefore the skill and versatility demanded of the grade are of the highest order.

203. The telephone mechanic must possess a knowledge of the specialised technique required for telecommunications equipment. He must be skilled in the diagnosis, location and correction of faults. He will need to be familiar with the behaviour of the equipment under normal and abnormal conditions. In addition to this, a sound knowledge of workshop practice is essential. Since a fair proportion of his work is of a mechanical nature, a knowledge of the principles of mechanics is required, and with it the manual dexterity of the craftsman. He will also be required to interpret drawings, diagrams, and engineering instructions.

204. The grade is largely recruited from junior mechanics. From the date of recruitment up to the age of 18 years, junior mechanics undertake vocational training on one day each week. Another day each week is devoted to further education. The syllabus of vocational training includes mathematics, technical drawing and those subjects in science related to the field of telecommunications.

205. Youths showing the necessary aptitude are offered facilities to continue their vocational training at technical schools after the age of 18. A number of junior mechanics and telephone mechanics undertake evening class studies for the purpose of obtaining further technical qualifications. From the date of recruitment until they become adult, a sound practical and progressive training is given, under supervision, in a fairly full range of work upon which they would be later employed. The Post Office recognise the high standard of technique and skill required of the grade and are proposing to introduce a practically full time training scheme for youths-in-training.

* Even, however, if the value of the repaired items was 66 per cent. of the rate book value of the items, there would still be a saving of £655,600, a saving per head of employees of £194 a year.

206. In recent years there have been many technical developments in the telecommunications industry which have led to considerable changes in the work carried out by the grade. In particular there has been the conversion to automatic dialling; and in more recent years the development of the coaxial cable system and other technical improvements, which have caused a gradual reallocation of work amongst the grade. Whereas a few years ago the repair of certain units, including cordless switchboards, was considered to be of the highest quality and appropriate to highly skilled, top rated mechanics, this work is now regarded as being suitable to the lower rated staff.

207. Construction work creates a problem for the mechanic, since the apparatus, being of recent origin, introduces fresh technical features. In many cases the design has not been finally decided upon and therefore only rough diagrams and specifications are available. Modifications to the design and circuits are often carried out during the process of the work. Since some considerable time will elapse before the apparatus is returned for repair, stocks of standard components will not be held; cables, for example, will be made by the mechanic from a schematic drawing. This type of drawing would record the circuit in the smallest possible space without having any regard to the layout of the components. It would require to be translated into a point to point wiring diagram which would show the colour scheme, following which a cable form would be prepared, and the cable made, the whole process requiring an extremely high knowledge of electrical technique.

208. Repair work creates quite a different problem. The items may have been originally manufactured by any of five different commercial undertakings, each of which introduces special features in their make-up of various components. The items could have been in use for a long time and they therefore become completely non-standard arising out of periodical repairs to them in the factories. If, for instance, a part is faulty, the telephone mechanic will not discard a serviceable component merely to make up a standard set, but adapts the old or new part in order to ensure that it will operate with the other. This improvisation saves a considerable amount of money but taxes the ingenuity of the mechanic to the full. It demonstrates, however, his value to the Post Office, and indicates the high degree of technical and practical skill required.

209. The completed items must be in strict accordance with the diagrams and specifications laid down by the engineer-in-chief's department, and are tested by testing officers in that department.

210. In the factories department, unlike any other Post Office department, there is a piecework system operated and both telephone mechanics and assistant telephone mechanics are paid on this system. The total time rate is made up of a basic rate and a bonus (which derives from the civil service war bonus). In addition there are piecework earnings which are based on the basic time rate and the piecework prices are so calculated as to allow an average telephone mechanic to earn 22½ per cent. of his basic time rate and to allow an average assistant telephone mechanic to earn 20 per cent. of her basic time rate. It will be noted that its proposals for increasing the present pay of the telephone mechanic and assistant telephone mechanic take the form of an addition to the bonus. This has been done because of the very great complications developing from any alteration in the basic time rate since all the prices of the many thousands of items of equipment which go through the factories department are necessarily related to this time rate and to the piecework earnings which can be earned by reference to it.

(ii) Assistant telephone mechanics

211. The assistant telephone mechanic grade—which consists entirely of women—was introduced into the factories department in its present form in 1942. Apart from a fair amount of repair and construction of a rejected range of apparatus the duties of the grade of assistant telephone mechanic mainly consist of work subsidiary to the main repair and construction. The following is a list of the classes of work: cable making; coil winding; engraving; metal polishing, part making; repair of telephone apparatus; spray enamelling.

212. The skill, responsibility and versatility required of factories grades is clearly considerable. Although considerations of the productivity of the factories department and of the value of its work to the Post Office enter into negotiations on the pay of factories grades there are comparisons which can be drawn with certain skilled workers outside. In making such comparisons however full weight must be given to the extensive range of work that these grades may be called upon to undertake.

MOTOR TRANSPORT GRADES

(i) Work of the motor transport section

213. The motor transport section of the engineering department is responsible for the maintenance of the entire fleet of Post Office vehicles—postal, engineering, supplies, road haulage, passenger and telegraph delivery vehicles—numbering in 1953 over 31,000, together with the maintenance of the Post Office mechanical aids. The range of vehicles maintained is very wide and is indeed greater than is usual in any but the largest national transport organisations.

214. From the grade of mechanic B upwards all the grades represented by the Union in the motor transport field are skilled grades and the Union has recently sought to negotiate with the Post Office—and ultimately taken to the Arbitration Court—a claim for mechanics A and mechanics-in-charge grades III and II.

(ii) Nature of the work of mechanics A

215. The mechanic A grade is required to exercise versatility and responsibility. This is shown by the report of a joint committee of Post Office and Union representatives set up at the end of 1951 to investigate the value of the work of the motor transport and engineering grades. This report states "We agree that the range of work of the mechanic A is greater than that covered by skilled mechanics in outside industry, but we have borne in mind that the number of types of vehicles in general use in the Post Office is fairly small.* We agree that the Post Office mechanics carry out both electrical and mechanical repairs and that in larger organisations of the motor repair industry, mechanics specialise in either one or the other type of repair". In addition to showing this versatility the mechanic A has to take personal responsibility for signing certificates of roadworthiness for vehicles he has inspected or repaired.

216. In putting before the Post Office its claim for an improvement in the rates of pay and a shortening of the scale, the major point which the Union had to establish was that the actual rate paid for motor mechanics of this degree of skill and experience were markedly in excess of the minimum rates agreed for different parts of the motor transport field in outside employment. This was difficult because the substantial excess over minimum rates might take the form of either simple leads, merit pay, "incentive" bonuses or agreed rates covering a selected sphere of employment. The Union's contention was that although in mid-1953 the agreed minimum London rate for the motor repair trade was only 144s. 10d., the actual rate received by a fitter of acceptable skill was between 170s. 0d. to 180s. 0d.

(iii) Nature of the work of mechanics-in-charge

217. The mechanic-in-charge grades are responsible for the day to day control of Post Office garages. They control the staff at these garages and organise the work. They are themselves supervised by a technical assistant Grade II but in fact this supervision is exercised only through infrequent visits at anything from weekly to six weekly intervals. A mechanic-in-charge III may control up to 40 vehicles and six men, a grade II up to 70 vehicles and 13 men and a grade I up to 300 vehicles and 71 men. The mechanic-in-charge II grade is recruited exclusively from the mechanic A grade and mechanics-in-charge II and I are recruited exclusively from the mechanic-in-charge III grade. These recruitments occur by promotion and normally a man will have reached the age of 40 and have had

* There has been a considerable increase in the variety of Post Office vehicles since 1951.

at least 12 years' service with the Post Office before he reaches the mechanic-in-charge III grade. Generally he will be 45 before he becomes a mechanic-in-charge II. Although there are, theoretically, outlets for the motor transport grades into the clerical officer grade, the sales representative grade and the assistant traffic superintendent grade in the Post Office, in practice the only outlets are into the technical assistant II grade which is within the motor transport hierarchy itself and to which the number of outlets is very limited indeed.

218. For such grades as the mechanics-in-charge information about outside comparisons is difficult to marshal, although some was provided to the Arbitration Tribunal on the pay for foremen and managers in outside motor transport establishments. In addition comparisons were made with outside pay for driving instruction—one of the duties of mechanics-in-charge III. Comparisons were also made between driving examiners in the Ministry of Transport and mechanics-in-charge II (who test engineering and postal drivers and render certificates on the basis of which driving licences are issued), and between clerical officers and mechanics-in-charge II. The point was however made to the Tribunal that the claim did virtually no more in the case of the mechanic-in-charge grades than propose the maintenance of existing relativities in the light of the claim for mechanics A.

219. The mechanic-in-charge I grade has extensive responsibility and some of its members have responsibility for upwards of 300 vehicles. The Union has claimed that its value should be recognised by the regrading of the posts and the staff into the technical assistant II grade.

220. The rates of pay which the Union is at present claiming for the supplies, factories and motor transport grades are set out on the two succeeding pages. The figures shown against the motor transport grades are of course those the Union has recently taken to the Arbitration Tribunal.

THE UNION'S CLAIMS FOR THE ALLIED GRADES

(London rates of pay)

1. THE SUPPLIES GRADES

								s.	d.
Watchman	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	140	0
Packer and porter	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	140	0
								145	0
Storeman	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	155	0
								160	0
								165	0
Warehouseman	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	185	0
								190	0
								195	0
Storewoman (incorporating teller)	age 16	...	...	...	...	...	...	75	0
	age 17	...	...	...	...	...	...	90	0
	age 18	...	...	...	...	...	...	120	0
Guard	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	140	0
								147	0
								152	0
Driver—1 ton or less	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	154	0
Over 1 ton to 5 tons	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	157	0
5 tons to 8 tons	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	161	6
8 tons to 12 tons	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	166	0
Over 12 tons	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	170	6
Indivisible load vehicles—									
6 to 10 tons	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	170	6
Over 10 tons	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	178	0

Consequential adjustments for juvenile grades.

2. THE FACTORIES GRADES

	Basic rate	Bonus	Total
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Telephone mechanic	74 4	110 0	184 4
	78 0	110 0	188 0
	81 8	110 0	191 8
	85 4	110 0	195 4
	90 10	110 0	200 10
Assistant telephone mechanic (female) ...	49 2	77 0	126 2
	51 0	77 0	128 0
	52 10	77 0	129 10

3. THE MOTOR TRANSPORT GRADES

	s. d.
Mechanic A	170 0
	173 0
	176 0
Senior mechanic and mechanic-in-charge, grade III ...	190 0
Mechanic-in-charge, grade II	207 0

No rates are quoted for the mechanic-in-charge I grade since the Union is at present negotiating for all mechanics-in-charge I to be regraded technical assistants II; also, rates are not quoted for labourers, garage assistants or mechanics B. This is because consideration of any claim for these grades has to wait upon the Award of the Tribunal at present considering the claim for the other grades.

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* Fourteen other Appendices, mainly statistical, were also submitted by the Union, but, by agreement, they have not been reproduced.

APPENDIX 1

NOTE ON GRADE CHANGES ARISING FROM THE 1946 REORGANISATION OF THE POST OFFICE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

Before the 1946 reorganisation, there were four main adult grades in the Post Office engineering department. These were:

- Skilled workman I.
- Skilled workman II.
- Unestablished skilled workman.
- Labourer.

The 1946 reorganisation abolished the unestablished skilled workman grade, but created a second skilled workman III grade, as well as a new grade of technician. But the names of these grades were changed in 1949, as shown below:

<i>New grade structure and titles, August, 1946</i>	<i>Present titles of grades, since 1949</i>
Technician	Technical officer
Skilled workman I	Technician I
Skilled workman IIA	Technician IIA
Skilled workman IIB	Technician IIB
Labourer	Labourer

For simplicity, the Union refers throughout its submission, to the post-reorganisation grades by their present titles.

At the 1946 reorganisation, the present grades emerged from the old grades in the following way. It must be understood that to the old grade structure was wedded a system of duty allowances, which no longer exists. These allowances could be earned by members of the skilled workman III grade. There were three main allowances—the "B", "C" and "D" allowances. Between 1931 and 1946 these allowances were:

	<i>Up to October, 1938</i>	<i>October, 1938— August, 1946</i>
	s. d.	s. d.
"B" allowance	10 0	12 0
"C" allowance	5 0	6 6
"D" allowance	3 0	4 0

To which duties these allowances referred is not here important. These allowances are referred to here so that the present grades can be traced back, from the point of view of making pay and other comparisons, beyond 1946. Thus, those skilled workmen III holding the "B" allowance became technicians I: those holding the "C" allowance became technical officers: those holding the "D" allowance became technicians IIA: those holding no allowance became technicians IIB. The old skilled workman I grade split, one part of its members going into the technician I grade, the other part going into the technical officer grade. There were exceptions to this general scheme of transfers, but it is a correct representation of what happened to all but a small fraction of the membership of the grades concerned. The 1946 grade changes can, therefore, be represented like this

Skilled workman I	Technical officer
Skilled workman II + "C" all'ce	Technician I
Skilled workman II + "B" all'ce	Technician IIA
Skilled workman II + "D" all'ce	Technician IIB
Unestablished skilled workman	Labourer
Labourer	

However, the major developments over the past twenty three years have not been confined to the telephone service as such and there have been many important changes in what may be regarded as ancillary services to and "offshoots" of the telephone service. As an example can be instanced the coaxial cable which, while developed for long distance telephony, has the added advantage that it can be used for the transmission of television programmes, and indeed it is the only form of cable which is in use in this country for transmitting television signals. It may be said in passing that the design of amplifiers and compensating networks for television links calls for work of the highest precision, as the object to obtain a transmission standard ensuring that the picture suffers no noticeable depreciation in transmission over very long distances.

An important part of the international telephonic network is played by the radio services that have been developed over the past twenty years or so. The job of these services is to provide radio links over continental distances between telephone centres, and they have expanded rapidly in recent years. Because of the limited spectrum available to this country under international agreement, it has been necessary to adopt the most up to date methods in using the permanent channels that are available. Among the more up to date methods that are in use is, for example, the quartz crystal which makes possible the most precise accuracy in the use of radio channels. The British Post Office has been in the forefront in introducing single sideband multi-channel working which in its latest form makes it possible to accommodate four telephony channels on one transmitter. Shift keying and other new developments have increased the speed of sending.

Another method of transmitting international telephone communication is, of course, through underwater cable, and here the improved design of submerged amplifiers, including those specially designed for deep water, as for example is to be found in the Atlantic, has enabled the circuit capacity of both telephone and telegraph submarine cables to be increased remarkably.

Another aspect of the work that has developed over recent years is that of suppressing interference in private radio and television sets. The legal position is that it is an obligation on the Post Office to ensure that as many people as possible receive the programmes of the B.B.C. as well as possible. Consequently complaints of interference to reception of the B.B.C. programmes must be dealt with promptly and efficiently. This work in particular perhaps has developed remarkably quickly over recent years not only because of the growth in the number of sets in use (and of different types of sets), particularly with television, but because of the vast growth in the number of commercial and household appliances and machines which are capable of causing interference.

Associated with telephony, of course, is telegraphy. Here too there have been important technical developments, the general aim being that any centre in the country should be able to transmit telegrams to any other centre without the intervention of intermediate operating staff for either switching or retransmission. To achieve this, automatic switching has been introduced together with automatic call queueing and selection of circuits. A new and more involved type of teleprinter is employed together with V.F. working. This can be regarded as one facet of automatization and partly an endeavour to make the telegraph service pay for itself by reducing operating costs and increasing the rate of transmission.

The sheer expansion in the size of the telephone service, which is referred to in paragraph 104 of the main statement, together with the highly important changes in the quality of the services offered, have naturally had a considerable impact on the work required of the engineering staff. The changeover from manual to automatic working itself has been a revolutionary change because of the fact that automatic telephone equipment works by different principles from manual equipment and is altogether more complex. As has been said also, much of the automatic equipment that has been introduced over the past twenty years has been in part experimental so that many different varieties of equipment, often working on different mechanical and electrical principles, have been introduced at different exchanges up and down the country. This aspect of the changeover to automatic telephony has, of course, directly affected the men working on automatic and trunk equipment, but a parallel advance has been made in the methods of construction and the techniques used by the external section of the engineering department, being as they are, mainly concerned with the connections between the subscriber, the exchange and trunk centres. The vast increase in subscribers and cable plant used has caused a revolutionary change in engineering methods and administration. Indeed, the men on the external side of the engineering department have also been much affected by the developments in long distance transmission that have been mentioned: not only has the number of cables which a jointer plumber for example is expected to be able to deal with increased from three to over twenty between 1931 and 1953 but the introduction of coaxial cable in particular has introduced quite new standards of precision working into the job of installing and repairing cables.

Apart, of course, from the actual impact of new technical developments, the Post Office is constantly striving to cut its costs, so that in the external field for example there has in recent years been introduced a system of cable distribution which depends on what are called street cabinets and pillars. These contain terminal blocks with cross-connecting facilities which are of much easier access than were the old arrangements for carrying out this job, which in any case were located underground. However, while the connections between local cable have been taken above ground from underground the general development in the laying of new wire has been to emphasise the dependence of the telephone service on underground wire so that where the percentage of underground wire was 88 in 1931, in 1953 it was 93. Between 1931 and 1953 no less than 20½ million miles of single strand wire were laid, the great bulk of it underground. With the development and expansion of the service and the laying of so great a mileage of wire in so short a time, the engineering department has had to revise its methods completely by setting up planning groups whose function is to estimate the future demand for telephones in any locality and to plan how the cable should be laid, and will require to be laid over periods of anything up to twenty years.

The rapid increase in the number of subscribers has caused the engineering department to change completely its earlier methods of selling telephones to the public, whereas in the early thirties the engineering part of the installation of telephones was generally done by the local exchange. Today we find a central control where engineering officers are responsible for dealing with public enquiries on the engineering details of telephone installation, the records and plans associated with these telephone networks and the preparation of estimates for these installations.

One effect of regionalisation in the Post Office has been the devolution of area staffs of certain types of work, particularly on cable installation and maintenance.

In general it can be said that these developments have increasingly demanded for their construction, operation and maintenance a type of individual who, in addition to the necessary technical skill, has the ability to understand the fundamental principles involved; and, as is evidenced elsewhere, the provision by the Post Office of an efficient telecommunications system necessitates the employment of an engineering force fully conversant with the specialised equipment upon which the operation of the system depends, and fully capable of performing the manual processes connected with the provision and maintenance of the equipment.

APPENDIX 3

ARBITRATION AWARDS IN COMPARISON WITH POST OFFICE OFFERS ON WAGE CLAIMS SINCE 1950

(i) GENERAL WAGE CLAIMS

	T.O.	T.I.	T.2A	T.2B	LAB.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
1950					
(Existing London maxima)	(160 0)	(135 0)	(125 0)	(119 0)	(103 0)
Post Office offer	5 0	5 0	3 0	3 0	1 0
Arbitration Award	5 0	5 0	3 0	3 0	1 0
Amount by which Award exceeded offer	40 0	30 0	20 0	17 0	7 0
P.O.E.U. claim	35 0	25 0	17 0	14 0	6 0
Amount by which claim exceeded Award					
1951					
(Existing London maxima)	(165 0)	(140 0)	(128 0)	(122 0)	(104 0)
Post Office offer	4 6	6 0	4 6	4 6	4 6
Arbitration Award	13 0	12 6	10 0	12 0	8 0
Amount by which Award exceeded offer	8 6	6 6	5 6	7 6	3 6
P.O.E.U. claim	53 6	30 0	21 0	14 0	16 0
Amount by which claim exceeded Award	40 6	17 6	11 0	2 0	8 0
1953					
(Existing London maxima)	(196 0)	(168 0)	(152 0)	(147 6)	(123 0)
Post Office offer	7 0	7 0	7 0	7 0	7 0
Arbitration Award	8 0	8 0	8 0	8 0	8 0
Amount by which Award exceeded offer	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0
P.O.E.U. claim	19 6	16 6	15 0	15 0	12 6
Amount by which claim exceeded Award	11 6	8 6	7 0	7 0	4 6

(ii) FACTORIES WAGE CLAIM 1951

	T.M.	A.T.M.
	s. d.	s. d.
1951		
(Existing London maxima)	(126 6)	(80 8)
Post Office offer	11 0	5 6
Arbitration Award	19 0	12 8
Amount by which Award exceeded offer	8 0	7 2
P.O.E.U. claim	33 0	23 0
Amount by which claim exceeded Award	14 0	10 4

AWARDS AS A PERCENTAGE OF POST OFFICE OFFERS
GENERAL CLAIM

1950	...	...	No Post Office offers			
1951	...	...	290	208	222	267 178
1953	...	...	114			

FACTORIES CLAIM

1951	...	...	172	230
------	-----	-----	-----	-----

AWARDS AS A PERCENTAGE OF UNION'S CLAIM

GENERAL CLAIM

1950 ...	12.5	17	15	18	14
1951 ...	24	42	48	86	50
1953 ...	41	49	53	53	64

FACORIES CLAIM

1951 ...	...	...	58	55
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APPENDIX 4

SECTION 1

COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
WEEKLY HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE OF TWO FAMILIES EARNING RESPECTIVELY
£8 AND £6 11s. 0d.

Household Income

Each household is assumed to contain two children. The household income will in each case, therefore, be increased by one family allowance.

To facilitate comparison with the retail price index pattern of expenditure, we have first excluded National Insurance contribution and trade union subscription, neither of which is taken into account in the retail price index, and called the result "net household income".

For the two families concerned, net household income is as follows:

										£	s.	d.
(a) Wage										8	-	-
Family allowance, 1 child										8	-	-
										8	8	-
Less National Insurance										5	9	-
Less trade union subscription										9	-	-
										6	6	-
Net household income										£8	1	6
										£	s.	d.
(b) Wage										6	11	-
Family allowance, 1 child										8	-	-
										£6	19	-
										s.	d.	
Less National Insurance										5	9	-
Less trade union subscription										6	-	-
										6	3	-
Net household income										£6	12	9

Weekly Household Expenditure

Two budgets are given; "A" where the net household income (as defined above) is £8 1s. 6d., and "B" where the net household income is £6 12s. 9d. It is assumed that in each case the children are a boy aged 10, and a girl aged 7.

The main sections of expenditure are the same as in the retail price index.

Summary figures are given below, and detailed explanations follow. For comparison, alongside the summary of actual expenditure, we have given what the expenditure in each section would be on the basis of the "weights" in the retail price index. The fact that actual expenditure varies, in some cases widely, from what is suggested by the retail price index, weighting is not necessarily any criticism either of the budgets or

of the retail price index. The retail price index weights are averages, and the actual pattern of expenditure is bound to vary. In this particular case two factors must lead to variations from the average:

- (1) London rents are higher than the national average, and
- (2) the households are among the lower paid and, therefore, necessarily cut expenditure on the less essential items very heavily.

	" A "		" B "	
	Actual	Index	Actual	Index
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Food	3 12 1½	3 4 5½	3 5 1	2 12 11½
Rent and rates	1 5 1½	11 7½	1 5 1½	9 6½
Clothing	15 11	15 10	11 1	13 -
Fuel and light	14 9	10 8½	9 7	8 9
Household durable goods	1 3½	10 -	10½	8 2½
Miscellaneous goods	9 10	7 1½	9 3½	5 10
Services	14 8½	14 8½	11 8½	12 1
Alcoholic drink	-	12 7	-	10 4½
Tobacco	7 8	14 6½	-	11 11½
	£8 1 5	£8 1 6½	£6 12 9½	£6 12 8½

I. Food

Expenditure for the "A" household is given, and then variations for the "B" household. It is assumed that the husband takes sandwiches to work.

	" A "
	£ s. d.
Meat (3 lbs. imported leg lamb @ 2s. 8d. lb. and ½ lb. imported chuck steak @ 2s. 4d. lb.)	9 2
Butter (12 ozs. @ 3s. 4d. lb.)	2 6
Margarine (1½ lbs. @ 1s. 6d. lb.)	1 10½
Cooking fat (8 ozs. @ 1s. 8d. lb.)	10
Cheese (8 ozs. @ 2s. 2d. lb.)	1 1
Bacon (1½ lbs. collar @ 3s. 2d. lb.)	3 11½
Milk (2½ pints a day @ 6½d. pint)	9 5½
Bread (9 large loaves)	5 6½
Biscuits (½ lb.)	10½
Sugar (2½ lbs. @ 7½d. lb.)	1 7
Syrup (½ lb.)	5½
Eggs (12 @ 4d. each and 3 @ 3d. each)	4 9
Jam (1 lb. apricot)	1 8½
Sausages (1 lb.)	2 6
Kippers (4)	2 -
Flour (4 lbs.)	2 3½
Rice (6 ozs. @ 1s. 4d. lb.)	6
Porridge oats (1 lb.)	10
Tea (8 ozs. @ 4s. 8d. lb.)	2 4
Cocoa (½ lb.)	11
Currants (1 lb.)	1 -
Potatoes (14 lbs. @ 2½ lb.)	2 11
Cabbage (4 lbs.)	1 -
Sprouts (2 lbs.)	1 -
Carrots (1 lb.)	4
Cooking apples (3 lbs. @ 3½d. lb.)	10½
Eating apples (2 lbs.)	2 -
Oranges (2)	6
Sweets (½ lb.)	1 2
Salt, sauces, pickles, etc.	9
	3 6 8½
	5 5
School meals	£3 12 1½

School meals: The cost per day for two children is 1s. 5d., or 7s. 1d. per week. Children are at school for about forty weeks, or ten-thirteenths of the year. We have only charged a proportionate amount to the weekly budget but in fact, of course, there is not enough in the shopping basket set out above to provide two further good meals a day during the holiday period.

"B" Budget: For the "B" budget the following savings are made:

	s. d.
Meat—3 lbs. best end instead of leg	6
Milk—2 pints a day instead of 2½	1 10½
Eggs—9 instead of 12 @ 4d.	1 —
Jam—plum instead of apricot	5½
Sausages—beef @ 1s. 10d. instead of pork	8
Tea—4s. 4d. lb. instead of 4s. 8d.	2
Eating apples—1 lb. instead of 2 lbs.	1 —
Sprouts—1 lb. instead of 2 lbs.	6
No biscuits	10½
	7 0½

Total "B" expenditure on food, including school meals, is therefore £3 5s. 1d.

II. Rent and Rates

There has been no recent official survey of rents in London, but according to an enquiry carried out for the Central Office of Information in April, 1947*, among wage and salary earners, the average weekly gross rent in London at that time was 21s. 1d.

Between June, 1947, and January, 1952, the interim index of retail prices showed a rise of 4·2 per cent. But the Cost of Living Advisory Committee, in a Report written in September, 1951†, said that if the Index had taken account of rents of newly erected dwellings:

"We estimate that . . . the index figure for rent and rates would now be some 4 or 5 points higher than the published figure . . ."

We can assume, therefore, that by January, 1952, the index should have been not 104·2 but 108·7. Between January, 1952, and November, 1953, the "rent and rates" section of the index rose a further 9·6 per cent., making a total rise of 19·1 per cent.

The average gross rent today, therefore, may be taken to be 1·19·1 per cent. of 21s. 1d., or 25s. 1½d.

III. Clothing

The following is the annual expenditure on clothing for the two households, and its weekly equivalent.

	"A"		"B"	
	Price per unit	Annual expenditure	Price per unit	Annual expenditure
<i>Boy:</i>	s. d.	£ s. d.	s. d.	£ s. d.
2 pair shorts	13 6	1 7 —	10 6	1 1 —
1 jacket	30 —	1 10 —	24 11*	1 4 11
1/3 raincoat	77 6	1 5 10	69 —	1 3 —
3 shirts	12 3	1 16 9	†	1 — —
2 vests	9 6	19 —	5 6	11 —
2 pair pants	6 6	13 —	4 3	8 6
1 pair pyjamas	15 3	15 3	13 6	13 6
6 pair socks	4 6	1 7 —	4 —	1 4 —
16 ozs. knitting wool	1 6	1 4 —	1 —	16 —
1½ pair shoes	27 6	2 1 3	24 6	1 16 9
1½ pair sandals	22 6	1 13 9	20 6	1 10 9
1 pair plimsolls	5 6	5 6	3 11	3 11
		£14 18 4		£11 13 4

* corduroy lumber jacket.

† 3½ yards of material @ 5s. 11d. per yard.

* "The British Household", by P. G. Gray (Social Survey).

† Cmd. 8481, 1952.

	" A "		" B "	
	Price per unit	Annual expenditure	Price per unit	Annual expenditure
	s. d.	£ s. d.	s. d.	£ s. d.
<i>Girl:</i>				
½ winter coat	70 -	1 15 -	53 -	1 6 6
1 skirt	26 -	1 6 -	17 3	17 3
10 ozs. knitting wool	1 6	15 -	1 -	10 -
3 yards cotton cloth	2 11	8 9	2 -	6 -
vests—1 wool	5 -	5 -	—	—
2 cotton	2 9	5 6	2 9	8 3*
3 pairs knickers	3 6	10 6	3 -	9 -
3 pairs wool socks	2 3	6 9	2 -	6 -
2 pairs cotton socks	2 -	4 -	1 9	3 6
1 pair shoes	24 -	1 4 -	21 -	1 1 -
1½ pair sandals	13 -	19 6	11 -	16 6
1 pair plimsolls	4 6	4 6	3 9	3 9
		£8 4 6		£6 7 9
<i>Man:</i>				
1 shirt	25 -	1 5 -	18 6	18 6
1 vest	9 -	9 -	4 6	4 6
1 pair pants	10 6	10 6	4 6	4 6
1 pair shoes	47 6	2 7 6	35 -	1 15 -
4 pair socks	5 11	1 3 8	4 11	19 8
Part of suit†	—	2 9 6	—	1 11 -
		£8 5 2		£5 13 2
<i>Woman:</i>				
10 ozs. knitting wool	1 6	15 -	—	—
1 blouse	25 -	1 5 -	—	—
2 vests	4 -	8 -	2 9	5 6
2 pair knickers	7 -	14 -	4 -	8 -
1 pair shoes	40 -	2 -	30 -	1 10 -
1/3 winter coat	160 -	2 13 4	95 -	1 15 -
½ skirt	40 -	1 -	—	—
stockings‡	5 11	1 3 8	2 11	1 3 4
		£9 19 -		£5 1 10

* 3 cotton vests.

† For the "A" budget, ½ suit @ 9½ guineas; for the "B" budget ½ suit @ £7 15s. 0d.

‡ For the "A" budget, 4 pairs stockings @ 5/11 per pair; for the "B" budget, 8 pairs stockings @ 2/11 per pair.

Total annual expenditure on clothing is, therefore:—

	" A "	" B "
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
	14 18 4	11 13 4
	8 4 6	6 7 9
	8 5 2	5 13 2
	9 19 -	5 1 10
	£41 7 -	£28 16 1
or per week...	15 11	11 1

IV. Fuel and Light

It is not possible to "construct" a typical household fuel budget because there are too many variables. The most important of these is the proportion of various fuels used. The Ridley Committee found that the weekly running cost of a complete fuel service for a new house of 925 sq. ft. floor area varied from 11s. 0d. to 19s. 0d. a week.*

It is stated that "the figures refer to a complete fuel service and probably indicate a higher average level of expenditure than in fact is normal": on the other hand, as these were new houses they probably had modern fuel-saving fires or stoves (this is borne out by the fact that room heating in five of the nine cases was by coke).

Rowntree and Lavers, in a survey of household expenditure of wage earners earning up to £550 a year in York in October, 1950†, found that among those surveyed the average weekly expenditure on fuel and light was 11s. 8d., and the average of the three with the lowest expenditure was 7s. 7d. The "fuel and light" section of the interim index of retail prices stood at 117·8 in October, 1950, and at 140·1 in January, 1952—a rise of 18·9 per cent. Between January, 1952, and November, 1953, this section rose a further 9·6 per cent., making a total rise of 30·3 per cent. This would bring the average expenditure up to 15s. 2d., and the average of the three lowest to 9s. 10½d. It may be objected that York is colder than London, which would affect the cost of room heating though hardly the other items, and we have, therefore, reduced the "Rowntree" expenditure slightly to 14s. 9d. and 9s. 7d.

V. Household Durables

We have reckoned these on an annual basis, and have assumed that all furniture and appliances have already been bought: there are, therefore, no hire purchase instalments and only the minimum of replacements. For many families, therefore, this will be a gross underestimate.

	"A"		"B"	
	Price per unit	Annual expenditure	Price per unit	Annual expenditure
	s. d.	£ s. d.	s. d.	£ s. d.
½ pair sheets	39 9	19 10½	33 9	16 9
1 bath towel	5 11	5 11	3 3	3 3
3 yards curtain material	5 11	17 9	2 6	7 6
1 kettle	*	—	2 9	2 9
2/3 coal scuttle	8 11	5 11½	8 11	5 11½
4 cups and saucers	1 10	7 4	1 —	4 —
2 tea plates... ..	1 2	2 4	6 —	1 —
1 dinner plate	2 3	2 3	1 —	1 —
2 tumblers	5	10	4½	9
light bulbs†	2 1	4 2	1 1	3 3
		£3 6 5		£2 6 2½
Weekly equivalent		1 3½		10½

* It is assumed that the "A" household got a good kettle in the first place and replacements have been ignored. For those who cannot afford a good one replacements are necessarily frequent.

† "A" household uses up 2 better bulbs; "B" household 3 cheaper ones.

* "Report of the Committee on National Policy for the Use of Fuel and Power Resources" (Cmd. 8647, 1952), Table VI, page 32. The table is based on work done by the Building Research Station and applies to local authority houses at Abbot's Langley, Herts. A family of two adults and two children is assumed in each case.

† "Poverty and the Welfare State", Rowntree and Lavers—Longman's 1951.

VI. Miscellaneous Goods

Expenditure in the main is the minimum, and only minor variations are possible.

	"A"	
	s.	d.
<i>Soap:</i>		
1 tablet toilet soap, bath size	...	10½
1 packet soap powder	...	11
1 packet soapless detergent	...	1 11
<i>Miscellaneous:</i>		
½ tin scourer	...	6
½ tin shoe polish	...	3½
½ tin floor polish	...	3½
2 boxes matches	...	4
<i>Medical and toilet:</i>		
½ tube toothpaste	...	10
2-3 razor blades	...	7
½ shaving soap refill	...	2
1 roll toilet paper	...	1 1
<i>Newspapers, etc.:</i>		
1 daily paper	...	9
2 Sunday papers	...	5
Comics for children	...	7
Radio Times	...	3
Writing paper	...	1
		9 10

For the "B" budget there are two modifications; a cheaper kind of toilet paper is bought for 9d., and only one Sunday paper is taken.

VII. Services

Here again there are few modifications: we, therefore, give the "A" budget.

Travel

In the survey undertaken by London Transport in the spring of 1949* it was found that in those households where at least one member made a regular journey to work by public transport, weekly household expenditure on travel was, on average, 6s. 5d. or, in households where the chief wage earner's income was between £4 and £8, 6s. 2d.

The British Transport Commission's "Transport Statistics" show that between the third and fourth four weekly periods in 1949, and the eighth to tenth periods in 1953, average receipts per journey on London Transport went up by 48.3 per cent. for the railways, 28.7 per cent. for buses and coaches, and 36.5 per cent. for trolleybuses. The weekly expenditure of 6s. 2d. would, therefore, be increased today to 9s. 2d., 7s. 11d. or 8s. 5d., depending on which form of transport was used, if other things were equal. In fact other things are not equal; as the number of passenger journeys has gone down, however, the calculation serves as a guide.

To take a concrete case, supposing a man has a 5-mile journey to work and goes by road, his household expenditure on travel might be something like this:

	s. d.	
Each day: early morning ticket	...	4
return	...	8½
		1 0½
		s. d.
Five days' travel to work	...	5 2½
Wife's shopping, etc.	...	10
Family's travel to entertainment, visits, etc.	...	1 8
		7 8½

Actual expenditures, of course, vary widely. We have assumed that both children can reach their school on foot.

* "London Travel Survey", published by the London Transport Executive, 1950.

Shoe repairs
We assume that the man does repairs to his own and the children's shoes at home, and that the woman's go to the shop. A piece of leather for a man's soles costs about 5s.; for the children's about 3s. 6d. Rubber heels cost about 1s. for a man and 10d. for a child. The man's shoes are repaired three times a year, the woman's once. Each child has one repair to shoes and one-and-a-half to sandals. Total annual expenditure is, therefore:

therefore :										s. d.
Man, 6s. 0d. $\times 3$	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	18 —
Children, 4s. 4d. $\times 5$	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	21 8
Woman 	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9 6
										49 2

								114
or a weekly equivalent of	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	

The whole "services" section is as follows for the "A" household:

	s.	d.
Travel	7	8½
Postage stamps		5
Wireless licence (£1 per annum)		4½
Cinema —2 cheap seats adults	3	—
—2 children Saturday morning	1	—
Haircuts—man, 1 a fortnight @ 1s. 6d.		9
boy, 1 in 3 weeks @ 1s. 6d.		6
Shoe repairs		11½
	14	8½

Expenditure in the "B" household is 3s. 0d. less because the parents do not go to the cinema.

VIII. Tobacco
The man in the "A" household uses 2 ozs. tobacco at 3s. 8d. oz., and 1½ packets cigarette papers. No-one in the "B" household can afford to smoke.

None can be afforded in either household.

APPENDIX 4

NOTES ON THE LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT SPECIMEN BUDGETS

The following notes, which are not exhaustive, deal only with certain detailed points about the allocation of expenditure in the Labour Research Department's specimen budgets, and particularly with the items omitted. The budgets are incidentally drawn up to meet winter needs.

Food

The diet chosen by the Labour Research Department for both of the budgets seems to be reasonably well balanced by modern nutritional standards, although meagre in quantity and mediocre in quality. For the information of the Commission, the diets of the two budgets are compared in the Table below with (1) average weekly domestic consumption of a family of four between July and December, 1951, as calculated in the Annual Report of the National Food Survey Committee (1953) for the 1951 social class C—that is for those households where the income of the head of the household fell, in 1951, between £4 10s. and £8 a week, which, at today's wages, constitutes a range of £4 18s. to £8 15s., and (2) the simplified weekly diet worked out for autumn, 1953, prices in the section "A Human Needs Diet" published by the Oxford Bulletin of Statistics—this particular diet appearing on page 429 of the December, 1953, issue. Both of these diets are for families of four.

Commodity (1)	Ministry of Food social class C (2)	Schulz "Human Needs" diet (3)	Labour Research Dept. A budget (4)	Labour Research Dept. B budget (5)
Milk	20 pints	16½ pints*	17½ pints	14 pints
Cheese	10·4 ozs	6·4 ozs	8 ozs	8 ozs
Eggs	9	4	15	12
	lbs ozs	lbs ozs	lbs ozs	lbs ozs
Meat	7 -	4 10	5 12	5 12
Fish	1 12·8	3 3	1 -†	1 -†
Potatoes	16 9·6	16 13	14 -	14 -
Other veg.	8 4·4	12 13	7 -	6 -
Fruit	6 11·6	2 -	6 8‡	5 8‡
Cereals§	22 3·6	21 12	14 -	13 8
Fats	2 8·8	2 10	2 8	2 8
Sugar and preserves	4 5·2	3 3	4 8	4 8
Other foods ...	2 11·6	Tea and cocoa	Tea, cocoa and salt	Tea, cocoa and salt

* Excludes 5 pints of free school milk.

† Assumes 4 kippers are equal to 1 lb.

‡ Assumes 2 oranges are equal to 8 ozs.

§ Including bread.

Nevertheless it is a possible criticism, especially of the B budget, that the expenditure on food forms a higher proportion than is normal in such conditions and that probably, by cutting down further on food, money would be found for some of the items which at present are left out altogether. It should of course be said that the expenditure on food is not based on a scientific shopping expedition, as is the expenditure allowed for example in the Human Needs Diet calculations; on the other hand, the prices have not been chosen haphazardly but, where they are not controlled, are based on those given in "Shaw's Price List of Groceries", or else on observation—for fruit and vegetable prices, mainly street markets in central London, for other things, such as fish, inner and outer London prices were compared and if there was much difference the lower was taken.

It is assumed that the children only eat two main meals at home a week, i.e., Saturdays and Sundays, and that the parents have one main meal in the evenings during the week. Meat seems to be sufficient for two main meals for four people (two children) and one other main meal for the parents. That leaves four more days to provide for main meals (one a day) for the parents (the children eating their main meals on weekdays at school) and five lunches for the mother. It is assumed, therefore, that bacon is not eaten for breakfast but for the evening meal on one day (leaving enough for lunch for four days for the mother), another day kippers, and two days sausages. It is unlikely that a main meal can be made from 8 ozs. of cheese, because presumably the father has some of this in sandwiches. The A budget caters for 1½ lbs. of bacon which is rather a lot to buy in the circumstances. This could be revised by having ½ lb. cheaper cut, e.g., streaky: this would allow for ½ lb. spam or corned beef per week (2s. 0d. approximately) which would be more useful and go further—e.g., the mother could have ½ lb. of spam for two lunches in the week, and the father could also take ½ lb. in sandwiches for two lunches. But these possible alterations have not been incorporated in the following plan for a week's meals, which is designed to give an approximate idea of how the food could be divided out. In some senses the meals are perhaps artificial—e.g., kippers and cabbage—and opinions will differ on how to combine different items. Nevertheless, the Union believes that the description of meals set out below does achieve its object of showing what the food amounts to over seven days.

MAIN MEALS

(One per day)

SATURDAY	Main course							Nr. to feed
	Leg of lamb	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)	4
	Potatoes	...	...	...	...	...	(3 lbs)	
	Sprouts	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)	
	Sweet	...	...	...	...	...	...	
	Syrup pudding (2 ozs syrup)	...	...	...	...	...	...	

MAIN MEALS—continued.

									No. to feed
SUNDAY	<i>Main course</i>								
	Leg of lamb	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)	}	4
	Potatoes	...	...	...	...	...	(3 lbs)		
	Cabbage	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)		
	<i>Sweet</i>								
	Apples	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)		
MONDAY	<i>Main course</i>								
	Sausages	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb.)	}	2
	Potatoes	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)		
	Cabbage	...	...	...	...	...	(¾ lb)		
	<i>Sweet</i>								
	Rice pudding	...	...	...	...	...	(2 ozs)		
TUESDAY	<i>Main course</i>								
	Sausages	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb)	}	2
	Potatoes	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)		
	Cabbage	...	...	...	...	...	(¾ lb)		
	<i>Sweet</i>								
	Jam tart	...	...	...	...	...	...		
WEDNESDAY	<i>Main course</i>								
	Bacon	...	...	...	...	...	(6 ozs)	}	2
	Potatoes	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)		
	Cabbage	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb)		
	Carrots	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb)		
	<i>Sweet</i>								
	Rice pudding	...	...	...	...	...	(2 ozs)		
THURSDAY	<i>Main course</i>								
	Steak	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb)	}	2
	Potatoes	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)		
	Cabbage	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb)		
	Carrots	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb)		
	<i>Sweet</i>								
	Bread and butter pudding	...	...	...	...	...	...		
FRIDAY	<i>Main course</i>								
	Kippers	...	...	...	...	...	(4)	}	2
	Potatoes	...	...	...	...	...	(1½ lbs)		
	Sprouts	...	...	...	...	...	(½ lb)		
	<i>Sweet</i>								
	Rice pudding	...	...	...	...	...	(2 ozs)		
	<i>Sandwiches for father</i>								
	Bacon	...	...	...	...	...	(5 ozs)		2 days
	Cheese	...	...	...	...	...	(6 ozs)		2 days
	Egg	...	...	...	...	...	(1)		1 day
	<i>Lunches for mother</i>								
	Bacon	...	...	...	...	...	(9 ozs)		4 days
	Cheese	...	...	...	...	...	(2 ozs)		1 day

This leaves 6-9 eggs (according to income group) for children's teas, after allowing 3 eggs for cooking and 2 for the parents. All other teas would consist of bread and butter with jam or syrup, or else biscuits and cakes. Breakfast would be porridge and bread and butter.

The other items seem to be reasonable amounts for a low standard of eating—low standard not mainly because of the amounts but because the diet of this family would be monotonous.

School meals

Particular attention should be paid to the Labour Research paragraph on school meals where it is pointed out that 5s. 5d. is an average charge over the whole year and there is not sufficient "in the shopping basket" to cover two further main meals a day during the holidays. However, in practice, 7s. 1d. a week is spent on school meals while the children are at school and there is, therefore, 7s. 1d. to spend on ten additional main meals when the children are not at school. Therefore, while the children are at school,

there will be 1s. 8d. less to spend on food (other than for school meals) than is allowed for in either of the Labour Research Department's budgets. This amount has not, however, been deducted in working out the daily meals above. On the other hand, there will be 1s. 8d. more to spend on food when the children are away from school. However, school meals are subsidised, and it is difficult to see that 7s. 1d. makes much more of a contribution to adequately providing ten main meals a week for two growing children than does 5s. 5d.

Rents and rates

These can of course, vary widely, from 7s. 0d. to 8s. 0d. a week up to 35s. 0d. or even 40s. 0d., and an average figure does not always have much meaning, even though it is necessary to construct one in making up a budget. It will be noted that the average rent estimated by the Labour Research Department is based on a survey which also included salary earners, but they made up in all only 8 per cent. of the sample, two thirds of whom were owner occupiers whose notional rents did not enter into the results, so that their influence in the final figure can only have been very small. For this reason, and for others, the Union feels that the Labour Research Department's figure is about right, and would make only the further observation that the rents of nearly all the new Council houses are above this figure.

Clothing

Boy: While $1\frac{1}{2}$ pairs of sandals may be an overestimate of annual requirements, this cannot be said of the $1\frac{1}{2}$ pairs of shoes listed which, considering the wear shoes get, and allowing for growth, is most definitely an underestimation. It is debatable whether a raincoat for a growing boy is not required every two, instead of every three, years. It is notable, however, that the budget makes no provision for a winter coat nor for any waterproof footwear: nor sports clothes that may be required for games at school—cricket and football boots, shirts and trousers and pants. The quantities budgeted for the "A" and "B" budgets are the same, but the quality of the "B" budget goods is worse.

Girl: This budget allows for a winter coat every two years, but no raincoat. It allows for one skirt a year and no blouses, though probably one and a half dresses could be made from the three yards of cotton cloth. The two cotton vests are useless for the winter, and the one woollen vest insufficient. The two pairs of cotton socks would not last a summer and in general the wear and tear on such a limited wardrobe would be very heavy. There are no waterproof shoes. Again, the quantities bought in the "A" and "B" budgets are the same, with lower quality in the "B" budget than the "A", except that there is no woollen vest in the "B" budget.

Man: Neither a raincoat nor an overcoat is budgeted for, and a suit every four years is insufficient unless there is another suit, or sports jacket and trousers, to go with it. These, however, also do not appear in the budget. Also excluded are a hat, gloves, handkerchiefs, ties, braces (or a belt), a scarf, pullover or cardigan, or pyjamas. Generally there seems little scope for the selection of clothes primarily either for summer or winter wear. The quality of the goods bought in the "B" budget is lower than for the "A" budget. Also the "B" budget suit has to last over five years.

Woman: In the woman's budget, there is no provision for a raincoat, neither for a winter or summer dress, nor for a suit, to mention major items. Neither is provision made for a hat, a scarf, foundation garments, jacket or pyjamas, a slip or gloves. In the "B" budget, no knitting wool is bought, nor a blouse, nor is any money put aside for buying a skirt.

Household durables

The assumption that all furniture and appliances have been bought is an extraordinarily large one to make, even allowing for help at the time of the marriage, and for the marriage remaining childless for a number of years. In neither the "A" nor the "B" budget is any allowance made towards a replacement fund for these items. Looking at the budget as it stands, it is doubtful if the allowance for two thirds of a coal scuttle a year is necessary, while on the other hand there is no allowance for such items as hand towels, pillow cases, tea-cloths, table-cloths, or, possibly, blankets. Two bulbs a year would seem to be an underestimate of the normal requirements. The only difference between the "A" and "B" budgets is the price of the replacements bought.

Miscellaneous goods

The budget for the items under this heading covers bare necessities, but makes no allowances for library subscriptions, let alone books, nor for presents or toys for the children. Nothing is allowed for the repair of any clocks, or of the iron, or radio

or other household items such as, for example, a sewing machine. All these things would presumably have to be done by the members of the household, as would any plumbing necessary, and interior decorating.

Services

The amount spent on travel to and from work is, of course, an average figure and can vary widely in practice. The amount allowed for the family's travels for entertainment would not allow any of the members of the family to go very far from their immediate neighbourhood if they all went to the cinema every week. If the family did go further afield for entertainment, they would have to go less frequently or some of the members of the family not at all.

The assumption that both children can reach school on foot is a reasonable one to make for London children.

About the other items under the heading of "Services" it is, of course, cheaper to repair one's own shoes if the necessary equipment has already been bought, and if a certain amount of skill has been acquired in doing the job, so that the home repairs last as long as shop repairs do. However, it would seem that the assumption that the man's shoes are only repaired three times a year is a large one. Certainly, an average, not to say cheap, pair of shoes, constantly worn, would need repairing not less than twice as often. Enough money is allowed for the wife's shoes to be repaired only once a year.

It will be noted that no provision is made for a haircut for the wife.

The provision for entertainment, if it is in fact taken weekly, only allows a visit to a local cinema, theatre or concert; alternatively, it would be possible to go further afield for entertainment less frequently. In the "B" household, entertainment is not financially possible without saving on some other item of expenditure.

There is no saving for annual holidays.

As to the items drink and tobacco, the Union would only observe that it is likely that more would be spent on them in the average family than is allowed for by the Labour Research Department, and it is likely therefore that some of the other items which have been budgeted for would, on this count, be reduced in number or quality or be omitted altogether.

APPENDIX 4

SECTION 3

NOTES ON THE CALCULATIONS RELATING TO THE ROWNTREE AND LAVERS 1950 POVERTY LINE BUDGET

In 1950, from their survey of poverty in York, Rowntree and Lavers determined the poverty line as being at £4 6s. 4d. for an employed man with a wife and two children. These calculations were based on October, 1950, prices, and were exclusive of rent and National Insurance contributions that would have to be paid. If this minimum 1950 expenditure is revised in the light of the price level of January 1954, as measured by the Ministry of Labour's interim index of retail prices, then it has to be increased by 21.7 per cent., which brings it to £5 5s. 0d.

An alternative method of measuring the change in the cost of the budget is to use the London and Cambridge Economic Service index of retail prices, which conveniently distinguishes changes in the prices of three groups of items since before January, 1952 (which is the date that the Ministry of Labour starts to do this with its index). The three groups of items are

1. Food.
2. Drink and tobacco.
3. Clothing, household durables and miscellaneous goods.

The advantage of using the L.C.E.S. index is that the changes in price indicated for the three groups of commodities can be applied to the appropriate portions of the Rowntree and Lavers budget, and thus a more realistic appreciation gained of how the cost of the budget has increased. It is important to do this, because the cost of food takes up a much higher proportion of expenditure in the Rowntree and Lavers budget than is allowed for in the weighting of the Ministry of Labour's index—45.5 per cent. for a "Rowntree family" of four (and 47.3 per cent. for a family of five) as against 39.9 per cent. in the official index. It can then either be assumed that the remainder of the budget goes under the heading "clothing, etc." and that nothing is spent on drink or tobacco, or else it can be assumed that the 7.8 per cent. of the

budget that Rowntree and Lavers allowed for expenditure on "beer, tobacco, presents, holidays, books, travelling, etc." is all spent on beer and tobacco. The Union has made both assumptions, and has applied the following increases shown in the L.C.E.S. index for its different sections to their respective parts of the Rowntree budget:

Food	October 1950—December 1953: Increase 31.4 per cent.
Drink and tobacco ...	October 1950—December 1953: Increase 17.5 per cent.
Clothing, household durables and miscellaneous goods	October 1950—December 1953: Increase 5.1 per cent.

Unfortunately, the L.C.E.S. indices for the separate groups have not, at the time this is written, been published for January, 1954, and so the latest figures—for December, 1953—have been taken. The use of the L.C.E.S. indices in this way produces a figure for the December, 1953, cost of the Rowntree budget, for a family of four, of £5 7s. 0d. assuming that no drink or tobacco is bought, and of £5 6s. 3d., assuming that the full 7.8 per cent. of the budget is spent on these two items.

By means of similar calculations, the cost of a Rowntree budget for a family of five would have been, on the first assumption £6 4s. 4d., and on the second £6 3s. 5d., in December, 1953. (Using the Ministry of Labour's index of retail prices, the cost comes out at £6 1s. 11d.).

It is interesting that an independent survey was made in Durham of the March, 1953, cost of the Rowntree minimum budget. This was done by Mr. Kaim-Caudle, staff tutor in economics at Durham University. Because there was very little change in the level of retail prices, as shown by the Ministry of Labour's index, between March, 1953, and January, 1954, Mr. Kaim-Caudle's conclusions can be broadly compared with our own. These conclusions are contained in an unpublished document from which Mr. Kaim-Caudle has generously allowed us to quote:

"An attempt has been made to ascertain 'the sums necessary to provide the necessities for healthy living' in March, 1953, to correspond to the figures Rowntree calculated for October, 1950. Between the two dates the Ministry of Labour's Retail Price Index increased by 22 per cent. On this basis, Rowntree's minimum of £4 19s. 2d. for a family having three children must be increased to about £6 1s. 0d. If the five main components of Rowntree's minimum budget are adjusted by the respective changes in the individual group indexes of the Retail Price Index, the 'necessities for healthy living' have increased by about 24 per cent. Finally, the detailed dietary given by Rowntree has been recalculated at prices obtained from shops in Durham City. This showed an increase in the cost of buying the dietary of about 30 per cent. which is not significantly different from the 32 per cent. increase in the food group index of the Retail Price Index. While all these percentages must be used with a certain amount of reserve it is reasonable to assume that a standard of living which required the expenditure of £4 19s. 2d. in October, 1950, required an expenditure of between £6 and £6 2s. 6d. in March, 1953. This figure is comparable to the National Assistance scale for a similar family of £4 19s. 6d. It can be calculated* that a worker with a family of three, earning less than £6 13s. 6d. a week gross at the present time is living below the minimum of Rowntree's standard. For each additional child he requires a further 9s. 0d. a week to keep him out of poverty, for example, a man with seven children requires earnings of at least £7 11s. 6d."

APPENDIX 5

THE RELATIONSHIP OF PAY AND PRODUCTIVITY

REPRODUCTION OF A MEMORANDUM SENT TO THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE POST OFFICE ON 26TH APRIL, 1954

1. In the memorandum which the Union has submitted in support of its pay claim, and in the covering letter sent to the director general, the Union has raised two separate aspects of the relationship between productivity and pay in the Post Office engineering department. The first aspect which is raised in the memorandum itself is the use, to support a claim for improved wages, of arguments about increased output per head which has already been achieved. The second aspect is that dealt with in the covering letter to the director general in the following terms:

"We should be prepared, as part of the settlement of the claim, to get down immediately with the Department to discussions about improvements in productivity,

* "To £6 2s. 6d. is added a rent of 16s. 0d. (the Upper Quartile of families with children in receipt of National Assistance) the National Insurance contribution of 5s. 9d., a trade Union subscription of 9d., travelling and incidental expenses of 4s. 0d. From this total the Family Allowance of 16s. 0d. is deducted." (This footnote is taken from Mr. Kaim-Caudle's document.)

so that the Department might be assisted in meeting the claim. It is perhaps appropriate to recall that in 1947 the Union and the Department concluded an agreement on a shorter working week of which one clause was to the effect that the Union, through joint production machinery, would endeavour to ensure that output was maintained despite the reduction in hours. A joint review begun in 1949 showed that in fact output had been maintained despite the reduction in hours. While, of course, a claim for increased pay is not quite comparable with a claim for reduced hours, we would earnestly hope that the Union's present claim might be approached in a similar spirit of co-operation between the two sides."

2. There is no need to recall the universal emphasis which is put upon the relationship between productivity and higher living standards: the main political parties, employers' organisations, the Trades Union Congress and such special bodies as the British Productivity Council, all emphasise the extent to which higher living standards depend on higher productivity from British industry—to which all sections must make their contribution.

3. The Union is content to follow the guidance of the Trades Union Congress in this matter, but it wishes to emphasise how important it is, if there is to be a really widespread and keen interest in productivity, for workers to receive a share of the increased productivity to which they contribute. Such a practical demonstration will do more to stimulate further increases in productivity than any amount of explanation of the economic situation.

4. In this memorandum the Union is not concerned with elaborating the first aspect of the relationship between pay and productivity which it has raised; the passages on this subject in the Union's memorandum are already sufficient, and at the meeting on 5th March it was the view of the Post Office that past productivity could be considered and discussed "in the ordinary way" in wage talks. Here the Union is concerned with elaborating, as far as it can, the second aspect of this relationship.

5. It must be made clear that we are not thinking in terms of some elaborate piecework system or of any attempt to relate individual earnings to individual output. The Union has in mind the maintenance of the present grading structure in the Post Office engineering department (subject, of course, to the modifications which the Union has proposed in its policy document): nor, in speaking of the possibility of joint discussion on future productivity as a part of the wage settlement, is the Union thinking in terms of exhortation or of general undertakings. At the meeting on the 5th March the Union emphasised that it was not asking the Post Office to accept a "promissory note"; by that it meant it would be prepared, as part of the wage settlement, to get down to specific agreement on changes which would, in the Post Office and Union's view, increase output per head as they came into operation. The Union has, therefore, not in mind on the one hand a mere general statement that it would in broad terms co-operate in increasing productivity, nor on the other hand acceptance of the principle that pay increases shall take place only following the actual demonstration of achieved increase in productivity.

6. We wish, however, to emphasise that we regard this subject as essentially a case for joint approach. The Union has declared its willingness to get down to such discussions as part of a satisfactory wage settlement; it now feels that it is incumbent on the Post Office, if it accepts this approach, to say so, and to indicate the fields which are likely to be fruitful and in which savings in manpower can be effected.

7. The Union, together with other associations on the engineering side of the Post Office, is on the point of setting up with the Department a national engineering joint production council: the work which that council is to do will proceed from, and will in its turn also stimulate, the work of the local joint production committees throughout the country. So far as the items which the Department may think worth consideration in the present connection are concerned, however, the Union feels that initially at any rate direct discussions between the Union and the Department would be more satisfactory than proceeding through the engineering joint production council.

8. If, indeed, there is to be any progress along this line, the Union does not consider that any insuperable obstacles are created by the nature of the function which the engineering department performs. It has been argued that it is much easier to measure productivity per head, and the changes which it undergoes, in the case of a factory with some material product. This argument ignores the fact that a factory is producing a constantly changing range of diverse products, and has to take account of quality as well as quantity produced. In the Union's view there is no greater difficulty in finding some reasonably satisfactory yardstick for measuring productivity in the telephone service than in the case of the average factory; and would propose that the number of telephone stations per head of the engineering staff might be considered as an index of productivity sufficiently satisfactory for normal purposes.

9. In any case, the Union feels that it is unwise to make too much of the difficulties of precise statistical calculations. If there are measures which the Post Office believes can be shown will increase output per head, there is no reason why they should not be discussed—and, if agreed, put into operation—even though it may not be possible to calculate in advance by what precise degree they would increase output.

10. There can be no doubt that it would be far easier to see our way along this road if we had the assurance that, as far as could reasonably be foreseen, the telephone service would be rapidly expanding, or if the financial control exercised over the Post Office permitted the announcement of a reasonably firm plan covering say, the next five years.

11. In all this we trust that the Post Office will not underestimate the effect on morale of any agreement which can be made which covers both output and wages. For several years now the members of the Union, along with the members of other Unions, have been repeatedly told of the relationship of productivity to higher living standards. The facts and figures show that both the Union and its members have played their part, as is shown by the activities of the joint production committees and by the evidence which official statistics offer to the increase in output per head already achieved. The Union has now frankly posed to the Department claims which make reference to the two major aspects of increased productivity, i.e., productivity increases already secured, and productivity increases which may be secured in the future.

12. In conclusion, we venture to draw attention to the fact that there is no monopoly of public spirit and no monopoly of concern for the national economic situation possessed by either sides in these discussions. We emphasise the fact that we consider that there is a real need for a joint approach on the issues which the Union has posed, and we believe that this approach can result in both increased efficiency for the Department (with the consequential fall in the real cost of the services which it renders to the public) and higher real wages for the staff concerned. Having posed these issues in this way, the Union hopes that the Department will respond in a similar spirit and will further its views to the Union on this important problem.

* * *

FIG.1
WAGE MOVEMENTS
COMPARISON OF THE MOVEMENTS IN THE LONDON MAXIMA OF TECHNICAL OFFICERS
WITH THE GENERAL MOVEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL WAGE RATES
(1931=100)




FIG. 2

WAGE MOVEMENTS

COMPARISON OF THE MOVEMENTS IN THE LONDON MAXIMA OF TECHNICIANS I
WITH THE GENERAL MOVEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL WAGE RATES

(1931=100)




FIG. 3
WAGE MOVEMENTS
COMPARISON OF THE MOVEMENTS IN THE LONDON MAXIMA OF TECHNICIANS IIA, IIB AND LABOURERS
WITH THE GENERAL MOVEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL WAGE RATES
(1931 = 100)




FIG. 4

REAL WAGES OF POST OFFICE TECHNICAL OFFICERS, 1931-1953

(EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF AVERAGE 1931 PRICES)




FIG. 5
REAL WAGES OF POST OFFICE TECHNICIANS I, 1931-1953
(EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF AVERAGE 1931 PRICES)




FIG. 6
 REAL WAGES OF POST OFFICE TECHNICIANS IIA, 1931-1953
 (EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF AVERAGE 1931 PRICES)




FIG. 7
 REAL WAGES OF POST OFFICE TECHNICIANS IIB, 1931-1953
 (EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF AVERAGE 1931 PRICES)




FIG. 8
REAL WAGES OF POST OFFICE LABOURERS, 1931-1953
(EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF AVERAGE 1931 PRICES)




FIG. 9

PAY DIFFERENTIALS SINCE 1931

WAGES OF TECHNICAL OFFICERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGES OF LABOURERS
(MAXIMA OF LONDON SCALES)




FIG.10

PAY DIFFERENTIALS SINCE 1931
WAGES OF TECHNICIANS I AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGES OF TECHNICIANS IIA
(MAXIMA OF LONDON SCALES)




FIG. II
PAY DIFFERENTIALS SINCE 1931
WAGES OF WAREHOUSEMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGES OF PACKERS AND PORTERS
(MAXIMA OF LONDON SCALES)




FIG.12
 PAY DIFFERENTIALS SINCE 1932
 WAGES OF MECHANICS -IN-CHARGE I, II AND III AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGES OF MECHANICS A
 (MAXIMA OF LONDON SCALES)





FIG. 13
 PAY DIFFERENTIALS SINCE 1932
 WAGES OF MECHANICS A AS A PERCENTAGE OF WAGES OF M.T. CLEANERS / LABOURERS
 (MAXIMA OF LONDON SCALES)



Memorandum on hours and leave submitted by The Post Office Engineering Union

1. There has been a long term trend in British industrial and commercial life towards shorter conditioned hours and longer periods of paid leave. During the period 1920-1939 the hours per week of the majority of workers ranged between 44 and 50, the average being 47·5. During the period 1946-1953 the range was between 40 and 46 per week, with an average of 44·5. In 1920 the hours of work of the grades represented by the Union were 48, and remained at this figure until 1947, when they were reduced to 44. This reduction was subject to an undertaking that the general output of the grades would be maintained, and this has been achieved—a fact which has been recognised by the Post Office administration.

2. From 1914 and up to 1925 there was a rapid increase in the number of agreements which provided for paid holidays, and the Ministry of Labour estimated that approximately 1½ million wage earners were covered by collective agreements providing paid holidays. There was little further change in this direction between 1925 and 1937, but in that year, if all workers are included, then it has been estimated that of the 18½ million earning £250 per annum or less, 7¼ million enjoyed paid annual holidays. By 1952, however, the Ministry of Labour has estimated that about 14 million wage earners received paid holidays, and most of these received two weeks' paid holiday or more. In addition almost all received six days' public holidays.

3. There is no doubt that this tendency towards increased paid annual leave has contributed largely to the improvement in the health of the working population, which in turn has resulted in greater efficiency and increased production.

4. In 1920 the paid holiday entitlement of grades represented by the Union ranged between 12 and 14 days. Of a total staff complement of 20,695, the majority (13,235) received the lower figure; the average weighted leave was 12·7 days per year. In 1953, paid holidays ranged between 13 and 18 days, but only a minority received the higher entitlement, and the average weighted leave was only 14·5 days per year. (The actual leave entitlements of the Union's grades are set out in the Appendix.) It will be seen, therefore, that the Union's grades have to some extent participated in the general tendency towards improvements in leave and hours.

5. The Union stresses that the Civil Service should continue to participate in any general trend towards more favourable conditions of hours and leave, and feels that the first steps ought to be in the direction of improving the conditions of those sections of the Civil Service staff who are unfavourably placed in this respect.

6. Hours and leave for different sections of the Civil Service are not uniform. For example, the hours for what are known as the office grades are more favourable than those of the Union's grades at comparable pay levels. Apart from the office grades, there are certain departmental and technical grades on broadly similar pay levels to some of our grades which also have more favourable leave allowances. If the net working hours of the executive officer, clerical officer and clerical assistant are 40 per week*, it will be seen that the gross annual hours† of the grades represented by the Union are 208 greater than those of the executive officer, clerical officer and clerical assistant. (See Figures 1 to 4.)

7. In the following paragraphs the Union expresses in percentage form some of the relativities existing between the annual leave entitlements of its own grades and some of the office grades in the Civil Service. These have been calculated after abating the leave of the office grades concerned to what they would be entitled to if they worked a five day week.

* Treasury Introductory Factual Memorandum, paragraph 58.

† Gross annual hours means total annual working hours excluding any allowances for meal reliefs, annual leave or public holidays.

8. Assuming that the annual leave entitlements shown are taken in one continuous period, or in full weekly periods, technical officers with a leave entitlement of 16 and 18 days receive 20 per cent. and 10 per cent. less leave respectively, than the clerical officer. The remainder of the grades represented by the Union, with the exception of the technician I, receive 35 per cent. less than the clerical officer, and 28 per cent. less leave than the clerical assistant with an entitlement of 18 days on a five day week basis. The net annual hours worked by the technical officer receiving his maximum leave are 17 per cent., 12 per cent. and 11 per cent. more than those worked by the executive officer, clerical officer and clerical assistant respectively, who are similarly receiving their maximum leave; the hours worked by the other grades represented by the Union are 19.5 per cent., 14 per cent. and 13 per cent. more.

9. If the office grades take part of their leave in odd periods (excluding Saturdays), thereby increasing the number of full leave days taken, and reducing the number of Saturday leave days, the disparity becomes even greater. The Union would point out to the Commission that masked in these comparisons of net hours is the fact that the grades we represent enjoy 7 public holidays per year against the 9 public holidays enjoyed by the office grades, and we contend that there is no basis, in principle or on merit, for the differentiation in hours and leave between the Union's grades and the office grades, which in any case is mainly traditional.

10. The Union claims consequently that the net hours of duty of the grades represented by the Union should not exceed the net hours of office grades. In inviting the Commission to subscribe to this principle, we recognise that it may be necessary to reduce in stages the hours of the grades represented by the Union, as a result of which parity would be reached after a period of time. (It should be pointed out here that the hours of our members are calculated on a basis different from that which is normally used in the Civil Service. No allowance is made for meal times, and the hours of the Union's grades are therefore net as opposed to the gross hours by which civil service attendances are normally reckoned. The Union is not at the moment disposed to press for a change in this basis of calculation, although it reserves the right to review the matter.) In addition we claim that the leave allowances of the grades which we represent should be increased to those of office grades with comparable pay scales. A claim to this effect has already been submitted to the Post Office, but the Commission is invited to determine the future annual leave entitlements of the grades represented by the Union by declaring that the wage bands of the office grades with their existing annual leave entitlements should be regarded as the basis for fixing annual leave entitlements within our field.

11. The Union contends that the range of pay should be the sole criterion for determining annual leave, although it recognises that in the past some attention has been paid to the degree of responsibility of grades in determining their leave. Should the Commission still consider this to be an important factor the Union would like to conclude this submission on hours and leave by drawing the attention of the Commission to the responsibilities covered by many of the grades we represent—responsibilities, that is, in terms of the supervision of the work of other staff, which are no less onerous than those borne by many of the office grades, quite apart from the more general responsibilities attached to the use of specialised knowledge in the public service. For the information of the Commission, therefore, the Union gives below some examples of the grades it represents with supervising responsibilities:—

- (a) Mechanics-in-charge grades I, II and III are responsible for the direction of staff allocated to their workshop. The average number of staff for whom they have a responsibility is 19, 5 and 3 respectively.
- (b) A senior mechanic is a leading workman of a group of four or more other motor transport staff.
- (c) Mechanics A can be employed upon the examination and control of the work of mechanics B, garage assistants and motor transport labourers.

- (d) Technical officers can be employed on the control of other officers, and should the responsibility be for a group of four or more, an allowance is paid. There is no entitlement to the allowance when the number controlled is less than four.
- (e) Technician I is a grading given when a group of three or more other staff (without any upper limit) are controlled. In exceptional cases, such as chargeship of a permanent works order stores, the grading is given where two or more assistants are employed and, of course, controlled.
- (f) A technician IIA can be a leading hand of a group of two technicians employed on advice note work, or in a gang of at least six other officers.
- (g) Warehousemen are responsible for the direction of a stores section, comprising storemen, packers and porters, and storeboys, who are under their control.

The general question of responsibility for staff—for supervision and control of their work—is dealt with more fully in the Union's main submission on pay.

APPENDIX

UNION'S GRADES: PAY AND LEAVE

ENGINEERING:				s. d.		
Youth-in-training	...	...	Age 16 years and below	...	59	12 days
			Age 17 years and below	...	70	
			Age 18 years and below	...	81	
			Age 19 years and below	...	92	
			Age 20 years and below	...	105	
Labourer	...	...	On entry	...	129	13 days
			After one year	...	131	
Technician IIB	...	...	Age 21 years	...	132	13 days
			Age 22 years	...	135	
			Age 23 years	...	139	
			Age 24 years	...	142	
			Age 25 years or over	...	146	
			Then by annual increments	...	151	
					155	
Technician IIA	...	...	Age 21 years	...	140	13 days
			Age 22 years	...	143	
			Age 23 years	...	146	
			Age 24 years	...	150	
			Age 25 years or over	...	153	
			Then by annual increments	...	156	
					160	
Technician I	...	...	On entry	...	169	16 days
			After one year	...	176	
Technical officer	...	...	Age 21 years	...	143	From T. II:
			Age 22 years	...	146	13; 16 after 5 yrs.
			Age 23 years	...	150	est. service, 18
			Age 24 years	...	154	after 5 yrs. as T.O.
			Age 25 years or over	...	157	
			Then by annual increments	...	162	From T. I:
					168	16; 18 after 5 yrs.
					174	as T.O.
					180	
					186	
					191	
					198	
					204	
MOTOR TRANSPORT:						
Labourer (M.T.)	...	...	On entry	...	129	13 days
			After one year	...	131	
Garage assistant	...	...	On entry	...	132	13 days
			After one year	...	137	
Mechanic B	...	...	Age 21 years	...	131	13 days
			Age 22 years	...	133	
			Age 23 years	...	135	
			Age 24 years	...	138	
			Age 25 years or over	...	140	
			Then by annual increments	...	142	
					145	
					149	
					152	

					s.	d.	
Mechanic A	...	...	...	Age 21 years	138	-	13 days
				Age 22 years	140	-	
				Age 23 years	142	-	
				Age 24 years	144	6	
				Age 25 years or over	146	6	
				Then by annual increments	149	-	
					152	-	
					155	6	
					158	6	
Senior Mechanic, mechanic-in-charge, grade III	...	...	...		162	-	18 days
					166	-	
					169	-	
					173	-	
Mechanic-in-charge, grade II	...	...	...		185	-	
Mechanic-in-charge, grade I	...	...	...		197	-	
SUPPLIES:							
Storeboy	...	...	...	Age 16 years and below	59	-	12 days
				Age 17 years	70	-	
				Age 18 years	81	-	
				Age 19 years	92	-	
				Age 20 years	105	-	
Storeboy (F)	...	...	...	Age 15 years	53	6	12 days
				Age 16 years	59	-	
				Age 17 years	70	-	
				Age 18 years	81	-	
				Age 19 years	87	6	
				Age 20 years	96	6	
Driver	...	...	...	1 ton or less	138	-	13 days
				Over 1 ton to 5 tons (and passenger cars)	141	-	
				Over 5 tons to 8 tons	145	6	
				Over 8 tons to 12 tons	150	-	
				Over 12 tons	154	6	
				Indivisible load vehicles:			
				Over 6 tons to 10 tons	154	6	
				Over 10 tons	162	-	
Guard	...	...	...	On entry	131	-	13 days
				After one year	136	-	
Watchman	...	...	...	On entry	129	-	13 days
				After one year	131	-	
Packer and porter	...	...	...	On entry	131	-	13 days
				After one year	136	-	
Storeman	...	...	...	On entry	136	6	13 days
				Then by annual increments	140	-	
					143	6	
					147	-	
Warehouseman	...	...	...	On entry	148	6	16 days
				Then by annual increments	151	6	
					155	6	
					158	6	
					161	6	
					165	-	

Storewoman	...	...	...	Age 16 years	...	...	61	—	13 days
				Age 17 years	...	...	68	6	
				Age 18 years	...	...	75	6	
				Age 19 years	...	...	84	—	
				Age 20 years	...	...	93	—	
				Age 21 years or over	...	...	104	—	
				Then by annual increments	...	...	107	6	
							111	—	
							115	—	
							118	—	
						122	—		
Teller (F)	...	...	...	Age 15 years	...	...	52	6	(provinces) 13 days
				Age 16 years	...	...	57	—	
				Age 17 years	...	...	63	6	
				Age 18 years	...	...	70	—	
				Age 19 years	...	...	77	6	
				Age 20 years	...	...	84	6	
				Age 21 years or over	...	...	96	6	
				Then by annual increments	...	...	100	—	
							103	6	
							106	6	
						110	—		
Packer and porter (F)	...	...	...	On entry	...	...	105	6	12 days
				After one year	...	...	109	—	
Factories									
Telephone mechanic	...	...	...	...	...	...	141	8	13 days
							145	10	
							150	—	
							154	2	
							157	10	
							162	—	
							168	—	
Assistant telephone mechanic (F)	...	...	...	...	...	...	105	2	13 days
							107	—	
							109	4	
Youth-in-training (Factories)	...	...	...	Age 15 years	...	...	59	—	12 days
				Age 16 years	...	...	59	—	
				Age 17 years	...	...	70	—	
				Age 18 years	...	...	81	—	
				Age 19 years	...	...	92	—	
				Age 20 years	...	...	105	—	
Junior mechanic (F)	...	...	...	Age 15 years	...	...	49	10	12 days
				Age 16 years	...	...	55	3	
				Age 17 years	...	...	63	—	
				Age 18 years	...	...	74	5	
				Age 19 years	...	...	85	10	
				Age 20 years	...	...	95	5	

NOTES: The rates quoted are for London; .

The leave quoted is appropriate to established officers, with the exception of:—

Youth-in-training
 Youth-in-training (factories)
 Storeboy
 Junior mechanic (F)
 Packer and porter (F)

Fig. 1

COMPARATIVE ANNUAL LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS OF POST OFFICE ENGINEERING AND ALLIED GRADES AND OTHER ESTABLISHED POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE GRADES BETWEEN THE MAXIMUM PAY LEVELS OF 176/- AND 262/-
(ALL LEAVE SHOWN AS IF FOR A 5 DAY WEEK; MALE, ADULT GRADES THROUGHOUT)




FIG. 2

COMPARATIVE ANNUAL LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS OF POST OFFICE ENGINEERING AND ALLIED GRADES AND OTHER ESTABLISHED POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE GRADES BETWEEN THE MAXIMUM PAY LEVELS OF 155/6 AND 174/-
(ALL LEAVE SHOWN AS IF FOR A 5-DAY WEEK; MALE, ADULT GRADES THROUGHOUT)




FIG. 3

COMPARATIVE ANNUAL LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS OF POST OFFICE ENGINEERING AND ALLIED GRADES AND OTHER ESTABLISHED POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE GRADES BETWEEN THE MAXIMUM PAY LEVELS OF 103/6 AND 152/-
(ALL LEAVE SHOWN AS IF FOR A 5-DAY WEEK; MALE, ADULT GRADES THROUGHOUT)





FIG. 4

NET ANNUAL WORKING HOURS FOR REPRESENTATIVE P.O.E.U. GRADES AND SELECTED CIVIL SERVICE OFFICE GRADES



Memorandum on superannuation submitted by The Post Office Engineering Union

SUBMISSION THAT PIECEWORK EARNINGS SHOULD COUNT FOR SUPERANNUATION BENEFITS

1. The staff connected with this case are non-industrials employed in the factories department of the Post Office and in general their conditions of service are subject to negotiation between the Union and the Post Office. In respect of superannuation however, they, like other civil servants, are covered by various Superannuation Acts and agreements reached between the Treasury and the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council.

2. The various grades of factories staff concerned, and the approximate number employed, are as follows:—

Telephone mechanics	...	...	...	...	...	1,004
Assistant telephone mechanics (female)	...	...	...	...	...	864
Junior mechanics	...	...	...	...	...	268
Junior mechanics (female)	...	...	...	...	...	163

All these grades had always been regarded as unestablishable until an agreement was reached between the Treasury and the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council in 1947 which provided establishment for the grades of telephone mechanics and assistant telephone mechanics. In connection with the counting of service for pension purposes, it was decided that all service should count as to one half from the 1st January, 1919, and in full from the 1st January, 1948, provided that by that date they had served a two years' qualifying period for establishment. In the case of junior mechanics and junior mechanics (female), the grades as such remained unestablished, but service in these grades was allowed to count as to one half towards the two years' qualifying period for establishment.

3. All the grades are employed on piecework, or payment by results, with the exception of a small number of mechanics who at times are selected to perform certain work which may be of an experimental character or falls within the category of work that cannot be performed on a piecework basis because of pricing difficulties. There are also a number of junior mechanics who whilst undergoing a period of training are paid on a flat rate basis. It is quite reasonable to say that almost the whole of the grades of telephone mechanics and assistant telephone mechanics spend the whole of their time on piecework.

4. The present weekly rates of pay for telephone mechanics and assistant telephone mechanics are:—

TELEPHONE MECHANICS (From 1.1.53)

						Basic	Bonus	Total time rate
						s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
LONDON								
Minimum	...	...	...	...	...	67 -	74 8	141 8
Maximum	...	...	...	...	...	90 10	77 2	168 -
PROVINCES								
Minimum	...	...	...	...	...	63 4	74 8	138 -
Maximum	...	...	...	...	...	87 2	76 8	163 10

NOTE: By agreement reached with the Union piecework prices for work given to telephone mechanics are so fixed to allow a mechanic of average ability to earn at least an additional 22½ per cent. of his basic rate. In London therefore a mechanic would be able to earn an additional amount of at least 15s. 0½d. on the minimum rate, and on his maximum rate, 20s. 5½d. In the provinces the corresponding additions would work out at 14s. 3½d. and 19s. 7½d. respectively.

ASSISTANT TELEPHONE MECHANICS (FEMALE)
(From 1.1.53)

				Basic	Bonus	Total time rate
				s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
LONDON						
Minimum	...	...	...	49 2	56 -	105 2
Maximum	...	...	...	52 10	56 6	109 4
PROVINCES						
Minimum	...	...	...	45 6	55 6	101 -
Maximum	...	...	...	49 2	56 -	105 2

NOTE: Piecework prices for assistant telephone mechanics are fixed in order to allow the worker of average ability to earn at least 20 per cent. of the basic pay. In London therefore an assistant telephone mechanic on the minimum would be able to earn an additional 9s. 9½d. and 10s. 7d. on the maximum. In the provinces the corresponding additions would work out at 9s. 1d. and 9s. 9½d. respectively.

5. From the foregoing it can be seen that the portion of pay regularly received by telephone mechanics and assistant telephone mechanics in the form of a piecework bonus forms an appreciable part of total pay. It is drawn so regularly that on occasions when the Union has endeavoured to secure general pay increases for factories grades the Post Office has invariably stressed its monetary value as part of actual wages as a form of argument against the Union's claim.

6. The Union has always taken the view, in the case of staff who are employed on a piecework system of working, that total earnings as such should be taken into account for pension purposes, chiefly because the total expected minimum earnings, including piecework bonus, have been fixed as a result of agreements with the Union. This matter was, in fact, taken up with the Treasury in 1949 by the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council, and in support of the claim the following points were made by the Staff Side:—

1. That piecework was a normal condition of service and that piecework bonus was regularly earned during the whole of service.
2. That overtime payments earned regularly, i.e. by scheduled extra duty or Sunday duty, could be taken into account for pension purposes.
3. That when telephone mechanics had retired from service in an unestablished capacity, piecework earnings had in fact been taken into account in assessing the lump sum gratuity payment.

7. The Treasury freely admitted the validity of the first two points, describing as anomalous the position where piecework earnings were not reckonable for pension purposes and at the same time allowing scheduled overtime to count.

8. With regard to point 3, the Treasury agreed that piecework earnings had in the past been taken into account in assessing the value of retirement gratuities, but assumed this was due to an oversight, and they proposed therefore that in respect of new entrants to the Civil Service from a given date following discussions with the Staff Side this part of earnings would not be taken into account for the payment of unestablished gratuities.

9. The grounds on which the Treasury's decision to reject the claim on behalf of telephone mechanics have never been accepted as valid by the Union, particularly as continued reference was made by the Treasury to the comparability of the case with that of industrial staff employed in the Post Office and other Government Departments. These industrials, or the vast majority of them, secured establishment in 1948 arising out of negotiations between the Treasury and the Joint Industrial Council, but the conditions of establishment differed to some extent from those negotiated by the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council on behalf of the non-industrials. For instance, the past service to count for pension purposes in the case of the industrials went back as to one half from

the date of employment, but in the case of the non-industrials past service went back as to one half to the 1st January, 1919. This, of course, makes quite a difference in the maximum amount of pension obtainable by members of these two groups of staff who may have rendered comparable long periods of service in the same Department prior to 1st January, 1919.

10. The Joint Industrial Council's agreement with the Treasury stated specifically that so far as industrials were involved, piecework earnings should not be allowed to count for pension purposes, but no such agreement was reached between the Treasury and the Staff Side in the case of the non-industrials. Indeed, that matter was not even discussed.

11. The Treasury also argued that different treatment for telephone mechanics as regards the counting of their piecework earnings for pension to that applied to industrial staff, could not be defended, and further argued that if piecework earnings did count in the case of non-industrials, they should also count in the case of industrials. Whilst the Union has no comment to make on whether or not industrials should be allowed to count piecework bonus for pensions, it cannot accept that the superannuation conditions negotiated by the representatives of the industrial staff should define the conditions applying to non-industrial staff.

12. A further objection raised by the Treasury related to the fluctuating amount of piecework bonus, which, of course, is determined by the speed at which the operatives work, as the Treasury maintain that this part of wages is unstable. The Union suggests however that there could be an average taken over a period of time as is taken in the case of ordinary earnings, including payments for overtime. The income tax authorities appear to experience little difficulty in adjusting tax payments on fluctuating earnings, and it would therefore seem that no serious problem arises in determining the average total earnings of pieceworkers over, say, their last three years of service. The Treasury incline to the view however that a man may be tempted to work at an artificially high level of production in the last three years with a view to increasing his amount of pension accordingly. It is suggested that this may be detrimental to the workers and their work. The Union, based on actual experience, cannot accept this view, and in any case care is taken to see that a high standard of work is maintained as all completed work is subject to an acceptance test by a quite separate department. If however the Treasury wish specifically to guard against the payment of inflated piecework earnings to count for pension, consideration could be given, we suggest, to a piecework bonus limit being allowed to count for pension, having regard to the terms of agreement made with the Union in respect of the percentage of piecework bonus mechanics of average ability should be able to earn and on which the piecework price for work is actually determined. The fact is, of course, that as operatives approach retiring age they invariably lessen their speed of work, although they manage, partly due to long experience, to maintain an average amount of piecework bonus.

13. The Union believes that if piecework bonus were allowed to count for pension it would act as an important incentive for them at least to maintain the average amount of output expected of them. The Union has felt so strongly on this matter since the last discussions with the Treasury that in attempting to secure pay increases for the staff concerned we have asked for such increases to be in the form of a bonus and therefore unrelated to piecework in order that any addition would earn increases in pension. This form of claim has, of course, prevented the adjustment of piecework rates which would have been necessary had the increases been secured on basic pay.

14. In examining this matter the Commission may be concerned at the cost involved on the basis of the Union's claim. That would, of course, depend on whether the actual amount of piecework bonus were taken into account or if the negotiated average amount were used, but quite certainly it would not mean more than a few shillings' increase in the pensions the majority of existing staff would receive because of the limited amount of service they will have to reckon for pension.

Examination of Witnesses

MR. L. G. FOX, *President*,
MR. CHARLES SMITH, *General Secretary*,
MR. A. J. BEASLEY, *Assistant Secretary*,
MR. G. W. WRANKMORE, *Assistant Secretary*,
MR. J. LYONS, *Research Officer*,

on behalf of the Post Office Engineering Union,

Called and examined

1250. *Chairman*: Mr. Smith, would you like to start by telling us something about whom you represent?—*Mr. Smith*: I do not think there is very much I can add to what is said on this subject in the Factual Memorandum. We represent what the Treasury describe as the rank and file grades in the Post Office Engineering Department. Numerically, of course, the most important of those are the engineering grades themselves, and, as you will have seen, we have devoted the major part of the third section of our memorandum to them. In addition we cover the motor transport grades up to the mechanics in charge, grade 1, who are the people who control the workshops and exercise day to day supervision there, the rank and file grades in the Supplies Department and the Post Office factories, as well as the crews of the cable ships who are in a rather specialised field.

1251. The first question I have to ask is on paragraphs 2 to 10, which deal with the lack of clearness and fairness of the Tomlin formula. We wondered whether you might not agree that, so far as the "long term trend" is concerned, it is designed for a time of fluctuating prices, and that there are certain advantages in the formula at such a time?—*Yes*, we would agree that the reference to the "long term trend" was introduced because of the history of civil service pay in the period preceding the appointment of the Tomlin Commission, but we do feel that the circumstances that we have faced more recently have been very different with constantly rising cost of living and outside rates.

1252. *Mr. Hall*: In paragraph 13 you suggest that the Treasury has receded gradually from social responsibilities. I wonder if you would elaborate that a little bit?—That referred to the doctrines which they seemed to be advancing and the basis on which they seemed to be acting. We have, of course more direct contact with the Post Office and, through Post Office policy we imagine we discern changes in Treasury policy. We have found that the Post Office, particularly in one or two recent cases, do appear to have receded from the doctrine of measuring themselves against good employers. In a recent case affecting our transport grades we had to raise this point before

the Arbitration Tribunal and point out that the Post Office had introduced what seemed to us to be a new formula. They referred to the mean of outside rates, which was a phrase and indeed a conception which we could not find anywhere else, although perhaps it has got some relation to the term "the generality of employers" which the Treasury have used once or twice in their evidence to the present Commission.

1253. So it is really in the application of the Tomlin formula that you feel this retreat from the previous position has been developing?—*Yes*.

1254. Is it partly the time lag which has caused trouble?—That is certainly a real grievance.

1255. But suppose outside wages were to fall?—The time lag would then, if the Treasury operated as at present, tell in favour of the staff.

1256. But the Treasury might resume its past position?—I ought to make the point that we make a distinction between negotiations which are intended to compare the level of civil service pay with the level of outside rates on the one hand, and negotiations which are intended to compare movements in civil service pay with movements in outside rates on the other. It is rather in respect of comparisons between levels of civil service pay and levels of outside pay that we make the comment in paragraph 13.

1257. *Mr. Burman*: May I refer to your paragraph 12, where you refer to the pronouncement of the Anderson Committee? Is not the principle of supply and demand, taken in the general framework of the economy of the country and of course of the world as a whole, one of the ultimate methods of measurement?—I think in a general sense it is, but, in the way in which it is expressed in the report of the Anderson Committee, it seems to us to be going much further than any reference to general questions of supply and demand.

1258. In several places throughout the memorandum you refer, quite rightly, to earnings outside and the level of pay in the Civil Service. Outside the question of supply and demand does come in. In certain parts of the country wages are very much higher than the average because of the shortage of particular types of

labour, so you would agree that supply and demand does enter into it both ways perhaps?—It is inevitably a factor. Supply and demand, together with trade union negotiation and trade union bargaining power, is certainly a factor in the determination of outside wage rates and of civil service rates, but what we found deplorable was the statement that there was only one consideration.

1259. I accept that. Then there is the difficult question of how to compare sheltered occupations and those that are exposed to the blast of world competition. Should we for example take the shipbuilding industry, which is at the moment suffering from foreign competition, as a proper basis, or some of the sheltered semi-luxury industries which can afford to pay very high wage rates?—On the method of fixing an initial level we feel that one can take certain broadly comparable outside occupations. That has always been the attitude which the Post Office has sought to follow. We may not have agreed as to which were the comparable outside occupations or on precisely how you derive appropriate civil service levels, but I do not think we could disagree with the general line of the Tomlin formula in taking certain broad comparable occupations.

1260. Should we consider the efficiency of those occupations, since we have not got the profit and loss yardstick in the Civil Service?—That is quite true, Sir, but I think one must take the level of actual wages in themselves in comparable occupations as they are at the time when the comparison is being made. I put my emphasis, incidentally, you will have noticed, on actual wages. The level of actual wages in outside occupations, for example, the engineering industry which is bound to be one to be brought into a comparison with our grades, is substantially above the level of minimum rates.

1261. *Chairman*: In paragraph 21 you say that no simple automatic formula could apply, but we infer from paragraph 54 that you think it possible to find a body of principles to suit the whole of the Service.—We deliberately stated that we had drawn up our formula in the light of our own experience and with the conditions of our own grades very much in mind. We could not claim that it would necessarily fit other sections of the Service although it does seem to us to have some broad arguments to commend it.

1262. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In your paragraphs 22 to 26 you touch upon the importance of collective bargaining and in paragraph 26 itself you use the expression "a more constructive attitude towards negotiations." Could you amplify that somewhat?—What we have in mind

is that not since 1948 has it proved possible for the Union and the Post Office to reach agreement on a major pay matter. We consider that the facts that on every occasion these claims have had to go to the Arbitration Tribunal and that on every occasion the Tribunal has awarded more than the Post Office was prepared to offer (often substantially more), show that the Post Office could have made a more real effort to reach a settlement by agreement.

1263. So the word "constructive" in this context means that you hope the Post Office will be more forthcoming?—I certainly would not quarrel with that word!

1264. *Chairman*: How far do you think the difficulty is due to departmental autonomy?—That is a very difficult question because, as you know, each civil service Department takes responsibility for its pay negotiations. We do know in fact, from what the Treasury themselves say, that Treasury control is very strict, but just what interplay goes on between the Post Office and the Treasury we can only speculate upon.

1265. *Sir George Mowbray*: May I chip in here on your Appendix in relation to the unreasonableness of the Post Office? Is it fair to point out that in certain cases the claim which you put in was very much more in excess of the arbitration award than the Post Office offer was below it?—That, of course, is the Post Office reply to the point, but we still feel that does not absolve them from a measure of responsibility. There is after all, I think, a special responsibility on an employer in trade union negotiations, and I think it would be agreed that if an employer consistently offers less than seems reasonable, as experience has shown, to an independent arbitration tribunal, it is often very difficult for the union, on its part, to frame its claims in such a way as to assist in the process of getting agreement.

1266. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Did you make reasonable claims?—The claims we put forward are well substantiated by arguments and reasonable in that sense.

1267. *Chairman*: How far do you think the value of work aspect of your claims has been the cause of the disparity?—That is certainly a large element in it, but not the whole. Differences of opinion about the fundamental value of the work have had a very big influence in the past six years of negotiations, and probably if we had all been solely concerned with maintaining the value of a rate which both sides believed to be adequate we might not have been so far apart. One additional factor has of course been that Governments for much of the time have put a lot of emphasis on wage restraint. Especially in 1950, and to a considerable, although lesser, extent in 1951, the policy of wage restraint

was in our view a big factor in the Post Office attitude.

1268. *Sir George Mowbray*: Just a point in relation to the 1953 claim, when the Post Office offer as I understand it was 7s., the award was 8s. and the claim was 12s. 6d. Would you really argue that the Post Office offer of 7s. indicated a very unconstructive attitude towards negotiations, bearing in mind that the Arbitration Tribunal only gave 1s. over that?—I think you have picked, Sir, on the particular example which is least typical. That was the sole case in which the award of the Tribunal exceeded the Post Office offer by a relatively small margin. Incidentally, too, going back to the point which the Chairman raised, the 1953 claim was the sole one in which general economic conditions as distinct from the value of work were the basis of negotiations. If one took 1950 or 1951 or 1953 by itself we agree we could not justify the conclusions we are drawing, but we ask the Commission to look at the whole picture since 1948 and see it as one.

1269. At any rate, the 1953 settlement does indicate a more constructive attitude, and that is the most recent?—On that, Sir, I think you must bear in mind the point that in 1953 it was solely general economic changes that came into the picture. We failed to reach agreement with the Post Office on another matter affecting pay, our claim for the recognition of the need to pay a shift allowance to Post Office staff on shift work. That was a principle which had been introduced by agreement in the Civil Service generally through the National Whitley Council, but one on which we could not get agreement of principle with the Post Office. We had to take that claim too to the Arbitration Tribunal and they came down in our favour. One does need to see the whole picture.

1270. *Chairman*: You have got a claim pending. Has the value of work element come back into that?—This claim which we have pending at the moment and which we describe in Section III is based on value of work. It does not take into account changes in outside wage rates or general economic conditions since January, 1953, and the Post Office have accepted discussion on it on that basis.

1271. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraphs 27 to 34 you deal with pensions and you stress that the arrangements are much more to the advantage of the public than to the employees in that the Treasury is using superannuation to prevent a casual attitude towards employment in the Civil Service and also as a disciplinary weapon. But there is another side, is there not? It is an advantage to the civil servant to have a superannuation scheme and security of employment?—Naturally, Sir, we could

not deny for a moment that it is an advantage to a man to have a permanent job and a pension to which to look forward.

1272. And as much as it ever was, in spite of what goes on outside?—As much as it ever was in an absolute sense, but of course it is not so much of a relative advantage now as it was perhaps before the war. I think it is common ground that there has been a very marked increase in permanence and pensionability outside the Civil Service. The Treasury witnesses themselves drew attention to this fact.

1273. It is a factor that should be taken into account in fixing scales of salaries and wages, is it not?—We suggest that it is a factor which, while it must be taken into account, should not be given the heavy weight that is sometimes given to it. It is material to notice, we think, that the Tomlin Commission made no reference to this as a point to be taken into account in fixing civil service pay, even though at the time that the Commission was sitting the permanence and pensionability of civil service employment were far greater relative advantages than they are today.

1273A. *Mr. Cash*: May I just intervene at this point in order to get it quite clear? The Tomlin Commission recommended a contributory superannuation scheme for the Civil Service?—That is so, Sir.

1274. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Most pension schemes outside the Civil Service are contributory?—It is difficult to be precise on that point, but we do notice that this is a field in which there has not been a great deal of study as yet. There is some conflict on this question of the degree to which the trend in outside pensionable employment is towards contributory or non-contributory schemes. We would not, however, deny that outside the Service there is a very substantial proportion of contributory schemes.

1275. In local authorities is the amount in the region of 6 per cent?—*Mr. Lyons*: I understand it is.—*Mr. Smith*: I would like to make a point on that question. It is one which is implied in our document but which we think requires a lot of emphasis. The civil servant cannot take his pension rights with him unless he is either over age 50 or unless he is going to a relatively restricted number of alternative occupations. We notice that the Commission has shown an interest in this point, and we would like to emphasise the fact that, generally speaking, a civil servant at the levels with which we are concerned, if he is under the age of 50 and wants to take up some alternative employment, has got to sacrifice all the pension credit he has contributed.

1276. *Mr. Cash*: Have there been any instances of the use of superannuation rights as a disciplinary weapon?—There have been cases in which it has been made known that, if certain action were taken, individuals would render themselves liable to such action. I think I am right in saying there was such a case during the war when there was considerable agitation on the part of civil service trade unions against the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, and there was a threat of some kind of unofficial action to secure a change in the attitude of the Government. The action that was to be taken was, I believe, affiliation to the T.U.C., and it was made known at that time that individuals who supported such action, or who remained members of organisations which took such action, would place their pension rights in jeopardy. It did have a very big effect indeed.

1277. How does that differ from cases outside the Civil Service? Does not the same thing operate there too?—I do not think in the case of action of that kind—strike action, for example—an individual on the railways or any other employment places any pension rights which he possesses in jeopardy.

1278. Following up this difference between your members and outside industry, you refer to the difficulty, which is not uncommon, of frustration through lack of promotion?—As we say, Sir, these disadvantages which we have mentioned are found in a similar way in a number of other large organisations.

1279. You say there are very limited opportunities outside the Civil Service for using the knowledge which your members have acquired. Is there much wastage?—It varies to some extent according to the nature of the man's employment and the experience he has gained, but certainly it is true that for very many of the staff we represent the opportunities of using their experience outside, if they exist at all, are very limited.

1280. Once in, really you have got to stay in?—Very largely that is so, and that, of course, is reinforced by the nature of the pension scheme.

1281. Yes, but let us be quite clear about this. Which comes first?—I think a man would weigh up the whole situation—the facts that he could not take his pension with him and that the skill and experience he had acquired were not easily marketable outside would both deter him from moving to outside employment.

1282. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Is it your point, Mr. Smith, that in the case of your members their skill is not as marketable in outside industry as is the case with other sections of the Service, and to that extent your people are at a disadvantage?—That

is a little difficult to answer because there are quite clearly other sections of the Civil Service to which this applies, and we would not like to go very far in making comparisons between different sections of the Civil Service in this respect. We would prefer to rest at saying that it certainly does apply to the extent I have suggested.

1283. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Does it not come to this, that you are largely the servants of a monopoly and that servants of monopoly cannot change their posts?—To a large extent. There are certain possibilities, depending on the nature of the duties.

1284. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Does one deduce from this that there is little mobility from your grades into industry?—The only figures we have are of resignations, and again in the form of percentages of total strength of the technical officer grade. For 1953-54 the percentage of resignations was .5 of one per cent., for the preceding year it was .7 of one per cent. and for the two years preceding that it was 1.2 per cent. We do not know of any case of a technical officer going out to a private manufacturing firm.

1285. I would have thought that the telecommunications industry, at any rate of recent years, had been in need of additional personnel, and that, if there was in fact a marked discrepancy in remuneration between you and industry, there would have been a greater tendency than this for them to go into private industry.—*Mr. Lyons*: I may say that there has in fact been a contraction in the capacity of the telephone industry from about 1950.

1286. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Where have these people gone to?—*Mr. Fox*: Into a number of places, the B.B.C., the British Electricity Authority and other electrical employers who broadly set the standards of the technician in the electrical industry.

1287. *Mr. Burman*: When we come, Mr. Smith, to your alternative formula in paragraph 35, you suggest that the work should be valued by reference to skill, experience, responsibility, training, general and specialist knowledge required. As a principle, of course, that is quite impeccable, but like many principles it becomes very difficult to turn it into practice. Are you attempting to make a comparison between the skills in your grades and those in the clerical, administrative and executive grades?—*Mr. Smith*: These factors which we have mentioned play their different parts and have their different degrees of relevance for different grades. The skill of a telephone engineer is quite obviously very difficult to compare with the skill of an experienced clerical worker. But first of all, we do think that the skill which a man has acquired in his particular

line has got to have a proper weight, and the various factors of training and experience which have contributed to that skill have to be properly assessed, particularly in taking the various grades in the same hierarchy. In our own hierarchy, for example, one of the factors to be taken into account in determining differentials would be the varying measures of skill. We would agree that clearly one cannot, taking the element of skill alone, make a direct comparison between fundamentally different types of workers.

1288. But in several places you do compare them, do you not?—Rather in the way of suggesting that there is a broad comparison, taking into account not only the actual skills but also the training, the kind of qualifications that are required, and the degree of responsibility. I agree that in any field of employment one has got to take into account the fact that there will be people of differing capacities and one cannot hope to do much more than set a broad standard of the requirements of a particular civil service grade.

1289. *Mr. Jackson:* Would the possibilities of promotion cover that adequately?—Promotions at the moment, and in the immediately foreseeable future, from the technical officer grade are not particularly numerous. In the year 1953-54, the number of promotions of technical officers was 0·8 of 1 per cent. of the total number of people in the grade.

1290. On what sort of considerations was the selection based?—Mainly technical qualifications and experience as well as the potentiality to advance further still.

1291. Are you suggesting that the number of promotions is out of keeping with the number of men who justify promotion?—I think that undoubtedly we could substantiate the view that there are far more people in the technical officer grade who could perform duties of higher grades than are likely in the foreseeable future to get an opportunity of promotion. I mentioned the figure of 0·8 of 1 per cent. in respect of 1953-54; in the preceding year the figure was 1 per cent.; in the year preceding that 2 per cent., and in the year preceding that 1·9 per cent. Those figures, we think, are a reflection of the general settling down after the war, and our anticipation is that the promotion rate will in the next few years be rather nearer 0·8 of 1 per cent. than the higher figures which I have quoted.

1292. You seemed to give the impression earlier on that it was not possible to make very reliable comparisons in terms of skill and nature of work, and so on, with outside employment. Does this apply to the whole of the categories with which you are concerned, or particularly to the technical

officer?—I think we would say it does apply particularly to the technical officer among the engineering grades.

1293. This surprises me somewhat because the kind of education that you associate with the technical officer grade bears a close relationship to that found in many sections of the telephone communications industry, with whom the Post Office are in very close collaboration.—We have set out examples of the comparisons that we feel are reasonable—with the B.B.C., for example, and with other Departments of the Civil Service—and we have made some broad comparisons with outside private industry as well.

1294. And where you can make comparisons, there is a marked discrepancy in remuneration and in prospects?—Certainly in remuneration.—*Mr. Lyons:* On the point of outside comparisons with technical officers, we have tried to find such comparisons as you mention, and though you can find groups of staff in various private industries with similar qualifications, we have found that in nearly every case they have either been entirely technical workers or mainly supervisory workers. The technical officer grade is to a large extent technical, but also includes some craft skill and is not mainly a supervisory grade, and therefore we have been unable to find really close comparisons.

1295. *Chairman:* We have heard a good deal about internal horizontal relativities from witnesses. In paragraph 37 you seem to be ready to abandon internal horizontal relativities, but in paragraph 44 you say some regard must be paid to them. Would you care to add anything on the latter point?—*Mr. Smith:* We think, Sir, that so far as relativities are purely traditional and based solely on what has happened in the past, a great deal of weight should not be attached to them, but in so far as they are based on reasoned comparisons and on attempts to show that there are broad equivalents between the experience, responsibility, training, and so forth, of various grades, then they deserve, perhaps more weight than they have had in the past.

1296. An example would be?—We have quoted the fundamentally different Treasury clerical and executive structure. Quite clearly we cannot make a comparison between the nature of the work or the skills, but we do suggest that one can be made between the length of training required, the kind of responsibility exercised, and the length of experience necessary to do the job adequately.

1297. *Mr. Thorneycroft:* It could happen that the comparison based on internal relativities could conflict with outside comparisons. What would you say on that point?—At the moment we feel that in

respect of the claim we are putting forward the outside comparisons and the internal relativities tell broadly the same tale and entitle us to draw the same conclusions. If there were a conflict between the two I think it would be necessary to try and balance the one against the other. I do not think we could say that either of them ought to provide the guide to the complete exclusion of the other.

1298. You would want to avoid any rigidity and to have flexibility in regard to both?—Yes, so long as both provided any reasonably reliable guide.

1299. In your paragraph 47 you say that those comparisons "should be on the basis of the rates actually paid by good employers." Further on you suggest that once you get what you regard as a reasonably satisfactory rate fixed then one of the factors to be brought into the reckoning would be the trend as reflected by the wages index?—That is correct.

1300. The wages index is a picture of average rates within certain ranges. How would you comment on the view that it is more appropriate to take average rates than actual rates to fix the basis in the first place?—We are making a distinction between negotiations designed to establish the level, where we think the comparison must be with the actual rates in broadly comparable occupations, and secondly, negotiations designed to deal with the application in the Civil Service of movements in outside occupations. We agree to some extent this may be an artificial distinction, but we think it is a very helpful one to have in mind. When one is fixing the rate for the job, it does seem to us to be important to take the actual rates which are paid for the normal week's work by good employers in comparable outside industry. Thereafter, once the rate for the job has been fixed satisfactorily, and we emphasise that this is a thing which can only happen at fairly long intervals, if one is concerned with giving to the Civil Service the appropriate adjustments of its pay in the light of outside movements, then we think it is reasonable to take as the basis the wages index which is, for the most part, a measure of the changes in minimum rates. I wonder whether it would be useful if I gave another example to indicate the reasons why we attach so much importance to using actual rates as distinct from minimum rates in determining the level of civil service pay. We give some examples later on about the application of this so far as outside engineering rates are concerned, but we have been particularly studying in the last few weeks, because of the negotiations we have been having, the outside rates of pay for motor transport fitters. We have been very much struck there by the fact that

you have an agreed rate, which at the time we were conducting these negotiations was 144s. but which was exclusively a minimum rate, and we were able to produce a very substantial body of evidence to show that for people of the general level and skill of our motor transport fitters the actual rates paid were in very many cases far above 144s. In the extreme cases, the repair departments of large motor car firms, the actual rates went well over 200s., and in the case of local authorities they were something like 170s. In a number of large concerns maintaining their private repair organisations, the rates were 170s. or 180s. That example indicates the extreme importance in our field if one is making a comparison with levels of pay in outside industry of taking the actual rates and not the agreed rates which are so often merely minima.

1301. You have just quoted quite a number of outside concerns all of whom pay different rates. Now how would you arrive at your comparison?—That does illustrate the difficulty of applying this conception of comparison with rates in comparable outside industry. Our view has been that one must take first of all large employers and good employers who require the sort of skill and the sort of standard of responsibility that is required from the worker in the civil service grade concerned, and we came to the conclusion that the rates for local authorities, for the B.B.C., for the large private concerns such as those I mentioned earlier, were all round about the 170s. and 180s. mark. We could find those which went far above it, but we thought those were really rather extreme; and we could find others which fell much below it, but those were usually in small private garages where it was often difficult to determine what actual rates a man really got, and where such factors as tips and other ancillary earnings played an important part. If one takes as the basis of one's settlement the level among comparable good employers outside there is still plenty of scope for negotiation. It is not by any means a hard and fast formula, but certainly we have to emphasise the point that the actual rates paid by comparable employers outside for comparable work are in most cases substantially above the agreed minima for the trade as a whole.

1302. Thank you, Mr. Smith, but when you speak of good employers, what is the definition of "good"? Is it determined by the actual rates that the employer pays, and if so does it follow that what you really want is comparison with the rates paid by the best employers, best being determined by the employer paying the highest rate?—We actually use the phrase "the best outside employers".

1303. In paragraph 47 you use "good"?
—Yes, that is so, but in our actual formula we have used the phrase "the best". Generally speaking by "good outside employers" we had in mind the ones who pay the best rate, provided one can establish a broad and reasonable degree of comparability of work and general circumstances.

1304. That will save you and anybody else concerned the trouble of deciding between a series of rates paid by good employers.—Even among the best employers one does not find necessarily a complete identity of rates, especially as in outside employment there is generally a flat rate for the job, whereas in the Civil Service there will be a scale of pay. One has got to make some adjustment. One cannot rest simply on the flat rate that is paid even by the best outside employers.

1305. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Is not the definition of a good employer the man who pays trade union rates?—Certainly the definition of a bad employer will be the man who pays under trade union rates!

1306. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: And to the extent that he pays more than he is required to do then he is a jolly good employer!

1307. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I am not sure whether there is not a slight inconsistency in what you have been saying. The suggestion at one point was that the good employer is the man who pays most, but you indicated that when you looked at them there were various people, some at 170s., some 180s., some as high as 200s. and you took something in between there. Would it be right to say what you aim at is an average amongst the top ones, or would you say it was the point where you find them clustered round?—Yes, in practice one does find a cluster of employers with whom one can make a proper and fair comparison. If I might elaborate that a little further, there is no virtue in the sort of field that I have been discussing in paying the trade union rate. The national agreed rate in circumstances like this represents the absolute floor below which no employer can expect to recruit people of any reasonable standard of skill, quite apart from any other considerations about paying the union rate.

1308. *Mr. Hall*: I would like to ask a general question about these very interesting paragraphs 48 to 50 and 78 to 81. This is the first time we have seen the introduction of the concept of productivity into discussions of remuneration in the Civil Service. I do not know whether Mr. Smith would like to start by giving us a little more detail of what he has in mind?—We do appreciate that this is probably difficult to apply to some sections of the Civil Service. We do,

however, take note of the constant emphasis, and in our view as a Union the proper and necessary emphasis, on the need for increased productivity over the whole field of employment. We have, therefore, as a Union, not only in the last few months, and not only for the purposes of this Royal Commission, but consistently, argued that the increasing productivity to which we draw attention is a factor which ought to be taken into account when the pay of our grades is determined. The Union argued this in the wage negotiations in 1950 and again in 1951, but it is of course the fact, and indeed the Post Office have themselves very recently made the point to us, that productivity is not an element mentioned in the Tomlin formula, and since they must rest on the Tomlin formula in negotiations they cannot take productivity into account as a distinct and separate factor. We feel that this is a point which we ought to put to the Commission, not in any way concealing the difficulties which there are about it, but suggesting that it is something which can be taken into account in a broad sense in the case of our members.

1309. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Could you make it a little more realistic by citing an example of increased productivity? Would it, for example, show itself in the number of items of telephone equipment for which an individual is responsible, and if so would this increased responsibility be the result of the man's individual contribution, or would it be the result of the impact on technique of research and development activities, or greater expenditure on plant and equipment?—That is one of the difficulties, and we would agree, of course, that as in outside industry, increased capital investment and technological improvements have all contributed to the increase in productivity over the last few years in the telephone service. On the question whether we can point to any example perhaps I could say something in a general way and then Mr. Fox could say something about the field with which he is directly acquainted and in which there have been some recognised developments. In a general sense I would say that we do not think of this as some sort of glorified piecework scheme. We think of the productivity experience, as it were, over the immediately preceding period being taken into account when wage negotiations take place.—*Mr. Fox*: It is in a very limited field that I speak. I come from the inspection side of Post Office work, where we looked forward when the war ended to the large expansion which we thought would take place in the Post Office field. It seemed to us that if the manufacturers were working at full pressure we should have to change our inspection methods or we should have such a tremendous number of people that the force

would be out of proportion to the work to be done. We therefore studied publications issued by American writers and a British standard specification on inspection, and we joined with the heads of the particular department in a suggestion that we should move from the type of inspection that we were doing to inspection based on statistical control methods, quality control and certain tables of the Dodge and Romig type where we have mathematically calculated risks. We have as a result been able to move away first from the one hundred per cent. inspection arrangements, then again away from curtailment of inspection with unknown risks to statistically controlled risk. We have gone quite voluntarily into that, and there has been a very substantial increase in productivity measured in the amount of work which can be put into service by the number of people employed on inspection. Had we gone on with the way we were testing, the number of staff would have grown enormously. As it is we have been able to make the job more interesting for the people who are doing it and more realistic in relation to the development in inspection fields.

1310. When this change has occurred in the process of inspection has it imposed a greater load on the man who is conducting it—as you yourself have said it makes it more interesting for him. May it not in fact improve his conditions of employment? —It certainly improves, as I said, his interest in what he is doing. It increases his responsibility because the decision which he makes in respect of, say, a sample of twenty-five means the acceptance or rejection of a batch of from five hundred to one thousand items. It has another reflection too, that we now find that where there is bulk rejection of one thousand items, interest is shown at a much higher level in the management structure, and our people find themselves in contact with the managerial field whereas previously they were in contact with chargehands.

1311. You mentioned initially that you were only speaking for a limited category? —Yes.

1312. How widely has this affected the whole of the grading structure that we are discussing?—It can only affect perhaps 400 to 500 technical officers out of 14,000. —*Mr. Smith*: I think *Mr. Beasley* and *Mr. Lyons* have something to add.—*Mr. Beasley*: If we turn to another field, the men employed on external duties are mainly concerned with the provision of cables and overhead wires to subscribers' premises. Since the war there has been a considerable change in the technique of providing external plant, mainly by the provision of mechanical aids. This has been a joint effort. The Engineering Department

and ourselves have got together on the best ways of using these aids. We have agreed to a different set up and a different use of existing grades upon this work. Our people have fully co-operated in this, realising the importance of providing cables cheaper and more quickly. Another aspect of this, of course, is the introduction since the war of the system of flexibility of cable pairs by the use of cabinets and pillars. This was an entirely new technique. To introduce it, there had to be co-operation at all levels, and there were discussions between the technicians IIA, plumber jointers and engineers concerned, and as a result there was evolved the system now in use of providing these cables.

1313. Do you suggest that this is something unusual in the present day operation of industry? Is not this kind of change going on generally?—I was suggesting it shows our interest in productivity.—*Mr. Lyons*: I believe you were particularly interested in the various indices by which we could measure productivity. We have given two examples, and we give some further ones on page 322 in Table 7 where we give telephones per head, exchange connections, trunk speech channels per head; and the Post Office have a series of productivity indices which they keep for their own administrative purposes and which they will probably tell you about. They all reveal the same picture. It was also asked to what extent these increases in productivity resulted from increased effort by the staff. I think we would say they do certainly to some extent result from increased effort, and that is alluded to in part at least by *Mr. Gammans* in the footnote on page 321, but I think it would be fair for us to argue that in fact the great historical increase in productivity which has occurred and continues to go on is not due so much to increased physical effort—in fact, if anything, it is accompanied by reduced effort—but to increased intelligence and skill, and that, of course, is not so easy to point to here. In our document where we refer to the increased standard of training required by the Post Office of the telephone engineers it is shown to be an important factor.

1314. *Mr. Hall*: You do not think that would be covered in effect by the first part of your formula where you call attention to the skill required? It sounds to me rather like a development of new skills or elaboration of existing skills, and I wonder what is really different in what is now suggested?—*Mr. Smith*: I think there is something more than the changing of skills, although clearly the changing of skills and acceptance of greater responsibility is a part, but on top of that there is a general increase in productivity. We were thinking

in conformity with outside industry, for example, with negotiations in the engineering industry.

1315. Could we try and follow that through a little, because I can see it in the case of certain specialist or technical staffs, but when we get on to office workers and people of that sort the chain of causation seems to be getting rather remote.—That was what we had in mind when we said we did appreciate there were difficulties in introducing this conception, and naturally we would not claim to speak, or to be competent to speak, about the position of office workers. I think the only comment we can usefully make on that point is that in many outside concerns where they have taken productivity into account in one way or another in their wage negotiation they have devised ways and means of covering the office and administrative staff. We are not of course thinking of this exclusively, or even mainly, in terms of the position of the individuals, but rather of productivity as an element which can properly come into the picture when wage negotiations are taking place.

1316. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: What I am searching for is how it can come into the picture? Could it come in adequately by a change in proportions in the different grades, and has it already shown itself in this way. For example has the proportion of technical officers changed over the last ten years, and do you think the effect of what you are suggesting might be to increase the proportion of technical officers compared with the lower grades, and therefore introduce this recognition of skill that you refer to?—The proportion of technical officers has increased somewhat since the grade was introduced in 1946, but the increase is not very high—from 20 per cent. to about 26 per cent. It is quite true that in some cases the increase in productivity will reflect itself in improved grading. I think it has done so in the case mentioned by *Mr. Fox*.—*Mr. Fox*: To a limited extent, but nothing like the proportion that the average output has increased. There has been a greater overall reduction in the force, perhaps of the order of 400 to 500 per cent.—*Mr. Smith*: Which does emphasise the point that although to a limited extent these changes are reflected in improved grading, that is not in our view an adequate reflection, because there may be changes which cannot be reflected in that way and which can therefore only be reflected in our view adequately in rates of pay settled in negotiations.

1317. That is the point I have difficulty in grasping.

1318. *Mr. Cash*: Are you satisfied with the training facilities that are offered by the Post Office? How do you think they

compare with outside employers' training facilities?—*Mr. Fox*: It is not easy to compare what happens in outside employment beyond the pre-adult stage. It is easy to compare apprenticeship schemes and what happens up to the age of twenty-one but it is not at all clear what training actually takes place after twentyone. The Post Office arrangements for training are in the main I think good, but they are associated with the ever changing technique in telecommunications which is not so readily reproduced, at least not reproduced in a way in which we can define it, in outside industry. I think the apprenticeship training schemes are better in outside industry, speaking generally, up to the age of twentyone than the Post Office schemes, but I do not think we are able to compare with outside industry after that age.

1319. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: This is in fact another aspect of what we have just been discussing. You appear in your paragraphs 125 to 136 to be suggesting some connection between pay and training?—*Mr. Smith*: This section to which you have drawn attention is designed to set out the amount of training and the kind of training and the sort of qualifications that are required in our job. We do think that the kind of training and perhaps particularly the general standard of qualification that is required for a job is a factor to be taken into account in valuing it.

1320. And you do not feel that this would be covered adequately by the change in proportions of the technical officer grade relative to less highly qualified and less responsible jobs?—No, Sir. We feel that the general level of pay in our grades is below that which is justified by the comparisons with Treasury technical classes and with other employment, if one takes into account various factors, including training and the general standard of qualifications.

1321. Can you draw a distinction between the significance and need for training in the Post Office relative to other branches of the Civil Service? Is it not of general importance throughout the Civil Service in reasonable comparable kinds of employment and in industry generally?—That is true. We are here trying to use, or to give as an example, the amount of training required to show the sort of position which we think our grades ought to occupy in the civil service pay structure

1322. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: On page 300 you have a section headed "The maintenance of the rate". What you said earlier on to me gave me the impression that you do not want the wage index to be used as an automatic criterion but as a guide?—Yes.

1323. Would you tell us just what would happen? Assume for a moment that you have your foundation rate agreed and you are going to look *inter alia* to the index of wages to determine just what the trend is and to go forward to some adjustment, how would you determine what you ask for?—At the time which we thought appropriate, which would presumably be after there had been some sizeable rise in the wages index, say roughly five per cent., we would expect to open negotiations with the Post Office on the basis that both sides accepted that that movement gave a broad guide as to what ought to be done; and that the percentage increase which the movement in the wages index indicated ought to be translated into a similar percentage increase for the grades that the Union represents, subject to the proviso that either side could introduce into the negotiations any substantial arguments for doing something somewhat different.

1324. *Mr. Cash*: If that movement was downward would you move?—I think in that case probably the first approach would come from the Post Office. But we could not resist the implication that if the wages index moved down, we would have to discuss with the Post Office adjustments in that direction. We feel that if in fact there was a general reduction in the rates of pay outside it would be neither realistic nor reasonable to expect that the Civil Service would be immune from it.

1325. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Presumably you have no fear that the use of the index might lead to over-rigidity?—We have to some extent that fear, and that is why we have put so much emphasis upon our two aspects, the fixing of the rate and the reflection of the movement. We do feel that there would be a danger of excessive rigidity if one side could apply the wages index in any automatic and unqualified way. We think that there has got to be, in the first place, scope for consideration over a relatively long period to determine what is the appropriate level of civil service pay, and that when over the shorter period one is using the wages index, either side has got to be free to introduce any reasonably substantial argument for doing either more or less than the movement in the wages index alone would seem to suggest.

1326. Your proposed rates would, I think, be higher than the average reflected in the Ministry of Labour wages index. If on top of that you obtained further increases on a percentage basis, you would be getting a lot.—I think it is the case that, when the rates measured by the Ministry of Labour's index move in outside industry, the actual rates which may be at a higher level tend to move also. Indeed as compared with pre-war, or even compared with the period immediately after the war, our

information is that on the whole actual rates have tended to move more than minimum rates. But if the method was going to work out in a way that was unsatisfactory or extravagant the Post Office would very speedily point it out to us and advance that as an argument for doing something a little different from what the wages index taken alone would seem to indicate. I do not think that we envisage a formula which is too inflexible to allow any substantial argument of that nature to come into the picture.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

1327. *Chairman*: In paragraph 57 you quote the Bridgeman Committee as saying that no other organisation is in such continuous, varied and intimate contact with the lives of the public as is the Post Office. Would you agree that this statement needs a little modification in view of the development of the welfare State and the growth of local office work in Departments such as the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance?—Yes, I think we would agree this is probably not quite so true now in relation to other organisations.

1328. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraphs 68 and 69 you talk about the Post Office surplus, and you mention that the Treasury are likely to use the argument that the surplus has been much reduced as an argument against claims for an increase of wages. You would not accept that argument?—No, Sir.

1329. You think these surpluses ought not to be related to wages at all? If the surplus is considerable, it should be still disregarded in wage discussions?—The Post Office has never been prepared to accept the fact that the surplus was high as an argument in favour of wage increases. Therefore it seems to us reasonable that when there is the contrary situation and the surplus is low, that factor should not be taken into account.

1330. You do not propose to try to break their attitude?—I do not think we should have any chance in view of the Bridgeman Committee and what they said on this subject about the relationship of Post Office rates of pay to civil service rates generally.

1331. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: You deal in paragraph 77 with reductions in differentials for skill, and so on. Do you feel your members have been treated worse than workers generally in this respect?—It is not easy to make a comparison, and I do not think we could say we have really studied this in comparative terms. We were very struck by the fact that the Treasury, when they gave evidence, used language which suggested they thought that perhaps the differentials had narrowed more in the Civil

Service than in outside fields of employment.—*Mr. Lyons*: I think we could say that our differentials, have narrowed a little bit more than in industry over the past 23 years. If you take the technician IIA and the labourer there has been a decline of 16 per cent. in the differential. If you compare the skilled fitter in electricity supply with the labourer, there has been a decline of only 9 per cent. in that differential. If you take the differential between the engineering fitter and the labourer there has been a decline of 15 per cent. in the actual minimum rates, but the actual rates of the fitter have not fallen by anything so much as this amount in relation to the actual rates of the labourer.

1332. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I wonder if you are aware that the railways and the British Transport Commission have now reached the position where they are about to examine the structure in the spirit of paragraph 100 of the Report of the Court of Enquiry to which you refer in paragraph 76?—*Mr. Smith*: Yes. We realise of course what a difficult problem it is in the railway service, just as it is in the Civil Service.

1333. *Mr. Cash*: We are interested in the evidence in paragraphs 82-91 on the living wage. In paragraph 84 you say the Union is not at present attempting precisely to define the living wage. Does that mean it hopes to do so soon?—No, Sir. What we had in mind there was that we realise the phrase "a living wage" is a vague one open to a number of interpretations. If in fact the Commission made a recommendation along these general lines, naturally we and other civil service trade unions would have to get down to a very much more precise study of what, in terms of pounds, shillings and pence, that could be said to mean; but since it is an academic question really at the moment, and one we cannot bring into negotiations at present, we have not gone into it in detail.

1334. So in that elusive will o' the wisp the new formula which is to take the place of the discarded Tomlin formula, the living wage would have no part?—Not directly.

1335. Or indirectly?—We suggest in our section dealing with the statement of the formula that, although we have not put it precisely in the formula, we would think it desirable that the Government should not pay, for a normal week's work, less than a living wage.

1336. So that the Government you suggest, should give general guidance on minimum wages?—No, Sir; but it should accept the responsibility not to pay below a living wage. I agree that that would probably mean that, if the Commission

recommended along those lines, then the Government would have to accept some sort of calculations about a living wage, and those would no doubt be used in negotiations in other industries.

1337. *Chairman*: Do you know how many of your members have £130s. a week or less?—We could give approximate figures, I think, of those who are earning or receiving those rates of pay for a normal week's work.

1338. Including overtime and shift allowances?—No, I am afraid we could not give you that figure. The only figures we have on earnings are figures which show the average earnings for whole grades, and those do not disclose the range of earnings in particular grades.—*Mr. Lyons*: The approximate figure is something like 3 to 4,000.

1339. That is the basic wage?—Yes.

1340. I suppose a good many men would be earning other allowances as well?—*Mr. Smith*: Some, although not a great number. I do not think that many at this level would qualify for shift allowances. So far as overtime is concerned we do know that the Post Office has recently taken a survey of the number of staff who, in a given week, were receiving payments for overtime. They have not yet collated those figures. Our impression is that in a representative week not more than 50 per cent. of the staff receive overtime pay—but that is only an impression.

1341. You say you have worked on prices at the end of 1953. But in paragraph 96 you seem to suggest you will be getting a wage increase based on economic grounds. That will affect the picture to some extent, will it not?—It will affect the figures of the claim.

1342. Supposing you got 7s. or 8s. a week more, would this affect the living wage argument?—It would affect it; but we have not, as you will see, gone into that in very great detail, for the reasons I explained a few moments ago in reply to *Mr. Cash's* question.

1343. Do you think a good many of your people would still be in that region?—We think men not receiving overtime in some of our grades would still be fairly near it.

1344. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Do I deduce that you are suggesting the retention of these five grades? To put it perhaps another way, a newcomer to the Civil Service at a young age does not go through all the grades in succession, does he?—Not normally. He would normally—this is with reference to paragraph 95—begin as a youth-in-training and probably progress to a technician IIA; then to technical officer-in-training and then technical officer. If he were employed on the external side,

his progression would be slightly different and he would probably finish up as a technician I, from which he might get further promotion.

1345. This could be presented in two parallel lines?—Broadly speaking though it is not hard and fast.

1346. *Chairman*: These movements you refer to in paragraphs 98 and 99, do they show more than the sort of lag you would expect from the Tomlin formula?—I think they do, Sir; if you look at the relative increases shown on the right hand side of the graph, they do show quite a substantial lag. We think it is more than could reasonably be accounted for by the time lag inherent in the way the Tomlin formula has been applied.

1347. *Sir George Mowbray*: On paragraphs 104 to 110, dealing generally with changes in the work, could I ask whether you feel these have been more marked in your grades than in other comparable industries?—My impression is that the changes have been as great as in any reasonably comparable outside industry—and certainly greater and more rapid than one might say was the average in outside industry. Perhaps other representatives would like to express a view.—*Mr. Fox*: I think the position in the Post Office Engineering Department has been one of continuous change and the actual work which the people have to do has changed more than the work of individual people in outside industry. I think it certain too that, unless the people who desire to progress and keep themselves abreast of the work, attend evening classes practically throughout the period in which they can absorb new teaching, and generally really understand developments that are taking place, they will drop behind their fellows. That is also emphasised by the continually changing courses at the Post Office training schools. For instance, at the present time there is the development on trunk mechanisation whereby the subscriber can have direct connection to the trunk line. That brings new factors into automatic telephone exchanges. For instance, it ties closely together the transmission systems, the carrier frequency transmission, and the purely automatic equipment normally located in the automatic telephone exchange; and in trunk mechanisation you have to put in devices which will let the subscriber know the delay on the particular service, which would normally be done by the operator. It is developments of that kind which, although they are gradual, are also continuous, and I do not think, judging in the rather limited way that we can of outside industry, that workers are quite so directly affected by

continuous change.—*Mr. Wrangmore*: Perhaps I could amplify what Mr. Fox has said. I think it is undeniable that there has been great advancement and the war itself provided a tremendous impetus in the field of telecommunications, both in respect of land lines and methods of signalling and radio. In the field of telegraphy, the continued deficit in the telegraph services has, in itself, brought the mind to bear as to how this deficit could be eradicated. One of the developments in this field has been the automatization of the telegraph service and the introduction of trunk automatic switching as distinct from auto manual switching, which means a far speedier service, less operating costs and more direct connections. It may be equally true, of course, that in certain fields closely allied to telecommunications development has equally been great but I should say that the speed at which it has been applied in the Post Office is as great, if not greater, generally speaking, than is generally found outside, except possibly the field of television.

1348. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I do not see how it can be any faster; because after all industry manufactures most of the equipment which you in the Post Office use. Therefore the corresponding personnel in industry, dealing with the same type of work, must keep pace equally if not more so, with the development and the impact of new ideas. So what I would like to put to you again is, do you feel that in this change your people have suffered relative to corresponding people in industry?—It is of course true that much of the research work from which industry itself benefited has been the result of research work done in the Post Office laboratories.

1349. But is it done by people you are representing?—Yes, the grade of technical officer, represented by the P.O.E.U. Whilst I am quite prepared to concede that development has taken place in outside industry, the Post Office, being the sole provider of telecommunications in Great Britain, and indeed London being the centre of what we might call the trans-Continental telephone service, the actual application has been felt more rigidly, and I still think more quickly, because whilst manufacturers have been interested in the production of the goods, and have installed the equipment, the fact remains that keeping abreast with the maintenance of the equipment has been the function of the men in the Post Office.

1350. I think that is unquestionable. To what extent has it imposed additional effort, additional responsibility on the individual? Has it in some respects not eased these?—I should say distinctly no; for this reason. The development in the telephone industry is an ever growing one. It does

not matter whether you are employed in a telephone repeater station, a radio station, or an automatic telephone exchange, it is quite a common thing to be employed in that particular building for a year or two years and find side by side with you contractors who are installing entirely new equipment of which little is known, until one morning you are told that this new equipment is yours to maintain. In the field of automatic telephony, the standard type of switching used to be the pre-2000 type, and the standard automatic relay the pre-3000 type, whilst the modern standard equipment is the 2000-type selector and 3000-type relay. Thus there is quite a mixture of equipment to be maintained demanding varying mechanical skill and often fundamental changes in the principles of design.—*Mr. Fox*: Take the people concerned with interference on radio and television. That has grown considerably and interference which did not exist before is now disastrous, particularly interference between one television set and another. A great deal of extra work has come into the field of radio interference personnel.

1351. You are talking about technical officers?—They have some assistance from technicians IIA.—*Mr. Beasley*: There is the simple example of the electrical supply industry, particularly when you get into the field of external cable such as coaxial. In the electrical supply industry I think one could say that in recent years there have been probably two or three types of cable introduced, whereas in the Post Office there have been approximately 30. We are suggesting that the range of technique required of our technicians IIA is considerably greater than that of the electricity supply industry and that this is just a simple example which illustrates our point.

1352. Notwithstanding that the techniques of people employed on high voltages is of a high standard and that the degree of responsibility is of a very high order?—So in our field. If you are referring to high voltage, admittedly we do not go into extra high voltage cable, but coaxial cable does take high voltages so we have the same responsibility; and if you have a cable which is carrying probably 2,400 trunk circuits, and in addition a television programme as well, the responsibility of that jointer is considerable.

1353. *Mr. Cash*: I am not clear whether you think there should be any direct relationship between charges and prices. You refer to this in paragraphs 111 and 112 of your memorandum.—*Mr. Smith*: No, Sir. We are merely making the point that telephone charges have risen markedly less than the general price level. In other words, the real cost to the subscriber of his telephone service has diminished over a long period quite markedly.

1354. Do you suggest there should be any relationship?—No, Sir. We do not think it is appropriate for us to deal with that point. That is really a matter for the Post Office.

1355. *Chairman*: Paragraphs 113 to 116 deal with the period 1946 to 1953. Is it your view that the 1946 reorganisation provides an appropriate base line and that at that time the remuneration of your members was as nearly right as it ever has been?—No, Sir; we do not altogether accept that. In our view the 1946 reorganisation did not take into account, nor have any subsequent adjustments taken into account, the revaluation which took place in the general technical field covered by the Treasury. The 1946 reorganisation was designed to rationalise the former structure. People had been getting payment for their work on the basis of very extensive allowances. The reorganisation brought into being a new structure in which allowances were consolidated in pay. Certain changes in the grading were made at the same time, and in addition it was designed to improve somewhat the prospects to which a youth coming in on the internal side with the object of becoming a technical officer could look forward; but there did not appear in the discussions, nor in any of the official and semi-official statements made about it, any element of a deliberate effort or intent to raise relative pay for this technical work.

1356. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: You mean relative to the clerical?—Yes.

1357. Notwithstanding that, if I understand it correctly, on the technical side there has been about 125 per cent. increase over 1938, and 63 per cent. for the clerical officer maximum?—One ought I think to take the whole group of the grades on both sides if one is going to make the comparison.—*Mr. Lyons*: The comparison between the maximum wages of our grades and the maximum of the clerical officer alone is really not valid at all. You have to take the whole structure, and then I think you would find a different picture.

1358. *Chairman*: In paragraphs 152 to 154 you introduce the question of earnings. How far do you think the Commission should take this into account in settling new rates of pay?—*Mr. Smith*: When we are fixing rates which are to be the basic rates of pay for a period, we think, as we have said, the Commission ought to take very seriously into account the actual rates of outside industry, which are so often markedly above the minimum rates. We would agree that it is sometimes a very difficult calculation to make precisely, because so many different elements enter into it; but even if one leaves out of account any additional earnings in respect of overtime, it is clear that the wage which a man of acceptable skill may normally

expect to receive for a normal week's work in the engineering industry, for example, will be substantially above the agreed minimum rate.

1359. You are thinking of actual rates rather than total earnings?—We are thinking of the actual pay received for a normal week's work, leaving out of account any overtime element. Merit pay, bonuses and so forth, which so often in outside industry are really intended to produce the results which the Civil Service achieves by a more elaborate grading system, can fairly be taken into account.

1360. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Can you find out what the earnings are?—*Mr. Lyons*: The Ministry of Labour survey of earnings gives a fairly accurate guide as to the level in industry. From figures which we have extracted from this survey, we have found the total weekly earnings and the average weekly hours. By and large, in the great majority of industries which show higher weekly earnings than are earned by our grades, the average hours are roughly the same. Therefore a broad comparison is possible. We think one of the main reasons why the average earnings in comparable industries are so much higher than earnings in ours is that higher weekly basic wages are paid, and we have quoted various authorities to show that, as well as making the actual calculations in respect of the engineering industry. We agree there are many qualifications to be made to these figures. The proportion of pieceworkers in many of these industries is quite high. On the other hand, we have a much smaller element of unskilled labour in our industry, which tends to have an opposite effect on these comparisons. Looking at them generally, we do think there is a great disparity between the average weekly earnings of our people and in other industries; and that the main reason for this is that actual wages for a 44-hour week are appreciably higher than minimum rates in industry.

1361. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I rather gather that a very important part of your argument is the desire on your part to equate your technical officers with the technical officer III.—*Mr. Smith*: Rather to suggest that there should be a much closer relationship between their pay than there is at the moment.

1362. The technical officer on the works and engineering side is required on entry to have not only the Ordinary National Certificate, but at least three years' experience in the trade. On your side, to what extent is the possession of an Intermediate Certificate an essential requirement for a technical officer?—At the time of reorganisation it was fairly clear that the

intention of the Post Office, accepted by the Union, was that we should work towards the Intermediate Grouped Course Certificate, which is broadly the equivalent of the National Certificate. The Post Office now tend to take—and this is a matter which is still under discussion between us—a somewhat different view. They take the view rather that they require a leavening of men with this qualification, but that advancement to the grade ought to be on the basis of practical experience on the job rather than paper qualifications. But such figures as we have do show that the tendency is for the proportion of people in the technical officer grade with the qualification to rise.

1363. Could you give me some idea of the size?—It is not at the moment very large, 12 to 15 per cent.

1364. Are the Post Office authorities tending to reduce the proportion with the qualification?—No, Sir. Our experience is that the authorities in the field pick out the man with the qualification, and give him preference in promotion; and our expectation, frankly, is that they will go on doing that, even though there is a slightly different emphasis at the moment at Post Office headquarters.

1365. Does this fit into the trend of argument on productivity; the number of people needing a substantial background might perhaps tend to decrease relative to the total employed?—I do not think that the Post Office have argued that the work of technical officers has grown any less complex. Indeed, they have expressed the view to the contrary. Perhaps I could quote in that connection a report which was made in 1951. At that time because there was very widespread dissatisfaction with an award of the Arbitration Tribunal, the then Postmaster General set up a joint body of experts from the Post Office and Union representatives, under the Chairmanship of the then assistant engineer in chief, to re-value the work of the skilled engineering and motor transport grades, because, to use the Postmaster General's own phrase: "This, I think, is where the shoe is pinching rather tightly". That body produced a report, and we have received permission from the Post Office to use that report and to put extracts from it before you, on the understanding that we emphasise to you and make it quite clear that this report, although it is a report of a joint body, has never been formally accepted by the Post Office. I should like that explanation to be placed on the record. That report did quite specifically say that whereas the duties of certain other grades had not changed, the work of the technical officers had got more complex.

1366. This is what I find difficult to understand, since the Post Office also at

the present time appear to be withdrawing from the view that this City and Guilds Intermediate Certificate is an essential or desirable qualification for the technical officer grade.—I do not think the Post Office would ever say that it is not a desirable qualification.—*Mr. Fox:* I would like to go back to the first part of your question. During the proceedings of this joint committee we did carry out a careful examination of the people within a limited field in the Treasury technical classes as to the qualifications which they actually held and those which were specified in the entry conditions. We found that only very few held the Ordinary National Certificate. I think the figure was 7 per cent. The number of technical officers, also in a limited field, was of the order of 10 per cent. Both those figures are very much affected by the absorption procedure which took place when the new grades were set up; the sitting tenants were taken into the new grades without having to overcome the hurdle of qualifications. The position of the Post Office in relation to the intermediate group course certificate has, I think, been very largely affected by our desire to establish this relativity which Mr. Smith has mentioned. We are encouraged by the Post Office to travel the educational roads defined by the City and Guilds Institute. Until recently that was the only national examination which dealt with telecommunications subjects. Because we wanted to establish our comparability with the technical field in industry, we sought to establish it by saying that the inter-group course certificate was the equivalent of the Ordinary National Certificate in engineering. There is a difference in the mathematical valuation and engineering drawing and one or two other minor details, and also in that the National Certificate is a certificate for a course, whereas a City and Guilds certificate is a certificate of having passed an examination.

1367. Which some people regard as an important difference?—That difference has been emphasised. But right up to the time when we approached the Post Office to secure from them what we regarded as our proper status, in every way since re-organisation, they had expressed the long term view that the ultimate manner of entry to the technical officer grade should be by the possession of an intermediate group course certificate; and they went further by saying that entry to the grade above, assistant engineer, should be governed by the possession of a Final Certificate in the City and Guilds subjects. When we asked them to go on record that the Intermediate Certificate was to be an essential provision for the technical officer, they began to lean in the other direction; but at the same time they have still given preference to those people who hold that Certificate.

1368. Is it your wish that this Intermediate Certificate should in fact be a condition of entry?—Yes.

1369. And would you prefer it to the Ordinary National Certificate?—Not now that the Ordinary National Certificate covers telecommunications subjects. What we are anxious to do is to establish the level at which the City and Guilds corresponds with the Ordinary National level.

1370. Have you any idea what proportion of your technical officers compare in responsibility to the Treasury technical III?—In the process of this committee we did run into a difficulty which is recorded in the report, that the monopoly position of the Post Office Engineering Department means that direct work comparisons can only cover a fringe. The planning and development duties of technical officers do carry rather more responsibility than those of the Treasury technical III, because the amount of money which can be involved in a planning scheme by the latter is much less than that which can be involved in the planning carried out by technical officers. But, apart from planning and inspection duties and a few fringe duties, there is absolutely no direct comparison. The only comparison we could make was on the basis of study, training, and general responsibility.

1371. *Chairman:* Generally on comparisons no mention has been made of industrial staff in other Government establishments. Are there no useful comparisons to be drawn in this field?—*Mr. Smith:* The nature of their employment is very different. They are, after all, usually in fairly large units, in a dockyard, in an ordnance factory, or a large building site, and are very much working as normal industrial workers. They are not, as are most of the Post Office engineering staff, in small groups, frequently in direct contact with the public in the way we have described. We think the use of comparisons is very limited because of the fundamentally different nature of their employment.

1372. Do you want to add to the point about the shortening of incremental scales in paragraphs 178 to 183?—No.

1373. Coming to the allied grades, I take it the same broad considerations apply as on the engineering side?—Yes.

1374. *Mr. Thorneycroft:* Is it not the case that there are storemen in other Departments and are their duties comparable to those of storemen in the Post Office?—It is not as easy as it would seem to make a direct comparison. The grading structures and the nature of the stores to be handled differ, as does the function of the supply or store department. So the actual responsibilities and work of men who may

be called storemen may differ, and in fact do differ, quite materially.

1375. You are satisfied it would be less relevant to compare your storemen and the storemen in other Departments than your storemen and clericals?—In general yes; although one could not leave out of account what is to be compared. One must bear in mind that the storemen and the supplies grades generally in the Post Office are employed in pretty continuous contact with members of the clerical grades.—*Mr. Fox*: I think the Post Office Supplies Department is a unique institution in the field of store-keeping. The centralisation of Post Office stores and the issue of both Post Office supplies themselves and a good deal of material for other Government Departments from a central point is rather different from what happens in most other Government Departments where there is an arrangement—I think it is pretty general—for the manufacturer of the goods to deliver them to the particular site where they are to be used. In the Post Office centralisation means that the contractor supplies to the central point, from which all the receiving points are fed. The storeman in the Supplies Department is a much more versatile person than most people in other stores where they do not cover such a wide range of items and do not normally have the responsibility of extracting items from stock to make up a comprehensive requisition, or of sending that completed requisition to a telephone area some hundreds of miles away. If it is not done correctly, it can have a considerable effect and cause a considerable interruption in telephone work all over the country.

1376. How do you compare the work of your storemen and those of clericals?—I think, firstly, in receiving documents which come from different places all over the country, peculiarly written in some cases; the storeman has to interpret the document, he has to identify the stores and he has to make records which are in their turn passed on for repetition by clerical assistants and clerical officers. He initiates in written form the documents which form the basis for the central recording of the position of stocks; and as the initiator of the document and the recording person, he really not only does the recording himself but sets in train the process of other clerical work.—*Mr. Smith*: The comparison we did particularly emphasise in paragraph 196 is with the sorting assistant, which is a grade employed in association with the clerical grades, but largely concerned with the sorting and the custody of documents, and again has a certain amount of record keeping as well as these sorting and storage duties. These bear a resemblance to those performed by the storeman, but are indeed

in some respects, because of the experience and the knowledge which a storeman has to have, possibly not quite of the quality of a storeman's duties—and certainly not superior.

1377. I suppose it would have to be conceded that the storeman in other civil service Departments also has responsibility for the reception, sorting and so on of the particular stores items, just as in the Post Office?—Not in quite the same way or to the same degree, for the reason which *Mr. Fox* has mentioned, the centralised nature of the Post Office supplies organisation.

1378. On the strictly stores side, as distinct from the clerical recording side, it is a question of degree?—*Mr. Fox*: I think there is the other difficulty, that in this particular field titles and work do not correspond closely. People get called storemen in some places where the duties have not the slightest relation to those of storemen in other places. But I must emphasise the very wide range of duties in the Post Office. They run from the stamp section to the clothing section, to the ordinary apparatus, telephone apparatus, switch gear and so on; in fact they cover almost every item one could imagine. Although individual members of the grade do not perform all those duties, they are liable to be moved at any time, and a good many of the duties carry considerable responsibility, particularly in the stamp section, where values of course are very high, although of course careful security precautions are taken.

1379. *Mr. Cash*: Can you give us some idea as to what are the duties of a warehouseman?—The duties are equally wide in character. He is the person who is in charge of a section of stock and also the person who would preside at the point of receipt of supplies from a contractor. He would certify that the contractor had in fact delivered what he is supposed to have delivered, and would direct those supplies from the point of receipt into the appropriate channel. First he would identify them as being a particular Post Office item and enter the description on the report which would be made out and which would accompany the supplies through their various channels. He would decide, for instance, whether they were supplies which had been tested at a contractor's works and therefore were ready to go straight into stock or issue, or whether they should be diverted into the channel for inspection within the Supplies Department itself. He would also in some cases carry out inspection work himself. For instance, he might be called upon to inspect cycles, cycle parts, chains, and other accessories. He would be called upon in some circumstances to approve the supply of spare parts for motor

vehicles before they go into issue. He would be holding a more exalted position in the stamping issuing part of the supplies depot. He would be responsible for going to the parts of the store where more valuable stamps were housed and compiling the requisitions and certifying they were suitable for issue. On the other hand, he might find himself in the position of looking after the security of the premises, of being in charge of the gate and supervising the timekeeping of people employed in the premises.—*Mr. Smith*: There is also some work on examination of items such as clothing; he does not go into it in great detail, but is responsible for the initial examination of clothing.

1380. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Can you put a figure on the proportion of the storeman's time which is taken up with clerical work as distinct from other work?—It varies a good deal according to the actual duty. Possibly 25 per cent. might be a representative figure, but I would not like to be held too tightly to that. But I should think it is probably as high as the time of the sorting assistant that is spent on record keeping.

1381. *Chairman*: Have you made any attempt to cost your proposals either in cash or as a percentage of the wage bill?—The Post Office have provided us with certain estimates which we have not ourselves yet examined in detail. The total cost of the proposals contained in Section III is said to be of the order of £5 million a year, which is quite a high proportion of the aggregate wage bill of about £25 million of the grades concerned.

1382. We should say goodbye to the surplus and a little more too?—It is a little difficult I think at the moment, with the changes in telegraph charges and so forth and the expansion in the service, to forecast what the Post Office surplus will be, but I think it is true to say that with the awards which have recently been made by the Arbitration Tribunal to fairly large grades on the manipulative side the surplus has probably dwindled pretty substantially. Of course, we have in this connection, Sir, made the point that we recognise that the cost of our proposals would be high, and that we would be prepared, as part of the negotiations, to get down with the Post Office to discussions about ways in which output per head could be further increased.

1383. Have you any answer to your letter to the Post Office dated 26th April, of this year?—No, Sir. We have had some discussion with the Post Office on it in a preliminary way, and the Post Office have indicated that they are very interested in this suggested approach but it will require, as we appreciate, very careful consideration on their side, and they are at the moment giving it that examination.

1384. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Would the increase in output per head you mention lead to redundancies in staff?—We would hope that any move in that direction would be accompanied by a programme of Post Office expansion. It is common knowledge that there are plenty of people still waiting for telephones, and we feel there could be a re-allocation of staff on to the installation and construction side which would avoid redundancy and which would, at the same time, assist in meeting the public need for telephones. Naturally we do not imagine for a moment that there is an easy solution, but we do think there are real possibilities in making a planned approach along these lines.

1385. *Chairman*: That finishes our questions on the pay side of your case. May we turn now to hours and leave?

1386. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In paragraph 1 of this section you point to the developments since 1920 in the way of reduced hours, but would you agree that there has not been very much change during recent years and that there is a tendency now to find a stabilised 44 hour week?—I think we would agree that at the moment the tendency is to regard the 44 hour week as the standard, though, during and since the war, there have been quite marked movements in the direction of a reduction in the standard working week in quite a lot of industries.

1387. There have been instances, I know, but speaking broadly the major move was made in the pre-war years, and the stabilised figure appears to be at the moment 44?—Yes.

1388. Would you agree that for annual leave there appears to be a general move towards stabilisation at a fortnights' leave plus six bank holidays?—I do not know that we would feel we had very complete information on that point.

1389. From your general knowledge?—Yes, speaking offhand, I would not say we have very much information to the contrary but the point we were making was the very marked trend towards improvement in paid leave over, say, the last 15 years. *Mr. Lyons*: I certainly have the impression that there is considerable feeling in the engineering industry, particularly among technician grades, for an increase from two to three weeks.

1390. *Mr. Cash*: Is it two weeks or three—plus the six public holidays?—Three weeks plus bank holidays.

1391. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: But this second week in the engineering industry is only a recent addition to the leave allowance, and I think Mr. Thorneycroft is right that generally in industry it is two weeks leave, and six statutory holidays?—I was talking particularly of the technician field.

1392. When you were talking about pay you were looking to outside employments, but when you talk about hours and leave you look at the other classes in the Civil Service. Why should you not look to outside where we have the 44 hours, the fortnight's leave and the statutory holidays?—*Mr. Smith*: We have in our pay submission brought comparisons with other parts of the Civil Service very prominently into the picture. We have not by any means rested solely on external comparisons.

1393. But predominantly you have?—I think we have to a large extent been influenced there by a knowledge that in the past—and we anticipate it will probably remain the case in the future—outside comparisons were bound to be very weighty.

1394. Your best comparisons are with the outside?—I would not altogether agree. As I think I put it to Mr. Thorneycroft, we take the view that the internal and the external comparisons both lead us to the same conclusion:

1395. You have a five day week, have you not? How did you get that?—That was introduced at the end of the war in 1946 by agreement between the Post Office and the Union for a reduction in hours and a five day week on the understanding that output would be maintained. Two years after that agreement was made the Post Office and the Union set up a working party or a joint committee to review the whole position, and the joint committee reached the conclusion that the Union had fulfilled its promise and that output had been maintained notwithstanding the reduction in hours.

1396. But when you first got that, it was by relating yourself to what was going on outside?—Not altogether, Sir. I think it was in part that, but it was also related to the argument that Saturday morning was relatively not very productive from the point of view of the Department.—*Mr. Wrangmore*: That is perfectly true, we did not lay emphasis on the outside comparison; we sought to prove to the Post Office that the Saturday morning 4½ hours was practically 50 per cent. non-productive. The percentage of non-productive time on a Saturday morning plus the cost of petrol, vehicles and so on could be easily done away with and by reorganisation here and there production maintained.

1397. I have no doubt it is a very sensible arrangement in every way and industry has thought the same, but when you are talking about leave and hours you are asking us to look at other classes in the Civil Service who are doing 5½ days. If you had had regard to this when you got your five days where would you have stood?—*Mr. Smith*: In our proposals on hours we have made calculations which

you will see set out in the graphs, which make a comparison between the hours of work over the year as a whole, taking into account the difference in the length of the working week, and also the fact that the working week among the grades we represent is calculated on a net basis—in other words our members eat in their own time—and not on a gross basis of getting meal-times in the employers' time. So we have taken these factors into account, some favourable to us, some unfavourable to us, and made our calculations over a year, which we think is not an unreasonable thing to do.

1398. *Sir Alexander Gray*: In the operation of your five day week what arrangements do you make for emergency work?

—We have appropriate emergency arrangements according to the nature of the work, and of course in some cases quite a proportion of our staff must all the time for years at a time be on shift duties.

1399. *Mr. Burman*: On a general point of principle. You have mentioned that for pay you wish to be associated for purposes of fair comparison with what we have described as the best of outside employers; on hours and leave you have until recently been much better off than outside. Does the Union feel the Government should give a lead in this direction, set a standard for outside employers, or do you accept the same principle that it should be in line with the best of outside employers?—It has always been a feature of civil service employment that there should be this lead in respect of hours and of annual leave. Naturally we should welcome the fact that outside workers are improving their conditions, but, since this has always been a feature of civil service employment, we feel that the Civil Service generally should participate as the years go by in the trend towards further improvement. We think that this trend has been one which has contributed to the general improvement in efficiency and to the longer working life. I think it is because hours have over the last generation in industry as a whole been shorter than they were, say, a generation or two ago, that we are now as a nation discussing the question of whether the working life might be rather longer than it has been in the past.

1400. I would not be putting it too bluntly to say that where you are not up to anybody else you want to be brought up, but where you are ahead fair comparison does not apply?—No, I do not think that is so at all. I do not think we are suggesting that we should maintain permanently the advantage that at one time the Civil Service enjoyed but that there should over the Civil Service as a whole be a common pattern in respect of leave. We would like to see a common pattern in

respect of hours, but we fully recognise that we cannot expect this Commission or anybody at the moment to make a drastic cut in hours. We do not think that is unreasonable, but we do think, as a matter of principle, we ought to move towards a common pattern in the Civil Service in hours. I think in that respect we should be in line with outside employment where there is, generally speaking, a fairly common pattern.—*Mr. Fox*: I would like to say just a word, if I may, on the conditions in outside industry. It is a factor in the annual leave of our grades, which in some cases is quite small in quantity, 13 days for instance, for the Post Office to expect reservations of part of the leave entitlement for foreseeable domestic distress. In outside industry, although there is a prescribed amount of leave, that is for a holiday, and it is a common feature of weekly paid staff—which is the comparison with our own—that throughout the year reasonable employers allow odd days at various times for special circumstances which are not debited against the normal leave entitlement.

1401. What about sick pay in outside industry?—*Mr. Smith*: Sick pay I think in the Civil Service has been an accompaniment of the permanence of civil service employment.

1402. Agreed, but how does that compare with the good employer outside?—I should think it compares well with the good employer. We have not got any comprehensive information on that.

1403. *Chairman*: In paragraph 68 you make some detailed comparisons between office staffs and your people. Has your relative position improved at all since, say, 1920?—Yes.

1404. But you still think you are behind?—By absolute comparisons we are still behind, but there has undoubtedly been a relative reduction in hours which, as I said earlier, was accompanied by no diminution in output.

1405. *Sir George Mowbray*: I gather that you take the view that there should be no differentiation between your people and office staffs in so far as hours of work are concerned.—In principle, Sir, and you will recall this was the view expressed to you by the spokesman of the National Staff Side who represent the view of course of all of us, the people with the shorter hours and the people with the longer.

1406. May I assume for the sake of argument that office hours were reduced to, say, 38½, the old pre-war gross. Would your view be in those circumstances that your hours should come down to 38½ in principle, even if not immediately?—We are really seeking here to establish a principle, or to ask the Commission to endorse a principle, and we recognise that

progress towards that principle will have to be dictated by circumstance. The principle, which we think is reasonable, is that there should not be differentiation in respect of hours between the office grades and the other staff. Indeed, our position is summed up by the paragraph or so which appeared in the National Staff Side's submission on this point.

1407. You would agree, I imagine, that if that principle were immediately implemented and you did find yourself with hours of 38½, you would be in a very privileged position *vis-à-vis* outside industry?—We would agree with that straight away.

1408. It is an aspect of it which, if you are making comparison with outside industry, is fair further comparison to make.—Yes. As I emphasise, we recognise that the implementation of the principle would have to be dictated by circumstance and would probably be a matter of negotiation over a very long time.

1409. *Chairman*: You mention that your grades have seven public holidays against nine of the rest of the Civil Service. Is it not the fact that the nine include Easter Saturday and Whit Saturday which come outside your five day week altogether?—We are this year by a decision of the Postmaster General just two or three weeks ago getting the Queen's birthday as a privilege holiday for the first time. That is included though in the seven.

1410. In paragraph 11 you refer to pay and responsibility as criteria for leave. I wonder if you could amplify the second point a little? Have you in mind wholly or mainly supervisory responsibility?—We have really, Sir. We think that the range of pay or the maximum pay of a grade should be what determines its annual leave, and we consider that should be the criterion to the exclusion of others. The Post Office though has in general dealt with representations on this point by reference to a decision of the Industrial Court of 1928. That decision said that the main criterion in deciding the leave of a grade should be its position in the pay structure, but that other factors including status should come into it. Our view, Sir, is that if any factors other than pay are to come in we think the most important one is responsibility, and on responsibility the most obvious example—although not by any means the only example—is supervisory responsibility; so if the Commission does not feel that pay alone is an adequate criterion, we suggest that responsibility of the grades is the only other factor which it is reasonable to take into account.

1411. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In your paragraph 10 you mention that the hours of your members are calculated on a different

basis from that used elsewhere in the Service, and that your hours are net. You said something just now I think in reply to Mr. Lloyd Williams about meals. I would like you to explain just precisely what happens in regard to meals?—The 44 hours our grades work is exclusive of the period in the middle of the day when they have their meal. That does not count in the calculation of the 44 hours. The hours are in that sense net hours.

1412. 44 hours working time?—44 hours working time.

1413. Do they arrange their meal intervals according to the requirements of the job in hand?—No Sir, those are scheduled by the supervisor.

1414. *Chairman*: Have you attempted to form any estimate in terms of money or manpower of the cost of these proposals?—I am afraid we have not. The specific proposals we have had in negotiation with the Post Office have been the ones in respect of leave. We have not any current claim in respect of hours. There is one point which perhaps I might mention in this connection, that the grades that we are concerned with are, particularly in their early years, expected, if they are going to make reasonable progress, to undertake quite an amount of study in their own time. That of course is not by any means a peculiarity of our grades; we recognise that it is very widespread, but it is a point that is worth taking into account. We ought also Sir, perhaps for the sake of the record again, to say that we have currently with the Post Office a claim for payment of double time in respect of Sunday duty. We mention this because we know that another organisation will be putting this claim to you and we should not like it to be thought we disagreed in principle with the claim. The sole difference between us is that we think it is a matter to be resolved by normal negotiation and we regard it as too detailed a matter to bring to you.

1415. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: On the bottom of the first page of your superannuation chapter you have a note which says that piecework prices are so fixed as to enable a man of average ability to earn at least an additional 22½ per cent. of his basic rate. Could you tell me what percentage of the basic rate you think a quick worker could earn?—I think I am right in saying 40 per cent. would be pretty good for a quick and experienced worker.

1416. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In paragraph 14 you tell us:—

“The Treasury also argued that different treatment for telephone mechanics as regards the counting of their piecework earnings for pension to that applied to industrial staff, could not be defended, and further argued that if

piecework earnings did count in the case of non industrials, they should also count in the case of industrials.”

Do you agree with that as a statement of fact?—No, Sir. I think I ought to amplify perhaps a little the position of the staff that we represent. They are, for Treasury staff classification purposes, described as industrials. That is an arrangement which goes back over a very long period of time. In fact, they have always had their conditions determined by negotiations which were broadly under the auspices of the National Whitley Council, and by reference to non industrial staff. We have taken the opportunity to point the contrast in this connection with the industrial staff who are not employed on Post Office conditions, not represented by civil service unions, but employed on outside trade conditions and represented by outside trade unions. Now, Sir, this staff, the industrials—or the tradesmen staff I think it is more appropriate to call them in this connection—had certain establishment arrangements negotiated. One of the features of this agreement was that they would become superannuable, but that their piecework earnings would not reckon for superannuation. We were not parties to that agreement and were not concerned in the operation at all; it was nothing to do with us; it was staff which we did not represent and the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council did not represent. They were able to complete this agreement, which secured them the reckoning of their past service as to one half, irrespective of the date at which they had begun that service. Our staff under the general auspices of the National Whitley Council, have their superannuation and their unestablished service reckoned as to one half only from the end of the first world war. That is a condition which our people share in common with all the other staff represented by the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council and, as you know, the Staff Side will be coming before you on that general issue. Our people were in the same boat as everybody else and we make no complaint of that. Their case is part of the general case. But we do feel it is unreasonable that the Treasury should argue in the way we described in paragraph 11 about the precedent which would be set for the tradesmen staff if piecework earnings of our people were counted, when they had never admitted, or never been prepared to accept, any precedent being set by the reckoning of past unestablished service without a limiting date in the case of the tradesmen staff being a precedent for our people. This is a rather detailed point and it is one that the National Staff Side has pursued, at considerable length with the Treasury. The Staff Side if should emphasise has no doubt

about the soundness and justice of this claim. It has merely left it to the Union to represent it and not included it in its own general representations on superannuation for the same reason that it has in the case of some other unions left rather specialised points which affect only a small group of staff to the union concerned rather than putting them all under the broad umbrella.

1417. *Mr. Cash*: Could I just ask one question on paragraph 12. In outside pension schemes where the pension depends on the last few years of service it is usual to introduce a rule whereby if a man is put on to a lower rate of pay owing to the fact that his physical ability is reduced, that does not count for calculating his pension. In paragraph 12 you argue first of all that the Treasury say somebody is going to work frightfully hard at terrific speed for the last few years if this principle is adopted, and then you go on to say on the contrary he will probably work much slower because of his age. If your argument is right, might it not be that the man would in fact suffer?—No, I do not think so, because he would be reckoning, if the Commission accepted our view, an element in his remuneration which does not reckon at all now.

1418. I quite see that, of course it would be a great advantage. What I mean is that if the man would be working slower, then his pensionable earnings over the last few years would tend to taper.—We do not think that would be a serious difficulty because, although a man's actual physical strength may not be so great, we think that because of his experience he is normally able to maintain a reasonable level of piecework earnings.

1419. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: If over the last three years, owing to circumstances over which the individual has no control, his piecework earnings were considerably less, he would be very unfortunate in relation to the man who had retired three years before who had a busy period; it would result in inequality, would it not?—It would to some extent. This system of averaging does in certain cases produce anomalous results, but it is a general system which applies universally among the staff covered by the National Whitley Council; everybody has averaging over the last three years applied to them. We do not think it would be particularly anomalous in the case of the staff we are concerned with here, but we did propose, as a matter of fact, in the course of the negotiations on this subject, that any difficulties of that kind might be got over by agreeing some standard figure.

1420. *Chairman*: I think we have asked all the questions we wanted to ask.—I do not know if there are any matters which

have arisen today on which you would like us to express any further views or give any further information. I am wondering, for example, whether Mr. Jackson would like us to furnish any further information on what we regard, and I think he regards, as a very important point about the general certificate qualification.

1421. We would like any supplementary information you would care to send us.

1422. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Have you had any difficulties in recent years in recruiting to the grades you are discussing?—I think the most important aspect of this is the recruitment of youths-in-training. On that, it is a little difficult to be precise as to what standard the Post Office have in mind. Before the war I think it is true to say they expected to get a grammar school boy with Matric as a youth-in-training. In the discussions on post-war structure nothing very specific was said about this, because the educational background and what sort of standards were going to exist were at that time a little bit uncertain. We would be inclined to say that, while in rural areas and in the small country towns, the Post Office does not have much difficulty in getting the sort of people it wants, in the large centres and in the industrial areas, London, the Midlands, indeed practically anywhere where there is real competition, the Post Office has experienced some difficulty. While it is hard to be precise about this, it is a very generally expressed view by our Union representatives in different parts of the country that their controlling officers are concerned about the standard of some of the recruits that are coming in. Comparison is made not only with the pre-war standard but with the immediately post-war standard. I do not know if my colleagues would like to amplify that a little?—*Mr. Fox*: It is becoming apparent that the career value which the larger organisations can now advertise to youth, particularly the large firms and the Coal Board, is very attractive. They are putting forward comprehensive apprenticeship schemes which did not exist years ago. At one time it was only the most fortunate of boys that ever got a chance to have a real apprenticeship, but now a boy who makes reasonable progress in technical studies has a very wide field of choice with an assured ladder of promotion at the end of it. That certainly is making it difficult to get the boys of pre-war quality. My own experience, which is a fairly long one in the Post Office leads me to believe quite certainly that the level of boy who is now attracted to the Post Office has fallen considerably and those who come very often do so not because they want to stay with the Post Office but because it provides an avenue for the limited competitions to go somewhere else.

1423. Are you saying the kind of training these youths-in-training get does not really compare in comprehensiveness with the kind of training telecommunications firms now provide?—That is true, because concurrently with their practical training in the larger firms they are expected to reach a prescribed technical level which is acceptable in the engineering field, and that is the real difficulty we are having with the Post Office, who are not prepared to agree with us the prescribed level that does give a guarantee of future progress.

1424. *Sir Alexander Gray*: How do you choose the boys?—By interview.

1425. No competitive examination?—*Mr. Smith*: No, it is on a general directive, broadly along the lines that they seek a boy who has the General Certificate of Education standard in maths and physics or maths and science, but if there is a lad with intelligence and technical aptitude who has not got that standard they will interview him and consider him.

1426. They will choose them from all over the country?—Yes, and they naturally have better results in some parts of the country than others.—*Mr. Wrangmore*: I think in fairness to the Post Office we ought to say that the new system of education, sending the child either to a secondary technical school or a secondary grammar school, has had some bearing, but the fundamental point I think, to answer *Mr. Jackson*, is this: that at the time a child leaves school, 16 or 17, the encouragement that is given by the large electrical industries is an encouragement which is far greater than the Post Office gives, and therefore is enticing the type of boy which the State ought to be enticing as well.

1427. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: To come back to our previous discussions, this is something over and above questions of salary?—No, I think there is a tie-up of both—the career aspect I would say.—*Mr. Beasley*: Career prospects.

Chairman: Thank you very much, *Mr. Smith* and your colleagues, for your patience this afternoon.

(The witnesses withdrew)

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Assistant Secretary, Civil Service National Whitley Council (Staff Side)

on behalf of the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

TENTH DAY

Monday, 14th June, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E., F.R.S.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, Bart.

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum on the civil service superannuation scheme submitted by the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council

1. The terms of reference of the Royal Commission in regard to superannuation require them to consider whether any changes are desirable "within the framework of the existing superannuation scheme".

2. The Staff Side wish to emphasize that they have deliberately confined their submission to a limited number of issues which they regard as of greatest importance to large numbers of civil servants. There are others which are not included in the submission which are of no less importance to some sections of the Service. Some of these will be the subject of separate submissions by grade or sectional organizations.

3. The matters which the Staff Side wish to bring before the Royal Commission are:—

(i) *Reckoning in full of unestablished service followed by established service*

The Staff Side wish to submit that all unestablished service followed by established service should count in full for superannuation purposes. Under the 1949 Superannuation Act only such service after the passing of the Act (14th July, 1949) is allowed so to reckon.

(ii) *Reckoning for superannuation purposes of service in a temporary capacity amounting to 10 years or more at the time of retirement on age grounds*

The Staff Side ask that temporary staff whose service by the time of their retirement on age grounds amounts to 10 years or more should be superannuated as though their service had been in an established capacity.

(iii) *Treatment of pensioners who continue in civil service employment after formal retirement*

The Staff Side seek a modification of current practice based on the Official Side's interpretation of Section 20 of the Superannuation Act, 1834.

(iv) *Gratuities for unestablished staff*

The Staff Side seek an improvement in the present provision for payment of gratuities to unestablished staff.

- (v) *Reckoning for superannuation purposes of service in excess of 40 years completed by age 60.*

The Staff Side claim that all complete years of service rendered by age 60 should count for superannuation purposes and not only those within a maximum of 40 as at present.

- (vi) *"Added years"*

The Staff Side ask for an extension of the existing statutory provision whereby late entrants to the Civil Service who are recruited because of their specialised knowledge and experience may earn a higher pension by receiving a credit for years over and above those actually served.

- (vii) *Minor superannuation adjustments to be made without recourse to legislation*

The Staff Side seek a greater measure of devolved authority for the Treasury to deal with minor superannuation matters so that, to this limited extent, the National Whitley Council shall have the same powers in regard to superannuation as it has in regard to other conditions of service.

4. RECKONING IN FULL OF UNESTABLISHED SERVICE FOLLOWED BY ESTABLISHED SERVICE

This is an issue on which feeling in the Service is particularly strong. The principle for which the Staff Side are contending, viz., the counting in full for superannuation purposes of unestablished service followed by established service, does not need to be argued for it was accepted without reservation by the Government of the day when the 1949 Superannuation Act was passed. The operative effect of the change was, however, restricted to unestablished service rendered *after* the passing of the Act. That is to say, all civil servants whose establishment after a period of unestablished service took place *before* July 14th, 1949, were denied any benefit whatever from a change brought about as a direct result of consideration of their particular grievance. At the report stage of the Superannuation Bill, on 31st May, 1949, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, the late Sir Stafford Cripps, succeeded in securing a reversal of an amendment adopted during the committee stage of the Bill which would have conceded what the Staff Side now seek. He took this course despite pleas from all sides of the House and notably from members of the present Government who were then in opposition. The only reason which the Chancellor gave for opposing what was clearly revealed in the debate to be the general wish of the House was the cost. In the course of his speech he said:—

"I do not believe it was ever right to have these very long, indeed, unending, periods of unestablishment. Nor was it right in the first place to introduce a system which might result over these long periods in very great loss of ultimate pension rights granted on establishment."

Notwithstanding this forthright denunciation of the system which the 1949 Act was to end, he pressed on the House the reversal of the committee stage amendment and so created a situation in which the change he himself argued for was limited to unestablished service rendered after 14th July, 1949, leaving unremedied the grievance of those who had been established under the conditions he condemned.

The Staff Side feel that the Commission cannot but share the late Chancellor's view that it was not "right in the first place to introduce a system which might result . . . in very great loss". That is the crux of the matter and the Staff Side contend that there is an unanswerable case for putting right an injustice which falls, sadly enough, mainly on those whose pensions are, in any event, on the small side. By far the greater number of sufferers from the pre-1949 rule were officers in the lower grades who gained establishment after long periods of unestablished service. Many of them entered the Civil Service during or even before the 1914-18 war and feel themselves entitled to as favourable treatment of their Forces service in that war as that enjoyed in respect of their Forces service by those who entered the Civil Service after the 1939-45 war.

It was the misfortune of those whose case is now under consideration that the 1949 Bill passed through its stages at a time when the economic situation was far less favourable than it is today. It was not merely the cost of this particular concession but its significance in the context of the national budgetary situation at the time that influenced the Chancellor's attitude. The Staff Side urge the Commission to recommend that this genuine and deeply felt grievance should be remedied.

The Staff Side earnestly trust that the Commission will include within their recommendation on this matter not only serving civil servants but also those who have retired whose pensions take account of only one half of their unestablished service. They are the immediate sufferers from the old rule and their case for relief is, therefore, the most pressing.

As a matter of courtesy and with the approval of the Commission, the Staff Side have been made aware of the terms of the Official Side's submission on this question and they understand that it would meet the convenience of the Commission if the Staff Side included some observations on the Official Side's document in this memorandum.

The first comment the Staff Side wish to offer is that the Official Side seem to be seeking to argue the whole question of principle *ab initio*, though members of the present Government, when the 1949 Superannuation Act was before the House of Commons, gave unqualified support to the principle and to the Staff Side's claim for its retrospective application. The attitude of the Government of the day has been described above. Nothing has happened since 1949 to change the essentials of the problem and what the Staff Side seek is quite simply what Ministers now in office urged on their behalf in 1949.

The Staff Side note the suggestion in paragraph 25 of the Official Side's submission that the Commission should leave this problem aside because of the activities of the Phillips Committee on the Economic and Financial Problems of the Provision for Old Age. The Staff Side feel that this suggestion ought not to have been made and they hope the Commission will reject it.

As to the Official Side's arguments on the question of retrospection, the Staff Side readily agree that, in general, changes by way of improvement must take effect for the future. Changes which are belated recognition of wrong treatment are, however, on a different footing, and it is in this category that this claim falls. An unfair and arbitrary arrangement for the treatment of unestablished service before establishment was ended by the 1949 Act. To dismiss the past by invoking the rule of no retrospection would, in this particular case, be indefensible in the Staff Side's view. There is no single superannuation issue on which the Service as a whole feels more strongly.

5. RECKONING FOR SUPERANNUATION PURPOSES OF SERVICE IN A TEMPORARY CAPACITY AMOUNTING TO 10 YEARS OR MORE AT THE TIME OF RETIREMENT ON AGE GROUNDS

The Staff Side ask that temporary staff whose service by the time of their retirement on age grounds amounts to 10 years or more should be superannuated as though their service had been in an established capacity. In the Staff Side's view the case for this proposal rests on broadly the same grounds as those for granting full superannuation rights to "medically rejected" officers who fail to pass the health test on entry to the Civil Service but demonstrate by their subsequent record of service their ability to stay the course. In the same way as these officers are reviewed and treated for superannuation purposes in the light of the facts about their service and not of expectations at the time of entry, so ought officers engaged *bona fide* as temporaries whose tenure endures for as long as 10 years by retirement on age grounds be reviewed and given the superannuation treatment merited by their actual record.

The Staff Side consider that the adoption of this proposal will remove a long standing defect of the present superannuation scheme. They make no suggestion as to the precise way in which their proposal should be carried into effect feeling that that is a matter for discussion with the Official Side after the Royal Commission has approved the principle.

6. SECTION 20, SUPERANNUATION ACT, 1834—TREATMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE PENSIONERS WHO CONTINUE IN A LOWER GRADE FOLLOWING FORMAL RETIREMENT

The particular aspect of the application of Section 20 to which the Staff Side wish to invite the attention of the Commission is its effect upon a pensioner who, after formal retirement, is re-employed in a lower grade. By the operation of Section 20, such a pensioner is denied the benefit of any increase in the pay of his new grade, from whatever cause it arises, if such increase brings his pay and pension combined to more than the "profits of his former office". When, as has happened on more than one occasion in recent years, there has been a general "uplift" in pay scales because, broadly speaking, of the rise in the cost of living, the pensioner whose case is now under consideration has received no benefit—a situation which the Staff Side feel to be inequitable and one which they do not think would be allowed to arise in private employment. Whatever explanation is offered to a pensioner who undergoes this experience—and there is a growing number of pensioners in this position—it is difficult to satisfy the individual concerned that the arrangement is a fair and reasonable one.

EXAMPLE

	£	£
Pay on Retirement from Grade A ("profits of former office")	600	
Pension based on 40 years' service	300	
Pay on re-employment in lower Grade B		400
Pension (abated under Section 20)		200
Pay and Pension combined		600
If pay of Grade B is increased to		450
Pension is further abated to		150
Pay and Pension combined remain at		600

This applies regardless of the nature of the increase in the pay drawn in Grade B so that whether it results from length of service in that grade or by a revaluation of the work of the grade, any increase in salary to which the pensioner becomes entitled is immediately offset by a reduction in pension. One proposal put forward by the Staff Side to remedy this situation was that the reduced amount of pension which the pensioner draws upon taking up employment in a lower grade should be treated as a stable figure and not, as at present, one which is still further reduced whenever pay in the lower grade is increased.

Another proposal which the Staff Side think would help a good deal would be to interpret the "profits of the former office" as the amount of pay which the pensioner would be drawing had he not retired. This would mean that the "ceiling" for the application of Section 20 would not be limited to the pay drawn by the pensioner immediately before his retirement, as at present, but would move upward as the pay of the pensioner's former post moved upward. If this suggestion were adopted a re-employed pensioner would have some prospect of benefiting from any improvement in the pay of his "re-employment" grade which is barred to him absolutely at present.

The Staff Side urge the Commission to support this extremely modest proposal for the modification of the present interpretation of Section 20. They have been under heavy pressure from many quarters of the Service to seek the complete repeal of this Section but they have confined themselves in this submission to suggesting a remedy for what is felt throughout the Service to be an extremely unfair and vexatious feature of its application. They hope the Commission will not be deterred from making a recommendation on the lines the Staff Side are seeking by suggestions that to do so will create anomalies between one pensioner

and another. There is ample evidence in superannuation legislation of the ability of Parliamentary draftsmen to ensure that benefits accrue only to those for whom they are intended. The 1954 Pensions (Increase) Act affords a good example.

7. GRATUITIES FOR UNESTABLISHED STAFF

The Staff Side consider that there should be an improved scale of gratuities for unestablished staff who, under present regulations, are entitled to such a gratuity upon resignation or retirement after not less than seven years' continuous service. At present the gratuity is one week's pay for each year of service which is equivalent to rather less than 2 per cent. of pay compared with the current estimate of 15 per cent. as the value of the superannuation benefits of an established officer. This means that the minimum gratuity amounts to between one seventh and one eighth of a year's pay—a very small sum indeed whether it is to tide over a period of unemployment or to provide a nest egg for retirement. Temporary civil servants who stay in the Government service long enough to qualify for a gratuity are at a considerable disadvantage when their employment comes to an end because it rarely provides them with experience useful to other employers. Indeed, they may be at a positive disadvantage compared with others in the labour market because of the attitude of some employers towards service in Government Departments.

The Staff Side think it would be reasonable, if the present qualification of seven years' service is maintained, to ask that the following scale of gratuities should be introduced:—

For officers who have over seven years' but not more than ten years' service—a gratuity of two weeks' pay for each year of service.

For officers who have over ten years' service—a gratuity of four weeks' pay for each year of service.

In putting forward these proposals the Staff Side feel that they ought to record their emphatic view that temporary service ought never to extend for as long a period as ten years. Where it does, it is doubtful whether any gratuity system can provide adequate compensation for the officer who then confronts the necessity for seeking fresh employment. To the extent that the introduction of an appreciably larger gratuity for those who complete ten years' temporary service would act as a curb on excessively long temporary appointments it would, in the Staff Side's view, have an added advantage. There are, the Staff Side understand, large numbers of temporaries now in post who have served continuously for well over 10 years.

8. RECKONING FOR SUPERANNUATION PURPOSES OF SERVICE IN EXCESS OF 40 YEARS COMPLETED BY AGE 60

The Staff Side submit that all complete years of service rendered by age 60 should count for superannuation and not only those within a maximum of 40 as at present. They do not couple with this proposal any suggestion that the age of optional retirement with pension should be lowered. Nor do they propose that the maximum number of years of reckonable service should be extended beyond the present limit of 45; and they are conscious of the fact that this would mean, if their proposal were adopted, that some civil servants would have earned their maximum pension by, say, age 62. The net effect of their proposal would be that non-reckonable years which now fall between completion of 40 years' service and the attainment of age 60 would fall between completion of 45 years' service and age 65.

In the Staff Side's view there is no logical justification, given the extension of the maximum number of reckonable years from 40 to 45, for treating as non-reckonable, years over 40 within the maximum of 45 completed by age 60. The Staff Side fully appreciate the Government's desire to provide inducements to civil servants to continue after 60, but the extension of reckonability to years over 40 served by age 60 is not incompatible with the attainment of that aim. There will undoubtedly be a growing tendency on the part of civil servants to continue after age 60 for

stronger reasons than those provided by the extra reckonability of years over 60 for pension purposes, and the number of retirements at 60 will progressively diminish. But it must be borne in mind that civil servants have no absolute right to continue beyond 60 under present Treasury regulations and there may be many who will be called upon to retire at that age for health or efficiency reasons or because of redundancy. Those whom the Treasury will not allow to continue after 60 have a clear moral right to count all completed years of service within the maximum of 45 now that the old maximum of 40 has lost its significance. The Staff Side consider that not only they but those who retire at 60 of their own volition should be similarly treated.

9. "ADDED YEARS" FOR LATE ENTRANTS

Section 2 of the Superannuation Act, 1946, empowers the Treasury to direct that a person who becomes an established civil servant after the age of 40 shall have his service treated for superannuation purposes as eight fifths of its actual length. A person who enters between 35 and 40 may be granted similar treatment, but his service before the attainment of age 40 is disregarded. The Act does not specify the conditions under which these powers are to be exercised but requires that any direction under them made by the Treasury must be laid before each House of Parliament forthwith. The purpose of the provision is to enable the Treasury to offer better superannuation terms than the normal ones to those whom it recruits at a relatively late age in order to obtain professional or specialist qualifications or experience not acquired within the Civil Service.

The Staff Side support wholeheartedly the principle of compensating in this form those who cannot qualify for maximum pension solely on account of late entry due to their recruitment after acquiring outside qualifications or experience essential for the performance of their civil service tasks. They are, however, of the opinion that the powers vested in the Treasury should be used to cover a far wider category of late entrants than at present. This is a view which received support from the Committee on Legal Departments of the Civil Service under the chairmanship of Sir Alan Barlow, and it was pressed upon the Government by Lord Schuster when the 1949 Superannuation Bill was passing through its stages in the House of Lords. Lord Schuster tabled an amendment to the Bill along the lines of the recommendations in the Barlow Report providing:—

- (a) that the benefit of "added years" should apply to people holding professional or other specialist qualifications or experience not ordinarily secured in the Civil Service;
- (b) that when such a person is admitted to the Civil Service the Civil Service Commissioners should give a certificate specifying the number of years spent in acquiring such professional or other specialist qualifications or experience while between the ages of 20 and 40, and before the date of admission to the Civil Service, except that no account should be taken of any years in which the person is entitled under any superannuation scheme, to a superannuation allowance;
- (c) that a person having such a certificate should then be entitled to add to the number of years of service which would ordinarily rank for superannuation the number of years specified in the certificate issued by the Civil Service Commissioners or, if the retirement was prior to the normal retiring age, a proportion of the number of years in the certificate, varying with the number of years of his actual service.

The Staff Side desire to press very strongly for a fresh approach to be made to the whole question of compensation for late entry on the lines of Lord Schuster's amendment which was not accepted by the Government. They do not bring forward at this stage examples of categories which might benefit from a wider use of the Treasury's powers to allow "added years" feeling that these would be more appropriate for discussion through normal Whitley channels within any new bounds laid down by the Royal Commission for the operation of the section in question.

10. MINOR SUPERANNUATION ADJUSTMENTS TO BE MADE WITHOUT RECOURSE TO LEGISLATION

The Staff Side are of opinion that the civil service superannuation scheme suffers from undue rigidity owing to the extent to which changes, even those of a relatively minor character, can be made only by legislation. Experience has shown that from time to time it is difficult to negotiate on comparatively small points because of the tightness with which the original enactment has been drawn and the absence of any devolved authority in it under which the Treasury could take suitable action. If in such cases the Official Side were disposed to accept the Staff Side's proposals, considerable delay would occur before effective action could be taken with resultant loss of benefits which might be quite substantial. Examples of this type of case which have recently been discussed with the Official Side are treatment for pension purposes of (a) service in the Air Ministry Works Services Company, (b) service in the former Ministry of Information of staff now in the Central Office of Information, and (c) service in the Ministry of Pensions hospital at Roehampton.

Questions of treatment of service in the so-called "fringe" Departments afford further examples of the kind of case which the Staff Side feel ought to be capable of discussion and adjustment without the necessity for legislation.

With Parliamentary time so heavily taken up with pressing matters it has become increasingly difficult in recent years to secure facilities for the introduction of legislation on civil service superannuation, which means that desirable changes of general application though of a modest character cannot be effected without perhaps prolonged delay, or that a change affecting a particular group of people, upon which the two Sides are in complete agreement, has to be held up indefinitely.

The Staff Side seek to do no more in this submission than to pose the problem in the hope that the Commission will see fit to recommend that the powers of the National Whitley Council in regard to superannuation matters are brought more reasonably into line with those which the Council exercises on other conditions of service. The Staff Side think the Commission will share their view that a body which can, for example, reach a pay agreement affecting the whole Civil Service ought, working under precisely the same safeguards as govern settlements of that order of importance, to be empowered to deal equally conclusively with the lesser aspects of superannuation.

Examination of Witnesses

MR. S. W. MAYNE, *General Secretary, Institution of Professional Civil Servants*,
MR. H. GILLENDER, *Honorary Deputy Secretary, Association of First Division Civil Servants*,
MR. R. A. HAYWARD, *Deputy General Secretary, Union of Post Office Workers*,
MR. E. P. HODGSON, *General Secretary, Association of Post Office Controlling Officers*,
MR. J. L. WILLIAMS, *Deputy General Secretary, Society of Civil Servants*,
MR. L. A. WINES, *Assistant Secretary, Civil Service Clerical Association*,
MR. T. R. JONES, *Secretary, Civil Service National Whitley Council (Staff Side)*, and
MR. R. ANSTIS, *Assistant Secretary, Civil Service National Whitley Council (Staff Side)*.

On behalf of the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council

Called and examined

1428. *Chairman:* May I start by thanking you all for coming?—*Mr. Mayne:* Thank you, Sir.

1429. We start on the question of unestablished service. Do we take it that pre 1949 unestablished service should count back only to 1st January, 1919, or back to the date of employment where that is earlier?—We should have thought back to the date of employment.

1430. Then could you explain why 1st January, 1919, was the date recommended by the Whitley Committee of May, 1946, and carried into the Act?—One of the processes of bargaining, Sir. One got as far as one could, and that was as far as one could get. The difference, of course, was that a lot of people served in a variety of ways during the first war, and war service did not count. In the second war it has,

which makes us think there is, on merits at least, no basis for treating the first war service differently and, *a fortiori*, no particular merit about 1st January, 1919. There are quite considerable numbers—"considerable", in a relative sense—of the older members of the Service who were in it before 1919.

1431. So you are making a second try at something you have always wanted to do?—Partly that, and partly the change in circumstances by the different treatment of war service in the two wars.

1432. *Lady Albemarle*: Surely conditions have not changed since 1946?—No, indeed, that is perfectly true, and one gets what one can.

1433. Yes, I can see it is a bargaining factor, but when you said conditions have changed that does not mean since 1946?—No.

1434. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: I think what happened was that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had suggested that the ex-service men from the 1914-18 war should have their unestablished service reckoned as far back as January, 1919, then when the Special Committee of the Whitley Council came to deal with it they applied it to all classes and adopted that date.—*Mr. Jones*: I think that is right, Sir. As a matter of fact the operation was a rather more limited one than the one we are discussing now, and it was really the final effort on the part of the Government of 1946 to wind up the problem of the ex-service temporary who came into the Service after the first world war.

1435. *Chairman*: Would considerable practical difficulties arise with regard to Forces service, for instance, would the necessary records still be extant?—*Mr. Mayne*: I should have thought so, Sir. Departments are very careful about this kind of thing, and an officer's personal record follows him everywhere. That would be true equally of people on pension. I cannot think of any possible difficulty in that respect.

1436. *Mr. Menzler*: I have been trying to refresh my mind, Mr. Mayne, as to who would benefit under this proposal. There are several classes on which the Commission would like to have any specific comment you may have to make. The first big class one can identify is the ex-service men of the first world war. Have you any comment to make in regard to that class? Do you feel that they had a raw deal in any way?—Yes, the treatment of post-war entrants from the first war was very bad indeed. There was considerable public disturbance over their whole methods of pay and their treatment for superannuation purposes. The arrangement for pro-

viding establishment, where service continued over a substantial period of years, was also one of constant dispute between staff associations and Treasury.

1437. I am talking solely about superannuation, not about pay.—Yes, but superannuation was one of the ways in which they were worst treated, because the service has been continuous throughout, for practical purposes on the same kind of work.

1438. But, going back in history, they were treated just like any other temporary civil servants, were they not?—Yes, except to the extent that quantity makes a difference. In the main you were clearing up the position of the temporaries in the Civil Service, and the bulk of the temporary problem in the inter-war period was the one of the post-war entrants. Prior to the first war there had been a good number of classes of civil servants who were regularly on a temporary basis, if I can put it in that way. You got what were known as the "lump-summers", for example, people who were employed on civil service work but employed at second hand. All that kind of problem was being cleared up as the result of the Reorganisation Report of 1920, save in respect of the professional and technical classes, where temporary employment continued fairly generally, and continues today, to a much greater extent than on the executive, clerical and administrative side of the Service. But within that field one could say that the post-war entrant problem was the one that really bulked largely at the time, and with later establishment of considerable numbers of them the fact that their pre-establishment service did not count for superannuation was patently a very serious grievance, felt everywhere throughout the Service.

1439. It could be said that, subject to the general limitations imposed by the doctrine of not re-writing history, a strenuous attempt was made to give them not unreasonable treatment in 1935 and 1946?—1946 was a considerable step forward. It was not putting the position right, of course, it was only counting the service as to one half.

1440. What about the second war reconstruction entrants, do you think they have any special grievance that distinguishes them from other people?—No, I think treatment after the second world war has been much more generally reasonable and that the National Staff Side would regard the whole settlement there as satisfactory. But that of course lends point to the feelings of people who came in after the first world war.

1441. Then there is another large group, the pre-war unestablished classes such as

messengers. They have had, shall we say, very generous concessions?—Yes, there have been several improvements in the superannuation scheme.

1442. Major improvements?—Quite major improvements.

1443. If you enter public employment with no expectation of pension and you get one afterwards, you have got something you did not expect?—Yes, indeed, Sir, that is perfectly true, but it would not necessarily mean that you should not have equitable treatment, nor does it mean of course that when you come in you do not expect that your conditions may improve. After all, the attitude of staff associations on the National Staff Side throughout on this kind of issue has been the same.

1444. Have you any idea of the numbers of people that would be affected by your proposals?—No.

1445. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: I think you have had the advantage of seeing the Treasury memorandum on this subject?—Yes, Sir.

1446. In paragraphs 19 to 22 the Treasury is arguing against reversing the 1949 decision. They say, particularly in paragraph 21, that some people concerned have already received better treatment than they could have expected to receive when they entered the Service; many entered without any right to pensionability.—Yes, but is it a really valid consideration, because there are many circumstances that were true when I entered the Civil Service in 1916 which no longer are true? The associations in the period concerned, on Treasury initiative in some cases, have altered circumstances almost out of recognition. I should not have thought that was any reason for saying that the Civil Service could not be made a better place, or conditions more equitable.

1447. It does amount to this, that they entered possibly with expectations, and the realisation of those expectations is better than they can have expected on entering?—That would be true, but one of their expectations on entering would be that, as the result of staff association activities, they would be able to improve upon the situation as it was when they entered; for example, Sir, in the immediate post-war period temporary people came in to the established Service on a rate of pay appropriate to an entrant aged 18. There was an enormous storm about that; people had accepted those posts in default of any other employment but they looked to their staff associations to improve that situation, which they did. That is true equally with the pensionability point. None of the temporaries or people who later secured establishment liked the fact that their temporary

service did not rank for pension. To what extent they expected to be able to put that right would depend upon the degree of optimism in the individuals, but certainly in the building up of their associations they took such steps as they could to see that they were put right.

1448. Thanks to the efforts of their associations, they have done better?—Conditions are now better than they were, and we are putting it to you, Sir, that this Royal Commission ought to treat the ex-temporary in an entirely equitable way and let the whole of his service rank for superannuation.—*Mr. Jones*: The extent to which they have done better, Sir, is no greater than would have been their experience, we think, in outside employment. The climate of opinion in regard to superannuation has changed progressively since the first world war, and the changes that you have referred to as marking improvements in their conditions are no more than a reflection of the wish of the administration to remove what were anachronisms in the conditions of employment of temporary staff. What we are seeking to do now is to remove the final anachronism which we think still exists.

1449. Thank you. Will you now look at paragraph 23, which rather suggests that a reversal of the 1949 decision would create further grievances and anomalies.—*Mr. Mayne*: I should have doubted that, Sir. The Treasury are careful not to be explicit about the point. It depends upon what you read into the statement, but it seems to me they somewhat exaggerate.

1450. It supposes that a man may have left the Service because he saw no prospect of a pension, and that a man may have entered a lower grade because he got earlier establishment. Can you dispose of that?—I cannot dispose of it, Sir, because it is obviously the case. All kinds of people will have gambled in all kinds of directions. In some cases the gamble will have come off and in others it will not, but I should not have thought this was the creation of any anomaly. On the kind of instance that you are giving I would suggest that there is no denial of anything to A, but the giving to B of a benefit that A had not anticipated B would have. In cases of this kind I should have thought one had got to say: "Where is the greatest general measure of justice?" and be guided by that. Our submission is that *prima facie* it is clear that the general benefit is to give the full counting of unestablished service. There may be difficulties, there may be people with grievances, but it certainly would not, so far as we are aware, be a major matter. After all, part of this job was done by the 1949 Act. I think

it is important to bear that in mind. As we try to point out in our memorandum, Sir Stafford Cripps, when he was dealing with the amendment that had been carried against the Government in Committee, did make it quite clear that the basis of employment of people for such long periods of temporary service was essentially wrong.

Then he went on to make the point that in the then very difficult financial circumstances he could not put the whole of that right, and what he did was to put it right as from a particular date, from July, 1949. There was no sanctity about that particular date; it was purely an expedient and we think in the somewhat warmer financial climate of 1954 this withholding of what Sir Stafford Cripps admitted to be justice should not go on.

1451. *Mr. Burman*: One of the principles we have heard much about on the Commission is the importance of maintaining relativities and differentials. If what you suggest comes to pass, would established civil servants feel that they were then not in such a favourable position as they used to be *vis-à-vis* the unestablished, and therefore require still further advantages?—It is only when a person becomes an established civil servant that this issue arises, and we are concerned with the establishment of an equitable position between two lots of established civil servants. One will have come in as an established officer and all his service has ranked; another has come in as a temporary officer, and has later secured establishment. They are probably working side by side in the same Department.

1452. But there will have been a difference in their past history. That will not give rise to any grievance?—No, there would not necessarily have been a difference in their past history, apart from the nature of their first employment in the Civil Service.

1453. *Chairman*: Have you any other point on this topic?—Yes, Sir, if I may, it is a small point on paragraph 23 of the Treasury memorandum.

“Such a course is almost if not wholly unprecedented (see footnote to paragraph 11).”

Paragraph 11 says:—

“These concessions which were made in respect of past service extended not only to civil servants in post at the time but to civil servants who had already retired. Their awards were revised accordingly, pensions at the revised rates being paid as from 1st April, 1946. This retrospective application of the benefits of a change in superannuation practice was very unusual.”

All I wanted to say, Sir, is that, going back no farther than the 1949 Act there have been several cases where the benefit of the Act was extended back—in Section 32, subsection 3, and Section 44, subsection 3. The first dealt with the application of the provisions of the Act to ill-health pensioners, and that included those who had retired on ill-health before the date of the superannuation agreement, not only before the date of the Act and its application.

Then there were several other instances of the application of a new principle to serving civil servants but in respect of the past period; those you will find in Section 36, subsection 7; Section 38, subsection 2; Section 40, subsections 1, 3, 4 and 5; Section 42, subsections 2 and 10, and another instance within the same section, subsections 3 and 10. Now the first of those is the application to service already rendered in an unestablished capacity on re-employment following retirement of the new principle of extra reckonability. The second is the application to unestablished service already rendered of the new decision to apply the continuity rule to unestablished service separated by a break from later established service. The third, Section 40, was the application to part time unestablished service already rendered of the principle of reckonability of part time service. Section 42 covered the application to established and unestablished service already rendered at unhealthy places abroad of the new principle that such service would count as to half as much again in the computation of pension or gratuity, and a point on the minimum normal retiring age. It is thus not quite as unique as you might have thought from the footnote to the Treasury memorandum.

1454. It sounds on first reading a very formidable lot of precedents.—The advantage is that they are all very recent.

1455. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Coming to the question of reckoning for superannuation purposes of service in a temporary capacity at time of retirement on age grounds, you know that the Commission are in some difficulty about this point, as to whether it is within the terms of reference?—Yes, Sir. We appreciate the difficulty that the Commission feel on this, but we are bound to say that we do not share it since this is a matter within the superannuation scheme. We are not asking for any fundamental reconstruction of the scheme. It is common ground between the Official Side and the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council that temporary employment is a thing to be reduced to a minimum, if not completely got rid of, and all we are saying to the Commission is that where—perhaps because it could not be helped—people did in fact continue for a long

time as temporary officers and then retire on age grounds, they should receive the pension which they undoubtedly would have received if it could have been foreseen that their service would continue in that way. It is merely a way of dealing with an aspect of employment which the two Sides have failed to clear up in the way they both desire.

1456. To treat as established service, after it had been completed, service which was unestablished?—Yes; the analogy with the medical reject is a sound one. With the medical reject you are saying: "We do not know what the future holds, but we will wait and see, and, if it works out right, then you will be regarded as a completely established officer throughout." Similarly it has been agreed between the two Sides of the Whitley Council that temporary employment should be reduced to negligible proportions. But here we are saying: "This is not working out as right as either side would hope." Where you can say: "Here is X, who has now put in 15 to 20 years' service; he is temporary and he is going," then we say: "It is clearly demonstrated that he could have been made established if we could have foreseen the future with sufficient precision."

1457. Could that be done unless you make a provision for his establishment before his service actually terminates?—There, Sir, I suggest that you are looking at the mechanics rather than the principle. I would draw a distinction between those two things. If we are agreed that in principle this is the right kind of thing to do, then I should have thought the mechanics ought not necessarily to present us with any real difficulties—there are always two or three ways of doing a job, if you really want to do it. I suppose it would be practicable for the Treasury to say: "Yes, we will give you as an *ex gratia* payment a sum of £X which actuarially is calculated as the pension to which you are entitled" and I do not think the Treasury would need any more authority than they have at the moment to do this. They might on the other hand say: "This is a matter that ought to be put on a specific basis, and we ought to have an amendment of the Superannuation Acts to provide specifically for it." They might go to the Civil Service Commission with a view to getting it dealt with as a matter of certification. On machinery there are these three possible ways of coping and I am quite sure there are a dozen others if one liked to sit down and work them out. They do not seem to me to be really what matters, because, if the Commission decides the principle, I am sure we and the Treasury could work out appropriate mechanics.

1458. *Lady Albemarle*: You did mention people with 15 to 20 years' service;

I wonder if you could tell us whether there would be many people who had served temporarily for 15 to 20 years who would not have had opportunities of establishment?

—No; there are certainly some, but in the main one could say that officers of that length of temporary service have almost certainly had an opportunity for establishment. That of course does not necessarily get you over the hurdles.

1459. *Chairman*: Is the analogy with the medical reject quite sound, because they have all passed competitions and satisfied the Commissioners that they are qualified for establishment except for this one health point?—Yes, that is perfectly true, but I suggest that the other officer has satisfied the pragmatic test here, because he has done the job.

1460. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: But there surely is a difference, if he has had the opportunity of establishment and has not taken it. This may be because of a doubt on his part that he could in fact satisfy the test?—I am sorry, I hope we can be clear about this: it does not follow that the individual did not take an opportunity of securing establishment. He may have gone up for establishment and not been accepted. You see, all kinds of factors will enter into whether one is accepted for establishment or not: the number of posts available, the emphasis that may be placed on specific factors at a particular time. But here what we are saying is that the individual is doing a recognised job in the Civil Service, of a recognised category; he is a person who has been there for a very long time.

1461. Yes, but not in a category recognised for establishment.—I am sorry, that is not really quite true. I can think most readily of people in my own sphere of the Civil Service, of the professional civil servant, where in a limited competition for the works group a number of officers holding down posts at senior or main grade level were rejected for establishment in the basic grade. What the reasons were for the rejection, I do not know, but those individuals have continued in those higher posts, doing highly responsible work.

1462. Work indistinguishable from what they would have been doing had they been established?—Completely indistinguishable. Temporary civil servants are not hived off from established civil servants, doing a special or an inferior kind of work. In each of the classes of the Civil Service they are working quite interchangeably.

1463. *Lady Albemarle*: This is a new principle, in a way, is it not? We are talking about pensions for temporary civil servants, which we have not talked of before?—I would draw a very sharp

distinction between this proposal and a proposal for pensions for temporaries. What we are really saying is that this person never was temporary.

1464. Then really what you are saying is that there should be two forms of establishment, by certification and by length of service?—In effect, yes.

1465. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Why do you draw the line at 10 years?—Because that is the period of reckonable service for getting a pension in the established field.

1466. *Mr. Menzler*: I rather infer from your earlier answers that you regard the machinery, as you call it, as little more than a technicality to be overcome?—Perhaps I ought not to write it off as lightly as that!

1467. As a matter of expedience which really reduces the thing to a simple matter of administration to be overcome in the various ways the Civil Service do overcome difficulties! Would you not agree with me that you are in fact proposing a fundamental change in the basis of the Act of 1859? Under that Act you only get a pension if you have issued to you a certificate from the Civil Service Commissioners putting you in an established post.—Yes, in that sense I do agree, but I am suggesting, Sir, that what you are substituting for it is the fact of continued satisfactory service over a substantial period.

1468. Are you really not raising the much wider question of temporary employment over long intervals?—No, Sir. The general issue, as a matter of principle, is already agreed between the two Sides of the Whitley Council. In the post-war reconstruction documents we both put our names to a statement of principle that there ought not to be temporary civil servants, apart from purely temporary civil service which you get in places like the Ministry of Labour Employment Exchanges, or rush jobs which may last for two or three years, like the 1951 rearmament expansion. None the less we cannot be as precise in our workings out in practice as we should like to be, and you therefore get this kind of case arising. It is really a cover for the inevitable margin of error in the work that the two Sides of the Whitley Council are doing.

1469. As the law stands, would you agree that the Civil Service Commission would be hardly likely to issue a certificate in the circumstances you mention?—I should not have thought with deference there would have been a difficulty, because you will have the departmental certificate of what the individual has been doing, as well as the fact that he has been there for that time.

1470. But before the Commissioners confirm a post there must be an established post to fill.—That again is a rather separate point, Sir, and part of the difficulty. It is not for the Civil Service Commission to decide whether posts are established or unestablished, but for the Treasury and the Department, and in many cases there will be a very considerable time lag in fixing an established complement, so that the individual gets penalised in that way.

1471. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Are you arguing that all those who are not established are, on the grounds of qualification, invariably competent to be established?—It depends—I must be careful about answering that, because it depends upon how you are using the word "qualification"—if you mean a qualification such as membership of a particular professional body, that would be so in a great number of cases.—*Mr. Williams*: There is an additional factor to bear in mind, Sir, here. It may be that one of these people whom we are talking about will have tried to gain establishment by sitting a competition, and he may well have sat that competition at the age of 50 or 55, and his capacity to pass a written competition at that age and perhaps to face an interview may not measure up to his competence in the performance of his work. It has been our contention on a number of occasions that officers have failed to gain establishment in that kind of competition, notwithstanding that their Departments would give them a complete certificate of efficiency. Our contention really is that, when the proof of the pudding is there, if a man has had more than ten years' service, when it comes for him to retire and he has proved himself thoroughly efficient, then he ought not to go out without a pension. Anyone inefficient should have been discharged on efficiency grounds.—*Mr. Mayne*: And I should have thought, with the heavy redundancies there have been, would have been.

1472. There may on the other hand be cases where shortages of staff over a long period would have prolonged the period of employment.—Ten years is quite a time to keep an individual on. If he is not doing the job I should have thought one would have got rid of him and tried somebody else.

1473. *Lady Albemarle*: On the question of redundancy, would not "last in, first out" rather take away from that argument?—No. That applies between people who are equally efficient and it does not rule out either the right of the Department or its duty to get rid of the inefficient.

1474. *Mr. Menzler*: You would agree, Mr. Mayne, would you not, that this does involve a departure from a fundamental

principle of the Act of 1859?—On the points you mention, I agree entirely.

1475. And would involve legislation?—Yes, I should think that very likely.

1476. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Is not the point really that a man who has served for ten years should automatically become established?—No, Sir. I am sorry, we must be absolutely clear about this, because there are other claims that we make about what should be done about people who carry on as temporaries, but our proposal here is limited to the man who has reached retiring age and is being got rid of because he has reached retiring age, and has been in the Service at least for the ten years of qualification for pension.

1477. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Is it not part of your general case that there should not be people for ten years unestablished?—Yes, indeed, Sir.

1478. And at the end of 10 years whether they retire or not they ought by that time to have been established?—I would have thought so, but that is no part of the Staff Side's case in relation to superannuation.

1479. No, not in relation to this, but underlying all you are saying that is there?—I cannot deny that it is in my mind, and expressed in my mind in a number of other relations, but I think it is something that is quite separate and distinct.

1480. Yes, but I want to be clear on this, you are disclaiming this as part of your case on this point, but in practice it is part of your general case?—No, Sir, I must be quite clear about this. Each association deals rather separately and specifically with the separate conditions applying to the various categories of people, and the prescriptions that any of us might be advocating in our separate organisational capacities might well be different, and we should not be putting the general view. This is a distinct and special circumstance about which we are all completely united and which we see as one thing.

1481. *Chairman*: Do you think 65 should be the minimum age at which temporary staff should be allowed to retire on pension, or should it be 60 years as in the case of established staff?—I should see no reason for differentiating.

1482. *Mr. Burman*: On the treatment of pensioners who continue in civil service employment after formal retirement, you say it is inequitable that a pensioner re-employed in a lower grade and drawing an abated pension should be denied any increase in the pay of that grade. How would you reply to the argument that so long as he is already being paid more than the rate for the job he can have no claim to benefit from any increase which is related

to the rate for the job?—Primarily, Sir, I think it is a simple case of equity, because you are picking out one category of person to treat in this way. If the civil servant goes out to a job anywhere else, nobody thinks of abating his pay or his pension. If a local government or any other pensioner comes into a civil service job his pension is not abated. Within the civil service you have got three types of re-employed person, you may have the disestablished officer who continues in his old grade who does not receive any pension because his pay is above it, and he attracts any increases in scales. You may go to the other extreme and have an officer whose remuneration has been fairly considerable and who just wants a little odd job after his retirement, and he is re-employed in a grade in which his pension plus his pay together are less than the pay of the post from which he retired; he would get any increase which the grade attracted. The one person who is penalised is the individual who drops a grade or so, and whose pay plus the full amount of his pension takes him to or beyond the previous pay of his job. We think that is unfair and that the situation ought to be put right.

1483. You mention outside employment; are there any cases that you know of of non-contributory pension funds which allow re-employment in the same service?—I cannot say that I do, offhand. But a serving officer in the Forces who completes his service and draws his pension, and then comes in a civil service job, comes in with an unabated pension. It is all the service of the Crown, though it is not civil service.

1484. *Chairman*: Could he go back into the Service and draw a pension and pay?—I think I am right in saying that he could not.

1485. *Mr. Burnan*: How would you reply to the argument used by the Treasury, that, if the reduced amount of pension on re-employment should not be abated any further, that would in fact be giving him a right to a certain amount of the pension as opposed to the whole amount of the pension?—That is perfectly true, Sir, it would be giving him that right, but we should have thought that that was fair enough and was equitable treatment compared with his colleagues in the other two categories that I mentioned.

1486. Why do you not put forward the whole argument, Mr. Mayne, that you should draw your pension as of right, that you are re-employed as a completely different individual and that your pension is a private income?—You really ought not to assail us for our moderation, because there is a substantial section of the Staff Side which thinks that is precisely what we ought to be claiming, but the Staff

Side has discussed this with the Treasury and it has quite deliberately modified its view and makes this very much more limited claim.

1487. *Mr. Cash*: A limited claim which might conceivably in the next 20 years perhaps work by way of a reduction, supposing salaries decreased, so that you would have to take the rough with the smooth in that case?—Yes.

1488. You would not be afraid of that?—No.

1489. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You suggest that some people think that you ought, after retirement, to be able to come back and get complete pension plus the salary of your job?—Yes.

1490. How would you deal with a case which sometimes arises, of a person who has done 40 years' service at the age of 60 has not yet retired, and continues in the same job? On the argument of your friends elsewhere, would you say he has earned his pension and therefore from that date should get full pension plus full salary in that job?—I cannot really answer for people who are putting a claim which I am not putting this morning. I think that would probably be the logic of their case, but I am not sure that all of us are always strictly logical!

1491. Is it really possible that I myself who have qualified for a pension and am still in my job, would be justified next year in drawing the 100 per cent. pension I have earned plus the 100 per cent. salary of my job?—I would like to think so, but must we not look at what in fact is happening in the Civil Service and the three categories of civil servants continuing after having formally retired?

1492. *Mr. Cash*: Does it not really amount to this, that if you were logical people would become too expensive?—That might be so, Sir. That would then provide its own answer, but is that really a fair reply to the case that we are putting, because what I have tried to emphasise is that this is one section out of three of disestablished persons. And it is quite apart too, Sir, from the person who gets employment outside and does in fact retain his pension.

1493. I was really trying to help you, if I could, because you are saying: "We are only asking for a certain moderate thing"; if you were logical and asked for the full claim, would you not then be in danger of people becoming too expensive? That is one of the factors surely which you have in mind in only asking for what you are now asking.—Indeed, yes.

1494. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: On your page 5 you make the proposal that the profits of the former office should be interpreted as the amount of pay which the

pensioner would be drawing had he not retired. Do I deduce that you would regard it as justifiable that a man who is not doing a certain job should benefit from an increase of pay designed for men who are doing the job?—No. We are referring to the type of increase which most civil servants have been having over the last few years. This is an alternative proposal for trying to meet a difficulty because generally where a man is re-employed in a lower grade he will be employed in the same field of work as before. If the individual had stayed in his exact job, he would have got the increase anyway. It may be at least as much to the benefit of his colleagues or of organisation that he drops a grade or two so as to maintain the flow of promotion. Now he is barred from an increase which is given to the grade in which he is serving because of the relationship between pay, pension and old pay. We say you can deal with this problem in one of two ways, either by defining the profits of office rather differently from the present practice of the Paymaster General or by giving a man a fixed entitlement to pension—to which there are objections.

1495. You think this will cover, without injustice, a case where the change of pay in his former job was associated with a change of type of work in that job?—I think that is a point, Sir, yes.

1496. You think he should have the benefit?—Yes, indeed.

1497. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Many civil servants after retirement come back in a lower grade?—Yes, it is a fairly frequent practice.

1498. Is it desirable?—The Staff Side think it is highly desirable, and we did in fact suggest it to the Treasury at the time when the Government's new policy of extending the retiring age came in. The Treasury were not very sympathetic to that.

1499. It seems a bit odd, on the face of it, for the State to say: "You are too old for the job, come and do another one".

—No, it is not that. What one is really saying—and this is a point which frequently appeals to people—is: "I am now 60, 62 or 63, whatever the age is, and I feel I want to ease up a bit. I do not want all the worry and strain of the rank of the job I had before; on the other hand, I do not want to be out of touch with this work".

1500. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: "And I do not want to stand in the way of promotion of people coming up"?—"And I do not want to stand in the way of promotion of my colleagues".

1501. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: This is the point of my question about the change of salary in former employment, not based on cost of living but on a change of work.

Why under those circumstances should a man benefit from the increased salary of his former grade?—I think that is a real point, but I wonder whether it is a major difficulty? It is a question of assessment. This is what comes of suggesting the machinery to deal with a principle, because practically any piece of machinery will have its assets and liabilities. In the main increases in pay since 1946 have been increases on what you might broadly call cost of living grounds. That is true of the majority of increases.

1502. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: I am looking at the letter which was from the Treasury to Mr. Day, which deals with the anomalies and the difficulties which would arise. You ask us in your memorandum not to be deterred by these anomalies.—You would get over the first by adopting our second proposition, of defining the profits of the office formerly held as a changing factor, the office remaining constant, so that the ceiling itself would change.

1503. Yes, but there are real anomalies which do arise unless we depart from Section 20 altogether?—This is an anomaly which could arise on a particular method of dealing with this problem, but we are not suggesting that we have reached the limit of ingenuity. What I am saying is that if you choose the second way, the anomaly referred to there does not arise, because you would be working to a variable ceiling, and if, as I suggest, the bulk of pay revisions in the Civil Service have been general pay revisions which have affected all classes, this individual would get his overall remuneration adjusted by the new profit of his old office.

1504. *Mr. Menzler*: Would it not require legislation to do this?—It might or it might not. There are plenty of legal people who take the view that the phrasing of the Act ought to be applied in the sense in which we have used it here.

1505. In this letter of the 20th May, 1953, it was said that you were not seeking to challenge Section 20 of the Act of 1834. At that time there were certain compensating factors, for example, that pensions are re-assessed in relation to the extra service in a disestablished capacity?—Yes, Sir.

1506. And again of course those who have nominally retired get the lump sum grant as on the date of formal retirement?—Yes. The officer retires and he takes his lump sum, because that is regarded in a separate category from his pension.

1507. Would it be fair to say that there was a deal by which you accepted those concessions in return for not pressing the abrogation of Section 20?—*Mr. Jones*: No, Sir, "deal" is hardly the term. We refrained from pressing the claim for the

abolition of Section 20 in recognition of the extent to which the Official Side came some way to recognising that there was a case to be met but we have not compromised our position with regard to the abolition of Section 20 by the 1948 agreement which was given legislative effect in 1949. Could I refer, Sir, to what Sir Alexander Gray said? He was talking about the arrangement whereby people stepped down after formal retirement, and he expressed some surprise that a person who was competent should go through that procedure. I thought it would be useful to explain just how it operates in practice. This is a developing situation. It began during the war and it is likely to be increased, I think quite considerably now that we have had a changed view about the age of retirement. May I illustrate what happens by an example that I think will be familiar to the Commission? If you take an inspector of taxes in charge of a heavy district, he at age 60 is carrying a very heavy load, which takes two forms: one, administrative responsibility for the unit and, two, the highest grade technical work, that is to say, the examination of the accounts of very large concerns. I think it will be quite easy to visualise a situation when, at 60, confronted with the necessity of carrying a load of that kind for another few years, the individual says: "Really, I doubt whether this is worth while. I think on the whole I will draw my pension and go." But, given the alternative of stepping down two grades in the office, the picture is transformed completely. He then can undertake the highest grade technical work, and his ability and judgment will be used to the utmost, but he will be relieved of the day to day responsibility for the administration of the unit and find himself doing work congenial to him, work with which he is extremely conversant. By the operation of the retirement provisions he is ensured of further useful employment under conditions which are congenial to him. To the extent that that arrangement can be operated—and it is limited in the Service; it cannot be applied, for example, to the head post-mastership, where the individual either does the job or goes—it is very desirable for several reasons; first, because it facilitates the flow of promotion which is a good thing from the point of view of the administration as well as the staff, and, secondly, and perhaps more important, it is in keeping with the present Government policy of keeping people in productive employment as long as possible. Therefore I think the Staff Side are right in feeling that, to the extent that this proposal which they are now urging helps people to continue in useful employment, it is a very good proposal and one to which the Commission ought to give their backing, if they feel

that the anomalies which have been stressed in the Treasury response to the case can be overcome in some way or other.

1508. *Mr. Cash*: May I ask whether any detailed reply was ever sent to the Treasury letter?—*Mr. Mayne*: I think we just accepted it because of the Royal Commission.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

1509. *Chairman*: Before we get down to the next section, might I ask you to convey to Mr. Day the congratulations of the Commission on his knighthood?—That is very nice of you, Sir.

1510. And will you say how sorry we are that owing to his illness we have not had the benefit of his advice because we know how much he has done for the Service?—Thank you very much. I know Mr. Day will be delighted to have that message. Of course, as you all appreciate, if his illness had not intervened he would have been occupying the chair I am occupying today.

1511. Turning to gratuities for unestablished staff, the Staff Side suggest that the introduction of an appreciably larger gratuity for temporary staff completing ten years service would act as a curb to excessively long temporary appointments. Is it not conceivable that it would have the opposite effect, and that staffs would themselves exert pressure to be allowed to stay as long as possible in order to earn a higher gratuity?—The control there, Sir, is with the Department. What we are concerned about is that temporary service is so much cheaper in this respect than established service, and we think the present circumstances rather encourage Departments to use the temporary rather than the established officer, and that you do not get re-adjustments of complements quite as rapidly as you might otherwise.

1512. Is there any outside evidence you would like us to examine in this connection?—I am not aware of any useful cases we can quote. The civil service superannuation arrangements are rather peculiar to the Civil Service. The point really is the comparison within the Service between the temporary and the established officer where the disparity seems to us to be unduly marked.

1513. How did you arrive at the details of the change you have proposed?—There is no particular sanctity about our figures. We were of course taking account of the fact that, in the Northern Ireland Government, for example, the ordinary temporary gratuity is on the basis of two weeks pay for each year of service, and that was our first thought. We thought

that that would serve for what we might call the shorter periods of temporary service. But we would not like to argue for seven years as against five years; we were trying to be as modest as we could and, at the same time, to meet the demands of our members. It seemed to us that you have to ask yourself certain questions. Recognising an entitlement on the part of the Government Departments to have temporaries for really temporary service, where do you draw the line? It seemed to us that seven years as the first marking point was, if anything, erring against the staff rather than for them, and there might be an argument for five. Then after that you get your ten years period which we thought quite excessive, and to the extent that people are spending that amount of time in civil service employment, then that ought to be marked by something larger, but still substantially smaller than the sort of superannuation entitlement that an established officer would earn.

1514. *Mr. Cash*: Have you examined any precedents in the Dominions?—No Sir.—*Mr. Wines*: We know several foreign governments which award gratuities to their civil service staffs on the basis of a minimum of two weeks pay per year of service. In fact, the U.K. Government employing locally entered staff in foreign countries has been obliged in one or two instances to increase the amount of its gratuities to take account of the practice in the country concerned.

1515. *Chairman*: Do you suggest that the improved scale of gratuities should apply to service given after legislation or retrospectively?—*Mr. Mayne*: We had in mind it would apply to people going after the date on which it becomes effective; it would be in respect of their whole service up to that time,—but not to people already gone.

1516. We come now to the reckoning for superannuation purposes of service in excess of 40 years completed by age 60.

1517. *Mr. Menzler*: Was not the alteration in practice, whereby an additional five years was allowed after 60, deliberately introduced to encourage people to carry on after 60?—Yes.

1518. Take the case of a clerk completing 45 years, say, at 61 or 62; would not your proposal have the effect of causing him to retire then because he has the equivalent of three quarters pay?—I should not have thought so. The individual who wants to keep on probably wants to do so either because of the particular job with which he is concerned, or his desire to remain in the Service. The difference between pay and pension rate is of course very marked.

1519. Are you aware of any case outside the Civil Service where more than 40 years ranks for pension up to 60?—I was under the impression that one ranked all one's superannuable service in quite a number of schemes.

1520. Do not the Inland Revenue refuse to approve a scheme which allows more than 40 years to count up to age 60?—Not quite, Sir. As I understand the Inland Revenue arrangements, they look at a two thirds salary ceiling, and that does depend how the figures work out.

1521. The normal standard is 1/60th up to a maximum of 40 years.—If it is in terms of 60ths, yes. All schemes are not on the same terms; F.S.S.U. would not work out quite like that.

1522. It would work out very much less! You have probably heard of the Millard Tucker Committee, and they have endorsed that standard?—Yes.

1523. Would you agree that if the Service went beyond 40 years below age 60 it would be a standard which would not only conflict with the Inland Revenue practice, but would have repercussions not only on other forms of public employment but outside the Service?—You are suggesting here that by ranking in the gratuity with the pension you have in effect got 60ths and therefore 40 ought to be the statutory maximum, taking the Millard Tucker standard. I take that point, but this is what the Treasury has already done, and all that we are really concerned with is the period in relation to which you start your calculations. You either regard the 40/60ths as a ceiling beyond which one ought not to pass—in which case the Treasury has already gone over that—or you deal with it as we are attempting to deal with it; given that there are certain arrangements for superannuation, ought not people who were admitted into superannuable service at such and such time in their lives to be enabled to count the full part of that within the overriding maximum fixed by the Treasury, at whatever point beyond age 60 they officially retire?

1524. You know in local government service the same principle has been adopted for service over 65; they now go on to 70?—Local government service fairly commonly follows the Civil Service in things of this description.

1525. If the Civil Service adopted your proposal, it would have repercussions there.—To the extent that they have people in the same circumstances.

1526. And the same would apply to teachers whose service can now go on to 70 and with the possibility of counting another five years—Probably, although I cannot speak with authority.

1527. This would extend to other forms of public employment?—That could be so. If there is a thing in the Civil Service which seems more desirable than other conditions outside, one would expect people outside to try and get the same standard, but I should not have thought that was a major consideration for this Commission. It might be a consideration for the Government.

1528. You are not suggesting the Commission should be oblivious to matters of public policy and repercussions on other forms of employment?—No Sir.

1529. *Sir Alexander Gray*: On the question of added years for late entrants, I gather you want a fresh approach to be made in the light especially of Lord Schuster's amendment?—Yes.

1530. Is the primary idea at the back of your mind to make it easier for the State to get recruits?—Yes.

1531. Is it partly also the idea that you have cases of people coming in late who retire on an inadequate pension?—Both.

1532. Which would you stress the more?—I think I can best answer that by taking each of my capacities separately. As spokesman for the National Staff Side I place much more emphasis on the position of the Civil Service as such and its capacity to recruit. As General Secretary of the Institution I am bound to have very much in mind the position of serving civil servants and their proper treatment.

1533. Have you evidence that the State cannot get the people it wants because of this deterrent?—It is always very difficult to answer that; it is guessing at the reasons why people who have not come into the Civil Service have not done so. We would think that our proposal would be, on the face of it, calculated to provide a wider range of applicants and therefore a better choice for the Civil Service, and we have Sir Alan Barlow's categorical views in the Barlow Report on lawyers.

1534. I take it from what you say here that you regard the present device of counting 8/5ths as inadequate?—It is not the device we are so much concerned with as the provisions of the Act and its extremely limited application.

1535. There are two or three different kinds of case which might arise. There is the question of qualification for a profession, as with the doctor and architect. Have you in mind the time it takes to qualify or the time it takes to practise a profession to make a man useful in the Civil Service?—Both.

1536. Take a doctor, how would it work in a case like that? Would you allow a lump sum for ten years or eight years,

or what?—We are rather inclined to leave the mechanics of that to be worked out after you have given, we hope, your approval of the principle, because there are two or three ways of doing it. You could either give a straight allowance from age 20 up to the individual's age, or you could say—"We will give him the period from 20 to age 35", which is the effective minimum age of entry.

1537. You dismiss this rather gaily as a matter of mechanics, but is it not important in cases like this to know where you are?—It certainly would be simpler from our point of view if the Royal Commission decided not only to recommend that a power should be given but a clear prescription under which it should be given. But we doubted whether that was practicable because the circumstances of classes vary a good deal.

1538. If you takes the Schuster amendment it gives you a somewhat vague test of a kind not ordinarily applicable in the Civil Service. That is the kind of case that worries me a bit. I suppose you might take as an example somebody going into the Ministry of Labour with experience of trade unions. Would you not be opening the door to rather difficult problems of assessing how much he ought to get?—Yes, and it was just because of that, that it seemed to us the only way was to leave it for determination between the Treasury and the Civil Service Commission on the one hand and the association concerned on the other. We would have thought that, given a broad indication of what the Commission has in mind by and large we ought not to find it impossible to rely on the ordinary give and take of negotiations.

1539. I would have thought with a thing like that there might be great danger of giving somebody an arbitrary power, and I would have thought also, if I may say so, that there might be a danger of a suspicion of jobbery occasionally?—I should not have thought that very likely in these days. Let me be quite clear about this, that, if the Commission feels that it would on its side be happier about a firm prescription we should be the last to object.

1540. Take the other side of this; how far at the back of your mind is there the idea that a person who has had a fairly important position in the Civil Service should not be retired with a very small pension?—As you know, it does happen at the present moment, and with the medical officers it is of course quite inevitable. By and large they come in at 40 and that means they have 20 to 25 years service. Circumstances will be different in the future because of the National Health Service and its superannuation regulations.

1541. With transferability of pensions the question may solve itself?—A long time hence. We have to deal with people at the moment.

1542. Is there any possible technical difficulty in regarding certain kinds of service previously as counting for pension? May I give you a concrete case to illustrate what I mean? It is rather on the fringe of the Civil Service, but take the librarian of a national library, for instance. He may come into the Civil Service quite late and he disappears with a small pension. Is there any way of getting round the question of regarding previous similar service as counting for pension?—To the extent that the individual has been in one of the schemes outside in which transfer arrangements exist, that is catered for. But your librarian example is a good one; many come into the Civil Service in precisely that way. They get nothing they can reckon.

1543. Would you give a power of certification to the Civil Service Commission?—That was the contemplation in Lord Schuster's amendment. It seemed to us a convenient arrangement but there is nothing sacrosanct about it.

1544. What about late entrants on the clerical side?—The distinction we have drawn is between people who are required by the Civil Service to come in late as against people who come in late to suit their own circumstances.

1545. In what cases does the Government require you to come in late?—In all the professional classes and, to a more limited extent, in a number of the administrative and scientific classes, for example, the librarian or press officer.

1546. How far are you departing from the idea that pensions should be based on length of service?—We are not really departing from it so long as we stick to what the Government requires. The Government requires the late entry of certain classes because it does not do its own training and, in the case of professionals, almost invariably requires outside experience.

1547. Will this question disappear, when, for instance, the scientific service of the Government throws up its own people for promotion?—Not really, Sir, because the scientific service has been doing that for a considerably number of years now. And in the medical profession or certain others, like the architect or the engineer, there will always be a problem.

1548. But, apart from those special cases, you are not claiming that people on retirement should have an entitlement to a certain pension?—No, it must be related to service and to the requirements of recruitment.

1549. *Chairman*: What of the idea of recruiting clerical officers over the age of 40. If that were adopted, do you think the added years principle should be extended to them?—That is not part of the National Staff Side's proposal. Recruitment at age 40 is not, as I understand, primarily a measure for recruiting people to the clerical class, but for dealing with a social problem and using the Civil Service as a step towards meeting that problem.

1550. *Mr. Cash*: Is it not true that this is one of the ways of making up a recruitment shortage. If, and I stress the word "if", it is necessary to supplement recruitment to the clerical class by these means, has the Staff Side considered whether they are going to ask for added years?—We had not envisaged it.—*Mr. Wines*: Our view on this is—is it inevitable that people shall be recruited late because without the experience and special training they could not do the work? As to the elderly clerical officer that is merely an alternative form of recruitment; in the case of the doctor or the lawyer it is not an alternative.

1551. *Mr. Menzler*: Have you any evidence as to outside practice in regard to added years?—*Mr. Mayne*: No, but one does in a personal way hear of cases where substantial provision by way of added years is made to people within one's own circle of acquaintances where they are going to a particular concern late in life.

1552. Is it not a fact that the Local Government Superannuation Acts give local authorities power for added years?—Yes. For some years now in half a dozen, or perhaps more, local authorities there have been local Act powers to do precisely this thing, and the power has been made a general one in the Local Government Superannuation Act passed last year.

1553. Is there not such a provision in the L.C.C. superannuation scheme?—Yes.

1554. Is not up to ten years the general outside practice?—That has been used in a number of cases, and up to ten years of course would meet a number of cases in the Civil Service, though not the rather extreme case of medical officers. It seems to me that that is one of the pities of a rigid provision.

1555. Could you tell the Commission what was the maximum amount granted under the Act of 1859?—I think it was up to twenty years but at Treasury discretion.

1556. Was that power only abolished in 1909?—Yes, there was a point Sir Alexander Gray made about nepotism in particular cases, which brought it into

disrepute, because of the way in which it was done rather than because of the arrangement itself.

1557. *Lady Albemarle*: Would you agree that the possibility of staying on for an extra five years with the consequent ability to earn more pension has a bearing on this?—It is perfectly true that a man can earn a better pension but as an equitable arrangement between parts of the Civil Service I should have thought it did not measure up?—*Mr. Jones*: Expressed in another way, it imposes a greater obligation on these people to stay longer in order to earn the same amount of pension.

1558. *Mr. Menzler*: Would not the case of the professions be largely met if there were a more generous administration of the existing powers?—*Mr. Mayne*: It would have to be very much more generous! It needs to be done in a different kind of way from the 1946 Act, because that Act is intended for the individual highly exceptional case. We are suggesting that it should not be exceptional at all but the rule.

1559. Is the Act so drawn that it would debar the typical late entrant?—The Act as drawn would preclude the present situation being put right, because you have to lay the Treasury Minute within a period of, I think, six months of the person's entry into the Civil Service.

1560. *Mr. Cash*: Would you make any distinction between contributory and non-contributory schemes in the number of added years?—No.

1561. When you add years in a contributory scheme the employer has to find that contribution which would otherwise be found by the person in question?—Yes, I take that point.

1562. From an actuarial point of view it would make a large difference?—Yes, but the question is surely one of equity within the Civil Service?

1563. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Passing on to minor superannuation adjustments to be made without recourse to legislation, have the Staff Side discussed this with the Treasury and, if so, with what result?—*Mr. Jones*: The Treasury reactions were friendly; there was something to be done here but there was no possibility of action until superannuation legislation was in prospect. The position was left on an indeterminate basis that when that stage was reached they would look at it again.

1564. One wants to find ways and means of making the scheme more flexible?—*Mr. Mayne*: Yes.

1565. And the difficulty is getting the ways and means without legislation or delegated legislation. In the kind of case we cite here this kind of thing is always arising. The Treasury are quite as anxious to do something about it as we are. You are not dealing with the principles of superannuation, but with the things thrown up.

1566. Might it be argued that, as the civil service superannuation scheme fixes the standard in many respects for other schemes in the public service, it is desirable it should be tightly drawn?—I should not have thought so. When you have got the principles of your scheme clearly and tightly set down, applications should be determined with some discretion left to the administrative body. A case has occurred just recently in the Forestry Commission where trouble arose from the wording in four Superannuation Acts. In three of them continuity of service is referred to, and the definition of "continuity" is left with the Treasury. In the other one the definition of "continuity" is not left with the Treasury. There is no reason to think it would not have been, if anybody had thought of it at the time; it is probably a slip in drafting. We have this case in the Forestry Commission at the present moment where the Treasury would be quite likely to do something—I think we can say that fairly. We are quite clear that something ought to be done and it cannot be done because it is a case that comes within the mischief of the one Act where the definition of "continuity" is not left to the Treasury. That seems to us to be carrying rigidity too far.

1567. Are these instances to which you are referring recent ones? Are they growing more and more?—Yes, because superannuation legislation and superannuation practice outside tend to develop.—*Mr. Jones:* The growth of superannuation in recent years has made this point much more significant. The 1949 Act alone is a very large Act with many aspects, and trivial points on it which could be settled by agreement cannot because there are no powers in the Act.

1568. *Chairman:* Have you thought about the form the clause could take, because it is going to be difficult to define what are minor amendments and what are not?—*Mr. Mayne:* Parliamentary draftsmen are pretty ingenious on this kind of thing. We should not have thought there would be undue difficulty here, particularly on a subject like continuity.

1569. Do you know of discretionary clauses in other schemes?—Yes.—*Mr. Jones:* The Teachers' Superannuation Bill now before the House contains

clauses which empower the Minister to introduce schemes for widows' pensions. That is an extraordinary development compared with anything in the civil service world.—*Mr. Wines:* The Police Pensions Act enables the Secretary of State, with the advice of the police authorities and the Police Council, to make regulations covering a very wide variety of conditions.

1570. *Mr. Lloyd Williams:* I think there is something in the National Health Service too.—*Mr. Mayne:* I frankly do not think there would be any difficulty in finding a formula to fit this kind of circumstance.

1571. *Mr. Cash:* The Tomlin Commission rather came down on the lines that the Treasury did not want this discretion and should not have it?—Even the Treasury changes over the years.

1572. Are you recommending that those discretionary powers should be exercised by the Treasury or by the National Whitley Council?—It would be nice if they could be exercised by the National Whitley Council but I fear it would have to be the Treasury!

1573. It would mean in every case you would have to negotiate with the Treasury?—Yes Sir, but in any case that would be true.

1574. You want enabling powers to give discretion?—Yes.

1575. Do you see any limit to those enabling powers?—Yes, it is not our view that we should get enabling powers to alter the main structure. We can well see there would be objections from Parliament to such a course.

1576. When you say the main structure you have to be a little careful where your main structure begins and ends?—I should have thought it included the provision that there should be a pension and that it should be of a specific amount; and that there should be a gratuity; also the question of reckonability of service.

1577. *Chairman:* On the transfer of pension rights, you will have seen the Treasury memorandum. Is there anything you would like to say?—As a National Staff Side we have always been very anxious to see transfer carried as far as possible. The action the Treasury have taken here we have always applauded as being good and helpful. They do not go far enough, of course, until they cover everything. How far that is possible is not only a matter for the Treasury. We have not thought it desirable or necessary to make representations on this particular aspect.

1578. On the whole, you think progress is reasonable?—Yes.

1579. *Mr. Menzler*: Do you think there ought to be transfer arrangements as between public and private employment? —We would see no objection to that at all the wider the transfer the better.

1580. *Chairman*: Is there anything further you would like to say?—I have only one point, Sir. May I refer you to page 7 of the Treasury document on transferability:—

“The decision to pension permanent scientists under the Acts rather than under F.S.S.U. has not diminished for them the possibility of easy movement, on the contrary it has improved it.”

I think that is a gross exaggeration. One does meet a difficulty here. Departments are sometimes less ready than the Treasury has indicated to agree to people going out. It is one of the fundamental points of the arrangement that it must be with the consent of the Department, and that is not always given as readily as it should be.

1581. *Mr. Menzler*: Do you disagree with the statement on page 5:—

“The policy is that such consent should not be withheld without good reason”.

—I have underlined that and propose to use it in negotiations with the Treasury!

1582. If in fact transfer arrangements were available to private industry, that statement on page 7 would be true?—Provided page 5 is implemented, yes, and there perhaps I might be allowed to say that because of our difficulties—not with the Treasury but with the Departments—in the application of transfer arrangements to classes other than scientists, we did in fact at the time of the transfer from F.S.S.U. to the civil service Superannuation Act get a specific assurance that transfer arrangements would be no less favourable than they had been under the F.S.S.U.—which places the onus not on the Department but on the man, which is rather a different thing!

Chairman: It only remains for me to thank you very much for the way you have put your case.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Tuesday, 15th June, 1954 at 11.30 a.m.)

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ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

11

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

ELEVENTH DAY

Tuesday, 15th June, 1954

Union of Post Office Workers
Witnesses



LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1954

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MR. L. F. B. MORGAN
Chairman,

MR. C. J. GEDDES
General Secretary,

MR. R. A. HAYWARD
Deputy General Secretary,

MR. L. V. ANDREWS
Assistant Secretary,

MR. D. L. BROWN
Assistant Secretary,

MR. C. STENNETT
Assistant Secretary,

MISS N. WHITELAW
Assistant Secretary,

on behalf of the Union of Post Office Workers.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

ELEVENTH DAY

Tuesday, 15th June, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE*

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

* LADY ALBEMARLE was in attendance during the morning session only.

Memorandum of evidence submitted by the Union of Post Office Workers (Post Office manipulative grades)

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I. REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OF THE UNION OF POST OFFICE WORKERS

1. As indicated in the Factual Memorandum on the Civil Service submitted by H.M. Treasury, para. 456, the Union of Post Office Workers represents the Post Office manipulative grades. The Factual Memorandum refers to the establishment at 1st July, 1953, as being 196,081. Approximately 160,000 were in membership of the Union of Post Office Workers at that date.

2. A brief description of the duties performed by the grades covered by the Memorandum and represented by the Union is given in para. 451 of that Memorandum.

3. In the following paragraphs the Union makes submissions on:—

II Principles which should govern pay.

III Pay of Post Office manipulative grades.

IV Hours and leave.

V Overtime.

VI Superannuation.

II. PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN PAY

(a) DETERMINATION OF WAGES

4. In industry the settlement of wages questions as between the employer and employee is essentially a matter of free negotiation, and industry would not countenance the imposition of a set and rigid policy by the Government or by anybody acting on behalf of the Government. In the Union's opinion the wages of the manipulative grades should be settled on a similar basis to that operating in industry generally. The Union respectfully submits therefore that the Royal Commission should not become an instrument for imposing a wages policy on a national basis to be operated in the comparatively restricted field of the Civil Service. It further submits that such a question forms only a part of the wider implications of a wages policy for the country as a whole, and if the Government intends to take action in that connection it should do so through the appropriate machinery and not by selecting its own employees in the first place for the laying down of any such policy.

5. The Union feels very strongly indeed that the essence of good industrial relationships is the complete freedom of negotiation on wages questions, and that whatever machinery decides issues unresolved by negotiation between the employer and the employee should be completely free to come to its own independent decision. It follows from this, therefore, that the Royal Commission on the Civil Service should do no more than set down general guidance which may be of use to the parties concerned. It should be quite clear that in the event of the parties proceeding to arbitration, any arbitration body should be quite uninhibited and be free to make a decision on the facts presented and should not be subject to any directive. This is the pattern of industrial conciliation machinery in this country.

6. It is doubtful whether it is appropriate for the Government to call upon a Commission which it has itself set up to enunciate a wages regulating formula to apply only to Government employees.

(b) BASIS OF PAY AGREEMENTS

7. As has been stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the Union accepts that guidance is desirable for parties concerned in wage negotiation.

8. The pay of Post Office manipulative grades has been governed by the same principles as those governing the remainder of the Civil Service, reference to which is made in paras. 114-146 of the Factual Memorandum. It will be observed that these paragraphs deal with what has become known as the "Tomlin formula" laid down by the Royal Commission presided over by Lord Tomlin.

In that formula were two broad issues:—

- (i) "Civil Service remuneration should reflect what might be described as the long term trend both in wage levels and in the economic conditions in the country";
- (ii) The desire to link Civil Service pay with comparable classes outside the Civil Service;

The Union considers it not unreasonable to maintain the broad relationship indicated in (i). The difficulty however which has faced the Union has been in securing an agreed interpretation.

9. The formula has been subjected to considerable criticism because of the varying interpretations which have been placed upon it from time to time. The dispute has centred around the method of measurement of the trends in outside wages. Whereas on the one hand the Union has consistently argued that the Ministry of Labour wages index as a whole provides a suitable guide, the Post Office has been selective in its comparisons with outside workers, and, as will be shown later in this document, has itself varied its own interpretation of this formula.

10. From the outbreak of war in 1939 it has been the case in the Civil Service that the Ministry of Labour wages index has virtually governed the adjustments which have been made, and which have been in accordance with the principles laid down in the formula.

11. It was early recognised during the war that the frequent movement in outside wages had to have a comparable adjustment within the Civil Service both from the point of view of the desire to avoid interminable negotiations with separate organisations, and also in order that equity could be given to the civil servants. As early as 1940 an agreement was reached between the Official and Staff Sides of the Civil Service National Whitley Council resulting in increases of pay related to changes in pay of industrial workers as reflected in the wages index. From time to time throughout the war years similar agreements were reached, all on the same basis, all having the same purpose, and it would be true to say that this method of settlement was acceptable to both sides of the industry.

12. At the close of the war, the all-over civil service settlements were consolidated, but the Union has continued to negotiate on the basis of the Ministry of Labour wages index. In 1947 the Union of Post Office Workers submitted to the Post Office a claim based on the Ministry of Labour wages index, and the Post Office accepted that as the appropriate basis for negotiation. In 1949 the Union submitted a claim to the Post Office covering a number of factors, but including as a major part of its claim the movement in the Ministry of Labour wages index and, although agreement on the claim was not reached, the Post Office, during the discussions, did not dispute the appropriateness of the Ministry of Labour wages index as the basis of negotiations on the general part of the claim.

13. In January, 1952, the Civil Service National Whitley Council reached an agreement for a pay addition of 10 per cent. on the first £500 of remunerations and 5 per cent. in the range of £500 to £1,000. This agreement arose directly from the acceptance by the Official Side of the Staff Side's claim that the Ministry of Labour wages index accurately measured the pay changes in outside industry and was appropriate for interpreting the Tomlin formula. The measure of disagreement between the two Sides related only to the extent to which the Ministry of Labour wages index should apply to the salary range above £500 a year. It is, in the Union's view, significant that the Treasury itself commented in the statement it issued subsequent to the Award that—"the settlement is based on the general movement in wages over the last 12 months as shown by the Ministry of Labour wages index."

14. As to the appropriateness of the wages index to cover the manipulative grades the Union has no doubt. The index covers between 12,000,000 and 13,000,000 workers on wage rates similar to those paid to the Post Office manipulative grades. It is clear, therefore, in the Union's view, that the Ministry of Labour wages index provides the guide for the parties concerned.

(c) COMPARABILITY WITH OUTSIDE WORKERS

15. The Union has, in para. 9 above, indicated that an issue in the dispute on the interpretation of the Tomlin formula has been the reference to comparable classes. The Factual Memorandum, para. 145, page 35, reproduces para. 308 of the Tomlin Commission Report. The relative passage in this connection is as follows:—

“308. We agree that the closeness with which comparisons can be made varies. It is a simple matter to compare the rates paid to fitters in the Royal Dockyards with those paid to fitters in outside employment. It may be more difficult to make comparisons in the case of, say, an executive officer. We are satisfied, however, that broad general comparisons between classes in the Service and outside occupations are possible and should be made.”

16. It will be seen that the Tomlin Commission accepted the difficulties of making comparison where there was no like work outside the Civil Service. The Union's experience has been closely in accord with that view expressed by the Commission.

17. The Post Office is, by its very nature, not comparable except perhaps in a very small degree with outside industry. It is a monopoly and has imposed upon it by the Government sole rights for the conveyance of mails, the sole maintenance of the telephones on a nation-wide basis, and sole responsibility for carrying out the Telegraph Acts.

18. The Union reproduces in an Appendix to this report a full statement on comparisons together with their use by the Post Office. Members of the Commission will, from their own knowledge and experience, be aware of the differences which obviously come to mind in comparing the types of work which have been quoted by the Post Office. Below the Union underlines those differences from its intimate knowledge of the work performed by the manipulative grades.

Postmen

19. The postman will be a familiar figure to the members of the Royal Commission, and he is closely identified with the service which he renders to the public.

20. The popular conception that he is employed only on the collection of letters from posting boxes, and the delivery of letters to business houses and private residences, is completely inaccurate. It may be that it is this popular conception which has encouraged the Post Office to compare the postman with workers in undertakings concerned with delivery, e.g., milk roundsmen and bakers. The Union entirely rejects these comparisons in the submissions which it now makes.

21. It may be that the most useful way of putting this submission to the Commission is to trace what happens to an actual item of correspondence, and to what extent members of the postman's grade handle it. For this illustration the Union has not taken an exceptional item of correspondence, but a normal one, an ordinary unregistered letter passing from a sub district in Manchester to a sub district in London. The letter first has to be collected by the postman who, in passing, changes the time-plate for the next collection.

22. At the local sorting office the proceeds of the collection are then checked by the postman to see that it bears postage stamps at the appropriate rate, and conforms with the appropriate regulations. The postage stamps are then cancelled either by machine, or by hand if the item is too bulky for the machine; and it is essential that the postman should see that all the letters are accurately time stamped. The Commission will readily appreciate this point because of the possible controversy which can arise, particularly on the large amount of correspondence dealing with betting transactions. It will then be the postman's duty to sort this correspondence into as many as 48 different selections. He is required to have a general knowledge of the geography of the country and a more particular knowledge of certain areas, the actual selections depending on the distribution of the correspondence which is handled at his office of employment. He may be required to sort bulk postings, packets and parcels on to a sorting plan different from that used for the ordinary correspondence.

23. The letter which has been collected, examined, franked with the cancelling stamp, and sorted, solely and entirely by the postman, may at this stage be bundled in accordance with the appropriate selection and passed to the postman higher grade for final despatch, or it may at this stage be passed to the postman higher grade for further sortation. The sealed bags of bundles of correspondence are then conveyed by postmen, who will be responsible for their safe custody to the point of hand over, which may be at another office, or in the case of the illustration a railway station, where they are loaded on to the appropriate railway train. On arrival at the distant railway station the train will be met by other postmen who will receive the bags of correspondence from the railway authorities, and convey them to the sorting office. At the receiving office a postman higher grade will be responsible for verifying the correct number of bags has been received, after which a member of the postman grade will deal with the bundled correspondence. This has to be sorted for local delivery into what are known as walks, and this may require more than one handling in order to break the correspondence down into the number of walks covered by the local office. For example, a long street may require several postmen to deliver it, and considerable local knowledge is required as to where the street splits for delivery purposes, because much of the correspondence is addressed to firms by name, houses by name, as well as by the more orthodox method of numbers. Any residue correspondence for delivery at outlying offices will also be sorted, bundled and despatched by the postmen.

24. The postman is also expected to use his common sense and knowledge in accurately disposing of items which are incorrectly addressed, and he is expected to make the fullest use of his local knowledge, which might not be confined to that particular delivery office. For example, much correspondence addressed to Hither Green, London, is proper to S.E.6, some to S.E.13 and some to S.E.12, Hither Green being a residential locality and not a municipal or postal boundary. In a large number of instances municipal and postal boundaries do not coincide.

25. The Commission will appreciate that to economise in town delivery force the Post Office do not employ postmen to go purely and solely along one road and back again, but each walk consists of a selected compact area comprising of a number of roads, and where these turn off a long main road, local knowledge is again required to know where each walk fits into the general picture. The postman responsible for the actual delivery operation after the correspondence has been sorted to his particular walk, has then to put it in the order in which it can be most speedily delivered, bearing in mind that Post Office duties are based on the most economical way of effecting delivery. While placing this correspondence in the correct delivery order he must also pay the fullest attention to the various redirection notices and delivery instructions for the premises covered by his walk. The Post Office places very great importance upon the need for an effective service which provides for correct delivery and the immediate redirection of postal packets to an addressee who may be away on holiday or who may have removed from the district.

26. The actual delivery is undertaken by the postman without supervision. He must exercise great care in finally disposing of the item.

27. In the foregoing paragraphs the Union has dealt with the more usual transaction and has, it submits, shown that the work is complicated and involves a number of processes, and requires specialised knowledge. Roughly, similar considerations apply to the handling of packets and parcels. The Union does, however, desire to stress that the postman is called upon to handle items of considerable value in the treatment of registered matter which, as will have been seen from recent Press comments on security questions, can be of very large sums of actual cash.

28. The postman in the larger towns and cities of this country is regarded by the public as their immediate link with the mails, and this is even more accentuated in the rural areas where the postman undertakes certain transactions which otherwise would have to be performed at the public counter.

29. An itemised description of the work performed by postmen is as follows :—

1. Facing and stamping.
2. Outward primary sorting :—
 - (i) Short and long letters, including tying up and labelling (not bagging of direct selections).
 - (ii) Packets.
 - (iii) Parcels.
3. Inward primary sorting :—
 - (i) Letters and parcels.
 - (ii) Tying and labelling and bagging of bundles of letters.
4. Inward secondary and residue sorting including tying, labelling and bagging off.
5. Private box sorting and making up of private bags.
6. Handing out to private box renters.
7. Assembling of registered receipts.
8. Customs work, opening and closing of parcels.
9. Opening of non-bill bags.
10. Bagging of inward correspondence for subordinate offices.
11. Bagging of correspondence for sub-offices not under the control of the despatching office.
12. Staffing of separate private box counters and normally the handing out of registered items and high value packets for box holders.
13. Liability for supervision of postmen on telegraph delivery work for short periods.
14. Higher grade postmen's work of less than one hour's duration daily.
15. Coin collecting from telephone kiosks and stamp selling machines.

30. The Union submits it has clearly demonstrated in the foregoing paragraphs that the class of work of the workers with whom the Post Office have made comparison can in no way be reasonably compared with that of the postman.

Postmen higher grade

31. The Union submits there is no basis for comparing postmen higher grade with any outside worker. His duties are performed only within the Post Office. In no industry, nationalised or private, does the work compare with that of postmen higher grade.

32. The postman higher grade in his handling of unregistered correspondence, is responsible for what is known as outward secondary sorting, that is to say that when the item has been first selected, or primarily sorted, into one of 48 broad divisions in which work he may also have been involved, it is the responsibility of the postman higher grade to then sort it into a more closely defined area. For example, at the primary sorting stage, letters may have been sorted to the Yorkshire division. It will be the responsibility of the postman higher grade to sort those letters into selections covering the whole of the county. He is required to have an intimate knowledge of the postal circulation arrangements which determine the routing to the town of delivery, either direct, through a forwarding office or a travelling Post Office. The routing may change throughout the 24 hours.

33. A route which may seem to the ordinary member of the public to be direct, may have no bearing whatever on the postal circulation which links up with trains coming across country.

34. The Union avers that the postman higher grade is required in many cases to have a knowledge of hundreds of direct selections into localities. It follows from this that the Post Office places great reliance on the experience which

these men require in order that they may be able to dispose accurately and speedily of correspondence which is addressed to areas which are not accurate for postal services, e.g., correspondence addressed to the Ridings of Yorkshire. Every unnecessary handling of correspondence is, of course, a further charge on staffing costs and the Post Office expects to obtain, and does obtain, a very high standard of sorting.

35. With the exception of the collection and delivery the whole of registered correspondence is handled by the postman higher grade, who is responsible for the separate sorting, circulation and despatch to all offices. He must maintain an absolute balance of all registered traffic which he handles.

36. The submissions which the Union has made so far have referred to the responsibility which the postman higher grade has in dealing with internal postal traffic. In addition it is the postman higher grade who is required to sort foreign mails and who requires for this purpose a very wide knowledge of countries, and of towns and provinces in those countries. The standing of the British Post Office is very high indeed because of its efficient handling of foreign mails; and that is directly attributable to the men who do the actual sortation.

37. A full list of the work performed by the postman higher grade follows:—

1. Outward secondary and residue sorting for inland and imperial and foreign destinations—letters, packets and parcels.
2. Bagging of bundles of letters:—
 - (i) Made up at outward primary, outward secondary, or residue roads (by postmen and postmen higher grade).
 - (ii) For imperial and foreign destinations.
3. Bag opening (bags containing bills).
4. Acceptance of registered letters and parcels and entry items from bag openers, counter officers and collecting postmen.
5. Treatment of registered and entry items following acceptance from bag openers, etc.
6. Preparation of receipt forms for all registered items for delivery—letters and parcels.
7. Enclosing bills, registered and entry items in mails despatched—letters and parcels.
8. Express work—letters and parcels.
9. Surcharging.
10. Inward mail tick.
11. Outward mail tick.
12. Bill tick.
13. Miscellaneous superior sorting and parcel office duties.
14. Corrections to rule books retained and used in sorting offices and postmen's district offices; minor writing duties, e.g.—preparation of bills at present provided for on sorting office duties; minor writing work at present performed by outdoor force.
15. Other work, including "outdoor" writing work now performed by head postmen, or supervising postmen.
16. Customs work, docket, etc., work.
17. Acceptance of registered items at separate private box counters.
18. Treatment of high value packets in sorting offices.
19. Acceptance at sorting offices of bulk postings of firms' parcels—pre-stamped and non-stamped items.
20. Initial preparation of mis-sent reports.
21. Checking of registered receipts.

22. Taking over registered items from counter clerks at public counters and the associated despatch work where separate staffing by postmen higher grade is justified.

23. Returned letter section:—

- (a) Opening of letter and parcel mails containing "dead" matter for returned letter section treatment, together with the allied tick and bill work connected with these mails.
- (b) Sorting of "dead" items into simple working divisions, e.g., letters, packets, parcels.
- (c) Disposal of the items at (b) to the various points for further treatment.
- (d) Returning to the sender items bearing an address for return on cover.
- (e) Disposal of printed paper matter.
- (f) Opening of parcels not bearing on the outside the name and address of the sender and the closing of such parcels after the contents have been examined by the appropriate returned letter section officer.

24. Supervision of postmen on telegraph delivery work.

25. Supervision of outdoor force.

38. It is submitted that in the foregoing paragraphs dealing with postmen higher grade the Union has shown quite clearly that there can be no valid comparison with any class of worker in outside industry, since no other worker can possibly be called upon to perform this type of work.

Telephonists

39. The Union has previously mentioned in this document that in its view one of the main reasons why accurate comparisons cannot be made is that the Post Office is a monopoly, and has a virtual monopoly of the national telephone network. The telephone service, as members of the Commission will be aware, is a vital part of the industrial and social life of the country. As a result of the mechanisation of the service, the telephone operator has now become much more a public servant in the sense that he, or she, deals more directly than hitherto with the public when they are in difficulty. The telephonist is called upon when dealing with local calls to deal with "the difficult call," the one in which the subscriber has been unable to complete a call which he has initiated through some failure on his part or failure on the part of the system itself. Whilst the telephonists are not in physical contact with the public, their work is confined to dealing with the public in circumstances which emphasise the difficulty of the task. When the subscriber makes contact with the operator it is after he has endeavoured to complete the call himself and often has become exasperated by his failure. The telephonist is concerned with the amount of revenue which the telephone service provides, particularly when dealing with trunk and toll calls.

40. As far as trunk calls are concerned, he or she is directly responsible for connecting the two subscribers, for timing a call in order that the appropriate charge may be made, and failure to do this efficiently may result in overcharging and, therefore, enquiry by the subscriber with resultant clerical work, or loss of revenue to the Department through failure to accurately charge a call.

41. The telephonist also deals with toll calls, which carry an additional charge over and above that of local calls, and again is responsible for timing the call in order to ensure that the Post Office gets the maximum revenue from this service.

42. In addition certain telephonists perform clerical work in connection with recruitment, wages, subsistence claims, etc., sick leave, annual leave and special leave; certain preparation work in connection with attendances, losses or damage

of the personal effects of the staff, accidents on duty, transfers, resignations, duty rotas, statistical returns with regard to subscribers' lists, exchange records, complaints, coin box discrepancies, routine testing of telephonists' instruments and equipment, preparation of telephone tickets, stores and traffic statistics.

43. It will be seen from the above that there is no real comparison between the work performed in the Post Office telephone system and by telephonists employed outside the Post Office, and certainly, in the Union's submission, there is no possible comparison with shop assistants, co-operative assistants, or the retail distributive trades.

44. The above submissions are conclusive proof that it is not possible to find a strict comparison between telephonists employed in the Post Office and any other telephonists, and certainly no comparison with workers performing other types of work.

Telegraphists

45. The telegraphist is not a typist in the accepted sense of the word. Telegraphy is a craft of its own. It has its own special procedure, its own special knowledge and its own special skills. While it is true that the telegraphist operates a teleprinter which has a keyboard similar, although not the same as that of the ordinary typewriter, the work performed is different.

46. The duties of telegraphists are varied, but in the main comprise the transmission of telegraph traffic. For this purpose a thorough knowledge of typing is required, but once a high degree of touch-typing efficiency has been attained, a highly specialised course of teleprinter operating training is then necessary. The operator on the teleprinter machine works to distant points all over the country to which he can obtain almost immediate contact by an automatic switching device. Meticulous accuracy is required for a number of reasons:—

- (a) The major portion of telegraph traffic is of an urgent business nature where error can lead to the loss of commercial orders, as was acknowledged by the Special Committee of the House of Commons which considered telegraph traffic and which underlined the essential part telegraph services play in industry.
- (b) Government services pay particular regard to the telegraph service which forms an essential part of the defence services of the country. The following questions and answers which were before the Select Committee show clearly the importance which the Government places on a thoroughly efficient and competent telegraph service during the time of national crisis.

1188. *Chairman :*

I should have thought that it covered it, the telephone service and the wireless? (Sir Ben Barnett)—No, it has strategic value and that is one of the reasons why I do not think anybody could contemplate, as it were, apart altogether from the public aspect, closing down the telegraph service altogether.

1189. *Chairman :*

What is the strategic aspect? Getting a line of communications between different points for defence purposes.

1190. *Major Sir Frank Markham :*

Map references, and so on? Yes.

1191. *Chairman :*

Yes, quite? Apart altogether from that, there is an immense amount of work involved in calling up the troops at the outset of war, and the peak of that is extremely high. I do not know whether you call that strategic, but it is rather important for the service point of view. I would call it strategic myself.

- (c) The automatic system does not require the immediate attendance of an operator at the receiving end and thus imposes on the sending officer a need for accuracy to obviate the querying of incorrect transmission after the circuit has been broken.
- (d) The handling of the various types of traffic requires a knowledge of procedures which vary from time to time and which are essential to the smooth running of the service.

47. The Union now turns to the comparisons which have been used by the Post Office. From the schedule submitted in the Appendix the Union selects a few of the comparisons made in order to demonstrate that there is no relationship between the work performed by the telegraphist and that of those cited by the Post Office. For example, the Post Office has cited shop assistants, co-operative assistants and clerks and railway messengers. In the Union's view there can be no comparison whatever between the work performed by a telegraphist and that of a shop assistant, co-operative assistants and clerks, and railway messengers. The only class of worker employed in the private sector of industry with which, in the Union's view, there is an analogy is that of the cable company telegraphist. It is significant that although the Post Office used that comparison prior to 1927, they ceased to use it then and have not used it since. The Union assumes the reason for this is the disparity in favour of the cable company telegraphist in the pay between the two classes. The Union asks the Royal Commission to draw the conclusion, therefore, that the comparisons quoted by the Post Office are not on the basis of work at all, but on some other basis to which reference will be made later in this document.

Postal and telegraph officer

48. The Union submits that clearly there is no point of comparison between the postal and telegraph officer working at a Crown Post Office, and a shop assistant with whom he has been compared by the Post Office. The Union could, however, see points of comparison between the work of a postal and telegraph officer at a counter and that performed by bank officials, certain local government officials, and clerical officers in local offices of the various Ministries.

49. In addition to the counter work, the postal and telegraph officer is responsible for the clerical work in the head postmasters' offices throughout the United Kingdom.

50. As far as the counter work is concerned, the work of the postal and telegraph officer is of immense personal value to the public. He is responsible for the handling of the multifarious types of transactions which can be made across the Post Office counter. On the banking aspect of his job he is responsible for Post Office Savings Bank, National Savings Certificates, and Government Stock transactions. His agency work on behalf of the Government involves the payment of the complete range of benefits under the National Insurance Act, National Industrial Injuries Act, the various Acts dealing with war disabilities and Forces service pensions and allowances (he is regarded by the public as a counsellor and friend on many questions associated with these benefits). Work on behalf of local government authorities covers taxation, particularly road vehicle taxation, which requires precisely the same knowledge as that possessed by the local government official doing similar work. In fact, if the Post Office did not issue these licences the road vehicle taxation system of this country could not operate without tremendous inconvenience to the public and an enormous increase in expenditure to local authorities. A number of other items are undertaken by way of agency work for Government Departments or for local authorities, and in this connection the Union instances the acceptance of Inland Revenue payments, dog licences, gun licences, the payment of postal drafts, etc.

51. Turning now to what may generally be described as purely Post Office business, the postal and telegraph officer is responsible for the issuing and payment of money orders, both inland and overseas. This necessitates in many cases currency conversion. Auxiliary services in the money order service would include such items as the transmission of money by telegraph money order. The second means of exchange of money conducted by the Post Office is the postal

order. Postal orders are both issued and paid by the postal and telegraph officer. He is responsible for the whole of a very wide range of postage stamps, insurance stamps, and Inland Revenue stamps covering more than 230 denominations ranging in value from a halfpenny to £50. One of the main services given by the postal and telegraph officer is the answering of the enquiries of the public which range over the whole postal facilities from the regulations on printed paper rate to the complicated instructions on the acceptance of insured boxes for foreign countries, through the whole gamut of imperial and foreign telegrams and radiograms, and to the services which have been previously mentioned by the Union in the foregoing paragraphs. There is, of course, internal licence work for the Post Office, the issuing of licences for wireless receiving stations, and television receiving stations, including mobile stations in motor cars. It is not uncommon for the turnover of the till of a postal and telegraph officer to amount to £11,000 per day.

52. The Union would now submit as a complement to what it has said about the work performed on the counter, a statement of the duties performed in the head postmasters' offices in the provinces, and district postmasters' offices in London. The postal and telegraph officer is responsible for the clerical work covering the whole range of management of head office and subordinate offices, incorporating the control of postal, telephone and telegraph matters.

53. One of the functions of management referred to above is the supply of stock and cash to head and subordinate offices. Many offices have a large number of subordinate offices and considerable sums of money are involved in these transactions. If one takes a large district office in London, there are something over 200 sub offices which have to be supplied with money for the payment of pensions, and for the conducting of post office business. This involves a postal and telegraph officer in handling and despatching cash, for which he has the sole responsibility, a sum of £12,000 is not uncommon. As far as the provincial offices are concerned there is in addition the supplying of stamps, postal orders and other stock which the sub postmaster would have to use.

54. The clerical duties which the postal and telegraph officer is required to perform include:—

Local management:—

The postal and telegraph officer has a considerable degree of responsibility for the proper functioning of sub offices. He checks accounts, revises pay scales of sub-postmasters, and keeps under close observation local services and their extension.

Postal organisation:—

He handles the clerical work in connection with the establishment and alteration of mails. He deals with special facilities such as business reply services, and postage meters. The complicated special arrangements for Christmas pressure are prepared by him. In addition there are a number of other essential matters.

Telegraphs:—

He maintains necessary traffic returns and checks completed traffic to ensure that revenue is not lost. Public enquiries in connection with the telegraph service are dealt with by him, as also are enquiries and reports on wireless licences. These sometimes lead to the preparation of police prosecution cases.

Accounts:—

He maintains records of stocks of stamps and postal orders, he prepares the office account and revenue and expenditure schedules, and is responsible for work in connection with business reply services and firms' accounts.

Establishment work:—

He undertakes clerical work dealing with recruitment, examinations, leave, pay increments, and superannuation. He maintains various important incidental matters, such as accident and discipline cases, and cleaning arrangements.

Staff control:—

He deals with day to day staffing arrangements, and the regular balancing of staff complements. The important preparatory work for the quinquennial reviews of staff, the annual returns of work and the overhauls of force are done by the postal and telegraph officer.

Buildings, stores, etc.:—

The necessary clerical work in connection with office maintenance, transport service and the erection of posting boxes and telephone kiosks is performed by the postal and telegraph officer.

Salaries and wages:—

He prepares wages and salary sheets involving the necessary income tax adjustments and checking of overtime and substitution claims. There is, of course, a variety of incidental work in this field.

General:—

Many other matters fall to the postal and telegraph officer, and of these the Union would instance the maintenance of records of expenditure on establishment, on which the Post Office bases its estimates of expenditure. He deals with confidential enquiries with the public, and is frequently called upon to visit them.

The Post Office regulations contain a detailed list of about 100 items for which he bears either final or part responsibility.

55. The Union has given a broad description of the work undertaken by this grade, for which there is a common liability to rotate both on the whole range of counter duties and on the whole range of writing work. Postal and telegraph officers are also called upon as occasion demands to perform the duties of postmen higher grade and telegraphists.

56. The Union expresses the view that there is no worker in Government, local government or outside industry with the same range of duties. It is quite impossible to find other workers who perform the same variety of work of this quality.

Radio operators

57. The radio operator has no direct counterpart in outside industry. No radio operating is allowed except by permission of the Government, and the limited use of radio frequencies is confined in voice transmission to such organisations as fire brigades, and some transport undertakings.

58. The Post Office radio operator is required to have a very high skill of telegraphy, both teleprinter and morse. The teleprinting skill is necessary for the disposal of messages which he received over his wireless communication. Ships at sea are in continuous touch by morse with British radio stations, which are centred at various points in England and Scotland.

59. The typical circumstances in which a radio operator has to work is for him to be required to receive a morse message transmitted at the same time as a number of other totally different messages can be heard being transmitted by other ships and in addition there may be interference caused through atmospheric conditions. It is not at all unusual for six or more ships to be sending morse at the same time, on the same wavelength, and for the radio operator to have to concentrate on the pitch of one note, and to have to read it accurately through a background of interference.

60. There are varying standards of operating ability emanating from the ships, but the Post Office operator is expected to be able to read them all, and to ensure absolute accuracy. The range of wireless communication of some ships is limited and if they are in an area from which reception is difficult the operator has to be alert so that he does not miss traffic while the ship is in range.

61. The radio operator is the key link in the S.O.S. service, both with the radio telephone when the ship is close to the shore and on the wider radio telegraphy system where only morse contact can be made; and it is true to say that hundreds of lives of sea-going and air-going travellers have been saved as the result of the vigilance of Post Office operators, as indeed have also the lives of people taken ill on board ship, when as part of the normal service obtaining, requests for medical advice have been received from ships, and such advice transmitted by the Post Office radio station.

62. In order to accomplish these tasks the radio operator must be able to transmit and read morse at a very high speed, he must have a knowledge of German and French languages, and he must have technical certificates which enable him to deal with the highly expensive and intricate apparatus he is required to use.

63. The Union submits in the foregoing paragraphs that there can be no true comparison with outside industry, and while it is a fact that there are radio operators employed at certain Government establishments with whom a comparison might be made, the Post Office radio operator has higher qualifications, linguistic, technical and operational than these Government wireless operators. The qualifications are higher than those required by sea-going operators.

Cleaners

64. As far as the grade of cleaners is concerned it is true, of course, that the Post Office has been more consistent in its choice of comparison and has cited cleaners in outside industry and in other Government Departments.

65. The Union does not accept that there is a strict analogy between these classes, and submits the following list of duties which the Post Office cleaner is called upon to perform:—

1. Washing of floors, corridors, walls and yards.
2. Scrubbing of floors, corridors and staircases.
3. Dress, wax and polish floors.
4. Dusting generally—including office furniture and sorting office fittings.
5. Sweeping and dusting overhead pipes and walls of offices.
6. Sweeping of sorting office floors.
7. Sift and examine sweepings for the recovery of lead seals, string and paper.
8. Bag up used lead seals, paper and string ready for collection.
9. General tidying and cleansing of retiring rooms and welfare accommodation.
10. Cleansing of lavatories, water closets and urinals.
11. Spray disinfectant into offices, rooms, cubicles and lavatories.
12. Cleaning of firegrates, laying of fires and carrying of coal.
13. Stoking duties, i.e.—replenishment of fuel, clinkering of fires, clearing of ash pits, conveying ashes to ash hoists, cleaning of flues.
14. Attention to guages and boilers (water and heating).
15. Venting of radiators.
16. Keeping boiler house clean, starting up or closing down boilers as conditions warrant.
17. Receive, check and trim coke for stoking.
18. Check and be responsible for receipt and use of firewood.
19. Read meters in connection with gas, water and electricity.
20. Dust and clean electric light fittings.
21. Window cleaning and changing window curtains.
22. Assist with stores, transferring goods to and from storeroom.
23. Issue of personal user towels.

24. Pack, despatch and receive laundry weekly.
25. Attend fire fighting appliances.
26. Clean and oil trucks and handcars, and effect minor repairs.
27. Clean motor garages.
28. Clean public posting boxes and signs.
29. Clean telephone kiosks and public call boxes.
30. Tidy public counters and replenish forms for public use.
31. Collection of confidential waste from other Government Departments.

66. From this list of duties the Union would draw attention to No. 7; the recovery of lead seals, string and paper, all of which are of value to the Post Office; particularly so in the case of the lead seals, the salvage of which is considerable, due to the very high price of lead.

67. No. 13—stoking duties: stoking duties are normally performed in outside industry by specialised staff on much higher rates of pay than that given to the post office cleaner, while in other Government Departments it is not a function normally undertaken by the cleansing staff.

68. No. 14 flows from the duties which have to be undertaken under the preceding item in the schedule.

69. Items 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 31 are not normally undertaken by cleaners in outside industry or other Government Departments; and on No. 29 the Union would add that there have been many instances where kiosks and public call boxes have been misused, and this work is often extremely unpleasant.

70. It is the Union's view that the work of the cleaners, in general, is universally underestimated. It has traditionally been considered as a purely labouring job, requiring no skills. Consideration, however, of the actual work performed, the conditions under which it is done, and the unpleasantness which is often associated with it, disposes of this general argument that it is unskilled work unworthy of special recognition. Furthermore, the results of the cleaners' work are seldom taken into account. The contribution which they make to the well being of the public and the staff from a health point of view, and the contentment which results from working in clean and bright surroundings, is under valued.

71. The Union would like, exceptionally, to quote a particular case. It is the only case within its knowledge where urgent representations have been sought because of the absence of a single person in such a vast organisation as the Post Office. The case in question was where a cleaner had been off duty for a week and it had been found impossible, due to the circumstances prevailing in the local labour market, to replace him. Urgent representations were received by telegram that the Union should take the matter up direct with Post Office headquarters because of the condition of the office; and the request was accompanied by a threat that the staff could no longer work under the conditions which prevailed due to the absence of the cleansing staff.

72. The scale submitted by the Union is, in its view, modest in relation to the work performed, the variety of the work, the difference between the work performed by the Post Office cleaners and cleaners generally, and in the general contribution made by the cleaners to the well being of the Post Office staff and the general public.

73. From the analysis of the Appendix which is submitted on page 41, it will be apparent to the Commission that the Post Office choice of comparisons has not followed a consistent pattern, and reference to this has been made from time to time in the above submissions where it has been stated that the Post Office have, for some reason, ceased to use a particular class of worker as a comparison.

74. It will also have been apparent to members of the Royal Commission that the manipulative grades have been compared with classes of workers who are not performing the same work.

75. It will be clear to members of the Royal Commission that the Post Office have moved from one category of comparisons to another as wage rates have moved, and that they have disposed of a particular class of comparison where the pay of that particular class has advanced beyond the grade with which it was on the last occasion compared, and, in fact, the Tomlin formula has been used as a device for the selection of industries with which to depress the wages of the particular grade under consideration. It is the Union's submission that this was never the intention of the Tomlin Commission.

76. It was clearly their intention to compare like work with like work as is indicated in paragraph 308 of the Royal Commission reproduced on page 35 of the Factual Memorandum when they cited fitters in Royal Dockyards and fitters in outside employment as examples of where it was a simple matter to make comparisons.

77. It is the Union's submission that for these reasons the Ministry of Labour wages index should be accepted as a guide, because it is not possible to find comparable classes and since the view of the Tomlin Commission that it was the overall long term trend in wages in outside industry which was to decide service wage movements.

78. In these circumstances the Union hopes that the Royal Commission will agree that the best possible guide to the parties concerned in wage negotiations on the basis of changes in the pay of outside industrial workers is, in fact, to be found in changes in the Ministry of Labour wages index as reported by the Ministry of Labour from time to time.

(d) SYSTEMS OF ADJUSTMENT

79. In the Treasury Factual Memorandum reference is made to the all-service settlement reached on the Civil Service National Whitley Council for a revision of civil service pay. On that occasion the revision was related to the percentage rise in the Ministry of Labour wages index, and a percentage increase in pay was granted to civil servants. In the Union's submission this is the only just way in which to revise the pay of the manipulative grades. In the male adult grades of postmen, postmen higher grade, telephonists, telegraphists, and postal and telegraph officers employed in London, there are 42 different rates of pay varying from £6 3s. 6d. a week for postmen at 21, to £9 16s. for postal and telegraph officers at the maximum. There are, however, three scales of pay, London intermediate and provincial, and there are more than the five grades quoted in the manipulative group. Within the five grades, therefore, there are 126 different rates of adult pay ranging from £5 17s. for a postman of 21 in a provincial office, to £9 16s. for a postal and telegraph officer at his maximum in London. These rates will vary by a few shillings a week.

80. It is clear, therefore, that a flat rate increase to all men in the five grades stated will result in a very uneven compensation for any loss of purchasing power. For example, an increase of 7s. a week to a postman at 21 in a provincial office on £5 17s. a week, will result in a 6 per cent. increase in pay. The same increase of 7s. a week for a postal and telegraph officer at his maximum, in London, would result in an increase of 3.57 per cent. The rate of pay of both of these workers determines his standard of life, and increases in pay designed to restore purchasing power are designed to restore the standard of living. It is clear, however, that a flat rate increase such as that stated above may more than restore the loss of purchasing power to the postman quoted, but will fall far short of restoring the purchasing power to the postal and telegraph officer. A series of flat rate increases may, therefore, result in improving the standard of living of the postman at 21 in the provinces, whilst at the same time reducing the standard of living of the postal and telegraph officer at the maximum in London, despite the fact that the increase is designed to restore the standard of living of both.

81. The Union's view is that the Ministry of Labour wages index should be used as a guide for changes to be made on a percentage basis. Only by this method is it possible to ensure the preservation of relativities, and to ensure that each

worker receives equal compensation. The Union's view is therefore that any measurement which is used to vary the changes of pay of the Post Office manipulative grades should be a percentage change and not on the basis of a flat rate increase.

82. The Union hopes that the Royal Commission will recommend that where changes in the rates of pay are the subject of negotiation that it would be a correct conclusion to those negotiations if the increases were granted on a percentage basis.

83. The Union asks the Commission to agree that once the pay of a manipulative grade has been fixed in relation to the value of the work performed, the purchasing power of that wage should not be varied more markedly than the purchasing power of workers in outside industry; that for the purpose of assessing such changes the Ministry of Labour wages index should be accepted as the appropriate guide; that the application of the changes should be in the form of a percentage increase at all points of the scales, and should not be on the basis of a flat rate.

III. PAY OF POST OFFICE MANIPULATIVE GRADES

84. In paragraphs 19-72 above the Union has given a brief description of the work of the main manipulative grades. The Royal Commission is invited by its terms of reference to consider whether any changes are desirable in the rates at present in force for the main categories. The Union submits that changes are justified in the case of the manipulative grades. The Union has endeavoured for many years to obtain a reassessment of the wages scales of these grades on the grounds that the work performed has been, for a number of reasons, undervalued. The Union has shown that the wage scales have been depressed by comparing these grades with other workers with whom there was no just comparison. The Union now submits that the pay of these grades should be revised in accordance with the following scales and gives further reasons in support of this submission.

POSTMEN

					s.	d.
16 years and under ...	...	...	...	...	74	—
17 years ...	...	...	...	...	83	—
18 years ...	...	...	...	...	93	—
19 years ...	...	...	...	...	103	—
20 years ...	...	...	...	...	117	—
21 years ...	...	...	...	...	138	—
22 years ...	...	...	...	...	146	6
23 years ...	...	...	...	...	153	—
24 years ...	...	...	...	...	159	6
Then by annual increments as follows:—					166	—
					172	6

POSTMEN HIGHER GRADE

					s.	d.
21 years ...	...	...	...	...	138	—
22 years ...	...	...	...	...	149	—
23 years ...	...	...	...	...	157	—
24 years ...	...	...	...	...	165	—
Then by annual increments as follows:—					173	—
					179	6
					186	—
					192	6

TELEPHONISTS (M) AND TELEPHONISTS (F)

	telephonists (M)	telephonists (F)
	s. d.	s. d.
16 years and under		74 -
17 years		83 -
18 years		93 -
19 years		103 -
20 years		113 -
21 years	138 -	133 -
22 years	149 -	136 6
23 years	157 -	140 -
24 years	165 -	143 6
25 years (highest age point)	173 -	147 -
	179 6	150 6
	186 -	154 -
	192 6	

TELEGRAPHISTS (M) AND TELEGRAPHISTS (F)

	telegraphists (M)	telegraphists (F)
	s. d.	s. d.
16 years and under	74 -	74 -
17 years	83 -	83 -
18 years	93 -	93 -
19 years	103 -	103 -
20 years	117 -	113 -
21 years	138 -	133 -
22 years	149 -	136 6
23 years	157 -	140 -
24 years	165 -	143 6
25 years (highest age point)	173 -	147 -
	179 6	150 6
	186 -	154 -
	192 6	

POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH OFFICERS

	P. & T.O.s (M)	P. & T.O.s (F)
	s. d.	s. d.
At 16 years of age	74 -	74 -
17 years	86 -	86 -
18 years	98 -	98 -
19 years	110 -	110 -
20 years	122 -	122 -
21 years	149 -	137 -
22 years	160 -	144 -
23 years	171 -	150 -
24 years	182 -	156 -
25 years and over	193 -	162 -
Then by annual increments as follows:—	204 -	168 -
	214 -	174 -
	224 -	180 -

TELEGRAPHISTS (redundant)
SORTERS (redundant)
SORTING CLERKS AND TELEGRAPHISTS (redundant)

	(M)		(F)	
	s.	d.	s.	d.
21 years of age	138	—	133	—
22 years	149	—	136	6
23 years	157	—	140	—
24 years	165	—	143	6
25 years	173	—	147	—
Then by annual increments as follows:—	179	6	150	6
	186	—	154	—
	192	6		

N.B.—The work of the above redundant grades has not been described in this document as in the main these grades are employed on work now performed by postmen higher grade or telegraphists.

RADIO OPERATORS

	(M)	
	s.	d.
At 21 years of age	180	—
22 years	190	—
23 years	200	—
24 years	210	—
25 years and over	220	—
Then by annual increments as follows:—	230	—
	240	—
	250	—

CLEANERS—MALE

	s.	d.
On entry	143	— a week
After one year	147	— a week

CLEANERS—FEMALE

s. d.
122 — a week

85. The Tomlin Commission in dealing with general considerations which should govern the pay of the Civil Service, referred to Award 1325 of the Industrial Court, dated July 28th 1927—reference appears on page 37 of the Factual Memorandum submitted by the Treasury.

86. In Award 1325 reference was made “to the maintenance of a fair relativity between their wages and those in outside industry as a whole, and as between the various classes within the Postal Services . . .”

87. The Union has already dealt with the relativity between the wages of the manipulative grades and those in outside industry as a whole. It now desires to deal with the question of relativities within the postal services.

88. In the Union's submission relativities cannot be rigidly maintained for all time. Relativities are not necessarily a guide to the value of work performed by the various grades. Relativities may be disturbed by various claims put in by the many organisations within the Service, based on a variety of factors. The fact that relativities may be disturbed should not, in the Union's submission, be a reason for rejecting any evidence designed to obtain reassessment of the value of work of the grade under

consideration. In any case, the view of the Union's membership is that the present relativities between the Post Office manipulative grades and those of the clerical grades in the Civil Service are regulated by a wages pattern which was based more on class than on the value of the work performed.

89. It appears to them that the importance and, therefore, the value of clerical work was originally based on a scarcity of people suitably educated and this valuation has become traditional and has persisted even though the scarcity has long since passed.

90. For some hundreds of years the number of people who could read and write with any degree of ability was extremely limited.

91. This small minority became secretaries and assumed great importance because of the scarcity value; they were invaluable to merchants and to the growing development of the English courts and Government. They were essential both for the carrying on of correspondence and the recording of decisions; they occupied a key position in relation to their masters.

92. The ability to read and write was considered valuable and important and those possessing it automatically occupied important positions through qualifications which by themselves would not be considered as satisfactory to-day.

93. English society in the middle ages placed the "clerical" worker in a position which the later industrial revolution strengthened. The growth of industry with its commercial development required competent pen men. Many of the new masters were ill equipped for this task and certainly among the great influx of agricultural workers who came into the growing towns and cities there were few who could undertake the correspondence work of their new employers. The limited number of clericals were therefore eagerly sought and their pay and status became firmly established as being above the non-clerical worker.

94. Parents, in the developing new society, were quick to see those possibilities and saw to it that their sons chose the more remunerative and socially higher posts.

95. In modern times this trend is being reversed and scientific and technical qualifications are often remunerated at a higher level than clerical qualifications. Every year great emphasis is placed on the part to be played by the industry worker, he is exhorted to produce more goods and to adapt himself to new and involved processes, yet traditionally he remains behind the office worker in both pay and social status. Any improvements made by the industrial worker have usually brought from the clerical section a demand for the restoration of traditional relativities.

96. The wages paid for clerical work appears to have been related not so much to the value of the work performed, as to the social standing of the worker. For many years the wages system appeared to concede that certain classes were entitled to a standard of living as a class. The "working class," manual workers, general labourers and skilled craftsmen, such as engineers, bricklayers, carpenters, etc., appear to have had their wages related to a given standard of living as a "working class" rather than to the productive value of their labour. In more recent years the important place of the manual worker in society has been more widely recognised than hitherto; there has been a trend to give the craftsman and the technician that importance in industry which their value clearly justifies but without a revision of the pay relationship with the "white collar" clerical class.

97. Relating those submissions to the Post Office the Union submits that the staff can be divided into two parts: (1) Those employed on the operational side, i.e., those in the hierarchy actually rendering the services and responsible for the degree of service given and who exercise the necessary control over those services. (2) Those who are concerned with the general administration of the service, i.e., dealing with establishments, buildings, accommodation, welfare and the application of general regulations governing the conditions of the staff as a whole. This division in the Post Office is clearly indicated by the fact that there are on the one hand a large number of departmental classes peculiar to the Post Office and, on the other hand, general Treasury classes common to the whole Civil Service. The operating hierarchy, rising from the postman on the postal side or telegraphist and telephonist

on the telecommunications side and postal and telegraph officer on the counter and writing side are Post Office departmental classes. The clerical classes are general Treasury grades recruited on a common basis, on the same conditions, and same pay as all other clerical agents employed in the Civil Service.

98. That the clerical workers have better conditions and higher pay than their operating counterparts is due, in the Union's submission, to the policy of paying "white collar workers" more than other workers, and not to the respective value of the work performed.

99. The falsity of this artificial standard can be exemplified by the postal and telegraph officer who is paid less than a clerical worker yet, who, in the Union's view, performs a wider range of work than the clerical worker.

100. The postal and telegraph officer plays an important part in the Post Office service because of the range of duties he performs and his immediate contact with the public in the performance of those duties, which have been briefly described in paras. 48-56. He is the one who actually renders the services to the public at the public counter. It is he who supplies the stamps, the postal orders, the money orders, pays the allowances, does banking transactions, accepts parcels and registered letters, accepts telegrams, etc., besides performing the clerical work in connection with management. He is the general utility man of the Post Office.

101. So far as the telecommunication services are concerned it is the radio operators, the telephonists and telegraphists who actually render the services to the public.

102. The radio operator (a brief description of whose work appears in paras. 57-63) has technical knowledge and skill which enables him to deal with messages received in unstable conditions which are inherent in radio transmission and ensure their correct transmission. The bulk of the work is to ships at sea and he combines the work of the cable room telegraphist and the inland telegraphist.

103. A brief description of the work of the telephonist is given in paras. 39-44, and as stated therein it is the telephonist to whom the public will turn in the case of difficulty. The Union would make it quite clear that it in no way underestimates the value of the work rendered by the technicians on the engineering side; clearly the telephone operators would be unable to render any service to the public if the apparatus were not properly installed and regularly maintained. Nevertheless, it is the operator to whom the public turn if they are in any doubt or difficulty with a telephone call which they desire to make.

104. The accurate and swift transmission of urgent messages, in the form of telegrams and cablegrams, is the responsibility of the telegraphist, a brief description of whose work is contained in paras. 45-47. It is he who, once the cable or telegram has been accepted, either over the counter or by the operator himself over the telephone, is responsible for ensuring correct transmission. The telegraph service, then, pivots on the radio operator and the telegraphist, whose knowledge and skill and dexterity determines the quality of the service that is rendered to the public.

105. In paras. 19-38 the Union describes the work of postmen and postmen higher grade which briefly stated consists of collecting letters posted in posting boxes and delivering them to the addressees and which from that description it is clear is not so simple as it might appear to be. There is a complex organisation which interlocks a number of processes designed to ensure the speediest collection, transmission and delivery, with a view to rendering the best possible service to the public. It is the postman and the postman higher grade who are responsible for all the many processes involved in handling all types of correspondence from the point of acceptance to the final point of disposal from London East to London West or Land's End to John o' Groats.

106. The above submission with regard to the work performed by the grades may appear to members of the Royal Commission as some repetition of the submissions contained in paras. 19-72. The Union is conscious of repetition, but the conclusions which it hopes the Royal Commission will draw from this repetition are different

from those which can be drawn from the previous paragraphs. In this section the Union is challenging the present relativities within the Post Office, and is seeking to show that the function of the manipulative grades justifies a disturbance of the present relativities.

107. All of the manipulative grades, together with the supervising hierarchy and those higher grades which are concerned with the function of management on the operating side—postmasters, controllers, traffic staff, etc.—together with the higher administration whose work the Union does not underestimate, are the key workers in the Post Office.

108. So far the Union has made submission with regard to the Tomlin formula; comparabilities within and outside the Service; and the value of work performed by the manipulative grades. Within its terms of reference the Royal Commission is asked to consider what general principles should govern service pay. As the Union has stated, in its view no general principle could, or should, be laid down, but it would accept the desirability of some guidance being given to those responsible for wage negotiation—both workers and administration. If the Union were called upon to suggest such guidance it would propose the following:—

- (1) That pay should, in the first instance, be determined as the result of an assessment of the value of the workers (or groups of workers) to the industry in which they are employed, and of its consequential value to the community as a whole; and
- (2) Having related the workers' purchasing power to the value of his work, that purchasing power should not be varied more markedly than the purchasing power of other workers whose value to the community has, presumably, been similarly assessed.

IV. HOURS AND LEAVE

(a) LEAVE

109. These submissions are designed to supplement the submissions by the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council on hours and leave presented to the Royal Commission on Monday, 26th April, 1954.

110. The Union desires to refer particularly to paragraph 26 of those representations. In that paragraph the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council intimated that they saw no justification for applying, *inter alia*, to the Post Office manipulative grades represented by the Union conditions less favourable than those of other staffs on broadly comparable pay scales.

111. The Union would submit, in addition, that the amount of annual leave granted to a grade should be considered in relation to the type of work performed and the conditions under which it is performed. It would submit that annual leave is designed, amongst other things, to enable the individual officer to recuperate and to rest and this, it is suggested, must be related to the needs of the particular work performed and the conditions under which it is performed.

112. With the exception of public counters, of which only a few are open for 24 hours daily, the service given by the Post Office extends over the 24 hours of the day, seven days in the week. It follows that the staff must be conditioned to attendances covering the 24 hours and they are compelled to work irregular hours of attendance; for example on the postal side shifts commence as early as 4 a.m. and finish as late as 1.30 a.m. Whilst the shifts of other grades may not be so extreme, in all grades the attendances are on a shift basis, a number of shifts being performed in rotation. In addition there is a liability to perform Sunday duty; the actual performance varies from grade to grade but a considerable number of these grades perform Sunday duty.

113. The Union submits, therefore, that if there is to be discrimination it ought to be in favour of these grades and not against them, since they will not have the same opportunities for leisure and rest as staff conditioned to regular hours and free weekends. The contrary is the case, however, and as a broad submission

it can be stated that the leave of the Post Office manipulative grades is not as good as the leave of broadly comparable service classes. The following schedule shows the leave conditions of general service classes in broadly the same salary band. This schedule shows that the Post Office manipulative grades are treated very badly in comparison with the general service classes quoted and there would appear to be no justification for this discrimination.

PAY AND ANNUAL LEAVE OF CERTAIN TREASURY AND POST OFFICE GRADES

Note on pay

For weekly paid staffs (all grades except clerical officers) the annual equivalent is here shown. For radio operators the figure shown is the "notional" London equivalent of the provincial maximum.

TREASURY GRADES

Grade	Male staff		Female staff	
	London max.	Leave (days)	London max.	Leave (days)
	£		£	
Clerical officer	570	24	460	24
Shorthand typist I... ..	483	21 rising to 24	391	21 rising to 24
Shorthand typist II	451	21 rising to 24	363	21 rising to 24
Clerical assistant	438	18 rising to 21	350	18 rising to 21
Typist I	433	18 rising to 21	347	18 rising to 21
Typist II	404	18 rising to 21	321	18 rising to 21

POST OFFICE MANIPULATIVE GRADES

Grade	Male staff		Female staff	
	London max.	Leave (days)	London max.	Leave (days)
	£		£	
Radio operator class I ...	591	21 rising to 24	—	—
Cable room telegraphist ...	518	18 rising to 24	—	—
Postal and telegraph officer	511	18 rising to 24	411	18 rising to 24
Postmen higher grade ...	480	14 rising to 21	—	—
Telegraphist	454	14 rising to 21	353	14 rising to 21
Telephonist	443	14 rising to 21	378	14 rising to 21
Postmen	403	14 days	—	—

114. The Union hopes, therefore, that the Royal Commission will recommend in accordance with the submissions of the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council that there is no case in principle or merit for the continuance of the present unfavourable treatment. It would suggest that in the light of any such recommendation the definition of comparable classes for the purpose of applying the recommendation should be left for departmental discussion between the Post Office associations concerned and the Post Office.

(b) HOURS

115. In the same submissions by the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council reference is made to hours, and the Union again asks that the Royal Commission shall recommend that the present discrimination between the hours of the Post Office manipulative grades represented by the Union and that of general service classes should be abolished and that the hours performed by the Post Office manipulative grades should be the same as those performed by the general service classes either now or in the future.

116. The Post Office manipulative grades represented by the Union are conditioned to a 48 hour week and, as indicated above, they perform that 48 hours on a 6 day basis and, generally speaking, covering 24 hours a day, whereas the condition hours of the general service classes are either 42 or 44. The Union submits that there is no justification for different hours being performed by one set of civil servants and that performed by another. The Post Office manipulative grades are in every sense of the word established civil servants just as much as any other established civil servant in the general service classes. In the Union's view it is difficult to understand the basis of the present discrimination. The conditions under which the Post Office manipulative grades perform their work would appear to justify discrimination in their favour and not against them because of the spreadover of their hours and the anti-social attendances which they are called upon to perform. The fact that their attendances cover 24 hours a day—6 days a week, is not in itself justification for a longer working week. Neither would it be difficult to adjust those attendances to a shorter working week.

117. It is true that a 5 day week on the basis of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. could not be applied to the Post Office manipulative grades. That does not mean, however, that a 5 day week could not be applied. It would be quite easy in the Union's submission, to prepare a scheme of attendances on a 5 day week basis, which would cover a 24 hour—6 day week service. The application of the 5 day week, therefore, to the Post Office manipulative grades is not an impracticable proposition. On the contrary, it is perfectly practicable.

118. The Union hopes, therefore, that the Royal Commission will recommend that the hours of work to be performed by the Post Office manipulative grades should be the same as that for other civil servants employed in the general service classes.

V. OVERTIME RATES

119. The submissions which the Union of Post Office Workers wishes to make regarding the rates of overtime which ought to be paid to the grades it represents are:—

- (a) Removal of the present restrictive maximum;
- (b) Payment at rate and a half for all weekday overtime;
- (c) Double time payment for Sundays, Bank Holidays, Good Friday, Christmas Day and New Year's Day in Scotland.

(a) REMOVAL OF THE PRESENT RESTRICTIVE MAXIMUM

120. The present maximum overtime rates are:—

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
	s. d.	s. d.
(a) For staff conditioned to a 42 hour week—		
Time rate and a quarter	6 6	5 3
Time rate and a half	7 10	6 4
Double time	10 5	8 5
(b) For staff conditioned to a 44 hour week—		
Time rate and a quarter	6 3	5 -
Time rate and a half	7 6	6 -
Double time	10 -	8 1
(c) For staff conditioned to a 48 hour week—		
Time rate and a quarter	5 8	4 7
Time rate and a half	6 10	5 6
Double time	9 1	7 4

These rates are, of course, adjusted according to the weekly rate of pay of the individual. For example, men earning 96s. per week would receive as time and a quarter 2s. 6d., time and a half 3s., and double time 4s.

121. So far as the grades for which the Union caters are concerned, time rate and a quarter is paid for the first six hours overtime, time rate and a half for the second six hours and thereafter double time. The restrictive maximum comes into operation at a figure of 218s. a week for men and 176s. a week for women.

122. The Union has examined overtime rates paid in outside industry, and can find no single case in industries paying premium rates of overtime where a financial restriction operates. The true rate of overtime is paid irrespective of the hours worked. The name given to these rates is an indication of what is thought to be a fair payment and, if it is considered just to pay double rate after a certain number of hours, then that rate is paid irrespective of whether a man earns £5 or £12 a week.

123. In the Union's view there can be no justification for different treatment being meted to overtime earning classes in the Civil Service, and the restrictive maximum ought to be removed.

(b) PAYMENT AT RATE AND A HALF FOR ALL WEEKDAY OVERTIME

124. On the premium rates, the Union submits that a flat rate of time and a half ought to be paid for overtime performed from Monday to Saturday. There does not seem to be any valid reason why weekly paid overtime should change from time and a quarter to time and a half and to double time when performed from Monday to Saturday, for whenever the overtime has to be performed it creates a degree of inconvenience to the person concerned.

125. Many industries, moreover, have adopted a flat rate of time and a half for weekday overtime. The following list is admittedly not complete, but it nevertheless represents a large section of industry paying a flat time and a half rate for overtime:—

Beet sugar manufacture.
Chemicals (I.C.I.).
Cinema theatres.
Coal mining.
Coopering.
Daily newspaper printing.
Dock labour.
Electrical contracting.

Electricity supply.
Jute manufacture.
Papermaking.
Retail co-operatives.
Seed crushing, and provender manufacture.
Shipbuilding.
Surgical dressings manufacture.

(c) DOUBLE TIME PAYMENT FOR SUNDAYS, BANK HOLIDAYS, GOOD FRIDAY, CHRISTMAS DAY AND NEW YEAR'S DAY IN SCOTLAND.

126. The worker invariably places a higher value on his Sundays, Bank Holidays, etc., than on his leisure time during the rest of the week and for this reason the rate paid on such occasions should be better than the rate paid for week-day overtime. Sundays and other public holidays are the traditional days of rest and respite from daily toil. They provide opportunities for religious observance and worship, for recreation and exercise, and for social contacts and cultural pursuits. To the married man Sundays and public holidays enable him to spend at least one day in the week in the company of his family. Such days free from work is a right which few people would surrender whatever the monetary recompense, except in a dire emergency or under the most compelling circumstances.

127. So far as outside industry is concerned the Ministry of Labour in the *Labour Gazette* of May, 1951, summarised the position by saying:—

“For Sunday work, when performed by operatives who are not normally required to work during the week-end, the agreed rate is, with a few exceptions, double time.”

Furthermore, in almost all industries in which wages are regulated by Wages Councils (employing about 2,000,000 workers) Sunday work is paid at double rate.

128. Although a limited amount of work is performed on a Sunday by members of the grades the Union represents, it is not a normal working day. The Union, therefore, submits that payment for duty on a Sunday, Bank Holiday, Good Friday, Christmas Day and New Year's Day in Scotland should be at double rate.

VI. SUPERANNUATION

129. The Union desires to make submissions on three aspects of superannuation:

- (a) counting of service with the armed forces for civil service superannuation purposes,
- (b) recognition of the principle that superannuation is deferred pay, and
- (c) non-abatement of civil service superannuation benefits by National Insurance pensions.

(a) COUNTING OF SERVICE WITH THE ARMED FORCES FOR CIVIL SERVICE SUPERANNUATION PURPOSES.

130. The Union submits that non-pensionable service in the armed forces of the Crown, followed by civil service, shall be reckonable for civil service superannuation purposes on final retirement from State service.

131. The present position is that civil and armed forces' service are separately reckonable, and for each there has to be a qualifying period before a pension becomes payable. The qualifying service for an armed forces' pension is 22 years, and for civil service pension is 10 years. If, therefore, an individual leaves the armed forces after, say, 12 years' service he would not be eligible for a pension and, if immediately entering the Civil Service, would not qualify for a civil pension until a further 10 years' State service had been given and, even then, his pension would not be based on the aggregate of his armed forces and civil service but only on the latter.

132. In the Union's submission, men and women who change from one type of State service to the other should not have their earlier service excluded from the period of reckonability for pension. Those affected by this question have been accepted for employment by the Post Office because of the exemplary characters while serving in the armed forces, and it is submitted that the risks generally associated with that service merit it being counted for civil service superannuation purposes.

133. This claim is one of long standing. Hansard in August, 1925, reported that the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury interrupted a speech by Mr. Ammon to say that agitation on this question has existed for 30 and not 20 years.

134. In 1906, a departmental committee presided over by Col. Sir E. Ward, made a most exhaustive enquiry into the subject and strongly recommended the inclusion of service in the armed forces of the Crown for civil service pension purposes as the following excerpt from their report will show:—

"43. At present ex-soldiers and sailors, who having been discharged from the Army or Navy without pension subsequently obtain an established position in the Civil Service are debarred from reckoning any of their Military or Naval service for pension on final retirement. The disadvantage of such an arrangement to the ex-soldier and sailor can best be illustrated in the following manner, viz.:—

'A' joins the Civil Service at the age of 19 and 'B' joins the Army at the same age, and obtains on his discharge at the age of 26 a Civil Service appointment. Both men, their total service being equal, are superannuated at the age of 60. 'A' whose services have been purely civil, receives the maximum pension of 40/60ths, and 'B' not being able to count his military service, only 34/60ths of his salary. In point of fact, the longer the Army service the greater will be the disproportion in favour of the civilian.

Such an arrangement as this is in our opinion inequitable and rests upon a purely arbitrary basis, for Army or Navy service, with its attendant risks, should surely be regarded as at least equivalent in its pension bearing value to the Civil Service, and the existence of such a rule which declines to recognise the former as such is not unnaturally viewed by those concerned as unjust."

The Union submits that the views of the Ward Committee are as sound today as they were when they were enunciated.

135. There appears to have been a partial recognition of the principle involved, for under Section I of the Superannuation Act of 1946, ex-regulars who were recalled to the colours at the outbreak of the 1939-45 war, were allowed to count their period of re-engagement with the forces as though it were civil service, subject, of course, to the forfeiture of any excess remuneration or non-effective pay they may have received from military sources. The Act also enabled ex-servicemen who, prior to their 1939-45 war service had not been employed as civil servants, to reckon their war service, on subsequently becoming civil servants anytime between the date of demobilisation and the end of June, 1950. There was thus a recognition that 6 years or so of service with the armed forces could be added to the period normally reckonable for civil service superannuation even though there may have been as much as a 5 year gap between demobilisation and the end of the period during which employment in the civil service took place.

136. Moreover, national servicemen can now voluntarily extend their compulsory period of national service training from two to three years, and where this is done with the Department's consent the whole period of training may reckon for civil service superannuation purposes. This is a clear acceptance of service with the armed forces counting for civil pension purposes.

137. The Union submits that the granting of armed forces' service to count for civil service pension would be in accord with the Government's declared intention to do all that it could both to stimulate recruitment for the forces and to provide suitable employment when forces' service is completed.

(b) RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT SUPERANNUATION IS DEFERRED PAY

138. It is submitted that there should be a recognition of the principle that superannuation benefits are really deductions from salaries or wages. It is the contention of the Union that superannuation benefits are taken into account by the Department when fixing scales of pay, and that scales of pay are lower than they would be if superannuation benefits did not exist.

139. In 1903, the Royal Commission on civil service superannuation examined Sir F. Mowatt, Secretary to the Treasury, and the following exchanges took place:—

"4058. (Chairman): Now in fixing the scale of pay of your different servants, you necessarily have some regard to the advantage secured by that annuity? Yes.

"4059. Is it done on strict arithmetical calculations? No.

"4060. Have you any rough estimate of what the value is? I am afraid I can hardly even say that. The circumstances of the particular office, the circumstances even of the particular men make it very difficult to apply any definite rule. I do not think I can go nearer than this—that of late years when we have moved men from the non-pensionable part of the Service to the pensionable part of the Service we have usually reduced their pay by something under 10 per cent. But I must explain to the Commission that that does not mean a permanent reduction of 10 per cent. throughout the service, but only this—that so long as they are in a particular class to which they are transferred that deduction is continued. When they are promoted, say, from the third class into the second class above them, that deduction terminates, so that practically it is very much under the 10 per cent.

"4061. What do you consider to be the motive of the remuneration of the Civil Servant being arranged in that fashion—a salary down plus a contingent annuity? Firstly, no doubt, the pension is a direct addition to the salary; secondly, the pension is paid by the State for the purpose of having a more free control over the officer in removing him from his department when he becomes less efficient.

"4184-85. (Mr. Blunt): I was under the impression, Mr. Dickinson, that the answer of Sir Francis was at that time to a question: 'Then you consider that pension is deferred pay,' I think you said 'Yes' or something of that kind? No, my impression is, I think you will find, I explain what I think is deferred pay. My own definition of deferred pay, which perhaps you will

allow me to give again with reference to this is really this, that there is no doubt that a part of a Civil Servant's remuneration is deferred pay in this sense, that it is remuneration which is deferred from his immediate salary, and applied towards granting him a pension. In that sense, and within the condition of the Service which he joins, that is a deferment from his actual remuneration; if there were no pension he would no doubt get some more pay.

"4198. (Mr. Bunn): Then the argument, as I understand it, of the Deferred Pay Committee amounts to—perhaps can be divided into two divisions—first, if the whole pay or any proportion of the cost of pensions may be considered deferred pay, it is therefore unjust not to give the widows and orphans of a deceased servant some proportion of that pay? I believe that to be the argument.

"4199. Well, would it be right to ask you to express any opinion upon that? Yes; the deferred pay, whatever proportion it is, and I admit there is a proportion should more properly be described as deferment from pay. When a man enters the Service this bargain is made with him: 'We shall defer from your actual pay a certain sum to be devoted towards pension.' If you do not defer a larger sum than will produce that pension, you have deferred nothing from him which he can claim for some other advantage.

"4200. That is assuming that the pension you gave him was adequate for the amount deducted? Yes.

"4201. Well, now, that will bring me to the second argument, which I understand to be, if the 16 to 20 per cent. was paid in wages, and the men were allowed to make their own provision, that they could make a much better provision than you make for them with the money; are you aware of that? Yes, I am aware of that."

140. In 1928, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, received a deputation from the General Federation of Trade Unions to discuss old age pensions, and he pointed out that there was a distinction between the State as an employer and its position as a partner in an insurance scheme. He said that one of the conditions of the employment of civil servants was that part of their pay should be deferred for the purpose of providing a superannuation allowance.

141. There is a percentage relationship between the superannuation payments and the salaries or wages of different grades. In March, 1930, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury was asked "What are the classes which are separately dealt with for the purpose of estimating the pension liability in preparing the Post Office Commercial Accounts, and what are the percentages of wages, including bonus, for each class in respect of which a separate percentage is employed?" and the following reply was given by the Postmaster General, Mr. Lees-Smith:—

"I have been asked to reply to this question. The classes dealt with separately and the percentage of wages (including bonus) represented by the current provisions for pension liability, following actuarial investigation are as follows:—

Male Staff—

Administrative and Clerical Staff	...	...	...	14.20 per cent.
Indoor Manipulative and Supervising Staff	...	...	...	13.23 per cent.
Miscellaneous Staff (Night Telephonists, Porters, etc.)	...	...	...	9.76 per cent.
Engineering Manipulative Staff	...	...	...	9.08 per cent.
Postmen	...	...	...	9.62 per cent.

Female Staff—

Administrative and Clerical Staff	...	...	...	12.26 per cent.
Indoor Postal and Telegraph Manipulative and Supervising Staff	...	...	...	10.32 per cent.
Telephonists and Supervising Staff	...	...	...	9.68 per cent."

142. In 1938, the Post Office in a written submission to the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal stated that the civil service pension scheme, provided by the Superannuation Acts, represented an addition to the cash value of wages which was estimated by the government actuary as from $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 12 per cent. in the case of established manipulative staff, and the following table was submitted:—

AVERAGE WEEKLY COST TO THE STATE OF CERTAIN MALE P.O. MANIPULATIVE STAFF

Class	Average of actual weekly pay and allowances 1937	Estimated weekly cost of privileges				Total 1937	Estimated weekly cost in	
		Super-annuation benefit	Annual and Bank Holiday Leave	Sick Leave	Free Medical attention		1914	1926
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Counter clerks and Telegraphists, London ...	80 4	9 7½	7 8	2 1	2½	99 11	66 1	109 11½
Telegraphists, London ...	102 11	12 4	9 9½	2 8	2½	127 11	63 7	115 4½
Sorters, London...	80 4	9 7½	7 8½	2 7	2½	100 5½	63 7	115 2½
Sorting clerks and Telegraphists, Provinces ...	70 10	8 6	6 9	1 11½	2½	88 3	48 3	96 10½
Postmen, London	63 5	6 —	4 5	2 4	2½	76 4½	40 10½	82 4½
Mail Porters, London ...	62 10	7 3	4 5	2 2½	2½	76 11	38 —	78 6½
Postmen, Provinces	56 10	5 5	3 11½	2 5	2½	68 10	33 4½	69 7½

143. In 1949, evidence submitted by the Post Office to the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal showed that the government actuary estimated that the cost to the Exchequer of civil service superannuation amounted to—men, $15\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., or $16\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and women, 12 per cent. It is clear, therefore, that civil servants ought not to be regarded as beneficiaries of ex-gratia payments but, on the contrary, fully entitled to the benefits which they have earned.

144. It can be said that the practice continues, and that a percentage of wages is assessed for superannuation purposes. The civil servant, therefore, throughout the whole of his working life receives less pay than he would do if he were not within a superannuation scheme, but while there is an automatic and constant deferment of pay there is not automatic entitlement to benefit.

145. It is normal practice in contributory superannuation schemes for the contributor to be permitted to take his contributions out of the scheme when leaving the service of his employer before the normal retiring age and, in many cases, there is a plus for compound interest that has been earned.

146. In the Union's view there should be a legal right to benefit which ought not to depend upon the individual satisfying all the requirements of the Superannuation Acts, but which recognises that superannuation is in effect deferred pay and in the event of retirement from the Service benefit should be paid.

(c) NON ABATEMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE SUPERANNUATION BENEFITS BY NATIONAL INSURANCE RETIREMENT PENSION

147. Prior to the introduction of the National Insurance Act on July 5th, 1948, civil servants were only compulsorily insured for widows' and orphans' pension and then only up to a salary limit of £420. Many civil servants, however, were voluntary contributors under the National Health Insurance Act of 1936 and

through voluntary contributions became eligible for an old age pension. Such old age pensions when drawn were in addition to civil service superannuation which was not in any way abated.

148. The National Insurance Act of 1946, which came into operation in 1948, compulsorily brought all civil servants into State insurance in precisely the same way as it did the rest of the nation. The same rate of contribution applied and the same rates of benefits became payable but, in the case of civil servants, special legislation was enacted whereby the superannuation of civil servants recruited after February 29th, 1948, was abated when National Insurance retirement pension became payable.

149. The regulations were contained in Statutory Instrument No. 498, headed "The National Insurance (Modification of the Superannuation Acts) (Amendment) Regulations, 1948," paragraph 5 of which says:—

"Any superannuation allowance payable to any civil servant (other than a person to whom these Regulations do not apply by virtue of Regulations 3 and 4 hereof) shall, in respect of any period during which the civil servant is, in the case of a man, over the age of 65 or is, in the case of a woman, over the age of 60, be reduced by the sum of £1 14s. per annum in respect of each year of service which in the computation of the superannuation allowance has been reckoned, for the purposes of the Superannuation Acts 1834 to 1946, as service in the capacity of a civil servant."

The actual effect of this is that a civil servant's pension can be reduced for each year of reckonable service on which the civil service pension is based, by 1/40th of the weekly rate of National Insurance retirement pension for a single person. Thus, when the civil service pension is based on 40/80ths of salary it would be reduced by the full amount of National Insurance Retirement pension, viz., 26s.

150. It is the submission of the Union that civil servants ought not to have been specially selected for this restriction and that they should be allowed to draw the whole of their civil service pension unabated. For the purpose of this submission the Union will refer to the rates of contribution payable when the Act first came in, which were:—

	Insured person	Employer	Exchequer supplement	Total
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Men	4 7	3 10	2 1	10 6
Women	3 7	3 —	1 7	8 2

It will be seen from these figures that the contribution made by the State as employer (3s. 10d.) represents approximately 36·5 per cent. of the total sum required for insurance purposes (10s. 6d.), and the Union submits that whatever may be the arguments in favour of an abatement of civil service pension—and it has already suggested there ought not to be any abatement—in any case, the employer is not entitled to abate more than 36·5 per cent. as the total contribution which he has made into the Fund.

151. Furthermore, the Union submits that the figure of 36·5 per cent. itself ought to be reduced because the employers' contribution into the fund, like that of the employees' and the State, covers all benefits and yet the civil servant is not permitted to draw sickness benefit in addition to full pay. Clearly the employer (the State) is taking advantage of his own contribution by abating sick pay by the amount of sickness benefit drawn and thus paying less to a sick employee than he would have done had there been no National Insurance Act.

152. Pursuing this point, the Union would draw attention to the National Insurance Bill of 1946, Command Paper 6730, paragraph 19, in which the rates of contribution to operate at the beginning of the scheme were analysed as follows:—

RATES OF CONTRIBUTION FOR EMPLOYED ADULTS
(in pence per week)

		Full actuarial contri- butions	Contributions from:		
			Insured person	Employer	Exchequer supplement
<i>Men:—</i>					
Retirement pensions...		46·9	19·6	19·5	7·8
Widows' benefits and guardians'	...				
Allowances...		9·5	3·9	4·0	1·6
Unemployment benefit		32·0	10·7	10·6	10·7
Sickness benefit		19·5	8·1	8·1	3·3
Maternity benefit		1·0	0·8	—	0·2
Death grant		1·9	1·9	—	—
Cost of administration		5·0	1·9	1·9	1·2
Total for all benefits		115·8	46·9	44·1	24·8
<i>Women:—</i>					
Retirement pensions...		41·9	17·5	17·4	7·0
Unemployment benefit		21·0	7·0	7·0	7·0
Sickness benefit		15·5	6·4	6·5	2·6
Maternity benefit		5·2	3·0	1·3	0·9
Death grant		1·1	1·1	—	—
Cost of administration		5·0	1·9	1·9	1·2
Total for all benefits		89·7	36·9	34·1	18·7

153. It will be seen that of the 115·8 pence per week for employed men, the actual contribution set aside for retirement pension was 46·9 pence, of which only 19·5 pence (approximately 40 per cent.) was supplied by the employer. Therefore, taking the 1948 retirement pension of 26s. per week, the portion contributed by the employer was approximately 10s. 5d., and the Union submits that if there has to be an abatement it should not be more than one fortieth of 10s. 5d. instead of one fortieth of 26s. for each year of reckonable service.

154. The rates of contribution have altered since the Act was introduced, and are now:—

	Insured person	Employer	Exchequer supplement	Total
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Men	4 9	4 —	2 1	10 10
Women	3 9	3 2	1 7	8 6

There is no analysis available similar to that contained in paragraph 24 of this document.

155. The government actuary expects the cost of retirement pensions—now about £321,000,000 a year—to double in the next 25 years, and most of the extra cost will fall on the Exchequer. Thus again, there will be a heavy subsidising of the non civil servant's retirement pension and a corresponding reduction in the ratio of the sum paid by the insured person and the employer. It will increasingly become the case that the contribution paid by the Treasury, as employer, into the retirement fund will decrease in proportion to that contributed by way of Exchequer

subsidy and the possibility can be foreseen of the retirement pension being subsidised by Exchequer grants to an extent greater than the combined contributions of both the employer and the insured person. In the Union's submission it would be indefensible in such circumstances for the Treasury, as employer, to take back the whole of the retirement pension paid to the insured person.

156. In asking the Commission to concede this submission, the Union would point out that no retrospection would be involved because abatement only applies to civil servants recruited after the 29th February, 1948, and, as they cannot qualify for a civil service pension until having completed ten years service, it would be 1958 before abatement came into effect.

APPENDIX

The use of comparisons by the Post Office

1. INTRODUCTORY

The use of comparisons by the Post Office in fixing the wages of Post Office employees has a very long history, going back far beyond the attempt made by the Tomlin Commission to formulate principles of comparison. Indeed, as will be seen from the reference made by the Tomlin Commission to Award 1325 of the Industrial Court on a claim by the Union of Post Office Workers, the Tomlin Commission's attempt may be said to have been much influenced by Post Office practice.

In its earliest, crude form, Post Office practice was based on the principle of obtaining labour as cheaply as possible, as was explained to the Tweedmouth Committee (1897) by a Post Office witness with reference to the wages of postmen:

"They are based, so far as we could, according to the value of labour in the several towns—the cost of living and the value of labour. Up to the time of the Fawcett revision of 1882 . . . the wages in each town were fixed independent of any other town, according to what it was found to be necessary to pay in that particular town. As long as we could get a sufficient supply of qualified men we did not increase the pay."

Although that principle has been modified by the fixing of wages nationally, and the use of comparisons by the Post Office has taken a variety of forms it is our submission that the attitude of the Post Office has retained much of the spirit of the early practice.

There has been no consistency in the use of comparisons by the Post Office and there is no evidence of the development of a coherent principle for the assessment of wages.

2. VARIED FORMS OF COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE

An examination of the way in which comparisons have been used over a long period shows the following main forms:—

- (a) the use of indices of outside wages showing the percentage movement over a period of years for comparison with the movement of Post Office pay.
- (b) specific occupational comparisons designed to compare the pay of individual Post Office grades with the pay of outside workers performing the same or approximately the same duties.
- (c) comparisons based on "status" not on similarity of duties.
- (d) comparisons with outside occupations which involve duties considered to be similar to some part of the work of Post Office grades, and
- (e) wage or earnings comparisons which show the general levels of pay in a selected but sometimes very extensive range of miscellaneous occupations not embodying any specific duties similar to those of Post Office grades.

(a) THE USE OF PERCENTAGE MOVEMENTS OF OUTSIDE WAGES

The use of percentages by the Post Office began very early and has been revived from time to time, though on occasion the Post Office has indicated its opposition to this method when it has been used by the Union.

At the Hobhouse enquiry (1906) the Post Office put in a memorandum showing "percentage fluctuations in the average Standard Time Rates of Wages 1874–1903" in respect of building workers, coal miners, engineering workers, textile workers and agricultural labourers. The Post Office also submitted an index of average earnings of shipbuilding and engineering workers prepared by Professor Bowley.

In 1927 the Post Office submitted to the Industrial Court a table comparing the percentage increases of the average weekly pay of sorters, telegraphists, postmen and sorting clerks and telegraphists between 1914 and 1926 with the percentage increases of the average weekly pay of 14 groups of workers employed in the engineering, shipbuilding, building industries and on the railways.

At the 1938 Arbitration on the pay of the Post Office manipulative grades the Post Office did not take the initiative in submitting percentage comparisons but, at the request of the Tribunal, they submitted a document showing the movement of pay between January, 1927, and July, 1938, in the very large number of occupations used by the Post Office at the 1927 Arbitration for comparison with Post Office pay.

At the 1949 Arbitration and again at the 1951 Arbitration (Awards 108 and 149) the Post Office submitted percentage figures showing the average increase of outside industrial wage rates since 1939 for comparison with the average percentage increase of the pay of the manipulative grades. On both occasions however the Post Office expressed the opinion that the average amount of increase of outside wage rates should be used instead of the percentage increase.

The Post Office also sought to diminish the relevant amounts and percentages of increase of outside wage rates by excluding agriculture and coal mining in 1949, and by excluding agriculture, coal mining and merchant shipping in 1951, on the ground that the wartime increases in these industries had been exceptional.

(b) SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL COMPARISONS

The most thorough attempt by the Post Office to compare the pay of Post Office grades with workers performing the same duties was at the Tweedmouth Inquiry 1897. This was a comparison with sorters, telegraph operators, counter clerks and postmen employed in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Holland. On the basis of a brief description of the duties of these grades the administration in each of the seven countries was asked to give information about pay, hours, allowances, leave, pensions, etc., of the grade performing those duties.

The Post Office has never repeated this form of inquiry and indeed when a staff association representative made comparison between the pay of British postmen and the pay of postmen in U.S.A. and Australia, at the Holt Enquiry 1912 the Post Office rejected it because of the isolation of the places at which these overseas postmen worked (minutes of evidence. Question 8958).

It has to be recognised that international comparisons need to make allowance for differences of national habits and standards and are therefore difficult to apply.

Comparisons of the same kind have been made with occupations inside this country but the field is necessarily limited because of the monopoly character of Post Office services. Comparisons with the staffs of the National Telephone Company were submitted by the Post Office to the Holt Committee 1912, just before the absorption of the company services by the Post Office, and the Post Office has made comparison between post office telegraphists and cable company telegraphists (e.g., at Hobhouse Enquiry 1906, minutes of evidence. Pages 20 and 26; at Holt Enquiry 1912, "Comparisons". Page 11; and at the 1927 Arbitration, Post Office Statement 1927. Page 4). On these occasions the Post Office indicated what in their view were the qualifications needing to be made in a comparison between post office and cable company telegraphists and in general the attitude of the Post Office has progressively hardened against the comparison.

While the Union did not agree with the post office assessment of the relative value of the work of post office and cable company telegraphists it is certainly true that a mere similarity of title may conceal a disparity of work and conditions as with such occupations as railway telegraphists and the telephonists employed by commercial firms, hospitals and licensed residential establishments.

(c) COMPARISONS BASED ON STATUS

An example of this kind of comparison will be found in the evidence submitted by the Post Office to the Holt Enquiry 1912 in the document "Comparisons between the pay and conditions of employment of Post Office servants and of persons in outside employment".

On page 42 the Post Office showed ranges of pay and average earnings of skilled handworkers in a number of trades, including jewellery manufacture and watch and clock making and repairing and the manufacture of telegraph apparatus. The tables were introduced with the observation:—

"The figures are quoted, not as directly comparable with figures relating to any class of Post Office employees which has so far been heard by the Select Committee, but as relating to some of the higher grades of handworkers whose status might be regarded as comparable with that of Post Office employees, and whose work necessarily involves high manipulation, skill and training."

Other comparisons used by the Post Office seem to have been selected on the same basis, e.g., the comparison between school teachers and bank clerks and telegraphists, counter clerks and sorters, and the comparison between postmen and policemen. As regards the teachers and bank clerks the Post Office explained that they considered their work as being of a superior and more responsible character than that of the Post Office grades. ("Comparisons" 1912—page 6). The comparison between postmen and policemen was offered at first without any such qualification, and a Post Office witness described policemen as "the nearest corresponding class", a "fairly accurate" comparison. (Bradford Committee 1904. Minutes of evidence, Questions 187 and 200.)

Later the Post Office became more and more critical of these comparisons (teachers, bank clerks and policemen), and ceased to use them, and this in our submission reveals the illogicality of the Post Office attitude. To start with the Post Office presented them as outside occupations suitable to be compared and with pay at or above the pay of the comparable Post Office grades (at the same level in the case of postmen and policemen). Later on, as pay of the Post Office grades fell increasingly below the pay of these outside occupations, the Post Office abandoned and opposed the comparisons and selected in their place miscellaneous outside occupations with lower pay. Moreover, while, at the beginning, the Post Office was willing to select outside occupations, some of which had pay above the Post Office levels, the marked tendency of recent years has been to vary the selection so that the outside rates of pay are below Post Office levels.

There is, of course, no limit to this progression. If Post Office pay falls relatively to outside occupations with which it was formerly compared it is always possible to go lower and lower in the ranges of outside pay in order to find new low levels to drag down the pay of Post Office employees; but this in our view is to destroy whatever validity there was in the original conception of comparisons based on an undefined "status".

(d) COMPARISONS BASED ON PART OF THE WORK OF THE GRADE

Other comparisons used by the Post Office have been selected because of a real or supposed similarity between some parts of the work. Thus the long used comparison between telegraphists and compositors was originally justified by the Post Office on the ground that "the work in some respects is not unlike; they have to deal with manuscript and perform certain manual operations which convert that into another form". (Hobhouse Enquiry 1906. Minutes of evidence. Page 20.)

Other comparisons of the same kind are the comparisons between postmen and the drivers of various vehicles, the delivery men on milk and bakery rounds, railway office messengers, railway porters, and warehouse workers.

That the Post Office has to seek such remote comparisons supports the Union's contention that really valid comparisons based on the all round duties of post office grades are almost impossible to find.

We do not believe that a useful basis for assessing the value of the work of post office grades can be found by comparing a block of post office grades comprising postal and telegraph officers, telegraphists, postmen, higher grade, and telephonists with such occupations as drapery assistants, booksellers assistants, railway signalmen and office messengers, hand compositors and bookbinders and machine rulers. (See Post Office Statement 1951, Appendix.)

(e) COMPARISONS WITH MISCELLANEOUS OUTSIDE OCCUPATIONS

Under this head fall the block comparisons of Post Office grades with the pay or earnings in very large numbers of occupations taken from scores of industries such as those used in the 1927 and 1938 arbitrations.

There is no suggestion here of any principle behind the selections except that, being taken almost entirely from Ministry of Labour material on industrial occupations and the retail trades, they do not include the more highly paid occupations, some of which were at one time used by the Post Office.

To the extent that such material can be used, as it was at the 1938 arbitration, to indicate the average movement of outside industrial wage rates over a period of years, it is much inferior to the Ministry of Labour wages index.

In this connection it is interesting to observe that since the war-time and post-war sharp upward movement of *earnings* in industrial occupations the Post Office has ceased to put in Ministry of Labour figures on average earnings.

3. THE VARIED COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE 1897-1954

To illustrate the analysis of the comparisons used by the Post Office lists have been prepared showing the occupations selected by the Post Office for comparison with each grade. These lists are in two parts. Part I shows the comparisons used on different occasions during the past half century, indicating how the selection has varied from time to time, old comparisons being dropped and new ones introduced. Part II shows all the comparisons that have been used at any time during the whole period.

POSTMEN

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE AT DIFFERENT TIMES, 1897-1954—PART I

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1897— (Tweedmouth Inquiry. Report, Appendix IIIB.) (Minutes of evidence. Question II, 648)	(a) Postmen in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Holland (b) Policemen		
1904— (Bradford Inquiry. Minutes of evidence. Questions 187 and 200)	Policemen	Postmen in continental countries	
1906— (Hobhouse Inquiry. Minutes of evidence. Pages 20-21.) ("Post Office Information 1906", Pages 191-5)	(a) Policemen (b) Bank messengers (c) Railway parcel porters (d) Railway signalmen (e) Gardeners (f) Percentage movement of wages 1874-1903, of building workers, Coal miners, Engineers, Textile workers and agricultural labourers (g) Earnings index for workers in shipbuilding and engineering (Professor Bowley)		(a) Bank messengers (b) Railway parcel porters (c) Signalmen (d) Gardeners (e) Percentage wages and earnings indices
1912— (Holt Inquiry. Minutes of evidence. Question 8910.) ("Comparisons", page 42)	(a) Railway signalmen (b) Average earnings of skilled handworkers in manufacture of electrical and telegraph apparatus, gold and silverware, jewellery, scientific instruments, and watches and clocks	(a) Policemen (b) Bank messengers (c) Railway parcel porters (d) Gardeners (e) Percentage indices	(a) Average earnings of skilled handworkers in various trades

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1927— ("Comparisons" and Post Office general statement page 7)	(a) Railway porters (b) Checkers (c) Shunters (d) Ticket collectors (e) Guards (f) Tram drivers and conductors (g) Road haulage horse and motor drivers (h) Agricultural labourers (i) Drapery porters and packers (j) Co-operative Wholesale Society porters, warehouse workers packers (k) Average time rates or earnings in a large number of miscellaneous trades* (l) Percentage increase of pay 1914– 1926 compared with engineering, shipbuilding, building and rail- way workers.	Average earnings of skilled hand- workers in manufacture of electri- cal apparatus, jewellery, etc. replaced by a different and larger selection	(a) Railway porters, Checkers, Shunters, Ticket collectors, Guards (b) Tram drivers and conductors (c) Road haulage drivers (d) Agricultural labourers (e) Drapery porters and packers (f) Co-operative Wholesale Society porters, etc. (g) Percentage increases in engineer- ing, etc.
1938— ("Comparisons")	As in 1927 but with addition of: (a) Railway callers off (b) Printing general assistants (c) Retail grocery vanmen and porters (a) Co-operative retail warehouse- men, packers and porters	Percentage increase of wages in engineering etc. dropped	(a) Railway callers off (b) Printing general assistants (c) Retail grocery vanmen and porters (d) Co-operative retail warehouse- men, packers and porters
1949— (Post Office general statement and Appendix)	(a) Railway porters (various and grades) checkers (b) Shunters (c) Ticket collectors (d) Guards (e) Tram and bus drivers and con- ductors (f) Road haulage motor drivers (g) Printing general assistants (h) Porters in retail distributive trades	(a) Road haulage horse drivers (b) Average rates or earnings in large numbers of miscellaneous trades	(a) Bus drivers and conductors (b) Wages index of Ministry of Labour

1951— (Post Office statement and Appendix)	(i) Co-operative Society warehousemen, packers and porters (j) Agricultural labourers (k) Wages index of Ministry of Labour (a) Railway porters (various grades) (b) Goods checkers (c) Shunters and head shunters (d) Ticket collectors (e) Guards (f) Railway office messengers class B and C (g) Tram, bus and trolleybus drivers and conductors (h) Road haulage motor drivers (i) Retail distributive trades porters (j) Co-operative Society warehousemen, packers and porters (k) Wages index of Ministry of Labour	(a) Printing general assistants (b) Agricultural labourers	(a) Railway office messengers (b) Trolleybus drivers and conductors
1954— (Post Office statement, Appendix)	(a) Railway porters (various grades) and checkers (b) Shunters and head shunters (c) Ticket collectors (d) Guards (e) Railway office messengers, B and C (f) Railway motor drivers and attendants (g) Local authority motor drivers (h) Tram, bus and trolleybus drivers and conductors (i) Road haulage drivers (j) Retail distributive trades porters, van salesmen and vanmen, milk roundsmen and aerated water deliverymen (k) Co-operative retail porters, warehousemen, milk roundsmen and assistants, bakery roundsmen (l) Co-operative wholesale warehouse workers (including porters)	Wages index of Ministry of Labour	(a) Railway motor drivers and attendants (b) Local authority drivers (c) Retail distributive van salesmen, milk roundsmen and aerated water deliverymen (d) Co-operative retail milk roundsmen and assistants and bakery roundsmen

* Full list included in Part II.

POSTMEN

COMPARISONS USED BY POST OFFICE, 1897-1954—PART II

Policemen	Shop assistants and clerks
French postmen	Cotton workers*
German postmen	Woollen and worsted workers*
Austrian postmen	Lace workers*
Belgian postmen	Silk workers*
Italian postmen	Linen workers*
Swiss postmen	Jute workers*
Dutch postmen	Hosiery workers*
Bank messengers	Carpet workers*
Railway porters	Bleaching workers*
Signalmen	Textile making up and packing workers*
Gardeners	Pottery workers*
Workers making electrical etc. apparatus	Brick and tile workers*
Gold and silver workers	Glass workers*
Jewellery workers	Chemical workers*
Workers making scientific instruments	Cement workers*
Watch and clock makers	Explosives workers*
Railway checkers	Paint and colour workers*
Railway shunters and head shunters	Soap and candle workers*
Ticket collectors	Miscellaneous chemical workers*
Guards	Pig iron workers*
Tram and bus drivers and conductors	Smelting workers*
Road haulage drivers (horse and motor)	Tinplate workers*
Agricultural labourers	Non-ferrous metal workers*
Retail distributive trades, porters, packers and warehousemen	Brass foundry workers*
Hand compositors	Bedstead workers*
Bookbinders	Sheet metal workers*
Bricklayers	Wrought iron workers*
Masons	Light castings workers*
Carpenters and joiners	Hollow-ware workers*
Plumbers	Wire workers*
Plasterers	Anchor and chain workers*
Painters	Screw, nut and bolt workers*
Building labourers	Needle, pin, etc. workers*
Fitters and turners	Water supply workers*
Ironmoulders	Canal, dock and harbour workers*
Pattern makers	Railway callers off
Engineering labourers	Printing general assistants
Shipwrights	Retail distributive trades, porters and vanmen
Ship joiners	Railway office messengers
Shipbuilding labourers	Local authority motor drivers
Gas works labourers	Milk roundsmen
Electricity supply labourers	Aerated water deliverymen
Local authority (non-trading) manual workers	Bakery roundsmen

* Average earnings.

POSTMEN, HIGHER GRADE

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE AT DIFFERENT TIMES, 1897-1954—PART I

(Including comparisons made with sorters and sorting clerks and telegraphists before 1946)

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1897— (Tweedmouth Inquiry. Report, Appendix IIIA and IIIB)	(a) Railway clerks and railway telegraphists (b) Sorters in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Holland		
1906— (Hobhouse Committee. Minutes of evidence, pages 20-21; and P.O. Information, pages 191-195)	(a) Teachers (b) Percentage movement of wages of building workers, coal miners, engineers, textile workers, 1874-1903 (c) "Earnings index for workers in shipbuilding and engineering (Professor Bowley)"	(a) Railway clerks and railway telegraphists. (b) Sorters in continental countries	(a) Teachers (b) Percentage wages and earnings indices
1912— (Holt Committee) "Comparisons with outside employment"	(a) Railway Clerks (b) Compositors (c) Commercial clerks (d) Teachers	(None of 1906 comparisons dropped in 1912 except the percentage indices)	(a) Railway clerks (b) Compositors (c) Commercial clerks
1927— "Comparisons" and Post Office general statement (Page 7)	(a) Shop assistants and clerks (b) Railway clerks, class 5 (c) Signalmen (d) Hand compositors (e) Bookbinders (f) Average time rates or earnings in a large number of miscellaneous occupations* (g) Percentage increase of pay 1914-1926 compared with engineering, shipbuilding, building and railway workers	(a) Commercial clerks (b) Teachers	(a) Shop assistants and clerks (b) Signalmen (c) Bookbinders (d) Average time rates or earnings in large number of miscellaneous occupations (e) Percentage increases 1914-1926 in engineering, etc.

* Full list included in Part II.

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1938— (P.O. general statement, Appendix)	Same as 1927 except for addition of linotype and monotype operators	Percentage increases dropped	Linotype and monotype operators
1949— (P.O. general statement and Appendix C)	Same as in 1938 except for dropping of average earnings in outside industries. Wages index used to show percentage increase since 1939	None of 1938 comparisons dropped except miscellaneous outside average earnings	Post Office used wages index to show percentage increase since 1939
1951— (Post Office statement, Appendix B)	Same as in 1949 except for addition of railway office messengers, class A		Railway office messengers, class A
1954— (Post Office statement of case, Appendix)	(a) Shop assistants, cashiers, etc. (b) Railway clerks, class 5 (c) Signalmen (d) Hand compositors	(a) Bookbinders (b) Linotype and monotype operators (c) Railway messengers	

POSTMEN, HIGHER GRADE

COMPARISONS USED BY POST OFFICE, 1897-1954—PART II

Railway clerks	Linen workers*
Railway telegraphists	Jute workers*
French sorters	Cabinet makers
German sorters	Upholsterers
Austrian sorters	French polishers
Belgian sorters	Baking table hands
Italian sorters	One-horse carters
Swiss sorters	Boot and shoe workers
Dutch sorters	Hosiery workers*
Coal miners	Carpet workers*
Teachers	Bleaching etc. workers*
Hand compositors	Making up and packing workers (textiles)*
Commercial clerks	Miscellaneous textile workers*
Shop assistants and clerks	Pottery workers*
Signalmen	Brick and tile workers*
Bookbinders	Glass workers*
Tram drivers	Chemical workers*
Tram conductors	Cement workers*
Bricklayers	Watch and clock workers*
Masons	Linotype and monotype operators
Carpenters and joiners	Explosives workers*
Plumbers	Paint and colour workers*
Plasterers	Soap and candle workers*
Painters	Miscellaneous chemical workers*
Labourers (building trade)	Pig iron workers*
Fitters and turners	Smelting, rolling etc. workers*
Ironmoulders	Tinplate workers*
Pattern makers	Non-ferrous metal workers*
Labourers (engineering)	Brass foundry workers*
Shipwrights	Bedstead workers*
Ship joiners	Sheet metal workers*
Labourers (shipbuilding)	Wrought iron workers*
Gas works labourers	Light castings workers*
Electricity supply labourers	Hollow-ware workers*
Local authority (non trading) manual workers	Wire workers*
Agricultural labourers	Anchor and chain workers*
Railway guards	Screw, nut, bolt etc. workers*
Railway ticket collectors	Needle, pin etc. workers*
Railway checkers (goods)	Water supply workers*
Railway porters	Canal, dock and harbour workers*
Railway leading porters	Electrical and telegraphic apparatus makers*
Railway passenger porters I and II	Gold and silver workers*
Cotton workers*	Jewellery workers*
Woollen workers*	Scientific instrument workers*
Lace workers*	Railway office messengers
Silk workers*	

* Average weekly earnings.

TELEPHONISTS (MALE AND FEMALE)
COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE AT DIFFERENT TIMES, 1912-1954—PART I

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1912— ("Post Office Information")	Staff employed by National Telephone Company		
1927— MEN ("Post Office statement" on night telephonists) WOMEN ("Post Office general statement," Appendix B; "Post Office statement on women telephonists," page 3)	MEN (a) Railway shunters (b) Ticket collectors (c) Railway guards (d) Shop assistants and clerks WOMEN (a) Shop assistants and clerks (b) Railway clerks, class 2	(The N.T.C. had been taken over by the Post Office in 1912)	MEN (a) Railway shunters (b) Ticket collectors (c) Railway guards (d) Shop assistants and clerks WOMEN (a) Shop assistants and clerks (b) Railway clerks, class 2
1938— MEN (Post Office statement on night telephonists, page 5) WOMEN ("Post Office general statement," Appendix)	MEN (a) Railway guards (b) Ticket collectors (c) Shop assistants WOMEN (a) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks (b) Railway clerks, class 2	MEN Railway shunters WOMEN (No change from 1927)	
1949— MEN ("Post Office general statement" and Appendix)	MEN (a) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks (b) Railway clerks, class 5 (c) Railway signalmen (d) Hand compositors (e) Linotype and monotype operators (f) Bookbinders (g) Wages index of Ministry of Labour	MEN (a) Railway guards (b) Ticket collectors	MEN (a) Railway clerks, class 5 (b) Railway signalmen (c) Hand compositors (d) Linotype and monotype operators (e) Bookbinders (f) Wages index of Ministry of Labour

WOMEN	WOMEN	WOMEN	WOMEN
(“ Post Office general statement ” and Appendix)	(a) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks (b) Railway clerks, class 2	(No change)	MEN (a) Railway office messengers (b) Railway clerks, class 4
1951— MEN (“ Post Office statement ”, Appendix)	MEN As in 1949 but with addition of: (a) Railway office messengers (b) Railway clerks, class 4 WOMEN (As in 1949)		MEN (a) Telephonists in other Government Departments (b) Hospital telephonists (c) Telephonists in licensed residential establishments WOMEN (a) Telephonists in other Government Departments (b) Hospital telephonists (c) Telephonists in licensed residential establishments (d) Co-operative Wholesale Society telephonists
1954— (Post Office statement on telephonists, Appendix)	MEN (a) Telephonists in other Government Departments (b) Hospital telephone switchboard operators (c) Telephone operators in licensed residential establishments (d) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks (e) Railway signalmen WOMEN (a) Telephonists in other Government Departments (b) Hospital telephone switchboard operators (c) Telephone operators in licensed residential establishments (d) Co-operative Wholesale Society telephonists (e) Railway clerks, class 2 (f) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks	MEN (a) Railway clerks, class 4 and class 5 (b) Railway office messengers (c) Hand compositors (d) Linotype and monotype operators (e) Bookbinders	

TELEPHONISTS (MALE AND FEMALE)

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE, 1912-1954—PART II

MEN

National Telephone Company staff
Railway shunters
Ticket collectors
Railway guards
Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks
Railway clerks, class 5
Railway clerks, class 4
Railway signalmen
Hand compositors
Linotype and monotype operators
Bookbinders
Railway office messengers
Telephonists in other Government Departments
Hospital telephonists
Telephonists in licensed residential establishments

WOMEN

National Telephone Company staff
Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks
Railway clerks, class 2
Telephonists in other Government Departments
Hospital telephonists
Telephonists in licensed residential establishments
Co-operative Wholesale Society telephonists

TELEGRAPHISTS (MALE AND FEMALE)

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE AT DIFFERENT TIMES, 1897-1954—PART I

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1897— (Tweedmouth Inquiry. Report— Appendix IIIA and IIIB)	(a) Railway telegraphist and railway Clerks many, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Holland		
1904— (Bradford Committee, page 9 of minutes of evidence)	(a) Hand compositors (b) Typists	(a) Railway telegraphists and clerks (b) Telegraphists in continental countries	(a) Hand compositors (b) Typists
1905— (Stanley Report, opening para.)	(Comparisons were used but no details were published)		
1906— (Hobhouse Committee. Minutes of evidence. Page 20) ("Post Office Information 1906." Pages 191-195)	(a) Railway telegraphists (b) Cable company telegraphists (c) Compositors (d) Railway clerks (e) Teachers (f) Percentage movement of wages 1874-1903 of building workers, coal miners, engineers, textile workers and agricultural labourers (g) Earnings index for workers in shipbuilding and engineering (Professor Bowley)	(a) Typists	(a) Cable company telegraphists (b) Railway clerks and telegraphists (c) Teachers (d) Percentage wages and earnings indices
1912— (Holt Committee "Comparisons with outside employment" Post Office, November, 1912)	All those used in 1906 plus:— (h) Commercial clerks (i) Bank clerks (j) Shop assistants (female only) (k) Typists and shorthand typists (female only)	(None of 1906 comparisons were dropped in 1912, except the per- centage indices)	The new ones used in 1912 are the four:— (h), (i), (j), (k)

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1927— ("Comparisons" and "Post Office general statement," page 7)	(a) Shop assistants and clerks (private traders) (b) Shop assistants and clerks (Co-op) (c) Railway clerks class 5 (and women Class 2) (d) Signalmen (e) Hand compositors (f) Bookbinders (g) Average time rates or earnings in a large number of miscellaneous occupations* (h) Percentage increase of pay 1914-1926 compared with engineering, shipbuilding, building and railway workers	(a) Cable company telegraphists (b) Teachers (c) Commercial clerks (d) Bank clerks (e) Typists and shorthand typists	(a) Shop assistants (for comparison with male telegraphists) (b) Co-operative assistants and clerks (c) Signalmen (d) Bookbinders (e) Average time rates or earnings in large number of miscellaneous occupations (f) Percentage increases in engineering, etc.
1938— (Post Office general statement Appendix)	Same occupations except for the addition of linotype and monotype operators	Percentage increases dropped	Linotype and monotype operators
1949— (Post Office general statement and Appendix C)	Same as in 1938 except for dropping of average earnings in outside industries. Wages index used to show percentage increase since 1939	None of 1938 comparisons dropped in 1949 except the miscellaneous outside average earnings	No additions or revivals in 1949 but the Post Office used the Ministry of Labour wages index
1951— (Post Office statement, Appendix B)	Same as 1949 except for addition of railway office messengers class A	(None of 1949 dropped in 1951)	Railway office messengers class A
1954— (Post Office statement of case Appendix D)	(a) Teleprinter operators I and II at Air Ministry etc. (b) Copying typists I and II in Civil Service (c) Railway clerks 5 and 4 (d) Signalmen (e) Shop assistants and clerks (f) Shop assistants and clerks (Co-op)	(a) Hand compositors (b) Linotype and monotype operators (c) Bookbinders (d) Railway office messengers	(a) Teleprinter operators in Air Ministry, etc. (b) Copy typists in Civil Service

* Full list included in Part II.

TELEGRAPHISTS (MALE AND FEMALE)

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE, 1897-1954—PART II

Railway clerks	Baking table hands
Railway telegraphists	One horse carters
French telegraphists	Boot and shoe workers
German telegraphists	Railway passenger porters grades I and II
Austrian telegraphists	Cotton workers*
Belgian telegraphists	Woollen and worsted workers*
Italian telegraphists	Lace workers*
Dutch telegraphists	Silk workers*
Hand compositors	Linen workers*
Typists	Jute workers*
Cable company telegraphists	Hosiery workers*
Railway clerks	Carpet workers*
Coal miners	Bleaching, dyeing and finishing workers*
Teachers	Making-up and packing workers (textiles)*
Commercial clerks	Miscellaneous textile workers*
Bank clerks	Pottery workers*
Shop assistants, clerks and cashiers	Brick and tile workers*
Shorthand typists	Glass workers*
Signalmen (railways)	Chemical workers*
Bookbinders	Cement workers*
Tram drivers	Explosives workers*
Tram conductors	Paint and colour workers*
Bricklayers	Soap and candle workers*
Masons	Miscellaneous chemical etc. workers*
Carpenters and joiners	Pig iron workers*
Plumbers	Smelting, rolling, etc. workers*
Plasterers	Tinplate workers*
Painters	Non-ferrous metal workers*
Labourers (building trade)	Brass foundry workers*
Fitters and turners	Bedstead workers*
Ironmoulders	Sheet metal workers*
Pattern makers	Wrought iron workers*
Labourers (engineering)	Light casting workers*
Shipwrights	Hollow ware workers*
Ship joiners	Wire workers*
Labourers (shipbuilding)	Anchor and chain workers*
Gas works labourers	Screw, nut, bolt, etc. workers*
Electricity supply labourers	Needle, pin, etc. workers*
Local authority (non-trading) manual workers	Water supply workers*
Agricultural labourers	Canal, dock and harbour workers*
Railway guards	Electrical and telegraph apparatus workers*
Railway ticket collectors	Gold and silver workers*
Railway shunters	Jewellery workers*
Railway checkers (goods)	Scientific instrument makers*
Railway porters	Watch and clock workers*
Railway leading porters	Linotype and monotype operators
Cabinet makers	Railway office messengers
Upholsterers	Teletprinter operators (Air Ministry, etc.)
French polishers	Copy typists in the Civil Service

* Average weekly earnings.

POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH OFFICERS (MALE AND FEMALE)

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE, 1897-1951—PART I

(Including counter clerks and telegraphists and sorting clerks and telegraphists before 1946)

Date	Comparisons used	Former comparisons dropped	New comparisons brought in or old ones revived
1897— (Tweedmouth Inquiry. Minutes of Evidence Appendix IIIA and IIIB)	(a) Railway clerks and chief clerks (b) Counter clerks in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Holland		
1906— (Hobhouse Inquiry. Minutes of evidence. Pages 20-21) ("Post Office Information, 1906," Pages 191-195)	(a) Teachers (b) Railway booking clerks (c) Shop assistants (d) Indices of wages of workers in building, coal mines, engineering, textile and agriculture	Counter clerks in continental countries	(a) Teachers (b) Shop assistants (c) Wage indices
1912— (Holt Inquiry "Comparisons")	(a) Railway clerks (b) Commercial clerks (c) Bank clerks (d) Teachers (e) Shop assistants and salesmen and saleswomen (f) Typists and shorthand typists (g) Compositors (h) Skilled handworkers in a number of trades	Indices of wages in selected trades	(a) Commercial clerks (b) Bank clerks (c) Typists and shorthand typists (d) Compositors (e) Skilled handworkers
1927— (“Post Office statement on counter clerks” page 5; “Post Office general statement” page 7; and “Comparisons”)	(a) Scale payment sub-post office assistants (b) Percentage increases of wages in engineering, shipbuilding, building and railways 1914-1926 (c) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks (d) Railway clerks class 5, and signalmen (e) Hand compositors and bookbinders (f) Railway clerks class 2 (women) (g) Average time rates or earnings in a large number of occupations*	(a) Commercial clerks (b) Bank clerks (c) Teachers (d) Typists and shorthand typists (e) Skilled handworkers	(a) Scale payment sub-post office assistants (b) Percentage increases of wages in a number of trades 1914-1926 (c) Average time rates or earnings in a large number of occupations (d) Bookbinders

1938— (Post Office general statement Appendix)	(a) Shop assistants cashiers, and clerks (b) Railway clerks class 5, and signalmen (c) Hand operators, linotype and monotype operators and bookbinders (d) Railway guards, ticket collectors, shunters, checkers, porters (various grades) (e) Workers of various grades in engineering, shipbuilding, building, road transport (passenger and goods) and furniture making (f) Bakery workers (g) Boot and shoe workers (h) Local authority labourers (i) Agricultural labourers (j) Average earnings of workers in textiles, brick, pottery, etc. making, metal and engineering, transport and storage and public utility services	(a) Scale payment sub-post office assistants (b) Percentage increase of outside wage rates	(a) Linotype and monotype operators (b) Various railway grades (c) Bakery workers (d) Boot and shoe workers (e) Local authority labourers (f) Agricultural labourers
1949— ("Post Office statement" on postal and telegraph officers. Page 11) ("Post Office general statement and Appendix")	(a) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks (b) Railway clerks class 5, and signalmen (c) Hand compositors, linotype and monotype operators and bookbinders (d) Percentage increases of outside wage rates, 1939-1949	(a) Many railway grades (b) Workers in engineering, shipbuilding, etc. (c) Bakery workers (d) Boot and shoe workers (e) Local authority labourers (f) Agricultural labourers	Percentage increase of outside wage rates, 1939-1949
1951— ("Post Office statement." Page 7 and Appendix)	(a) Percentage increase of outside wage rates 1939-1951 (b) Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks (c) Railway clerks class 5 and 4, and signalmen (d) Railway office messengers (e) Hand compositors, linotype and monotype operators and bookbinders		(a) Railway clerks class 4 (b) Railway office messengers

* The full list is included in Part II.

POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH OFFICERS

COMPARISONS USED BY POST OFFICE, 1897-1951—PART II

(Including counter clerks and sorting clerks and telegraphists before 1946)

Railway clerks, class 5 and 4, and chief clerks	Shipwrights
Railway clerks, class 2 (women)	Ship joiners
Counter clerks in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Holland	Shipbuilding labourers
Teachers	Gas works labourers
Shop assistants, cashiers and clerks	Electricity supply labourers
Indices of wage rates	Cotton workers*
Commercial clerks	Woollen workers*
Bank clerks	Lace, silk and linen workers*
Typists and shorthand typists	Jute workers*
Compositors and linotype and monotype operators	Hosiery workers*
Bookbinders	Carpet workers*
Workers making electrical and telegraph appa- ratus, gold and silver ware, jewellery, scientific instruments and watches and clocks	Bleaching workers*
Scale payment sub-post office assistants	Other textile workers*
Signalmen	Pottery workers*
Railway guards	Brick workers*
Ticket collectors	Glass workers*
Shunters	Chemical workers*
Checkers	Cement workers*
Porters (various grades)	Explosives workers*
Bakery table hands	Paint and colour workers*
Boot and shoe workers	Soap and candle workers*
Local authority labourers	Other chemical workers*
Agricultural labourers	Pig iron workers*
Bus and tram drivers and conductors	Smelting workers*
Bricklayers	Tinplate workers*
Masons	Non-ferrous metal workers*
Carpenters and joiners	Brass workers*
Plumbers	Bedstead workers*
Plasterers	Sheet metal workers*
Painters	Wrought iron workers*
Building labourers	Light castings workers*
Fitters and turners	Hollow ware workers*
Ironmoulders	Wire workers*
Pattern makers	Anchor and chain workers*
Engineering labourers	Screw, nut and bolt workers*
	Needle, pin, etc. workers*
	Water supply workers*
	Canal, dock and harbour workers*
	Railway Office messengers

* Average weekly earnings.

RADIO OPERATORS CLASS I (M.)

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE

As regards comparisons with other occupations radio operators have been treated exceptionally by the Post Office and only one outside comparison has been offered in recent years, that of radio operators class I in other Government Departments (Post Office statement on radio operators, 1949, page 5). On this occasion the Post Office additionally compared the work and pay of radio operators class I with the work and pay of telephonists (Post Office) and held that the difference between the two scales adequately compensated radio operators for the superiority of their work, their technical and language qualifications and their exceptional conditions as regards hours of work, etc.

The Post Office offered the following explanation for having drawn no other comparisons:—

“No satisfactory comparison with rates of pay outside the Government service is possible since, so far as is known, no comparable radio operators are employed by outside concerns in this country.”

(*ibid*, page 6).

At arbitration in 1949 and again in 1951, when the Union was making claims for a number of grades, including radio operators, the Post Office did not include radio operators in the appendices in which several Post Office grades were compared with a number of outside occupations.

We may conclude from this that the Post Office were unable to find outside occupations that in their opinion even partly resembled the work of radio operators. This would however not have prevented the Post Office from using for radio operators the kind of comparisons with numerous miscellaneous wage rates and earnings that they have used in the past for sorters, telegraphists, counter clerks and postmen. That the Post Office have not done so is to be explained by the circumstances that it is only since 1938 that the Union has presented a claim for radio operators along with claims for other grades and in 1949 and 1951, when radio operators were included with other grades, the Post Office did not use this form of comparison for any grades.

CLEANERS (MEN AND WOMEN)

COMPARISONS USED BY THE POST OFFICE (1927 TO 1952)

The outside comparisons used by the Post Office in connection with wage claims for men and women cleaners are fewer in number and less varied than those used for other grades. In particular the Post Office have not included the cleaners in the tables submitted to the Arbitration Tribunal (e.g., in 1927 and 1938) comparing a block of Post Office grades with large numbers of miscellaneous outside occupations.

List of Comparisons

Cleaners in other Government Departments (at one time part of the unestablished messenger staff).

Labourers and porters, Engineering and Stores Department of the Post Office.

Railway porters, grade II (performing cleaning work at railway stations).

Charwomen (women cleaners) in other Government Departments.

Charwomen in domestic employment.

Women employed on skilled and semi skilled duties in Post Office Factories.

Shop assistants and clerks, retail distributive trades.

Cleaners, retail distributive trades.

Servants, mess employees, labourers, etc., War Office and Air Ministry.

Railway carriage cleaners.

Railway messroom attendants.

Railway signal and telegraph labourers.

Cleaners, Co-operative Retail Societies.

Cleaners, Co-operative Wholesale Society.

Group I workers (including cleaners), local authority services.

General porters, hospitals.

Kitchen porters, hospitals.

Kitchen porters, licensed residential establishments.

Cleaners, unlicensed residential establishments.

House porters, National Service hostels corporation.

Women cleaners, railways.

Women cleaners, gas boards.

Stationmen and house porters, London Transport.

Labourers, gas boards.

House porters, Port of London Authority.

Women cleaners, Port of London Authority.

SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS

1. *Pay.* That pay should, in the first instance, be determined as the result of an assessment of the value of the workers (or groups of workers) to the industry in which they are employed, and of its consequential value to the community as a whole.
2. Having related the worker's purchasing power to the value of his work, that purchasing power should not be varied more markedly than the purchasing power of other workers whose value to the community has presumably been similarly assessed.
3. That in ensuring that the purchasing power should not be varied very markedly, the Ministry of Labour wages index should be accepted as a guide.
4. That changes in pay resulting from the use of this guide should be on a percentage basis.
5. *Pay of the main categories.* That the pay of the main categories should be as in the scales set out on pages 20 to 23.
6. *Leave.* That the leave of the manipulative grades in the Post Office should not be less favourable than that in the general service classes.
7. *Hours.* That the hours of the manipulative grades in the Post Office should not be less favourable than those in the general service classes.
8. *Overtime.* That the present restrictive maximum should be removed.
9. That week day overtime should be remunerated at rate and a half.
10. Sundays, Bank Holidays, Good Friday, Christmas Day and New Year's Day in Scotland should be remunerated at double time.
11. *Superannuation.* Service with the armed forces should count for civil service superannuation purposes.
12. That there should be recognition of the principle that superannuation is deferred pay.
13. That there should not be an abatement of civil service superannuation benefits by National Insurance pension.

Examination of witnesses

MR. L. F. B. MORGAN, *Chairman*,
 MR. C. J. GEDDES, *General Secretary*,
 MR. R. A. HAYWARD, *Deputy General Secretary*,
 MR. L. V. ANDREWS
 MR. D. L. BROWN
 MR. C. STENNETT
 MISS N. WHITELAW

} *Assistant Secretaries*,

on behalf of the Union of Post Office Workers.

Called and examined.

1583. *Chairman:* May I start with a question on your representative capacity? Would you care to add anything to paragraph 1?—*Mr. Geddes:* I do not think there is much I can add. We represent about 163,000, that is about 85 per cent., of the possible members, and we represent the manipulative grades in the Post Office as distinct from the clerical, with the exception of the engineering side which is represented by another organisation.

1584. In paragraphs 4-6 you raise some rather general issues of principle. Would you agree with what the Treasury said at the beginning of their oral evidence about the Government being in a rather special position as employer, and that there is a

need for some tolerably well defined and accepted principles for settling civil service pay?—We find difficulty in agreeing that the Government as such is entitled to have principles governing its employees different from those which govern other employees. We find it difficult also to understand why the Government should say that civil servants—with the exception of course that some of their conditions differ from those of outside employees—should be governed by different factors and why their pay should be determined on different principles. What we are particularly concerned with here is that even in Government it is necessary to have some machinery for the settlement of any dispute which may arise between the employer and the

employee, and the Government itself has accepted that by setting up an arbitration machine, the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal. Our difficulty is that the arbitration machinery in the Civil Service should, in our view, be as completely free to make a decision on any issue before it as any other industrial tribunal. Our impression is, and that has been rather fortified by a recent incident before the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal, that in fact it is not free, that it considers itself to be governed by decisions, recommendations and advice, offered by the Tomlin Commission and has indicated, through its Chairman, that it considers it is bound by any decision of this Royal Commission. It seems to us that, if that is so, then the Civil Service is going to be in the position that it has no independent arbitration machinery and that what the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal is going to do in future is to look up your Report and determine any issue before it by what you have said. That seems to us not to be arbitration at all. It seems to be merely a body which will ensure that the views of the employer—if they accept the recommendations of the Royal Commission—are imposed upon the employee, and we suggest that that is not in accord with accepted concepts of arbitration. It certainly is not in accord with normal industrial arbitration machinery and should not be the position in the Civil Service. Therefore we suggest, with great respect, that the Royal Commission ought not to lay down as it were laws which govern not only the employer but also the arbitration machine. We can understand that the employer may say as the Government:—"I want some advice and I have asked a Royal Commission to give it me" and the employers' relations with the employees will be governed by that advice. It is hoped that the employee would also be so governed if it is acceptable. But our experience is that a recent pronouncement by the Chairman of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal indicates that in his view he is bound by the previous Royal Commission and will be bound by your Commission.

1585. *Mr. Menzler*: Does Mr. Geddes implicitly challenge the term of our reference as to whether any change is desirable in the principles which should govern pay? Are you suggesting that really our terms of reference ought not to have been drawn in that way?—I think I must reply to that by saying that we had nothing to do with drawing up the terms of reference. Had we had something to do with them we might have drawn them differently, but all I am saying is that, if this Royal Commission think changes are desirable, their recommendations are not necessarily binding upon the employees of the Government. I think if this Commission decides

that the principles which now govern the Treasury attitude to wage claims should be varied, that would be a matter for consideration of course by the section of the Service which was responsible for presenting a claim and they would have to take into account when they were preparing their claim that the Treasury would deal with it in accordance with those principles.

1586. What you are really saying is the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal should be free as an ordinary national tribunal is free, and not subject to directives or principles?—Exactly.

1587. *Chairman*: The real exception you take is to the fact that the Arbitration Tribunal are, in your view, inclined to consider themselves bound by the principles of the Tomlin Commission and to be bound by the principles adumbrated by this Commission?—Not inclined, they made a statement that they are.

1588. It would be interesting to have that on the record.—This is a verbatim note taken by the Treasury reporter.

"*Chairman*: I appreciate the two points, but the point I want to put, and I want the parties to think on this somewhat seriously is this. It is quite true, as Mr. Geddes said, that each case is put by itself but it is equally true that this Tribunal must have some regard to previous decisions of its own. It must have regard also, at least until the present Royal Commission tells us something different, to the principles which Tomlin enunciated as to the general treatment on wage claims and salary claims in the Civil Service, and it is impossible for us in the light of what the Tomlin Commission said, particularly where they approved of one of the particular tests mentioned in the Industrial Court Post Office case in 1927—I am speaking now from memory—that one did have to have some regard to relativities within the Post Office . . . Call it a dilemma if you like, it is a dilemma which may affect both sides".

It seems to us that the Chairman has positively said that he is bound by the Tomlin Commission and will be bound by this Commission.

1589. Were not his words "must have some regard"?—Yes, Sir, his words were:—

"It is equally true that this Tribunal must have some regard to previous decisions of its own. It must have regard also, at least until the present Royal Commission tells us something different . . ."

Then he goes on to say:—

"It is impossible for us, in the light

of what the Tomlin Commission said . . ."

It seems to me that that is rather more positive than "regard". He is saying that it is impossible for him to do certain things in the light of what the Tomlin Commission said.

1590. *Mr. Menzler*: You would agree that recommendations of either the Tomlin Commission or this Commission must be accepted by the Government first?—Undoubtedly; of course it is equally true that the Government can accept those which it likes and discount those which it does not.

1591. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I have a series of questions I would like to put to you on the section of your submission dealing with the principles of pay which you seem to divide into two, the first being the question of initial rates and then the maintenance of your standards. On the fixing of initial rates you seem to take the view, if not that outside comparisons have lost any validity, at least they have to a large extent, and in your submission about fixing the rates you seem to suggest that this can only be done on the basis of a determination of value of work, and possibly of some civil service internal comparisons, for example, the postal and telegraph officer and the clerical officer. Are we right in assuming that the main contention of the Union is that manipulative work is unique, and that the doctrine of fair comparisons therefore is inapplicable in principle?—Unique, of course, is a very wide term and, in so far that the work is not performed by anyone else in its precise form, it is unique. I would not suggest that the work performed by the manipulative grades on certain broad issues cannot be compared with outside. We do suggest, Sir, that, because it is impossible to find work outside which is strictly comparable with that done by the manipulative grades, it is not a fair comparison to take selective workers outside and compare them with the manipulative grades on the basis purely of pay, where there is no relationship with regard to work.

1592. You did say just now, I think, that there were certain broad issues on which you thought comparison could be made with outside industries?—Yes, Sir.—If I may I would suggest that what the Union has in mind, and perhaps it was an omission not putting it in the submission, is that the value of any worker, whether he be salaried or wage earning, can be measured to some extent at least by this sort of thing: What degree of responsibility does he accept? What degree of skill is required? How much initiative does he exercise? What degree or standard of integrity is required from him? I would have thought that the value of the individual to his employer, and in the case of the public

servant to the community, or for that matter any other worker to the community, could be reasonably measured on the basis of those four and possibly other things that the Commission itself can think of. Our difficulty is that it seems to us that the pay of manipulative grades in the past has not been related to those four things, but mainly to internal relativities, and a determination to ensure that the manipulative grades did not rise above some sort of hidden imponderable departmental status which is imposed upon them because they are a departmental class. If you examine the pay of the manipulative grades in relation to skill, for example, they are very badly paid in relation to broad bands of skilled workers in outside industry. I think I am right in saying that the average earnings of skilled men in outside industry are about 196s. a week at the present time. That skilled worker will get somewhere round about 4s. an hour. Therefore, he is getting a certain standard of living in return for the work that he is doing for his employer and his contribution to society. But the manipulative grades, taking them by and large, do not appear to be getting the same standard of living. You see, the skilled worker outside will get 4s. an hour at 21 years of age, and he may be able to increase that 4s. in many ways by earnings and he comes near the average of 196s., but the pay, for example, of the postman at 21 years of age is something like 2s. 1d. an hour. It is true that when he reaches his maximum at the end of ten years it is about 3s. 1d. an hour but he is far below the standard of living of the skilled worker outside. We would not deny that if you take the skill, the responsibility, the degree of initiative—and these are all matters of degree—the integrity, which is required from him, then he is badly paid in relation to the broad band of skilled workers outside. Therefore, we admit that if one is going to value the work of a given worker it is inevitable that some sort of formula—if that is the right word—must be applied, and we suggest that on our formula we are badly paid.

1593. Now you say, at one stage, you "discount" the fairness of outside comparison. Is that right?—We discount the fairness of outside comparisons as they have been used by the Post Office over the years, and for this reason. As we have shown in our document, the Post Office chooses a comparable worker outside and changes that comparison when the pay of that worker alters in relationship to the pay of the manipulative grade under consideration.

We think that, with great respect, that is not fair dealing or fair tactics. If you said, thirty years ago, that a postman could be rightly compared with a policeman, and if there has been no material change in the

work of a policeman but there has been a material improvement in the work of the postman, why should you now decide that the policeman is not a comparable class? Well, you decide it because the policeman suddenly gets more money than the postman, and we say that we do discount that sort of comparison!

In other words, I think our view is that it is neither fair, nor right to select certain groups of workers in outside industry and say:—"We are going to compare this grade outside with that grade in the Service", when in fact there is no comparability of work. We say if there is going to be comparison there ought to be a broad estimate of the values of the work performed by our grades, and they should then be compared to broad bands outside.

1594. Of course, within these broad bands there could be a variety of skill and responsibility?—Certainly, Sir.

1595. What I want is to try and appreciate exactly how the differing scales in the Civil Service get evaluated except by comparisons, perhaps on a narrower basis than you would like?—I take your point, Sir, and I think my answer is that in the past Post Office manipulative grades have been related to unskilled labourers on occasions. For example, a postal and telegraph officer, who not only performs a valuable and complicated service to the public but also does very important clerical work, is compared to a shop assistant in a grocery store! Now we say that is quite wrong and that what ought to be done here is to make an estimate—difficult I agree but then of course the issues before the Commission are not necessarily easy—of the degree of skill, the degree of responsibility, the degree of initiative he exercises, the integrity that is demanded from him, and try to measure that against broad bands of workers outside exercising the same degrees of those things.

1596. Would I be right in inferring from what you say that you do not object to external comparisons on the basis of broad bands of rates of pay?—My answer, Sir, is that we do not think it is correct to make comparisons on the basis of pay. If such comparisons are made then all you have to do is to go outside, find comparable pay, and say that is a comparison, but that comparison only operates at a given point in time. It ought to be done on the basis of the type of work performed and the qualities necessary to do that work. We do not deny that it is possible in outside industry to find people performing work with the same degree of skill and responsibility but we say that that should be the method of comparison and not the rates of pay.

1597. But surely you cannot divorce the two elements? If you take degree of responsibility must you not take in conjunction with it the rate that is being paid for it?—Yes, Sir, always on the assumption of course that the outside employer relates his wages to these factors, when in all probability he relates them to factors of supply and demand.

1598. You would agree that that comes into it?—I would agree that in outside industries supply and demand certainly comes in. It comes in within the Service but the difficulty within the Service of course is that you do not—as the outside industrialist must when he is dealing with skilled workers—relate your supply and demand to the skill of the man you are employing. What you do in the Service if you cannot get the people is to reduce the standard.

1599. And if this principle that you are enunciating were in fact adopted you would not mind its application, if at some time in the future a serious recession were reflected in the pay of the broad band of outside comparisons?—"Mind" is a difficult word to answer, I have not the slightest doubt whatsoever that if there were a recession in this country and if outside wages came down the Treasury would take the necessary steps to bring our wages down.

1600. Assuming the principle had been found to be practicable and the Commission found it wise to recommend its adoption, how would it be applied?—I think, Sir, that in the interests of good industrial relationships it certainly ought not to be applied by the employer. That unfortunately is what has happened in the past of course, and I would suggest that it would be a very sound thing indeed, in the interests of good relationships so far as wages are concerned, that there should be a joint examination of the sort of outside comparison that was legitimate and I think we, certainly, would enter into those discussions with the best of goodwill.

1601. Can I ask a question about cleaners? If you look at the minutes of evidence of the meeting that we had with the Civil Service Union you see that that Union thought it possible and reasonable to compare the rates of cleaners in Government Departments with those outside, provided a suitable selection were made. Do you feel that this might be possible in your case as well, even if allowance may have to be made for variations in the nature of the duties?—Clearly it is not so difficult to find similar work being done outside, and provided, as you say, due regard is paid to the difference in work, I do not think we could object to the comparison being made.

1602. Might it not perhaps also be possible to find somewhere outside the Service work which is more or less comparable with the postman? It is your basic grade and since you are concerned with internal relativities among your grades, it follows that we must get the base right before we can build up the pyramid. I think, earlier on, you did make a brief allusion to the police?—Yes, Sir, that is the only comparison we think is in any way valid. I assure you, that is not because of the present relationship on pay, because at one time the policeman was getting in fact, less than the London postman, and we were quite willing to adopt that comparison then. They are both public servants. They are both uniformed servants. One would agree that the policeman in the course of his duty is probably subject to a greater risk of personal injury than the postman, although recent events would show that even the postman of course is subjected to the possibility of personal injury. In any case from time to time he has to meet quite fierce dogs when he goes round delivering letters, and is quite often subjected to risk not of very serious, but at least of personal injury. They both require a very high degree of integrity. I am not sure, if I have to weigh these two up, whether I can say that the postman has to have the same degree, but certainly a very high degree because the work that the Post Office does, the service it renders and therefore its effect is such that unless industry has complete faith that the matter posted, no matter what it contains, will be duly delivered, industry will be undermined. Therefore, since the postman is the man who handles this correspondence and delivers and collects it—it is not a question of whether it is valuable or not but of whether it is going to be collected and delivered—the integrity required for the postman is quite considerable. As for responsibility, it may be said that the responsibility of enforcing the law is rather more important than the responsibility of carrying out Post Office work; I am not going to judge on those things. I would say that they both have their responsibilities. I think it could reasonably be said that the policeman would have to exercise a greater degree of initiative but it does not mean that the postman does not also have to exercise a degree of initiative. Therefore, we do feel that, if there is any comparison at all outside, it would be with the police.

1603. I should like to pick out one point in that answer where you refer to the serious things that would happen if the postman did not deliver the letters. Would those serious things not happen if the office boy did not post the letter?—Certainly, Sir, if the office boy did not post the letter of course it might have a very serious effect

indeed upon the individual firm, but the fact that the office boy did not post the letter would not bring a public service into disrepute. It might have an effect upon the employer who might be looked upon as being careless, but it certainly would not bring a public service into disrepute.

1604. My next point is on your paragraphs 48 to 56, dealing with the postal and telegraph officer. Those paragraphs would seem to suggest that in your view there is a comparability between the work of the postal and telegraph officer and that of other agents but that he does a wider range of it. Is that correct?—Yes, Sir. We feel that that is a statement of fact and that if we had the time and the opportunity—we do not want to put a burden upon the Commission which would be quite unjustified—we could produce evidence which would support our contention that the postal and telegraph officer has so wide a range of duties that it is very doubtful whether any other worker has anything like the range. In other words, it is doubtful whether anybody has the wide range of counter work together with the wide range of clerical work.

1605. In your paragraph 48, you mention bank officials. Would you like to amplify this particular comparison?—*Mr. Andrews*: We think a comparison with the work of the bank official is not unfair. Both of them stand behind a counter and deal with the public as they come in and with the various transactions which the members of the public wish to undertake. Both of them discharge considerable financial responsibilities in undertaking their jobs, and we think for those reasons that the counter work of the postal and telegraph clerk and the work performed at the counter in a bank by a bank clerk are not at all dissimilar. There may be occasions, I think it fair to say, when the bank clerk probably handles larger sums of money during the course of the day whereas on the other hand the postal and telegraph officer deals with a much wider variety of transaction; he moves from one position on the counter to another as occasion demands dealing with banking business, money order business, sale and encashment of postal orders, the sale of stamps, insurance, Inland Revenue postage; he accepts parcels for all over the world, telegrams and cablegrams. In other words we would say that what we may lose by comparison in the volume of cash handled, we make up in the variety of transaction.

1606. Are there any other comments about the question of outside comparisons that you would like to make?—*Mr. Geddes*: No, I do not think so, Sir. It is very desirable that we should make it clear that we did not intend in our evidence completely to discard the possibility of

comparisons in a broad sense. If we have given that impression I think we may a little have overstated our case. What we were so anxious to do here was to contend that the proper way in which the pay of the manipulative grades should be measured was to choose certain classes of workers in outside industry only if it could be reasonably shown that those workers were performing the same type of work or were required to have the same qualities in the performance of that work as our people. Our main contention has been, as we have shown here, that the Post Office in its selection of comparisons seems to have been judiciously selective, in the sense that it has always chosen a comparison with less pay. I cannot recall—I may be wrong—a single case where the Post Office has gone to the Arbitration Tribunal and quoted an outside comparison where that outside comparison was getting more pay than the grade with which they were dealing.

1607. *Chairman*: I was very interested in the method of your assessment of the value of work that you mentioned. These are just the sort of things that are being dealt with in the new science of job evaluation, where teams of experts go round and assess the value of work. This system is actually being used quite a lot in a large section of industry. I know of one firm who entirely assessed the value of its jobs in this way. Have you thought about that as a means of starting this basic evaluation of work from which we have to make our beginning?—We have certainly never made that suggestion to the Post Office, Sir. I think in my reply to Mr. Thorncroft I indicated that we would welcome the opportunity of discussing with the Post Office some sort of job evaluation on the basis that I suggested to the Commission if we were given the opportunity. Whether we would reach agreement or not I do not know, but certainly it would be infinitely better than the present system. It would be better than the Post Office looking up the worst possible wages and giving that as a comparison!

1608. This is becoming quite a science. It started in America and spread over here. In my own University of Birmingham there is a department on engineering production which takes part in these evaluations.—I think what we have in mind when we are talking about this sort of conception is the system which operates in those countries where you have a national wages policy, for example, Norway, where you have a national wages policy and you put all the workers in given categories and then fix the pay of the categories. There must be some system of putting people into categories. I think in Norway there are twenty two, and somebody must have got down to the issue of deciding that this particular worker—they are workers in a

vast variety of industries—goes into category 19 and this one into category 21. I do not know how it is done but I would have assumed it was done on the same sort of basis as the one I have suggested.

1609. Could you give us examples of the skilled workers you have in mind for comparison?—I think, Sir, that it is frightfully difficult to go to the list of skilled workers in outside industry and say that this particular grade exercises the same degree of skill, and that is why I try to make the point that it is not only skill but on other factors which must be combined. Our general view is that the remuneration received for the job should give a certain standard of living. The present level of earnings of the skilled man in outside industry is about 196s. and on that basis taking the skill exercised by our people together with the other factors, we think that shows clearly that our people are badly paid. I think therefore our view would be that we must decide if our workers are all skilled or semi-skilled or unskilled; and, if they are skilled, then their pay should be related to that of the skilled workers in outside industry.

1610. *Lady Albemarle*: I thought you said you felt that up to the present too much attention had been paid to internal relativities, and the standards of value you suggested were responsibility, skill, initiative and integrity. I take integrity for granted throughout the Civil Service but these other three surely are the very basis on which relativities are built up within the Service?—We would not deny that, if you applied them the result would be different rates of pay because they would be related to the degree of these things which the individual had to exercise. As to our comments on internal relativities—you may think this quite wrong and that workers sometimes get wrong views—it is undoubtedly the view of the manipulative grades that they have been held down in many ways, and particularly in wages, in order to ensure that the people above them did not make claims resulting from successes by them. In other words it is not a question of dealing with a claim on its merits, but on the effect of its concession upon the rest of the Service. We are therefore, as it were, always on the ground floor and the doors are as closely guarded against us as possible in case we start something. Therefore, we have not been able to get established a wage system for the manipulative grades relating to the value of the work they do, but related to other factors, the main factor being the possibility that, if they were given an increase in pay, it would result in the disturbance of internal relativities. We think that is wrong? We think, in the first place, you should try and measure the qualities required to do the job.

1611. It was just that I did not see how those particular four standards you suggested to us as a means of assessment could conflict with internal relativities which I imagine have been built up in exactly that way.—We would think not. If I may give an example, we would have thought if you examined the work of the postal and telegraph officer on our four standards, you would say that he ought to be very much better paid than he is in relation to other workers within the Civil Service.

1612. *Mr. Cash*: On those four standards, where would you put the agricultural worker today?—Quite high. I would have to agree that the agricultural worker, for example, has to exercise a very high degree of initiative if he is going to do his job. For example, if he failed to observe the signs of illness in a prize bull he would be doing great injury to his employer! I think he has got to exercise all the other things but it does not follow that he is sufficiently well paid for all the qualities he exercises.

1613. Have you seen the proceedings before the Agricultural Wages Tribunal and the comparisons that are made between their pay and the pay of the postman? I think we are rather apt to look at the London postmen and the London policemen, but postmen and policemen go all over the country districts into very rural areas where the comparison is continuously being made in the pay of the postmen and the pay of the agricultural worker, and that is not 196s.—I agree, Sir.

1614. Or anything approaching it?—I accept that the agricultural worker does not get 196s. or anything like it, but, if you examined his work on the basis of the four points, would you not give him very much more than he gets at the present moment?

1615. You see the comparison is made with the postmen.—But I am suggesting it should not be. I am suggesting that their pay should be related to the four qualities which they exercise.

1616. If the postmen's pay is put up that would be a factor before the Agricultural Wages Tribunal?—It might well be but I do not think justice ought to be determined on the cost of justice.

1617. No, but then your average is immediately disturbed.—My average might be disturbed in either an upward or a downward direction, I agree.

1618. Have you any particulars as to pay for the telephonists in Kingston-upon-Hull?—No, Sir. Their pay may well be lower but this is a case where there is no comparison. Kingston-upon-Hull has a

small municipal telephone system which has to rely upon the Post Office system for all its toll and trunk calls and you are dealing with a purely local operator who has nothing like the responsibility, variety or complexity of work that is performed in the Post Office. In our view it would be wrong to say that if the telephonists in Kingston are getting "X", that ought to be the pay of the telephonists in Glasgow.

1619. *Mr. Menzler*: You compared the 4s. an hour for the skilled worker in industry with the 2s. an hour for the postman at 21 and I think you said he gets that after his apprenticeship. Are you claiming that at 21 a postman is in fact fully skilled in relation to all the duties set out in paragraph 29?—*Mr. Stennett*: The postman entering the Service at the juvenile age of recruitment of 16, would serve an apprenticeship until he reaches 18, and from the age of 18 he is expected, and indeed is scheduled, to perform the full range of duties as shown in the evidence before the Commission. From 18 years of age, therefore, until 21 he would have served his apprenticeship. He would have had three years on the full range of duties proper and he is indeed fully qualified to perform the full range of duties.

1620. I think in an earlier remark, Mr. Geddes, you said that you do not find the incremental system outside?—*Mr. Geddes*: I think if our view were taken to its logical conclusion there would be no incremental system. We have of course been seeking a reduction in the length of the scales for many years.

1621. I was interested in Mr. Andrews' comparisons with the bank clerks, and it did seem to me that the corollary was that the postal and telegraph officers should be graded as clerical officers but you do not make that claim, you do not put it as high as that?—On the contrary, we certainly make that claim. One has to be careful in giving evidence before a Royal Commission—one has friends in the rest of the Service!—but I think I must say that, taking the variety into consideration and the range, the postal and telegraph officer, if anything, should get more pay than the clerical officer, and certainly not less.

1622. *Chairman*: There is just one point before we have to adjourn. It does seem to me that the only answer to your contention about the work value would be some national body with the requisite skill that could examine the whole structure, rather as you have suggested must have been done in Norway.—Yes, we were hoping, of course, that the Royal Commission would undertake that, in relation to the manipulative grades at least.

1623. I should not think we have the requisite or appropriate skills, but it does

look as if something of the sort was the only logical answer.—I would agree, that, if such an assessment were to be undertaken, it might be advisable to have expert advice.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

1624. Could we pass straight to the next question or is there something you would like to add?—I wonder whether the Commission would give me permission, arising from the question put by Mr. Cash, to make written submissions as to the differences in the work performed by Post Office telephonists and those employed at Kingston?

1625. By all means, we want to get all the information we can.

1626. *Mr. Lloyd Williams:* We spent the morning talking about outside comparisons. I wonder if I may now approach the question of internal relativities, particularly that between the Post Office manipulatives and the clerical classes. Would you agree, Mr. Geddes, that a good deal of ground has been made up since 1939 in the gap between those two categories, the clerical officer having obtained an improvement of 63 per cent., whereas the postman has obtained an improvement of 106 per cent. since 1939?—I would agree, Sir, that as the result of the operation of the series of flat rate increases there has been a disturbance in the pre-war relativities, that the postman, for example, has had a greater percentage advance than that of the clerical officer.

1627. He has crept up much nearer?—He has crept nearer, Sir, yes; I am not sure about the much nearer.

1628. Should the manipulatives close up still nearer and even overtake the clerical classes?—We have no doubt in our minds that on an impartial examination of the work done by some of the clerical grades—not necessarily the clerical officer grade—there is need for re-adjustment of pay as between them and the manipulative classes. I said this morning that one had to be careful because one has friends in the rest of the Service and one does not want to attempt to build up a case by denigrating the work of other grades within the Service, but it is significant, for example, that a male typist, grade II, who is required to do no more than type copy given to him, gets more pay than a postman on his maximum. I would have thought that a comparison of the pay of a woman typist and that of a telephonist and telegraphist (woman) would justify an increase for the telegraphist and the telephonist. I would think, without any doubt whatever, that an impartial analysis of the work performed by the postal and telegraph officer justifies an adjustment in his favour in relation to

the clerical officer. So, despite the operation of the series of flat rate increases which has undoubtedly disturbed pre-war relativities, we feel that on examination of the value of the work performed by the manipulative grades there is justification for a further adjustment in an upward direction for the manipulative grades.

1629. In order to measure relativity you have an impartial analysis of the work that is done in each grade?—I would have thought that if you examined the work done by some of the clerical grades in the Civil Service on the basis of responsibility, initiative, intelligence required and skill, an impartial observer would come to the conclusion that the manipulative grades were underpaid.

1630. What do you think of the current relativities between your members and the Post Office Engineering Union?—When we are dealing with engineers we are dealing with something that must be related to knowledge and skill. I do not think our Union has made any close examination of the relativities, but if I were asked whether the radio operator employed in the Post Office on our side were paid properly in relation to the engineering grades I think I would say no, Sir. I think that the technical knowledge that he has may not be as extensive, he may not have to use it in the same way as, for example, an engineering inspector, but he has operating ability in addition in so far as he uses his technical knowledge for adjustment, it is probably higher. I would have thought, therefore, that the radio operator ought to be much more closely related to the engineering inspector than anyone else. When I come to the other classes on the engineering side, I am afraid I must content myself with saying that I think if an examination took place on the basis that I suggest, it might result in the disturbance of the present relativities in an upward direction as far as our grades are concerned, not in all cases but in some.

1631. What about the technician and the telephone operator?—I do not think they are to be compared in the same sense, but if I were asked did I think that the telephone operator had to exercise the same skill as the technician, I would be bound to say no, because he has no technical skill anyway, or very little, and operating skill is one thing and technical skill is another. I am not too sure that I could give a proper answer to that question.

1632. My impression is that he compares favourably with the technician.—With the technician, yes. I was thinking when I was replying to you rather more in terms of the technical officer, but again I must confess that this is a field to which we have not turned our eyes, and I cannot speak well on it.

1633. *Mr. Cash:* (Mr. Geddes, how far would you bring the issue of supply and demand into your consideration, if at all? —I think that it must be brought in, but it is not simply a question of supply and demand, but of the standard of person you want to do the job, and if you cannot get the standard you want at the pay which you are giving, then you should not in a public service reduce the standard in order to increase the supply.

1634. No. Have you any facts which lead you to suppose that the standard has fallen?—Undoubtedly, Sir, many facts. For example, take the postman's class. Before the war 50 per cent. of these vacancies were filled from professional ex-servicemen, and they had to have the first-class Army Educational Certificate. There were many more of them than there were jobs, so that the Post Office was able to select from this class of people. In recent years it has had to raise the age of recruitment to 60 in order to get the necessary supply of postmen.

1635. *Chairman:* These are ex-regulars you are referring to?—No, Sir, I am referring to anybody they can get. The pre-war age was 45 and they have now raised it to 60 because they cannot get the supply, and they cannot be selective now. I must admit that one of the reasons for this is that the professional ex-serviceman is very often now a technical man, and therefore he has an opportunity with acquired skills of going elsewhere, which he does. But there is no doubt whatever, in my submission, that the entry both at the boy messenger level—or what we termed the boy messenger in the past, the junior postman—and the ex-serviceman is much lower than it was before the war. Thirty years ago the young boy trying to become a boy messenger had to compete with quite a number of other boys, and he was considered fortunate if he got the job. I think the position today is that the Post Office is very fortunate if they get anybody at all!

1636. You think that parents would say —“We are not going to put Tommy into this service”?—Yes, Sir. I think the position is proved in the case of the postal and telegraph officers, where the Post Office deliberately set aside 25 per cent. of the vacancies for open competition, hoping to get grammar school leavers, and have failed to a considerable degree.

1637. They have not got all they want?—No, and they are not getting grammar school leavers.

1638. You say, in paragraph 108 (2):—

“Having related the worker's purchasing power to the value of his work, that purchasing power should not be varied more markedly than the

purchasing power of other workers whose value to the community has, presumably, been similarly assessed.”

Is this really so, or is this assessment not much more a matter of supply and demand?—I think you will observe that we were rather civil service in this! We did insert the word “presumably”, and I would be bound to admit, Sir, if asked the question, that supply and demand probably does play a much more important part in outside industry.

1639. The 1946 re-organisation was an agreed one, was it not?—It was agreed, Sir, with the one exception of the pay of the postal and telegraph officer which, whilst not the subject of precise disagreement, was the subject of a note exchanged between both Sides of the effect that the Union did not accept the rate as being applicable, and the Post Office noted it by letter.

1640. If that is so would it be wrong to take this as a baseline and as the time at which the value of the work of the manipulatives was properly assessed?—It would of course be a baseline, but it certainly did not satisfy the Union representatives in the negotiations. The Commission will be aware that when worker and employer get together, if you are going to reach agreement at all it must always be on the basis of compromise; unless the employer startles the other side by giving them all they ask for, and that would be very unusual! What happened here was that after we had discussed the re-organisation of the work we got down to the question of pay, and the Union was in the difficulty that it had worked for some 18 months trying to reach agreement, and eventually succeeding, on allocation of work and all the details that were necessarily involved, and were by no means satisfied with the pay that was being offered, and it was partly through the desire not to waste an enormous amount of quite excellent work that we eventually came to agreement. I am bound to say that the postal and telegraph officer was the only one in which we issued a caveat, but nevertheless the fact that one registers agreement does not mean one is satisfied. I have since entered into agreement with the Post Office on an increase of wages on two occasions, ignoring the Arbitration Court, and in neither of those cases did I get what I asked for, because the Treasury would not let the Post Office give it to me.

1641. Paragraph 462 of the Factual Memorandum says:—

“The principal objects of the scheme were to introduce a more logical allocation of work, to align remuneration more closely to the value of the work

of each grade, and to offer the postman grade the prospect of a better career."

Was any attempt made in that allocation to apply the four principles you have spoken of today?—No Sir.

1642. It was simply hard bargaining?—It was simply a matter of proposal by the Post Office and attempt by the Union to get amendment of the proposal.

1643. So it really does not represent a triumph for the principle you are trying to get laid down?—It certainly was not a scientific survey of work valuation.

1644. *Mr. Cash:* You said that you were not prepared to take 1946 as the baseline, but of course we all know that when you go to anybody to negotiate a thing you ask for something more than you expect to get, and they offer you something less than they expect to give, and in the end you hit somewhere half way between the two; that is the usual result?—Curiously enough that is not the case; it is not true in the case of my Union. I think I can say with absolute certainty that I have never yet put in a claim that I was not absolutely certain I could justify by what I believed to be reasonable argument, and if I did not believe it was reasonable, I did not put it in.

1645. It is only to get the point clear why you were not satisfied with 1946 as a baseline. You would say that the upper figure you asked for was the right figure.—We did not ask for anything. What happened was that the Post Office came to us with proposals; we did not go to them. What the Union did was to go in with a counter proposal on an entirely different basis, a two tier instead of a three tier structure. Eventually the proposal was made on the three tier structure and we merely tried to get more.

1646. *Chairman:* The three tier structure includes the grade of postal and telegraph officer?—Yes, Sir. There are three tiers, postmen, postmen higher grade and postal and telegraph officers. What we wanted was postal officer, class 1, and postal officer, class 2, and we wanted to divide the work rather differently from the way in which it is divided under this scheme. Incidentally we are sure it would have been much better had they accepted our scheme!

1647. *Mr. Menzler:* As I understand it the basis of your proposal is that at some point in time you establish the right rate and then, according to paragraph 79, you adjust it on analogous lines to those adopted when the pay addition was granted, by applying the wages index. Your words are :—

"In the Union's submission this is the only just way in which to revise the pay of the manipulative grades."

We are not quite clear whether this is a formula in the sense that once a year or every six months you would revise on the basis of the wages index or, in the words of your summary, you would use the vagaries in the wages index as a guide? How would you do that? What would be the machinery?—May I draw attention to paragraph 108 on page 26. We deal with this in the second part of our guidance, as it were, when we say :—

"Having related the worker's purchasing power to the value of his work, that purchasing power should not be varied more markedly than the purchasing power of other workers whose value to the community has, presumably, been similarly assessed."

1648. Is it fair to describe that as automatic?—I would not have thought it would necessarily be automatic. It would be a matter of commonsense on the one hand and bargaining on the other. If you have the Ministry of Labour wages index as your guide, you are not necessarily going to say that wages shall move so much for each point, each five points or each ten points.

1649. That index is a summation of all the increases in all industries, including I believe coal mining. As flat rate increases have been very prevalent in industry, as indeed in your own case, it follows, does it not, that the percentage increases at the lower levels of earnings have been greater than at the higher levels?—Yes, but the Ministry of Labour index is a percentage index. It is not an index of flat rates.

1650. It reflects the percentage effects of granting flat rate increases?—It is an average percentage, yes, Sir.

1651. If you were to break that down to people getting up to £5, from £5 to £7, from £7 to £10 and so on, you would find up the scale the percentage increases were lower?—Not necessarily so; it may or may not be true. Surely this works both ways. If you have an average of averages, which is what the index is, the resulting average may be the result of very material increases in pay at the higher level and very small increases at the lower level, or vice versa. It could operate either way; that is true of any average.

1652. Is it not a matter of complaint by craftsmen that the differentials have been diminished between them and the unskilled workers?—Yes.

1653. If that were so, it would follow, would it not, that the percentage increases given to the craftsmen are lower than those given to other people, otherwise the differentials would not have decreased?—Yes, Sir, I do not want to misunderstand you. The fact is that the complaint of the

craftsman about the reduction in the differential is due to flat rate increases, and his relativity has been disturbed.

1654. The point I am trying to make is really much simpler than I appear to have made it. Here is an overall average for a mixed bag of people in every industry, skilled and unskilled, highly paid and lowly paid trades. You are going to adopt this overall average, with all its limitations, with the very great variabilities it conceals, in order to move the pay of your people of all grades, having once fixed a datum line?—Yes, but would it be out of accord with the facts? I am dealing with people who range from 110s. at 21 in the provinces, postmen, to 196s. for the postal and telegraph officer in London, and I would have thought broadly that range would be about the range you get in the index. As I think we said in our evidence, you have something like 140 points in the scale here varying by as little as 2s. or 3s. a week, and if you have a body of workers whose pay ranges from something like a little more than £5 a week to nearly £10—and even within that you get an enormous variety of different rates of pay—I think that would broadly compare with the workers in the index.

1655. If you look at the various sources of reference like the London and Cambridge Bulletin or the Ministry of Labour index, wage rates by the end of 1952, when I think you had your last important settlement, had gone up about 120 per cent. over pre-war wage rates? Under your formula, if the 1939 rate had been right, then the 120 per cent. would have satisfied you?—No, Sir, because the wage rate does not necessarily relate to purchasing power. Under the previous Royal Commission we are not allowed to relate our wages to the cost of living, and we have to be satisfied with another measurement. In order to preserve our purchasing power over 1938, it would have to be strictly related to the increase in cost of living which, unless I am wrong, is slightly more than the increase in wage rates.

1656. I have a figure which shows that the postman compared with 1939 is up 177 per cent. at 21 and 106 per cent. at the maximum. That means on the average he is about 140 per cent. up, taking the scale as a whole, compared with 120 per cent. which is the increase in the index to which you attach importance for the purposes of maintaining your status.—I think that is true in the case of postmen, but not in any other of the manipulative grades, and it is only true in the postmen's case because of this series of flat rate increases which produces, as it were, a distorted percentage increase.

1657. Since 1946—the wages index has gone up 36 per cent. Have you any idea

how much the postman grade has gone up since then?—Offhand, no; I can supply the figures.

1658. It would be interesting to see, as a matter of comparison.—Very good, Sir.

1659. *Chairman*: And the other grades as well.—From what date in 1946?

1660. *Mr. Menzler*: The one to cover your reorganisation in that year?—Yes.

1661. *Sir Alexander Gray*: On this question of procedure you rather suggest, on a hasty reading perhaps, that you want your remuneration to be moved proportionately to the wage index, but you also use the word "guide". Could you elaborate a bit more what precisely a guide is?—Yes, Sir, The Union feels it should be completely free to go to the Post Office and make any claim; no matter how outrageous that claim may be, it ought to be free to make it. At the same time, there ought to be some guide for measuring the validity of that claim. We feel the Ministry of Labour wages index is such a guide, to us, to the Post Office, and subsequently presumably to the arbitration tribunal when the argument is put to them.

1662. But you disown any suggestion that there should be a rigorous measurement and that you ought to move parallel?—We do not say it should be an automatic measurement, but we do believe it should be a very important factor in measuring.

1663. If in fact you took it as a complete yardstick and made proportionate alterations, you would stabilise things for all time, would you not?—Subject, Sir, to the fact that you might revalue the work, and then the stabilisation would not be complete because there might be a change in relativities because of a change in the value of the work.

1664. *Mr. Menzler*: It does look as if it is a quasi automatic basis. It is a major factor in determining what changes there should be in keeping things up to date?—The major factor.

1665. I remember the insistence you place on complete freedom of negotiation on wages questions and I wonder whether you would not be sacrificing a great deal of freedom once you got tied up with a wage index. Would you like to comment on that?—I would have complete freedom to determine when I should put a claim in for the amount by which the index had increased, and I would be completely free to go to the Post Office as my employer and make a claim. I would accept, Sir, that if the Ministry of Labour wages index were laid down as the guiding principle I should be inhibited inasmuch as I could not justify a claim unless there had been

a change in the index and unless my claim was related to that change. I would accept that.

1666. You would be more hampered than if you had not got some formula in which you look to the wages index to secure a revision of your initially determined rates?—If I have understood the question aright, and I apologise if I have not. I should be more hampered in presenting a claim, but I should be far less hampered in getting a settlement.

1667. I have not got any figures, but have you any idea what the effect on the average rate of wages would be for your people if your initial rate proposals were accepted—the baseline you put forward here? Would it not bring it much above the average rate for workers in the wages index?—It would not bring us above the average earnings for the skilled worker. Our view is that it is the standard of living which is the important thing here. Our people have not the same means of supplementing that base rate as other skilled workers have, and that in the first place lowers their relative standard of living. There are no merit increases or anything of that sort. We feel we are entitled to relate ourselves not to base rates outside, but to earnings. If we take earnings we are well below the earnings of skilled workers.

1668. Do you not get overtime?—We get a measure of overtime, yes, Sir. My estimate would be, off the cuff, that it would seldom average, taking the country as a whole and the classes as a whole more than about 15s. on average a week over the base rate. The outside worker with premium payments, piecework rates and overtime will get infinitely more than 15s. a week over his base rate.

1669. Have you any system of spread-over allowances for split duties?—Time allowance only.

1670. That is included in your 15s.?—No Sir. I have not included the time allowance.

1671. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Does your proposal mean anything more than that it shall be applied on a principle which is twofold: (a) an initial evaluation of work and responsibility and, having established that standard, (b) adjustments by negotiation on the basis of the trend in the Ministry of Labour wages index?—I think that is put even better than we have put it, Sir. thank you.

1672. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 99 you argue for slightly better treatment than the clerical worker, at least as good treatment as the clerical worker. If your pay were related to that of clerical officers and clerical officers did not move because they

were not conditioned to the wages index, how would you go in relation to that? Are you pursuing incompatible objectives: on the one hand asking to be treated as industrial workers by having your pay adjusted from time to time in relation to the wages index, and on the other hand claiming parity, at any rate for the postal and telegraph officer, with the clerical officer? Are those two incompatible?—I do not think so, Sir, because, if I may go in for hypothesis, let me suppose that the Commission agrees to the rate for postal and telegraph officers suggested in the Union's submissions, and that that rate should be the same as the clerical officers' rate. That would be the initial evaluation. The Royal Commission would have decided that the work performed by those two would be worth that much, and that there should be parity. Thereafter it would be a matter of complete freedom to pursue changes related to other factors than the value of the work. It may well be that the Union pursuing one line might be more successful or less successful than the other Association pursuing the other line. If they did that, it might result in a change of relativities but that would not alter the fact that the relative values had been determined. I do not think they are incompatible, Sir.

1673. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I think it is part of your case that relativities should be subject to variation in both directions. up or down?—Yes Sir.

1674. If you had a case, which you might very well have, when you are trying to assess what the rate of pay should be partly on relativities and partly on the cost of living index, to which would you give more importance? Take the clericals, for instance. If perhaps they do not follow the normal movement would you take one rather than the other?—My personal view is that the two should never be mixed. If you are making a claim for a change of relatives based on a change in the value of work you should not mix that with a claim relating to changes in purchasing power. In fact in the last three years that has been the policy of my Union, to divide these issues quite clearly and make claims purely and simply related to the value of work, and then to reserve and make other claims relating to losses of purchasing power. My own view is that if you do go with a claim which is a combination of both it is very difficult for whoever you make the claim to assess which is the more important, and certainly it is impossible to tell which has been so regarded.

1675. A wise man never gives a reason for his answer.—In that case arbitration courts must be very wise people!

1676. On this question of change of relativities you mentioned the policemen. Why have they at various times shot ahead?—I do not know, Sir.

1677. May it be that the reason was that there were not enough policemen—that there was a shortage in the force everywhere? Is that kind of thing going to alter relativities?—Clearly, if the pay of any main class of worker is not enough to attract the type of person you want, you have to lift the pay. If it is true, and I accept that the reason why the pay went up was because you could not get the right type of recruit, I would submit it was a case where the Government or the responsible authority dare not lower the standard, but the Post Office have overcome that difficulty by lowering the standard. If they had kept to the same standard as they had before the war they would not have got recruits to the postmen class either.

1678. You mentioned recruitment at the age of 60 I think. Is a man a competent person to begin being a postman at the age of 60?—I would like Mr. Stennett to talk about the recruitment of postmen because he is much more knowledgeable than I am.

1679. If I may say so, postmen differ throughout the generations—you do not ask a postman to walk 20 miles a day.—Yes we do.

1680. In certain places would you care to start walking 20 miles a day at the age of 60?—But they do do it, Sir.

1681. Begin to do it?—I think the position is that we are recruiting men at a very late age but I would rather Mr. Stennett answered this as he is the expert.—*Mr. Stennett:* It is true to say the recruitment problem of postmen varies according to the particular geographical situation of the area. I could quote, for instance, the difficulty at Coventry at the present moment. In the establishment there are 299 established postmen's posts. Today there are 151 established postmen, and 99 temporary postwomen. A woman's place is not proper on the postman grade, but they still have 99 women employed on postmen's duties in Coventry. There are approximately 72 temporary postmen not eligible for appointment—maybe for medical reasons. There are 35 vacancies due to sick and annual leave.

1682. Why is Coventry peculiar?—Coventry is peculiar because of the rates of pay offered to the inhabitants of Coventry in the engineering industries. The rate of pay offered for postmen is not sufficient inducement to recruit them.

1683. Is there any other place like that?—There are other places where difficulties

are being experienced. London is a case in point. Recruitment in London did step up some 12 months ago, but the rate of resignations amongst the London postmen, particularly in the central offices, is really alarming today, and difficulty is being experienced.

1684. At what age do they resign?—All sorts of ages because they are taking them in at all sorts of ages.

1685. What do they do when they resign?—They resign because they get better rates of pay, better hours of attendance, greater facilities than they have got inside the Post Office, better opportunities for enjoying social life.

1686. What about Sutherland?—I would not say recruitment is difficult in Sutherland. It is not difficult at the moment in Glasgow—again, there are reasons for that. There is no difficulty in Belfast—again, there are reasons for that. A transfer of industry to Belfast would quickly alter the situation.

1687. *Mr. Cash:* You said just now that you would always put in a claim which you felt you could justify. How have you tested the validity of a claim in the past? By the method you are now proposing?—*Mr. Geddes:* No Sir, because in the past what we have had to do is to put in a combined claim. We put in a claim related either to a change in the cost of living figure or the wages index, and in addition we put in evidence with regard to the value of the work. When we are dealing with a claim based on general economic factors, we find out the percentage increase in the Ministry of Labour wages index, and the claim that we make is precisely that percentage, no more, no less.

1688. There is nothing in it for what you might call esteem or status?—When we have evidence with regard to the value of work performed by the grades, we have of course challenged the existing relativities. But we have never deliberately put in a claim on the Persian Market—if you ask for £1 you might get 5s. Of course the desirability of making a scientific assessment has not been so obvious to us in the past as it has been today. We have been faced with the issue of consulting our members and saying—"What do you think you are worth?". They say—"We think we are worth 'X'." Since we are a democratic body we have to accept their assessment, Sir.

1689. *Chairman:* In paragraph 84 you set out new rates of pay. Could you say a little more as to how the actual figures have been reached?—I have to confess, Sir, that there was no scientific analysis of values of work here. What we did was to look at the pay of other classes within the Service, and

we came to the conclusion that the evaluation of the work we were performing in relation to the value of the work they were performing was not the correct one. What we did, therefore, was to try to build a new scale with a new rate of pay which would disturb the existing relativities in our favour and give us a better reward for the value of the work that we perform. Again, I must be extremely careful, but we really cannot see what possible justification there is in paying a male typist Grade II more than—and I agree it is only slightly more than—a postman. We cannot see the justification for paying a shorthand typist more than a woman telephonist or a woman telegraphist. Neither can we see the justification for paying a clerical officer more than a postal and telegraph officer.

1690. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Does it not amount to this, Mr. Geddes, that on such evidence as is available to you, you have attempted to apply the first part of your proposed formula and to evaluate the work of your grades?—Yes, Sir.

1691. But that you are still quite open to discuss those proposals with the other side, and, if they can convince you that those rates are really not proper, you would be prepared to consider a revision of them?—Unfortunately, Sir, the other side have refused to discuss it with us. In other words, they have rejected our proposals. There was a discussion on one of them only, the postmen, but it was abortive, it lasted for about 1½ hours and we were no better off than when we went in!

1692. But that was not on the basis of evaluation of work in terms that you now put to us?—If, Sir, there were a joint examination of the work performed by our grades on some sort of basis such as I have suggested this morning, and it could be proved we were wrong, then of course we would have to modify our views, subject to the democratic right of our members to tell us not to do so.

1693. *Chairman*: When you come to the duties of postmen, in paragraph 22 there is a reference to "appropriate regulations." Could you tell us a bit more about that? There are regulations governing the receipt of mail, the size, and so on; there are a number of regulations which lay down the things you can and cannot send by post, and it is up to the postman to see, generally speaking, that you observe those regulations at this stage.

1694. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Could we have copies of the regulations?—Certainly, Sir.

1695. *Chairman*: There is also a reference to 48 selections. Is that normal, and is the postman given any guidance, or does he have to do this by himself?—*Mr. Stennett*: The sorting frame is labelled into

48 selections. The selections vary according to the geographical situation of the offices, and it is the postman's job to sort correspondence into these 48 different selections inside a particular fitting.—*Mr. Geddes*: It is a set fitting, but it may vary from office to office and in certain circumstances according to the type of letter or the type of packet he is handling.

1696. How many postmen do all these things and what proportion of their time is spent on duties other than delivery?—*Mr. Stennett*: It all depends on the make up of the office. I would suggest that 40 per cent. of the time is taken on sorting office duties. The postman is the first to handle the correspondence when it is received from the public and he does the outward primary sorting. Then he receives the mail from the incoming offices into the various selection for delivery work. He does this preparatory to the preparation for the actual delivery when the items are laid in the order of delivery of the route he is to take.

1697. Is it a fact that the side of the postman's work that we see is less than half what he has to do?—Quite, in some cases; it is difficult to get an average. In some cases a postman is employed exclusively on sorting duties all through the night. In other cases of course, in the rural areas, he spends more time on the outdoor duties than he does in London.

1698. And postmen might be called on to do any of those duties?—A postman is liable to perform the full range of the postman's duties, and he can be called upon to perform either town or rural jobs, indeed any duty to meet the exigencies of the Service.

1699. *Chairman*: Would you say that in spite of any falling away of standard, the great majority of postmen would be capable of doing all these things?—I would say yes, particularly the established staff. The established staff would be not only capable but liable to be called upon to perform the work at any time, apart from their normal hours of attendance. For instance, a man may terminate his attendance the previous night, shall we say, at 9.30 or 10 o'clock; someone may knock at his door at 5 o'clock in the morning with the peremptory request: "You are wanted for the night mail delivery", and he is expected to turn out. He may not be the regular man on that particular delivery, but he is expected to respond to the request, to prepare and take out that delivery, so that the correspondence is on your table before 9 o'clock in the morning.—*Mr. Geddes*: I would like to add to this, however, Sir, that whilst it is true, of course, that the work is done, it would be the view

of the Union that it is not done as efficiently or as speedily as it could be done with a higher standard of recruit.

1700. Could you give me some indication of the duties on which most of the time of the postman higher grade is spent?—

Mr. Brown: The postmen higher grade are employed almost exclusively on indoor sorting work, and they do the superior work in the sorting office. Where a postman initially sorts the correspondence which has been brought in on collection, he sorts it into selections. The postman higher grade in the main takes over from that stage and subdivides the correspondence to the various parts of the country. In a medium sized office, for instance, 40 selections which are made may have a box for Scotland, a box for Wales, and then England may be divided up into a combination of counties. These are then taken to various roads where they are further subdivided into the next selections of towns or villages for the whole of the country. In addition, the postman higher grade does in the main all the registered correspondence; he is responsible for seeing that they are transmitted to the various parts of the country. In this connection he must know where a particular address will circulate to, because they cannot circulate every item of correspondence direct to the office of delivery. Sir Alexander mentioned Sutherland, for instance; any correspondence for any place in Sutherland will probably find its way into the box for Thurso, which will then distribute it at a further stage. The postmen higher grade have also a variety of superior sorting office duties which used to be undertaken by the sorting clerk.

1701. Does he have any supervisory duties?—He is responsible for the supervision of the other postmen higher grade, or postmen in certain circumstances.

1702. Could you explain what is involved in the work mentioned in sub paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of paragraph 37?—Where bags of correspondence come into the office they come via the railway from another office, are brought over from the station into the sorting office; they must then be ticked into that office by the postman higher grade, who has a list of all the offices which send bags to his particular office, and he must tick them off as they come in. In addition, for instance, London, sending to Glasgow, might send 40 bags of mail by one dispatch; one of these bags is the final bag, which tells the postman higher grade that there are 39 other bags along with this to be dispatched. He is responsible for ticking them in to see that he gets them all, so that any disappearance of a mail should be shown up at that stage.

1703. It is checking by ticking?—It is checking by ticking, but, if there are any

discrepancies, he must take steps now to put them right, even if it means getting in touch with the sending office.

1704. *Mr. Lloyd Williams:* Coming to the work of the telephonist, is there anything you would like to add?—*Miss Whitelaw:* Nothing except that our description is very abbreviated however comprehensive it may seem.—*Mr. Geddes:* If I added anything, Sir, it would be to call particular attention to paragraphs 40 and 41, where it is seen that the operator is responsible to a very large extent, if not entirely, for the amount of revenue that comes to the Post Office on the toll and trunk system.

1705. I appreciate that. In your proposed new scales, for telephonists, postmen higher grade and telegraphists you are asking for the same scale of pay. That suggests that you regard the work of the telephonist as of equal value to that of the postman higher grade and the telegraphist?—Yes, Sir, that is the valuation we place upon them.

1706. So the relativities between those three have not been correct hitherto?—That is our view, Sir.

1707. Coming to the telegraphists, do you regard their work as better than both that of typists in the general Civil Service and of teleprinter operators in Departments such as Transport and Civil Aviation or the Air Ministry?—Yes, Sir, without any question, because with regard to the typist it is true, as we say here, that the telegraphist has also—and that is the important, almost the operative word—to be a typist, and a very efficient typist. The teleprinter is capable of speeds of 60 words a minute, and before the war there were a number of operators who could work that machine to capacity. They are dealing very often with difficult stuff; for example, if you get on a fish wire, like Grimsby fish docks, you are dealing not only with curious abbreviations but a large amount of figures. In addition to that the method of operating requires a greater rhythm, because there is on most teleprinters what is known as a locking bar, which means you can only depress one key at a time. That is true, of course, of a typewriter, but you can press a typewriter keyboard at varying speeds, as you know, on a teleprinter you cannot, you have to keep up this steady rhythm in order to get the maximum efficiency out of the machine. Moreover the operator has to have a certain amount of knowledge of the instrument, because he has to do a certain amount of minor repairs—I accept they are very minor—which the typist does not have to do. We are therefore perfectly satisfied that the telegraphist cannot be fairly compared with the typist.

1708. What about the teleprinter operator?—The teleprinter operator in other Government Departments is operating a teleprinter almost entirely on the basis of point to point and of a set sort of message. He generally is not involved in dealing with lengths of cloth on one occasion, fish on another, stock terms on another, mother dying on another. You get a sort of set type of message. Now the variety, and, furthermore, we believe—we say this with reserve—the intensity of the work in the Post Office is greater than in other Government Departments, and we believe therefore that the telegraphist in the Post Office is entitled to a higher rate of pay than elsewhere and certainly than the typist.

1709. *Chairman*: This is a range over which it ought to be possible by job evaluation to get a pretty exact comparison?—I would have thought so, Sir.

1710. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: I have a note here describing the work of the teleprinter operators, and this is the language which is used:

“These Departments employ specialist staff on teleprinter work paid at the copy typist's rate plus a lead. The work involves not only the operation of the teleprinter keyboard but the ability to deal with procedure and routine instructions. Messages are also often in code which may be considered to impose a greater degree of strain and require a greater degree of accuracy than plain language as in the normal case of Post Office telegraphists.”

—That pre-supposes that the Post Office telegraphist does not deal with messages in code; I would have thought that was quite incorrect. It pre-supposes that the Post Office telegraphist does not have to know something about routing instructions, which is certainly incorrect; for example, a telegraphist nowadays—the telegraph service has been mechanised, as you may know—gets a message either going to somewhere or coming from somewhere; he does not know until the teleprinter opens up and he gets the signal, who he is working to; he may be working to a different office for every message he deals with in the course of an hour. That certainly is not true, I would have thought, Sir, of other Government Departments. I do not want to be involved in a comparison here particularly, but what is said there is most certainly true of Post Office telegraphists but there is a plus, in our view, in the case of Post Office telegraphists.—*Mr. Hayward*: On the code question, I think five codes are permitted for use in the international telegraph service today, so that a telegram handed in at a public

counter can be in one of five codes. There is the transmission of that telegram from the handing-in office until it reaches the connecting point; then they are operated by one of these telegraphists who operate in code as a recognised part of the foreign telegraph traffic, apart from the other codes which may be received for any other specific purpose.

1711. *Mr. Cash*: Is there any difficulty of recruitment here?—I am coming to the conclusion, Sir, that on Royal Commissions one must be prepared to answer very awkward questions. I would say this from my own personal knowledge, as a telegraphist of many years' standing, that the standard of telegraphist employed by the Post Office now is not comparable with the standard twenty five years ago, when the telegraphist had to come into the Service through a limited competitive examination.

1712. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Of course, there may be exceptions today, just as there were exceptions 25 years ago?—Certainly, Sir.

1713. Paragraphs 50 and 51 in your statement describe the duties of postal and telegraph officers in rather broad terms. We wondered whether it would be possible for you to give us an indication of the time (perhaps in percentages) spent on those duties, in other words, how a typical postal and telegraph officer's time is occupied?—*Mr. Andrews*: I am afraid I shall be unable to deal with it as precisely as all that, Sir, but it is a fact that all postal and telegraph officers are trained initially in counter duties, and they have the liability to rotate from duty to duty; one week, for instance, on the banking team, the following week on the stamp team, and the following week perhaps on the parcel end of the counter. There is a real liability to perform all these duties. In connection with the writing duties there is in all offices, or there should be, a system of rotation whereby, according to local circumstances, there is a rota consisting of between three and five years on writing duties, interspersed with periods at the counter.—*Mr. Geddes*: Would it help the Commission if we submitted a series of what we would term typical duty rotas for each class of office?

1714. You know what we want, and if you can let us have the best that is available to help us on it, we should be much obliged.

1715. Is it your view that the clerical work of the postal and telegraph officer is more fairly comparable with that of the clerical officer than that of the clerical assistant?—Without question, Sir.

1716. [Would it be true to say that clerical officers are on the whole required to do better clerical work in mixed establishments employing both clerical officers and postal and telegraph officers?—If one went on a selective process, one would be able to find clerical officers doing clerical work superior to that of postal and telegraph officers; it would be equally possible to find clerical officers doing work less important. Our case is that on average, our work is probably as good as, but if we add to that the work on the counter, then the two combined should be valued more highly than the duties of the average clerical officer.]

1717. If you take a head Post Office in the provinces, who would do the simpler clerical work there?—The postal and telegraph officer, but one does wonder whether it can be described as the "simpler work"; in fact he does the work connected with management. Very often he will be doing the work at head office in a less specialised form than the clerical officer will be doing at regional headquarters. For example, he may be dealing with sick absence and would be responsible for seeing that the regulations are observed; the clerical officer of the region will be doing the same thing, but he will concentrate probably on sick absence duty, whereas the postal and telegraph officer may be involved in other duties at the same time.

1718. *Chairman*: What of the work that would be done by a clerical assistant in an ordinary office?—I would not have thought that any of the work done by a postal and telegraph officer would be done by a clerical assistant. I may be quite wrong, but I would not have thought so.

1719. Are there no typists in Post Offices?—Yes, Sir, in head postmasters' offices there may be a typist.

1720. And the typist might possibly do the work that otherwise would be done by a clerical assistant?—*Mr. Andrews*: The typist is sometimes called upon to do work that does not call for a knowledge of the postal or telephone system; in other words, she can and does do minor registry work. Moreover the postman higher grade undertakes a large range of minor writing work which can be performed at sorting office level and might be regarded as of the character that would be given to a clerical assistant.

1721. *Mr. Menzler*: In connection with this list of duties set out in paragraphs 50 and 51, are members of this grade expected to be capable of doing all those duties from a certain age, say, 21 or 22?—During the initial training scheme, a postal and telegraph officer is sent to a training school and is trained first of all for what are described as junior counter duties; he comes back

and stays for 13 weeks in the office, then goes on a senior counter course, comes back, has a short period of a few days' run in, and then is employed on the senior duties. So during his probationary period, which is two years, he has to qualify on the whole range of counter duties and has to be certified as capable of performing them; and at a later stage, usually after four years he makes his contact with the writing duties.

1722. But take, for instance, the very large and busy Post Office in Victoria Street, do the postal and telegraph officers circulate from job to job, or do they take more important jobs as they gain in experience and go up the incremental scale?—They circulate from job to job, but the work is split up into teams under what we call the Ipswich scheme, where you have a group of transactions performed by a number of officers. You have probably seen the indicator labels over the counter, and each officer in that particular team undertakes all the duties of the team. But, there is mobility, people go from team to team in a rotation system on the counter, and counter clerks do actually perform these duties in normal course during their period at the counter.

1723. A man selling stamps can be transferred to the postal order work, shall we say, or the money order work, or to the paying out on warrants?—Yes.—*Mr. Hayward*: And on the same day, too.

1724. I got the impression they were jobs having a certain cachet or status, to which people would only gravitate as they got more experience?—On the particular example you took, the man would also probably during the course of a month, do all the counter duties, and might also have to go to the district office and do clerical work.

1725. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Could I ask Mr. Geddes to look at page 14, the first paragraph of which says:—"He maintains necessary traffic returns and checks completed traffic to ensure that revenue is not lost"—would you care to elaborate that?—*Mr. Andrews*: Yes, Sir. The telegraphist staffing is on the basis of the traffic handled, and returns are kept of all the traffic dealt with at a particular office on every day of the week and every week of the year. The method of assessing the staffing requirements is a combination of the average traffic which is handled and samples taken half hour by half hour. The statistical work is undertaken by postal and telegraph officers, also the other aspect of the work—the completed check of traffic in order to ensure that all the telegrams which have been handled have been properly charged.

1726. In formulating your proposed scales for postal and telegraph officers, have you had regard to the existing clerical officer scale, or the proposed scale put forward by the Civil Service Alliance?

—*Mr. Geddes*: This scale was prepared basically in 1951. We would hold the view that, if the Commission decide to recommend the Alliance scale, the postal and telegraph officer should be allowed to get the same or a little more.

1727. *Chairman*: In paragraph 57 you describe the work of radio operators. Is there anything you would care to add to that?—*Mr. Andrews*: Once again, Sir, this is a very potted version, but we have tried here to give a brief account of the work, while endeavouring to convey the responsibilities involved.—*Mr. Hayward*: I would like to add something to that, Sir. On paragraph 63 I would like to emphasise the very difficult reception conditions of today, the fact that Post Office operators work in a restricted wave band; the highly specialised qualifications involved and the linguistic qualifications, which are not required elsewhere in the Service.

1728. *Mr. Hall*: I would like, if I may, to turn now to the subject of hours and leave, and to your paragraphs 109 to 114. I get the impression from your document that you think leave should be related not to outside comparisons but solely to civil service office staff?—*Mr. Geddes*: I think so.

1729. There is a minor point on paragraph 112, in connection with the liability to perform Sunday duty, which you think might rank for extra leave. Would you on reflection prefer that to read "the performance of Sunday duty should rank for extra leave"?—Yes. The fact is of course that though we talk about liability, I think a very large proportion of the staff have in fact to do Sunday duty.

1730. But your case is that some of your people, for reasons of health and efficiency, quite apart from the question of leave in other parts of the Service, ought to have special consideration because of the nature of their duty?—Yes.

1731. *Mr. Menzler*: *Mr. Geddes*, you do not refer in your memorandum to sick leave. Is it not fair to say that postal servants, like other civil servants, have exceptionally high sick leave privileges?—They have the same as the rest of the Service, Sir.

1732. But on the basis of outside comparisons they are exceptionally well situated?—I would accept that.

1733. It is a fact perhaps to be taken into account when we discuss leave?—Yes, Sir, but not in relation to other people who get the same conditions in the Civil Service.

1734. I did feel that in your earlier comparisons with industry and your reference to 4s. an hour for the skilled worker you were laying great stress on outside comparisons, but when it comes to these other conditions of employment, such as sick leave, and so on, and leave, you rather tend to stress the internal comparison. Is there a certain inconsistency about that?

—If there is an inconsistency, Sir, it is a perfectly justified one. When we were talking about wages we were faced with the fact that the Tomlin Commission had said that there should be external relativities and comparisons, but when we come to hours and leave, here we are dealing with civil servants and there are general conditions for civil servants as a whole. It so happens that Post Office manipulative grades get different conditions for comparable wage rates, even though money determines status in the Civil Service, and perhaps outside as well.

1735. If for the sake of argument you took the 4s. an hour which you have mentioned for the skilled worker outside: would it not be fair on a strict basis of comparison to discount that 4s. an hour for pension rights worth 10 per cent. plus the sick leave, which is worth perhaps another 5 per cent.?—I think it would be right to take those things into consideration, but at the moment they are taken much too much into consideration.—*Mr. Andrews*: On the last analysis by the Ministry of National Insurance there is no greater amount of sick leave actually taken in the Post Office than in industry generally, where these regulations do not apply.

1736. *Mr. Hall*: You would say that your people are discriminated against in the matter of leave on the grounds that they are not office staff?—Yes, Sir.

1737. And that your leave allowances are now too low and should be raised?—Yes, Sir.

1738. And you go further and suggest that in this matter the Government in effect should do something which is rather uncommon for non office staff?—I would not have thought so, because if they are prepared to give a typist grade II 18 days rising to 21, will they be setting an example to industry if they give the postman 18 days rising to 21, or even more?

1739. Could I go on to hours? I gather that you have the same view as on leave.—Yes, Sir.

1740. That notwithstanding that hours in industry outside are 44, that might be ignored in considering your hours?—We think, Sir, that since we are dealing with civil servants, where you have an almost universal service condition, then it ought to apply to us as well.

1741. Are the scales proposed in paragraph 84 related to 48 hours?—To the present hours, Sir, or whatever hours might be in the future.

1742. Would you think they might be reduced, if the hours were reduced?—We would not think so, Sir, because we would think that the hours ought to be reduced in relation to the factor I have just referred to, that the Post Office manipulative grades ought not to be dealt with differently from the rest of the Service.

1743. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: On overtime, *Mr. Geddes*, presumably the week's total of hours has to be worked before you can determine what overtime has to be paid for and at what rate?—*Mr. Geddes*: Yes, Sir.

1744. How is Sunday dealt with?—*Mr. Hayward*: As a separate attendance entirely, the normal working week being from Monday to Saturday inclusive, except in the case of male telephonists.

1745. The restrictive maximum is not found in the Post Office exclusively?—It is throughout the grades covered by overtime.

1746. Can you tell us the reason for it?—I am afraid I cannot, Sir.—*Mr. Geddes*: Could I hazard a guess, Sir, and say it is cheaper that way?

1747. *Mr. Menzler*: Does this not illustrate the danger of tying yourself too closely to general service practice rather than industrial practice?—There are always dangers, Sir, but on balance we think the advantages are greater than the dangers.—*Mr. Hayward*: This has been laid down as a restrictive maximum for I do not know how many years.

1748. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: I suppose it follows from what you have said that you think this restrictive maximum ought to be removed generally?—We would not deny it to anybody else if they wanted it, Sir.—*Mr. Geddes*: I think there is very little doubt that, if the principle were determined by the Commission on these lines, the rest of the Service would welcome it.

1749. Do you think the removal of the restrictive maximum would lead to anomalies of any kind between different grades?—*Mr. Hayward*: We have not come across any, Sir. The removal of this would be the removal of one of those irksome rules.

1750. A little later on in your document you ask for time and a half for all week-day overtime, and you quote some industries where that rate is paid. I wonder if you could tell us whether or not you know which is the most common arrangement over industry as a whole, time and a half, time and a quarter or plain time?—There is another one, Sir, time and a

third, and that is the difficulty here. There are varying methods in industry, but in looking at this problem we looked at it as a whole and it seemed to the Union that a fair rate of overtime here was rate and a half, with double time for Sundays. It is clear that where outside you have got a time and a half payment recognised for Monday to Saturday, then you have a double time recognition on the Sunday. In the Union's view it is fairer to pay a man for the inconvenience occasioned by overtime at the flat rate of time and a half for the whole of his overtime and not increase it during the week, as at present, but have a flat rate of time and a half and then put Sunday at double time.

1751. I take it you would like to see overtime abolished altogether?—Yes.

1752. And your time and a half you judge to be a fair assessment as a penalty charge upon the employer for requiring staff to work beyond normal time?—Yes. Frequently overtime, particularly in the Post Office, arises as an urgent summons, for example if somebody falls sick. Perhaps in some jobs you could say: "All right, that work can wait until to-morrow"; in the Post Office it cannot wait. It is a social penalty which we do not feel is adequately compensated by time and a quarter.

1753. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Turning to superannuation, your first proposition is that service with the armed forces should count for superannuation purposes in the Civil Service. That is a question that has been mooted for many years. The argument against it is this, is it not, that, if anything is to be done about armed forces service, it should be done inside the services. Otherwise you get this sort of thing: the man who has been twelve years in the Army goes into the Civil Service and he benefits, and the man who goes into industry, which may be equally important in the national interest to-day, does not get anything?—This is a question of long standing, but whether this is the responsibility of the armed forces or not is open to question, because since the last time this matter was posed there have been extensions which we mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136 where it has been recognised that this should be dealt with in the Civil Service to some extent.

1754. In that case you would be dealing with the person whose service was compulsory?—That is so, Sir.

1755. What are you going to do when you have the person who is sent into the Army, and the other person who, because he has special qualifications, is not sent into the Army but to somewhere else in the national interest?—That issue is not posed to the Royal Commission. The issue

we are concerned with here is the question of a man who goes into one of the armed forces.

1756. In the one case we are dealing with a man who has done 12 years Army service, and that has been voluntary service, whereas recent war service was compulsory.—The Government have accepted the principle permitting service to count where a national serviceman voluntarily extends his service.

1757. Is that not a minor departure from main policy?—It opens the door. Whether it opens it wide enough is a matter for you.

1758. *Mr. Cash*: Is there any distinction between the man who went into the 1939-45 war before he joined the Civil Service and the man who was already in the Civil Service but was called up?—The soldier who went into the forces before the war in 1937 and then came into the Service in 1950 would be allowed to count the period 1939-45 but not the period 1937-39.

1759. *Chairman*: I suppose the reason we get this in your submission and not from the Staff Side is because this is particularly important to you in view of the large proportion of ex-regulars?—Yes, Sir. And this is an issue which is constantly being raised at conferences from year to year.

1760. *Mr. Menzler*: I should like to ask a question on this claim for recognition of the principle that superannuation is deferred pay. As I understand it from your statement it takes two forms: there should be what you describe as the legal right and you would also like civil servants to have something equivalent to the withdrawal benefit in private superannuation contributory schemes, is that it?—What we are asking for here would be in effect the equivalent of what a man would have got had this civil service superannuation been worked out on a basis of return of the contributions in the event of resignation before 60.

1761. It is rather an important point because you may be suggesting an enlargement of the benefits which would push up the value of the superannuation benefits.—*Mr. Geddes*: I think the claim here is that if a man retired before the normal retiring age he should have a right to his pension, and, in given circumstances, if the length of service was not long enough to justify a pension he should get at least some return for what in theory he has paid in.

1762. Are you asking for a pro rata pension according to length of service on retirement at any age? I believe a person can retire after the age of 50 and can take a cold storage pension at the age of 60.

Are you asking for an extension of that principle?—*Mr. Hayward*: That is in effect what it amounts to.

1763. Now the terms of reference of the Commission are to recommend whether any changes are desirable within the framework of the existing superannuation scheme. Would you not agree that it would be a material departure from the existing superannuation scheme if a man of 45, for example, could have a pro rata pension immediately?—The existing scheme allows retirement at 50 with a frozen pension, and it would be surely within the basis of the existing scheme to undo the freezing.

1764. Is there any precedent in any employment for giving a man who retires at any time the right to an immediate pension?—The difficulty in finding a precedent in other employment is that we just cannot find the sort of information.

1765. Will you take it from me that there is no case in public employment?—I would not be surprised, but public employers are sometimes not as generous as private employers on the question of superannuation in spite of the popular view.

1766. Would you agree that there is no superannuation scheme that is materially better than the Civil Service?—No. I think it is very difficult to be positive in the private field but there are some where the schemes are very good indeed, if not better than the Service.—*Mr. Geddes*: There is one condition that operates in most superannuation schemes in outside industry which does not operate within the Service, and that is that any person who is in a superannuation scheme and withdraws from it can at least draw something out when he goes irrespective of the time he goes whereas in the Civil Service you draw nothing out of the scheme unless you are 50 and unless you qualify, and then you do not get it until 60.

1766a. *Chairman*: Is that true for non-contributory schemes as well as contributory schemes?—Contributory schemes certainly. The basis of the Union's claim is that this is in fact a contributory scheme because it is deferred pay and because we have quoted against us in arbitration courts the fact that our pay should remain as it is because in addition we get so much increase for pension. We go to arbitration and the Post Office say "We think that the present day pay is right not only because of this and that but because you have got to add 12½ per cent., 10 per cent., or 15 per cent, whichever is the cost of superannuation". Now if it is correct for the Post Office to quote that, then it is by inference part of our pay, and so we should be able to do the same as a normal contributor does in investing in an industrial superannuation scheme.

1767. One could use the same argument with the university scheme. There is a 5 per cent. contribution and 10 per cent. from the university which could probably be said to be taken into account in the pay of the university officer.—I agree that the employer's contribution in outside industry is withheld. A man only gets the employee's contribution, but in the case of the Civil Service a man gets nothing. When I retired from the Service after 27 years established service I got a note from my authority telling me that they noted my resignation! That is all I got out of the superannuation scheme!

1768. *Mr. Menzler*: You have drawn analogies with outside employment where there is a contributory scheme and the man at least gets his contribution without interest. I would like to be clear whether you are asking for returned contributions or accrued pension?—*Mr. Hayward*: It is a very difficult issue, but I think we would leave it on the second basis.

1769. Will you take it from me that would be an extremely costly benefit, and might double the value of your pension benefits?—I will accept it from you!

1770. And if you had your benefits restricted to no more than a return of contributions with interest, or without, that itself would imply an addition to the benefits under the Superannuation Acts and would push up the percentage of 10 perhaps to 11 per cent?—*Mr. Geddes*: We appreciate that. We are undoubtedly asking for improvements in the superannuation scheme, but I would make this submission, if I may, that what we are asking is for the acceptance of the principle that the pension rights of our own people are deferred pay. If the Commission decided that that was a sound principle it might well be that within the framework of that decision certain things might result, not necessarily the full payment of pension at any time.

1771. On the question of national insurance, I think your case, *Mr. Geddes*, is that there should be no discrimination against civil servants recruited after 1948?—Yes.

1772. And I think you used the phrase that you have been singled out for adverse treatment?—*Mr. Hayward*: We have been singled out. There is no reason why we should be singled out in comparison with industry generally.

1773. Has not the same policy been pursued in the local government service and with teachers?—Yes, but in the view of the Union that is no reason to impose it on the Civil Service, and the thing happened at the time when the negotiations were taking place over the National Insurance Act.

1774. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: That is a matter for national insurance and the National

Advisory Committee on National Insurance. —*Mr. Geddes*: It is imposed by the employers.

1775. It is a regulation under the National Insurance Act?—Imposed by the employers.

1776. *Mr. Menzler*: Is there not a matter of public policy behind this? Would you not agree that if the State decides to give a minimum pension, of, say, £100 a year from the national scheme it would not be unreasonable to say that part of the pension of civil servants shall be dealt with in that fashion and the rest should be under the Superannuation Acts?—*Mr. Hayward*: I think it would be reasonable for the employer to say that a proportion of this the employer has paid, but I think it unreasonable for the employers to be able to keep back from the accrued superannuation scheme part of his own contribution. As times goes on, the amount which the Treasury as employer pays to the retirement pension benefit of the individual decreases, but the amount which the Treasury pays into everybody's retirement pension will increase very much indeed. In the next 10 to 15 years the amount paid into superannuation by the State for everybody's retirement pension may be greater than that of the employer and the employee together. It seems to me quite unfair, therefore, that the Treasury or any other employer should take back the whole of that man's State retirement pension from his occupational superannuation pension when they themselves have paid in less than 25 per cent. of the total contribution.

1777. Do you regard what you call the occupational pension as a binding obligation for all time? Or again, supposing the State pension were increased to such an extent that the State pension plus the civil service pension gave a person more in retirement than he was earning at the time he retired, would you regard that as reasonable?—Whatever is paid by the State in retirement pensions is either actuarially based or been decided on by the Government. Actuarially it arises out of contributions which the individual insured person makes either by his insurance contributions or by taxation, and he is entitled in our submission to draw the benefits of the National Insurance Act, apart from whatever he may derive from his own superannuation scheme.

1778. Is not the State greatly preoccupied with the amount of pensions and has it not appointed a Committee to examine the matter?—Yes.

1779. Does that not indicate that there should be a limit to the pension obligations to particular classes?—The civil servant has paid for this in the same way as anybody else in outside industry has paid into

the National Insurance fund. He ought not to be separately selected because he is a civil servant. He is one of 22,000,000 insured persons under the National Insurance Act and should take from it what he is entitled to. I would concede to the Treasury only that they might be entitled to say "Because we give you a superannuation pension in certain circumstances we can take back from the National Insurance retirement pension that part of our contributions in that particular employment."—

Mr. Geddes: As far as my knowledge goes on private superannuation schemes, the individual gets the pension to which he is entitled under the private superannuation scheme and in addition his State pension. It does not matter whether that private superannuation scheme cost him £700 a year, or £7,000 a year. He still gets his State pension. If it is true of private schemes why should it not be true of public schemes?

1780. Are you aware that relatively few private schemes have reached the two thirds standard and that the reason why they do not amend private schemes is that they welcome the State scheme in order to make their schemes more adequate? Do you not get half pay after 40 years service?—
Yes, Sir.

1781. Plus a lump sum which you can invest in an annuity to bring you up to two thirds.

1782. *Chairman:* Could I ask whether you have formed any estimate of the cost in money and manpower of your combined proposals?—No, Sir, we have not done so because, I say this with a due sense of responsibility, we do not feel that, if our case is just, it ought to be determined on the basis of ability to pay. We have to admit that the Government has a great responsibility to the nation to see that it carries out its duties administratively in the cheapest, most economical and most efficient way, but nevertheless if certain sections of Government employees are being underpaid then they ought not to be, and if their conditions are not as they should be then those conditions should be amended. We doubt whether it is right for the Royal Commission to say "This is a good argument, logic demands that we should come to that conclusion, but we are not going to because it would cost too much money."

1783. *Mr. Cash:* It is one thing for us to recommend, but it is another thing for the Government to implement our recommendations.—I agree, and we can only hope that you will recommend and leave us to deal with the Government!

1784. *Chairman:* May I say, thank you, Mr. Geddes, for your patience?—May I say thank you very much to all the members of the Commission for their kindness to us.

(The witnesses withdrew)

(Adjourned until Thursday, 1st July, 1954 at 11.30 a.m.).



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ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE



MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

12-13

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

TWELFTH and THIRTEENTH DAYS

*Thursday, and Friday, 1st and
2nd July, 1954*

Institution of Professional Civil
Servants and Society of Technical
Civil Servants witnesses

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on behalf of the Society of Technical Civil Servants

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

TWELFTH DAY

Thursday, 1st July, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E.,
F.R.S.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

**Memorandum of evidence submitted by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants
on the professional, scientific and technical classes**

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CHAPTER I

THE INSTITUTION

1. The Institution of Professional Civil Servants was founded in 1919. The persons eligible for membership are non-industrial civil servants, established, unestablished or temporary, engaged on professional, scientific or technical work. The Institution's objects are:—

- (a) to protect and promote the interests of members, to maintain and improve the conditions of their employment and the relations between them and their employers, and to provide and maintain such services for the benefit of members as may be approved by Conference from time to time;
- (b) to advance the efficiency and well-being of Her Majesty's Civil Service;
- (c) to provide for the promotion, teaching or extension of or the interchange of views on professional knowledge, science or practice;
- (d) to establish or support funds or trusts for the purpose of benefiting members and employees and such other persons as Conference may from time to time determine.

2. At 31st December 1953 the Institution had 43,221 members.

3. The Institution is the organisation recognised by the Treasury as the association having sole representative capacity for the following general Service and linked departmental classes:—

- Actuaries
- Assistants (Scientific)
- Composite Signals Organisation, Grades I—IV
- Experimental Officers
- Illustrators
- Information Officers
- Librarians
- Medical Officers
- Photographers
- Professional Accountants
- Psychologists
- Scientific Officers
- Technical Works, Engineering and Allied Classes
- Works Group of Professional Classes.

4. The Institution shares recognition with the Society of Technical Civil Servants for Architectural and Engineering Draughtsmen and their subordinate grades of Drawing Office Assistants and Tracers, and for Cartographic Draughtsmen.

5. The Professional Engineers of the Post Office are in membership of the Institution. Their subordinate technical staffs are organised in separate departmental organisations.

6. In addition to the general Service classes, the Institution represents many hundreds of departmental classes, mostly classes that are related to the general Service classes specified but including a number of other specialist classes peculiar to particular departments.

CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES OF REMUNERATION

7. For many years now there have been attempts to set out the principles on which the remuneration of civil servants should be determined but the first relatively clear statements on this issue have given way to more equivocal statements and the interpretation of the current Tomlin Formula has been so much a matter of dispute that it can hardly be said to be a formula at all.

8. The attitude of the Government as to what these principles should be has changed materially:—

1893—On the 6th March, 1893, a resolution was adopted in the House of Commons which said:—

"That no person in Her Majesty's Naval Establishments, be engaged at wages insufficient for a proper maintenance, and that the conditions of labour as regards hours, wages, insurance against accidents, provision for old age, sickness, etc., should be such as to afford an example to private employers throughout the country."

1909—In a statement on 10th March, 1909, when the House of Commons was in Committee of Supply on Civil Service Supplementary Estimates, Mr. Sydney Buxton, the Postmaster General, said:—

"I entirely endorse the words of the late Prime Minister ('It is the duty of the Central Government and of the Municipal Government as employers of labour, whether directly or indirectly to set an example to every employer of labour in their dealings with their workmen, whether in regard to wages, hours of labour or conditions of labour.') . . . The essence of trade unionism is that a man shall not take a rate below that which he thinks is a fair rate, and which his fellow trade unionists think a fair rate. I myself have cancelled contracts because the contractor was not carrying out the terms of the Fair Wages Resolution."

1914—The 4th Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service 1914 said:—

"It is an accepted principle with all parties that Government should be a 'model employer'."

1922—In giving evidence before the Select Committee on Estimates on 24th July, 1922, Sir Russell Scott, then Controller of Establishments at the Treasury, having referred to the practice of taking into account outside conditions, was asked what conditions he had in mind. He said:—

"As prevailing amongst the best employers and not the worst."

In reply to a further question as to whether he meant the "average," Sir Russell Scott said:—

"The best employers. The Government is, in fact, committed to giving not the treatment of the worst, but the treatment of the good employers."

9. The Geddes economy committee appointed by the Government immediately after the first World War suggested the appointment of a special committee or committees to enquire into the remuneration paid to Government employees generally. A committee was appointed in 1923. Its chairman was Sir Alan Garrett Anderson, K.B.E., and it has since been known as the Anderson Committee. Its title was the Committee on the Pay, etc., of State Servants, 1923, and its report said:—

"In our view there is only one principle in which all the factors of responsibility, cost of living, marriage, children, social position, etc., are included—the employer should pay what is necessary to recruit and to retain an efficient staff."

The view expressed by the Anderson Committee has been embodied from

time to time by Treasury spokesmen in their submissions in arbitration cases. It can only be said that this view has not generally been found acceptable by arbitration tribunals as representing the complete responsibility of the Government in fixing the salaries of its employees.

10. In 1927 in Award 1325, the Industrial Court dealing with the remuneration of the manipulative grades in the Post Office, said:—

“In their consideration of the claims and counter-claims, the Committee have taken the view that the broad principle which should be followed in determining the rates of wages of Post Office Servants is that of the maintenance of a fair relativity as between their wages and those in outside industries as a whole, and as between the various classes within the postal service, with due regard to the adequacy of the payment for the work done and the responsibilities undertaken.”

11. In evidence to the Royal Commission in 1929 (the Tomlin Commission), the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council sought to re-establish the proposition that the State should be a model employer. This point of view was not accepted by the Tomlin Commission which dismissed it in the following terms:—

“In seeking to define the relationships which should exist between the State and its employees, the phrase ‘a model employer’ or ‘the model employer’ has frequently been used. We find that different interpretations have been placed upon this phrase. Some have used it as meaning an employer who in the matter of conditions of service is ahead of other employers; others as someone in the first flight of employers; others again have used the phrase in order to emphasise the responsibilities of the State towards its employees.

We think that a phrase which lends itself to such varied and contradictory interpretations affords no practical guidance for fixing wages or for indicating the responsibilities of the State towards its employees.”

12. The Treasury, in its submissions to the Tomlin Commission, said:—

“The principles on which successive Governments have acted in regard to the remuneration of the Civil Service might, I think quite briefly be summarised as follows:

The first principle is that remuneration is only one of a number of factors in the conditions of service of civil servants, and that in fixing remuneration due regard must be had to those other factors in the conditions of employment of civil servants notably security of tenure, prospects of promotion, leave and sick leave privileges, and pensionability. Subject to that, it has been held to be essential that the remuneration and other conditions of employment of civil servants, shall be adequate to ensure the recruitment to the Civil Service of a fully qualified staff, and the maintenance of an efficient and healthy public Service. It has followed from this principle that the rates of remuneration and other conditions of employment in the public Service must be such as to compare well with the rates of remuneration and other conditions of service normally available outside the public Service in competing occupations. Beyond that, it has been held that in order to achieve the main object to which I have referred, the recruitment of a fully qualified staff and the maintenance of a healthy and efficient public Service, it would not be right to prescribe for civil servants rates of remuneration and other conditions of service which were out of scale with the standards normally obtaining amongst good employers outside the public Service. For the reasons I have given already, they must not be out of scale in the sense of their being on this comparison too low; nor on the same comparison ought they to be unduly high, because any such disparity between the conditions of service of civil servants and the conditions of service outside the Civil Service would have the effect of elevating civil servants into a privileged class, and so of doing an injustice to the community which *ex hypothesi* would be worse off, and has always to foot the bill. More than that, it has been held, if I may for a moment leave out of account the temporary expedient of bonus, that the remuneration of civil servants should as far as possible, be so fixed as to endure for a considerable period of time. The result is that remuneration in the Civil Service is apt to fluctuate less from year to year than the remuneration in certain branches of outside industry where the terms of employment of the staff are subject to a more or less frequent variation according as that particular branch of industry is faring well or ill.”

13. The Tomlin Commission in its Report said:—

"308. It was suggested by the Staff Side of the National Council that in practice it was impossible to institute any valid comparisons between remuneration inside and remuneration outside the Service and that for this reason relativity with outside rates was of no practical assistance.

We agree that the closeness with which comparisons can be made varies. It is a simple matter to compare the rates paid to fitters in the Royal Dockyards with those paid to fitters in outside employment. It may be more difficult to make comparison in the case of, say, an executive officer. We are satisfied, however, that broad general comparisons between classes in the Service and outside occupations are possible and should be made.

In effecting such comparisons the State should take a long view. Civil Service remuneration should reflect what may be described as the long term trend, both in wage levels and in the economic condition of the country. We regard it as undesirable that the conditions of service of civil servants when under review should be related too closely to factors of a temporary or passing character.

309. The following considerations must also be borne in mind. First, except in the lowest ranks the Civil Service is and must always be a graded service with fixed scales of pay and regulated complements of staff in each grade. Secondly while a considerable number of outside bodies adopt a scale system of payment for clerical staff in their earlier years of service, such bodies usually relate the salaries of higher staff to the circumstances of the particular case. Thirdly, for various reasons, including the greater security of tenure in the Service as compared with the hazards of many outside employments, and the relationship between the permanent Heads of Departments and Your Majesty's Ministers, the highest posts in the Service do not carry a rate of remuneration as high as that paid in posts of corresponding responsibility in outside employment."

14. Finally, the Treasury put to this Royal Commission the following statement in paragraph 26 (2) of the first Memorandum of evidence:—

"For any particular class or grade of civil servants, in order that the Civil Service may offer fair market rates, the comparison should be with the current rate paid by the generality of outside employers to staff engaged on comparable work."

This is putting the basis for paying civil servants at the lowest level yet achieved in any statement by the Treasury to such a body as the Commission. In the examination of the Treasury witnesses on this point it is observed that they advanced the view that there is no longer any necessity for reference to good employers as most employers are good employers. This contention seems so far divorced from ordinary experience and knowledge that it is difficult to take it seriously as a point of view. It seems to the Institution that in all sections of industry or commerce there are organisations which are recognised as being better employers than others. It can only seriously be explained as a part of the negative approach of the Treasury to their administrative problems that they do not recognise the true situation. This can be paralleled by their complaint about the "concertina-ing" of Civil Service scales, a process for which they are themselves almost wholly responsible.

Tomlin Formula Examined

15. There are two difficulties with the Tomlin formula. Its meaning is not precise and, where its meaning seems to be precise, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, of application.

16. That the Tomlin formula is not precise is shown by the confusion between the drawing of direct parallels between particular classes inside the Civil Service and similar groups outside and the proposal to take the long-term trend. For example, in paragraph 308 of the Tomlin report quoted in paragraph 13 above there is the reference to the comparison of the rates paid to fitters in the dockyards with those paid to fitters in outside employment. No one would deny the relevance of such a comparison. But basing Civil Service pay on such a comparison does not necessarily produce remuneration

which reflects the long-term trend both in wage levels and in the economic condition of the country.

17. Where comparisons can be made with persons outside the Civil Service, it is obvious that the comparison will be made. It is very rarely that any such comparison can be made both properly and fully. Even where such comparisons can be made it may sometimes be questioned whether they should be made. It is necessary, therefore, to examine shortly:—

- (a) cases where comparisons can properly be made,
- (b) cases where comparisons ought not to be made, and
- (c) cases where comparisons cannot be made.

18. An instance in the first category is the medical profession. There is more information available about the remuneration of medical men outside the Civil Service than there is about most other professional people. It has been the contention of the Institution over a long period that this information should be applied directly in the calculation of Civil Service Medical Officers' salaries. The Treasury denies the weight of the comparison and in negotiations has stressed the importance of relativity with other Civil Service grades. As there are only some 600 medical officer civil servants as against some 50,000 persons in the profession in the whole country, the Institution sees it as a case in which the application in the Civil Service of the general levels of medical remuneration should be reasonably clear and straightforward.

19. An example in the second category is the small class of Prison Chaplains. In this type of case it is the Institution's submission that the Tomlin formula ought not even to be considered. The low standard of remuneration of parochial clergy is due to the poverty of the Church. This is something which the Church Commissioners freely recognise. In determining, therefore, the salaries appropriate to Prison Chaplains there should be no regard to salaries outside which have been conditioned by wholly different factors not applicable in the Civil Service. By an Act of Parliament of 1877, Governors, Chaplains and Medical Officers in prisons are known as superior officers, the remainder of the staff ranking as subordinate officers. Yet in recent years the Prison Chaplains' salary has been completely left behind by the changes in the salary levels of the other two classes. It is the Institution's submission that in such a case it is wrong of a Government Department to do other than provide salaries commensurate with the responsibilities falling upon the officers concerned, basing these on relativity with other civil servants' salary scales because of the inadmissibility of salaries outside the Civil Service. This view is, however, not one which the Prison Commissioners have been prepared to accept.

20. Between these two extremes there is every variety of circumstance. In the two instances quoted, there is clear evidence about salaries outside the Civil Service and reasonably clear knowledge of the responsibilities falling to the individuals concerned. In respect of the vast majority of civil servants, however, it is not possible to get such clear-cut comparisons.

21. The difficulty of getting appropriate comparisons outside the Civil Service is partly the absence of appropriate information and partly the differences following from the kind of organisation.

22. Some of the difficulty can be shown by the class of Architectural and Engineering Draughtsmen. It might be thought that, at any rate so far as Engineering Draughtsmen are concerned, clear and relatively simple comparisons could be made. In practice this is not the case because negotiations in industry follow two broad lines. In the first place, the trades unions fix a minimum salary for age 21 and then deal with increases on basic salaries from

that point on. Secondly the union's local officers go on to fix the pay of the persons in particular establishments. There may be, and frequently is, a wide difference between these two figures. This is a factor which is too often forgotten, or at any rate insufficiently regarded, in negotiations about Civil Service pay. In the Civil Service the scale is all that is received and that is the beginning and the end of it.

23. There are negotiations between the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen and the Employers' Federations which deal with the increases payable over the basic rates. Union representatives in the factories then work from that basis and the actual salaries paid vary quite considerably. An indication of this has been given in one instance by a representative of the employers. Mr. W. W. Vinson, of the Engineering and Allied Employers' Federation had a meeting with the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen on 14th October, 1952, and, talking of the actual increases that had accrued to draughtsmen during the year July, 1951-52, in which the only national award had provided an increase of 14s. per week, said:—

"Yes I do want to make this point because I think it ought to be made. I think the employers have generally looked after their draughtsmen. You can say of course, 'well that is due to pressure on the part of the draughtsmen's Association in various ways.' One can say that of course but I do want to suggest that whatever the reasons I think the draughtsmen have been looked after very well by the employers and I have got some figures here which I will read out to you. These are average figures of increases between July, 1951, and July, 1952, and are taken from the returns of all the Federation membership. I will give you the figures for the provinces first. Age by age from 21 I will give them to you to the nearest penny. They show the increase in take-out. The figures for the provinces are as follows:—

Age	Average increase	
	s.	d.
21	15	0
22	16	2
23	17	4
24	17	6
25	19	0
26 and over ...	19	7

The London figures are as follows:

Age	Average increase	
	s.	d.
21	15	6
22	15	2
23	16	9
24	18	0
25	21	8
26 and over ...	18	11

It will be seen that the increases average 17s. 6d. as compared with the national award of 14s. per week.

24. The difficulty, of course, goes well beyond this because there are draughtsmen above age 25 and there are higher grades of draughtsmen. For the higher grades concerned there is almost always an individual assessment of salaries and there can be wide variations but, more important from the point of view of Civil Service negotiations, it is practically impossible to get details of these salaries.

25. In the professional field, the difficulties are even more considerable. In some of the major professions where private consultant work was, at

the beginning of the century, the rule of the profession, there are now approximately 50 per cent. in salaried employment. Many of these salaried officers are employed in organisations which tend to follow Civil Service salary patterns, or, as in the case of local Government for example, will follow a Civil Service pattern for the bulk of employees but provide a certain number of higher posts at salaries well exceeding those of comparable persons in the Civil Service. The only equitable comparison would be the income, after making allowance for business risks, that can be expected in private practice by a person of the standing required by the Service. On this, practically no information can be obtained, certainly no information of a reliable evidential nature.

26. The standard of salary scales of scientists is to a considerable extent set by the Civil Service which is the biggest single employer. It seems unreasonable in such a case to look to salary figures in outside employment. The question then arises whether, and if so to what extent, the Government ought to look at entirely different criteria in determining salary scales.

Perquisites

27. Another complicating factor in taking account of outside rates is the current practice, which is an inevitable outcome of present high taxation levels, of providing facilities or services for the employee which, while forming no part of his salary, nonetheless affect materially his standard of living. For example, it is not uncommon for local authorities to quote as an attraction when advertising a post the provision of a local authority house. The provision of a house at all is a great attraction at the present time and the provision of a house at a local authority rental is, of course, a substantial inducement. Commercially, the provision of a motor car is a fairly frequent form of inducement. Indeed, Professor Gower, the Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of Commercial Law in the University of London, in lecturing a year ago, asserted:

"It is significant that the vast majority of cars are to-day registered in the names of companies."

In the same lecture he said:—

"Although in theory a company's taxable trading profits are assessed on the same principles as those applicable in an individual trader, I think we all know in practice it is possible by trading as a company to set-off expenses which would otherwise not be allowed. For example, sums expended for personal maintenance or for domestic or private purposes are obviously not allowable as a business expense, but a company, as an artificial person, needs no personal maintenance and has no domestic expenses. Hence the expenses of maintaining its houses, motor cars and the like are *prima facie* deductible as an expense of the business even although the controlling shareholder or director may reside in the house with his family or use a car for private purposes at weekends."

28. The provision of heavily subsidised canteens is a feature of modern industrial and commercial life of which some reflection appears in the Civil Service but the arrangements are not so extensive as those made by the best employers.

29. Another development which applies particularly to clerical, technical and administrative employees outside the Civil Service is the provision of the meal vouchers. This applies nowadays throughout the country and is an extremely valuable tax free addition to the employee's income. The value of meal vouchers varies with firms and with the grade of the employee; but it can be said to be general in those industries where there is no subsidy in the form of canteen meals at less than cost price.

30. Another perquisite is bonus payments. It is not necessarily or even generally a regular provision although a bonus at Christmas or at holidays is a regular feature in some firms.

31. There are many other perquisites of this kind outside of the Civil Service which will be within the general knowledge of the Commission but about which it is virtually impossible to present evidence. These facilities differ from firm to firm but it is probably true to say that to a very considerable extent outside the Service provision of this kind adds to the employee's real income.

32. Most of these facilities cannot, and, indeed, should not, be made available to civil servants. Quite what weight is to be attached to them and how far they should be reflected in Civil Service salaries is very difficult to say. It seems reasonable to say that any information that can be gathered about salaries and salary scales outside the Civil Service needs to have an element added to take account of perquisites.

Comparisons With Outside Conditions

33. It is the Institution's submission therefore that while the rates of pay outside the Civil Service of comparable professions or types of employee, are facts to be taken into account in fixing Civil Service pay in some cases, it is necessary that, when these are used, the information should be complete. That is to say that the information should be sufficient to give a clear picture of the work performed and responsibilities carried as well as of the total emoluments.

34. It is the present practice for the Treasury, in cases submitted to the Arbitration Tribunal, for example, to cite salaries or salary scales, generally without giving any identifying information and, indeed flatly refusing such identifying information to the staff organisation concerned. It is essential to know:—

- (a) Precisely the work being done;
- (b) the prospects of promotion;
- (c) other conditions that attach to employment in that concern.

Very rarely indeed is it possible for staff associations to have complete information on these subjects which determine the relevance or irrelevance of the scales quoted by the Treasury.

35. For the Official Side simply to provide a statement that in such and such an un-named firm such and such salaries are being paid to a person alleged to be carrying similar responsibilities to the Civil Service class under consideration is not only a completely unsatisfactory way of doing business it is also quite unfair to the staff concerned.

36. It is the Institution's submission that unless full information is available, then partial information of the kind which the Treasury generally submits is unfair and may be most misleading as a basis for determining salary scales. To call such a process the application of the Tomlin formula is merely an attempt to dress up anarchy to make it look like science.

37. If the Commission can find a satisfactory answer to this problem it will go a long way towards solving the negotiation problems within the Civil Service.

38. Since the publication of the Tomlin Report in 1931 circumstances have changed enormously. The creation of a large number of Public Boards has brought under general Government guidance and control the salaries and conditions of employment of many hundreds of thousands of employees who were not previously under such control. This itself is a major factor in putting the Government in the position of being the wage and salary fixing authority. The number of persons whose incomes it can in this way directly or indirectly control is a very substantial element in the total number of employed persons.

Other Tomlin Factors

39. There are two other factors in the Tomlin formula which must be considered. These are contained in paragraph 308 of the Tomlin Report that Civil Service remuneration should reflect:—

- (a) the long-term trend in wage levels, and
- (b) the economic condition of the country.

40. Taking the second item first it is the Institution's submission that account ought not to be taken of this factor in so far as the maintenance of relativities with the rest of the community are concerned. Civil Service conditions will and can only in the nature of the case, reflect the general position in the country. When the Civil Service sets the pattern for the country it is proper that the general economic conditions of the country should be taken into account. In other circumstances, however, this seems hardly reasonable. When the Civil Service is merely adjusting itself to what has happened elsewhere, then the civil servant ought not to be penalised merely because he is a Government employee. If the economic circumstances of the country have not precluded an alteration in the general level of remuneration elsewhere then, it is submitted, that the civil servant should take his place with other people. On two occasions since the end of the second World War the Civil Service has got seriously behind the rest of the country in general adjustments in remuneration because the Government used their powers to hold Civil Service wages and salaries as a political example to industry and commerce. Such a control was not attempted for salaries and wages generally. It should suffice to relate Civil Service conditions to the appropriate long-term trend.

41. Taking the first item, there would be no dissent from the Civil Service, certainly no dissent from the Institution, that there should be an adjustment of Civil Service salaries on the basis of the long-term trend outside the Civil Service. This, in the Institution's view, calls for a general consideration of Civil Service salaries from time to time, according to the extent to which there have been considerable movements in salaries and wages outside the Civil Service. This principle was followed in the case of the Pay Addition given to most of the Civil Service as from 1st January, 1952. That precedent seems to the Institution to be an excellent one which should be kept in mind if the value of money continues to fall rapidly, as it has since the end of the war.

42. It is the Institution's submission that it is not practicable to get proper evidence of what is being paid to particular groups of people outside of the Civil Service and that it is necessary, therefore, in circumstances such as have obtained in recent years for general adjustments to be made to Civil Service salaries following a shape indicated as that being followed over the country generally. In this connection, the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council has, in its discussions with the Official Side, used the wage rates index as a general indication of what has happened about the value of money.

43. The wage rates index has been used for this purpose because, tracing the movement of this index, the wage earnings index and the cost of living index over the period between the two wars and since the second war, the wage rates index has provided a very conservative measurement and one that has avoided the violent fluctuations of most of the others and has provided, on the basis of that experience, a good general reflection.

44. One of the difficulties about the use of the wage rates index is that it is a direct reflection of wage movements in respect of rates only up to the level of some £600 a year or thereabouts. It is not, therefore, *prima*

facie, a good basis for considering or determining the movements in salaries of officers earning up to £2,000 a year and even less so of officers earning over £2,000 a year. Such a contention seems to be unanswerable. It is the fact, however, that such statistics as are available about the movement of salaries give some colour to the view that while it is not a direct measure of what happens to salaries, the movement in salaries in recent years has not been dissimilar from that of wages. The tables and charts reproduced in Appendix A are indications of the movements in certain salary tables revealed in national statistics. These figures are fairly tentative in character but it is the combination of evidence that they give which is impressive.

45. It may be purely adventitious that the movements have been of this kind and the wage rates index could not be relied upon to continue to serve this particular purpose. Other material such as is available must be used for this purpose to the fullest possible extent.

46. There is another indication. In submissions to Mr. Justice Danckwerts when he considered the size of the pool that should be available for the remuneration of general medical practitioners, certain evidence was given in camera by the Inland Revenue Department. What can be deduced from the judgment given by Mr. Justice Danckwerts is that the evidence before him showed that as between 1939 and the beginning of 1952, professional earnings had increased by some 100 per cent.

47. Memoranda prepared by Professor R. G. D. Allen, of the University of London, for the Association of First Division Civil Servants seems also to lend support to the general view of a movement of salaries not vastly dissimilar from the movement of wages save that the reflections were rather different at differing points of time.

48. These differences might be summarised as saying that there were greater increases in wages than salaries in the period from 1939 to 1946 and then rather greater increases in salaries than in wages in the period from 1946 to date. That is to say, that salaries are tending to recover their pre-war relationship to wages. Over the whole period the total movement in salaries is not dissimilar from that in wages.

49. It is the Institution's view, and it hopes that the Royal Commission will concur that arrangements should be made to provide general evidence about movements in salaries. The Institution is unable to see why the Inland Revenue Department should not produce annual figures of the movements in professional earnings. Such statistical information would in no way affect the general secrecy under which information is given to the Inland Revenue Department. They would be generalised figures in which no individual and no concern would be particularised. Such statistics would be of inestimable value.

50. It seems, as another possibility, that the Ministry of Labour and National Service could give in respect of salaries the service it gives in respect of wages. It might not be desirable to produce just one index; indeed the Institution thinks a series of points would be needed to give an overall picture of the salary field.

51. Given that it is agreed that a salaries index or information allied to it is desirable then the points mentioned seem to be merely matters of machinery, which may well present difficulties, but none of the difficulties should be insurmountable. Even if they could not be regarded as final and definite proof, they would be valuable pointers, and pointers which are lacking in salary negotiations at the present time.

52. It is the Institution's hope, therefore, that the Royal Commission will recommend the production of something of this kind so as to help in salary negotiations in the future.

53. It is the Institution's view that there should be machinery for the general adjustment of Civil Service salaries in the light of such information.

54. It would be sound administration for such adjustments to be made in a general way either over the Civil Service as a whole or over substantial areas of the Civil Service. It is an alternative much to be preferred to present attempts to try and deal with each class or section of the Service in relation to some parallel, real or imagined, outside of the Civil Service. This would leave a much narrower field for specific negotiations affecting particular sections of the Civil Service. It would enable the issues of relativity and changed relationships between one grade and another, to be dealt with at the relatively infrequent intervals that would be necessary while the general value of the wages and salaries in the Civil Service could be maintained in fair relationship to the long-term experience of the community generally. In this way there is likely to be much greater satisfaction in the Service and much less waste of time by officers of H.M. Treasury as well as of the various staff organisations.

Unsuitability of "Average" Conditions

55. One of the problems troubling all civil service staff associations is the inordinate time taken in negotiations on salaries and conditions of service to say nothing of the lack of reality in much that purports to be negotiation.

56. It is necessary to comment on one further point. The Treasury in its evidence to the Royal Commission dealing with the principles of remuneration has laid emphasis on Civil Service remuneration being related to the average of conditions outside of the Civil Service. It seems to the Institution that such a view may well be justified in relation to such grades as, to quote the example in the Tomlin Report, fitters in an Admiralty dockyard. It is also entirely apt when dealing with the maintenance of the general value of Civil Service remuneration in line with the maintenance of standards throughout the country as a whole but quite inappropriate when one is dealing with the non-industrial Civil Service and particularly when one is dealing with the higher grades and classes of the non-industrial Civil Service.

57. For example, in the medical Civil Service, medical officers have to discharge two or three different functions. In some places they will be found to be exercising a semi-supervisory role over general practitioners in the country. In other places they will be giving guidance and advice on major issues of medical doctrine and practice. It is essential that these officers be leaders in their sphere and recognised as such. It is necessary for architects in, say, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, to exercise a control over the work of architects employed by local authorities and in private practice. They, too, must be leaders in their sections of their profession.

58. Unless the Town Planning Inspectors of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government are definitely recognised as first rate practitioners in their particular profession, how can the Ministry stand up to the very difficult decisions that it has to take? There must be public confidence that there is no reasonable likelihood of ordinary error in the work done by the department.

59. Professional officers must have a standing with their professional fellows that will enable them to establish for the Civil Service the right status and leadership. Just as it is generally accepted that the administrative class could not maintain its position unless it were recognised as a *corps d'élite* in its own particular field.

60. The Civil Service has a reputation throughout the world which is second to none. It has secured this reputation because in the years before the Second World War the Civil Service was, on the whole, offering attractive careers. It was not that the monetary rewards were very high but the general standing of the Civil Service was excellent and the rewards were sufficient to attract the above-average person who was inclined to a work of social service rather than to work in fields where private and personal ambitions can secure greater rewards. In those days, competition for almost any Civil Service vacancy was very keen. It matters not to which of the non-industrial classes of the Civil Service one turns for examples, the story was the same. Entry into the Factory Inspectorate, for example, was very competitive and attracted into its ranks the kind of mixture it wanted; a preponderance of professionally qualified people and some persons holding degrees in the humanities. Now, the Factory Inspectorate is incapable of attracting professionally qualified people to its ranks. What a shocking diminution in the standards of the Civil Service. What a threat to the reputation of the Civil Service in the future.

61. The Institution submits that not the least of the Royal Commission's responsibilities is to recommend arrangements that will restore the prestige of Civil Service and ensure that conditions in the Service will be sufficiently attractive to give rise to reasonable competition.

62. The very grave danger of the Treasury recommendations is that the general depression of the standard of the Civil Service will continue. For the moment the Civil Service can, in effect, live on the fat of the pre-war years. With every year that passes that diminishes and will, in the not distant future, come to an end. It seems to the Institution that the Treasury is most ill-advised to follow such a short-sighted policy. It is the Institution's hope that the Royal Commission will restore the Civil Service to its proper place in the community.

63. This is put as a constructive criticism of the Tomlin recommendations and of the practice in the twenty years since the Tomlin Report. It leads, in the Institution's submission, to the following general description of the criteria that should apply:—

- (a) That Civil Service pay should be maintained at its real values through National Whitley Council machinery on the basis of experience outside the Civil Service as disclosed by the wage rates index so far as salary scales up to and including the maximum of the Clerical Class are concerned and by other general statistical indications for classes on salary scales higher than that of the Clerical Class;
- (b) that the pay of the various classes should
 - (i) take full account of the responsibilities involved in and the character of the duties performed, the proper maintenance and development of the cultural and professional standards of the officers concerned, the social position of the officers as servants of the State, the capacity they show in performance of the work and the contentment of the officers;
 - (ii) where appropriate, and to the extent possible, be so determined as to take account of the pay and other emoluments given outside the Civil Service by the best employers of the kind of officer concerned;
 - (iii) take account of the levels of remuneration of officers in the Civil Service exercising similar responsibilities or in related classes.

CHAPTER III

**THE PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC
CIVIL SERVICE**

64. The Institution here states its claim that professional, technical and scientific civil servants should be accorded a status and standing in relation to the remainder of the Civil Service that

- (a) more accurately represent the relationships obtaining between the administrator and the professional man outside the Civil Service,
- (b) more accurately reflect the importance of the professional man in the life of the country as a whole,
- (c) give real effect to the frequently announced views that it is important to encourage young people to take up professional, scientific and technical careers.

65. This issue of the relationship between the administrative, executive and clerical areas of the Civil Service with the professional, scientific and technical side of the Civil Service is a fundamental one. Since the Institution's formation in 1919 it has been its first aim to secure parity for the professional side of the Civil Service with the other side of the Civil Service. It is the Institution's submission that the professional side of the Civil Service has always been kept subordinate to the remainder of the Civil Service. This reflects itself not only in the organisation of the Civil Service, with which the Royal Commission cannot concern itself directly, but in salary scales and career values at every stage and in every general Service class.

66. The administrative, executive and clerical hierarchy is the basic organisation of the modern Civil Service. There would be a considerable measure of truth in an assertion that this basis was constructed 100 years ago. The actual details of the organisation have varied, and varied quite considerably, in the course of that time until they reached their present detailed shape in the Reorganisation Report of 1920. But although it has developed in detail that side of the Civil Service has not altered fundamentally, and still provides the criteria for pay scales within the whole Service.

67. It is perhaps apt that the Royal Commission should be considering these matters in the same year as is celebrated the centenary of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of 1854. There is no doubt of the enormous value of the reforms that were put forward in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and later adopted. It seems to the Institution to be time, one hundred years after that Report, that stock should be taken of the Civil Service that has developed. It is necessary to assess whether the Civil Service of 1954 accurately and properly reflects the society it serves.

68. In 1854 it was an urgent necessity to bring the Civil Service into line with the economic society of that day. For that purpose a good Civil Service, well trained, dispassionate in its outlook, and mainly concerned with administration of a very general character, had to be created. Of its impartiality there had to be no doubt. That Civil Service was created and an enormous debt is owed to the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.

69. In 1954 the society of which we are part is primarily a professional one. The major activities of life are now guided and directed in relation to technological issues. In almost every industrial conference and in every convention dealing with the development of education, emphasis is laid on the importance of training sufficient technical people to maintain this country in its proper place in the world. Comparisons are drawn, for example, with America and

all of these comparisons are to the disadvantage of this country when one considers the proportion of people technically trained and employed in industry in America as compared with the proportion in this country.

70. What is to be done about this? How should this affect the Civil Service? The Civil Service exercises a tremendous influence and that influence should be used to encourage persons to enter the professions. **It is incumbent upon this Royal Commission in its recommendations to see that the Civil Service of 1954 is set on the proper lines by re-shaping the relativities between the administrative/executive/clerical grades and the professional side of the Civil Service on a basis which leaves no doubt as to the importance of the professional side of the Service.**

71. The national needs in this matter were well set out in "Nature" for February 27th, 1954.

"To him (the Lord President of the Council) and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, rather than to the Minister of Education, we might also reasonably look for efforts to influence the choices which are made of careers by boys and girls at the age of fifteen or sixteen, or even the subsequent choice of university faculties, including the choice of technology rather than science itself. Drive and imagination are required to arouse the interest of young people, and to overcome the lack of awareness or appreciation of the opportunities and importance of both a scientific and a technical education. These qualities are more likely to be found in quarters fully aware of the vital need for scientists and technologists, and the limitations on progress which their absence must place in every sector of the national economy.

It is right and necessary that all possible measures should be taken not only in the schools, but also in the universities, in industry and in Government departments, to see that trained scientists are not employed on duties for which less highly trained men or women are competent, as it is also to see that their services and advice are not wasted by managements or administrators incapable of assessing scientific and technical factors in a situation.

Nor will it suffice to secure adequate numbers of scientists, technologists, technicians and craftsmen, managers and administrators capable of identifying the problems to which scientific or technical knowledge can contribute, of assessing the scientific and technical aspects of a situation, and of appreciating the significance of new knowledge. To secure the full and efficient use of such men in industry, Government establishments or public bodies, involves not only eradicating the idea that scientists and technologists must always remain such and be debarred from managerial responsibility; it may well involve also a new outlook and attitude in the Government and in industry at all levels, such as can come not simply by encouraging more people to take up scientific studies, but by a radical change in the content of general education and the teaching of science."

72. How are young people to be attracted into the professional side of the Civil Service? How are parents to be encouraged to advise their children to enter professional careers? How are teachers to be interested in leading children into professional careers? It is the Institution's submission that the only answer to these questions is to provide professional careers comparable with administrative careers.

73. At the present moment, at each educational stage the Civil Service offers better remuneration and better career prospects to the entrants on the administrative/executive/clerical side of the Civil Service than it does to the entrant to the professional side of the Civil Service. This relationship of salary scales and career opportunities on the professional as compared with the administrative side is the fundamental error in the modern Civil Service. It is an error which must be corrected if the Civil Service is to play its proper part in attracting young people to a professional career. If all that is stated in ministerial pronouncements and in the reports of learned Government committees is to be made real, and if serious attention is to be paid to the necessity for increasing the number of technologists available in the country generally

as well as the Civil Service itself, then a substantial improvement must be made in Civil Service salary scales and conditions.

74. It has already been pointed out that in some professions the number of salaried persons is equal to the number of persons in private consultant work. It has already been pointed out that in many professions the Civil Service is now the biggest single employer. The responsibility resting upon the Government therefore in this matter is one that is quite outstanding. It is the Institution's submission that the settlement of this problem in relativities in salary scales is by far the most important one before the Commission.

75. The Chorley Committee gave a little attention to this problem and in paragraph 34 of their Report said:—

"While we are on the whole satisfied with the salary relativities between the administrative class and the professional and technical classes, we are less satisfied with their career relativities. This matter does not, perhaps, fall strictly within our terms of reference, but we recommend that the complements of posts in the various classes should be re-examined, with the objects of ensuring that each class as a whole provides a sufficiently attractive career for its recruits."

76. As the Chorley Committee say, the matter was not strictly within their terms of reference so that it is perhaps unfair to criticise what looks like a lapse in their reasoning. In this paragraph the Committee say that on the whole they are satisfied with the salary relativities. Then they go on to recommend that the complements of posts in the various classes should be re-examined and make it clear that they think that the career provided is not sufficiently attractive.

77. The distinction that the Committee makes as between salaries and careers seems to the Institution one that is quite unreal. The two are merely facets of one thing. In the Institution's view a relatively low salary scale may be right if the length of time to be spent in that particular grade is short and the ultimate career provides the appropriate compensation. Similarly if promotion prospects are poor then the salaries in the lower grades need to be higher in order to compensate.

78. In the Institution's conception parity as between one class and another is achieved not necessarily by an identity of form and grade structure but by providing over the whole of a normal career something like an identity of total remuneration.

79. Taking as an example the relationship between the scientific officer class and the administrative class the average scientist receives up to age 39 some £3,000 less remuneration than his administrative counterpart. In the succeeding years this difference steadily increases until, again at the end of a normal career and at age 60, the loss to the scientific officer is £13,500. The structure of the scientific officer class is different from that of the administrative class. That may or may not be necessary, but there would be no difficulty in ensuring by an appropriate adjustment of salary scales that the total remuneration of the scientist would approximate to that of the administrator. What seems quite clear is that a differentiation against the scientist must diminish the number of people choosing science as their career. A similar situation obtains in the Works Group and other classes.

80. It is of vital importance to take account of career possibilities because in assessing the value of a career the career possibilities are no less important than the particular salary at any one point in the course of the career.

81. In paragraph 35 of its Report, the Chorley Committee said:—

"We have given particular thought to the relationship between the highest professional and technical salaries and the highest administrative salaries, i.e., those of Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries. We think it should be

exceptional for a professional or technical civil servant to be paid more than the Permanent Secretary of his Department, but we see no reason why it should not happen now and then, when men of professional or technical eminence are appointed for particular jobs outside the ordinary team-work of the Department—especially if they are appointed for a short term without any superannuation provision. We think the Deputy Secretary should normally have the second highest salary in the Department, but there are cases where a professional or technical civil servant may well be paid more than a Deputy Secretary. Two cases which occur to us particularly are:

- (i) the case where the work of the Department is predominantly technical or professional in character, and
- (ii) the case where the technician is in effect the Civil Service head of his profession and has a status higher than that of his strictly departmental work."

82. Until a few months ago no professional officer, other than three legal officers, was paid as much as a Permanent Secretary save where he occupied more than one post. Three posts in the Atomic Energy Department have been upgraded to £4,500 recently. Only one Permanent Secretary, Sir Ben Lockspeiser, the Secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, has other than a purely administrative background to his career. These two points constitute a grave criticism of the Civil Service of 1954.

83. The point made by the Chorley Committee that it should be exceptional for a professional civil servant to be paid more than a Permanent Secretary is a view in which the Institution concurs. It is the Institution's view that the management of major departments with an important professional, or series of professional, responsibilities should have at the head of it not one Permanent Secretary as the sole leader of the department but two or more persons occupying an equal status in the responsibilities of the department. This already obtains in the Service Departments where the salary and status of the Service Chiefs are similar to those of the Permanent Secretary.

84. For example, it is the Institution's view that in a department such as the Ministry of Works, the Director General of Works with his comprehensive professional responsibilities should be at the same level as the Permanent Secretary. Each in his own field must decide on the advice to be given to the Minister; it is a misconception of the proper distribution of responsibilities to imagine that in professional matters the Permanent Secretary would even consider overriding the professional Head. The advice given on any particular subject may well differ and it is important that the Minister should have before him the two pieces of advice in order to enable him to make up his mind with a full understanding of the problem and its implications professional and administrative.

85. In the Ministry of Supply, a Department of wide professional interests, the chief scientist in his field can have no less responsibility than the Permanent Secretary in his. The Controllers in their respective spheres in that Department must be responsible under the Minister in a quite complete sense. In such a Department as the Ministry of Supply in those questions where there is an overlapping of concern, as frequently there must be, then it is the advice of a small board that is really important for the Minister and it is that conception that, in the Institution's submission, needs to be fostered.

86. It is no part of the Institution's case to denigrate the very great responsibilities of a Permanent Secretary. On the contrary, the Institution is well aware of the importance of the work that the Permanent Secretary does. What the Institution submits is that the Permanent Secretary should not appear to be responsible in fields where in practice he cannot be and is not, but that the organisation of the Civil Service should reflect the facts of responsibility.

87. The two departments instanced are merely examples. There is no point in traversing the full range of cases in the Service but it may help the Royal Commission if one or two others are cited. The Chief Valuer in the Inland Revenue Department, the Chief Medical Officer in the Ministry of Health, the Director General of Works in the Air Ministry, the Chief Scientific and Agricultural Adviser in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries are all persons who in practice must be in a direct line of responsibility to the Minister and there should not be any interpolation of another officer purporting to hold responsibility and to give advice when in fact he can become only a transmitter of the advice of others. Transmission of professional advice is full of danger when it is done by a non-professional person. It is also, and this is the primary point, a means of lowering the value and status of the professional person and thereby demeaning the whole profession and structure.

88. In most of the instances that have been given the officer cited is only at Deputy Secretary level. In some cases posts have been created at a level between that of Deputy Secretary and Permanent Secretary and three salary points of £3,500, £3,700 and £4,000 have been used. The basis for the differences are not immediately obvious and one of them, the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Health, holds two other posts, Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry of Education and of the Home Office. All in all it can be said that the heads of the various parts of the professional Civil Service are in an unsatisfactory position *vis-à-vis* each other and particularly so *vis-à-vis* the Administrative Class. **It is the submission of the Institution that this relationship is not a right one, that it does not reflect the facts of responsibility, it does not reflect the proper standing of professionals in the Government of the country and it is of itself a factor in diminishing careers in the professional classes.** The highest professional officer being always a grade lower than his administrative colleague, it follows that his relationship applies right down to the lowest technical grades.

89. Having stated the general sociological and practical reasons for a fundamental change in present relationships, it will perhaps suit the convenience of the Commission if at this stage the position of the major higher classes in the professional Civil Service are dealt with.

CHAPTER IV

THE SCIENTIFIC OFFICER CLASS

90. Because of the similarity in the qualifications required and the statements that were made by the Government at the end of the last war the clearest claim for parity as between the administrative and the professional Civil Service is provided in the Scientific Officer class. Lord Cherwell, speaking in the House of Lords on behalf of the Government in 1943, said:—

"I must frankly admit that the Civil Service has not hitherto shown due regard for the contribution which scientists are making to the nation's welfare. I am glad to be able to say, in answer to Lord McGowans's question, that this matter has now been reviewed, and that an investigation has been in progress to make sure that the conditions of service, pay and prospects of Government scientific employees compare favourably with those on the administrative side of Government work, so that, among other things, interchange may in suitable cases be made easier. I hope that a definite announcement that these reforms are to be put into effect may be made before long."

91. Following on this the Barlow Report was published to which reference has been made in paragraph 208 of the Factual Memorandum. It is the Institution's view that the Barlow Report and the resulting White Paper (Command 6679) did not provide the favourable comparison with the administrative side of Government work to which Lord Cherwell referred. This view was shared by the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee which sent a deputation to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury, writing to the then Chairman of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, said on 27th February, 1946:—

"MY DEAR PHILLIPS PRICE,

I promised the deputation from the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, which you introduced on 20th February, I would put into writing the views I expressed on behalf of the Government on the future prospects of scientists in the Civil Service.

It is the Government's intention to provide Scientists with a career in the Civil Service equal to that of other staff of comparable quality. So far from accepting the view that the Scientist is inferior to the Administrative Officer, its aim is to ensure that scientific workers will, man for man and job for job, be in as good a position as other staff.

As you know, the future structure of the Government Scientific Service is only now taking shape, but none can doubt the ever increasing importance of the part it must play. The opportunities of advancement which the Service can offer Scientists of high ability may therefore well increase. Provision is being made for a 'pool' of senior posts to which individuals may be appointed on their own merits as scientists and independently of the number of such posts required for the normal work of the Department or research establishment in which they serve.

Much of course will depend upon the Scientists who have charge of the larger establishments. Their determination to secure the free interchange of staff throughout the Service, and to see that men of ability are not held up, will have a more direct effect upon the career prospects of the individual than any general rules which may be laid down, but you may be sure that the Government will endeavour to remove any injustices that may emerge and would welcome your Committee's aid at any time in bringing them to light.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) W. GLENVIL HALL."

92. The figures given in paragraph 79, Chapter III, demonstrate that the facts have proved that the fears of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee and of the Institution were justified and that the career of the scientist is much worse than that of the administrator.

93. The differentiation against the scientist shows itself from the beginning. The young scientist enters the Civil Service with the knowledge that he must

first secure promotion to Senior Scientific Officer and then to Principal Scientific Officer; that he is unlikely to get promotion to Principal Scientific Officer before he is 35, indeed that he is very likely to be 40 before this happens. The young administrator on joining the Civil Service knows that he will be an Administrative Principal by age 30 earning a minimum of £1,150 a year. That is to say, he will achieve by age 30 a point which the scientist may well not achieve until age 40 or after.

94. What can be the basis for such differentiation? The direct entrant Administrative Officer has to be a First or Second Class Honours graduate and is a person carefully selected for the work that will fall to him. The Administrative class has, however, two fields of recruitment. The direct entrant accounts for approximately half of the class, the other half being promotees from the clerical, executive, and some other classes. The promotees enter either through a limited competition or straight promotion on an assessment of their career in their own class. Entrants other than direct entrants are not required to have a degree qualification.

95. Recruitment to the Scientific Officer class and its departmental variants, e.g., Patent Office Examiners, is almost without exception of First or Second Class Honours graduates. There is no limited competition for Experimental Officers to enter the Scientific Officer class as there is for Executive and other classes to enter the Administrative class, and the prospects of class-to-class promotion from Experimental Officer grades to Scientific Officer grades are very restricted. There can be no doubt that the Scientific Officer class has a higher educational standard than the Administrative class as a whole. **It is submitted that it is quite unreasonable to reward the scientist with less pay than the Administrator.** This is clearly a major cause of the considerable shortage of scientists. It helps explain why at the universities to-day the number of students in the arts faculties is twice the number taking pure science. The latest published figures are for the year 1951-52 when the numbers for Great Britain were 35,936 and 17,053 respectively.

96. The responsibility of the Government for this situation must be emphasised because the Government is the biggest employer of scientific labour. The standing that the Government creates for the scientist dominates the general levels of pay outside the Civil Service. Indeed, in the majority of public research organisations outside the Civil Service the pay is almost identical. Over a large field of industrial research a similar condition holds. The responsibility for determining how attractive or unattractive a scientific career is to be is one that is placed very firmly on the shoulders of the Government. What is clear is that the career of the scientist is much less financially worth while than that of the administrator.

97. The point was put simply by the 5th Report of the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy (1951-52). It said:—

“This kind of transfer (that is from the arts to the sciences) cannot be brought about by administrative action. It requires a change in the climate of opinion affecting the prestige of science amongst school-children, parents and teachers.”

98. The Commission has the opportunity to place science on an equality with administration and such a step would represent a major advance.

99. It is necessary to consider what are the objections to giving the Scientific Officer a career no less good than that of the Administrative Officer. It has already been demonstrated that in terms of educational attainments the Scientific Officer class is at least as well-equipped as the Administrative class. This seems to leave the possibility only of a suggestion that the responsibilities of the work carried out by a scientist are less than those carried by an administrator. Comparisons of responsibilities are extremely difficult, and

much will depend upon the personal predilections of the person making the comparison. An absolute comparison is virtually impossible. The Institution could set out in detail the responsibilities falling upon the various grades in the Scientific Officer class but a full appreciation of these would require a detailed knowledge of the branches of science concerned.

100. For example, a Senior Scientific Officer, employed in the Underwater Detection Establishment of the Admiralty, is recognised as one of the four leading world authorities on photographic methods of studying rapid events. He has represented Great Britain at an International Symposium in America and at similar conferences in Germany and France. He has been called upon to advise scientists in all parts of the world. In the course of two years he has published no fewer than three important works on cavitation problems and four on photographic research. He has contributed articles to the Royal Naval Scientific Service Journal. Can it reasonably be said that this officer, the maximum of whose salary scale is the same as the minimum of the Administrative Principal scale, is carrying less responsibility than would normally fall to an Administrative Principal?

101. It must not be thought that the case cited is an exceptional one. In the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation Operational Research Station there is a Senior Scientific Officer who has worked in that section on a heterogeneous collection of tasks which has included two pieces of noteworthy original research. The first on developments of the theory of queues, particularly in non-equilibrium cases, and the second a study of the possible use of electronic digital computers in an Air Traffic Control System. He is a member of his Department's Standing Aerodrome Utilisation Committee which has the general responsibility of ensuring that the aerodrome capacity of the country is adequate for the needs of the civil operators and that it is used to the best advantage. He is the Chairman of the Technical Panel of this Committee with all of the responsibilities that that involves. The Institution finds it difficult to believe that this work is not at least as responsible as that of the Administrative Principal.

102. If the Commission is interested to pursue this point of the responsibilities carried it will obviously need a lot more information than the two cases cited and the Institution would be only too happy to supply a multitude of examples so that there can be no possibility of a suggestion that these were exceptional individual cases rather than typical samples. The Commission might also consider it worthwhile to visit some of the major scientific establishments to see what is being done.

103. A major obstruction in the Scientific Officer class career arises from the interpolation of the Senior Scientific Officer grade between the Scientific Officer and the Principal Scientific Officer. A further injustice is the treatment of the Senior Principal Scientific Officer grade as equivalent merely to the lower half of the Assistant Secretary grade.

104. In the Institution's view the Senior Scientific Officer grade should be abolished or at least combined with the Principal Scientific Officer grade in such a way that the combined scale has the same minimum as the Administrative Principal. Since in the Scientific Officer class the lowest grade is a working grade and not as in the Administrative class a training grade, there should be promotion at an earlier age, and the Scientific Officer should be promoted at age 26 or 27.

105. Next in the Scientific Officer class is the Senior Principal Scientific Officer. This grade should be the career grade of the class. It is not, but that is a point that is dealt with in paragraph 116 below. The Institution

submits that the salary scale of this grade should be identical with that of the Assistant Secretary. At the present moment the Senior Principal Scientific Officer salary scale covers only the first half of the Assistant scale, that is £1,500—£1,750 as compared with £1,500—£2,000. There seems to be no reason for this differentiation. It is unlikely that anyone will question the great value of the work for which the Senior Principal Scientific Officer is responsible, or suggest that it is of a lower value to the community than that of the Assistant Secretary. Unless this grade has a salary scale with the same maximum as the Assistant Secretary, the career position of the Scientific Officer in the Civil Service is bound to be worse than that of the Administrative Officer.

106. It is desirable to illustrate some of the work that is being done by Senior Principal Scientific Officers in the Civil Service, and again the assurance is given to the Commission that if further examples of the work are wanted the Institution will be very glad to multiply the number of examples to whatever figure the Commission would like.

107. The first example that the Institution submits is that of a Senior Principal Scientific Officer in the Safety in Mines Research Establishment in the Ministry of Fuel and Power. This officer, who is a Ph.D., F.S.S., has been described in "Nature" as:—

"Dr. , of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, is a mineralogist of international reputation and is now engaged on research into the mineralogical aspects of pneumoconiosis. He has been a pioneer in the application of X-ray diffraction techniques to the study of clay minerals, in the application of new mineralogical techniques to the study of dusts responsible for lung disease and in the application of the electron microscope to the study of clay minerals and dusts. He had developed and is still developing new techniques for the quantitative mineralogical analysis of small dust samples and for the identification of particular mineral particles too small for identification with the optical microscope. He is a member of the Industrial Pulmonary Diseases Committee of the Medical Research Council and is secretary of the Sub-Committee on Dust."

He has an imposing list of publications, details of which can be supplied to the Commission.

108. The second illustration is that of a Senior Principal Scientific Officer in the Scientific Adviser's Division of the Ministry of Food.

Training

Natural Sciences Tripos, Cambridge Pt. I Chemistry, Physics, Botany Pt. II Botany, B.A. 1929, 1st Class Honours, (University Prize). B.Sc. (London) external general 1928 (Physics, Chemistry, Botany). Ph.D. (1932) University of London Smart Studentship in Botany 1931-32. Exhibitioner of Downing College.

Work

His work has progressed from fundamental research in plant physiology and biochemistry at Cambridge (Botany School and School of Agriculture) through applied plant physiology (Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad) to large scale development of the results of research (Ministry of Food). The underlying theme has been the metabolism of tissues beginning with studies of the mechanism of respiration in seedlings and the biochemistry of cereals during growth continuing with the study of methods of controlling maturation of tropical fruits and during the past ten years applying the results of research to the processing of foods with particular reference to defence requirements, e.g., minimum bulk weight and maximum storage life. He has charge both of the Food Technology and the Food Defence Research Sections of the Scientific Adviser's Division and has been responsible for their programmes of work. These have included collaborative surveys and enquiries relating to wastage and quality of perishable foods during storage, distribution and processing. The defence scientific research and development have been centred on the new Experimental Factory built for the Ministry at Aberdeen, which in itself is an original venture for the United Kingdom.

His earlier research work has been published, but the more recent work has appeared in memoranda for internal use in departments and to a large extent has been administrative and advisory. He served on various inter-departmental committees concerned with substitutes and food hygiene.

Other Evidence of Standing

1948—On the detention of the first post-war shipments of manufactured foods by the U.S.A. on grounds of contamination with extraneous matter, he led a mission consisting of the directors of two food research associations and the chief chemist of a leading firm of biscuit manufacturers to Washington. As a result of consultations with the Food and Drug Administration and of work in their laboratories recommendations were made which led to voluntary quality control of exports by the Industry. No further detentions occurred.

1951—Again led a mission of one director of a food research association, the Deputy Government Chemist and two chief chemists of cocoa and chocolate manufacturers to Washington. A method of estimating cocoa shell in chocolate couverture was examined and tested in the laboratories of the Food and Drug Administration. After discussion modifications in method and in interpretation of results were agreed. The export of chocolate and cocoa has since then been unhindered.

1952—He played a considerable part in arranging a Conference between the U.K., U.S.A. and Canadian Civil Defence and Service Departments and voluntary Services on Scientific and Administrative aspects of Civil Defence relating to food. He was chairman of several scientific sessions.

1953—Attended the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science as one of the United Kingdom Delegation led by Sir John Cockcroft. Prepared and introduced the U.K. papers on Food Defence Research and on Technical Aspects of Agricultural Defence Problems on behalf of the Ministries of Food and Agriculture.

He too, of course, has a long list of publications.

109. The third and last example that is given is that of a Senior Principal Scientific Officer in the National Physical Laboratory of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.

Training

Imperial College, Royal College of Science, First in Physics, A.R.C.S., B.Sc., First Class Honours, Post graduate Research, D.I.C., Beit Scientific Research Fellowship, D.Sc., Thesis. Studies in Precision Alternating Current Measurements (at N.P.L.)

Membership of Learned Societies

Fellow of Physical Society. Member of Council and subsequently Vice-President 1932-40. Member. Institution of Electrical Engineers, Chairman of Measurement Section and as such member of Council and principal committees 1952-53.

Work

He is in charge of the section of the Electricity Division of the National Physical Laboratory which deals with the electrical standards, the methods of high-precision measurement associated with their application to various branches of the electrical industry, including radio and telecommunication generally, and the investigation of magnetic materials and insulating materials. He has made substantial contributions to the development of electrical science in these fields and has acquired an international reputation for his work on standards and precision measurements and also for that on dielectrics (electrical insulating materials).

His work on standards has included basic experiments necessary in order to realise or translate into concrete practical form the units as laid down by theoretical definitions, attendance as British delegate at the International Committee responsible for reaching agreement on the technical questions involved and for advising the International Committee and General Conference on Weights and Measures, and subsequently seeing through an Order in Council giving effect to the agreements reached while meeting also the requirements of previous British legislation.

The work on dielectrics has included studies of the insulating properties of plastics in relation to their chemical structure. The development of the techniques required for assessing the various properties has led to several important applications such as the following:—

- (a) A method originally devised for dealing with materials of interest in Television proved to have the widest application of any. It has been

adopted as a British Standard by B.S.I. and widely used in the U.S.A. also. It was also used for controlling the production of the special low-loss plastics required for radar.

- (b) The information and techniques were applied during the war to the study of radio-heating for the dehydration of vegetables and the rapid glueing of wood for the aircraft industry.
- (c) A moisture meter was devised, originally for controlling the drying of flax seed by Government establishments during the war. It was highly successful and subsequently extended to farm seeds of many kinds, grain, and dried egg.

These are offshoots from the main line work which aims primarily at providing the electrical industry with basic information about insulating materials, in the form of published papers.

Other Evidence of Standing

Kelvin Premium of I.E.E. for paper on Dielectrics Sylvanus.

P. Thomson Premium of I.E.E. for paper on Moisture Meter.

Invited to lecture on Radio Heating to:—

Royal Institution (Friday evening discourse)

Royal Society of Arts

Society of Chemical Industry

Invited to lecture at Summer Schools on

Dielectrics (Post Graduate) at Liverpool University and Imperial College

Invited to lecture on Instrumentation

Institution of Electrical Engineers

Society of Instrument Technology.

1950—Appointed British member of Experts Sub-Committee on ducts of International Electrotechnical Commission. Represent N.P.L. on High Polymer Committee of Chemical Research Board. Represent N.P.L. on Radio Materials Committee of Radio Research Board.

This officer has about 80 published papers which he has presented to learned Societies and is also the author of several books.

110. It must be emphasised that the three examples given are typical examples and not officers of special distinction picked out for the purpose of this statement of case. **It is submitted that it is wrong to evaluate this work as being on a lower level than that of the Assistant Secretary grade of the administrative class.** It is felt by the Institution that the work that has been described is of the highest intellectual and social value and that it ought to be recognised as such.

111. The next level in the Scientific Officer Class hierarchy is that of Deputy Chief Scientific Officer. On his present rate of pay he ranks as slightly higher than the Assistant Secretary and substantially lower than the Under Secretary. This the Institution believes to be a wholly improper evaluation. The broad reasons for this have already been given but the following illustrations of the work being done by these officers should demonstrate quite clearly how wrong such an evaluation is. The first illustration is that of the Deputy Chief Scientific Officer in charge of the Explosives Research and Development Establishment at Waltham Abbey.

Qualifications: D.Sc., Ph.D., A.R.I.C.

Previous Career: Research in Physical Chemistry.

Lecturer in Physical Chemistry in the Universities of Bristol, Birmingham and California.

Research manager, Shell Co., Stanlow.

Description of Post

This officer is responsible for the scientific direction and the administration of the Establishment which is engaged on the research and development of explosives, propellants and initiating substances of Service interest and those non-explosive, non-metallic substances used in contact with or proximity to them.

In addition to his direct functions in relation to the Establishment, this officer carries responsibilities for collaboration with other Establishments having direct responsibilities for weapon development and with the explosives divisions of the Royal Ordnance factories. He is also responsible for the technical direction of extramural contracts with Universities and industry for research and development in related fields, and for advice and assistance to a wide range of Boards and Committees of the Scientific Advisory Council and to the Ordnance Board as well as to the ordnance staffs of the armed Services.

He also has administrative responsibility for two "lodger" groups on the site—one at S.P.S.O. level, the other at P.S.O. level.

The following answer direct to this officer:—

Four S.P.S.O.s, two of whom are responsible for Propellants Research, one for Explosives and Intermediate Research and one for Chemical Engineering. (There is no separate Deputy to the Head of the Establishment and in his absence one of these S.P.O.s deputises.)

One Engineer I (Works Group Senior grade).

One Senior Experimental Officer, who acts as Safety Officer.

One Senior Executive Officer, who is the Senior Administrative Officer.

The Establishment covers about 540 acres and includes some 400 buildings. There are approximately 1,000 staff.

Approximately half of the Industrial staff are engaged on work ancillary to that of the scientific staff and the other half is devoted to maintenance and engineering duties, including estate work.

The site of this Establishment was until 1945 the Royal Gunpowder Factory and almost all of its buildings were very old and unsuitable for the work of a Research Establishment. The decision to transfer the Explosives Research and Development Establishment to this site meant its complete replanning to permit the discharge of the new functions. This has meant that in addition to carrying the scientific and administrative duties outlined above, the Head of the Establishment has been involved in the preparation and negotiation of a very extensive rebuilding programme which, in addition to the laboratories and other buildings required for the research and development work of the Establishment, has included two housing estates (one for "scarcity value" staff and one for W.D. (Constabulary)) and a small hotel.

112. Another Deputy Chief Scientific Officer is Deputy Director of the Road Research Laboratory, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and is in charge of the Materials and Construction Division of the Laboratory, with a scientific staff of about 145.

The work of the division includes research on concrete, bituminous and tar roads, soil mechanics and various special problems such as ice and snow and surface water drainage.

Until his appointment as deputy director, he was in charge of the Bituminous Materials Section of the laboratory and is a recognised international authority on road tar and bitumen. Several millions of pounds are saved annually on road maintenance directly as a result of the work of this section which was carried out under his direction.

He is chairman of the British Standards Institution Committees on tar and pitch, tarmacadam, rolled asphalt and gravel asphalt, and is chairman of the Institute of Petroleum Technical Committee for Bitumen. He is a member of the British Road Tar Association Technical Committee, and is a past chairman and secretary of the Roads and Buildings Materials Group, of the Society of Chemical Industry.

In 1951 he was chairman of the Bitumen Section of the World Petroleum Congress at the Hague, and in 1953 he lectured to the Dutch Asphalt Contractors Association and the Swedish Society of Civil Engineers.

Again, this officer is the author of very many papers which have been published in the scientific and technical press.

113. It is the Institution's submission that these duties need only to be cited, to provide the most complete justification for the claim that the Deputy Chief Scientific Officer in the Civil Service should rank with the Under-Secretary in the administrative class.

114. The Deputy Chief Scientific Officer is on a salary scale which is little more than the upper half of the Assistant Secretary scale, that is £1,850—£2,125 as compared with the Assistant Secretary basic maximum of £2,000 and the Under-Secretary's salary of £2,500.

115. It is perhaps unnecessary to pursue in detail the parallels in the higher appointments. Sufficient has already been said on this matter. **In summary, however, what is suggested is a series of parallels as follows:—**

Scientific Officer	= Assistant Principal.
Senior Scientific Officer/Principal Scientific Officer	= Principal.
Senior Principal Scientific Officer	= Assistant Secretary.
Deputy Chief Scientific Officer	= Under-Secretary.
Chief Scientific Officer	= Deputy Secretary.

There should also be higher posts above these equivalent to Permanent Secretary.

116. It must be emphasised that should this proposition be accepted by the Royal Commission the Scientific Officer class will still have less than parity with the Administrative class, unless there is a considerable improvement in promotion ages. In the Administrative class, 25 per cent. of the direct entrants to the class is in the Assistant Secretary grade and 16 per cent. at Under-Secretary level and above. This makes a total of 41 per cent. in the Assistant Secretary grade upwards. On this basis it can be stated that an officer entering directly into the Administrative class in the Assistant Principal grade will become Assistant Secretary unless he shows himself to be definitely below par.

117. In the Scientific Officer class on the other hand, there are only 13 per cent. of the class in the Senior Principal Scientific Officer grade and only 5 per cent. at Deputy Chief Scientific Officer level and above, that is to say, a total of only 18 per cent. above the Principal Scientific Officer level as compared with 41 per cent. above the Administrative Principal level in the Administrative class. **If an effectively equal career is to be given, then the salary scales must be substantially improved and the number of posts in the grades above the level of Principal Scientific Officer must be considerably increased. As it is, it cannot be gainsaid that the career open to the scientist is much less attractive than the career open to the administrator.**

CHAPTER V

WORKS GROUP OF PROFESSIONAL CLASSES

118. The Works Group has been described in paragraph 232 et seq. of the Factual Memorandum submitted by the Treasury.

119. The class was set up in the course of the general reorganisation of the professional and technical Civil Service in 1946 and it was reviewed by the Gardiner Committee in 1951. With this history it might well be thought that there could be no substantial basis for dispute and no case to put to the Royal Commission. This would be a wrong conclusion.

120. In the agreed report of the National Whitley Council's Committee on the Post-War Civil Service, dated 4th April, 1949, it was said:—

"A comprehensive review of the scientific, professional and technical classes has been made during the reconstruction period and a reorganisation effected comparable in significance with the 1920 reorganisation which followed the 1914-18 war. As a result the status of these classes was greatly raised and the chaos of departmental classes rationalised by the introduction of a series of general Service classes (with related departmental variants) and linked departmental classes."

121. The purpose of the post-war reorganisation was defeated by parsimony. The general conception of the organisation was right. The bringing together of the group of professional classes and paying professional officers as such seems to the Institution wholly sound. It is necessary, however, for the salary scales to be fixed at a proper level or the idea becomes useless because it is impossible to recruit officers of the numbers and, even more important, the quality required.

122. The Institution, very much to its regret, after reaching agreement with the Treasury about the general shape of the structure, found itself forced to register disagreement on salary scales. This disagreement was a fundamental one; the Treasury failed to understand what salary scales were necessary having regard to the qualifications required of Works Group officers. Entry to the Works Group is obtained on the basis of qualifications at a high level which range from honours degrees to corporate membership of the appropriate professional institutions. In addition to this, it is normal to require practical experience of work in the particular part of the profession. It was obvious to the Institution that there was no point in specifying high qualifications unless salaries were to be sufficient to attract persons with those qualifications. It was the Institution's contention that the whole set of salary scales needed substantial increases. That the Institution was right in 1946 and the Treasury wrong was demonstrated very quickly. The salary scales failed to attract officers of the quality required and recruitment fell to an impossibly low level.

123. Following on the recommendation of the Chorley Committee and as a result of the difficulties with which the Treasury were faced the Committee under Sir Thomas Gardiner was appointed to consider the Works Group.

124. The report of the Gardiner Committee improved the situation because it increased salaries in the three lower grades, the General Body as the Gardiner Committee called them. In other respects the Report was unsatisfactory. It failed to deal with the problem of providing a career in the Civil Service for the professional officer. It completely rejected as a conception of organisation a relationship to the career available to the Administrative Officer. It is fundamental to the proper development of the country, and not only the Civil Service, that a standard should be set in the employment of professional officers that is no less than in the employment of Administrative Officers.

125. Of the total of 9,000 established officers in the Works Group there are approximately 2,000 officers in the Senior grade and above, only 22 per cent. The Senior Grade cannot be regarded as the career grade for the class. Yet the Senior Grade has a maximum of only £1,575 a year which contrasts sharply with the career in the Administrative class where the Assistant Secretary grade, with its maximum of £2,100, is the recognised career grade. For many in the Works Group the career grade is only the Main grade with a salary scale maximum of only £1,320. For a proper comparison between the Works Group Officer and the Administrative Officer this £1,320 must be compared with the Assistant Secretary's £2,100, a differentiation of nearly £800 against the professional officer seems stupendous.

126. A simple comparison of this kind between the professional and administrative classes is not enough. The professional officer, in the main, enters the Civil Service a good deal later in life than does the administrative officer so that it needs a much higher percentage of higher posts to give the professional officer the same career average as the administrative officer.

127. Taking the average experience of officers in the Works Group and the Administrative class, it can be calculated that during an average career a professional officer will receive a total salary of £40,500, whereas the Administrator will receive a total salary of £62,000. Can this possibly be the basis on which students in universities and schools can be attracted into the professions rather than into the Administrative class?

128. The situation in the Works Group need not be so bad as it is, even on the Gardiner Committee basis. The Works Group have been made the victims of Treasury sharp practice. This is a serious accusation to make in a submission to the Royal Commission; the Institution makes it very regretfully but the circumstances make it impossible to avoid the charge.

129. The basis for the allegation is paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report. Paragraph 8 of the Report defines the functions and responsibilities of the general body of the class. What it says is:—

- " (a) The Senior Grade supervises and controls blocks of work and deals directly with the more difficult and responsible individual projects.
Scale of pay £1,050—£1,270.
- (b) The Main Grade handles the greater part of the day-to-day business.
Scale of pay £750—£1,000.
- (c) The Basic Grade is that in which new entrants first gain experience of Civil Service methods generally and of the work of their own Departments in particular, and perform the simpler jobs and provide skilled assistance to members of other grades.
Scale of pay £500 (at 26)—£750."

It is necessary only to read paragraph 8 and then consider the complementing figures set out in paragraph 237 of the Factual Memorandum to see what nonsense the Treasury has made of the Gardiner Report. The figures in paragraph 237 of the Factual Statement are as follows:—

	Numbers at 1.4.53		
	Established	Temporary	Total
Directing posts at salaries above £2,250	24	4	28
Directing posts at £2,250 and £2,100 ...	140	4	144
Superintending grade	468	35	503
Senior grade	1,551	141	1,692
Main grade	3,440	980	4,420
Basic grade	3,582	2,162	5,744
			12,531

Taking only the established members of the class, and this is done so as not to exaggerate the position and because it might be argued, with reason, that some of the temporary fringe is purely an expansion in relation to the armaments programme and not to be regarded as a permanent feature of the class, it will be seen that the largest grade in the class is the Basic Grade. It accounts for over one-third of the total established complement of the class. Yet Sir Thomas Gardiner's Committee says that the Basic Grade is that

"in which new entrants first gain experience of Civil Service methods generally and of the work of their own departments in particular, and perform the simpler jobs and provide skilled assistance to members of other grades."

Taking the figures including temporaries, the situation is, of course, much worse and if the Gardiner Committee definition is to be taken seriously the temporaries cannot be excluded.

130. The Institution has tried to secure the application of paragraph 8 of the Report but it has been met, not with reasoned argument but with a complete refusal to do anything and with what seems to the Institution to be a light-minded use of the English language. The Treasury has been concerned merely to confuse issues and to avoid applying what is the plain common sense of the Gardiner Report. The Commission will require the Institution to support so serious a charge.

131. The initial case was the Estate Surveyors in the Ministry of Works. Similar evidence can be provided in respect of other parts of the Works Group if the Commission desire it.

132. The Institution's Ministry of Works Branch proposed to the Department the reorganisation of the Estate Surveyors Division on the basis of the paragraph 8 definitions in which the Main Grade is said to "handle the greater part of the day-to-day business." In the Estate Surveyor grade the greater part of the day-to-day business is handled by the Basic Grade. This was rejected by the Department on the grounds that it was advised by the Treasury that the word "handles" means "responsible for." This was difficult to believe and the matter was accordingly taken to the Treasury. The report of the meeting with the Treasury follows:—

Note of a Meeting held on 13th January at the Treasury to discuss paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report on the Works Group

MR. MAYNE opened the discussion by asking if the Treasury had issued a circular letter to all Departments saying that the reference in paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report to the Main Grade "handling" the bulk of the day-to-day work should be interpreted as "is responsible for"?

2. MR. JOHNSTON said that that opinion had been expressed only in answer to an informal query from one Department. It was true that a circular letter had been sent to the Departments, but it did not cover this particular point. It expressed the Treasury's views on certain matters in the Gardiner Report, including paragraph 8. As regards the latter, the gist of the letter was that this paragraph did not provide any basis for the up-grading of posts. He saw no reason to give either document to the I.P.C.S. as they were not written with that end in view, and in any case questions of grading were for the Staff Side to discuss departmentally.

3. As regards the relevance of paragraph 8 to the grading of particular posts, MR. JOHNSTON said he could add little to his letter of 21st December. The descriptions given in that paragraph could not in their nature be more than a brief general indication of the work of various grades for the guidance of those who read the report. They could not possibly be understood as definitions superseding all others and laying down new standards to be put into effect in every case. Moreover, the Committee said in paragraphs 9 and 21 that they saw no reason to change either the existing structure or the standards of grading. In coming to that conclusion, the Committee doubtless had regard to the ample evidence submitted to them by Departments, including the Ministry of Works. The Treasury could not, therefore, accept the assumption, for which there was no foundation in the Report, that the pay scales recommended by the Gardiner Committee had been

devised solely by reference to the brief descriptions given in paragraph 8 rather than by reference to the standards of grading, and to the structure, which the Committee found in the course of their investigations.

4. MR. MAYNE did not agree that a document of this kind could not lay down definitions of grading. He instanced the report of the 1920 Reorganisation Committee and said that he could not take account of paragraph 21 of the Report without regard to paragraph 8. He considered that the grading standards which the Committee endorsed in paragraph 21 must be those described in paragraph 8, and in his view the pay scales were fixed on that basis.

5. MR. MAYNE produced an extract from a document setting out the duties of Estate Surveyors in the Ministry of Works.* In this extract, a description was given of the duties of the Main Grade but this description was, in his view, indistinguishable from that of the duties of the Senior Grade given in paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report. He asked which document was to be regarded as authoritative.

6. MR. JOHNSTON replied that, whereas paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report did not purport to lay down standards of grading, the Ministry of Works document was written for that very purpose. It followed therefore that it was these standards, assuming that they were those in operation at the time the Gardiner Committee undertook its enquiry, that the Committee had regarded as satisfactory and these standards that were to be regarded as applying to Estate Surveyor posts in the Ministry of Works. The Treasury could not therefore accept that apparent discrepancies or similarities between the terms of paragraph 8 and those of the Ministry of Works document (or indeed of any other dealing with grading standards) had any significance. Indeed, given the brevity of paragraph 8 and the variety of professions and duties in the Works Group, it would be wholly unreasonable to attach any significance to such things.

7. After some further discussion, MR. JOHNSTON asked whether the Institution was seeking to refer to paragraph 8 simply in the context of grading standards in the Ministry of Works, or whether it wished to base a pay claim on this paragraph for the whole of the Main Grade. MR. MAYNE asked whether the Treasury would regard such a claim as arbitrable to which MR. JOHNSTON replied that he could not commit himself on a hypothetical question. But obviously, the Treasury would be willing, without commitment, to examine the point in relation to any specific claim that the Institution might see fit to make.

133. The Institution is at an impasse. Grading is not an arbitrable subject and there is no appeal that the Institution can make, apart from the fortunate circumstance that there is this Commission. It is the Institution's contention that paragraph 8 was the foundation of the salary scale recommendations of the Report. If paragraph 8 means what it says, and it is difficult to believe otherwise, then the salary recommendations of the Report are not being applied unless the grading basis is applied simultaneously. If the Basic Grade is nothing more than a recruitment grade in which an officer finds his feet in the Civil Service and then passes on to the Main Grade in which he is more adequately paid for the professional duties he is in fact performing then the whole class needs reorganisation on a basis that would give a much better proportion of higher posts than it has at present. If the Gardiner paragraph 8 definitions are applied there would be a different and very much better situation in the Works Group than there now is although this would not provide parity with the Administrative class.

134. That there should be no chance of an appeal on such issues seems to the Institution to be a grave defect in the negotiating machinery of the Civil Service. The whole of a class finds itself without either defence or remedy of any kind because grading is said to be an issue of management and not a matter for any kind of arbitration.

* The official code of instructions of the Ministry of Works says:—

"18. *Senior Estate Surveyors* are responsible for the general control and technical direction of a number of sections, each in charge of an *Estate Surveyor* . . .

19. *Estate Surveyors* are in charge of a geographical district or a group of services composing a section. They deal personally with the more important cases and are responsible for the normal day-to-day work of the Directorate . . ."

135. It is the Institution's submission that the Commission should itself consider the issues involved here and set out in the clearest possible terms its views on the application of paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report and of the means for dealing with disputes of this kind that may arise in the future between the Treasury and staff organisations. It seems to the Institution intolerable that the present situation should be allowed to continue.

136. To give parity with the Administrative class the right course is to equate the Main Grade with the Administrative Principal and to apply the salary scale of that grade. The Senior Grade should take the Assistant Secretary scale. The Basic Grade scale would need to be calculated by taking the minimum of the Main Grade and using that as the maximum and then working downwards. If this were done, together with the adjustments organisationally that would follow from a proper application of paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report, it could be anticipated that something like parity with the Administrative class would be secured.

137. As in its submission on the Scientific Officer class, the Institution must give some attention to the possibility that it may be argued that the levels of responsibility are not of the kind that justify the Institution's claim. It is no part of the Institution's case that the work in the professional classes is of an identical character with that in the Administrative class. It obviously is not. The submission is that, if the Works Group is organised on the basis prescribed in paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report, then the Main and Senior Grades of the Works Group will carry no less responsibility professionally than the grades of Principal and Assistant Secretary carry administratively.

138. The position of the higher grades must now be considered. Paragraph 20 of the Gardiner Report says that it does not dissent from the contention of the Institution that comparison with the remuneration of the Administrative class is reasonable in relation to the Directing Grades of the Works Group. The Gardiner Committee then goes on to say that it has had regard to this in formulating its proposals for the higher Directing Grades.

139. It is difficult to understand this in the light of the facts. The Gardiner Committee made no adjustment whatever in the salary scales of the higher grades but it altered the grading of certain posts. So far as can be seen from the Report no regard was had to the fact, made clear in the Factual Memorandum, of the enormous disparity between the professional classes and the Administrative class in the complement of higher posts.

140. This is demonstrated by a comparison of paragraphs 182 and 237 of the Factual Memorandum. It will be seen from the first paragraph that there are 310 posts above the level of Assistant Secretary as compared with 2,100 at Assistant Secretary level or below. In the Works Group, if one assumes that the Senior Grade ought to be the career grade, then the figures are, taking only the established posts, 630 above the Senior Grade level and 8,600 at Senior Grade level and below.

141. Put another way, above the level of the career grade in the Administrative class there is a one to seven chance of promotion whereas in the Works Group the chance is only one to fourteen. An enormous disparity in opportunity. There seems to be no justification for such a wide differentiation.

142. The present salary scales repeat in the Works Group the phenomenon observed in the Scientific Officer class of there being two higher grades covering approximately the same salary range as the Assistant Secretary grade in the Administrative class. This factor contributes to the general depreciation of the professional officer.

143. The result of present arrangements is that there is a gross undervaluing of the higher posts in the Works Group. For example, the Director of Lands and Accommodation in the Ministry of Works, the head of a professional section of the Department which does not come under the Director General of Works, is remunerated at £2,250. This is the highest salary paid for this professional work in a Department which has a greater control of property and a greater trading in property than any other organisation in the world. The salary ceiling for this group of professional officers being fixed at this level has its inevitable compressing effects upon all of the salaries below.

144. In the Ministry of Supply, to take another example, there are the Superintendents of the Royal Ordnance Factories. These Superintendents are, in the main, paid only on the Superintending Grade salary scale, some of them have an additional £100. That is to say, they receive only the first half of the Assistant Secretary salary scale. Yet each of these officers is wholly responsible for running a Royal Ordnance Factory. High praise has been given to the Royal Ordnance Factories by various committees and no one will deny that the praise has been justly warranted. Yet it has so far proved impossible to have the Superintendents of these Royal Ordnance Factories put on any higher level than the Superintending Grade.

145. If Superintending Grade is the right grade for Royal Ordnance Factory Superintendents, having regard to the general responsibilities in the Works Group, then manifestly the salary scale of the Superintending Grade is wholly wrong. The responsibilities carried by the Superintendent of a Royal Ordnance Factory can reasonably be compared with those of the Works Director of a major factory in industry who would undoubtedly command a much higher salary.

146. Taking this measure of the value of the work done by the Superintending Grade, the Institution's suggestion that the appropriate level is that of Under Secretary in the Administrative class is seen to be in no way an exaggerated claim even though it involves a substantial addition to the present salary. The kind of responsibilities falling upon Superintending Engineers is illustrated by the following examples:—

- (a) In the Ministry of Works a Superintending Engineer, who is a member of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers having pre-Civil Service experience with a large number of firms primarily on steam boilers and welded pressure vessels, is in charge of the engineering design and execution of work in connection with the National Aeronautical Establishment. For obvious reasons, too much detail of the responsibilities cannot be given but it can be said that this work throws up major problems in engineering practice. The work ranges from the provision of wind tunnels to power stations. It can be said that the scientists concerned in this work provide the precise details of their functional requirements and it is then for the Ministry of Works engineering staff to deal with those requirements and solve the engineering problems that develop in the course of meeting the scientists' needs.

This work was envisaged some years ago as a purely agency work, that is of the Ministry of Works acting as agents for other departments. In practice the work has developed as an extremely important consulting engineer and managing agent operation.

In the course of the development work on some of these projects, it has been necessary to produce large-scale model experiments of the work and so important have been the contributions to engineering knowledge that the Superintending Engineer has represented this country and presented a British Paper concerning certain aspects of wind tunnel construction to the N.A.T.O. Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research Development.

It is of vital importance to the country's development in certain scientific and engineering fields that wind tunnel development here shall not lag behind any other country. This Superintending Engineer has had to pay a number of visits to various parts of the world acquiring information on development of aspects of the problems that arise in this work. Work of

this character makes heavy demands on the knowledge and skill of the Superintending Engineer's professional staff and those staffs include officers especially expert in electrical services, distribution and utilisation of electrical power, structural engineering and rotating machines.

- (b) The responsibilities of another Superintending Engineer in the Ministry of Works illustrates the wide range of duties that fall to these officers. This officer is a member of the Institution of Civil Engineers, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and is an Associate Member of the Institution of Electrical Engineers. He was a former Council Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers and still serves on a number of professional committees of that Institution.

He is responsible for approximately £5,000,000 of work, the design and execution of which falls to the Ministry of Works. It comprises a large number of projects spread over the country and involves work for several departments. Much of the work inevitably is of a secret character, but an indication of its range can be given by saying that it comprises original design and construction in connection with rocket emplacements and stretches from this to special refrigeration work for D.S.I.R. and the provision, in conjunction with the scientists of D.S.I.R., of a large hall for use in hydraulics research where there are special humidity problems. This range of work is such as would be unlikely to fall to any one consultant outside of the Civil Service.

- (c) A Superintending Grade Engineer in the Ministry of Supply, is B.Assoc.Eng., F.R.Met.S., F.R.Ae.S., F.I.N., M.Brit.I.R.E. His duties are to acquaint himself with the current position on all projects of electronic research and development carried on by the Ministry of Supply and to advise Civil Aviation Directors on any projects which appear to hold some promise of application to civil aviation. He progresses all projects being undertaken by the Ministry of Supply on behalf of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and advises the Ministry of Supply on civil aviation trends and requirements. He has recently completed a two year tour of duty in Indonesia where he headed the I.C.A.O. Mission which had to establish Civil Aviation in that country from scratch. His work embraced every aspect of Civil Aviation from training of local staff to Bilateral Treaties.
- (d) A Superintending Grade Engineer post at an out station of the Directorate General of Works of the Air Ministry. The local title is Chief Engineer, Air Ministry Works Directorate, Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East. He is a B.Sc.(Eng.), M.I.C.E., he entered Air Ministry service in 1935 and was promoted to his present grade in 1952. He is responsible for the administration of Works Services for the R.A.F. in the Middle East covering Egypt, East Africa, Aden and North Africa, to an annual value of approximately 3½ million pounds. He is personally responsible for all civil engineering work and in addition for co-ordinating through a Senior Grade Officer the mechanical and electrical engineering work in the command and through another Senior Grade Officer the quantity surveying work.

The total staff under his control is:—

Senior Grade Civil Engineers	...	...	...	...	...	4
Main Grade Civil Engineers	...	...	...	...	...	10
Basic Grade Civil Engineers	...	...	...	...	...	7
Senior Grade Mechanical and Electrical Engineers	...	...	...	...	...	1
Main Grade Mechanical and Electrical Engineers	...	...	...	...	...	7
Basic Grade Mechanical and Electrical Engineers	...	...	...	...	...	6
Senior Grade Quantity Surveyor	...	...	...	...	...	1
Main Grade Quantity Surveyor	...	...	...	...	...	4
Basic Grade Quantity Surveyor	...	...	...	...	...	5
Senior Executive Officers	...	...	...	...	...	1
Higher Executive Officers	...	...	...	...	...	3
Executive Officers	...	...	...	...	...	12
Q.S.A.s	...	...	...	...	...	11
Architectural Civil Engineering Assistants	...	...	...	...	...	6
Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Assistants	...	...	...	...	...	8
Technical grades (building)	...	...	...	...	...	49
Technical grades (mechanical and electrical)	...	...	...	...	...	46
Clerical Officers and Engineering Assistants	...	...	...	...	...	40
Directly employed labour industrials	...	...	...	...	...	3,000

The Institution can readily multiply these examples of the responsibilities carried. It seems to the Institution that it is difficult to dispute its claim that the responsibilities carried by these officers are equivalent to those of the Under Secretary in the Administrative hierarchy.

147. Taking what was said in Chapter III of the Institution's evidence with what has been given here of the responsibilities carried by the higher grades of the Works Group it is submitted to the Royal Commission that a wholesale change is needed to put the professional officer on a basis that reasonably recognises the degree of professional responsibility that he carries as compared with the responsibility carried in the Administrative class.

CHAPTER VI

PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANTS

148. At the time of the general reorganisation of the professional Civil Service in 1946, Professional Accountants, whose salaries and conditions of service had until then differed from one Department to another, were brought into a single, reorganised, Professional Accountant class, with common salary scales and conditions of service. A brief description of the class is at Appendix B. The remuneration and the career offered by the Treasury at that time were, quite unacceptable to the Institution. Despite the Institution's strong representations about the inadequacy of the proposed salary scales and the poor career possibilities that were offered, the Treasury introduced those scales by administrative action.

149. Within three years the Chorley Committee published its report on the remuneration of the higher grades in the Civil Service; at paragraph 33 of that report, published in February, 1949, it was stated, after a reference to the need for a review of the salaries of the Works Group:—

“A review of the salaries and organisation of Professional Accountants in the Civil Service seems to us scarcely less urgent.”

As a result there was appointed “The Committee on the Organisation, Structure and Remuneration of the Professional Accountant Class in the Civil Service” under the chairmanship of Sir Thomas Gardiner. The report of this Committee will be referred to in this chapter as the Gardiner Report (Accountants).

150. In considering the place of the Professional Accountant in the Civil Service it must be remembered that the bulk of the work which in a large-scale commercial or industrial undertaking would be performed by accounting and book-keeping staffs under the supervision of a qualified accountant is, in the Service, performed by the Executive class. The work of the Professional Accountant is, however, specialised and has largely resulted from the undertaking by Government Departments of responsibilities which bring them into close relationships with business and industry. It appears to the Institution that the Gardiner Committee (Accountants) did not appreciate the true nature of the functions of Professional Accountants in the Service; the remarks in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Gardiner Report (Accountants) demonstrate an incorrect conception of their duties and functions. Because certain cash accounting and record keeping is performed by the Executive class there is, it is feared, a tendency for Professional Accountants to be regarded as no more than a specialist part of the Executive class. This view is not shared by the Institution and, because of obvious misconceptions in the past, it feels bound to mention some examples of the work being performed by Professional Accountants in some of the Ministries.

(a) Ministry of Supply

This Ministry is the major purchasing Department for the Services. In addition to general financial investigations, Professional Accountants here are engaged on accountability investigations into most of the industrial undertakings (other than shipbuilding) in the country and the audit of the accounts of the Royal Ordnance and other Ministry of Supply factories and establishments.

The investigations carried out are not “cost accounting” in the sense of keeping or supervising the keeping of cost records, but are the initial review of records which are maintained by contractors and used as a basis for agreeing prices with the Government. The review is so directed as to ensure that sound and equitable principles have been adopted, or to agree the adjustments necessary to produce results to accord with those principles. This work is of a highly responsible nature and it calls for wide professional experience and the exercise of considerable powers of judgment and discrimination.

(b) Board of Trade

This Department during and since the last war became responsible to a greater degree than before for the control of the production of what are commonly known as consumer goods. A summary of the main work now being performed by the Professional Accountants in this Department is:—

- (i) General financial investigations are carried out for the Development Areas Treasury Advisory Committee and for the Advisory Committee on the Revolving Fund for Industry. The first named of these Committees advises the Treasury on the granting of loans to manufacturing concerns which provide employment in Development Areas; the second advises the Board of Trade on the granting of loans to assist manufacturers to increase productivity. Both Committees require reports on the financial position, past trading results, future prospects and capital requirements of applicants. After the granting of a loan, reports reviewing the progress of the concern, and to ensure that the terms of Loan Agreements are being complied with, are also required.
- (ii) All accounting investigations on behalf of the Monopolies Commission, except in the case of one industry, have been undertaken by Professional Accountants in, or seconded from, the Board of Trade. Each investigation covers an industry and normally involves the examination of costs, turnovers and profits, price structure, trading arrangements, inter-company relationships, etc. Members of the Commission will be aware of the size and nature of the concerns to which the enquiries related.
- (iii) Investigations are undertaken in connection with the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1939, and under sections 164, 165 and 334 of the Companies Act, 1948. Professional Accountants have been appointed Inspectors under section 165 of that Act. Similarly, investigations have been carried out for the Director of Public Prosecutions.
- (iv) Share valuations are made for the Administration of Enemy Property Department relating to concerns with enemy owned shares and, where the Custodian proposes to offer such shares for sale by tender, particulars of sale are prepared.
- (v) "Price fixing" enquiries were formerly carried out in relation to price controlled goods and are now conducted for the Ministry of Health and the Department of Health for Scotland in connection with the cost of medical supplies for the National Health Service and also in relation to the basis of remuneration of opticians and chemists. Price fixing enquiries are surveys of an industry to obtain information as to costs, profits and selling prices of all or a selected panel of the manufacturers in the industry, for the purpose of "fixing" reasonable prices.

(c) Inland Revenue

Professional Accountants in the Enquiry Branch of the Inland Revenue undertake detailed investigations where there is reason to suspect serious fraud in business returns and accounts. The complexities and often widespread ramifications of the cases dealt with are such as to put the investigations outside the scope of the normal back duty work carried out by District Tax Offices. The Professional Accountant is in constant contact with the accountancy and legal professions. Where cases are the subject of proceedings before the General or Special Commissioners, or reach the Criminal Courts, the Professional Accountant is frequently called upon to give expert evidence.

151. In addition to the considerable amount of financial and cost investigation work performed by Professional Accountants in the Ministry of Supply, the variety of work carried out in the Board of Trade and the technical complexities of the Special Enquiry Branch work in the Inland Revenue, there is similar or related work performed by Professional Accountants in other Departments. The negotiations on prices and margins which Ministry of Food Professional Accountants conduct with representatives of the meat, wheat and other basic food suppliers and distributors or the investigation by Admiralty Professional Accountants of compensation claims received by the Treasury Solicitor serve as further examples of the varied, and onerous, duties of this class. The Civil Service, while relying on the Executive class for the performance of bulk accounting work, must therefore look to a highly trained

professional service to deal with those aspects of accountancy which bring it into contact with the representatives, at the highest level, of trade, industry and the accountancy profession.

152. In considering the principles which should govern the salaries of Professional Accountants in the Civil Service, it is essential to provide for a career that will attract the type of professional accountant that the Service requires. New entrants must have had several years' professional experience since qualifying, as well as a high standard of professional qualifications and individual ability, and such men can only be attracted to the Service by the prospect of an adequate career.

153. The Gardiner Committee (Accountants), in considering salary scales for the Professional Accountant class, was concerned at the difficulty of providing a salary and career that would attract accountants of the quality required. In paragraph 12 of the Gardiner Report (Accountants) it is said:—

"... We recognise, however, that in order to recruit and maintain an efficient corps of Professional Accountants, there should be, in addition to the increases of salary which we propose in paragraphs 30-31, opportunities of advancement other than those available in their own hierarchy. . . ."

and in paragraph 39:—

"The Professional Accountant Class is a small one of recent creation and operates in a field which is not closely linked with the normal work of the Civil Service. We feel that as a result of these circumstances there is a danger of the potentialities of its members for work other than that falling wholly within the professional field being overlooked. It is disturbing that not a single place, so far as we have been able to discover, has been found in the Principal grade for a man of Professional Accountant origin. This fact is the more striking when it is remembered, on the one hand, how considerable is the part played in Business and Industrial administration by men drawn from that source and, on the other, how substantial has been the contribution of the other Professions and the Executive Class Accountants to the Administrative Class as a whole. . . ."

154. The Gardiner Report (Accountants) was presented on 2nd May, 1952. Since then not one officer in the Professional Accountant class has been transferred into the Administrative class. Furthermore, in discussion the Treasury have intimated that there cannot be any significant number of such movements. This destroys the very basis on which the Gardiner Committee (Accountants) salary scales were established.

155. Obviously, an important point in the provision of a satisfactory career for members of the Professional Accountant class is the organisation of that class. Although it may be outside the strict limits of the Royal Commission's terms of reference, it is a point which the Institution thinks should be considered by the Commission. It has been proposed that the class should be organised on the basis of a central pool which would consist of a body of Professional Accountants whose services would be available to all Departments (see paragraphs 13 to 18 of the Gardiner Report (Accountants)). Departments with continuing work for Professional Accountants would have officers attached to them; these officers would form part of the pool and would look to it for promotion outlets.

156. It is submitted that, only by the provision of such a central pool of Professional Accountants, coupled with an adequate proportion of senior posts, can a reasonable career be provided for officers in the Departments employing small numbers of Professional Accountants. Furthermore, the proportion of senior posts, i.e., Chief Accountant and above, should be considered in the light of the present age distribution of the class as a whole. The figures set out below show that a considerable proportion of the senior posts are occupied by comparatively young men and that this militates against the promotion prospects of many of those in the lower grades.

Age statistics of Established Officers in post at 1st November, 1953

<i>Year of Birth</i>	<i>Age in 1953</i>	<i>Directors</i>	<i>Asst. Directors</i>	<i>Chief Acct.</i>	<i>Senior Acct.</i>	<i>Basic Acct.</i>	<i>Total</i>
1889/93	60-64		3	1	3	1	8
1894/98	55-59	1	1	2	8		12
1899/03	50-54	3	6	8	12	1	30
1904/08	45-49	2	4	10	33	5	54
1909/13	40-44	2	7	33	73	4	119
1914/18	35-39			8	41	3	52
1919/23	30-34				5	6	11
1924/28	under 30					5	5
Total	...	8	21	62	175	25	291

157. In conclusion, the Institution submits that service in the Professional Accountant class, should offer reasonably attractive career prospects. The Institution claims that Professional Accountants, no less than other professional officers in the Civil Service, should therefore have before them the same career prospects as are available to entrants into the Administrative class. The career grade in the Administrative class is Assistant Secretary and it follows that the career grade in the Professional Accountant class should be Chief Accountant and that the maximum salary should be the same as that of an Assistant Secretary.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY

158. Below the professional classes are a series of grades in the scientific and technical fields educationally comparable to the Executive and Clerical classes and, in certain cases, superior to those classes. It is the Institution's contention that these subordinate classes, like the professional classes, are less well circumstanced than are their opposite numbers in the Clerical and Executive classes.

159. One of the important developments on the Administrative/Clerical side of the Service since 1920, for which there is no parallel in the professional Civil Service, is the extent to which opportunities have opened for promotion through the whole range of the Civil Service. It has sometimes been suggested that the Civil Service in this country should be built on the Australian model, a one-class Service with entry at a number of points. This has never been favoured in the British Civil Service but the opportunities for promotion, or entry to higher grades by limited competition, have become so considerable that, on the Administrative/Clerical side of the Service, it is doubtful if the situation, on that side, would be very different if there were a one-class system.

160. For example, the Executive class is now composed in the main of officers promoted from grades below. In the 1920s this was not so, the majority of the class was recruited by competition. Similarly the Clerical class which in the 1920s was primarily recruited by competition is now, as to the vast majority, recruited either by promotion from grades below, or by limited competition entry from minor manipulative grades, or by the absorption of temporary officers.

161. In the open competitions the educational standard for the Clerical class has had to fall. This is a fall in the actual standards of the class and not in the prescribed standard. The absence of competition in the open competitions for the Clerical class has been such that a less highly qualified officer enters this class now than was the case in the 1920s. The recent decision of the Civil Service Commission, for example, to recruit specially to the Clerical class, without a competition, persons who applied for the post on the basis that they had secured the General Certificate of Education is an indication of the change.

162. All these changes mean that the opportunities throughout the area of the Administrative/Clerical classes have greatly improved.

163. On the scientific and technical side of the Civil Service this has not happened. It is extremely doubtful whether it can ever become the case. It may be suggested that in certain respects the technical and scientific side of the Civil Service is too restrictive and too insistent on the possession of the prescribed technical qualifications. On the other hand it has to be remembered much blame would attach to the Civil Service if, by reason of its being insufficiently strict in its requirement of the proper qualifications, there should result some considerable waste of public money, or a serious accident, or other serious loss. Whatever may happen about minor easements by way of limited competitions or arrangements of that kind, in the main the professional Civil Service must remain insistent on entrants holding the specific qualifications before they are allowed in as established members of the various grades and classes.

164. This situation must be considered in conjunction with the Institution's contention in Chapter II that it is necessary to society for careers on the

professional and technical side of the Civil Service to be made at least as attractive as those on the Administrative/Clerical side. This raises no insuperable difficulties. **If the postulate is accepted that it is unlikely that promotion will be as free on the professional side of the Civil Service as on the other, then it becomes necessary to compensate for poorer promotion by a better salary scale. This probably cannot be done wholly but it can be done to some extent, and it will be demonstrated that it is necessary in most, if not all, of the technical and scientific classes at this level to provide salary scales that are better than those on the Clerical/Executive side of the Service in order to compensate for less adequate promotion prospects. The point will be developed in appropriate detail in dealing with the classes.**

165. Another factor, which will be dealt with in detail in a later section, has to be taken into account and must be mentioned here; that is the desirability of having a broad technical range of remuneration just as there is broad prescription of the Works Group and of the Scientific Officer classes. It seems to the Institution that there are all too many salary scales and that these make an unnecessarily complicated organisation. The minor differences in the salary scales of the various grades in the Photographer, Illustrator, Draughtsmen and Technical classes will be indicated in later chapters. It would be very much simpler administratively if these were aligned and the Treasury doctrine of broad banding applied here no less than at the higher levels.

166. With this general introduction it will perhaps best suit the convenience of the Royal Commission if the Institution deals with particular classes.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EXPERIMENTAL OFFICER CLASS

167. This Class was set up on 1st January, 1946, as part of the reorganised scientific Civil Service following on the issue of Command 6679. The class has been related to the Scientific Officer class from the outset.

168. The general basis for the Experimental Officer class is set out in paragraphs 13-14 in the White Paper:—

"13. The arrangements proposed for Scientific Officers will be capable of fulfilment only if the present Assistant Class is strengthened and more fully used, much of the work at present done by Scientific Officers being devolved on Scientific Assistants. Unless this is done the reorganisation of the Scientific Service will be stultified. A good deal of the work now carried by Scientific Officers does not require the highest academic qualifications, and unless this devolved, it will be impracticable to arrange complements in such a way that the Principal Scientific Officer grade will bear that proportion to the Scientific Officer Class which is intended. Moreover the present Assistant Class does not provide in itself a satisfactory career, nor one related to the qualifications of many of its existing members, and for its own sake as well as for the support which it can and should give to the whole Scientific Service, it is to be wholly reorganised.

14. The Class will be re-named the Experimental Officer Class. New salary scales will be introduced as set out in the Appendix. Existing scales are also shown. The new basic scale for Assistant Experimental Officers is aligned to the scale applicable to Junior Executive Officers (though again shortened, as in the case of Scientific Officers, in order to allow for an intervening grade not present in the Executive Class) and it is intended that the Class shall be partly recruited from boys and girls aged 18 to 19, of the same type as come into the Executive Class, but specialising in scientific subjects. Experimental Officers will also be recruited from University graduates and from persons with experience in industry and engineering, since Departments need a variety of types. For these older recruits higher starting salaries will be provided."

It should be noted that the phrase "Assistant Class" in paragraph 13 above refers to the pre-1946 "Carpenter Assistants," and not to the present Assistant (Scientific) Class created in 1947.

169. It will be seen from the foregoing that the Experimental Officer class was to have been recruited from much the same kind of person as, and to perform work of much the same level of responsibility as, persons recruited to the Executive class.

170. Since its inception, however, there has been a steady movement by the Official Side to increase the standard of qualification required for entry to the Experimental Officer class.

171. An example of this is given in the open competition for 1952. That competition was for Experimental Officers and Assistant Experimental Officers and the requirements were as follows:—

- "(i) The Higher School Certificate with Mathematics or a science subject as a principal subject, or an equivalent qualification,
- (ii) A General Certificate of Education in five subjects, at the levels shown in brackets:—
 - (a) English language (Ordinary)
 - (b) Two mathematical or scientific subjects (Advanced)
 - (c) Mathematics (Ordinary), if no mathematical subject is offered in (b)—except in the case of candidates who offer two biological subjects (Advanced) in (b).
 - (d) A scientific subject (Ordinary) if no scientific subject is offered in (b)
 - (e) Balance of one or two subjects (Ordinary) at candidate's choice.

To assist candidates *during the change-over period* they will be admitted to this competition if they already possess a School Certificate and in addition obtain

passes at the General Certificate or Education examination in two mathematical or scientific subjects at Advanced level.

"Candidates educated in Scotland or Northern Ireland must produce a statement from the Scottish Education Department or the Ministry of Education for Northern Ireland showing that they have attained a standard equivalent to that required by (i) or (ii) above.

(iii) A university degree in a scientific or engineering subject or in Mathematics.

(iv) Associateship of the Royal Institute of Chemistry, or graduate membership of any other professional institution accepted by the Commissioners as appropriate (e.g., Institution of Civil Engineers, Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Institution of Electrical Engineers).

(v) The Higher National Certificate.

(vi) The final certificate of a five-year grouped course in a relevant subject at the City and Guilds of London Institute.

"BUT (vii) Candidates who are not in possession of such certificate or equivalent qualifications may be admitted exceptionally by the Commissioners, at their discretion, if evidence of suitable experience on Scientific research and development work can be produced; such candidates at present serving in a Government Department must be certified by that Department as being worthy of consideration.

Candidates over 20 (other than Established Assistants (Scientific)) will generally be expected to have a Pass Degree or to have a technical qualification of similar standard, e.g., Higher National Certificate."

172. The requirement introduced in 1952, that candidates over 20 would be expected to have a pass degree or its equivalent, was brought in by the Treasury despite strong opposition from the Institution. It made the educational standard for recruitment higher than was originally intended, without adjusting the salary scales to provide properly for persons of the educational level sought.

173. The general result is that at present more than 25 per cent. of the Experimental Officer class hold a degree. The standard of qualification is certainly not found in the Executive class, in which there is a limitation of 5 per cent. on graduate entrants.

174. It is necessary to consider the career prospects within the two classes. The figures for the Executive class are in paragraph 267 of the Factual Memorandum and for the Experimental Officer class in paragraph 289. They are

"267. Permanent staff, with whom this paper mainly deals are divided into the following grades:—

	Numbers at 1.7.53			Pay	
	Men	Women	Total	Men £ a year	Women £ a year
Heads of major establishments	32	—	32	2,500	2,325
Principal executive officer ...	123	—	123	1,600-2,000*	1,434-1,825*
Senior chief executive officer	257	3	260	1,408-1,562*	1,229-1,408*
Chief executive officer ...	702	18	720	1,260-1,510	1,090-1,335
Senior executive officer ...	2,585	180	2,765	1,030-1,230	900-1,060
Higher executive officer ...	7,615	1,371	8,986	830- 995	710- 860
Executive officer ...	17,535	5,762	23,297	290- 800	290- 675
	<u>28,849</u>	<u>7,334</u>	<u>36,183</u>		

N.B.—(i) The scales shown are those relating to staff in London and those marked * include pay addition.

(ii) The standardised titles of principal executive officer and senior chief executive officer have been introduced only recently. The most common variations in use before were deputy accountant general and assistant accountant general respectively.

(iii) Temporary executive officers are known as temporary assistants and receive a scale with a maximum lower than that of established executive officers.

(iv) There are in addition some 28,000 established departmental executive staff, mainly in the Inland Revenue and Ministry of Labour, whose pay is very closely related to that of the general class.

(v) The rest of this Chapter will not be concerned with women's scales.

(vi) Present and earlier men's scales are set out in detail in Appendix E."

"289. The class is composed of the following grades:—

	Numbers at 1.4.53			Pay	
	Estab- lished	Tem- porary	Total	Men £ a year	Women £ a year
Chief experimental officer ...	18	2	20	1,177-1,408	1,001-1,228
Senior experimental officer ...	1,208	96	1,304	970-1,151	838- 980
Experimental officer ...	2,529	428	2,957	681- 838	586- 707
Assistant experimental officer	1,601	854	2,455	274- 607	274- 511
	<u>5,356</u>	<u>1,380</u>	<u>6,736</u>		

N.B.—(i) The scales are those relating to staff in London and include pay addition.

(ii) The rest of this Chapter will not be concerned with women's scales.

(iii) The present and earlier men's scales are set out in detail in Appendix F1.

(iv) Separate figures for men and women are not available."

175. Subsequent to the issue of the Factual Memorandum the following consolidated salary scales for the Experimental Officer class have been agreed with the Treasury:—

	Men £	Women £
Chief Experimental Officer	1,260-1,510	1,090-1,335
Senior Experimental Officer	1,030-1,230	900-1,060
Experimental Officer	720- 890	625- 760
Assistant Experimental Officer	290- 645	290- 545

176. It will be seen that in the Executive class, out of a total staff of some 36,000 there are 1,135 posts above the level of Senior Executive Officer. In the Experimental Officer class there is only one grade (Chief Experimental Officer) above the level of Senior Experimental Officer: for a proper comparison with the Executive class we must take only the established complements, and when this is done it will be seen that there are only 18 Chief Experimental Officer posts for the 5,356 members of the class. For the Experimental Officer class to have the same proportionate chance of grade-to-grade promotion above Senior Experimental Officer there would need to be 168 posts at Chief Experimental Officer (or higher) level, an enormous increase.

177. It should be noted that there are four grades, with a final maximum of £2,500, above Senior Executive Officer compared with the one grade, with a maximum £1,510, above Senior Experimental Officer. Furthermore, for the Executive class there is a limited competition for entry to the Administrative class and in addition to that an opportunity of promotion to the Administrative class. That these avenues are real and not simply theoretical is shown in that some 50 per cent. of the Administrative class have come from the classes below. For the Experimental Officer class the number of class-to-class promotions is so small as to be negligible and there is no limited competition for entry to the Scientific Officer class.

178. Yet another factor has to be borne in mind; the Experimental Officer class, because of the requirements on persons coming into the class, is almost wholly made up of open competition entrants. The Executive class is not so composed, the great majority of that class having been promoted from lower classes.

179. It follows therefore that:—

- (i) Entry to the Experimental Officer class is more restricted and therefore more difficult than entry to the Executive class;
- (ii) the career prospect is lower for the Experimental Officer than for the Executive Officer; and
- (iii) the prospect of promotion to a higher class is poorer for the Experimental Officer than for the Executive Officer.

180. Another handicap is that the Assistant Experimental Officer has a maximum of only £645 whereas the Executive Officer (his counterpart in the Executive class) has a straight run through to £800.

181. The work of the Executive class was described in the 1920 Reorganisation Report as follows:—

"This work covers a wide field, and requires in different degrees qualities of judgment, initiative, and resource. In the junior ranks it comprises the critical examination of particular cases of lesser importance not clearly within the scope of approved regulations or general decisions, initial investigations into matters of higher importance, and the immediate direction of small blocks of business. In its upper ranges it is concerned with matters of internal organisation and control, with the settlement of broad questions arising out of business in hand or in contemplation and with the responsible conduct of important operations."

182. There can be compared with this the description of the duties of the Experimental Officer class given in the Government's pamphlet "Scientists in the Civil Service":—

"The Experimental Officer Class is the main support of the Scientific Officer Class and is of great importance in the Service. . . . Experimental Officers work under the general guidance of Scientific Officers, relieving them of the more straightforward work and undertaking responsibility in suitable cases without detailed supervision."

183. It is difficult by means of published documents to compare responsibilities of the Experimental Officer class with those of the Executive class. The work done by the Experimental Officer class covers a large and varied field of scientific activity. In most cases the number of staff doing work of any one particular type is small. It is therefore not practicable to take a group of Experimental Officer class staff engaged on a block of work and compare those responsibilities with a similar group of Executive class staff of similar size. The most that can be done is to give the Commission a few examples of the work performed and to invite them as a reasonable jury in the case to satisfy themselves as to its standard of responsibility *vis-à-vis* that carried by the Executive class. One example, typical of many which can be produced, is given for each of the four grades in the Experimental Officer class.

CHIEF EXPERIMENTAL OFFICER IN THE METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE

Chief Experimental Officers are the Senior Meteorological Officers at certain R.A.F. Group Headquarters. As such they are responsible for:—

1. All meteorological advice on organisation or weather to the Air Officer Commanding.
2. The provision of meteorological services to the units within the Group.
3. The administrative and technical control of the meteorological offices at Group Headquarters and at the stations within the Group.
4. The provision of all necessary meteorological data and forecasts to Group Headquarters and to the stations.
5. The administration of, and supply of information to, such other stations within his area (e.g., civil aviation airports) as may be allotted to him.
6. Ensuring the prompt supply of all reports of conditions hazardous to aircraft and generally ensuring the safety of aircraft in bad weather conditions.

SENIOR EXPERIMENTAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH

Senior Experimental Officer, B.Sc. 2nd Class Honours, at the Building Research Station, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.

Research and Administration

This Officer is head of the Concrete Materials Section, responsible to a Senior Principal Scientific Officer and in charge of one Experimental Officer, one Assistant Experimental Officer, two Senior Assistants (Scientific), three Assistants (Scientific) and three labourers. The Section carries out research and does testing and advisory work on aggregates, cement and concrete.

The importance of this work to the building industry and to the country generally is shown by the facts that nearly 200 million pounds worth of concrete is produced annually in this country and that the Building Research Station occupies a key position in relation to the concrete-producing and using industries.

In this Officer's Section investigations include research on the design of concrete mixes, additives to concrete, new aggregates (some artificial) and cements of various kinds, including low-heat cements for dams for hydro-electric and other schemes. Standard tests for cements have been developed and are in use commercially. Of these, a method of strength testing has in this country replaced an earlier method and is under consideration for adoption abroad. Standard testing to the specifications of this and other countries is carried out when an authoritative result is required or when a research aspect is involved. The Officer has initiated and supervised a national survey of sands and has demonstrated that, by suitable design of mixes, most locally available sands can be utilised for making concrete. This has now made unnecessary the long hauls of large quantities of sand which frequently occurred and has resulted in large economies. Other personal contributions to technical development include work on the use of calcium chloride (permitting concreting in cold weather); the use of brick rubble as an aggregate (of importance in connection with post-war and slum clearance schemes); the use of blast furnace slag in both dense and foamed conditions as aggregates for concrete.

Advisory Work

This Officer deals with many technical enquiries from Government Departments, industrial firms, engineers, architects and builders, including manufacturers of machinery and testing equipment.

Other Evidence of Standing

The Officer is a member of: Twelve Committees of the British Standards Institution. Codes of Practice Committee on concrete walls. Institution of Civil Engineers—Committee on vibrated concrete. Five Study Groups, composed of representatives of Government and industry, on quality control, vibrated concrete, cement variability, aggregates, accuracy of testing machines. An international committee on mechanical testing of cement. He was extra-mural lecturer on concrete technology for the University of Durham and is sole or joint author of eight papers as well as various unpublished reports.

The considerable prestige in the building industry which is held by this Government Station has resulted directly from the work of such Officers as he.

EXPERIMENTAL OFFICER, THE CHEMICAL INSPECTORATE, MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

Qualifications

B.Sc. (Wales) 2nd Class Honours, A.R.I.C.

Duties

In charge of an outstation in County Durham which is responsible for the inspection of general stores including such materials as paints, varnishes, distempers, lacquers and their ingredients, temporary rust protectives, brake fluids, solvents (e.g., white spirit, naphtha, methylated spirit and acetone), soap, acids, miscellaneous chemicals (e.g., sodium nitrate, sodium sulphate and ammonium nitrate), calcined magnesia, cleaners and polishes. The outstation covers inspection of all materials of these types manufactured against Ministry of Supply contracts in North East England and Scotland.

The duties of this officer fall under the following main heads:—

1. Frequent personal contact with Directors, Works Managers, and Chief Chemists of firms manufacturing the stores detailed above. Discussions with them of the results of tests.
2. Control of inspection of all general stores inspected by the Director of Chemical Inspection in the area covered by this station.

3. Supervision of delegated inspection in the area and control of standards of inspection for all firms carrying out delegated inspection.

4. Visiting the premises of firms in the area which offer their manufacturing capacity to the Ministry, to assess their ability to undertake contracts and to report on this to the production branch of the Ministry.

5. Control of re-examination of paint stocks at Army Depots in the area to decide serviceability.

6. Advising other Ministry of Supply establishments and War Office establishments in the area on painting problems.

7. Direction and organisation of the work of the staff at the station which comprises 8 other scientific staff, 2 clerical staff and 6 industrial staff.

8. Administration of the station, such as dealing with problems relating to pay, leave and travelling allowances and arranging for the maintenance of buildings by the Ministry of Works.

This officer is directly responsible to his headquarters which is situated at Kidbrooke, London, S.E.3.

ASSISTANT EXPERIMENTAL OFFICER, INSECT BRANCH OF INFESTATION CONTROL DIVISION, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

This officer is an honours graduate in zoology (over 90 per cent. of the Insect Branch Inspectorate, all Experimental class, are graduates). His duties include:—

1. The inspection of food commodities on import (on ship) and in store, warehouses, flour mills, food manufacturing premises, ship's holds, river, rail and road transport and Crown properties for insect pests.

2. Identification of at least 200 species of insects.

3. Recommendations for, and supervision of, treatment (either insecticidal or fumigation).

4. Supervision of insecticidal and fumigation treatments, and field investigations on the efficiency of insecticidal treatments.

5. Advice to ship owners, importers, manufacturers and warehouse keepers on all aspects of infestation and its control and on the provisions of the Prevention of Damage by Pests Act.

6. Assistance in the training of new inspectors. He has lectured to Sanitary Inspectors and Royal Marines Hygiene Section.

Responsibility for planning his own work subject to the supervision of the Senior Experimental Officer.

Under a scheme of decentralisation this Assistant Experimental Officer will shortly be required to undertake certain duties formerly carried out by officers of the Executive class at Headquarters.

184. The Institution has, from the time of the reorganisation of the Scientific Service, claimed parity of salary scales as between Experimental and Executive classes. In March, 1953, a case was presented to the Arbitration Tribunal claiming identity of salary scales between:—

- (i) Assistant Experimental Officer and Executive Officer.
- (ii) Experimental Officer and Higher Executive Officer.
- (iii) Senior Experimental Officer and Senior Executive Officer.
- (iv) Chief Experimental Officer and Chief Executive Officer.

185. The Arbitration Tribunal awarded parity of scales to the Chief Experimental Officer and Senior Experimental Officer, but not to the Experimental Officer or Assistant Experimental Officer. The reason for the Tribunal's decision is not apparent to the Institution; it cannot understand how part of the class could have warranted parity and the rest of it not. As parity has been given at the higher end of the class it seems to follow automatically that parity should have been accorded to the rest of the class, particularly so as there is parity at the entry point and all other points of the Assistant Experimental Officer grade up to its maximum of £645.

186. It is now obvious, however, that had parity of scales been awarded it would have been a hollow victory for the Institution since the classes are

no longer directly comparable. The effect of the raised standards of recruitment has been to devolve upon the Experimental Officer class some duties appropriate to Scientific Officer class as these were envisaged in the Barlow Report, and for the Scientific Officer class to be composed of graduates almost all "of more than usual ability." As a natural result, many Experimental Officer duties have been transferred to the Assistant Scientific class, a class that offers a career to only a few and which, in any event, has a scale of pay in no way commensurate with these duties. The history of the Experimental Officer class is characterised by a succession of negotiated salary increases closely followed by a raising of standards so as to nullify these awards. Institution parity claims have, in effect, been ascending a descending escalator. It is now no longer adequate to claim similarity of status and responsibility between what were the corresponding classes.

187. The Institution would prefer to press its claim for parity between the Experimental and Executive classes on the same basis as in 1946. However, the changes in the constitution of the Experimental Officer class mean that equality with corresponding Executive staffs can be achieved only by awarding salary scales higher than those of the Executive class grades. **In claiming such a superiority of scales the Institution is maintaining its consistent policy with regard to parity of careers between corresponding scientific and administrative staffs. It is the Institution's contention that a broad comparison should be made between the Assistant Experimental Officer and the Executive Officer, the Experimental Officer and the Higher Executive Officer, the Senior Experimental Officer and the Senior Executive Officer, and between the Chief Experimental Officer and the Chief Executive Officer, plus the additional higher grades. The scales should clearly favour the Experimental Officer class because of:—**

- (i) the higher standard of qualification;
- (ii) the inferior promotion prospects as compared with those of direct entrants to the Executive class, and
- (iii) the increased responsibilities of the Experimental class over those originally envisaged.

What remains for the Royal Commission to assess is the extent to which the salary scales of the Experimental Officer class should be augmented to meet these points.

CHAPTER IX

THE ASSISTANT (SCIENTIFIC) CLASS

188. This class is described in paragraph 373 of the Factual Memorandum. It compares with the Clerical class which is described in paragraph 348 of the Factual Memorandum. The two paragraphs are:—

"373. The class is composed of the following grades:—

	Numbers at 1.4.53			Pay	
	Estab- lished	Tem- porary	Total	Men £ a year	Women £ a year
*Senior assistant (scientific) ...	928	124	1,052	528-707	451-592
Established assistant (scientific)	1,806	—	1,806	250-520	250-435
Temporary assistant (scientific)	—	2,812	2,812	215-480	215-415
	<u>2,734</u>	<u>2,936</u>	<u>5,670</u>		

N.B.—(i) The scales are those relating to staff in London. Those for senior assistants (scientific) include pay addition and those for assistants (scientific) are consolidated scales. The ranges of pay for temporary senior assistants are co-terminous with the established scales.

(ii) The rest of this Chapter will not be concerned with women's scales.

(iii) The present and earlier men's scales are set out in detail in Appendix K 1.

(iv) Separate figures for men and women are not available."

* Subsequent to the issue of the Factual Memorandum consolidated scales for the Senior Assistants (Scientific) have been agreed with the Treasury as follows:—

Senior Assistant (Scientific) ...	Men £550-745	Women £470-630
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"348. The numbers and salaries of the permanent staffs in this class, with whom this paper deals, are as follows [Clerical officers (secretary) are shown separately only in order to indicate numbers.]

	Numbers at 1.7.53			Pay	
	Men	Women	Total	Men £ a year	Women £ a year
Higher clerical officer ...	1,633	847	2,480	655-800	530-675
Clerical officer ...	51,153	26,260	77,413	170-570	170-460
Clerical officer (secretary) ...	15	1,284	1,299	170-570	170-460
Total	<u>52,801</u>	<u>28,391</u>	<u>81,192</u>		

N.B.—(i) The scales are those relating to staff in London and are consolidated scales not attracting pay addition.

(ii) The rest of this Chapter will not be concerned with women's scales.

(iii) The present and earlier men's scales are set out in detail in Appendix J."

189. It is difficult to show from these figures the prospects open to the two classes. The reason for this is that the Clerical class promotion avenue is not primarily to the Higher Clerical grade, which is a very small one, but to the Executive class. Opportunities for entry to the Executive class are partly by limited competition and partly by promotion.

190. The Clerical Officer has an opportunity for promotion through a limited competition, age limits 21-28, with a percentage of the available vacancies reserved for the internal entrants. But the Assistant (Scientific) has to enter for the Experimental Officer class through open competitions (up to the age of 27 for the Assistant Experimental Officer and up to 30 for the Experimental Officer) with no vacancies reserved for internal entrants.

191. There is a further point, the Clerical Officer comes into the Civil Service as an established officer but in the main the Assistant (Scientific) has

to be a temporary officer for two years in the first place. He can also have had similar experience elsewhere of scientific work but there must have been at least two years of this.

192. Although the Assistant (Scientific) is required to be a temporary in the first instance, his educational qualifications on this first temporary appointment are similar to those of the Clerical class. He is expected to hold the General Certificate of Education (the Clerical class standard) and to show that he has a scientific bent. He has an additional hurdle before he can be made an established officer for he must demonstrate that he has been actively continuing his studies. Often this involves him in having the Ordinary National or Higher National Certificate. Because of this his standard of academic qualifications has to be higher than that of the Clerical Officer, even of the open competition entrant.

193. The salary scale of the class reflects a curious phenomenon. The established Assistant (Scientific) has higher pay than the Clerical Officer up to age 22. From that point on, he proceeds on the same scale but only to an abated maximum of £520 as compared with the Clerical Officer's £570.

<i>Male Clerical Officer</i> (London)			<i>Male Assistant (Scientific)</i> (London)		
		£			£
Age 16	...	170			
17	...	195			
18	...	220	Age 18	...	250
19	...	245	19	...	270
20	...	270	20	...	285
21	...	295	21	...	305
22	...	320	22	...	325
23	...	340	23	...	340
24	...	360	24	...	360
25	...	380	25	...	380
or over	...	400	or over	...	400
		420			420
		440			440
		460			460
		475			475
		490			490
		505			505
		520			520
		535			
		550			
		570			

194. The Senior Assistant (Scientific) is similarly penalised. He proceeds to a maximum of £745 as compared with the Higher Clerical Officer's £800.

<i>Male Higher Clerical Officer</i> (London)	<i>Male Senior Assistant (Scientific)</i> (London)
£	£
655	550
680	575
705	600
730	625
755	655
780	685
800	715
	745

195. The temporary Assistant (Scientific) is further penalised because he goes to a maximum which is lower than that of the established Assistant although the range of work is the same.

196. Looking at the salary scales it might be thought the Government's intention was to penalise persons for attempting to follow a scientific career. It is submitted to the Commission that at the Assistant (Scientific) level as at the higher levels of the Scientific Civil Service it is important to attract young persons into a scientific career. It is wrong that the salary scales offered to them, let alone the prospects of advancement, should be inferior to those available in the alternative Civil Service career.

197. It seems to the Institution that there is an unanswerable case that the salary scales for the two grades of the Assistant (Scientific) class should be at least equal to those for the two grades of the Clerical Officer class.

198. The Institution must go on, however, to claim that here, as with the Experimental Officer class, there ought to be an augmented scale to compensate for the lower promotion prospects. If young persons are to be attracted to the Assistant (Scientific) class they must face up to the fact, that to make progress, they will have to qualify themselves more highly than if they entered the Clerical class, and they ought, therefore, to be ensured of some compensation in the way of an augmented salary scale. It must be emphasised that the avenues of promotion from the Assistant (Scientific) class are much more restricted than those avenues on the other side of the Service.

199. The duties of the Assistant (Scientific) are given in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum (page 92, Chapter 21, paragraph 372). There is a tendency to think of the Assistant (Scientific) in terms of Laboratory Assistants. It must not be thought that the level of work is of that kind. The "bottle-washing" functions in laboratories are, in these days, discharged by industrial or quasi-industrial grades and not by the Assistant (Scientific).

200. The duties of the Assistant (Scientific) class are in fact in accordance with the following statement made by the Treasury in its case to the Arbitration Court on the occasion of the hearing of the Scientific Officer claim for parity:—

"The Assistant (Scientific) class supplements and relieves the Experimental Officer class in the detailed work of organisation, construction, observation, calculation, and report. It is recruited from those whose education has taken them to at least the level of the old style School Certificate with credits in mathematics or a science subject."

201. For purposes of illustration two examples of the work of individual Assistants (Scientific) are given below:—

Duties of an Assistant (Scientific), Pest Infestation Laboratory, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research

This officer is directly responsible to a Senior Experimental Officer and her duties are as follows:—

1. Maintaining stocks of insects for use in laboratory tests of insecticides: the breeding of such insects must be carried out under rigorously controlled conditions and involves a specialised knowledge of the insects' life history and behaviour. In the course of this work the officer has evolved some new techniques which have been adopted at her own and other laboratories.

2. The laboratory testing of insecticides: this is a highly skilled operation involving meticulous attention to detail which, if neglected, can ruin weeks and often months of experimental work. The officer, after consultation with the Senior Experimental Officer, carries out many of these experiments without supervision, assembles the data, writes the reports and makes recommendations for further work.

3. Field trials on control of insect pests: the officer helps to plan such trials and is given a large measure of responsibility for making counts and observations and assessing the efficiency of insecticidal treatments. This work carries a very heavy responsibility since it is largely seasonal and any error may lead to a whole year's delay. In one experiment, concerned with the practical control of blowflies, she designed the original apparatus upon which depended all measurements of the effectiveness of the treatments. She was joint author, with the Senior Experimental Officer, of a published paper on the subject.

4. Advisory and inspection work: the officer, often unaccompanied, visits householders and public health authorities who have sought advice. She assesses the nature and degree of infestations and advises on methods of control.

5. Preparation of memoranda, reports, etc.: the officer prepares abstracts of published papers and reports and has written 38 reports and memoranda concerned with her own work.

Duties of an Assistant (Scientific), Royal Observatory

Present age 25.

Previous employment: 18 months in small branch bank in Norfolk; two years' service in R.A.F.

Civil Service: two years' Temporary Assistant (Scientific); two years' Established Assistant (Scientific).

By Day: Taking places of stars from catalogues and correcting them to date of present photographs, then transforming from spherical co-ordinates to rectangular co-ordinates.

Measuring these stars on the photograph to determine from them the position of moving minor planets with an accuracy of .001 mm.

Calculating the position of the minor planet and deducing its errors in two co-ordinates from the predicted ephemeris to enable an improved orbit to be deduced from a series of such photographs.

Assists in the testing of mirrors and lenses used with telescopes in the department.

Receives radio time signals for comparison of crystal clocks with those of other observatories.

By Night: On three nights per week, if free from heavy cloud, making visual observations by timing bright stars across wires in a 3-inch transit instrument. Taking level observations of instrument to determine its errors.

This work is for the determination of time to deduce errors of crystal clocks and for distribution to the public and to shipping. (Has also revealed variations in rate of rotation of earth). The observations have a probable error of 0.02 sec. per night.

202. Assistants (Scientific) are encouraged, and indeed expected, to study for higher qualifications, and the work upon which they are engaged demands an appropriate standard of scientific ability and a not inconsiderable degree of responsibility.

203. A broad comparison can be made between the Higher Clerical Officer grade and the Senior Assistant (Scientific). The Reorganisation Report of 1920, paragraph 29, in prescribing a Higher Clerical Officer grade in the Clerical class, says:—

"We recognise that experienced members of this class will be capable of being employed either as supervisors of sections of clerical class work or on higher individual work similar to that done by members of the junior grade of Executive Class."

There is a similar position in the Assistant (Scientific) class. The Treasury in paragraph 4 of Appendix A to Establishments Circular 27/47, which announced the creation of the Assistant (Scientific) class, in setting out the duties of the Senior Assistant (Scientific) gives a prescription which is similar to that for Higher Clerical Officers. It states:—

"Senior Assistant (Scientific)—Immediate supervision of small groups normally of Assistants engaged in testing or on sections of experimental work; preparation and use of apparatus and materials requiring the highest skill or wide experience. The grade will not be restricted to supervisory functions, and some Senior Assistants may be employed mainly or entirely on the most highly skilled individual work. Selected Senior Assistants may also be employed in training junior grades

in the duties of the class. Staff so employed on training duties may be required to train Assistant Experimental Officers in certain aspects of their work, but will not be responsible for general training of Assistant Experimental Officers."

It is the Institution's contention that supervision and training of Assistants (Scientific) as well as the carrying out of the most highly skilled and individual work should, on the scientific side of the Civil Service, attract no less remuneration than is accorded on the clerical side of the Service. It seems to be the nature of the case that the responsibilities are as onerous on the scientific side as on the other, and there is inevitably a heavy responsibility on Senior Assistants (Scientific) for ensuring that Assistants (Scientific) are discharging their duties adequately.

204. It is thought desirable to give two instances of the work of the Senior Assistant (Scientific):—

The duties of Senior Assistants in the Meteorological Office are officially described as follows:—

"Senior Assistants are required to have experience and knowledge of the work of Assistants and ability to supervise this work; they must also be capable of taking charge of an observing office or small unit where there is no other officer-in-charge."

At these isolated stations on airfields the Senior Assistant is in sole charge (his nearest superior officer being at a regional station some miles away) and is responsible for:—

- (a) The proper and efficient running of the station and all staff matters thereon (returns, discipline, proper attendance).
- (b) Supervising the accuracy of hourly and half-hourly weather reports.
- (c) Preparation of baratic and pre-baratic synoptic weather charts for the information of the pilots when necessary.
- (d) Obtaining forecasts from his regional station and interpreting them to pilots as required.
- (e) The provision of reports of conditions hazardous to aircraft.
- (f) The accuracy of all climatological returns.
- (g) The maintenance of all instruments and equipment in proper working order.

The duties of an individual Senior Assistant in the Radio Department, Royal Aircraft Establishment, Ministry of Supply, are as follows:—

Work on the development of circuits using transistors for ultimate incorporation into R.A.F. radio equipment and in test apparatus. Transistors are small rugged devices which may eventually replace valves with a great saving of space and weight.

Reports to a Principal Scientific Officer.

Previously worked on the development of special radio receivers for R.A.F. use.

Author of Technical Memos entitled—

"Narrow Band Crystal Filters using Transistors."

"Effect of Steady Magnetic Fields on Transistors."

205. A point that is not within the Royal Commission's terms of reference but to which the Institution thinks it should direct attention is this matter of recruitment to the class on a temporary basis. It seems to the Institution that this is an unwise restriction; it actively discourages recruitment instead of giving the encouragement that is so necessary. Particularly is this true in the case of the boy who has yet to undergo his period of National Service. Were he to be recruited on an established basis he might be expected to have in mind that his career was already settled and that he would be coming back into the Civil Service as an Assistant (Scientific). This might encourage him to continue and develop studies that would advance him in the scientific Civil Service. As it is he tends to be left very largely without roots and that, it is submitted, is a contributory factor in the large turn-over that is experienced with people going for their period of National Service.

206. As an ordinary matter of attracting entrants to the Assistant (Scientific) class there should be established employment from the outset as there is with practically all other Civil Service classes. The absence of this is a factor that the Royal Commission must bear in mind and on which it might feel itself inclined to make a comment.

207. In summary it can be said that the Institution's submission to the Commission is that the Assistant (Scientific) and the Senior Assistant (Scientific) should be placed on salary scales sufficiently higher than those of the Clerical Officer and Higher Clerical Officer to be attractive in competition with the salaries and careers available to officers in those grades.

CHAPTER X

THE TECHNICAL, WORKS, ENGINEERING AND ALLIED CLASSES

208. These linked departmental classes are described in paragraph 303 et seq. of the Factual Memorandum. The total number employed in the classes is nearly 19,000 but of these no fewer than 10,500 are temporary. This does not accurately represent the permanent position as the establishment of many of these classes is only now taking place. The temporary fringe to the class is a very big one and as a rough estimate there would be 6,000 temporaries in the classes if the present establishment arrangements had all been carried through.

209. The Technical Classes are composed of the following grades:—

	Numbers at 1.4.53			Pay as from 1.1.53	
	Estab- lished	Temporary	Total	Men £ p.a.	Women £ p.a.
Technical Grade A	148	53	201	1,000-1,180	
Technical Grade B	173	76	249	950-1,065	
Technical Grade I	2,262	952	3,214	780- 950	
Technical Grade II	3,412	3,007	6,419	655 (age 30)- 780	
Technical Grade III	2,276	6,210	8,486	540 (age 26)- 670	
Technical Grade IV	98	262	360	430 (age 25)- 585	

The numbers of staff are taken from paragraph 305 of the Factual Memorandum. The salary scales, which relate to London, are revised consolidated salary scales. The present and earlier men's scales are set out in detail in Appendix G of that Memorandum.

210. These linked departmental classes cover a wide range of technical knowledge and work and establish a general standard for technical pay as the Works Group makes a general standard for professional pay. Although salaries are tied to age 26 in Grade III and age 30 in Grade II the age of recruitment in very many cases is substantially above these ages because the experience required in most of the grades is considerable.

211. Comparison with the Executive side of the Service is inevitable. There the officer entering the basic grade direct from school, given satisfactory service, will go straight through to £800. The technical officer, however, entering at Grade III, after securing his technical qualifications and adding to that some years of practical experience, can rise to only £670 without promotion and even having secured one promotion still rises only to £780.

212. Such conditions could be expected only if it were the deliberate intention of the Government to discourage people from following a technical career. It is submitted that this is clear evidence of the wrong attitude adopted by the Civil Service in its organisation of technical officers.

213. It will be seen from paragraph 307 of the Factual Memorandum that it was impossible, within the compass of such a paragraph, to describe the qualifications required in the Technical Classes. Part of the difficulty was the range of work covered by the classes as a whole but even if the qualifications had been limited to one of the sections of the classes the difficulty would still have been there.

214. It cannot be too strongly emphasised, that the Technical Classes, although linked departmental classes, are made up of very many differing types of technical officer. The majority of them fall, however, into four main groups, i.e. (1) Engineering, (2) Building, (3) Quantity Surveying, and (4) Lands.

215. For the first group the qualifications are summarised in the model regulations for the Open Competition. These regulations say:—

"Grade III—Candidates must have obtained the Ordinary National Certificate in electrical and/or mechanical engineering or produce evidence of an equivalent standard of technical education; and have had five years' apprenticeship or its equivalent with an engineering concern which gave a good comprehensive training.

Candidates must also have had, after the completion of their apprenticeship, at least three years' wide experience in an engineering firm, or three years' service as a supervisor of labour, chargehand or technical officer in the engineering industry."

216. On the Building side the qualifications for a Grade III officer as laid down in E.O.C. 17/49 are:—

"Ordinary National Certificate in Building or Intermediate City and Guilds Certificate in a craft, or Associate membership of Institute of Clerk of Works, or First Class Certificate of Worshipful Company of Carpenters in Building Construction and Sanitary Science or equivalent or better qualifications.

They are required to have served an apprenticeship as craftsman with three years' experience as foreman of trade and experience as a general foreman or clerk of works, or three years' full-time training (i.e., five years' evening school) in a building school with three years' experience as a foreman of trade and experience as a general foreman or clerk of works, or at least three years' service in a builder's general office and experience in estimating, costing, management followed by further three years' experience as site foreman or general foreman."

217. For direct entry to Grade II, weight is given to the possession of Higher National Certificate in Building or Part II Examination of Institute of Clerk of Works or full Technological Certificate of City and Guilds provided it includes Building Construction, Sanitary and Domestic Engineering and Builders' Quantities.

218. The conditions of the third group, i.e., the Quantity Surveying Assistants are described in E.O.C. 33/49. In detailing the qualifications required for Technical Grade III, the E.O.C. lays down the City and Guilds Final Certificate (Sections A and B in Builders' Quantities and Building Construction), or the Ordinary National Certificate in Building or the Licentiate diploma of the Institute of Builders, or proof of professional study to an equivalent standard. Five years' training and experience with a Quantity Surveyor or Building Contractor is required or a lesser period if coupled with an approved course of training at a recognised school. These qualifications envisage officers going on to secure their professional qualifications.

219. A similar set of conditions is found in the Technical Lands Division. Details of the requirements are set out in E.C. 8/50. The qualifications required vary with the particular requirements of departments. In the Ministry of Works (Directorate of Lands and Accommodation) Grade III must have had at least three years' approved training and experience and must have passed the Preliminary Examination of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (Sub-Division V (Land Survey)) or the equivalent and should pass the Intermediate Examination or its equivalent within two years.

220. The duties of the Technical Class are described broadly in paragraph 3 of E.O.C. 43/48 as follows:—

"They are concerned with building of all kinds: with accommodation for government, administration, production, housing, training and recreation; they are concerned with services such as power, water, heating, lighting, ventilation, sanitation, cooking; with the maintenance of plant for providing energy and with its transformation, canalisation, storage, distribution and application. They are concerned with production by direct labour; with detailed control of contracts on the site or in the factory and with inspection. All these functions are exercised in connection with practically every kind of mechanical, electrical and other manufactured material and equipment, ranging from aircraft, ships and mobile or

stationary land power units to precision measuring instruments and minor accessories, such as small plastic and ceramic switchboxes. Finally, they are concerned with apprentice training and with management of industrial labour.

Their concern in these matters is executive—interpreting current technical practice, arranging and supervising its application and inspecting the results. Except in the case of some isolated pockets of technical staff, the ultimate responsibility will lie with professional officers. They will, however, devolve responsibility for matters which do not need professional qualifications so that, in practice, most day to day decisions on technical operations will be taken by technical staff. These latter will also handle the main mass of detailed orders and relations with industrial staff and outside agencies."

221. Can it be said that the standard of qualification or their duties are inferior to those of the Executive Officer? They are different. It is obvious that the Technical Officer must have a reasonable basic education, the discipline and training of apprenticeship and pupilage, the studies that necessarily accompany apprenticeship and pupilage, and then seal must be set on that work by the possession of the Ordinary National Certificate in building or engineering or a comparable qualification.

222. The Institution asks the Commission to examine this situation and to consider whether in the National Interest, this differentiation against technical officers should be allowed to continue.

223. It is the Institution's submission that grades in the Technical Classes should be equated with the Executive Officer class in the following way:—

Technical Officer Grade III	— Executive Officer
Technical Officer Grade II	— Higher Executive Officer
Technical Officer Grade I	— Senior Executive Officer
Technical Officer B and A	— Chief Executive Officer

224. The issue of career prospects which has been stressed in dealing with each of the other classes must also be raised in relation to the Technical Classes. Although a number of Technical Officers, obtain full professional qualifications with a view to making the professional class their career the vast majority of the Technical Officers must find their career within their own class.

225. Cases of class-to-class promotion without qualifications are virtually unknown to-day but even for the professionally qualified officer there appears to be little hope. In the Directorate of Lands and Accommodation—Ministry of Works—for example, out of 118 Estate Surveying Assistants Grades II and III, 28 are professionally qualified yet not one officer has received class to class promotion within the past two years.

226. These points emphasise the fact that most Technical Officers must look for promotion within the Technical Classes.

227. In their own sphere these officers are of a first rate quality and, at the highest levels, that is to say, in Technical Grades A, B and I are required, to a substantial extent, to do work which would otherwise fall to a professional officer.

228. Taking the total of temporary and established officers together because of the lack of certainty about the ultimate established complement of these classes, it will be seen that within a total complement of 19,000 some 3,700 are in the grade of Technical I or above. Even if entry to Grade III were at age 20 or thereabouts, only a small proportion of these officers could reckon to reach Grade I; for officers entering later in life the chance of securing Grade I appointment is that much less. It follows, therefore, that Grade II has to be regarded as the career grade. That is to say the average highest

point that can be reached is £20 a year short of the maximum of the basic grade in the Executive class: This seems to be a wholly inadequate reward for persons possessed of these qualifications and training.

229. The salary scales of the Executive and Technical Classes are set out below. The Technical Grade III is given in detail and against it is put that part of the basic grade of the Executive class from the corresponding age point.

Executive Officer		Technical Officer III	
	£		£
	520	Age 26	540
	545		560
	570		580
	595		605
	620		630
	645		655
	670		670
	695		
	720		
	745		
	770		
	800		
Higher Executive Officer		Technical Grade II	
£830 x 30 — £890 x 35 — £995		£665 x 25 — £780	
Senior Executive Officer		Technical Grade I	
£1,030 x 40 — £1,230		£780 x 25 — £830 x 30 — £950	
Chief Executive Officer		Technical B—£950 x 30 — £1,040	
£1,260 x 50 — £1,510		x 25 — £1,065	
		Technical A—£1,000 x 30 — £1,180	

230. It is clear that the Technical Classes scales fall far short of those of the Executive class and it is desirable in the interests of the Service that this should be put right if the Service is to attract and retain persons suitably qualified and with the necessary experience.

231. It has been the Institution's experience that Departments have proposed either Grade A or B quite fortuitously because there is no clear guidance to enable them to decide in favour of one or the other. **There is no organisational basis that can be discerned for having the two grades. It is therefore the Institution's submission that these two grades should be rolled up and equated with the Chief Executive Officer. The number of Grade A and B posts is small and represents only about one-fortieth of the class.**

232. It should be noted that in Departments where recruitment is from industrial staff difficulty is being found in quite a number of places in recruiting officers to Grade III. In centres where the district rate for industrial employees is tied to the steelworkers' rate a charge-hand, on promotion receives £10 less than he did prior to promotion. The salary scale is too low and the advantages offered do not compensate the persons concerned for the increased responsibilities. There is no improvement in hours (the Technical Classes are conditioned to 49 hours). There is less attraction in the annual leave allowance, now that the industrial has a fortnight's paid annual leave. The industrial is much less envious of the additional leave allowances of the technical officer. In the days when the industrial had no paid leave the provision of paid annual leave was a substantial attraction. Before the war there was a substantial difference between the earnings of an industrial and the pay of his technical supervisors but with incentive bonuses, etc., the difference has now been reduced to a minimum. It is probably unnecessary for the Institution to pursue this issue with the Commission; the matter has been one of considerable public comment and it is obviously something that needs correcting.

233. An aspect of staff organisation of very great importance is the extent to which technical officers can properly be used in substitution for professional officers. The Institution has done much to facilitate such devolution. In many places Grade I technical officers are formally regarded as equivalent to Basic Grade professional officers and are interchangeable with them. This situation was facilitated, prior to the Gardiner Committee Report, because the Grade I maximum pay was the same as the maximum of the Basic Grade of the Works Group. Similarly the Technical Grades A and B were contained within the salary limits of the Main Grade of the Works Group.

234. When the Gardiner Committee improved the salaries of the General Body of the Works Group the Institution proposed that there should be an appropriate increase in the maximum pay of Grade I and that Grades A and B classes should, as before, straddle the main grade of the professional classes. The Treasury has flatly refused to agree to this proposal. Inevitably the result militates against further devolution of this kind.

235. Professional officers have regarded the devolution operation with some concern. They were, very properly, anxious that professional work should not be handled by other than fully qualified officers. With appropriate safeguards, however, and having regard to the experience of the technical officers concerned and to the fact that there was no undercutting in the "rate for the job" they concurred in the arrangements that have been made in the major departments.

236. In the Ministry of Works, for example, a formal arrangement has been made for the Engineering Assistants Grade I and the Basic Grades professional to work in parallel. Similarly there is interchangeability in the Garrison Engineering services of the War Office. In the Ministry of Supply there is a formal agreement specifying the precise relationships between Technical Grades A, B and I and the Basic and Main Grades of professional officers.

237. It will be noted that this development where the work of the Technical and professional officers overlaps or coincides is not unlike the arrangement in the Executive/Administrative hierarchy where the Assistant Principal in his early years may do work normally regarded as appropriate to the Executive class and where the Chief Executive Officer is employed on work similar to or identical with that done by Principals. Such devolution is a continuing process and it is important that the salary structure should be devised to facilitate this process.

238. Accordingly, it is submitted that for the provision of a proper career for technical officers, a matter socially important as well as important to the individuals at present in post, it is imperative to increase the scales of the Technical classes and establish those scales on a basis of parity with the Executive class.

CHAPTER XI

ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING DRAUGHTSMEN

(Note.—This chapter has been written in consultation with the Society of Technical Civil Servants who will be submitting evidence to the Royal Commission in similar terms.)

239. The make-up of this class is set out in paragraph 327 of the Factual Memorandum. The details are:—

“327. The classes are composed of the following grades:—

			Numbers at 1.4.53		Pay	
			<i>Estab- lished</i>	<i>Tem- porary</i>	<i>Men £ a year</i>	<i>Women £ a year</i>
Chief Draughtsman	...	94	—	94	938-1,106	—
Senior Draughtsman	...	671	52	723	734- 891	618-760
Leading Draughtsman	...	1,803	240	2,043	623- 734	539-618
Draughtsman	...	3,434	1,896	5,330	397- 628	397-550
			6,002	2,188	8,190	

N.B.—(i) The scales relate to staff in London and include pay addition.

(ii) Above Chief Draughtsmen there is also, in the Ministry of Supply, a grade of drawing office manager (5 staff) on a scale of £1,106-£1,229.

(iii) The present and earlier men's scales are set out in detail in Appendix H 1.

(iv) The rest of this Chapter will not be concerned with women's scales.

(v) Separate figures for men and women are not available.”

240. It is necessary first to explain that the Architectural and Engineering Draughtsman class covers a wide range of officers. This class, like the Technical class, is a linked departmental class and not a general Service class. The Architectural and Civil Engineering Draughtsman (called Architectural or Civil Engineering Assistant in many Departments) generally has a different kind of training from the Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Draughtsman.

241. The Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Draughtsman has obtained his Ordinary National Certificate and usually had an engineering apprenticeship. The certificate normally requires a three years' intensive course of evening studies.

242. The Architectural and Civil Engineering Assistant is normally articulated to a practising Architect or Civil Engineer for a period of 5 years. This is supplemented by evening studies to an equivalent standard with the Ordinary National Certificate.

243. The position is summarised clearly in the regulations for the open competition. These regulations say:—

“(i) Every candidate must have obtained the Ordinary National Certificate or an equivalent or higher qualification: Except that, for the posts of Architectural and Civil Engineering Draughtsman candidates will be admitted, who, in place of this qualification, can show evidence of such professional

training and experience, as, in the opinion of the Commissioners, fits them for consideration for these posts.

- (ii) Every candidate must have had at least three years' practical experience, including at least six months in a Drawing Office.

For Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Draughtsmen posts in the Admiralty and Ministry of Supply a comprehensive apprenticeship including suitable workshop experience (or equivalent training of not less than three years) with a good class engineering concern in addition to experience as a draughtsman is required.

For posts in the Ministry of Works the three years' practical experience must include at least one year in a Drawing Office."

244. Architectural and Engineering Draughtsmen are concerned with the production of working drawings from which architectural, civil engineering, mechanical and electrical work is carried out. Maps and illustrations are prepared by other Civil Service classes. The basic requirements of the draughtsman are a sound understanding of architectural or engineering construction work to enable detailed drawings to be prepared and a sound theoretical training for design purposes. Drawing skill, whilst important, is a secondary requirement. The professional officer determines policy both in the organisation of the work and overall design. The development of these broad decisions falls upon the draughtsman and responsibility for detailed work is his. The relationship between the Professional Officer and the draughtsman makes a direct analogy with the relationship between the Administrator and the Executive Officer.

245. Reference is made in the Treasury Memorandum to the fact that draughtsmen are in linked departmental classes and in non-interchangeable groups. For example, an architectural draughtsman is not interchangeable with an electrical draughtsman. This must not be taken to imply that within these groups the work does not cover a wide field. To take civil engineering as an example, it may cover roads, bridging, structures, water supply, sanitation and ancillary services, whilst under mechanical engineering there are instrument work, machines of all types, plant, aircraft, guns, engines, etc., in an almost inexhaustible list. Moreover, new techniques are continually being evolved as for example the progress in radar, television, radio, prestressed concrete, plastic theory of structures, jet propulsion, and drawing office design staffs must keep abreast of new developments.

246. Architectural and engineering problems rarely follow a pattern which enables the solution to be found by the application of simple rules and regulations. The draughtsman must in the detailed design ensure that it fulfils the functional requirements demanded of it, he must make the necessary calculations to ensure that the components are of adequate strength and use materials and methods of manufacture that will produce a sound, suitable and economical job. Considerable savings can be and are made by draughtsmen as a result of their good design and construction based upon experience. Such economies cannot readily be checked by a senior officer, and the responsibility for determining the most economical means of carrying out the work is left on the shoulders of the individual officer. Like the Executive Officer in his sphere, the Draughtsman in his is constantly called upon to prepare schemes for submission to senior officers.

247. It is noteworthy that a substantial proportion of the staff possess at least the Higher National Certificate or its equivalent and these qualifications are taken into account for promotion. A survey made of the qualifications of the Ministry of Supply Drawing Office Staff gave the following results:—

Grade	Number who are corporate members of Professional Institutions	Number with University Degrees	Number who are graduates of Professional Institutions.	Number with H.N.C.	Number with O.N.C.	Number with City and Guilds Final Certificate	*Number with none of the previous qualifications
D.O. Managers	3						2
Chief Draughtsmen	12	1		6			15
Senior Draughtsmen	47	5	17	42	15	1	63
Leading Draughtsmen	35	1	80	111	65	10	135
Draughtsmen	9	7	88	287	427	10	394

* This includes a number who passed the pre-war Civil Service Commission examination for War Department draughtsmen. The number of officers qualifying by this method is not known. The standard of that qualification is indicated by the fact that the lowest exempting qualification was the Higher National Certificate.

Furthermore it has been observed that although three years' experience of the drawing office is required by the competition regulations, very rarely have draughtsmen with less than five years' practical experience been accepted for appointment by the Civil Service Commission in spite of the known shortage of draughtsmen. This underlines the high quality of the work that is required of the Civil Service draughtsman.

248. The presence of the Drawing Office Assistant class is an indication of the same thing. The Drawing Office Assistant is able to take over an amount of the routine work which, in drawing offices outside the Civil Service, would fall to the younger draughtsman in the course of building up his experience.

249. Given the range of training required and the responsibilities falling on the officer it is significant that although in the basic grade of Architectural and Engineering Draughtsman salary in the earlier years is somewhat greater than that of the Executive Officer, the grade goes to a much lower maximum than does the Executive Officer. As with the Technical Classes, the entrant to the basic grade goes to a maximum of only £670 and even having secured one promotion still rises only to £780 which is still below the maximum of the basic grade of the Executive Officer class.

250. This is wrong. Wrong not only in its treatment of these officers but wrong in the sense of a proper direction of the youth of the country in the careers they should follow. Given the training, and that is obviously considerable; given the responsibilities of the work; it is the Institution's submission that, in any circumstances the Draughtsman should get no less than the Executive Officer and that the salary scales of the various grades should be improved to attain that position. But more than this is necessary.

251. What is the career prospect of a Draughtsman? What are the opportunities for the Architectural and Engineering Draughtsman as compared with the Executive Officer? Taking the figures already quoted from paragraph 327 of the Factual Memorandum, it will be seen that of Senior Draughtsman and above there are only 765 established officers. That is to say, only

one-eighth of the established complement is at the higher levels. This means that it is impossible for the average draughtsman to reach even the Senior grade and he certainly cannot reach the chief grade. That is to say, the summit of the Draughtsman's career so far as the great majority are concerned is the Leading Draughtsman grade, a grade with a maximum of only £780 as compared with the Executive Officer who in his basic grade will go to a maximum of £800.

252. This is a disparity of treatment that is remarkable on any basis. It is particularly remarkable having regard to the highly selective nature of the requirements imposed on Draughtsmen before they can become established. It is remarkable if regard is had to the national interest and the emphasis that, in other places, is laid on the importance of attracting persons to a technical career. There is no basis, so far as remuneration is concerned, to lead a parent or teacher to advise a young person to take up the career of a Draughtsman in the Civil Service in preference to going for the career of an Executive Officer.

253. With such disparity of treatment against the Draughtsman is it to be wondered at that the shortage of these officers in the Civil Service is particularly acute. During the whole period since the war there have been serious recruitment difficulties and departments have resorted to a number of ways of getting the draughtsman assistance that they require. They have in some places reduced the standards, in other places they have overcome staff shortages by engaging draughtsmen on a contract basis at great expense and a great deal of work has been put out to private organisations. The age limit for recruitment has been extended up to 60 years, but still the requirements of the Civil Service have not been satisfied. In the light of the figures given it can hardly be a matter of surprise to the Royal Commission.

254. It is the Institution's submission that grades in the Draughtsman class should be equated in the first instance, and subject to what is said in the following paragraphs, with the Executive Officer class in the following way:—

Draughtsman	=	Executive Officer
Leading Draughtsman	=	Higher Executive Officer
Senior Draughtsman	=	Senior Executive Officer
Chief Draughtsman	=	Chief Executive Officer

As this would involve increasing the Chief Draughtsman salary from a maximum of £1,180 to a maximum of £1,510 this may seem startling. But it is the measure of the underpayment of the Draughtsman class.

255. The grade of Drawing Office Manager exists at the present time only in the Ministry of Supply and the Lord President's Office, although there are in the Admiralty various Chief Draughtsmen with allowances. Until 1946 the grade was paid on the same basis as Royal Ordnance Factory Managers. After Reconstruction the R.O.F. Managers were assimilated to the Senior Grade in the Works Group, but the Drawing Office Manager's position was left at a much lower level. At the time there was only one over-age officer in post and the general position was let go by default. In recent years the importance of the post has been realised and its use has been extended but there has been no considered re-assessment of the salary scale. The work consists of the technical control and administration either of large blocks of staff from 200 to 300 in number including several Chief Draughtsmen or, alternatively, the control of a fairly complex block of Drawing Office work as at certain atomic energy establishments. The Drawing Office Manager

is the controller of a sizeable department and to pay such an Officer only £130 more than the Chief Draughtsman seems wholly inadequate in relation to the Manager's considerably greater responsibility. It is suggested that such a post should be remunerated on a flat salary not a salary scale and that the figure should be not less than £300 above the maximum of the Chief Draughtsman.

256. There is a one in twenty-six chance of an Executive Officer whether a direct entrant or promoted from the Clerical Class of getting to the post of Chief Executive Officer or above. That is calculated simply by taking the number of posts at Chief Executive Officer level and upwards as a proportion of the total complement. Yet the draughtsman's chance of becoming a Chief Draughtsman is only one in sixty-three, and in only two Departments, for practical purposes, is the opportunity available. That is to say he has less than half the chance of the Executive Officer of getting to that level and even then, of course, it would only be to the level of the Chief Executive Officer and not to the higher levels available within the Executive Officer class. This situation arises in part because the higher posts are held not by draughtsmen but by professional officers. The officer's opportunity of becoming a professional officer is related entirely, or almost entirely, to his obtaining the necessary professional qualifications.

257. The counterpart of the Draughtsman is found not in the Executive Class as a whole but in the direct entrant Executive Officer. He, for promotion, is in competition with a large number of class-to-class promotees from the clerical grades. The direct entrant Executive Officer, therefore, will almost certainly obtain earlier promotion than Executive Class Officers generally and Treasury statistics have shown that the first promotion for such an officer is about 30 years of age. There is no class-to-class promotion into the Draughtsman class. Each Draughtsman has to satisfy the Civil Service Commission that he possesses the full qualifications for recruitment before he can enter the basic established grade of the Draughtsman class.

258. In other words the Draughtsman has a career lamentably inferior to that available to the Executive Officer.

259. A detailed comparison of the salary scales is set out below:—

Age	Executive Officer	Draughtsman
	£	£
21	380	420
22	410	440
23	440	460
24	470	480
25	495*	505
26	520	530
27	545	555
28	570	580*
29	595	605
30	620	630
31	645	655
32	670	670
33	695	
34	720	
35	745	
36	770	
37	800	

* Maximum age pay.

Higher Executive Officer: £830 x 30 —
890 x 35 — 995

Senior Executive Officer: £1,030 x 40
— 1,230

Chief Executive Officer: £1,260 x 50
— 1,510

Leading Draughtsman: £665 x 20 — 725
x 25 — 780

Senior Draughtsman: £780 x 25 — 830
x 30 — 950

Chief Draughtsman: £1,000 x 30 — 1,180

260. It will be seen that the pay of the Draughtsman point for point is higher than that of the Executive Officer until the Draughtsman reaches his maximum which is only £670. It is there that the Draughtsman begins to fall and to fall very seriously behind. The scales above the Draughtsman level are exceedingly short and provide little or no incentive to promotion. It seems desirable in the interests of the Service that this should be put right; that the scales themselves should be radically improved and promotion be made into a valuable thing really reflecting the increase in responsibility that flows from it.

261. It is submitted to the Royal Commission that it is only by a radically changed approach to the remuneration of draughtsmen that there is any chance of the Draughtsman class establishing itself as one of real standing in the Civil Service and of offering an attractive career to encourage the young person to take up draughtsmanship. It is the Institution's submission that the salary scales must be very sharply increased to figures in excess of the salary scales paid in the Executive class so as to compensate adequately for the very poor career prospects.

CHAPTER XII

CLASSES ACQUIRING PROFESSIONAL STATUS AFTER ENTRY

262. There is a group of classes within the Service whose conditions need to be brought specially to the attention of the Royal Commission. It comprises officers who, after entering the Civil Service through the Executive class competition are then obliged to acquire a standard of qualification and knowledge and to undertake duties that are indubitably professional. The three main classes of officers which the Institution desires to mention to the Royal Commission are:—

- (a) Actuaries
- (b) the Examining staff in the Estate Duty Office of the Inland Revenue Department.
- (c) District Audit staff in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.

263. Their salary scales at the commencement of their service are identical with those of the Executive class. As a condition of their continued employment in the particular office they have chosen, or to which they have been assigned, these officers are required to undertake professional training. This training is carried out under facilities granted by the department or directly as a part of arrangements made by the department; in either event most of the necessary study is necessarily carried out in the officer's own time. The qualifications that the officers are required to obtain are as follows:—

264. **Actuaries**—These officers have to attain the Fellowship of the Institute of Actuaries or the Faculty of Actuaries which normally takes about eight years. The officer is given a special increment of £60 on attainment of Associateship of the Institute or the equivalent in the Faculty which normally takes about five years. Appointment to the grade of Qualified Actuarial Assistant occurs after attainment of Fellowship. This grade has a salary scale with the same maximum as that of the Higher Executive Officer scale.

265. **Estate Duty Examiners**—These officers must secure the Bachelor of Laws degree of London University or be called to the Bar. After the completion of five years' service and the attainment of one of these qualifications they are given a special increment of £60. A further special increment of £100 is given after ten years' satisfactory service. Both of these increments are within the scales of the Executive class; the Assistant Examiner/Examiner grade covers the Executive Officer and Higher Executive Officer salary scales.

266. **District Audit Staff**—These officers are required to qualify under a special departmental training scheme which enables both practical and theoretical training to be given. The course of study is departmentally designed because there is no profession which of itself provides the range of knowledge required by the District Auditor and his assistants. It is a blend of accountancy and of law and the standard established is not less than that required for the final examination of other professional bodies. There is a special increment of £60 after five years' service provided that the professional examinations set by the Civil Service Commissioners have been passed.

267. It is necessary to demonstrate in some detail that professional standing has been acquired by officers in these classes.

268. **Actuaries**—It seems difficult to imagine that there could be any conflict of opinion in respect of this class. The qualification secured is the usual professional qualification. The work done is at least as comprehensive as that which would fall to an actuary employed elsewhere. Most actuaries in

the Government Service are in the Government Actuary's Department. The Commission's attention is directed specially to Appendix C, which sets out in some detail the work and responsibilities of the department, and its detailed staffing. The Government Actuary's Department is consulted on a wide range of subjects, including National Insurance, superannuation arrangements, population and morbidity statistics. If Departments did not consult the Government Actuary they would have to secure outside professional help. It is incontestable that the work of the actuary in the Government service is no less professional than the work of any actuary anywhere and that the Actuary should be remunerated on professional scales.

269. Actuaries are paid on a mixture of scales. On entry the officer is on the basic grade Executive scale. This is quite reasonable and no objection is offered. On qualification he passes to a scale which is a mixture of the top part of the basic grade Executive Officer and the Higher Executive Officer. On promotion to Assistant Actuary he has the Senior Executive Officer scale. At Actuary level he is on a scale which has the same maximum as that of Administrative Principal; then there is the Principal Actuary's scale which is that of the Assistant Secretary. The Deputy Government Actuary is on the Under Secretary salary and the Government Actuary on a salary of £4,000 a year—£500 less than the Secretary of other Government Departments.

270. It is the Institution's submission that the Assistant Actuary and not the Actuary should be equated with the Administrative Principal, the Actuary then being equated with the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Actuary should be at Under Secretary level, or, putting this in more direct terms in line with the Institution's general contentions, that the Actuaries should be made a part of the general professional structure of the Civil Service. The equations with the Administrative Class would then be as set out in the following table:—

Assistant Actuary	=	Administrative Principal	=	Main Grade
Actuary	=	Assistant Secretary	=	Senior Grade

the other grades, of course, taking their place both above and below in the normal run of the hierarchy. Again, the grade below the Main Grade, equivalent to the Basic Grade in the professional class, would need to be on a salary scale having as a maximum the minimum of the Main Grade scale and then working downwards.

271. **The Examining Staff of the Estate Duty Office**—Again a class where it seems difficult to contest the view that the officers are clearly professional officers once they have secured their professional qualifications. It is incontestable that their work is of a high professional order. In an article in the "Financial Times" of 13th March, 1954, the writer said:—

"The examiners of the Estate Duty Office possess a remarkably wide knowledge not only of the theories of valuation but also of the highly complicated laws, not to mention Court decisions, by which they are bound. These they can quote ad infinitum to the dismay and confusion of most executors, and their advisers. Indeed, their ability and astuteness is such that anyone who cares to look in Whitaker's Almanack will be astounded to find how grossly underpaid they are for the responsibilities they carry."

272. Recruitment to the class over the years has been in a variety of ways and this demonstrates the difficulty the Department has experienced in finding the right blend of legal training and specialised Departmental training necessary for this work. From 1894, the date of the introduction of Estate Duty, the staff was recruited from solicitors or barristers with an interval during which entrants were taken from the 1st Division (now the Administrative class). Between 1907 and 1915 recruitment was from the Intermediate examination. Entrants were first encouraged and then obliged to become barristers or graduates in law before promotion. After the 1914/18 war entrants

were taken from Reconstruction examinations but with the requirement of securing a legal qualification as the earlier Intermediate examination recruits. The Department failed to attract a sufficient number of recruits in this way and advertised for solicitors and university graduates. The salaries offered did not attract sufficient recruits of the necessary calibre. The situation became so serious that it was decided to adopt the expedient of taking successful candidates from the general Executive Open competition. These entrants were required to secure a legal qualification before they could expect any promotion. At the time this step was taken Sir Richard Hopkins, then the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, said:—

“this step is not to be taken as an indication that the Board has the slightest intention of doing anything to jeopardise the hard-won professional and semi-professional status of the Office, for which the Association has consistently striven; and as to which the Board is in complete agreement with the Association.”

273. A more detailed statement of the duties and responsibilities falling to the Estate Duty Office is set out in Appendix D.

274. Given the nature of the officers' qualification and in view of the qualifications of the persons with whom they are in daily contact in carrying out their work it is submitted that there can be no reasonable doubt of their professional standing.

275. It is the Institution's submission here as in the other cases, that if the professional status of these officers is accepted then they should be conditioned to the salary scales of other professional people within the Service.

The appropriate professional parallel in this case is obviously the legal profession. It is the Institution's submission that a direct parallel can be drawn between the Examiner at one end and the Assistant Controller at another stage in the salary scales of the Legal class and the Examiner should rank with the Legal Assistant, the Assistant Controller with the Assistant Solicitor. Between those two points, because of the organisational necessities of the Estate Duty Office, there are two grades, Senior Examiner and Chief Examiner, and the position there could well be met by dividing the scale of the Senior Legal Assistant.

276. **District Audit Staff**—This case does not demonstrate itself so clearly as do the preceding two because the qualification required of these officers is not that of one of the recognised professional bodies. The needs of Local Government audit work are highly specialised and the responsibilities resting on the District Auditor and his assistants are of a very special type. In consequence a training that is not available through any one of the professional disciplines is required. The Commission must be troubled, therefore, to read in rather more detail about this qualification than in the two preceding cases and the attention of the Commission is specially directed to paragraphs 18 et seq. of Appendix E.

277. It will be seen that the requirements are a wide knowledge of law and of accountancy. The standard exacted is necessarily very high.

278. It may assist the Commission in securing a more adequate idea of the intensity of the training and the extent of knowledge that is required if they read especially paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Appendix E which deal with the nature of the audit and of the duties falling on a District Auditor, some of which do not attach to an auditor in commerce or industry.

In the local government sphere, the accounts of some municipal boroughs are audited by qualified accountants who must be members of one of the recognised professional bodies. Their powers and duties are for less extensive than those of a District Auditor. Such an audit is an alternative to District Audit.

279. A feature of District Audit which does not apply to the other classes in this part of the Institution's case is that these officers are working in very small groups spread over the whole country and they must necessarily be of that competence and standing that will enable them to carry through their very responsible duties more or less on their own.

The accounts which they audit are those of independent corporations, almost always kept under the direction of officers holding professional qualifications. The Chief Officers of whom they have to require explanations and with whom they have to discuss matters arising out of the audits are, for the most part, professional men—solicitors, accountants, architects, engineers or surveyors.

280. As with the other classes, officers entering the District Audit service are placed on an Executive class scale in the basic grade of Audit Examiner and they secure a special increment of £60 after five years' service provided they have passed their examinations. The higher grades are on salary scales linked with, but not identical with, the Executive class. Promotions depend on vacancies which are filled by selection from amongst the qualified candidates.

281. It is the Institution's submission that District Audit Staff should be brought within the "Works Group" of professional classes. Upon qualifying, the Audit Examiner should enter the Works Group Basic Grade at the appropriate age point; the grading for the other posts in the audit service should be:

Junior Assistant District Auditor	— Main Grade
Senior Assistant District Auditor	— Senior Grade
Deputy District Auditor	— Superintending Grade
District Auditor	— Directing Grade

282. **Generally**—It is the Institution's view that the Executive class competition has demonstrated the basic educational qualification of the officer and assured the department of his mental equipment for the later professional training. There can be no reasonable case thereafter for keeping the salary scales of these officers linked to the Executive class. The special increments of £60 granted on qualification are payable only within the maximum of the Executive class scale and are an inadequate reward for the professional status attained. Continued linkage with Executive class scales is unreasonable in relation to the officers; it is demeaning in the relationship of these civil servants to the professional people with whom they are each in daily contact. It would be for the good of the Civil Service as well as equity for the individuals that they should take their place properly and clearly in the professional organisation of the Civil Service.

283. **In summarising this section it can be stated that the Institution's contention is that, in classes such as these where there is no doubt about the professional attainments of the officers or the professional responsibilities of their duties, they should, from the stage of professional qualification, be accorded the appropriate professional scales common in the Civil Service. There is no dispute about the arrangements for entry through the Executive Officer examination. That seems a reasonably satisfactory method to adopt and it is justified by experience to date. The whole purpose of the representations to the Commission are that, when the individuals have taken the qualifications and undergone the extra studies that are involved they should then be appropriately rewarded for them.**

CHAPTER XIII

CLASSES ATTAINING TECHNICAL STATUS AFTER ENTRY

284. Just as there are classes in the Civil Service which enter on a general educational qualification and then acquire a professional qualification, so there are other classes which after entering on a general educational qualification acquire a specialist technical qualification. These classes are, so far as the linked departmental and general Service classes are concerned:—

Cartographic Draughtsmen

Illustrators

Photographers

285. In each of these classes there are two systems of entry; to the basic grade with the general educational qualification and then the specialist training, or at a somewhat higher level after the individual has already attained the appropriate technical qualification.

286. The contention of the Institution is that these officers should attract the pay appropriate to the same general standard of education on the clerical/executive side of the Civil Service.

287. In each of these three classes, the requisite for recruitment in the lowest grade is possession of the General Certificate of Education. That is to say, precisely the same qualification as the Clerical Officer. Given this, it seems clear to the Institution that, as a starting point, the Clerical class scale is the apt one.

288. The practice in the three classes varies and the details are set out for each class in the following paragraphs.

Cartographic Draughtsmen

289. This is a linked departmental class of a total strength of about 4,450, employed in some 11 departments. Most are employed in the Ordnance Survey Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The standard required is set out in the regulations for the 1953 open competition.

"4. Qualifications and Experience

Every candidate must, on the date he sends in his application, either

(i) have obtained

(a) the General Certificate of Education at Ordinary level, or

(b) the Scottish Leaving Certificate on the lower grade, or

(c) the Senior Certificate of the Ministry of Education for Northern Ireland, in each case with passes in appropriate subjects (as below);

or (ii) have obtained the School Certificate with credits in those subjects;

or (iii) have obtained a Certificate regarded by the Commissioners as of equivalent or higher standard;

or (iv) produce a statement from the Scottish Education Department or the Ministry of Education for Northern Ireland that the candidate has attained an equivalent standard.*

The subjects in which passes or credits are required for the various Departments are as follows:—

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries—English, Mathematics, Geography and Drawing.

Ministry of Defence—Mathematics and Geography.

Ministry of Housing and Local Government—English, Mathematics and Geography.

* (The Commissioners understand that no Scottish third-year certificate is acceptable for this purpose; only candidates who entered upon the fourth year of an approved secondary course can be considered by the Scottish Education Department.)

N.B.—For posts in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government the qualifications in the subject "Geography" must be superior to that specified above, e.g., Advanced level or on the higher grade as appropriate in the Certificates named in 4 (i) (a) (b) and (c), or included in the Higher School Certificate.

War Office—three of the subjects: English, Mathematics, Geography, Physics, Chemistry, General Science, Art and a Modern Language.
Directorate of Colonial Surveys—English, Arithmetic, Geography and Drawing.

Note.—Where English is specified it means the subject English Language in English Certificates and the subject English in the Scottish Certificate. In the Northern Ireland Certificates it means the subject English if the Certificate was obtained in 1951 or earlier and English Language if obtained in 1952 or later."

290. The probation period is up to two years, during which period the new recruit must demonstrate suitability for permanent employment in the Service. During the next two or three years the basic grade draughtsman is mastering his craft, gaining more expert knowledge and experience of the precise work requirements of his department, and applying this knowledge and experience in the production of maps, charts and diagrams, etc., of a quality that constantly improves. In most departments at the end of a four or five year period the basic grade draughtsman is then fully trained, competent and qualified to carry out the field of work assigned to him. These first four or five years should be considered as the training period during which the newcomer to the Service must attain the standard required for carrying out the full duties of the basic grade.

291. The nature of the skill required is perhaps best indicated by describing the training provided in the Ordnance Survey Department, which as the biggest employer of cartographic draughtsmen, sets the standard.

292. Because of the complex nature of cartographic duties the necessary specialised training is best carried out within the department. The trainee has a six-month full-time course at either the Field Survey or Instructional Drawing Schools including attendance at further education classes. The syllabus naturally includes Map Projections, Grids, Interpretation of Boundaries, lectures on the Theory of Map-making and Construction, with practical work on survey methods (air and ground), instrumental work, plotting, compilation, computing and draughtsmanship. After this six-month course has been completed, a careful check is made of the trainees' ability and if they do not reach the required standards they are dismissed. Successful trainees undergo a further eighteen months probationary service on productive work under constant supervision. Dismissals on the grounds of unsuitability can take place at any time during this two-year period. It is estimated that required production standards are normally reached after five years.

293. In some of the other departments it is necessary to provide additional specialised training to meet the special needs of the departments. For example, in the Survey Production Centre of the War Department further education during and after working hours is compulsory and includes courses in geography, mathematics and modern languages, in addition, of course, to the full initial training in practical cartography.

294. It may help the Commission to appreciate the highly technical nature of the work if a few details are given of the work carried out by the employing departments. These are given in Appendix F.

295. **The Class**—There are four grades described in the Treasury Memorandum setting up the linked departmental classes in the following terms:—

- (a) **Draughtsman**—the basic grade to which will be assigned most of the drawing, etc., work (all of it in certain Departments).
- (b) **Draughtsman (Higher grade)**—who may be employed on the higher quality work (in Departments which have it), or in a supervisory capacity (in other Departments), or on both kinds of duty.

- (c) **Draughtsman (Senior grade)**—the main supervising grade in Departments which cannot assign supervision exclusively to the Draughtsmen (Higher grade). This grade may also be used exceptionally for individual work demanding an unusually high degree of skill or experience.
- (d) **Chief Draughtsman** for control, overall supervision and co-ordination of the work of the large units, consisting of several sections or categories of work.

296. The salary scales for the four grades are as follows:—

Grade	Men	Women
Draughtsman ...	*£150 (age 16) x 40 — £190 x 25 — £215 x 15 — £290 x 20 — £350 x 15 — £500	*£150 (age 16) x 40 — £190 x 25 — £215 x 15 — £230 x 10 — £270 x 15 — £315 x 10 — £400
Draughtsman (Higher grade)	£400 (age 25) x 20 — £600	£350 (age 25) x 20 — £500
Draughtsman (Senior grade)	£600 x 20 — £700	£500 x 20 — £600
Chief Draughtsman	£700 x 25 — £825	—

* Age scale to 25 (trained entrants), to 21 (untrained entrants) but special pay arrangements for untrained entrants over 21.

297. It will be seen from the foregoing that once the Cartographic Draughtsman is trained his work is of a highly technical character. His training has been no less severe than that undertaken by any other technical officer. It is the submission of the Institution that where an officer has come into the Civil Service and has then been specially trained so as to make him into a clearly defined technical officer then his salary scale should be related to the Technical classes. Here, no less than in the Technical classes recognised as such, arises the problem posed frequently in the Institution's case of the serious injustice of providing for Cartographic Draughtsmen and other technical officers a career that is grossly inferior to that available to, in this case, the Clerical Officer.

298. The Cartographic Draughtsman's pay in the basic grade rises only to the same maximum as that of the Clerical Officer despite the fact that the Cartographic Draughtsman has had to acquire a further qualification. From that point his position is worse than that of the Clerical Officer.

299. The career available to a normal open competition entrant to the Clerical class is summed up in statements made by the Treasury to the Arbitration Tribunal on 29th September 1952. What was said on that occasion was:—

"... promotion prospects are good for the direct boy and girl entrant ... and again "... It estimated that in a stable Civil Service, recruiting some 2,500 boys and girls each year, the number who will reach the maximum will be of the rough order of only 5 per cent."

It was made quite clear at this time by the Treasury that, in their opinion, the Clerical Officer scale should be a long one "to cater for the youngsters in their early years and ... to provide a reasonable number of further increments for older entrants."

300. The great majority of Cartographic Draughtsmen are fated to remain in the basic grade. The complement of the class is as follows:—

Grade	Established	Temporary	Total
Draughtsman ...	2,528	574	3,102
Draughtsman (Higher Grade) ...	995	37	1,032
Draughtsman (Senior Grade) ...	246	1	247
Chief Draughtsman ...	58	—	58
	3,827	612	4,439

301. It will be seen from these figures that it is impossible to provide the Cartographic Draughtsman with a reasonable career. Were he to have the same career as is available to the direct entrant Clerical Officer then his situation would be very much better than is his present one.

302. It is the submission of the Institution, therefore, that the proper organisation of the class requires in the first place a grade—as in the Illustrator class—of a purely training character. Such a grade could be called Assistant Draughtsman and be paid on the Clerical class scale, having been recruited with the same educational qualifications as is that class. On completion of his training he should then pass into the proper Cartographic Draughtsman grade which should be remunerated not with a Clerical maximum but with at least the maximum of the Grade III Technical Officer. The standard of mental equipment and training is the same and there is the same need for a compensating factor in the salary paid to make up for the absence of promotion prospects.

Illustrators

303. This class has been set up only since 1949 and is, again, a linked departmental class. Much the same problem arises here as in the other Technical classes. Although the general shape of the organisation of the class seems to the Institution to be right, the salary scales, having regard to the technical qualifications required and the absence of promotion prospects, needs to be stepped up in the same way as the Technical classes generally.

304. The salary scales of the class are as follows:—

Grade	Men	Women
Assistant Illustrator	*£150 (age 16) x 40 — £190 x 25 — £215 x 15 — £260	*£150 (age 16) x 40 — £190 x 25 — £215 x 15 — £230 x 10 — £250
Illustrator ...	†£340 (age 21) x 20 — £575	†£340 (age 21) x 15 — £370 x 20 — £500
Leading Illustrator	£570 x 20 — £675	£490 x 20 — £565
Senior Illustrator	£675 x 25 — £825	£565 x 20 — £585 x 25 — £700
Chief Illustrator	£870 x 25 — £970 x 30 — £1,030	—
Manager, M.O.S.	£1,030 x 40 — £1,150	—
	* Age scale to 21.	† Age scale to 28.

305. It will therefore be seen that the real basic grade, i.e., the grade of the officer after he has acquired the appropriate training and qualifications, goes to the same salary maximum as the Technical Class Grade III; the Leading Illustrator is on precisely the same scale as the Technical Grade II; the Senior Illustrator has the same scale as the Technical Grade I; the Chief Illustrator is on the same scale as the Technical Grade "A."

306. It is extremely difficult to get the necessary recruits into the Service and consequently much illustrative work is given to outside firms. The reason is the common one that salary scales are too low. This is graphically illustrated by a letter written just over two years ago by the Principal of a well-known School of Art:—

"... and would like to send suitable students into the work but it seems to me that something is very wrong when your top rate £510 (now £575) is less than we pay our caretaker."

307. The class is concerned with:—

Illustrations in line, wash, tone and colour.

Figure work.

Retouching of photographs for reproduction as illustrations.

Lettering.

Illustration design, including schematic presentation.

Layout work, including appropriate typography.

Within these broad categories the work varies both in character and quality—from the routine to that demanding a high degree of skill, experience and creative ability.

308. The Assistant Illustrator grade is a training grade and, subject to tests of suitability, an officer is promoted at about age 21. Those who fail to qualify for promotion to Illustrator are discharged from the Service.

309. Candidates for appointment to the post of Illustrator must have had at least five years' training and experience of illustrative work. This must consist of at least one year on practical art work in the Civil Service or private industry or a combination of the two. The remainder of the five years must have been spent in one or more of the following ways:—

(a) Full-time employment on practical art work in the Civil Service.

(b) Full-time employment on practical art work in private industry.

(c) Full-time training at a recognised art school.

310. It is the Illustrator grade which is expected to carry out the main work of the class.

311. As stated above, the Illustrator in the Service is called upon to produce art work within very broad limits. He may be required to carry out work comparable with that done in a normal commercial art studio or to produce minutely exact illustrations of complex equipment for use as visual aids for constructional purposes. Not only has the officer to be highly skilled in his own medium but he has, in addition, to acquire a facility to appreciate the intricacies and form of a variety of subjects and to develop the gift which enables him to transmit the purposes of a designer of equipment to the user.

312. The work may involve the creation of posters, display in exhibitions (for propaganda and recruitment purposes), illustrations for Press advertising, illustrations for textbooks, instructional posters, film strips (either still or animated), scientific reports or data for the Armed Forces, etc. The officer must also, in certain cases, be able to translate the written or spoken word into pictorial form. The complement of the class as at 1st April 1953 was as follows:—

Assistant Illustrators	...	...	...	...	...	8
Illustrators	...	...	...	...	...	190
Leading Illustrators	...	...	...	...	...	72
Senior Illustrators	...	...	...	...	...	22
Chief Illustrators	...	...	...	...	...	5
Manager, M.O.S.	...	...	...	...	...	1

313. These figures clearly show, without further argument, that the promotion prospects are no better in the Illustrator class than they are in the Technical classes.

314. For precisely the same reasons therefore as already given earlier in this section, the salary scales need to be improved if there is to be a reasonable

balance between the attractions of a technical career and one in the Clerical/Executive field. Again the Institution must stress the social consequences for the country if there is a continued failure to make a technical career attractive to boys and girls when they leave school.

Photographer Class

315. This is one of the most depressed of the Technical classes in the Civil Service and as with other classes in this section there is a dual form of recruitment. The Assistant Photographer needs to be up to the standard of the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary), with passes in at least one scientific subject, mathematics, and English, this again making a clear parallel with the entrant to the Clerical Officer class. Then there is the trained officer who may come in with the minimum qualification as a basic grade photographer or can be recruited with higher qualifications into a higher grade. The qualifications required for Photographers are set out in the Civil Service Commissioners Regulations as follows:—

"5. Qualifications and Experience

The general requirements for posts of this grade are that candidates must be skilled operators in one or more of the following methods of processes: Minor camera operations, multiple printing, line and continuous type negative making, bromide printing, enlarging or reducing to scale, lantern slides and diapositives in monochrome, processing of sub-standard ciné films in negative form or by reversal in monochrome, miniature film processing, toning intensification, reducing by chemical means. They must also have an elementary knowledge of photographic chemistry and be able to maintain and care for equipment and lighting units, to do re-touching, blocking and spotting negatives, to prepare minor composite negatives and carry out general finishing involving pencil and brush work.

Candidates must hold the Institute of British Photographers' Preliminary Certificate in the Practice and Profession of Photography or the City and Guilds Intermediate Certificate in Photography, or be prepared to obtain either of these qualifications."

316. Assistant Photographers are given assistance in their training and must have passed the preliminary examination of the Institute of British Photographers or gained the City and Guilds Intermediate Certificate in Photography before they can become established and entrants into the basic grade cannot have their appointments confirmed until they have complied with these requirements. This training usually occupies the best part of 3—4 years, requiring training in both theory and practice and even then the officer has only been given a sound grasp of the basic general principles of photography. Further training is necessary to develop the special facets of photography required in particular establishments.

317. His duties include the practice of still and ciné photography, the latter often being high speed in character and covering a diversity of subjects from publicity to photomicrograph. Work can be in either monochrome or colour. In addition he makes a substantial contribution to most schemes of training and education, in the large number of illustrated booklets issued by Government departments, and in public relations work generally. In certain cases the Photographer is performing duties identical with those of a newspaper photographer.

318. A good example of this specialisation, which also emphasises the great range of the Civil Service photographer, is found in the Air Ministry where there are 4 Chief Photographers. Each is in charge of a section as listed below:—

Chief Photographer (A)—Microfilming.—Multiprinting (Continuous Tone); Microfilming and Microprinting; 16 mm. and 35 mm. Film Duplicating; Film Strips; Film Slides; Duplex Printing (mechanical); Hand Printing; Mosaics; Ancillary Operations; D.T.C. Working Party on Microfilming; Negative Library; Stores and Equipment.

Chief Photographer (B)—Ink and Photomechanical Processes.—Dyeline and Blueprinting; Photostat; True-to-scale, Monochrome and Multicolour; Silk Screen Printing; Photo-Lithography; Printing, Monochrome and Multicolour; Litho Drawing; Letterpress; Printing-down methods; Four-colour Half-tone; Proving; Ancillary Operations.

Chief Photographer (C)—Cinematography.—35 mm. Cinematography (Monochrome); Sub-standard 16 mm. Cinematography (Monochrome and Colour); Specialised Applied Cinematography including Direction and Production; Cine Film Duplicating; 16 mm. and 35 mm. Duplicating and Processing; Sound Recording, Tape and Disc; Lighting; Editing; Cutting; Titling; Projection; Film Loops; Recognition; Preparation of Scripts and Commentaries; Production Costing.

Sensitometry.

Direct Colour.—Photographic Transparencies; Photographic Prints by Chromatone and other processes; Separation Sets by direct and retractive methods; Ultra-violet and Infra-red.

Chief Photographer (D)—Photography—Outdoor.—Town Planning; *Objets D'Art*; Historical Records; Architectural; Progress Records; Pictorial Surveys; Industrial Machinery; Press and Information; Recording Official Functions; Medical; Training Manuals; Catalogue; Air to Air.

Indoor.—Studio Operating; Half-tone Negative Making; Line and Continuous Tone Negative making; Colour Separation; Fine Art Printing (Exhibition Standard); Enlarging and Reducing to scale; Diapositives; Contact Printing; Passports; Stereoscopy; Miniature Film Processing; Retouching and Art Finishing; Lantern Slides; Reflex Printing; Dry Mounting; Ancillary Operations; Negative Library.

319. The importance of the Photographer, particularly in relation to research work, is growing with every year that passes. Much of the work calls for specialised technique and some is of a dangerous nature. Not only does the officer work in a studio under ideal conditions but he is frequently called upon to work in factories, laboratories, surgeries, on the sea, under the sea, in the air and under the ground. Indeed, in any facet of research the Photographer has his place.

320. This wide variety of photographic work and the responsibility which each type of work throws upon the individual concerned is one of the attractions of the class and is doubtless the factor that has kept them within the Civil Service notwithstanding the conditions. The responsibility and technical ability involved is no less than that of any other of the Technical classes.

321. The salary scales (basic) for the Photographer class are:—

Grade	Men	Women
Assistant		
Photographer	£150 (age 16) x 40 — £190 x 25 — £215 x 15 — £245	£150 (age 16) x 40 — £190 x 25 — £215 x 15 — £240
Photographer ...	*£260 (age 21) x 20 — £300 x 15 — £390 x 20 — £425	*£250 (age 21) x 20 — £270 x 10 — £330 x 15 — £360
Senior		
Photographer	£450 x 20 — £500	£380 x 15 — £410 x 20 — £450
Principal		
Photographer	£580 x 20 — £600 x 25 — £700	£475 x 20 — £575
Chief		
Photographer	£570 x 25 — £800 x 30 — £875	£625 x 25 — £750

There are two higher posts on individual salary scales.

* Age scale to 25.

322. It will be seen from the foregoing that at each stage the salaries paid to the Photographer class are lower, indeed much lower, than those in other Technical classes. It will not be surprising to the Royal Commission to know that there is very great difficulty in recruiting Photographers. It seems short-

sighted to remunerate a class of this kind in this way and it is the Institution's submission that the class should have the same remuneration as the other Technical classes.

323. Again the problem of careers presents itself. The composition of the class is as follows:—

			<i>Established</i> (1/1/54)		<i>Temporary</i> (1/10/53)		<i>Total</i>
Assistant Photographer	...	...	1	...	30	..	31
Photographer	...	...	91	...	195	...	286
Senior Photographer	...	...	131	...	75	...	206
Principal Photographer	...	...	85	...	12	...	97
Chief Photographer	...	...	22	...	—	...	22

324. These figures show quite clearly that an entrant into the Photographic class has less than a 1 in 5 chance of going beyond the Senior Photographer grade, a grade with a maximum salary exceeding that of the Clerical Officer by only £50. Even those who achieve the Principal Photographer grade, that is after three promotions, will get only the same maximum as the Executive Officer in the basic grade.

365. The Institution is confident that the Royal Commission will recognise that this is no basis at all for attracting young persons to take photography as a career.

CHAPTER XIV

TOO MANY SALARY SCALES

366. In that part of the Civil Service covered by the Institution there are no fewer than eighteen general Service or linked departmental classes, each with its own set of salary scales. Some classes have scales similar to those of others but varying at some points. In addition to this number of general Service classes there are many hundreds of departmental classes. These departmental classes fall into certain main groupings with rough similarities but each having its own particular and peculiar features. It seems to the Institution that there is a great deal of unnecessary work thrown upon the Treasury and upon Departments as well as upon staff organisations by this multiplicity of variations as very often the variations are too small to have much meaning in practice.

367. For ready reference the salary scales of the eighteen general Service and linked departmental classes are set out as Appendix "G."

368. It seems to the Institution that there would be everything to be gained and nothing to be lost if the Works Group precedent were developed and the bulk of the professional classes were given one set of salary scales. As at present, it might be necessary to depart from that scale in particular circumstances. For example, it has been recognised by the Arbitration Tribunal that it is necessary to give the Engineers in the Electrical Engineering Department of the Admiralty a somewhat higher scale than the Works Group, because of the special requirements in appointments to the Directorate. In the Valuation Office of the Inland Revenue Department the nature of the organisation requires an adaptation of the standard Works Group form. These variations are easy enough to deal with. They are designed to meet practical situations and do not provide any real trouble as there is a clear and definite relationship to the professional Works Group organisation.

369. The Psychologists class illustrates the danger when there is no firm alignment of a small class with a large one. The salary scales for Psychologists looked at in relation to those for the Works Group are, obviously, a curiosity. The inconsequentiality of these salary scales arises from the fact that when the Psychologist class was set up in 1950 it was decided by the Treasury that it should be aligned with the Works Group. It should be mentioned that the Institution's view was that the proper class with which to align the Psychologists was the Scientific Officer class, but that by the way. After the Gardiner Committee Report was issued the Treasury refused to apply to the Psychologist class the increases which had been awarded to the Works Group. The Institution took the case to the Arbitration Tribunal with the rather astounding result of the present scales. The basic grade was given Works Group conditions but the higher grades were not and there is now a ludicrous overlapping between the basic grade and the grades above. The organisation of this small class is now completely out of gear. The Psychologist class is one of only 59 people. It will probably grow, but in the nature of the case it will always be one of the small classes of the Civil Service.

370. It seems absurd that there should be a scale for Psychologists separate and distinct from either the Works Group, as was the preference of the Treasury a few years ago, or the Scientific Officer class as the Institution thinks is more logical.

371. Attention has already been directed to the curious way in which the Actuaries' set of scales is made up. It moves from analogies or identity with the Executive class in some grades to identity with the Administrative class in others.

372. Unless the Commission specifically desires it the Institution will not work through the details of all the general Service classes, much less through the hundreds of departmental classes, and list the unimportant and unnecessary differences in scales. The Institution's view is demonstrated by Appendix "G."

373. The Institution suggests there should be a few clear patterns to which all sets of scales could be aligned and given those few patterns it should be reasonably possible to deal rapidly and easily with negotiations on general salary adjustments.

374. It may be desirable at this point to consider the wisdom of aligning salary scales of one class to another so that salary revision in one case is followed by salary revision elsewhere. This may, at first sight, seem to be unwise. Practice has shown, however, that this is what happens. There is a very close linking of Civil Service classes one with another and there is a chain of circumstances that seems to run from the lowest grade in the Service eventually to the highest. This is, probably, inevitable in an organisation of 650,000 people working with varying degrees of closeness to each other. A change in one salary scale is bound to be considered in relation to other salary scales very quickly in the Civil Service, much more so than in industry, Civil Service salary scales are completely open and advertised to the whole world. In industry, above the lowest levels, there is much secrecy on this matter. Given this is it not wise to recognise that salary comparisons are bound to be made?

375. The Treasury has suggested in its evidence that it is undesirable that there should be this inevitable linkage. They expressed the opinion that there are occasions when it is desirable to raise the salary of one class, or one set of classes, for particular reasons which do not relate to other classes. If this is the fact there should be no difficulty in establishing it as a fact. It might be decided, for example, because of recruitment difficulties or because, for good social reasons, general encouragement was to be given to the development of a particular experience or profession to pay that class or that grade much more than had hitherto been the practice. That should be a clearly demonstrable arrangement and one that could be announced with the utmost clarity so that there could be no doubt about intentions. If there were consequential claims it would be necessary for the claimant class to establish that the conditions that applied in the other class applied to it. If they could, then the adjustment would be necessary. If they could not, then the contention of the Treasury would be proved to be sound and the claimant class would not be successful.

376. It must be the case, however, that once general relationships are fixed in an organisation the size of the Civil Service it will be only at infrequent intervals that there will be any general shifting of standards. For example, the Reorganisation Report in 1920 set out clearly the salary scales for the Clerical, Executive and Administrative classes, and thereby prescribed a relationship one to the other. That standard has lasted fairly well during the ensuing thirty years. There has been an amount of compression in the salary scales in the higher grades and that problem will doubtless be dealt with by the Commission. The general shape of that side of the Service has not been changed nor indeed is anybody proposing to change it even after thirty-four years' experience of it.

377. It is the professional side of the Civil Service that is concerned in relationships and it is the Institution that is claiming a major change in relationships, not as between the grades and classes on the administrative side but as between the professional and administrative sides. It is doing it on a

general social thesis that it is important in modern society that the professional and technical officer should have no less prominent a place in the sun than the administrative and clerical officers. That contention has importance outside of the Civil Service as well as inside of it. Indeed, it would, in one sense, be true to say that its importance is much greater outside of the Civil Service than inside of it. If these adjustments are made inside the Civil Service, the Government as employer is doing clearly, specifically and with set purpose, the thing necessary to encourage people into professional and technical careers. That is to say they would be giving practical effect to that which in speeches about educational theory, or employment and the welfare of the country, Ministers advocate as a matter of general policy without, apparently bothering unduly about the practice. The acid test of practice is found in Civil Service employment.

378. When the Royal Commission has reached its determination on this issue it is perfectly clear that it will have set the pattern for the professional side of the Civil Service in precisely the same way as the pattern was set for the Clerical/Administrative hierarchy in 1920. Thereafter it can only reasonably be anticipated that experience would be much as on the Administrative/Clerical side and the adjustments that would be made would be either minor ones of relationships or adjustments for the falling value of money or for other general economic manifestations.

379. If the foregoing contentions are accurate it seems reasonable to suggest that three things are then clear:—

- (a) There could and should be a much simpler set of salary scales on the professional side of the Civil Service;
- (b) that it is both right and inevitable that there should be a clear linkage of salary scales within the Civil Service between classes of similar educational standards and official responsibilities;
- (c) that career values are an essential factor in determining precise salary scales.

It is the Institution's hope that the Royal Commission will make proposals along these lines and will suggest a set of salary scales covering scientific classes and their analogues, another set covering the Works Group of professional classes and their analogues, and a third covering the Technical Classes and their analogues. The Institution also hopes that there will be a clear recommendation from the Royal Commission for negotiations to minimise the number of salary scales in the departmental classes along similar lines.

CHAPTER XV

HOURS

380. On the hours and leave issues dealt with by the National Staff Side the Institution has no comments to add.

381. The Institution has a special interest in one aspect of this question as its membership includes a number of classes conditioned to more than the present normal Civil Service hours, 42 in London, 44 in the Provinces.

382. In some cases there is an understandable, though, in the Institution's view, mistaken basis for the hours that have been fixed. In other cases there seems to be no basis for it at all.

383. In these submissions the Institution is not making a case as to what should be the working week of civil servants; that case is made by the National Staff Side. The Institution's concern is to claim for the classes now to be dealt with the normal Civil Service conditioned hours. In an organisation of 650,000 people there seems to be no prima facie basis for differentiation save in one respect which is detailed below.

384. Apart from the Technical classes, where there are some 13-19,000 officers, each of these classes is very small in the main, of 100 or so and in some cases of as few as a dozen.

385. The common point that brings these classes together is the simple request for a reduction and an adjustment of the Civil Service standard. Each class is set out separately but it must be made clear that the list is not complete. There are, however, enough cases cited to give the Royal Commission a clear picture of the situation and to enable it to make a recommendation.

Technical Classes

386. When the Technical classes were set up in mid-1948 the Treasury insisted on a 49 hour gross week. The Institution took the strongest possible exception to the Treasury's views and refused to agree the circular setting up the class. It has not been possible to resolve the conflict since.

387. The matter has been taken to the Arbitration Tribunal and the finding of the Arbitration Tribunal was that the hours of the class should be maintained at 49 but it made an exception in respect of all individuals in those parts of the linked departmental classes which, prior to assimilation to the Technical classes, had enjoyed the 42/44 hour week. The exception is a personal one to the individuals assimilated to the Technical classes and is not an exception in respect of the Group from which they are drawn. This decision of the Arbitration Tribunal produced a great deal of ill-feeling and an amount of dis-organisation in practically every department of the Civil Service.

388. The point made by the Treasury in the course of the negotiations on the hours of the Technical classes was that sections of the Technical classes were in direct supervision of industrials and ought therefore to be in attendance for precisely the same hours as the industrials. Such a generalisation applied to the Technical classes as a whole has little relationship to the fact.

389. To the extent, and it is a very limited extent, that members of the Technical classes are in direct supervision of industrials, then it is quite proper and, indeed, necessary that they should work precisely the same hours as industrials, whatever they may be. The great majority of the Technical classes is not working as direct supervisors of industrial staffs. It is not possible to get full information as to how the classes are divided between these sections but an analysis of one Department provides a rough guide to the class as a whole.

In the Ministry of Works out of approximately 3,200 Technical Officers, 1,800 are "office type," 700 are on indirect supervision and 700 are said to be in direct supervision.

390. The Technical classes can be divided broadly into two sections: (a) the "office" types of technical officer, and (b) the technical supervisor of industrial labour.

391. It is the Institution's submission that there can be no case whatever for the "office" types being conditioned to a longer working week than other office type civil servants. They are housed side by side with other grades and classes of civil servant nearly all of whom are conditioned to the 42/44 hour week. They work with professional officers and draughtsmen, and with Administrative Officers, Clerical Officers, and Executive Officers all conditioned to normal Civil Service hours. Only the Technical classes are conditioned to a 49 hour week.

392. This produces the curious anomaly that in these circumstances they work not a 49 hour week but the normal hours of the establishment of which they form part. In present circumstances with a standard working week of 45½ hours that means a 45½ hour week. Their colleagues receive either overtime or long hours gratuity or extra duty allowance according to their grading while the Technical classes officer receives no extra payment at all. He just gets the pay of the grade. This kind of differentiation, as the Royal Commission can well imagine, leads to an enormous amount of ill-feeling and serves no useful purpose whatever.

393. If the Royal Commission desires the Institution to submit a detailed memorandum setting out the various parts of the Service where these sections of the Technical classes are to be found, this the Institution will be very ready to do. It can say that over half of the Technical classes are so circumstanced. If the Royal Commission were to go to any of the major departments employing technical staff, that is, Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Works or one of the Defence Departments, it could readily see many hundreds of examples of this in any of the major London Headquarters.

394. In the Ministry of Supply, for example, there are Technical Class Officers working the whole time with professional officers and with officers on the Administrative/Clerical hierarchy. The Technical Class Officers are conditioned to a 49, the others to a 42/44 hour week, and the whole working 45½ hour week.

395. In the Ministry of Works sections of the Technical classes known as Engineer Assistants were, prior to the post-war reorganisation of the professional Civil Service, working in the Department as part of one organisation with officers who were assimilated into the Architectural and Engineering Draughtsmen classes. The officers assimilated into the Architectural and Engineering Draughtsman class are conditioned to a 42/44 hour week; the officers assimilated into the Technical classes are conditioned to a 49 hour week. They continue to work in close association with each other. They are working in conjunction with other grades all of whom are on a 42/44 hour week. To members of the staff concerned this looks like organisational nonsense and the Institution is unable to supply any rational explanation.

396. Before dealing with the second part of the Technical classes it is necessary to consider whether there would be insuperable difficulties about having conditioned hours applying to part of the class. The Institution sees no difficulty. It seems to the Institution that it would be just as simple to prescribe that the Technical classes should be conditioned to a 42/44 hour gross week with a proviso that officers working in direct supervision of industrial staffs should be conditioned to the same gross hours worked per

week as the industrial staffs they supervise as it is to prescribe the present arrangements which conditions the class to a 49 hour week and then provides that the officers concerned shall, in establishments where the establishment is working fewer hours per week, actually work the fewer hours.

397. Turning to the other part of the Technical classes, the technical supervisors of industrial labour, that divides itself again into two. Part are those technical foremen in direct supervision of industrials. The second part is the technical foremen who are only in indirect charge of industrials. In respect of the first part the Institution has already said that it thinks that the technical foremen must work the same hours as their subordinates. In the second case, however, there seems to be no more reason why the technical foremen should work the industrial hours than for the professional officer, or the administrative staffs in the establishment.

398. This differentiation against the foreman is a cause of much ill-feeling. In a Royal Ordnance Factory, for example, where there are professional officers, technical officers and industrial staffs, the professional officers, like the clerical/executive/administrative staff in the factory, work a 42/44 hour week. The technical officers work a 49 hour week, the same hours as the industrials. In a large proportion of cases, the members of the Technical classes are not themselves direct supervisors of industrials. They are supervisors of supervisors and this is clearly demonstrated in the War Office, R.E.M.E. Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Regulations which says:

"He (the Foreman) supervises, directs and advises the leading charge-hands under his control."

In turn, the leading charge-hand "supervises, directs and advises charge-hands under his control." It is the charge-hand who "works together with the personnel under his charge and is directly responsible to the leading charge-hand for the work carried out by him and his workmen." In such cases there is no reason at all why the Foreman should be conditioned to the same hours as the industrials. Psychologically there is every reason why they should not be so conditioned. One of the important things in encouraging the more able workman to increase his knowledge and technical equipment and to become a foreman is the privilege that is attached to the foreman. Before the war there were very considerable privileges attached to the post of foreman. Those privileges are now at a minimum and this matter of conditioned hours is one of the major issues where it would be a considerable incentive to industrial staffs to become foremen if, at least so far as those not directly engaged in the supervision were concerned they were known to be conditioned to the same hours as the people in the administrative block of the factory.

399. It is the Institution's submission to the Royal Commission therefore that Technical classes hours should be reconsidered and defined as a 42/44 hour week or whatever new week the Royal Commission determines for the Civil Service save where the member of the Technical classes is in direct charge of industrial staffs when he shall work the same hours as the industrial staffs.

Composite Signals Organisation

400. A similar case to the Technical classes is that of the Assistant Station Radio Officer grade in the Composite Signals Organisation. The Assistant Station Radio Officer grade is the lowest grade in the Station Radio Officer class and it is conditioned to a 44 hour net working week. The remaining grades in the class, viz., Station Radio Officer, Senior Station Radio Officer and Principal Station Radio Officer, are conditioned to 42 or 44 hours gross per week (London and Provinces).

401. The grading structure below the Assistant Station Radio Officer level provides for trainee operators, radio operators and supervising radio operators. The supervising radio operators work the same hours as the operators which are 44 hours net a week, and they are in direct charge of them. The assistant Station Radio Officers' duties include supervision of the supervising radio operators, supervision of clerical and other staff at the various stations who are conditioned to a 42 and 44 hour gross week and, in addition, an important part of their work is concerned with the technical administration of stations. **The conditioned hours could be altered to conform with those of the higher grades in their class without causing the slightest administrative difficulty, and the Royal Commission is urged to recommend accordingly.**

Photographers

402. One of the small grades concerned in this matter of longer hours than the normal Civil Service hours is the Photographer class. This class is conditioned to a 48 hour week. In every case of which the Institution is aware the Photographer is working in conjunction either with Scientific staffs or with Clerical/Executive/Administrative staffs all of whom are working the normal Civil Service hours. The same general effect obtains with the Photographer as with the Technical classes. He works in fact the hours of the establishment of which he is part. That again means that in practice he works a 45½ hour week. His colleagues get overtime, long hours gratuity or extra duty allowance. The Photographer gets nothing. This seems to the Institution to be indefensible. Where, as in very many cases the Photographer has to go out on jobs working on his own then he, of course, has to complete the full 48 hours before he becomes entitled to any extra payment. Again, a demeaning of his conditions for which there seems to be no rational explanation.

403. The Photographer class is a very small one. It is the nature of its work that it is inevitably working in relation to other grades. It is the fact of the case that those grades, almost without exception, are conditioned to a 42/44 hour week. **It is the Institution's submission that this class should be conditioned to normal Civil Service hours whatever those hours may be.**

Nursing Staff

404. Another class affected by this matter are the Nurses employed in the Civil Service. Nurses in the Civil Service are conditioned, for no apparently good reason, to the 96 hour fortnight that is common in hospital organisation. The Nurses are not in hospital and there seems to be no particular reason for this alignment. Nurses in Local Authority employment work the same hours as other Local Authority staff. There seems every reason why Nurses in the Civil Service should work the same hours as other civil servants.

405. Nursing Sisters are employed mainly on industrial nursing duties in factories and industrial establishments. The Ministry of Supply is the largest employing unit. In some departments, however, e.g., Ministry of Labour, Nursing Sisters act as advisers to the Department in the recruitment and conditions of employment of Nursing staff.

406. Although Nurses are conditioned to a 96 hour fortnight, the actual hours worked vary from department to department. In factories they work the industrial hours, while in other establishments they work the hours of the office—42 or 44. In certain Ministry of Supply factories on shift work the nursing staff have to cover between them the full periods of shift work. Because of the irregular incidence of shift work in some factories the complement of Nursing Sisters is frequently below that required to operate a shift

rota of normal hours. In consequence Nursing Sisters are very often involved in a 60 hour week and they receive no compensation for this either as overtime or extra duty allowance.

407. There is no reason why they should not work the 42/44 hour week. The picture presents itself perhaps most clearly in the Ministry of Supply's filling factories. In a filling factory there will be a chemical inspection laboratory staffed by Scientific classes. This laboratory is working in relation to the general work of the factory. This does not preclude that laboratory organising its works in relation to the 42/44 hour week to which Experimental Officers and Assistants (Scientific) are conditioned. The medical post in the factory is in a similar relationship. It is employed in relation to the factory and must be manned the whole time the factory is open. **Nursing staffs are a part of the general administrative hierarchy of the factory and it is submitted that in the Civil Service they should be conditioned to normal Civil Service hours and not to hours which may be perfectly appropriate to a hospital but have no relationship whatever to the Civil Service of which they form part.**

408. **The Institution therefore presses upon the Royal Commission that they should in this case no less than the others alter the conditioned hours of the Nursing staffs to normal Civil Service hours whatever they may be determined to be.**

Marine Staffs

409. The last group that the Institution proposes to mention to the Royal Commission, not, as has been pointed out, the only other group concerned, is that of the Marine staffs. Marine staffs are employed primarily in the Admiralty and the War Office. There are one or two other units but they need not be detailed here.

410. The Marine staffs concerned are the officer grades, Deck and Engineer Officers. They are conditioned to a 55 hour week. Their relationship to their subordinates in this matter is a very curious one.

411. Their subordinates in the Admiralty and War Office Fleets are formally conditioned to a 55 hour week but their overtime arrangements are such that, for practical purposes, their conditioning is to a 44 hour week. The Admiralty Fleet Order reads:—

“ 3695/52

17. Working hours of men on “normal” Yard Craft conditions.—The pay of these men will cover a working week of up to 55 hours, to be worked over six days as necessary; overtime will be payable after 55 hours have been worked. These hours are to be calculated on a cumulative basis for all work performed between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on weekdays. Any time worked outside the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. is to be paid as overtime, irrespective of whether work is also performed between these times or not.

19. Saturday Attendance.—Saturday is to be a normal day of attendance for men on “normal” or “modified” Yard Craft conditions if the requirements of the Service cannot be met otherwise; unauthorised absence on this day will incur check of pay.

Where a Saturday occurs during, or at the end of a period of paid leave of at least five working days duration, a man is to be considered as having satisfied the requirements of paragraph 27 of this Order and to be regarded as having carried out all duties required of him during the period concerned for the purposes of granting the enhanced payment.

20. Sunday Attendance.—Yard Craft crews will be liable for Sunday attendance and when called out for employment on this day will be paid a minimum payment of 4 hours at the appropriate Sunday rate. They are also to receive such minimum payment when called out for employment on a Public Holiday.

22. Meal Breaks.—No deductions are to be made in respect of meal breaks, except in the case of crews of C.E.-in-C. Department vessels.

26. Guaranteed Week.—Yardcraftsmen receive the benefit of the guaranteed week arrangements, applicable to other industrial workers, for 44 hours of employment; if 44 hours are worked during the week (seven days including Sunday) the employee will have no claim under the guaranteed week agreement. The guaranteed week's wages are (except for Vote 10 employees) the enhanced rates of pay specified in paragraph 27 of this Order.

Where a Yardcraftsman, by reason of having performed night duty and having taken rest leave next day, does not complete 44 hours between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. (excluding Sunday) the payable hours for night time worked between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. may be reduced by the number required to make the day hours up to 44; he will then be eligible to receive full weekly enhanced rate of pay for day hours if he has carried out all duties required of him between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. (week-days) plus the reduced night hours at appropriate rates."

412. The industrial staff have a guaranteed 44 hour week with a pay addition of 20 per cent. to compensate for the liability to work 55 hours but, and more importantly in regard to the present issue, they receive overtime rates for hours worked between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.

413. The overtime arrangements prescribed for the Deck and Engineer Officers are more akin to ordinary Civil Service arrangements and specifically exclude the arrangement for the industrial of regarding all hours worked between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. on a special basis. The Deck and Engineer Officers have to complete a 55 hour week before they get any overtime, and even when overtime is paid, it is at time and a quarter instead of the time and a half which would be appropriate under normal Civil Service arrangements after this period of working.

414. It is the Institution's proposal that these officers should, on the same basis as is proposed for the Technical classes, be conditioned to the same effective hours as their subordinates, that is the guaranteed week of 44 hours.

415. It must be clearly understood that the Institution is not asking for any reduction in the number of hours actually worked. In employment of this kind it is obviously necessary from time to time to work whatever hours a particular job may call for. There will be emergency cases when work is for 24 hours on end and it is a matter of snatching sleep when one can. It is not the actual hours of work that are the concern, it is the conditioned hours of work and the standing that is associated with the conditioned hours of work. At the present moment Marine staffs feel themselves hardly done by because they are treated in this matter worse than other non-industrial staff and worse than their subordinates instead, as is the more natural course, that the non-industrial grades are given rather better conditions than the industrial grades.

416. It is the Institution's submission to the Royal Commission therefore that the Deck and Engineer Officers of the Marine staffs should be conditioned to normal Civil Service hours, whatever those hours may be, it being clearly recognised that, in the future as in the past, the officers concerned would work whatever hours circumstances required and they would, in those circumstances, take more readily to the normal Civil Service overtime conditions instead of, as at present, their being required to take the worst of both worlds.

CHAPTER XVI

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS

The Institution's proposals may be summarised as follows:—

General

1. That when comparisons are made with rates of pay outside of the Civil Service, information about conditions of service and any perquisites in addition to remuneration should be made fully available. (Chapter II/33 and 36.)
2. That the economic position of the country is not a relevant factor in certain circumstances. (Chapter II/40.)
3. That use should be made of the Wage Rates Index and other general statistical information on remuneration in calculating changes in Civil Service salaries. (Chapter II/42, 52 and 53.)
4. That there shall be general criteria for determining remuneration and setting these out. (Chapter II/63.)
5. That professional salary scales should be related to administrative salary scales. (Chapter III/70.)
6. That the status and salary scales of the heads of professions in departments should be improved. (Chapter III/88.)
7. That compensation for poor careers at the second level of responsibility should be provided by way of improved salary scales. (Chapter VII/164.)
8. That members of classes attaining professional status after their entry to the Civil Service should be accorded the appropriate professional scales common to the Civil Service. (Chapter XII/283.)
9. That officers attaining technical status after their entry to the Civil Service should have their salary scales related to those of the Technical classes. (Chapter XIII/297.)
10. That there should be an aggregation of the salary scales in the professional, scientific and technical classes into a few clear patterns. (Chapter XIV/373 and 379.)

Scientific Classes

11. That the Senior Scientific Officer salary scale should be absorbed in that of the Principal Scientific Officer. (Chapter IV/104.)
12. That the Senior Principal Scientific Officer salary scale should be aligned with that of the Assistant Secretary. (Chapter IV/105 and 110.)
13. That the Deputy Chief Scientific Officer salary scale should be aligned with that of the Under Secretary. (Chapter IV/113.)
14. That each of the Scientific Officer grades be aligned with a grade in the Administrative class. (Chapter IV/115.)
15. That Scientific class salary scales and the complements of the higher grades must be improved. (Chapter IV/117.)
16. That the Experimental Officer grades should have higher salary scales than the corresponding Executive class grades. (Chapter VIII/187.)
17. That the Assistant (Scientific) and the Senior Assistant (Scientific) should have salary scales higher than those of the Clerical Officer and Higher Clerical Officer. (Chapter IX/198 and 207.)
18. That the Assistant (Scientific) class should be recruited initially on an established and not a temporary basis. (Chapter IX/205.)

Works Group of Professional Classes

19. That paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report on the Works Group should be properly applied in the organisation of Departments. (Chapter V/135.)
20. That the salary scales of the Works Group grades should be aligned with those of the Administrative class grades. (Chapter V/136.)
21. That the salary scale of the Works Group Superintending Grade should be aligned with that of the Under Secretary. (Chapter V/146 and 147.)

Professional Accountants

22. That a central pool of Professional Accountants should be created. (Chapter VI/156.)
23. That Chief Accountant should be recognised as the career grade in the class and that that grade should be given the same maximum as the Assistant Secretary. (Chapter VI/157.)

Technical Classes

24. That the Technical classes grades III to A should be equated with Executive class grades. (Chapter X/223 and 238.)
25. That the Technical Grades A and B should be amalgamated to form one grade. (Chapter X/231.)
26. That the "office type" Technical classes should be conditioned to the same weekly hours as other office type civil servants, with a proviso excepting technical officers in direct supervision of industrial staffs. (Chapter XV/391, 396 and 399.)

Architectural and Engineering Draughtsmen

27. That the Architectural and Engineering Draughtsman class should receive no less pay than the Executive Officer class. (Chapter XI/250 and 254.)
28. That it is necessary to provide an increase on the Executive class scales to Architectural and Engineering Draughtsmen in order to compensate for poor career prospects. (Chapter XI/261.)

Cartographic Draughtsmen

29. That the salary scales of Cartographic Draughtsmen should be aligned with those of the Technical classes. (Chapter XIII/302.)

Actuaries

30. That qualified Actuaries should be equated with certain grades in the Administrative class. (Chapter XII/270.)

Estate Duty Office Examining Staff

31. That Estate Duty Office Examining Staff should be equated with the Civil Service Legal class. (Chapter XI/275.)

District Audit Staff

32. That District Audit Staff of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government should be equated with the Works Group of Professional classes. (Chapter XII/281.)

Illustrators

33. That the salary scales of the Illustrator class should be improved in the same way as those of the Technical classes. (Chapter XIII/314.)

Photographers

34. That the salary scales of the Photographer class should be aligned with those of the Technical classes. (Chapter XIII/322.)
35. That the hours of the Photographer class should be reduced to normal Civil Service hours. (Chapter XV/403.)

Nursing Staff

36. That the conditioned hours of Nursing Sisters should be the normal Civil Service hours. (Chapter XV/407 and 408.)

Marine Staffs

37. That the Deck and Engineer Officers of the Marine Staffs should be conditioned to normal Civil Service hours. (Chapter XV/416.)

Composite Signals Organisation

38. That the hours of the Assistant Station Radio Officers grade be altered to those of the higher grades. (Chapter XV/401.)

PRINCIPLES OF REMUNERATION
(Chapter II)

Indices of the Movement in Salaries and Wages 1938 to 1952

Year	Total Salaries				Total Wages				Wage Rates Index (a)				Average Weekly Earnings Index			
	Indices				Indices				Indices				Indices			
	£ mn. (1)	Base 1938 (2)	Base 1946 (3)	Base 1949 (4)	£ mn. (5)	Base 1938 (6)	Base 1946 (7)	Base 1949 (8)	Base 1938 (9)	Base 1946 (10)	Base 1949 (11)	Base 1938 (12)	Base 1946 (13)	Base 1949 (14)		
1938	1,110	100			1,735	100			100			100				
1939	1,150	103			1,835	106			112			130				
1940	1,220	110			2,100	121			122			142				
1941	1,350	122			2,400	138			131			160				
1942	1,390	125			2,655	153			136			176				
1943	1,450	131			2,800	161			143			181				
1944	1,515	136			2,815	162			149			180				
1945	1,580	142			2,810	162			161			190				
1946	1,760	158	100		3,165	182	100		166	100		203	100			
1947	1,920	173	109		3,610	208	114		176	109		220	116			
1948	2,160	195	123		4,070	234	129		181	111		229	120			100
1949	2,315	208	131	100	4,270	246	135	100	184	116	100	240	126	100		
1950	2,480	224	141	107	4,510	260	142	105	199	129	116	265	139	116		
1951	2,750	248	156	119	4,985	287	157	117	216	137	123	285	150	125		
1952	2,995	270	170	129	5,285	305	167	124								

Sources : Salaries and Wages 1938-45. Statistical Digest of the War (C.S.O.). Table 180.
1946-51. National Income and Expenditure 1946-51 (August 1952). Table 14.
1952. Preliminary Estimates of National Income and Expenditure 1948-52. Table 1.

Wage Rates and Average Weekly Earnings. Ministry of Labour Gazette.

(a) Column 9—figures are for the monthly Averages of each year.

Columns 10 and 11—figures are for the end of December of each year.

Note to Table 1.

In order to construct continuous indices showing the movement in total salaries and wages between 1938 and 1952, it was necessary to use the figures published in the Blue Book on National Income and Expenditure (1946-51) together with those in the Preliminary Estimates on National Income and Expenditure, instead of using the figures contained in the more recent Blue Book (1946-52) published in August, 1953. The reason for this is that the August 1953 Blue Book made a change in the classification of wage earners and salary earners by transferring shop-assistants to wage earners. Whilst the Blue Book showed revised figures for the years since 1946, it did not revise the figures for the period 1938-46. Table 11, using only the August 1953 Blue Book figures, shows that the revision of the figures for total salaries and wages has not seriously affected the 1946-52 movement of the indices shown in Table 1.

PRINCIPLES OF REMUNERATION
(Chapter II)
Indices of the Movement in Salaries and Wages
1946 to 1952

Year	Total Salaries			Total Wages		Wage Rates Index (a)		Average Weekly Earnings	
	£mn. (1)	Indices		£mn. (4)	Indices			Indices	
		1946 Base (2)	1949 Base (3)		1946 Base (5)	1949 Base (6)		1946 Base (9)	1949 Base (10)
1946	1,620	100		3,250	100			100	
1947	1,760	108.6		3,690	113.5			107	
1948	1,975	121.8		4,140	127.4			116	
1949	2,120	130.8	100	4,365	134.2	100		120	100
1950	2,275	140.4	107.3	4,585	141.0	105.0	100	126	105
1951	2,550	157.3	120.2	5,090	156.5	116.6	116	139	116
1952	2,755	170.0	129.9	5,460	167.9	125.0	123	150	125

Sources . Salaries and Wages

—Blue Book on National Income and Expenditure, 1946-52.

Wage Rates and Average Weekly Earnings—Ministry of Labour Gazette.
(a) Figures are those for end of December each year.

PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANTS

(Chapter VI)

Description of the Class

1. **Duties.**—Professional Accountants are employed on work of a character demanding the employment of professionally qualified Accountants with wide experience of accounting practice in industry and commerce (although the main body of Government accounting is, and will continue to be, undertaken by the Executive class). This work covers a variety of different functions, and from time to time there must be considerable fluctuation in the proportion of staff required for particular types of work. It is therefore not enough that the individual officer should be qualified as a specialist in a certain line of work. His training and professional experience should fit him to undertake any of the tasks to which he may be assigned. The standard of professional qualification must therefore be of the highest. In consequence, recruitment to established posts is restricted to members of one or more of the bodies mentioned in the next paragraph.

2. **Qualifications.**—The General Service Class of Professional Accountants was created by the Treasury by E.O.C. 65/46 dated 26th September, 1946, under which recruitment was restricted to members of the following professional bodies:

- The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
- The Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors.
- The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.
- The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland.
- The Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants.

3. **Representation.**—The recognised staff association for the Professional Accountant Class is the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (I.P.C.S.).

4. **Numbers and Pay.**—The staff in the Class are divided into the following:—

	Permanent	Temporary	Total	Pay at 1st January, 1953
Director ...	8	1	9	Min. of Food: £1,600 x 75—£1,900 x 100—£2,000. Min. of Supply, B. of T., Admiralty: fixed £2,100. Unconsolidated but inclusive of pay addition.
Assistant Director	19	1	20	£1,485—£1,700. Unconsolidated but inclusive of pay addition.
Chief Accountant	65	2	67	£1,270 x 50—£1,500.
Senior Accountant	174	70	244	M. £900 x 30—£990 x 40—£1,220. W. £795 x 30—£855 x 35—£960 x 40— £1,065.
Accountant	29	46	75	M. £650 x 25—£750 x 30—£900. W. £650 x 20—£730 x 25—£795.
	295	120	415	M.—Men. W.—Women.

Notes: (a) The scales are those relating to staff in London.

(b) The salary scales shown are basic plus pay addition for Directors and Assistant Directors and consolidated for the other grades.

Directors and Assistant Directors: as recommended by Gardiner Committee (Accountants).

Chief Accountant, Senior Accountant and Accountant: as following the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal Award No. 246, dated 13th March, 1954.

(c) The minimum of the Accountant grade is linked to age 25 and is subject to increase at the rate of one increment for each year above that age to a maximum at age 34 of: Men, £900; Women, age 32, £795.

Subject to the maximum of the scale not being exceeded, an established officer in the basic grade of Accountant will receive a special increase in salary of £50 with effect from the date he first satisfies the following conditions:—

(i) he is at least 27 years of age;

(ii) he has been confirmed in his appointment after completing a period of probation of at least two years.

5. **Recruitment.**—Recruitment has been by nomination and interview before the Civil Service Commission of staff in posts at the time the class was created; limited competitions for the establishment of temporary staff; open competitions for new entrants. Up to 1951, when the last competition was held and before the introduction of the new scales recommended by the Gardiner Committee, the number of candidates who qualified for appointment was substantially less than the number of vacancies. There has not since been occasion to hold an open competition.

6. **History.**—Prior to the post-war reorganisation effected by the creation of the General Service Class by E.O.C. 65/46, salaries varied between departments.

7. **The Gardiner Committee.**—As a consequence of a recommendation made by the Chorley Committee (see paragraphs 30-36 of their Report) a Committee was appointed early in 1950 under the Chairmanship of Sir Thomas Gardiner to consider and to advise on the future organisation, structure and remuneration of the class of Professional Accountants.

8. **Salary scale history.**—The following table shows the movements since that time before the scales shown in paragraph 4, which are as at 1st January, 1953, were recommended.

	<i>As E.O.C. 67/47 Effective Date 1st January, 1947</i>	<i>Chorley Cttee. Effective Date 1st October, 1950</i>	<i>Gardiner Cttee. Effective Date 1st January, 1951</i>	<i>Pay Addition Effective Date 1st January, 1952</i>
Director	£1,320—£1,600	£1,500—£1,900	Min. of Food £1,500—£1,900 Min. of Supply, Board of Trade and Admiralty fixed £2,000	Min. of Food £1,600—£2,000 Min. of Supply, Board of Trade and Admiralty fixed £2,100
Assistant Director	Not provided. (Subsequently fixed at A.A.G. level, £1,150— £1,310)		£1,400—£1,600	£1,485—£1,700
Chief Accountant	£1,000—£1,160		£1,150—£1,350	£1,228—£1,433
Senior Accountant	£750— £950		£810—£1,100	£875—£1,177
Accountant	£475— £750		£575— £810	£628— £875

GOVERNMENT ACTUARY'S DEPARTMENT

(Chapter XII)

No. in post	Grade
1	Government Actuary
1	Deputy Government Actuary
4	Principal Actuaries
9	Actuaries
7	Assistant Actuaries
9	Actuarial Assistants

Work of the Department

1. The Government Actuary is, in effect, the consulting actuary to the Government and his advice is sought by many Departments on a wide range of subjects including national insurance (a field in which he has a special statutory responsibility), superannuation arrangements for public servants and employees of nationalised industries, population, morbidity and other statistics and the preparation of national life tables, problems connected with the Assurance Companies Act and the Friendly Societies Acts, etc. He also advises the Governments of Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, India, Pakistan and other countries of the Commonwealth on similar problems. The Department often has to prepare at short notice material for answering parliamentary questions, or estimates and memoranda relating to the financial or administrative provisions of Bills or Acts, and involving very large sums of public money.

2. The amount of routine work in the Department is very small. Actuaries in general are becoming increasingly recognised as not merely specialists in the theories of compound interest and life contingencies, but persons peculiarly fitted by training and experience to handle questions involving the collection, analysis and interpretation of all kinds of statistical data. The expansion of the work of the Department since the early days of National Health Insurance has been an outstanding example of this. Some of the problems referred to it may—especially if the relevant statistical data are incomplete—require the development of new techniques, or the adaptation of existing techniques, to meet the special circumstances of the case. A knowledge of the context in which a problem has arisen, an appreciation of the administrative reactions of the technical solution to it, and an ability to explain technical results in a way which the layman can understand are also necessary.

The Staff

3. Up to 1914 the professional staff of the Department—apart from a certain number of qualified and partly qualified actuaries introduced soon after the setting up of the Department in 1912—were recruited from the Intermediate Civil Service examination. Since 1920 recruitment has normally been through the Executive examination. To be eligible for assignment as an Actuarial Assistant a candidate must have reached a high standard in mathematics and have a high place in the pass list.

4. Members of the actuarial staff must become Fellows of the Institute of Actuaries or of the Faculty of Actuaries. This is a condition of service in the Department and a necessary requirement for promotion and involves a course of study including a large amount of spare-time study, for about eight years on average. The confirmation of appointment after the usual two years probationary period is subject to reasonable progress in the examinations.

5. A broad indication of the duties of the various grades is as follows:

6. **Principal Actuaries** are in control of the work of the Department and are directly responsible to the Government Actuary.

7. The duties of **Actuaries** and **Assistant Actuaries** include the planning and supervision of the calculations required on problems referred to the Department and the drafting of reports for the consideration of Principal Actuaries. This work involves the maintenance of contact with officers of Departments supplying the references and consultation with them on the form and details of the relevant statistical information.

8. The **Unqualified Actuarial Assistant** begins by doing calculations under the supervision of an Assistant Actuary or a senior Actuarial Assistant, and the scope and difficulty of his work gradually increases, more or less in step with his progress through the examinations. By the time he becomes a **Qualified Actuarial Assistant** he should have had experience of all the work of the Department and be competent to carry out all types of work under the general guidance of officers in the higher grades, and to supervise the work of the junior Actuarial Assistants.

ESTATE DUTY OFFICE

(Chapter XII)

No. in post	Grade
<i>English Office</i>	
1	Controller
2	Deputy Controllers
9	Assistant Controllers
49	Chief Examiners
117	Senior Examiners
270	Assistant Examiner/Examiners
<i>Scottish Office</i>	
1	Registrar
1	Deputy Registrar
7	Chief Examiners
18	Senior Examiners
28	Assistant Examiner/Examiners

Work of the Department

1. The function of the Estate Duty Office is the assessment and collection of the Death Duties. The examining staff are responsible for formulating and maintaining all claims for duty which arise in respect of property which passes or is deemed to pass on death.

2. The work requires an intimate acquaintance with Death Duty legislation and case law, a sound knowledge of general law and a more specialised knowledge of conveyancing and those other branches of the law affecting rights and interests in real and personal property. The construction of wills or settlements may raise, for example, questions concerning the vesting of gifts, the rule against perpetuities, or powers of appointment. In cases where property situated abroad is chargeable with Estate Duty, ascertainment of the liability to duty may demand a knowledge of private international law, especially those parts relating to domicile, the locality of assets, renvoi, and the proper law of contracts and settlements. Evidence as to foreign law may also have to be considered.

3. In addition to determining whether the property is taxable, the examining staff are responsible for ascertaining the correct valuation of all property (other than land) chargeable with duty. It will be readily appreciated that the valuation of such items as businesses, shares in private companies and interest in syndicates presents considerable difficulty.

4. The work is conducted by correspondence and interview, almost wholly with Solicitors and Accountants representing Executors and Trustees; and the responsibility resting on the staff, particularly at interviews, is considerable. In view of the present high rates of duty, Solicitors and Accountants must, in the interest of their clients, pursue each and every permissible point against the Office to the limit. Recent experience, in which practices that have endured for many years have been challenged in the Courts, illustrates this.

The Staff

5. Recruits to the Office are obtained from the Executive Examinations and enter as Assistant Examiners. During the first years of their career, entrants are required to obtain a legal qualification—either a University degree in law or a call to the Bar. The entrant is allowed 5 hours per week of official time to attend lectures, and his outlay is reimbursed to the extent of the cost of an internal degree at London University (approximately £100). The greater part of the work and study involved has to be done outside official hours and it can be fairly said to absorb most of an officer's private time.

DISTRICT AUDIT STAFF

(Chapter XII)

No. in post	Grade
1	Chief Inspector of Audit
1	Deputy Chief Inspector of Audit
15	District Auditors
17	Deputy District Auditors
63	Senior Assistant District Auditors
79	Junior Assistant District Auditors
224	Audit Examiners

Work of the Department

1. District auditors and their staffs are appointed by the Minister of Housing and Local Government, pursuant to Part X of the Local Government Act, 1933, to audit the accounts of Local Authorities in England and Wales. The whole of the accounts of the councils of counties, metropolitan boroughs, urban and rural districts and parishes, and those of river boards, drainage boards and a number of water boards (including the Metropolitan Water Board) are subject to audit by a district auditor. In addition, all of the accounts of 11 county borough and 127 borough councils are so subject, and the accounts of 72 county borough and 183 borough councils are in part audited by district auditors and in part by professional or elective auditors.

2. It may be estimated that district audit is applied to 75 per cent. of the income and expenditure (each amounting to upwards of £1,400,000,000 annually) of local authorities, the remaining 25 per cent. representing that part of the transactions of municipal boroughs not so audited. The authorities whose accounts are audited meet the cost of the service in accordance with a scale fixed by the Treasury. The statutory requirement that the service should result in no charge upon the Exchequer serves to emphasise the district auditor's position as an independent statutory officer. This was succinctly explained by the then Minister of Health in 1927:

"The district auditors are a body of officers appointed by the Minister of Health but they do not take directions from the Minister of Health. They are independent of him and they have duties laid upon them by Statute."

3. The audit held by a district auditor is an "audit" in the commonly accepted sense of the word. In addition, however, it is marked by the special attributes that it is public (i.e., held after due public advertisement) and that local government electors may attend and make objections to the accounts. Further, the district auditor has not only to allow and certify correct accounts: he has the duty of disallowing items of account which are contrary to law and of surcharging unlawful expenditure and losses due to negligence or misconduct upon the persons responsible. To assist him in the conduct of his audit he has powers to require the production before him of such books, deeds, vouchers and documents as he may deem necessary, whether belonging to the local authority and its officers or to any other body or person. He may require any person holding or accountable for a document to make a statutory declaration as to its correctness. After the completion of the audit, the district auditor must report to the local authority upon the accounts audited, and the authority must consider the report.

4. It will be appreciated that the auditor's duties are mandatory, and are not confined to such items as may have been objected to by local government electors. He is an investigator in his own right and must himself conduct such an audit as will satisfy him that he has not allowed any items of account contrary to law, that all sums have been properly brought to account and that any losses or deficiencies are visited upon those who have caused them. Exercise of any of the auditor's powers of allowance, dis-allowance and surcharge may be followed by an appeal against his decision by the person aggrieved, either to the High Court, where the amount involved exceeds £500, or, in other cases, to the Court or to the Minister. A person surcharged to an amount exceeding £500 is disqualified from holding office as a member of a local authority for five years.

5. Since the Minister is an appellate tribunal from the auditor's decision, it is not open to an auditor—even if he were so disposed—to seek the advice of the Department's legal officers upon questions which come before him, since those same legal officers may be called upon to advise the Minister in any appeal. Thus, it is the auditor who has to come to his decision, and, if so required, to state in writing his reasons for it. In the event of an appeal to the High Court, it is the auditor who will instruct his solicitor and arrange, through him for the services of counsel. In the event of an appeal to the Minister, if the appellant exercises his right to a personal hearing before the person appointed by the Minister, the auditor will usually appear in person. The appellant may appear by counsel.

6. A variety of authorities could be cited as to the scope of the district auditor's duties including references to reported cases for the last 100 years. The following example is taken from a widely recognised work of reference, Lumley's "Public Health," 12th Edition (vol. II at p. 1,950):—

"The duties of an auditor in general were thus explained by Lopes, L.J., in *Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (No. 2)* [1896]—

'It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent, careful and cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on the particular circumstances of each case. . . . He is a watch-dog but not a bloodhound. . . . If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the bottom. . . .'

The position of a district auditor, however, differs considerably from that of a company's auditor to whom the last cited case was referring, in that he is the public officer charged to a greater extent than anyone else with the duty of seeing that the authority act *intra vires*. For this reason it has been made clear that his duties are more far-reaching. In *R. v. Roberts* [1908] Farwell, L.J., said—

'I think the term "auditor" is unfortunate; it leads the mind to the idea of a company's auditor whose business is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the company at the time of the audit and nothing more. . . . But the auditors of the council are appointed by the Local Government Board, not by the council, nor are they elective. . . . I consider. . . that the auditor is appointed by the Local Government Board and is therefore presumably chosen for his fitness to perform the duties pointed out by the section and is not necessarily the mere accountant that Sir R. Finlay would seek to make him out. He is in this case a barrister.'

Extra Statutory Duties

7. In addition to his statutory functions, the district auditor and his assistants are frequently called upon by local authorities to advise them on points of difficulty and on arrangements for increasing efficiency and security. They have also to certify the claims of local authorities upon some 12 government departments for the wide variety of grants payable towards local expenditure. This duty is undertaken even where the accounts are not wholly subject to district audit. It involves, in effect, the incidence of charge of expenditure as between local rates and national taxes and there is good reason for stating that the officers of most local authorities appreciate the fact that the district auditor is an independent officer who will act impartially in the examination of these claims.

The Staff and Organisation

8. The Chief Inspector of Audit and his deputy (both former District Auditors) are appointed on the general establishment of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the Chief Inspector being responsible to the Minister for the efficiency of the Service and for the co-ordination of the work and liaison with other Government Departments for whom the auditors certify claims for grants. There is also at headquarters a Training Section consisting of one Deputy District Auditor and one Senior Assistant District Auditor.

9. England and Wales have been divided into 15 audit districts, each in the charge of a district auditor. The staff, consisting of Deputy District Auditors, Senior and Junior Assistant District Auditors, Audit Examiners and Clerical Officers is disposed amongst the districts according to the needs of the work.

10. The district auditor is, of course, responsible for the conduct of the audits within his district and normally signs all the statutory reports to local authorities, hears and determines the major objections, enters certificates of disallowance and surcharge and defends them in any legal proceedings which may ensue.

11. The audits are held at the local authorities' offices and, owing to the size of the districts and the remoteness of the places of audit, the officer immediately in charge is frequently isolated from the District Auditor. The officer in charge will be either a Deputy District Auditor or a Senior or Junior Assistant District Auditor, with a section manned by 2 Audit Examiners and 1 Clerical Officer. At the larger audits, of course, more than one section is employed. The Audit Examiners and Clerical Officers will look to the officer in charge for supervision, direction and instruction. It is his responsibility to satisfy himself before allowing the accounts, that the risk of undiscovered fraud, error or illegality has been eliminated with a reasonable degree of certainty. He will himself undertake important parts of the work and discuss matters arising out of his audit with the local authorities' chief officers and with mayors, chairmen and other members. His success in securing acceptance of his recommendations is a vital factor in the effectiveness of District Audit.

Recruitment—Previous methods of appointment

12. Prior to the introduction in 1921 of recruitment through normal Civil Service entrance competitions, appointments to the grade of Assistant District Auditor were by nomination and it had been usual since 1844 to appoint persons who were barristers-at-law, solicitors or chartered accountants, or those who had gained experience through service with a district auditor. In 1924, recruitment was through the examination for Assistant Inspector of Taxes, which attracted University graduates. At all times after 1911, appointments were subject to passing a qualifying examination designed to establish the candidates' competence in their professional duties, after a period of service.

13. In 1931, recruits to a cadet grade of Audit Assistant were obtained from the Executive class competition. They were required to pass a departmental examination, after a period of some three years' service, before being eligible for advancement to the grade of Assistant District Auditor.

The present position

14. Since 1939, new recruits have entered the grade of Audit Examiner from the Executive class competitions, and have been required to qualify professionally as a condition of advancement to the grade of Assistant District Auditor. A number of Clerical Officers promoted in 1939, who were not required to qualify, form a "reserved" class of officers which will shortly disappear.

Training

15. The unusual demands of the work to be performed, the extensive knowledge of statutory provisions and general law and the intimate acquaintance with the technique of auditing required have been recognised for many years and have resulted in training schemes for staff of the cadet grade. From about 1933, cadet Audit Assistants were posted to part of an audit district which was run as a training school. The numbers in training were relatively small and it was possible to combine the ordinary work of the district (which gave practical experience) with theoretical studies. This arrangement came to an end during the last war.

16. In 1946, the Civil Service Commissioners undertook the conduct of the professional qualifying examination. At the same time, in order to cope with an influx of untrained staff, a course was begun by the Department for the preparation of Audit Examiners for the professional examination. On entry to the Service an Audit Examiner may be posted to any audit district. Experience has shown that it is generally desirable for him to have at least six months to settle down and gain elementary practical experience before embarking upon the course, conducted by the Training section at headquarters. The papers for the course are issued in fortnightly stages and at each stage the student is required to submit written papers to be corrected and commented upon by the Training section. Periodical tests under examination conditions are also held. The fortnightly stages comprise comprehensive study notes and references to passages to be studied in prescribed textbooks.

The Professional Examination

17. The examination is in two parts, preliminary and final. The complete course of study extends over 3 years and, allowing for a period to obtain a general background before embarking upon the course, the new entrant has usually served 4 or 4½ years before sitting for the final examination.

18. The title preliminary examination is a misnomer. It is generally used in the case of professional bodies to denote a general educational test of approximately matriculation standard. The Audit Examiner, who must have passed the Executive class competition, will already have demonstrated the possession of a higher educational standard. The preliminary examination may properly be regarded as comparable to the intermediate examination of professional bodies. The subjects of the examination are:

Book-keeping and Accounts	...	...	...	...	3 hours' paper
Local Authority Accounts	...	...	...	...	3 " "
Auditing	...	...	...	...	3 " "
Local Government Organisation and Law	...	...	...	...	3 " "

and an oral examination. The pass mark is 60 per cent. in each subject, with a provision for "referring" candidates who fail in one subject, but who otherwise qualify by reaching a total of marks which is satisfactory.

19. The course of study extends over 12 months, the work being done in the students' own time, except for an allowance of official time to the equivalent of one day per fortnight. Normally only two attempts at the examination are allowed. Officers who fail to pass this examination which is partly designed to test the candidates' aptitude for audit work, are transferred out of the audit service.

20. The course of study for the final examination extends over a further 2 years, and makes even more considerable demands upon the private time of the candidates. The subjects of the examination are:

Local Authorities Finance and Accounts I	3 hours' paper
Local Authorities Finance and Accounts II	3 " "
Auditing	3 " "
District Audit Law and Procedure	3 " "
Local Government Organisation and Law	3 " "
General Law	3 " "

and an oral examination. The pass mark is again 60 per cent. in each subject; there is no provision for "referring" candidates in one subject.

21. Consideration of the scope of the professional examinations will assist the Royal Commission to an appreciation of what is required of the candidates and, indeed, of the scope of the work of the service. Taking, firstly, the Preliminary examination, the course covers:

Book-keeping and Accounts	A complete mastery of the principles of book-keeping is required.
Accounts of Local Authorities	This covers the application of the principles to the accounts of local authorities and includes consideration of machine accounting.
Auditing	Types of audits, principles of auditing, application of those principles to classes of accounts.
Local Government Organisation and Law	Constitution of local authorities. Law relating to Rating and Valuation; employees and their superannuation; borrowing; parish councils; expenses.
General Law	Nature and origins of English Law and its machinery; corporations.

Secondly, the course for the final examination covers:

Local Authorities' Finance and Accounts	Cost accounts; income tax computations; loans pools; consolidated loans funds; advanced accounting problems; commercial technique; special accounts, e.g., Housing, Education, Civic Restaurants, Water Undertakings.
Auditing	Use of statistics; financial control; budgetary control; contract settlements; borrowing; investments; special accounts, e.g., catering accounts, advances to house purchasers; review of balance sheets.
District Audit Law and Procedure	History. Detailed consideration of: control and conduct of audits; powers and duties of D.A.; notices to produce documents; statutory reports; certificates of disallowance and surcharge; reasons for auditor's decisions; evidence, appeals; recovery of sums due.
Local Government Organisation and Law	The powers and duties of local authorities generally; statutory provisions relating to particular services, e.g., Education, Housing, Rating, Public Health, Civil Defence, Children and Young Persons.
General Law	General Principles of: Interpretation of statutes; evidence; contract; property; crime; doctrine of <i>ultra vires</i> ; torts; income-tax; bankruptcy; mercantile law.

22. At all times since 1923, officers have been encouraged to obtain further qualifications in law or accountancy. Some are called to the Bar, some obtain an LL.B. degree and others qualify for membership of the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors. Monetary assistance (limited to one-half the cost of obtaining the LL.B. degree or half the cost of an accountancy course) has, since 1948, been available towards the cost of obtaining such additional qualifications.

CARTOGRAPHIC DRAUGHTSMEN*(Chapter XIII)***Details of work in various departments****ORDNANCE SURVEY**

1. The Ordnance Survey, is charged with the preparation and revision of the National Plans and Maps at many different scales—a responsibility involving the use of various technical methods. Cartographic work is also undertaken for public bodies within the United Kingdom and many other Government Departments. There has been, since World War II, an ever-closer liaison between the Department, Local Authorities, and other public bodies whereby the Ordnance Survey prepares special plans to their requirements or considers their needs during its preparation of the National Plans.

2. The Geodetic Control Division is responsible for providing by means of triangulation, traverse and computation an accurate framework of fixed points throughout the country forming a basis on which the detail survey depends, and providing heights for inclusion in the completed survey.

3. The field surveyor maintains this accuracy during the actual survey. After the framework has been plotted, ground detail is surveyed at either 1/1,250 or 1/2,500 scale for urban and rural areas respectively. When all names, boundaries and antiquities, together with levelling information provided by Geodetic Control have been shown, the plans are passed to the Reproduction Branch who prepare by photographic methods an accurate key base for the next stage of production.

4. The draughtsman makes a fair drawing of the plan, adding all names, boundaries, vegetation, symbols, and information provided by the Archaeology Division. After close scrutiny, a negative is made from which a printing plate is prepared.

5. Continuous ground revision with periodic re-publication ensures that accurate and up-to-date plans are always available.

6. From these large-scale plans are produced coloured maps at 6 in., 2½ in., and 1 in. to the mile. This last publication, traditionally and popularly known as the "one-inch" is the only topographical map published at this scale and based on an accurate survey. It is printed in ten colours and widely sold to a public of growing discrimination. Among other publications are the ½ in., ¼ in. and 10 miles to the inch layered editions. Maps of all scales are also produced on behalf of the War Office, Air Ministry and other Government Departments.

SURVEY PRODUCTION CENTRE, WAR DEPARTMENT

7. Certain specialist jobs undertaken at the Centre include Air Survey and computing work for survey, mapping and navigational purposes. The amount of air survey work is steadily growing as is the amount and complexity of the instruments needed to undertake such work. New developments in this field are adding continually to the burden of knowledge which the modern carto-draughtsman or map constructor must assimilate. Stereo-plotting equipment of the Multiplex, Zeiss and Wild type is becoming a vital necessity to modern map construction.

8. The growth of the navigational aid and the number of maps and charts needed to facilitate its use places a heavy work load on the geodetic and computing section. The constant change in the chains of radio aids and beacons all over the world means that a new and permanent field of work has now opened out.

SURVEY PRODUCTION CENTRE, WAR DEPARTMENT (AIR)

9. The foremost duty of No. 2 S.P.C. (Air) is to prepare and print Instrument Approach and Landing Charts for use by pilots of military and civil aircraft wishing to land in adverse weather conditions. Air information in the form of spot heights, hazards, beacons, traffic patterns, etc., has to be plotted with superlative accuracy and presented so clearly as to enable the user to assimilate at a glance his position relative to them.

10. Instrument Approach Charts also incorporate a Procedure Diagram. This is an accurate plot of the track flown by a pilot when descending through cloud to the airfield and is shown in both plan and profile. In order to draw the Procedure Diagram the draughtsman must have a knowledge of current R.A.F. and M.C.A. methods of approach on all radio and radar aids.

11. This Centre is also responsible for the production, regular amendment and printing of Radio Facility Charts covering the United Kingdom, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The charts are produced as three bound volumes, each of which is printed and distributed at regular intervals.

AIR MINISTRY

Specialist Jobs

12. A limited number of specialist jobs are called for by the branches; three-dimensional diagrams in several colours for reproduction, model making, flat material for exhibition display, photographic retouching, design for special photographic effects, and free-hand drawings constructed from scientific data supplied.

Diagrams

13. Preparation of maps and diagrams for publication in the main scientific, meteorological and climatological publications. The diagrams vary considerably in size and type, and have to be prepared to conform with the requirements of the various reproduction processes. Often this entails the use of multiple overlays and the interpretation of codes for synoptic charts and tephigrams from original coded messages. The more important types of diagram include plotting original meteorological and oceanographic data for atlases and Admiralty sailing directions. Preparation of wind roses and graphs from data, diagrams for Naval handbooks and work for world climatology. Outline drawing of meteorological instruments, and preparation of meteorological station site plans. Drawings of weather phenomena for publication from rough sketches submitted by authors. In general, all diagrams necessitate the preparation of a suitable background, in the light of the data supplied, and its interpolation.

DIRECTORATE OF COLONIAL SURVEYS

Surveying from Aerial Photographs

14. Expert knowledge of photogrammetry is required in those departments utilising aerial survey techniques for the compilation of maps for military purposes and Colonial development schemes. The cartographer so engaged must be conversant with modern stereoscopic plotting instruments such as the Zeiss Stereoplanigraph, Wild Autograph and the Williamson Multiplex. It is, of course, unnecessary to detail here the intricate technical processes involved. It will suffice to say that photogrammetry facilitates the measuring in three dimensions from aerial photographs; the conditions necessary for this may be achieved by various methods; e.g., in the multiplex instruments the anaglyphic principle is used, and the small-scale three-dimensional photographic model of the terrain so produced enables the cartographer to survey the area accurately. Graphical methods are also used for precise plotting of ground detail when required. Naturally the cartographer must be expert also in the interpretation of aerial photographs; e.g., he must be conversant with all the features and vegetation he is likely to encounter in the area to be mapped and be able to identify these features on the photographs.

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY AND MUSEUM

15. The work of the drawing staff of the Geological Survey is primarily concerned with the geological mapping of the British Isles. This is done on all scales, from 25 miles to the inch—to hand-coloured 6 inch to 1 mile sheets available to the public in the library of the museum. Although the topographical base is provided by Ordnance Survey, a geological map is a finished and constructive map compiled from field sketches and maps made by the scientific staff of the Survey.

TITHE REDEMPTION COMMISSION

16. In the Tithe Redemption Commission the function of trained cartographic staff is chiefly one of research into ancient maps, awards, apportionments and other legal documents. The information so obtained is recorded, together with information supplied by landowners and others, on the modern 1/2,500 scale Ordnance map as a basis for a legal instrument of Apportionment and/or Determination of Redemption Annuities created by the 1936 Tithe Act.

17. In determining the extent of the holding of half-a-million present-day landowners, complexities arise from the inaccuracy and "sketchiness" of many "plans" submitted by landowners and solicitors which must, nevertheless, be accurately reconciled with the latest Ordnance Survey revision.

18. Up-to-date revision on the ground, where required, is undertaken by the cartographic staff or by outside surveyors employed for the purpose.

MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

19. The work of the Headquarters Maps Office mainly consists of the cartographic presentation of surveys and research into natural resources, economic and social conditions. There is also mapping to illustrate current problems and the recording of survey information for general reference. The regional offices are engaged in similar work but in relation to local problems.

APPENDIX F—cont.

20. Maps on these subjects are prepared to illustrate the work of research, planning and administrative officers and committees, e.g., Air Pollution Committee and Advisory Committee on Sand and Gravel. They involve the collection and correlation of a variety of data, the design of suitable notations for preliminary studies, and carrying through of all stages to the final printing material.

21. The data may cover the interpretation from air photos of land utilisation and surface conditions, manipulation of statistics, selection of relevant information from Reports, Memoirs, etc., and any known published and manuscript maps at all scales.

DETAILS OF SALARY SCALES

(Chapter XIV)

At the present moment there are eighteen Treasury classes and linked departmental classes for which the Institution is responsible. Their salary scales (London, men) are set out below. (The scales attract the Pay Addition except where it is stated that they are consolidated scales.)

Professional Accountants

*Accountant	£650 (age 25) x 25—750 x 30—900.
*Senior Accountant	£900 x 30—990 x 40—1,220.
*Chief Accountant	£1,270 x 50—1,500.
Assistant Director	£1,400 x 50—1,500 x 75—1,600.
Director (Min. of Food)	£1,500 x 75—1,800 x 100—1,900.
Director (Admiralty, Board of Trade, Ministry of Supply)	£2,000.

Actuaries

Qualified Actuarial Assistant	£545 x 25—745 x 30—865.
Assistant Actuary	£900 x 30—990 x 40—1,075.
Actuary	£1,100 x 40—1,220 x 50—1,375.
Superintending Actuary	£1,450 (fixed).
Principal Actuary	£1,500 x 75—1,800 x 100—2,000.

Works Group

(Architects, Civil Engineers, Surveyors, Mechanical and Electrical Engineers, Industrial Chemists.)

*Basic Grade	£650 (age 25) x 25—750 x 30—960 x 40—1,000.
*Main Grade	£1,000 x 40—1,320.
*Senior Grade	£1,375 x 50—1,575.
Superintending Grade	£1,500 x 75—1,750.
Directing Grade	£1,850 x 100—2,125.
Directing Posts at	£3,500; £3,250; £2,750; £2,500; £2,000.

Psychologists

*Psychologist	£450 (age 21), 475 (22), 520 (23), 570 (24), 650 (25) x 25—750 x 30—960 x 40—1,000.
*Senior Psychologist	£890 x 30—980 x 40—1,195.
*Principal Psychologist	£1,265 x 50—1,550.
*Senior Principal Psychologist	£1,500 x 75—1,750.

Technical Works, Engineering and Allied Classes

*Grade IV	£430 (age 25) x 15—460 x 20—585.
*Grade III	£540 (age 26) x 20—580 x 25—670.
*Grade II	£665 (age 30) x 20—725 x 25—780.
*Grade I	£780 x 25—830 x 30—950.
*Grade "B"	£950 x 30—1,065.
*Grade "A"	£1,000 x 30—1,180.

Drawing Office (Cartographical and Recording) Staffs

Draughtsman	£150 (age 16) x 40—190 x 25—215 x 15—290 x 20—350 x 15—500.
Draughtsman (Higher Grade)	£400 (age 25) x 20—600.
Draughtsman (Senior Grade)	£600 x 20—700.
Chief Draughtsman	£700 x 25—825.

* Consolidated scales.

† Provincial scales.

Drawing Office (Architectural and Engineering) Staffs

*Draughtsman		£420 (age 21) x 20—480 x 25—670.
*Leading Draughtsman		£665 x 20—725 x 25—780.
*Senior Draughtsman		£780 x 25—830 x 30—950.
*Chief Draughtsman		£1,000 x 30—1,180.

Illustrators

Assistant Illustrator		£150 (age 16) x 40—190 x 25—215 x 15—260.
Illustrator		£340 (age 21) x 20—575.
Leading Illustrator		£570 x 20—675.
Senior Illustrator		£675 x 25—825.
Chief Illustrator		£870 x 25—970 x 30—1,030.
Manager, M.O.S.		£1,030 x 40—1,150.

Photographers

Assistant Photographer		£150 (age 16) x 40—190 x 25—215 x 15—245.
Photographer		£260 (age 21) x 20—300 x 15—390 x 20—425.
Senior Photographer		£450 x 20—550.
Principal Photographer		£580 x 20—600 x 25—700.
Chief Photographer		£750 x 25—800 x 30—875.
Ministry of Supply, top post		£910 x 30—1,030.
Air Ministry, top post		£910 x 30—1,000 x 40—1,150.

Composite Signals Organisation†

Assistant Station Radio Officer		£585 x 25—650.
Station Radio Officer		£675 x 25—725 x 30—785.
Senior Station Radio Officer		£790 x 30—915.
Principal Station Radio Officer at certain large stations		£1,000 x 40—1,200.

Scientific Officers

*Scientific Officer		£470 x 30—680 x 35—855.
*Senior Scientific Officer		£975 x 35—1,150.
*Principal Scientific Officer		£1,150 x 40—1,190 x 50—1,570.
Senior Principal Scientific Officer		£1,500 x 75—1,750.
Deputy Chief Scientific Officer		£1,850 x 100—2,125.
Chief Scientific Officer		£2,500.
Posts above Chief Scientific Officer		£4,500; £3,750; £3,500; £3,250; £2,850; £2,500.

Experimental Officers

*Assistant Experimental Officer		£290 (age 18) x 30—470 x 25—645
*Experimental Officer		£720 x 25—770 x 30—890.
*Senior Experimental Officer		£1,030 x 40—1,230.
*Chief Experimental Officer		£1,260 x 50—1,510.

Assistants (Scientific)

*Established Assistant		£250 (age 18) x 20—270 x 15—285 x 20—325 x 15—340 x 20—460 x 15—520.
*Established Senior Assistant		£550 x 25—625 x 30—745.

* Consolidated scales.

† Provincial scales.

APPENDIX G—*cont.*

Medical Officers

† Medical Officer	£1,500 (age 35) x 75—1,800 x 100—2,100.
Senior Medical Officer	£2,200.
Principal Medical Officer	£2,300.
Deputy Chief Medical Officer	} £2,500.
Deputy Director General	
Senior Medical Senior Commissioner	
Chief medical officer (Colonial office)	
Chief medical officer (M.P.N.I.)	} £2,850
Treasury medical adviser	
Deputy Chief Medical Officer (M.O.H.)	} £3,000.
Chief Medical Officer (Scotland)	
Chief Medical Officer (M.O.H.)	
	£4,000

Information Officers

* Assistant Information Officer	£290 (age 18) x 30—470 x 25—770 x 30—800.
* Information Officer	£830 x 30—890 x 35—995.
* Senior Information Officer	£1,030 x 40—1,230.
* Principal Information Officer	£1,260 x 50—1,510.
* Chief Information Officer	£1,325 x 50—1,475.
	£1,500 x 75—1,800 x 100—2,000.

Librarians

* Librarian Grade IV	£290 (age 18) x 30—470 x 25—770 x 30—800.
* Librarian Grade III	£830 x 30—890 x 35—995.
* Librarian Grade II	£1,030 x 40—1,230.
* Librarian Grade I	£1,260 x 50—1,510.

Drawing Office Assistants

* Drawing Office Assistant (female)	£230 (age 18) x 20—290 x 25—315 x 20—375 x 25—400.
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Tracers

* Learner Tracer (female)	58s. (age 15), 62s. (16), 68s. (17), 75s. (18), 80s. (19), 85s. (20), 90s. (21 and over).
* Tracer (female)	66s. (16), 75s. (17), 82s. (18), 91s. (19), 98s. (20), 105s. (21), 111s. (22), 117s. (23), 122s. (24) x 5s.—127s. x 6s.—133s.
* Leading tracer (female)	134s. x 4s. 6d.—143s.
* Head tracer (female)	£395 x 15—440 x 20—460.

* Consolidated scales.

† Medical Officer scale is not consolidated but is one in which Pay Addition is assumed.

Memorandum of evidence submitted by the Society of Technical Civil Servants in respect of draughtsmen (architectural and engineering) and associated drawing office grades.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Society of Technical Civil Servants is an organisation of some 7,600 members. These are in the main employed in various drawing office grades. In the grades dealt with in this document, the Society has a little over 7,000 members.

2. The Society shares national recognition with the Institution of Professional Civil Servants for the linked departmental classes of draughtsmen (architectural and engineering), draughtsmen (cartographic and recording), drawing office assistants and tracers.

3. The Society also has recognition for the various small departmental classes of drawing office staffs. Of these, only the grade of drawing office manager, Ministry of Supply, is directly before the Royal Commission.

4. Discussions have taken place between the Institution of Professional Civil Servants and the Society on the detailed evidence to be presented to the Royal Commission. The evidence contained in this document is virtually identical with corresponding parts of the submission from the Institution.

II. PRINCIPLES OF REMUNERATION

III. THE PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CIVIL SERVICE

5. The Institution and the Society are also agreed on the basic factors which should underlie the pay structure in the drawing office field. The Institution in their document, of necessity, deal with the whole of their field of membership. It would be inappropriate for the Society to comment so widely. It will, perhaps, best meet the convenience of the Royal Commission if we state that both organisations are fully in agreement on these questions. That being the case, it may suffice if we here record merely the fundamentals as they seem to us.

6. So far as the principles of remuneration are concerned, these fundamentals are:—

(a) That civil service pay should be maintained at its real values through National Whitley Council machinery on the basis of experience outside the Civil Service as disclosed by the wage rates index so far as salary scales up to and including the maximum of the clerical class are concerned and by other general statistical indications for classes on salary scales higher than that of the clerical class;

(b) that the pay of the various classes should

(i) take full account of the responsibilities involved in and the character of the duties performed, the proper maintenance and development of the cultural and professional standards of the officers concerned, the social position of the officers as servants of the State, the capacity they show in performance of the work and the contentment of the officers;

(ii) where appropriate, and to the extent possible, be so determined as to take account of the pay and other emoluments given outside the Civil Service by the best employers of the kind of officer concerned;

(iii) take account of the levels of remuneration of officers in the Civil Service exercising similar responsibilities or in related classes.

7. Dealing with that part of the professional, technical and scientific Civil Service, with which the Society is concerned, the factors are that these grades should be accorded a status and standing in relation to the remainder of the Civil Service that

(a) more accurately represent the relationship obtaining between the administrator and the professional man outside the Civil Service.

(b) more accurately reflect the importance of the professional man in the life of the country as a whole.

- (c) give real effect to the frequently announced views that it is important to encourage young people to take up professional, scientific and technical careers.

IV. ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING DRAUGHTSMEN

8. The make-up of this class is set out in paragraph 327 of the Factual Memorandum. The details are:—

“ 327. The classes are composed of the following grades:—

	Numbers at 1.4.53			Pay	
	Established	Temporary	Total	Men	Women
Chief draughtsman ...	94	—	94	£ a year 938—1,106	£ a year —
Senior draughtsman ...	671	52	723	734— 891	618—760
Leading draughtsman ...	1,803	240	2,043	623— 734	539—618
Draughtsman ...	3,434	1,896	5,330	397— 628	397—550
	6,002	2,188	8,190		

N.B.— (i) The scales relate to staff in London and include pay addition.

(ii) Above chief draughtsmen there is also, in the Ministry of Supply, a grade of drawing office manager (5 staff) on a scale of £1,106—£1,229.

(iii) The present and earlier men's scales are set out in detail in Appendix H 1.

(iv) The rest of this Chapter will not be concerned with women's scales.

(v) Separate figures for men and women are not available.”

9. It is necessary first to explain that the architectural and engineering draughtsman class covers a wide range of officers. This class, like the technical class, is a linked departmental class and not a general service class. The architectural and civil engineering draughtsman (called architectural or civil engineering assistant in many Departments) generally has a different kind of training from the mechanical and electrical engineering draughtsman.

10. The mechanical and electrical engineering draughtsman has obtained his Ordinary National Certificate and usually had an engineering apprenticeship. The Certificate normally requires a three years' intensive course of evening studies.

11. The architectural and civil engineering assistant is normally articled to a practising architect or civil engineer for a period of five years. This is supplemented by evening studies to an equivalent standard with the Ordinary National Certificate.

12. The position is summarised clearly in the regulations for the open competition. These regulations say:—

“(i) Every candidate must have obtained the Ordinary National Certificate or an equivalent or higher qualification: Except that, for the posts of Architectural and Civil Engineering Draughtsman candidates will be admitted, who, in place of this qualification, can show evidence of such professional training and experience, as, in the opinion of the Commissioners, fits them for consideration for these posts.

(ii) Every candidate must have had at least three years' practical experience, including at least six months in a Drawing Office.

For Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Draughtsmen posts in the Admiralty and Ministry of Supply a comprehensive apprenticeship including suitable workshop experience (or equivalent training of not less than three years) with a good class engineering concern in addition to experience as a draughtsman is required.

For posts in the Ministry of Works the three years' practical experience must include at least one year in a Drawing Office.”

13. Architectural and engineering draughtsmen are concerned with the production of working drawings from which architectural, civil engineering, mechanical and electrical work is carried out. Maps and illustrations are prepared by other civil service classes. The basic requirements of the draughtsman are a sound understanding of architectural or engineering construction work to enable detailed drawings to be prepared and a sound theoretical training for design purposes. Drawing skill, whilst important, is a secondary requirement. The professional officer determines policy both in the organisation of the work and overall design. The development of these broad decisions falls upon the draughtsman and responsibility for detailed work is his. The relationship between the professional officer and the draughtsman makes a direct analogy with the relationship between the administrator and the executive officer.

14. Reference is made in the Treasury Memorandum to the fact that draughtsmen are in linked departmental classes and in non-interchangeable groups. For example, an architectural draughtsman is not interchangeable with an electrical draughtsman. This must not be taken to imply that within these groups the work does not cover a wide field. To take civil engineering as an example, it may cover roads, bridging structures, water supply, sanitation and ancillary services, whilst under mechanical engineering there are instrument work, machines of all types, plant, aircraft, guns, engines, etc., in an almost inexhaustible list. Moreover, new techniques are continually being evolved as for example the progress in radar, television, radio, prestressed concrete, plastic theory of structures, jet propulsion, and drawing office design staffs must keep abreast of new developments.

15. Architectural and engineering problems rarely follow a pattern which enables the solution to be found by the application of simple rules and regulations. The draughtsman must in the detailed design ensure that it fulfils the functional requirements demanded of it, he must make the necessary calculations to ensure that the components are of adequate strength and use materials and methods of manufacture that will produce a sound, suitable and economical job. Considerable savings can be and are made by draughtsmen as a result of their good design and construction based upon experience. Such economies cannot readily be checked by a senior officer, and the responsibility for determining the most economical means of carrying out the work is left on the shoulders of the individual officer. Like the executive officer in his sphere, the draughtsman in his is constantly called upon to prepare schemes for submission to senior officers.

16. It is noteworthy that a substantial proportion of the staff possess at least the Higher National Certificate or its equivalent and these qualifications are taken into account for promotion. A survey made of the qualifications of the Ministry of Supply drawing office staff gave the following results:—

	Number who are corporate members of professional institutions	Number with university degrees	Number who are graduates of professional institutions	Number with H.N.C.	Number with O.N.C.	Number with City and Guilds Final Certificate	*Number with none of the previous qualifications
D.O. managers	3	—	—	—	—	—	2
Chief draughtsmen ...	12	1	—	6	—	—	15
Senior draughtsmen ...	47	5	17	42	15	1	63
Leading draughtsmen	35	1	80	111	65	10	135
Draughtsmen ...	9	7	88	287	427	10	394

* This includes a number who passed the pre-war Civil Service Commission examination for War Department draughtsmen. The number of officers qualifying by this method is not known. The standard of that qualification is indicated by the fact that the lowest exempting qualification was the Higher National Certificate.

Furthermore it has been observed that although three years' experience of the drawing office is required by the competition regulations, very rarely have draughtsmen with less than five years' practical experience been accepted for appointment by the Civil Service Commission in spite of the known shortage of draughtsmen. This underlines the high quality of the work that is required of the civil service draughtsman.

17. The presence of the drawing office assistant class is an indication of the same thing. The drawing office assistant is able to take over an amount of the routine work which, in drawing offices outside the Civil Service, would fall to the younger draughtsman in the course of building up his experience.

18. Given the range of training required and the responsibilities falling on the officer it is significant that although in the basic grade of architectural and engineering draughtsman salary in the earlier years is somewhat greater than that of the executive officer, the grade goes to a much lower maximum than does the executive officer. As with the technical classes, the entrant to the basic grade goes to a maximum of only £670 and even having secured one promotion still rises only to £780 which is still below the maximum of the basic grade of the executive officer class.

19. This is wrong. Wrong not only in its treatment of these officers but wrong in the sense of a proper direction of the youth of the country in the careers they should follow. Given the training, and that is obviously considerable; given the responsibilities of the work; it is the Society's submission that, in any circumstances the draughtsman should get no less than the executive officer and that the salary scales of the various grades should be improved to attain that position. But more than this is necessary.

20. What is the career prospect of a draughtsman? What are the opportunities for the architectural and engineering draughtsman as compared with the executive officer? Taking the figures already quoted from paragraph 327 of the Factual Memorandum, it will be seen that of senior draughtsman and above there are only 765 established officers. That is to say, only one eighth of the established complement is at the higher levels. This means that it is impossible for the average draughtsman to reach even the senior grade and he certainly cannot reach the chief grade. That is to say, the summit of the draughtsman's career so far as the great majority are concerned is the leading draughtsman grade, a grade with a maximum of only £780 as compared with the executive officer who in his basic grade will go to a maximum of £800.

21. This is a disparity of treatment that is remarkable on any basis. It is particularly remarkable having regard to the highly selective nature of the requirements imposed on draughtsmen before they can become established. It is remarkable if regard is had to the national interest and the emphasis that, in other places, is laid on the importance of attracting persons to a technical career. There is no basis, so far as remuneration is concerned, to lead a parent or teacher to advise a young person to take up the career of a draughtsman in the Civil Service in preference to going for the career of an executive officer.

22. With such disparity of treatment against the draughtsman is it to be wondered at that the shortage of these officers in the Civil Service is particularly acute. During the whole period since the war there have been serious recruitment difficulties and Departments have resorted to a number of ways of getting the draughtsman assistance that they require. They have in some places reduced the standards, in other places they have overcome staff shortages by engaging draughtsmen on a contract basis at great expense and a great deal of work has been put out to private organisations. The age limit for recruitment has been extended up to 60 years, but still the requirements of the Civil Service have not been satisfied. In the light of the figures given it can hardly be a matter of surprise to the Royal Commission.

23. It is the Society's submission that grades in the draughtsman class should be equated in the first instance, and subject to what is said in the following paragraphs, with the executive officer class in the following way:—

Draughtsman	...	Executive officer.
Leading draughtsman	...	Higher executive officer.
Senior draughtsman	...	Senior executive officer.
Chief draughtsman	...	Chief executive officer.

As this would involve increasing the chief draughtsman salary from a maximum of £1,180 to a maximum of £1,510 this may seem startling. But it is the measure of the underpayment of the draughtsman class.

24. The grade of drawing office manager exists at the present time only in the Ministry of Supply and the Lord President's Office, although there are in the Admiralty various chief draughtsmen with allowances. Until 1946 the grade was paid on the same basis as Royal Ordnance Factory managers. After reconstruction the R.O.F. managers were assimilated to the senior grade in the works group, but the drawing office manager's position was left at a much lower level. At the time there was only one over-age officer in the post and the general position was let go by default. In recent years the importance of the post has been realised and its use has been extended but there has been no considered re-assessment of the salary scale. The work consists of the technical control and administration either of large blocks of staff from 200 to 300 in number including several chief draughtsmen or alternatively, the control of a fairly complex block of drawing office work as at certain atomic energy establishments. The drawing office manager is the controller of a sizeable department and to pay such an officer only £130 more than the chief draughtsman seems wholly inadequate in relation to the manager's considerably greater responsibility. It is suggested that such a post should be remunerated on a flat salary not a salary scale and that the figure should be not less than £300 above the maximum of the chief draughtsman.

25. There is a one in twenty six chance of an executive officer whether a direct entrant or promoted from the clerical class of getting to the post of chief executive officer or above. That is calculated simply by taking the number of posts at chief executive officer level and upwards as a proportion of the total complement. Yet the draughtsman's chance of becoming a chief draughtsman is only one in sixty three, and in only two Departments, for practical purposes, is the opportunity available. That is to say he has less than half the chance of the executive officer of getting to that level and even then, of course, it would only be to the level of the chief executive officer and not to the higher levels available within the executive officer class. This situation arises in part because the higher posts are held not by draughtsmen but by professional officers. The officer's opportunity of becoming a professional officer is related entirely, or almost entirely, to his obtaining the necessary professional qualifications.

26. The counterpart of the draughtsman is found not in the executive class as a whole but in the direct entrant executive officer. He, for promotion, is in competition with a large number of class to class promotees from the clerical grades. The direct entrant executive officer, therefore, will almost certainly obtain earlier promotion than executive class officers generally and Treasury statistics have shown that the first promotion for such an officer is about 30 years of age. There is no class to class promotion into the draughtsman class. Each draughtsman has to satisfy the Civil Service Commission that he possesses the full qualifications for recruitment before he can enter the basic established grade of the draughtsman class.

27. In other words the draughtsman has a career lamentably inferior to that available to the executive officer.

Examination of Witnesses

MR. J. F. FRY, *Chairman*

MR. E. HEWLETT, *Vice-Chairman*

MR. W. F. BAILEY, *Deputy Vice-Chairman*

MR. S. MAYNE, *General Secretary*

MR. T. H. PROFITT, *Deputy General Secretary*

MR. J. R. WATSON, *Assistant Secretary*

on behalf of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants.

Called and examined.

1785. *Chairman:* My first question is the normal one I put, on your representative capacity; is there anything you would like to add to what you have submitted, and have you any similar reservations to those of the F.D.A., who did not claim to speak for the two highest grades of the administrative class?—*Mr. Mayne:* No, Sir. We have membership up to the highest grades on our side, though we have not had them serving on our committees in dealing with this; that would not be regarded as proper. So this represents the Institution's considered views in respect of them, without our suggesting that they have been specifically considered or endorsed by individual officers.

1786. If we pass to Chapter II, principles of remuneration, in paragraph 14 you quote, with some disapproval, the Treasury statement in paragraph 26 (2) of their first memorandum of evidence that for any particular class of civil servants comparison should be made with the current rate paid by the generality of outside employers to staff engaged on comparable work. Why do you consider that the Civil Service should be paid differently from the generality of comparable outside staff?—Partly tradition and partly the nature of the job that the Civil Service is required to do. As we indicate in the preceding paragraphs, the tradition has been quite different from the Treasury statement, and very much of the work in some Departments is, I will not say "supervisory," but to consider proposals from other professional people and to pass an opinion upon them; or to look at the work that is being done by other professional people and to pass an opinion, not so much upon the way it is being done, but on whether Ministers' desires and the intentions of Parliament are being carried out. That kind of factor, we should have thought, required something more than just the average of the profession. Moreover anything the Government does is much more open to public criticism than anything done by private bodies.

1787. *Sir George Mowbray:* Do you mean that there is no comparable staff outside?—Only in part. We have indicated

in later paragraphs the difficulties in establishing comparability, but there is nothing I think, comparable, for example, to the work that is being done by the architects in the housing division of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, whose work it is to examine housing plans and proposals submitted by local authorities, or to that of surveyors of roads in the Ministry of Transport, who deal with road proposals of local authorities. That kind of function derives definitely and clearly from the function of government.

1788. *Mr. Willis Jackson:* These of course are relatively small classes compared with the whole of the specialist classes. Are you intending to generalise?—No, Sir. I was giving specific illustrations, but any illustration will almost certainly be one of a small body of people, since the total of professional and scientific officers is not very considerable.

1789. But in respect of the generality are there not comparable classes outside?—Not in respect of some of the work that involves a form of oversight of that of other professional officers; there is other work which is much more directly comparable to that being done elsewhere, but because it is Government work it is very much more subject to public criticism—and rightly so—than that which is normally done outside.

1790. *Chairman:* Presumably you would not endorse what the Treasury said in their last sentence in reply to question 57: "the doctrine of fair wages has been not that wages outside were in the main fair but that it was fair to pay Crown servants something which was, by and large, the same sort of thing as they would get in other employment?"—No, Sir, because they are stating in a different way their thesis that it is the average which is right, and we say that that is contrary both to the tradition and the needs of the Civil Service.

1791. In the same paragraph you refer to the Treasury views on "good employers". What do you understand by a good employer? Does it mean more.

than the one who pays higher rates?—It is difficult to define, but it is well known amongst people in most professions and trades that X and Y are good employers to be with, whereas Z is a bad one.

1792. *Mr. Menzler*: Is it not really a question of public esteem and of the reputation some employers have as good employers, something that is quite well known in industry?—Yes.

1793. *Chairman*: Is it the view of the I.P.C.S., as it would seem from paragraphs 14 and 19, that in making fair comparisons regard must be had to the prosperity, or the lack of it, of the organisation with which a comparison is being made?—Yes.

1794. Then does not that make fair comparison harder than ever?—Indeed, part of our theme is that comparisons are extremely difficult to make.

1795. In paragraphs 17 to 26 you suggest that outside comparisons can properly be made for certain categories of staff but cannot or should not be made for others. Have you any other instances apart from medical officers in the first category?—There is no other example that springs to my mind.

1796. It might be said that your view is that outside comparisons should be used when they produce the most favourable result for the civil servant, and not otherwise?—We would not wholly dissent from that! The medical profession is pretty well unique because of the work of Sir Will Spens and his committees in defining the proper standard of remuneration for the profession. That has not happened in the case of any other, so far as I am aware.

1797. *Sir Alexander Gray*: What would you say about engineers?—I would think that the engineering profession was the most difficult area for comparisons. In the first place there is the difficulty of defining an engineer, which has caused great trouble to the profession. The kinds of work in which they are engaged, and the circumstances of that work—in the main with private employers—differ very much, and it is very, very difficult to ascertain exactly what an individual's remuneration is, using the word "remuneration" to mean his total income.

1798. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Take the graduate engineer who goes into an industrial research laboratory, and the graduate engineer who enters the scientific officer class of the Ministry of Supply. What is the essential difference between the types of work and the degree of responsibility of two such young men?—I should have thought there was a degree of comparability. But the difficulty in trying

to make comparisons is in the difference of organisation, difference of career prospects and of the requirements on the individual.

1799. You think the requirements on the individual are more severe in the civil service side at that stage?—In securing the appointment, normally, yes.

1800. I would have thought it was not too difficult to draw comparisons between type of work and degree of responsibility in the early years of employment?—I defer to your obviously greater knowledge! But surely there is a difficulty in finding exact parallels over the firm requirements. Take the civil service requirement that the officer shall be a first or second class honours graduate. That is very strictly applied by the Civil Service Commissioners, as you will have gathered. It is, to the best of my information, far less strictly applied outside.

1801. I would not have thought so for research and development departments in big industrial organisations.—I can only say that when we were going into this in considerable detail, a year or more ago, we found that we could not establish comparisons; that might of course be because firms just will not give us the clear and definite information that we want.

1802. *Mr. Menzler*: Is not one reason that your grading system has no real parallel outside?—I think that is entirely true.

1803. *Chairman*: In paragraph 25 you suggest that outside comparison is difficult because in the professional field many salaried officers are employed in organisations which follow the civil service salary pattern. The Gardiner Committee did not consider this difficulty as one they could not get over; did they not in fact find that civil service rates at that time were lower than those obtaining in industry and local government?—Yes, Sir. We of course have not been given full details of the inquiry that they made, but there were certain obvious holes in it. We do not know, for instance, the details of the range they covered, but, as I understand it, they made no enquiries about career prospects or ancillary sources of remuneration.

1804. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 25 you draw attention to parallels with private practice, and suggest that there should be some considerable discount in respect of business risks. Would you really regard that as offering a feasible basis? If you were dealing with lawyers, could you take a leading barrister and discount his salary for the risk he took in entering the profession? Do you think that people in private practice offer any comparable basis with civil servants in a graded service, and, shall

I say, a very high degree of security of tenure?—I should have thought so, Sir. If the suggestion were that one should take a particular barrister, or a small number of barristers, the answer would be "No", but, taking the generality, I should have thought—assuming one could get the information—that that would be right enough. The kind of discount that one would make for this could not have a scientific basis; it would have to be *ad hoc*. But it is private practice which sets the standard for the profession, surely, is it not, and by which everybody else would measure the income and standard of living they may reasonably expect to get, it being the sort of thing that their colleagues in schools or universities and articulated clerkships would expect to maintain in general.

1805. *Chairman*: In paragraphs 27 to 32 you refer to perquisites. Have you any view as to how the element you mention in paragraph 32 could or should be quantified?—Not the remotest, Sir! We have looked at this, and there has been some discussion amongst us, but we came to the conclusion that there was no useful comment we could make to the Commission, because so far as we are aware there is no straightforward way of trying to measure this element.

1806. You have just a general feeling that it ought to be taken into account?—Yes, we are very clear about that, because it does seem to us to be so important. For example, the Professional Engineers' Appointments Bureau, in the leaflet which they issue to employers, ask for details of the salary offered and supplementary remuneration, if any. That indicates the stage to which this has now got in ordinary daily life: it is an ordinary part of a very ordinary form issued as a routine measure.

1807. But you have no idea whether it should be 10 per cent., 15 per cent. or what, that should be added for this element? *Sir Alexander Gray*: It will vary enormously, will it not, from one profession to another?—Indeed it will.

1808. From being nothing at all in many cases?—Yes, to quite exorbitant arrangements. There was of course the case quoted as an example in the "Accountant" just recently, which members of the Commission probably saw in the Press.

1809. *Lady Albemarle*: It said this morning that that was an imaginary case.—I had thought it must be—but it was a pretty story, just the same.

1810. *Chairman*: In paragraphs 36 and 37 you say that the Treasury practice of quoting information about outside rates without giving full details or allowing the

staff associations to check up on it is unfair and misleading, and that if the Commission could find an answer to this problem it would go a long way towards solving the negotiating problems in the Civil Service. Have you any suggestions to make yourselves on that point?—Yes, Sir, the one thing implicit in this is that where either side for the matter of that are quoting outside examples they should make the information freely available to the other. Not long since I had occasion to go along to the Treasury on one of our cases, and the Treasury officer had a list of outside examples; they were identified only by letters, but he gave the nature of the firms as a kind of identifying material, and I said: "All right, this is interesting, can I take the list away? I suppose you will not give me the list of names?" He said: "No", but I said: "Let me take the list away and we will see what we can find out." He said: "No, if you are going to do that you cannot have the list", and promptly withdrew it! That, I think, reduces that kind of information to complete nonsense so far as negotiations are concerned, because there is no check of any kind that we can make. But if we could make a joint investigation of the material so that we are satisfied that all the factors that ought to be taken into account are taken into account, that would be satisfactory.

1811. Do you think it would help if there were a permanent body, or branch of the Treasury, which made it its job to carry out a running survey of the sort that a Royal Commission makes?—Yes, provided we could know the details of the make-up.

1812. *Mr. Menzler*: Are you asking that particulars of individual firms should be made known or that there should be generalised figures computed centrally by the Board of Inland Revenue or the Central Statistical Office?—The former.

1813. Do you think it is feasible to expect private employers to give this information?—It would be necessary to use a good deal of discretion in the use of the information, but unless both of us have access to the information it is unreasonable to use it in negotiations. For example, there was a recent case at arbitration where the Treasury quoted a particular case that we were able to identify from the material, and we found a number of factors which very materially modified what the Treasury had said. An enquiry about remuneration has to be very wide; it has to take account of career prospects and all kinds of other things.

1814. What I am suggesting is that you are in an impasse; private employers by

and large are not disposed to give material to the Treasury or anybody else for disclosure in wages negotiations.—I think you are entirely right. I do not think they would do it, therefore it ought to be ruled out.

1815. *Chairman*: Would you care to give a figure for the persons in paragraph 8 whose incomes the Government can directly or indirectly control?—My impression is that we calculated this as about five or six million people, but that is only a recollection, not authoritative.

1816. *Mr. Menzler*: I suppose you have in mind public boards. Are you asserting that the Government have any real say in their establishment policy? May I put it to you that I do know that in negotiations, shall we say, with the T.S.S.A. I have never seen any signs of governmental intervention in the negotiations on clerical wage claims. I am not saying it does not happen, I am only saying I have seen no signs of it.—I am very glad to hear it! Maybe it is because the rates of salaries in that particular area are fairly generally, I think I am right in saying, lower than those in the Civil Service, and that therefore it is not necessary for pressure to be exercised.

1817. *Mr. Cash*: Could I just press this one step further? You use the words "guidance and control". Those two things are not the same?—No, Sir, I would say that guidance is given but control is perhaps the wrong term to use. It will vary with the organisations. Take the Agricultural Research Council; there there is a quite tight control exercised by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, which is of course the same thing as the Treasury for this purpose.

1818. *Lady Albemarle*: But do they not get a 100 per cent. grant? Is not that why there is a control?—That is the means by which the control is exercised.

1819. It is not a nationalised body that is paying the wages?—No.

1820. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: In paragraph 38 you say that the creation of a large number of public boards is a major factor in putting the Government in the position of being the salary fixing authority. Is your point that, although the Government is now in that position, it has not made adequate use of it to establish satisfactory salaries for the kind of people you are considering?—It makes it very difficult to use the salaries paid in those boards as a measure of what should be paid in the Civil Service, that is our point.

1821. You were not intending that statement to be more general and to embrace the country as a whole?—No, Sir, I am

sorry we were not as clear there as we might have been.—*Mr. Fry*: This is an indication of the difficulties arising from any attempt to apply the Tomlin formula.

1822. *Chairman*: In paragraph 40 you mention two occasions when civil service pay got seriously behind the rest of the country because of Government policy. What were they?—*Mr. Mayne*: First, the freeze period, 1948 to 1950; secondly, after the pay addition of 1952, when again the Civil Service slipped seriously behind. We could have said that there were three occasions, because of the period up to 1946, so probably three is the right figure here, rather than two.

1823. In paragraphs 42 to 54 you suggest that the real value of civil service pay should be maintained by adjusting it from time to time in the light of the wage index and of movements in salaries and professional earnings. How would you deal with the objection that these figures give only an average drawn from a wide range of occupations and of income bands?—I do not think one really can deal with it, Sir! This is a very difficult proposition; there is no doubt about that. I think one could get some light on the subject if the Inland Revenue were to utilise and make available the information they have.

1824. *Mr. Menzler*: But supposing salaries by and large on a salaries index go up 100 per cent. outside, are you suggesting there should be a 100 per cent. increase in civil service salaries?—Yes, I should have thought so, Sir.

1825. But that 100 per cent. which I have postulated is the summation of a large number of differential increases in all kinds of professions and walks of life. Would it be equitable from a social point of view to apply a blanket increase to all civil service salaries irrespective of function?—But if you have a general increase over the whole country of 100 per cent. it is difficult to believe that that would not indicate a general rise in the standard of living, or maybe merely in the face value of cash. If of course there was a special definite uplift of a section for a clearly unusual reason, that would be a modifying factor.

1826. *Chairman*: Suppose, for example, a large class of workers got a rise in pay which was mainly based on a re-assessment of work values, that would be a special element which ought to be taken into account?—Yes, I agree.

1827. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I am not quite sure how this would work. If you had a figure of 100 per cent., and that included some special cases, would you have your increase then cut down from 100 per cent.

to, say, 80 per cent.?—It would be a calculable figure.

1828. *Chairman*: In paragraph 44 you say that evidence about salary changes supports evidence on wage rates. Have you in mind Blue Book figures?—Yes, Sir, the figures are summarised in our Appendix A, and there is no big change in the proportion of salary earners to wage earners over the various periods.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

1829. *Mr. Menzler*: You will remember we took the hypothetical case that the salaries index shows an increase of 100 per cent. That 100 per cent. comes from a large number of increases in rates. It is an average of averages. Do you think it would be valid to apply such an increase to all grades in the Service?—I would have thought so. Once you have got your salary levels fixed, it seems to us it is necessary to do something to maintain the general value of those levels in relation to the community. I think this aspect of wage fixing has developed primarily because of the fairly rapid fall in the value of money over recent years, and the only way we see you can do this is to take general relationships of that kind, the sort of thing which the Tomlin Commission described as the long term trend. We should have thought of that as not being meticulously right in any one case but as dealing out rough justice.

1830. Would you not agree that changes outside do establish different relationships between one occupation and another with the passage of time?—Certainly.

1831. The social evaluation of the work changes. Take the case of the miners.—Yes; but, as I think we agreed this morning, when there was this re-evaluation, it was a quite clear and definite act. People knew what they were doing and did it. It was not a thing that slid in unnoticed. It was done for a quite specific reason, in much the same way, I should have thought, as the operations of the Spens Committee which took the medical profession and dental profession and said what the standard of living ought to be in relation to the general standards of living in 1939. That sort of thing does not happen very often. We are suggesting surely an operation of the same kind in relation to professional and scientific civil servants in the Civil Service at this point in time. We do not expect it to be a continuing process. It is an operation which should stand for a substantial period.

1832. I take it you would not regard it as a criticism that it would tend to stabilise internal relativities for very long

periods?—I think those relativities are inevitably stabilised for a long period. There would have to be special reasons for making a major change in relationships.

1833. You would not think it sufficient to say that such an index would give a broad indication of the need for a particular revision to be worked out in the particular employments according to the circumstances of those employments?—I should have thought in practice it would not work out. Consider what in fact has happened in the Civil Service. At the end of 1950 and during 1951 you had a series of grade and class revaluations which in fact followed a pretty common pattern. On 1st January, 1952, the Treasury itself decided that the right and simple administrative line was to adjust the whole Service, giving rough justice as everybody recognised. At the end of 1952 they decided they would not pursue that course any more; but what in fact has happened? Over a long series of arbitrations, not negotiations, you have again had a discernible pattern which, I should have thought, one would have been capable of working out before we started just as easily, or indeed a good deal more easily, than going through all the cases.

1834. I have a final question on paragraph 50. We are not quite clear what you mean by: "A series of points would be needed to give an overall picture of the salary field." Would you mind amplifying that?—Yes, Sir. I am not sure we are really very clear about this; it is more a feeling. It seemed to us that if you were going to deal with salaries above roughly the £600 level at all realistically you would no more be able to take one picture, £600 to £3,000, than you could take the wage rates index as being a clear indication; and that there would have to be a certain series of points. We would not like to be categorical about this, but it seemed to us to be inevitable, if you wanted to cover the area from £600 to say £3,000, or even to £2,000.

1835. A series of indices?—Yes.

1836. *Chairman*: About £1,000 a year to £1,500 a year?—Somewhere like that; and you would probably need to start about £800 in order to get a connecting link with the wage rates index.

1837. If you have in mind Professor Allen's method, have you any comment to make on what he said?—We would generally accept what Professor Allen has said, Sir. It would be our view that calculations of that kind, taken in conjunction with others we have indicated, would be extremely useful material on which you could come to a general conclusion.

1838. *Sir George Mowbray*: Is Mr. Mayne really saying that there should be periodic automatic percentage adjustments the whole way up the scale, based on the percentages shown in a salaries index?—I hope, Sir George, I did not say that!

1839. I thought you very nearly said it!—I clearly must have created that impression, and clearly I must correct it. There are bound to be a lot of imponderables about anything of this kind that is produced, and that is why, in our own talk on this, we have rather linked Professor Allen's calculations with the production of a salaries index so that you could get a body of indications from which you could then draw conclusions. Again, if you take into account the postulate that Mr. Menzler gave us this morning, that you got an overall figure of 100 per cent., but that x has had a vast increase out of scale, for some good reason, you would have to make an adjustment. So we have not in mind an automatic adjustment, because we do not think it practicable, though it might become so.

1840. Therefore you would want individual negotiations based on the *prima facie* evidence of the general percentage rise?—Not necessarily individual, Sir.

1841. Not in every individual case, but a certain number of individual negotiations?—Not even necessarily that. The Institution would quite clearly envisage the possibility of an all-service adjustment of this particular character, maintaining the value of your salary in relation to the community generally. We should have thought that the nature of that operation was almost necessarily a general civil service operation, or at the outside, for one or two, or perhaps three sets of negotiations.

1842. *Chairman*: You would definitely think that information about salary movements would be clearer pointers than would be obtained by collecting information about outside rates?—I think we need both. The Allen method, if I may call it that, is based on certain statistics. We suggest that information of the kind the Inland Revenue Department prepared for Mr. Justice Danckwerts ought to become a regular feature of Inland Revenue publications. If we could add on to these indications some indices prepared by the Ministry of Labour, this would give a reasonably good picture for the negotiators to deal with, without necessarily any one of those things being an absolute.

1843. How often do you think salaries should be adjusted? For instance, do you agree with the Treasury that short term adjustments, which are appropriate to the

lower grades, would be less appropriate to the higher grades?—Yes, Sir. In the nature of a case an increase of, say, 1s. a week which would be material ought to be given immediately to, say, a Government cleaner, but it would be a little invidious to offer something of that kind to Sir Edward Bridges!

1844. Where would you draw the line?—It would be a practical issue in relation to each particular exercise. If there had been a very sudden and fairly big drop, or rise, in the value of money, then the adjustment would cover a wider area of the Civil Service than if it were a slight adjustment.

1845. *Mr. Hall*: If you accept the principle of slow changes to the higher people as compared with the lower people, would you expect it to give way to a secondary principle that the rate of change ought to be taken into account?—If our economy had got to the stage that there were substantial changes, say, twice in 15 months, it would probably be necessary to move at the top as well as the bottom. I think it is wrong, if I may say so, to look at this in terms of periods of time. It is really in terms of amounts of change.

1846. So you agree with the principle of slow changes for the higher salaries, but you think the question should be the size of the change?—Ycs.

1847. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Is your starting point the establishment of certain outside relativities and then as the outside indices change you make variations inside? Because this morning you gave me the impression you did not admit the possibility of comparison with outside?—The first point I made was not the establishment of a relativity with outside, because the Institution is asking for a re-evaluation of professional and scientific services and their salary scales on the basis of social need rather than of outside relativity.

1848. Not on a comparison of the work, or anything of that kind?—Not necessarily. Having established your standard by whatever criterion you finally decide, we say there needs to be some scheme for maintaining its value.

1849. You are in fact discarding the possibility of outside comparisons on the nature of the work, whereas I see a considerable similarity between the nature of the work in the early stages of civil service employment on the scientific side and industrial employment on the research and development side.—We then say that may be those outside salary scales are not right. We suggest the general trend of development in this country requires a different emphasis on the employment of scientists—

using the word in its most general sense—and that it is to that criterion you should look rather than to that of outside rates, which might themselves be wrong.

1850. What you are saying is that the outside rates of remuneration for scientific personnel are wrong against your social criteria, and you want to put the Government service in a position where it determines or lays down the rate which outside employment should follow?—There are two aspects of this problem; one is the social argument that we have advanced about the position of the professional and scientific person in society generally, and on that we submit to you that it is a responsibility of Government to give a lead in establishing that at its right general level. The other point is that, given that social relativities are right, you are in certain difficulties about comparison with outside rates, and we can only at the moment think of the medical and dental professions where you can make a fairly clear outside parallel; elsewhere for a variety of reasons there are difficulties in getting information. Indeed Mr. Menzler was quite brutally frank this morning in saying you would never get information that would enable you to make the parallels.

1851. *Mr. Burman*: You have just said that you wish the scientific side to be upgraded and to give a lead to the country, particularly from the point of view of social need and to stimulate demand; but in your paragraphs 57 and 58 you appear to bring in a new point, that professional officers in the Civil Service should be paid higher salaries than those normally obtaining outside because they are leaders of the profession. Would that view be generally accepted outside the Civil Service?—This is really precisely the same point as the Chairman raised with us first thing this morning—the propriety of average conditions. Our answer here is the same, for these two reasons: (a) that in parts of the Civil Service there is what I must almost term the supervisory function that is exercised by professional people in the Service; and (b) the fact that the operations of any Government Department are so much more open to public criticism that assurance ought to be made doubly sure.

1852. I was wondering whether you were postulating the Platonic theory of a trained intellectual aristocracy as the Government. I pick phrases out of your paragraphs: "To guide, advise, lead and exercise control over the work of professional people employed by local authorities and in private practice". That is an extraordinarily wide field, and I would like to know if what I have said was in your mind, or was it not quite as much as that?—I should have thought that was fair enough. You see it

is in fact the case. Take the case I mentioned this morning of the architects in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. It is part of the responsibility of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, not to prescribe standards that people must follow, but to lead the architectural profession of the country in the production of working class houses for various sections of the working class population. If you are going to do that and carry any conviction at all in the architectural profession, then you must have people who are respected by their fellows in that profession. That same kind of thing happens in several civil service fields.

1853. You mention that in paragraph 59 where you say: "The administrative class could not maintain its position unless it were recognised as a *corps d'elite* in its own particular field". But is it not true that the standing of the administrative class as a *corps d'elite* is hardly due to its financial reward, and that the question of prestige and financial rewards are not necessarily synonymous?—They are not necessarily synonymous, but it is the fact that the administrative class in the Civil Service is a good deal better rewarded than any other class in the Civil Service.

1854. *Mr. Menzler*: I would like to ask a question here. It runs through the whole evidence, and perhaps I could ask you first whether you accept the basic civil service structure, clerical, administrative and executive?—That seems right enough to us.

1855. Throughout your case there is a series of equations, scientific officers with principals, and so on. In making those equations I am sure we would all like to know what is the basic idea behind them. Is it an attempt to get the pay right? Is it an attempt to enhance the status of professional officers and scientific officers, or is it an equation based upon functions that the other two should follow? Which of those particular horses are you riding? Or are you riding the lot of them simultaneously?—It is a little bit of each really. If you ask are we trying to get the pay right, the answer is yes, although we should be hard put to it, as I imagine anyone else would be, to set out clearly and definitely what is the right pay for any profession or class.

1856. But you in fact intend to establish the right pay by saying that grade X, whatever it may be, shall be paid the same rate as a principal?—What we are saying, Sir, is less that it is ethically right than that, given that standard exists, we are quite happy to accept it, and that the status of the professional officer in the Civil Service ought not to be less than that of the classes that we conceive to be the appropriate opposite numbers, and that measurement of

status is partly at any rate a question of pay.

1857. Now, I am not speaking on behalf of the Commission, but supposing the Commission find that on the non-technical side "Everything is for the best in this best of all possible worlds", as did Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire's "Candide", you remember?—Clearly that would be a very heavy millstone round our necks in our future negotiations!

1858. What I want to try to put to you is that you might have a case on pay related to functions, not necessarily to the people with whom you are making a comparison.—I recognise that, Sir; but I am also bound to recognise the fact that it is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, for us to produce clear evidence on that point, so that we can only hazard the views that we put to you on that. We think it is much more important, in a community of 650,000 people or thereabouts, to place upon the professional and scientific officer the kind of emphasis that a number of people have said, and we hope you will say, is desirable if the country is to develop properly.

1859. When you equate what I call grade X to principal would you have regard to the functions performed by that grade in relation to the functions performed by principals, or would you have regard to equality of education?—To both. We tried to give you some evidence on particular classes, but not to overdo it because the case is already long. As to education and background, there are certain discernible and demonstrable facts which it is not necessary for us to detail because the Commission know them as well as we do. So far as responsibility is concerned it is frightfully difficult to measure responsibility A against responsibility B. We can only say that having looked at these varying responsibilities, in our view one is no less than the other, though of a different kind.

1860. Would you agree with me that much professional work is equivalent or similar to that performed by the higher executive groups in the Civil Service in that they are seeing that things get done within the ambit of a certain policy or a scheme which has been approved?—I should have thought that once you got above the senior executive officer level it is very difficult to distinguish between the responsibilities of the executive hierarchy and of the more or less parallel people in the administrative class.

1861. That has been put in evidence already by the Society of Civil Servants?—Yes, indeed; we would not dissent from that view. It is our view that roughly speaking on the professional side of the

Civil Service we are one grade down in relation to the other side of the Service; that would be our broad contention.

1862. Would you not say that on an analysis of functions it is easier to establish a comparison between professional grades and the higher ranges of executive work?—That would be true of many parts of the professional Civil Service. There would be other parts which I should have thought were patently indistinguishable from the administrative class in the normal discharge of its functions. I find it extremely difficult to see that there is any distinction to be drawn between the responsibilities of an officer like the chief scientist of the Ministry of Supply for example and the permanent secretary of that Department. They both have very important responsibilities to their Minister. The advice that either of them gives to him is obviously of tremendous importance and can have tremendous repercussions; and we should have thought there was no difference in the responsibility that they carry, although their fields of operation are quite different.

1863. Do you feel that all levels of professional officers exercise the functions of the administrators?—No, Sir, at some of the lower levels your analogy is the obviously correct one—with some of the higher grades of the executive class. Of course there are a substantial number of administrative principals who have no particular administrative function in the civil service sense of that term, but are administrative in what I might call the general sense of that term; that would be true of chief executive officers and numbers of people in our own hierarchy, for example the main grade in the works group.

1864. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I myself with the First Division Association remarked that the proportion of the administrative class in receipt of salaries of £2,500 and above was more substantial than in the professional and scientific classes. I take it from what you say you would not regard the bringing of these proportions into closer relationship as anything like an adequate readjustment of the relativity between the two classes. Do you want to carry this throughout the whole of the grades to the lowest, notwithstanding that in doing so you begin to introduce considerable discrepancy with outside conditions for the lower grades?—You might or might not, and I should have thought it depended very much with the class, but I doubt—this is a very difficult answer and one which I need not say has not been worked out—I doubt whether you could do what would be a legitimate deduction from the point you put to the First

Division Association without in fact doing very much what we have asked, because the adjustment in the number of higher posts and the remuneration of the higher posts to get the proportions roughly equivalent would require the sort of up-stepping we have in mind.

1865. This is a point of interest, because a change of function appears as between certain levels.—Yes, in both classes.

1866. A change of function which makes comparison with the administrative class easier?—Yes, indeed. You then adjust your proportions so as to square that up. For example, take the senior principal scientific officer. At the moment he has a salary scale which takes him half way up the assistant secretary scale. In fact in the scientific hierarchy you have two grades where the administrative class has one grade. We submit to you that the senior principal scientific officer is carrying a responsibility which is indistinguishable from that of the assistant secretary, and that the whole of the grade ought to be lifted to equate with the assistant secretary. That would make quite a big difference in the proportions in the hierarchy.

1867. When you come down to the lower levels in the class, can you ignore certain other types of comparison?—May we see where that takes us in the scientific class? You have the principal scientific officer who does now equate in terms of salary with the administrative principal. Below that you have, in the administrative class, merely the assistant principal. In the scientific class you have the senior scientific officer and the scientific officer. We have given you examples of the work and responsibility being carried by senior scientific officers, and we do not see how anyone can look at that kind of responsibility and at the kind of responsibility carried by an assistant principal and say that these are roughly equal. The salary proposals which we have made depend upon whether we make our case about the responsibilities being carried by these officers. We put the point to you quite honestly and sincerely. We are completely convinced about this. We have given you one or two examples, and to the extent that the Commission wants to pursue this extremely important point we will be only too happy to assist in any way we can. We could give more examples or suggest places which you might like to visit in order that you can make the comparisons with your own experience in a number of fields.

1868. Just a final point. You have chosen your own basis of comparison, but there are other bases of comparison.—That is absolutely right, but we come back to our social theory.

1869. *Mr. Cash*: I have one or two questions, Mr. Mayne, on your paragraphs 60, 61 and 62. In paragraph 60 you say that from your judgment and the judgment of your Institution there has been a shocking diminution in the standards of the Civil Service—those are your actual words? At the same time you say that the Civil Service is really living on its fat?—Yes.

1870. Would you say that before the war when the fat was recruited the scales were about right?—No, Sir.

1871. How did you get the fat?—There were two million unemployed.

1872. You think full employment has entirely changed the situation?—Full employment is bound to change the situation.

1873. And therefore if full employment does not continue the situation will change again?—It could be so, yes.

1874. Suppose in the country there are not sufficient physicists to go round, is the Civil Service to have the cream?—Yes, Sir.

1875. And the outside world must have the dregs?—There are several stages between the cream and the dregs! Taking the physicists, I should have thought it was quite indisputable that the Civil Service ought to have the cream, considering the work for which the Civil Service is at the moment responsible, in dealing with developments of nuclear fission and so on. Surely it is one of the most important things for the future of the country.

1876. What happens if outside industry begins to raise its price again?—That, Sir, is the reason for the proposals we have made in Chapter III, that socially the status of the scientist has got to be altered so that the number of people coming into science is greater than at present.

1877. What you are really representing, therefore, is not only your Institution but the whole field of the educated boy or girl who is to be attracted to science rather than to the humanities, because we are living in the second half of the 20th century, not in the first?—That is much the most important part of our case. We do think there is an important social thing here.

1878. But if you are going to raise the price, outside industry will respond by raising its price in a state of full employment, and we get nowhere.—I should have thought that was not incapable of solution. These things all take time of course, but, as I hope we demonstrate, the scientist is not offered, generally speaking, as good a career as the arts graduate, and that necessarily diverts a greater proportion of people on to the arts side. We say that the way

to alter that trend is to make the career prospects different and at any rate parallel. Our claim is not that there should be an advantage on the scientific side. All that we have said is that the career offered should be no less good. On the basis of our thesis we might well have put in a claim for a substantial advantage, but that would seem to us to be unreasonable, and we merely claim to be parallel.

1879. Have you worked out any figures on the increased percentage of remuneration in the classes which you are representing this afternoon as between pre-war and post-war?—We can give those to you.

(This information was subsequently handed in and is printed as Annex I at the end of these Minutes of Evidence.)

1880. *Mr. Burman*: On the question of supply and demand which *Mr. Cash* was raising, it is generally felt in industry that men with professional and scientific training, having been brought up in the academic world, prefer the more rarefied academic atmosphere of public service—and I use the word to go further than the Civil Service. Have you come across that sort of argument or feeling?—I should not have thought that was true, Sir. It certainly has not worked out that way in America, where the extent of scientific training is wider than in this country. I should have thought there was a certain amount of evidence to the contrary, because civil service Departments have to go to a great deal of trouble in canvassing students at universities in order to attract them into the Civil Service.—*Mr. Fry*: I should have thought both industry and the Civil Service would have had this kind of feeling, that it is a reflection of the overall shortage.

1881. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You seem to suggest that the arts student gets a better deal than the science graduate. On what do you base that?—*Mr. Mayne*: On the total income over normal working life in the Civil Service.

1882. You are merely talking off the Civil Service?—Yes, Sir. One of our difficulties is knowing precisely what happens outside. One does recognise the chances that are offered to professional and scientific people to become effective in the management of some of the major concerns outside the Civil Service.

1883. I think you put it much more widely and implied that students are attracted to arts, because they have a better chance in life than on the science side. I do not know if you have ever looked at any of the arts students 5 or 10 years after they take their degree and compared

them with the science students?—No, Sir.

1884. What do art students become?—A wide variety of things. Surely you have a very substantial number of arts students, so that there can be a good deal of picking and choosing among them. On the science side the number of students is very much less. Hence the concern in the country among people who bother about this sort of thing at all, because the supply of the one is adequate—indeed some people suggest it is more than adequate—and the supply of the other is clearly a good deal less than adequate.

1885. That may be so, but I was merely taking exception to the suggestion, and giving you the opportunity of correcting it, that at present our educational system is at fault because our people are turning to arts where prospects in life are better. I suggest it is rather the other way about. If you took the bulk of art students and looked at them 10 years after, they are not doing so well as the scientific people. Take for instance journalists, people going into the church and all the rest of it. If you want money you go into science, not arts.—Certainly not in the Civil Service.

1886. May I infer that what you are saying is that the arts student does better in the Civil Service than he does anywhere else? That is implied by what you are saying.—No, it is implied in what you are saying, if I may say so! Our knowledge is circumscribed by the Civil Service to a very large extent, and within the Civil Service what we say is clearly demonstrable. If what you say is true, then it may be because outside the Civil Service there is a good deal more use of scientific and professional people at top levels than there is in the Civil Service.

1887. *Mr. Hall*: Take two honours graduates, both of whom have taken honours in science. At the educational stage they are identical. One sits for the administrative class examination as a scientist and goes in as administrative officer. His colleague in the university, with perhaps the same academic qualifications, a little later goes in as a scientific officer, and for the rest of their career there will be a lack of parity?—I could introduce you to some very interesting examples of that!

1888. Your case is that, perhaps I might say through accident, at a very young stage of their career, their relationships in the Service are too much pre-determined?—Indeed yes, Sir.

1889. *Chairman*: Do you feel that the quality of officers in the professional and technical classes is lower than it ought to

be?—Yes, Sir. There has clearly been difficulty, as has been indicated to you by the Civil Service Commission, and indeed as we are at some pains to demonstrate here. If you take a case like the Patent Office, they just cannot get people to go in there. It is only fairly recently that we have had the Patent Office salary scales brought up, roughly speaking, to the level of the scientific salary scales. One of the curiosities of the Civil Service is the way in which it differentiates against odd pockets. The Patent Office scientist was on a lower scale and consequently the staff position was quite absurd and doing demonstrable harm to the country. That has now been more or less adjusted and the recruiting results may improve somewhat. The factory inspectorate, as we have indicated here, has got itself into quite a shocking state. The Department will not pay professional salaries, so it just does not recruit professional people.

1890. The First Commissioner took the view that he ought not to try for more than his share of the very first class scientists. Your argument that the best physicists must go into the Civil Service cuts across my ideas as a university officer, because unless a proportion of the best scientists are going to universities there will be no structure of fundamental science on which applied science can be based.—We would agree with you; we should not have thought there was likely to be any real contest. In no circumstances is the Civil Service going to take 100 per cent. of Mr. Cash's cream. There will obviously be different people who have different inclinations. At the moment we tend to get rather less than we ought.

1891. *Mr. Menzler*: Would you comment on Mr. Sinker's evidence: "We have more applications for first class organic chemists than we can use"?—It is not for me to criticise Mr. Sinker, but one of the difficulties is that you are dealing with a situation in which the Treasury is very sharply controlling staff ceilings in Departments. If D.S.I.R., for example, were given a free hand, there would be a substantial demand for chemists, but in practice it has to be restricted within quite severe limits. That produces the sort of result from which I think Mr. Sinker draws more conclusions than he is entitled to, because it is not Mr. Sinker who says to the D.S.I.R., "Here, I have some chemists on offer, would you like them?" What happens is that he has a demand from the D.S.I.R., "We want x physicists, because our emphasis has to be on certain aspects of our work involving physics rather than chemistry, although our chemical laboratory could very well do with some more staff". But on the demand, comparability. But the difficulty in trying

present moment, there is clearly nothing I can dispute.

1892. The only reason I am putting that to you was that I gathered from your evidence that you are not successful in recruiting the people you want?—That was talking by and large and not a particular group within a field.—*Mr. Fry*: That is quite important. These organic chemists may be more numerous than the Civil Service Commission can cope with, but it is certainly not true of the scientific field as a whole.

1893. The First Commissioner said that there was no difficulty in filling all vacancies for architects and surveyors with staff of adequate quality.—*Mr. Mayne*: That, I think, is just not accurate, and I should have thought the figures he himself submitted to you demonstrated that.

1894. May I take you to paragraph 63 (b) (i). You talk about "the social position of the officers as servants of the State" and "the capacity they show in performance of the work and the contentment of the officers". I am a little puzzled to understand how that can apply in a strictly graded Service.—It is not quite as strictly graded as that. It varies in different parts of the Service. In the scientific service there is an arrangement for the promotion of officers who are carrying out particular pieces of work at what is deemed to be a higher level than the one in which they are graded at the moment. But this is true only in particular places. It is becoming true in parts of the medical Civil Service, but does not happen outside those two areas.

1895. In (b) (ii) and (iii) you describe one criterion as being the best employers of the kind of officer outside the Civil Service. Then all the equations and relativities which we have been discussing come in. If there is a conflict of guidance there, which wins?—I should have thought in practical negotiations it would not be possible completely to ignore either of those features. If you must make a choice I think that the second one would be the right one to take because there you are dealing with the persons with whom you are living and working the whole of your time, but frankly I do not think the choice is a real one to make.

1896. What of the doctors, for example?—Yes. There will have to be exceptions to any formula. There are all kinds of factors that are more emphasised in one profession than in another. What is the size of the group, and who is it working with mainly? Is it working mainly with outside people or inside people. Frankly, I do not think you can separate the two criteria. You have really got to look in detail at the circumstances of the class.

1897. Is it not fair to say that the whole emphasis in your case is on the internal relativity?—Yes, indeed it is.

1898. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In your Chapter III generally, and in your subsequent chapters you are maintaining that the salary scales for the professional and technical classes should be related to the administrative, executive and clerical scales. You are satisfied that those scales can be got right in the first place?—I am bound to assume that this Commission will do right things!

1899. Must you not have regard for some outside comparison at some points?—It is not part of ours nor, I should have thought, of any other staff association's submissions, that one ignores the world outside. You cannot do that. What we have said is that there are very substantial difficulties in drawing parallels even if you know all the facts, and there is even more difficulty in getting the facts.

1900. Do you think that applies to the clerical, executive and administrative classes?—I cannot speak with authority in those fields obviously, but you will recollect that Mr. Redhead referred to an enquiry which the Society of Civil Servants got "The Economist" to undertake for them, where "The Economist" found themselves precisely up against that difficulty—they could not get the parallels.

1901. You seek to relate the assistant (scientific) to the clerical officer. Would you like to comment on the arguments that were put forward by the Civil Service Clerical Association as regards not only the difficulties, but the objections of principle in the way of settling clerical pay by way of outside comparisons?—I think I ought to ask not to do that. It seems to me to be a bit hard for one organisation to comment on the views of another in that way, but all my experience goes to support them—that it is very difficult to get the parallels.

1902. *Chairman*: The difficulty is, Mr. Mayne, that what you are proposing is that the administrative, executive, clerical structure should be the basis upon which the professional structure is settled, and the difficulty in evaluating the salaries by outside comparison, for example, seem to be greater in that field than in the professional field.—I see. That is a question of fact which the Commission only can determine.

1903. You see the difficulty we are up against. Take the Tomlin Commission Report: they picked out the executive class as being one that was particularly difficult to deal with from the point of view of comparison with outside. If we admitted the parity of the two tables, one way

we could do it would be to fashion the professional side by fair comparison outside and then either bring down or push up the administrative, clerical, executive.—I see the line of thought, but I am bound to say I have had a good deal of experience in trying to get full details of remuneration outside the Civil Service in the field covered by the Institution, and my efforts have been conspicuously unsuccessful.

1904. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Is it not correct, Mr. Mayne, that the Institute of Physics and the Royal Institute of Chemistry conducted an enquiry up to the equivalent of the principal scientific officer grade, and have published at least some averages?—The information is very useful and we are much obliged to these bodies with whom we have worked in close contact, but the number of people involved in those enquiries is very small in relation to the number of scientists in the country. It would be harsh to say it is an irrelevance, but I doubt whether it would be regarded as an effective statistical example.

1905. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: Do you appreciate the difficulty in which we are finding ourselves? All the major associations, except perhaps the First Division, in effect repudiate fair comparisons? Is it beginning to look as if the sole points of contact with current outside rates should be the 300 odd assistant principals and the permanent secretaries, and that on this slender basis a structure will have to be built for the many thousands of office staffs?—I should not have thought that this was really true, because the clerical class and the executive class have, after all, fairly long histories—much longer than the classes on our side of the Civil Service. The salary scales were established in 1920. They were reviewed by the Commission of 1929-31. They have been examined by arbitration tribunals on a number of occasions and broadly speaking—and I think it is important to note this—broadly speaking nobody is proposing any major change in that structure. The submissions that have been put to you by the C.S.C.A. are that the salary scales need to be "upped" in a modest way—not a major change at all. The executive class and the administrative class again are not challenging the generality of the structure. The executive class has put certain points on: relativities with the administrative, but what they are saying is that since 1920 the standards established have become depreciated; and the Treasury talked about a concertina in relation to the executive and the administrative classes. So there you have a structure throughout which is pretty firm and needs adjustment—according to submissions at any rate—because of discernible features

which are demonstrated to you in argument, and which you either accept or reject, so that they are clearly and well set out. What we say is: "It is not easily practicable to fix particular salary scales. This standard exists; it has stood for 30 years; we are quite prepared to slot into it whatever it is, but keep your social values properly adjusted."

1906. *Lady Albemarle*: Are you thinking, then, that we should try to settle scales for the classes you are representing entirely on internal relativities?—We are putting that to you as quite a major social issue. We do not think for one moment that you will blind yourself to any other information that becomes available to you.

1907. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I am thinking perhaps in terms of the senior people in the classes, and in respect of these would you express an opinion on the following? A lot of extremely able scientists do first class research work up to the age of 35 to 40; then inspiration leaves some of them and they have either less inclination, less urge, less inspiration to continue purely scientific work, but they can, and many do, perform an extremely valuable service in executive or administrative capacities. One possible way of taking advantage of this developing ability of another kind and in some way meeting the point you are making would be to transfer a proportion of these men into the administrative class at appropriately high level. This would provide a career prospect for a young scientist. Would it meet your point adequately?—No, Sir. It is a development in the Civil Service which in our view is quite essential and ought to have happened long since. We think it a grave defect that it does not happen, but it does not meet the point because it still leaves your higher grade scientific work, as such, less adequately remunerated than your higher grade administrative work.

1908. Do you think your equating of levels is essential to your thesis?—The equating of levels is essential to our thesis, but need not help or hinder the kind of development to which you refer.

1909. To what extent would the carrying out of your proposals still leave an administrative branch full of people who lack a scientific background and education? Would you deal with this by introducing into the administrative branch more young scientists at graduation level?—No, Sir, not necessarily. I think there are two things one might do there. One concerns some members of this Commission much more directly than it does the Institution, and that would be the introduction to the arts

disciplines in universities of something of scientific history the development of scientific thought, so that you do not get people coming up and boasting of their ignorance of science, which is so lamentable a feature in certain areas at the present moment. We would think that there is also a real need to do what you yourself indicated, provide for the person who, having spent a number of years at work in the Civil Service in a scientific laboratory, then shows himself more suited to an administrative career.—*Mr. Fry*: By using our equation you would make that kind of movement much easier.

1910. *Mr. Menzler*: Are you thinking of the statistician class and principals?—Yes, indeed.

1911. *Chairman*: In paragraph 64 (a) you say the professional, technical and scientific civil servants should be accorded a status that would more accurately represent the relationships obtaining between the administrator and the professional man outside the Civil Service. Have you any evidence of these outside relationships?—Some indications, not clear evidence. There were indications given, for example, in the report done by Manchester University just recently on the use of science in the factories, where you will have seen indications of the extent to which scientists actually entered into management in certain firms. We say there is nothing like that in the Civil Service. Then there was some material in "The Economist" about a fortnight ago.

1912. *Mr. Hall*: There are two points that arise out of paragraphs 75 to 80, where what you might call the career value as a whole is taken up in terms of cash. Supposing it were to be found that in a professional or technical class it is more or less inevitable that there must be a lower proportion of higher posts in the effective carrying on of the work. How would you deal with the question of correspondences lower down?—If you think the work is important then I think you have to increase the salary scales at the lower levels. Put it this way: I do not think it matters overmuch how you get your remuneration. You may get it by having one low grade fairly well remunerated or you may have it by a series of grades with a reasonable chance of going up; your lower grade would have a lower remuneration, but you spend a substantial time on higher remuneration. You cannot look for anything much different from the shape you have got. These people are essential, and you should pay, therefore, rather more in the basic grade than you otherwise would.

1913. If your triangle has to have a wider base, could you deal with the possible

criticism that in that part of the triangle you would get rather a long way from the rate for the job?—I wonder whether you do in practice, because the same general consideration would probably—not necessarily, of course—show itself in industry as well. If it did not, it would then probably mean that you had a very tiny cadre of this particular type of person in the Civil Service, and the career would rest in getting out of the Civil Service.

1914. You would not argue that a man, because of the high professional or scientific training he brought in as a young man, made his effective contribution more rapidly than a man who comes in with general qualifications and needs a period of training?—We have not in fact made that point, though we think it is a real one.

1915. Could we have a note of the method followed in reaching the figures quoted in your paragraph 79?—Certainly. We will let you have it in writing. *(This information was subsequently handed in and is printed as Annex II at the end of these Minutes of Evidence.)*

1916. One last question. Paragraphs 81 to 88 deal with the point about the top professional posts in certain Departments being given the same salary as the permanent secretary. I take it there are all the risks of two kings in Brentford or two housewives in one kitchen, which would be overcome by your argument about the need to keep the esteem in parallel?—Not only that, I do not think it is a kitchen, I think there is a substantial difference here. Take the case I mentioned earlier on of the position in the Ministry of Supply, the chief scientist and the permanent secretary.

They are in fact both essential in their Department, both of great importance to their Minister and with equal responsibilities. It is not enough to have the assumed authority of the permanent secretary over the chief scientist which is not in practice exercised, of course—the chief scientist is king in his own country. The standing ought to be made quite clear because the permanent secretary, with the best will in the world, could not do other than merely act as a straight letter forwarder for the chief scientist, which is absurd.

1917. *Chairman:* There is a parallel in the Army. There in your general staff you have got G., A. and Q., but the man who is on top is G.—Yes, but is that quite the same parallel? I should not have thought so. Sticking to the one example—there are others—there are three or four aspects of Ministry of Supply which no one person can compass. You must have people who are thoroughly knowledgeable in each of those aspects, and in their own field they must speak with complete authority. Their jobs are really parallel jobs in our view.

1918. *Mr. Menzler:* Are you not thinking in terms of industrial analogy—two joint general managers under a Chairman, the Chairman being the Minister?—That is a very good way of putting it.

1919. *Mr. Cash:* So your scientist has arrived?—He is there, doing the job. You may remember in the Tomlin Commission there was evidence given to you that the professional officer was kept away from his Minister. That is certainly not true today. The professional officer is there; he merely has not got the status and remuneration.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Friday, 2nd July, 1954, 11 a.m.)

THIRTEENTH DAY

Friday, 2nd July, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

*MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. WILLIS JACKSON, D.Sc., M.I.E.E.,
F.R.S.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

* Morning session only.

Examination of witnesses

MR. S. MAYNE, *General Secretary*

MR. J. F. FRY, *Chairman*.

MR. E. HEWLETT, *Vice-chairman*

MR. W. F. BAILEY, *Deputy Vice-chairman*

MR. T. H. PROFFITT, *Deputy General Secretary*

MR. J. R. WATSON, *Assistant Secretary*

on behalf of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants

Called and examined

1920. *Chairman*: I wonder before we go on whether there is anything you would like to say on the general questions as a result of yesterday's discussion.—*Mr. Mayne*: I do not think so, Sir.

1921. *Mr. Cash*: If I may take it a little out of order, I have just one or two questions on Chapter VI, professional accountants, which, naturally, is of interest to me. First, is recruitment to this class falling off, because the numbers as a whole are less?—The numbers are much less, Sir, and the Treasury tell us that they are liable to become a good deal less in the course of the next few years, but we think there are a number of spheres in the Service in which the professional accountant might be very usefully and much more widely used.

1922. Have you any view as to the type of recruit that comes into the Service, because in my experience the type of recruit that you get is the young man who finds that he is not likely to get a very big salary outside the Civil Service and has not the capital to set up in business for himself. With all professional men outside the Civil Service there are broadly three choices before them; one is to remain as

an employee, the other is to set up in practice, and the third is to go into the Civil Service if that avenue is open. You do not mention that aspect of the case at all, I think. I have in mind not only the accountant but other professional people, too.—That must, of course, be taken into account, but I should have thought it was impossible to assess its importance. Of course the employment of accountants goes a good deal wider than what I might call straight accountancy. Indeed some other professions have commented adversely on the extent to which accountants find avenues in management!

1923. Turning to another point on accountants, the Gardiner Committee said:—

"The most damaging criticism put before us of the existing system was that under it accountants who are not fully competent are not infrequently allowed from motives of compassion to enter the senior accountant grade."

Have you any comment?—Yes, nobody so far as I am aware in the Civil Service is able to understand how they could have come to make that comment, because it bears no relationship to any

fact known to us. You do not pass automatically from the accountant to the senior accountant grade. It is a matter of a promotions board, and if this really means what it says then what it is doing is to accuse those promotions boards, that is to say the establishment officers and the higher grade professional accountants concerned, of complete failure to do their duty. It does not square up with the facts because in fact people are stopped.

1924. You did not make this comment?

—No, and we just cannot understand it. We have commented on it to the Treasury and we have not discovered that they could understand it any more than we could.

1925. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 154 you refer to the failure to promote the best accountants into the administrative class. Since you wrote this I suppose there have been no cases?—No, Sir.

1926. You say that failure to do this destroys the very basis of your salary scales, but if a man were put into the administrative class he would no longer be an accountant. Could you amplify that?—You will find in the Gardiner Report two references, in paragraphs 12 and 39:—

“We recognise, however, that in order to recruit and maintain an efficient corps of professional accountants, there should be, in addition to the increases of salary which we propose in paragraphs 30-31 opportunities of advancement other than those available in their own hierarchy. Our proposals in this regard are contained in paragraph 39.”

“The professional accountant class is a small one of recent creation and operates in a field which is not closely linked with the normal work of the Civil Service. We feel that as a result of these circumstances there is a danger of the potentialities of its members for work other than that falling wholly within the professional field being overlooked. It is disturbing that not a single place, so far as we have been able to discover, has been found in the principal grade for a man of professional accountant origin. This fact is the more striking when it is remembered, on the one hand, how considerable is the part played in business and industrial administration by men drawn from that source and, on the other, how substantial has been the contribution of the other professions and the executive class accountants to the administrative grade of principal and through it to the administrative class as a whole.”

Our contention was that the Gardiner Committee in making its salary recommendations did relate them to there being these transfers into the administrative class, and with the absence of those transfers there needs to be a reconsideration of the salary scales.

1927. *Mr. Cash*: We have of course the Gardiner Report before us, but, if Mr. Menzler will allow me, I would ask you to read the last sentence of that paragraph.

—Yes:—

“We were glad to learn that it is already the practice of departments when considering appointments to top ranking posts on finance work to have regard to the claims and qualifications of high level professional accountants and that as a result some of them have received well merited advancement.”

That is true, there have been one or two promotions to the top executive grades, but not many.

1928. Would you say those are not administrative posts?—I would hardly like to say that. I think we would be prepared to lump them in as part of the picture, but the number of promotions cannot be regarded as an effective implementation of the earlier paragraph which I read.

1929. May I refer you to the first two sentences of paragraph 37?

“The duties of professional accountants in the Civil Service are ill-balanced and lacking in variety. This is due to the fact that a large proportion—60 per cent.—of those duties consists of cost accounting and auditing.”

Do you think that that requires any modification of your general claim, or would you like to comment on it?—It is not true. We think that probably the origin of this—we are merely hazarding guesses on this—is the experience of Sir John Morrison and to a certain extent of Sir Harold Howitt during the war when there was a wide and very often not very well considered use of all kinds of labour including that of professional accountants. In the particular field in which Sir John Morrison was employed during the war there was some truth in that statement, but that is now a long time ago.

1930. You do not accept that 60 per cent.?—I would not accept 10 per cent. today. It just does not relate to the current facts, and by current I mean from 1947 onwards.

1931. *Mr. Menzler*: You do attach great importance to the recommendation of the Gardiner Committee for professional accountants to have equal opportunities of promotion, I take it?—Yes, Sir. We think

that, given that the employment of professional accountants is to be restricted in the general kind of way that the Gardiner Committee has indicated, that is the most desirable form of organisation in which you will get the most efficient service and the most economical use of professional accountants.

1932. Have you taken that up with the Treasury?—We are at the present moment engaged in correspondence with them. This is about the third occasion on which we have done this since publication of the Gardiner Report.

1933. *Mr. Willis Jackson:* Mr. Mayne, in paragraph 93 you mention that the senior scientific officer is unlikely to be promoted to principal scientific officer before he is 35 or even possibly 40. Have you any figures of the numbers or proportions who are promoted at the minimum age which I seem to remember was taken as 31?—I have some figures and I wonder if they could be passed round. (*This was the document printed as Annexe II at the end of these Minutes of Evidence.*) If you look at the table in paragraph 2 of the document—the latest figures we have got—you will find that of the senior scientific officers 100 per cent. of them were over 24, 99·8 per cent. were over 26, then at 30 you begin to get a substantial number promoted, but at 41 you have still got 6·3 of the grade there.

1934. What is the primary reason for staff not having been promoted at age 40?—Much would depend upon the complementing of Departments. If, for example, you are employed in the Atomic Energy Department you would find that your promotion rate was relatively good. To go to the opposite extreme, in the Government Chemist's Department promotion is very slow indeed. The staff is fairly static in its numbers and it is a case of waiting for dead men's shoes.

1935. They would not all go to principal scientific officer irrespective of merit?—No, Sir. First of all you will get your promotion blocks, but of course you are selecting staff with a very high degree of ability. There is the further weeding of the probationary period which is strict, so that if you are not the kind of person who is going to progress you ought to have been weeded out at the end of two years in the scientific officer grade.

1936. What then happens?—Then you go on in your Department and you will be promoted from scientific officer to senior scientific officer as you develop to that standard. There is a distinction to be drawn between promotions from scientific officer to senior scientific officer on the one hand where we have got what we call

fluid complements, although not always quite as fluid as one would like, and promotions from senior scientific officer to principal scientific officer where the complement is a fixed thing and the hole is either there or it is not.

1937. Is there any appreciable movement from the senior scientific officer to the senior experimental officer grade?—No, Sir.—*Mr. Fry:* Not generally, only on the 1946 re-organisation.

1938. A small proportion of men do not go beyond the senior scientific officer?—1 per cent. of the class are over age 51 and 0·6 per cent. over age 56.

1939. *Mr. Burman:* Mr. Mayne did mention that in atomic energy promotion was rapid. Would it be due to the fact that this is a Department which has expanded phenomenally, and therefore is bringing in a large number of young men?—*Mr. Mayne:* Yes.

1940. But surely as a consequence of that in ten or fifteen years time there will be a block at the top because they will all be the same age group?—You are absolutely correct.

1941. That might have happened ten years back in the chemical field?—Yes, that was not in fact the full story there, but a rapid expansion creates its own consequences at some point in the future.

1942. *Sir George Mowbray:* You say in paragraph 93 "unlikely to get promotion to principal scientific officer before he is 35, indeed that he is very likely to be 40 before this happens." Now the figures that have just been handed round show that in the senior scientific officer grade 58·9 per cent. are over age 31. Does that mean that 41·1 per cent. have been promoted by age 31, and, following the next figure up, does it mean that 80·1 per cent. have been promoted by age 36?—Either that or they died.

1943. Pre-supposing the luck of life, if I may put it in that way, is it quite true to say that a man is unlikely to get promoted before he is 35 if in fact 80·1 per cent. have been promoted by age 36?—Of course a number will have gone into outside industry and one is bound to have normal wastage. But the conditioning factor is the principal scientific officer age distribution, where 82·2 per cent. are 36 or over. Again in the senior scientific officer grade you have 58·9 at age 31 and you have 19·9 at 36. Now somewhere between those ages a lot of things are happening, and certainly the general experience of Departments is that you do not look for a P.S.O. appointment until you are well over 30. I think that would be the general experience in D.S.I.R. and in the Ministry of Supply outside atomic energy.

1944. It may be that the atomic energy position invalidates these figures in relation to the generality of the scientific classes?—It does indeed.—*Mr. Hewlett*: It has quite an effect.

1945. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Do these figures show any marked discrepancy between the scientific class and the administrative class for reasonably corresponding grades?—Yes, Sir, these figures show that with the administrative class you have a virtual guarantee of promotion within seven years or by age 30, and it is a demonstrable fact that that has happened. Indeed it is a part of the design in the direct recruitment to the administrative class that you do not take in more people than you can be quite certain of being able to get into the bottom working grade of the administrative class, the principal, by about age 30. Incidentally, you will see from the figures in paragraph 3 of our paper that the average ages of promotion in the period 1949 to 1952 were about 30 to senior scientific officer and something over 36 to principal scientific officer.—*Mr. Proffitt*: I should like to add that the Table in paragraph 3 represents the average ages of those who were promoted, but there are people in the class who would be older and who have not yet been promoted. Thus the average age of promotion of the grades in the class must be higher.

1946. In paragraph 96 you say that the Government dominates the pay levels outside for the scientists. Do you intend this to apply to all levels including the highest?

—*Mr. Mayne*: No, it would not go as far as that, Sir. We were talking about the generality.

1947. Have you any idea at what sort of level the transition occurs?—We referred, Sir, yesterday to the valuable tables—within their limitations—which have been prepared by the R.I.C. and the Institute of Physics, and one would see from them that there are a certain number of posts where the salaries are what I might describe as out of all relationship to civil service salaries, for individuals at the higher levels.

1948. You have no further information?

—No.

1949. In paragraph 104 you suggest that the senior scientific officer grade might be abolished, or at least combined with the principal scientific officer grade so as to give a combined scale having the same minimum as the administrative principal to which the scientific officer would be promoted at age 26 or 27.—Yes, Sir. Here you are getting people in as working officers more or less from the word go, whereas in the administrative class you are giving your person the training that he requires for his work after he comes in. We would therefore expect that, when you are recruiting

people on this level and with the assured background which you have got, that that should be a reasonable kind of development.

1950. In other words this proposal of yours is related to the nature of the work on which the senior scientific officer and principal are engaged?—Are necessarily engaged. If I might illustrate it a bit this way, Sir, it may help. The scientific officer, for example, when he comes in is told "You have to do such and such a job, and you can regard that as your probationary job", and in fact he has two years in which to do a fresh thesis in effect. That is designed both to serve the Department and to stretch the individual, to see what the Department is really going to get for its money, so that the probationary period is quite severe, and on direct work, in a way which it could not be with the assistant principal because of the differences between the tasks.

1951. Why did you agree the S.S.O. grade and what has changed your views?

—Broadly I think one can say that it was thought that you needed three grades. It was devised as an arrangement for providing early promotion, and it was rather anticipated—I will not put it higher than that—that people would be picked out very quickly and put into these grades, and that, while some scientists would do much better than administrators and some rather less well, the class as a whole would work out about even, and that just has not worked out.—*Mr. Fry*: I do not really know the origin of this. It arises from the Barlow Report, and I would not know what the Barlow Committee had in mind other than the point that Mr. Mayne has just made, except that the S.S.O. scale could be used for specially qualified people from outside. But it was really a new conception of the class and to some extent I think should be regarded as a trial.

1952. *Mr. Menzler*: Do you conceive the scientist/administrator parity as a matter of Government policy already, but that they have not carried it out?—This was announced as Government policy way back in 1943 or 1944, apart from Mr. Glenvil Hall's letter of 1946.

1953. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: You equate this combined grade to that of the administrative principal?—Yes, Sir.

1954. From the First Division Association we have had certain proposals for the salary for the principal grade, and this equation would give the combined grade of S.S.O. and P.S.O. a starting salary of £1,600 rising to £2,200.—*Mr. Mayne*: Yes, Sir.

1955. And you relate this to an entry age of 26 to 27. Have you any outside evidence that would justify that kind of rate for a man of 26 to 27?—No, Sir,

we have not, but this surely is where we get back to Chapter III and our contention that, if it is true that this is a scientific age and that the interests of the country require a big development on the scientific and technological sides, then you can only ensure that by providing at least comparable careers.

1956. *Chairman*: Inside the Civil Service?—Yes, because that is all we are competent to deal with and is the business with which this Commission is concerned. We would, I think, recognise the fact that if there were to be somewhat earlier appointments into this field, than on the administrative side, it would not be unreasonable for the minimum to be adjusted. It is broad parity that we are looking for and not a meticulous identity.

1957. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: You do identify yourselves with that kind of figure?—The answer to that is "Yes". We have not attempted to get at precise figures, because, as we have indicated, we just do not see the possibility, but given that there are standards fixed of such and such a kind and the Commission puts its seal to those standards, then we think that the other ought necessarily to follow.

1958. In paragraph 117 you say that if parity of career is to be given between the scientific officer and administrative classes the number of posts in the grades above principal scientific officer must be considerably increased?—Yes, Sir.

1959. How would the increase you have in mind compare with the proportion above principal grade on the administrative side, and how would your proposed correlation relate to the nature of the work on the scientific side?—Partly, of course, this would flow from the specific proposals that we have made on equations. If the senior principal scientific officer is properly equated with the assistant secretary, that helps lift the whole thing and the prospects. It is very much a matter of organisation and careful examination. We think that there is scope for more higher posts. This is a grading issue which the Commission cannot deal with, but it is certainly our view that in the P.S.O. field and consequently in a number of the others the quality of work required would merit its upgrading.

1960. Have you any idea...?—Of precise figures, no, Sir. We have not worked that out. We have looked at particular places, but we have not the machinery to look at the generality.

1961. And so you have not related your ideas of growth at this level to the nature of the work?—No, one could not do that without an enormously detailed examination.

1962. Have you in mind that the man who remains wholly or almost wholly on scientific work should go above the senior principal grade as a research worker?—

Yes, Sir; at the present moment certain people can be so promoted to deputy chief scientific officer on very high individual work, and again I think we must emphasise this a little, because it would be our thesis that it is right ethically to evaluate the best scientific work at no lower level than the best of other kinds.

1963. *Mr. Burman*: Is it not more fundamental than that? In the administrative field it is easier to compare one kind of worker with the other. One can, for example, compare Shakespeare with Shaw, but it is virtually impossible to compare an atomic physicist with a chemist and an architect. You can compare different ranges of oranges but you cannot equate oranges with bananas, so the question of valuation must be of necessity a very hit and miss affair.—I am sorry, but I wonder if that is right. In administration in the Civil Service you have two big fields of financial control and general policy, put it that way. These equate and work out in relationship to one another. As between the physicist and the chemist they are doing entirely different jobs, but I should not have thought that there was any major difficulty in making an assessment of the relative value of the work done. Indeed we have sought to do so in our case, where we have given you certain instances of work being done by different kinds of scientists at different levels.

1964. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: May I now come back to the point which Mr. Burman raised earlier on. The scientific side of the Civil Service has grown, I would guess, much more rapidly than most other classes?—Yes, since 1939.

1965. So that the age range is probably not normal?—No.

1966. Will it not happen then that, unless there is a continuing growth of the Service, or a marked change in the present trends of wastage, in 10 years' time a very large proportion are going to be aged 40 to 45?—That is bound to be the case.

1967. Now is this worrying at all in view of the fact that scientific work is generally speaking a young man's activity, and have you thought of this in relation to the equating of the higher posts and the nature of the work?—I should have doubted very much the axiom that you have stated, that scientific work is necessarily a young man's work. I should have thought there was evidence to the contrary. Let us take an outstanding example, a scientist whose pay has just been increased, Sir John Cockcroft. His contribution must have been very very considerable since the day on

which we are supposed not to have any new ideas, say after the age of 25. Whether you are talking of scientific development or any other development, it is not only going to be a question of entirely new thought, is it? The number of entirely new thoughts that occur anywhere must be very limited. What one must surely be looking for here is the general development, the reconsideration of older ideas, the re-ploughing of old lands and developments that result from that, and I would hesitate to believe that at my advanced years I was completely finished in this way, and that that would be true of scientists!

1968. I was suggesting that between now and ten years hence there may occur a considerable change in the centre of gravity in age, and I wondered whether you had thought of this in relation to seniority and the nature of the work, because, as I said yesterday, it is I think true as a generalisation amongst scientists that in respect of original research the vitality of many men does in fact change with age. As a generalisation I would have thought there might have been such a change in the scientific Civil Service and I wondered what you thought the effect might have been.

—We are concerned about the age distribution of the Service but largely because of the effect upon careers, and therefore upon salaries, that of course has its psychological reactions on the individual himself, but in terms of work I am bound to say that it has not seriously occurred to us. There has been some discussion about this from time to time as you will appreciate, but there is no serious body of opinion in our field that there is not just as important a contribution to be made by more senior men as by junior men.

1969. I was visualising that with this change in the centre of gravity of age there might develop an increasing need for an outlet of men from the scientific side into other branches of the Civil Service on the executive or administrative side.—That could well be the case, but it does seem to me, if I may say so with respect, that there is a tendency here to underrate the contribution which the older scientist makes. I find it difficult to believe that, just because the whole of science is relatively modern, general truths that have been found true of other professions would not be applicable here, and that the older man would have no less an important contribution and in many ways a more important contribution than the younger man.

1970. The last thing I would wish to do is to understate the contribution of the older man in the scientific field, but is there not—as a generalisation—a tendency for his contribution to change in character? —Yes.

1971. And I would search for the relationship of this change in character to the structure of the class as it will emerge in ten years time.—I think that to the extent that the country becomes increasingly scientific and therefore as a consequence the work of the Civil Service becomes increasingly scientific, the contribution of the older scientist as such will be required and that aspect of the thing will probably look after itself to some extent.

—*Mr. Fry*: I cannot help feeling we take as rather too axiomatic the fact that the scientific service has stopped expanding. Dr. Willis Jackson's point would be quite relevant in a static service, but I do not think that we, or anybody else in the country, would assume that this will be so. Indeed there has been a great deal of criticism of the failure to extend the scientific Civil Service already. In addition there has been quite a noticeable change in my Department in recent years in the type of job that is being done; more particularly it is becoming necessary for us to build up a group of people who can give advice and help to industry on research applications for science and so on. In that kind of activity there is no doubt at all that the older and more experienced man can play his part.

1972. There is just one other general point, on conditions of service. Does it cause you anxiety that generally speaking recruitment to the scientific Civil Service is direct from the universities so that, with the passage of time, not many members of the scientific Civil Service will have had experience of work outside? Would you think it desirable to extend the sabbatical leave type of arrangement?—*Mr. Mayne*: Yes, Sir. Indeed there is agreement between the Official and Staff Sides about the general desirability of it. It has been restricted in its operation because of the manpower situation.

1973. What about getting some experience of industrial life?—There is quite a substantial amount of entry into the senior scientific officer class, essentially of course of persons with outside experience. Then there is an amount, I would not like to put it too high, of secondment from Departments to organisations with which the Department is working. Then of course there is quite an amount of work being done for the Civil Service in universities, where the individuals are subject to university influence rather than civil service influence.

1974. Is enough done inside the scientific Civil Service to ensure that men are given a broad appreciation of the diversity of its work?—It depends upon the circumstances of the particular Department, but it would be my personal view that rather

more of it might usefully be done. It does of course go on, and I think as the manpower situation eases more will be done.—There is quite a conscious effort to do something about it, but at the present time it is extremely difficult because of manpower restrictions.

1975. *Chairman*: I have here a table showing the salary effect of some of the equivalents you suggested. They show the figures put in by the First Division Association and the Society of Civil Servants and your equivalents. Could you at your leisure consider it and let us know whether you want to correct any of the figures. There is one other thing I just want to mention. You have made a charge against the Treasury of lack of good faith and they have sent a note which I believe you have seen.—Yes, Sir.

(The table of equivalents is printed as Annexé III, and the Treasury note as Annexé IV, at the end of these Minutes of Evidence.)

1976. You do not want to make any comment?—I do not think so. The Treasury say at the end that they believe that a study of the documents will lead the Royal Commission to the conclusion that the charge is unjustified. When I saw this, I immediately wrote to the Treasury and said "What do you mean by this reference? Are there some documents other than those that we have produced, and if so what are they?" The reply that I got was "The word 'documents' in the last sentence of the Treasury's note is intended to refer to the written evidence of the Institution and the report of the Gardiner Committee", so that you have in our statement, Sir, all the documents that are relevant, and we are entirely happy to rest on that. There is no personal feeling between the Treasury officers and ourselves on this. We are negotiators and it is for us to represent the views of our members, but on this particular issue and on the treatment of the works group in relation to the definition in paragraph 8 of the Gardiner Report, I am bound to say to the Commission that there is tremendous feeling throughout the works group that they have been very very badly treated, and that to their mind the clear intentions of the Gardiner Committee are being defeated in circumstances in which they have no court of appeal apart from, I would not say the accident of the Royal Commission being appointed, but the unusual event of the Royal Commission, so that this issue can be represented to you.

1977. *Mr. Menzler*: Now, Mr. Mayne, there are one or two implications in paragraph 127 which I would like to pursue

with you. I think it is basic to your case that equality of opportunity or careers should be ensured by varying the complement?—Yes.

1978. Complementing is normally an assessment of post in relation to work to be done.—Yes.

1979. So that if your principle were accepted then complementing would be simply a means of giving more pay and would depart from an analysis of functions?—In this particular case the whole problem is thrown into relief by what we regard as the definitions in paragraph 8 of Gardiner. It is our view that if these definitions were applied it would of itself go a very long way to meet this particular case.

1980. My point is a much more general one on the works group classes, where you give figures to show the difference in careers as between one side and another, and I think your general idea is to put that right by varying the complementing?—On the basis that there is always a margin within which one can operate in dealing with the definition of the work and the allocation of the work to grades; where the career possibilities are bad then one should be generous with one's use of the margin and where the career possibilities are good one can be much more severe.

1981. May I take that to mean that you would not depart from the fundamental point of an analysis of work performed?—No, Sir, we cannot.

1982. If you get into that position, do you think you have sufficient play in the existing gradings to give the career values you want to give generally?—We would think so, yes. Part of the result as far as the higher posts were concerned would be achieved by giving to the professional side of the Civil Service the status that we suggest is really appropriate.

1983. Right through your case and in particular the case of the works group I think it is basic that you claim equality of educational status with the administrative class on recruitment?—Yes.

1984. Do you claim that corporate membership of a typical engineering body is the same as an honours degree?—There are many of our professional people who would say that it is better, but it is difficult to answer that clearly. On the whole, Sir, We think that there is a certain amount of evidence in support of it in present civil service practice. For example, the Post Office takes its engineers as young men and trains them in the particular Post Office field of electrical engineering. They

take the young man with his degree and they give him his training on top of that and reckon to retain him if he becomes a corporate member of the I.E.E. in a reasonable period of time. The normal Government Department wants a trained person and it takes the corporate membership which is after all two things, background academic knowledge plus actual experience in doing the job. It is our general view that you get roughly the same quality of individual when you get one with that kind of training behind him as you get with the honours graduate.

1985. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I think you are being too modest. On the engineering side the acquiring of an academic qualification is only one part of the overall requirement; it must be supplemented by an approved training and a recognised period of responsibility, so that the professional qualification is at least the academic qualification and a good deal more.—Do not let me enter into this discussion!

1986. *Mr. Menzler*: Do you attach any significance to Mr. Sinker's figure that only 10 per cent. of the entrants to the works group, are university graduates?—No, not really because it has not so far been the normal way of developing within the professions.

1987. Now will you help us to understand this tangle in connection with the Gardiner Report? How much of the Report do you accept?—It is difficult to be precise about that. There are parts that we accept, but, as I indicated yesterday in the enquiries about remuneration, we think that the Committee made too limited enquiries and therefore did not get a perfectly accurate picture. In other respects we think that the Gardiner Report was not quite logical, in that in dealing with higher grades it admits that it is quite right to make an analogy with administrative, but it contested the general analogy that we drew. Moreover the Committee made no changes consequent on that admission to the higher grades. What they did was to take some 60 individual posts and deal with those, so that they did not really implement in practical terms what they admitted to be right as a general thesis. Then you get this point about the definition of work in paragraph 8. As we read this paragraph, if work were really graded on this basis, it would mean a complete overhaul of the organisation, and it would so transform the picture that we would have to start off again.

1988. You say they did not carry out their own principles about giving bigger salaries to the quasi-administrative and

administrative posts in the top ranges. The Factual Memorandum, page 252, reads:—

"The pay of the superintending and higher grades was increased in 1950 as a result of the Chorley Committee's recommendations."

Might that not be a partial explanation of their failure to write up some of the posts?—I fail to see that it could be. What the Chorley Committee did was to take the administrative class as the basis for its operations, make recommendations there as to what should happen to specific administrative grades, and then said that the professional classes should be treated *pari passu*. So the relative positions of the grades in the works group and administrative class were quite unchanged by their operations.

1989. Your reply then is that relativities were merely preserved and nothing more given?—Yes. You get the same position there of a divided structure above the administrative principal level, instead of the assistant secretary straight run through.

1990. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Was not the whole trouble that no one knew what *pari passu* meant?—In view of your experience on this, I would not like to comment!

1991. *Mr. Menzler*: Could we come to the bone of contention? I wonder how looking at the document as a whole you correlate your point of view with the remarks in paragraph 21. May I put one or two sentences to you? There was a proposal about upgrading and there they say:—

"We regard this claim as unsound in principle and unjustifiable on merits. We take the view on the one hand that complements should be based, as is now the case, on the requirements of the work and that a pattern of fixed ratios as suggested by the Institution would lead inevitably to paying more for some jobs than they are worth."

and now the crucial sentence:—

"The existing grading standards on the other hand seem to us to be in general reasonably well adapted to the needs of the case, and our pay proposals are founded on the assumption that those standards will, by and large, continue to be applied."

This says, so far as words have any meaning, that the present grading of duties is more or less all right. They do qualify this by saying that if you want to alter the career values you should not put more jobs on top, but down-grade some of the work at the lowest level. But taking the paragraph as a whole, could you let us have any comment as to how far that tends

to qualify the statements in 8?—I should have thought it emphasised our point, but it is not for me to comment upon the drafting.

1992. We have to try and understand it, Mr. Mayne, and I am asking you to help.

—Paragraph 21—its placing is not unimportant—indicates that, as they understand it, the thing is right enough, but paragraph 8 is telling us what they understand. And if paragraph 8 is telling us what they understand, what we say is that that does not represent the facts. After all the Gardiner Committee did not, as you have done to some extent, go and look at the work on the ground. They took evidence from this, that and the other person, and you appreciate how difficult that is, and here they have set down what they think. What we have said to the Treasury is: "Make that good, and that will produce a substantial difference." And that is really the point.

1993. I do not wish to make a debating point, but do you remember when it came to another Gardiner Report, you complained it was not taken as a whole. Are you going to pick out paragraph 8 of this one and leave 21 in mid air?—No, Sir. I do not think there is any distinction to be drawn between our use of the accountants Report and our use of the works group Report. In the Accountants, we pointed to an early paragraph which made certain basic assumptions, and we then pointed to a further paragraph which supported those basic assumptions and we argued from the two of them combined. Here we say: "Take 21 with paragraph 8 and, applying them together, you will get certain results." And to do that would quite transform the works group, but it has not been done, and the trouble is the Gardiner Committee misunderstanding.

1994. I am still a little puzzled by these words:—

"The existing grading standards seem to us to be in general reasonably well adapted to the needs of the case, and our pay proposals are founded on the assumption that those standards will, by and large, continue to be applied."

How do you reconcile that with the other?

—I cannot see how you read paragraph 21 and define its meaning. How do you derive from paragraph 21 the Gardiner Committee's understanding of how the work is organised? I am quite certain that the only indication of what was in the mind of the Committee as being the accurate representation of the work is what is in paragraph 8, for two reasons—(a) that there is nothing else said anywhere, and (b) they did not go and look.

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1995. May I follow your interpretation up? It says here the basic grade—

"is that in which new entrants first gain experience of Civil Service methods generally and of the work of their own Departments in particular, and perform the simpler jobs and provide skilled assistance to members of other grades."

Turn to paragraph 132 of your case. I presume that is drawn from the facts of life as they were in the Ministry of Works. Have you got any other cases?—We could readily provide the Commission with those, but this we regarded as the test case, because it was in the discussions with the Department that we found the Treasury had issued its definition of what "handling" meant. Having got that established there was little that we could do because it was quite clear that Departments had been told to define it in a particular way.

1996. I should like one or two more cases where you see the work to be out of keeping with the definition given for the work of the basic grade in paragraph 8—Certainly.

1997. *Lady Albemarle*: The work that was being done by the basic grade at the time the Gardiner Committee sat, was it in essence the same as is being done by basic grades today?—Yes.

1998. And while therefore it is possible that their description was inadequate, they did not, according to paragraph 21 as I read it, think that the type of work should alter?—It is more than that their description was inadequate; there is a clear difference in conception between a grade in which new entrants first gain experience in the work of their Departments and a grade which handles the greater part of the day to day business.

1999. My difficulty is that the basic grade was in fact, at the time the Gardiner Committee sat, doing the same work as it is today?—That is true.

2000. In other words, the description given in paragraph 8 was an inaccurate one?—Completely—that was our trouble.

2001. Presumably they must have taken evidence, they must have known what the grade was doing? Having done that, they say in paragraph 21 they think there should not be a rearrangement?—You remember Cromwell's letter to the Scottish Divines in which he said. . .

2002. "I beseech you in the bowels of Christ think it possible that you may be mistaken"?—Exactly, thank you. That I think is precisely what has happened with the Gardiner Committee. We are not accusing them of deliberately going out for

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falsification of facts—obviously it would be absurd—but what we do say is that this is where they have defined their understanding. Whether their understanding was right or wrong does not matter for the moment, it was their understanding, and on that understanding they produced certain other statements and certain conclusions. Now, what we have said to the Treasury since is: “Make good the understandings of the Gardiner Committee, because it is only by making good those understandings that you can really apply the Gardiner Report.”

2003. But, Mr. Mayne, you are then causing them to make good the misunderstandings of the Gardiner Committee?—One can deal honestly with it in two ways: either make good their misunderstandings and say the definition is right, in which case their recommendations need to be very heavily revised. . . .

2004. But you see my difficulty: either they misunderstood the work of the grade, in which case you really want another Gardiner Committee, or they misdrafted their description of the work but understood the work, and said that the grading was correct. It seems to me we are in a cleft stick.—Not really as cleft as all that, but I take your point. The line we have taken in our written evidence is that there is only one way of dealing with this. What you are saying is that there are two ways. One can either adjust the organisation to the definition or one can say “Well, now, clearly they have got this wrong. Let us either call them back or have another Committee to look at it on the basis of what it really is.”

2005. *Mr. Menzler*: When you had this acute difference of opinion on the two sides, did it occur to any one to go back to Sir Thomas Gardiner or his Committee?—A Committee, when it has finished a job of this kind, is finished completely. This is one of the real difficulties here, Sir, that on a dispute of this kind there is no appeal open to us anywhere at all.

2006. We cannot understand why you do not go back to the fountain-head, namely, Sir Thomas Gardiner?—We cannot do that.

2007. You could go to the Treasury?—The Treasury are not prepared to move. They are satisfied that the phrase “handles the greater part of the day to day business” means “responsible for day to day business”, and on that basis they see no reason to move about anything.

2008. *Chairman*: Have you asked them to go to Sir Thomas Gardiner?—We did suggest that this might be made the subject of arbitration, and they said: “No, this is

a grading issue, and we would not agree to arbitration”. I do not think we made the specific suggestion of re-convening the Gardiner Committee.

2009. I should have thought that the sensible thing to do. There must be a permanent body of men to do simpler jobs and provide assistance to other grades. The question is what should be the size and grade of that body? I should have thought the right thing was to ask the Treasury anyway to get Sir Thomas Gardiner to say—if he would do it—what they really did mean.—It would really need the Committee—a rather more difficult proposition. The Gardiner Committee was composed of representatives of a number of professions, and there would be a fairly clear understanding of the position of the young man in his profession coming in and acting as an assistant in a way to a more senior colleague—which is the impression conveyed by paragraph 8 for the basic grade, but it is not what happens. You do not reckon to get promoted out of basic grade until you are about 37, and the main grade is for practical purposes the career grade, so we suggest that their understanding was clearly wrong.

2010. *Mr. Menzler*: One final point on career values. It is basic to this claim and to other parts of the claim that some attempt should be made to rectify career values. What you are comparing the professionals with is a group which, for want of a better term, we will call a general staff. The people who do the executive work must have a much wider base to the pyramid because they have so many jobs to do, whereas the general staff at the top does not require a retinue of people to carry out a job. Does that not mean that the administrative structure must have a much higher proportion of senior jobs than a job of executive work?—That would be true, Sir, if you had to compare the administrative class alone with the whole of the professional/technical structure. The argument ignores the very important part played by the technical staff in relation to the professional staff. The technical classes—in the widest sense—provide the professional officer with just the same kind of assistance as the administrative class gets from the executive.

2011. Would you not agree that at professional executive level, as I call it, you could have 20, 30 or 40 professional engineers without necessarily having a similar hierarchy on the other side?—That is conceivable on particular jobs. On the whole I should have thought that it did not work out like that, because there has been hiving off from professional officers particular jobs which are then allocated to highly graded technical officers.

Wherever we can, we work with the Official Side on this because we are quite convinced it is to our mutual advantage. With their training and background, men of very considerable technical experience can in fact do those specific jobs more or less as well as the professional officer, and we have done a fair amount of that kind of devolution. A number of our professional members are very nervous and suspicious about it; the professional institutions are even more nervous and suspicious about it, but we think it is a good thing and it has taken away quite a lot of the force of your point.

2012. *Chairman*: Is it the same sort of process which resulted in the introduction of the experimental officer class?—Exactly.

2013. *Mr. Menzler*: One question on elucidation. In paragraph 146 you say:—

"It seems to the Institution it is difficult to dispute its claim that the responsibilities carried by these officers are equivalent to those of the under secretary in the administrative hierarchy".

Would you accept as an alternative form of words "... merit a salary in keeping with that of ..."?—Indeed, I think we would; I am not quite sure how we distinguish the two.

2014. My difficulty is that I cannot compare unlike things. I can see that two people might have the same salary, though quite unlike in function. While I do not underrate the importance of the superintending engineers for one moment, I would have preferred to see the phrase as I put it.—We would not dissent from that at all, Sir.

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

2015. *Chairman*: Mr. Jackson has some questions for you.—*Mr. Mayne*: Perhaps, before we start, I might say we have had a look at the document printed as Annex III, which you gave us, and it seems to us that we cannot usefully make any comment because all that we can say to you here is really what we said in Chapter III. We have no particular views on what the right salaries ought to be, but, given that these are the right salaries for the grades on the left, it is our view that those must be the right kind of figure for the grades on the right.

Chairman: Thank you very much.

2016. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Coming to the experimental officer class, in paragraph 172 you say that candidates over 20 are expected to have a pass degree or its equivalent, whereas in the Factual Memorandum, paragraph 291, the age of 22 is given?—

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We would not dissent from the Factual Memorandum.

2017. Could you tell us in a few words the reason for this degree requirement and why you opposed it?—It is difficult to be precise, this class is a fairly young one, but it does seem to us that an increasing responsibility is being put upon it.

2017A. Perhaps not enough distinction is drawn between the scientific class and the experimental class?—There has been a tendency to push a lot of work down, we have perhaps gone a little farther than was envisaged in the original scheme.

2018. The chief experimental officer grade was introduced as recently as 1951?—Yes.

2019. Could you tell us what the reason was and why the number in that class is so small?—Yes, it is very small indeed. The reason why there has been a movement towards this grade, both in the Institution and from the Treasury, is that there ought to be an outlet in the experimental field similar to that of the chief executive officer on the executive side for some of the same reasons. Indeed, the limitation applied in the establishment circular setting up the grade was that it should be work rather more of an executive character—if I can use that in relation to scientific work—than of scientific research. But it is difficult to talk with authority on this because even there the practice is beginning to change already. In Mr. Hewlett's Department, the Ministry of Supply, where more chief experimental officers have been appointed than in any other Department—about 20 I think—there has been the tendency to create posts more directly parallel with the principal scientific officer.

2020. And is it part of your proposal that the number in this grade should increase substantially?—We think that there is scope for a stepping up there. There are several ways of doing this. One is to provide a greater avenue of promotion into the scientific officer class.

2021. That is what I was leading to. Would you think there was perhaps not a very big case for a substantial increase at chief experimental officer level but that there should be improved facilities for promotion to the scientific class?—I think I would be right in saying that you could do this kind of thing either way but it is more obvious if it is an experimental officer moving up in the experimental officer hierarchy than in the scientific officer class.

2022. On the other hand, that would not give so good a career prospect, would it?—That is quite right.

2023. And the number going from the experimental officer to the scientific officer class is rather small?—Very small indeed.

2024. Could you give the order of numbers?—*Mr. Proffit*: In 1952 the number of assistant experimental officers who were promoted to scientific officer was three; the number of experimental officers promoted to senior scientific officer was four; the number of senior experimental officers to senior scientific officer was one; senior experimental officer to principal scientific officer, six; a total of fourteen for the whole of the class.

2025. Which is quite small.—*Mr. Mayne*: Very small.

2026. *Mr. Menzler*: Is that not what you would expect, having regard to the basis of the Barlow Report laying down very high standards on research work?—It is partly consequential on that but we should have thought too much was being made of it in that it is placing too little reliance on the development of people in the experimental officer class and the accumulated experience that they get there.

2027. You say that candidates over 22 are expected to have a pass degree, but of course it is common form, is it not, that the real research people in the scientific officer class have honours degrees and must have, there is that difference?—Yes, but then you see you are dealing with quite young people and it is not a bit unusual for there to be substantial developments. More interest in the work will frequently build up a young man or young woman and they show qualities that you had not expected them to.

2028. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: You cite a number of examples in paragraph 183. Is your first example there, the one with second class honours, the kind of man that you would expect to be transferred to senior scientific officer in due course? Was that the general purpose of introducing this example?—No, Sir. What we have endeavoured in these examples to do is to show you fairly typical cases.

2029. This particular man is not, I take it, representative of the class in respect of qualification?—*Mr. Fry*: Fairly, I should think.

2030. But he has second class honours; I thought you were objecting even to the pass degree?—Yes, that is true. Probably it is a little unusual to find second class honours, but it is certainly not unheard of. There are quite a number of them.

2031. I cannot correlate this with your questioning of the pass degree.—*Mr.*

Mayne: There is a difference between what happens and what is required.

2032. In paragraph 185 you say that you cannot understand why the Arbitration Tribunal awarded parity of scales with the executive class to chief experimental officer and senior experimental officer but not at the lower levels. May the explanation be that the distribution of responsibility and demands of the work differ between these two classes?—It could be, Sir; anything might have been in their minds, but we have given you examples of what experimental officers are doing and on the basis of those as typical examples we should have thought that it was a bit difficult to justify.

2033. Going on to paragraph 186, you say that the experimental officer and the executive classes are no longer directly comparable. If this is so do you consider it desirable or possible to maintain any link with the executive class?—Because of the habit in the Civil Service, and I should have thought it was inescapable, of making relationships between classes. There are 48,000 in the executive officer class so that they do create a fairly effective standard of the kind of remuneration that should be obtainable for persons of a particular intellectual standing.

2034. In other words, you deny the relationship of work but you want to establish a relationship of salary?—In part of this we are conditioned no less by civil service practice than your own terms of reference, one of which is to consider the relativities of salary scales.

2035. In paragraph 187 you argue that the experimental officer class ought for various reasons to have better scales than the executive class. Then you go on to say that it remains for us to assess the extent to which these salary scales should be augmented. You have no suggestions?—Not really, Sir. We have spent a good deal of time on this and tried to see how we can say it ought to be 10 per cent., 20 per cent. or any other figure that you like, but really at the end there was a feeling it would be purely an *ad hoc* assessment, and there seemed to us to be no virtue in putting it forward.

2036. You would not, in respect of this class, be prepared to relate rates to outside comparisons?—We find it difficult to do so; we find that making these parallels just does not work in practice. We looked at one case in some detail so far as one can from the outside, and what was clear was that there was an avenue in their organisation for persons of experimental officer standing, and there is not that avenue for the experimental officer in the Service.

2037. It is difficult to make comparisons at higher levels, but at the lower levels I should have thought there was a good chance of getting a realistic comparison.—But is it realistic? You can find "X" doing a particular job and you can find "Y" doing a particular job, which in terms of responsibility is identical with it, but what you have to look at is what is going to happen to "X" in the course of his life, or what is likely to happen to "Y" in the course of his. Career prospects are no less important than the actual rate of pay that a person gets at a particular point in time.—*Mr. Fry*: I think we should reiterate our view that such comparison is not necessarily sound anyway because of our feeling that the Government Service largely sets a standard in the scientific field.

2038. If, as you suggest, some members of the experimental officer class are in charge of quite important scientific jobs, I should have thought there was an eminent case for them to be moved over to the scientific officer class, and that this would be their career avenue if they were of that quality.—*Mr. Mayne*: You may well be right. We would certainly agree with you, but what we have to deal with and what, if I may say so with respect, the Commission has got to deal with, is life as it is in the Civil Service, and life as it is in the Civil Service is that these people—these one or two examples we have given as typical of the class. . . .

2039. I do not think they are typical of the class.—*May* I take two points here? We are in considerable difficulty because the experimental officer class was set up following the Barlow Report as the equivalent of the executive officer class in the scientific field. It is clear to us that the experimental officer class is being used on work of a much higher character than could possibly have been envisaged by the Barlow Committee. The class is thus for the purpose of our evidence to you—the experimental officer class that Barlow designed—conditioned by certain other observable facts about what happens on promotions, and from that flow certain consequences, and that is why we say it is wrong if you are only paying this kind of salary to have a class which has something like 28 per cent. of degree holders in the class as compared with an executive officer which quite obviously does not contain that number.—*Mr. Proffitt*: The imposition of the pass degree as a standard of qualification is something that was introduced two or three years ago, so you have to relate your 28 per cent. of degree holders in the class to that period.—*Mr. Mayne*: May I pursue the other point, which is very important? You have said that you do not feel that the examples that we have given are typical. Now that is fairly serious from our point

of view, and, if that is really the view of the Commission, then I must ask two things, (a) that we have an opportunity of presenting to you a much lengthier document on examples, and (b) that you will be good enough to come and look at the jobs?

2040. Perhaps, I had better say, if that is what you are taking me up on, that I should have thought it was not typical of the class as a whole to have second class honours.—It was perhaps unwise of us to have used this particular case, because the man has that particular honour. We are not directing your attention to qualifications but to the job.—*Mr. Hewlett*: As an illustration of that, the second example we give—the experimental officer—has a second class honours degree, but 18 months ago the job he is doing was being done by a man who had no degree.

2041. *Sir George Mowbray*: May I follow up one answer you gave to *Mr. Willis Jackson* in relation to the quantum of augmentation on which you felt you could not give us any useful figures. Is one reason why you feel yourselves unable to do this the fact that you are really asking for parity, or something rather more than parity, with the executive class and therefore you are not prepared to try and evaluate that quantum?—*Mr. Mayne*: Indeed, that is a difficulty with which we are faced. Here we are considering relativity between scales, and here is a picture to which we can direct attention, the relative lack of promotion for the direct entrant experimental officer as compared with the direct entrant executive officer. How does that shape up to get a balance between people who were supposed to come in at, roughly speaking, the same level?

2042. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: In paragraphs 188 to 190 you say that the clerical officer has very much better promotion prospects than the assistant (scientific). Are you arguing this in the light of what has happened since the war, or what you expect to happen in the future?—I have no reason to believe that anything in the measurable future will be very different from what has happened. The clerical class is at present bound to contain a very substantial number of promotees and ex-temporaries, so that the direct entrant clerical officer is bound to be a very small part of the class. The direct entrant assistant (scientific) is bound to be 100 per cent. of the class.

2043. You see, the Civil Service Alliance memorandum in paragraph 46 mentioned that there were 300 promotions in 1954 for a staff of some 78,000 clerical officers. How would the promotion prospects for the assistant (scientific) compare with that?—You are taking overall figures there, of course, which makes the first

figure, as I have said, subject to correction. I think about ten per cent. of the clerical class are direct entrants and those figures relate to the whole of the clerical class, which I think alters their effect.—*Mr. Proffit*: On the assistant (scientific) side, there were five assistants (scientific) promoted to assistant experimental officer by class to class promotion in 1952, twelve senior assistants promoted to experimental officer, a total of seventeen for the class.

2044. These are promotions as distinct from competition?—*Mr. Mayne*: Yes, Sir.

2045. What is the basis, personal assessment?—Personal assessment.

2046. And would a man then avoid the competition altogether?—He would be over age; it is general doctrine that no one is promoted who could enter a competition.

2047. *Chairman*: How many are there in the class?—5,600.

2048. *Lady Albemarle*: Are not over half of those temporaries?—That is perfectly true. That is one of the difficulties in regard to recruitment. We think it is unsatisfactory.

2049. Will most of them normally become established?—Yes, but they are recruited as temporaries, and on the basis of having a General Certificate of Education.

2050. The established class then is far bigger than it appears?—Yes, indeed.

2051. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: In paragraph 190 you say that the assistant (scientific) can enter the experimental officer class only through open competition, whereas paragraph 378 of the Factual Memorandum mentions a limited competition.—There is a distinction to be drawn there. The limited competition for the assistant (scientific) is limited only in the sense that he gets an extended age range in which he can enter but it is precisely the same competition. The limited competition for the clerical officer that is referred to is limited in the type of competition as well as in the age.

2052. Then in paragraph 205 you suggest that recruitment to the class on a temporary basis is a bad thing. Why is there no direct recruitment to established posts?—Because we have been unable to persuade the Treasury, or rather the interdepartmental scientific panel. This is a difference of opinion between the bottom end of the scientific hierarchy and the top end. The people who are in direct touch with the problem of employment and recruitment are all—or nearly all—of the opinion that it ought to be established recruitment, but the interdepartmental scientific panel does

not share our view and the Treasury is against it so far.

2053. These boys come in between 17½ and 26, so that many of them will have to do military service, probably immediately after the completion of their two years' temporary service. What is the effect of this on their return?—There is an awful loss; that is one of the factors. There are some figures on this that we can let you have if you like. The Meteorological Office, which has to spend a very considerable sum of money on training the youngsters, got very worried about the fact that an enormous proportion never came back, and they did an analysis of this about a year or 18 months ago.

2054. Do these youngsters get any really systematic training in the early years?—Yes.

2055. Is this well organised throughout the Civil Service?—I would think it rash to say invariably, but in the main it is.—*Mr. Fry*: I can say there certainly is in my own Department.—*Mr. Hewlett*: There certainly is in the Ministry of Supply.—*Mr. Mayne*: There is a real sense of responsibility towards these young people on the part of the older people with whom they work.

2056. Is the leakage because they can use that training elsewhere or because they go to quite different work, as so many people do after National Service?—There are all kinds of factors that enter into it. They have not a firm anchorage in the Service. They were there as temporaries. They have had their two years in the armed Forces and they begin to think again.

2057. *Chairman*: This is a phenomenon common to a very large part of national life.—Indeed it is.

2058. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: How does this affect recruitment? Are you in fact getting enough recruits?—There is generally a shortage.—*Mr. Proffit*: There is generally a shortage, but in addition the difficulty is that people who may have come into the scientific assistant class and who have not passed the Civil Service Commission Board on the first or second occasion continue in a temporary capacity indefinitely because of the difficulty of filling the established posts, and our plea to the Treasury was to make sure on initial entry as soon as the person applies through the Civil Service Commission that they are the kind of people that you want and establish them first.

2059. *Mr. Menzler*: But in practice how many years of temporary service do they put in before they are established?—*Mr. Mayne*: They can come up for establishment within two years, but there you get

an awkward point which we have discussed, with the Civil Service Commission without getting anywhere very satisfactory, because you find in fact that many people who get the Inter B.Sc. and are continuing their scientific studies, who are well thought of locally, come up before the Civil Service Commission and fail to pass. The attitude of the Civil Service Commission to this type of entrant is causing some concern throughout the Service.

2060. Do you mean a written examination or an interview?—It is a competitive interview, but they are there with the recommendation of the people with whom they are working, who are anxious to see them established in their station, and there is a very high degree of failure which we think is rather serious, having regard to the level with which you are dealing. We should think it difficult, if not impossible, for the Civil Service Commission to make a better assessment of the individual in 15 or 20 minutes than has been made by the seniors with whom that assistant has worked over a period of two or three years.

2061. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Perhaps we could move to the technical classes. In your paragraph 210 you say that the recruitment age is in very many cases substantially higher than age 26 for grade III and age 30 for grade II. Could you tell us what the average age actually is?—We have no details.—*Mr. Bailey*: It varies. Take a clerk of works, it would be round about 35, supervisory grades probably 30; the office grades might come down a little, but generally the age is much higher than 26 due to the experience that is required.

2062. In paragraph 225 you say that there is very little class to class promotion. Can you give the reason for this?—*Mr. Mayne*: I think perhaps the best reason, Sir, is the phrasing of the establishment circular dealing with class to class promotion. What it says in effect is that class to class promotion into the professional class shall take place only where the officer holds the qualifications of the professional class, save in quite exceptional circumstances of high individual attainments. Of course, in certain of the fields you would not expect class to class promotion to be very much of a factor, in other fields you would expect it to be a considerable one, for instance, estate surveyors in the Ministry of Works. You have in the technical class two quite distinct types of individual, the young professional coming through and the technical coming up as a result of long experience.

2063. Were any of the 28 officers mentioned in this paragraph eligible to sit for

the open competition? Did any of them do so?—I will let you know.

2064. At the same time could you let us know what proportion of technical officers acquire professional qualifications during their employment in this class, and whether there are any difficulties in the way of a man getting promotion?—If you are asking me about this particular group I can get you the information, but if you are asking me about the technical classes as a whole I do not think I can, but I will go into it and see if we can put it in a paper.

(This information was subsequently handed in and is printed as Annex V at the end of these Minutes of Evidence.)

2065. In paragraph 232 you mention that in some centres Government industrial employees are tied to the steelworkers' rate. Could you tell us how this comes about?—In various Government factories ordinary productive jobs are going on and the industrials are getting what might be described as the district rates with all of the various on-payments appropriate to that particular district, and the result is in this particular example that the individual actually tends to lose a bit of money on his immediate promotion, and, even where that does not happen, the recompense for promotion is so slight as to be negligible. We think this is the same thing as the other point on the position of the foreman in industry being altogether too low.

2066. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 232 you refer to a leave differential. Our information is that the technical grade III has recently got twenty eight days' leave.—Yes, within the last weeks and our statement needs correction in the light of that arbitration tribunal award.

2067. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: In paragraph 211 you compare the direct entrant executive with the technical grade III, and we have already had from the Post Office Engineering Union a comparison of their Post Office technical officer with this technical grade III. What is your view on that?—We have not considered it specifically.

2068. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 314 (a) of the Factual Memorandum, it is stated that the I.P.C.S. do not accept the need for this technical grade IV. Would you care to comment on that?—We think it is too low a grade to be part of the technical class. It has been used to a very limited extent, as you will see from the figures, primarily as a training grade.

2069. Do you object to it as a training grade?—*Mr. Bailey*: I was going to say that on the engineering side it is a dilutee grade more than a training grade. They used it in the past on the building side for the type of builder's clerk person. We think there is no place for that type of

person who has not the full apprenticeship and training in the technical classes structure.—*Mr. Mayne*: It is liable to undercut the qualification element in the technical class, and we think that a great pity.

2070. *May* I go back to your paragraph 56? You agree that Tomlin comparisons can be made in respect of dockyard fitters. Are similar comparisons not possible at higher industrial levels, say chargehands?—The chargehand, of course, is below the technical class level. You have got to get above that to get to the technical class, and again, it is very difficult to make the comparisons; we have not found the figures available.

2071. You do not think the comparison is feasible then?—I would not like to go so far. All I can say is that we have not found the means of getting at the facts.

2072. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I should have thought within approximation you could get them?—*Mr. Bailey*: Within a limited field, as long as you are comparing like with like, but it is the use of the terminology that is difficult; a foreman in the Civil Service does not automatically equate with a foreman in industry, unless you know what the duties are.

2073. *Chairman*: Have you ever thought of getting professional aid in making these comparisons? For instance, the Department of Engineering Production in Birmingham specialise in this sort of thing, and the whole of the structure in certain parts of industry is based on this method of job evaluation. I should have thought it was easier to get comparisons than it used to be.—*Mr. Mayne*: That is an interesting suggestion that we might look at. *May* I ask you a question on this? Do I understand from you that they would really be able to get facilities within firms—I think they would probably within the Civil Service—to look at the jobs, to evaluate the full range of responsibility, and say that A equals B, or A is B plus, or something like that?

2074. This has actually been done in comparatively large areas of industry and it is a technique which has developed very much in America.—Yes, indeed I do appreciate that. That is very valuable, Sir. We have not so far regarded that as a possible way of doing it and we should certainly be happy to pursue it.

2075. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: I will just finish up by saying that perhaps you do not want to make outside comparisons?—We do not regard our job here as primarily one of making outside comparisons, because of the thesis that we have advanced to you in Chapter III.

2076. I am interested in the carrying of this thesis throughout the whole structure of industry.—I should have thought there

was at least as much public evidence in support of the desirability for that as in the fields which we have mentioned. If you think of the time and attention that has been paid in conferences of one kind and another to the unhappy results of the debased position of the foreman in modern industry, and the comparisons that are made between the treatment of foremen—just using that section of the technical class—in England as compared with America.

2077. Yes, but with whom are you comparing him now?—What we are saying is two things. First of all, we cannot get the right kind of reliable pictures from outside—we have not taken advantage of the facilities that we now learn are available—but what is clear to us is that something needs to be done, and urgently, to lift the status of these people. Now since we cannot act outside the Civil Service let us have a look inside; inside you have an executive class which seems to us in its field to be carrying the same kind of responsibility as the technical class is in its field, and a correlation would provide for an improvement in the position of the technical class. That may not be a heaven-sent way of doing things, but to some extent it would go to meet the general criticism of the treatment of the technical class.

2078. I would have thought that you would benefit in this particular argument by carrying out, where you could, a real and careful outside comparison.—It is only this afternoon that we have been put in possession of a possibility in this direction. We have explored a number of other possibilities which have not got us anywhere.

2079. Because your argument is really carrying you outside the needs of the scientific, technical and other classes in the Civil Service to a national campaign, and I would have thought you would have been helped by doing this.—In both fields I should have thought much the same questions were raised of social significance there.

2080. *Sir Alexander Gray*: May I ask you to turn to Chapter XIII—"Classes acquiring professional status after entry." This is really a problem of people in the Service who thereafter, either on their own or by regulation, are required to get some kind of qualification as a condition of their job?—Not on their own, always by regulation.

2081. This question of post-entry education is, in a sense, rather more than that. I have constantly had people for instance in the university who come to my place and who educate themselves by qualifying for a degree in public administration or administrative law, which in a kind of way is a general qualification. Have you

anything to say on that aspect? Could that be encouraged, and if so, in what way?—That is, I suggest, a very different point. I do not deny it is a very important point, but I would not like it to be mixed up with the submissions we make to you in Chapter XIII. It is a common feature of all grades in the Service.

2082. Especially the young, energetic and ambitious?—Yes, men who pursue, quite outside the requirements of their jobs, their studies in the field in which they are interested. I am not at all sure that one either can or should reward them specially for getting particular qualifications. In practice their reward will probably show itself in promotion because they are obviously the keener types.

2083. I merely mentioned that because it seems to be part of the same picture and I do not like to think of this without the other. Coming to the cases you mentioned, there are certain jobs in respect of which the people who enter as executives—they are mostly executives—are told they have to qualify in certain ways—Not quite that, Sir. This is where we must be clear about this distinction. These are people who pass the executive class examination. That is their basis for entry into the Civil Service. Then having passed that they are asked to opt for this, that or the other thing within the Service, and in this field what you are looking at are primarily the people who have opted and said, "I am now prepared to take a further hazard on this. I am interested in this kind of activity and I would therefore like to be posted to the Government Actuary, Audit Department or Inland Revenue, and I will then enter on a further severe course of study." Each of these jobs requires a special technique, in two cases of an existing learned body, in the third case a purely departmental technique, which has to be covered by its own examination.

2084. You speak about these people doing indubitably professional duties, that is in a civil service sense?—I do not think so.

2085. You say that these qualifications might not qualify them for the profession—the man who studies law for the purpose of the Estate Duty Office does not become a lawyer?—I should say he does, though. I am not sure what you mean by becoming a lawyer. The Estate Duty Office examiner must get a legal qualification, that is to say, he must become a lawyer. He then practises in the Estate Duty Office just as if he went out into the general world he would undoubtedly specialise in some particular aspect of the profession.

2086. And could he walk out of the office and set himself up as a lawyer, put his

plate up?—If he has the solicitor's qualifications. He would have to pay the practising fee and get accepted by the Law Society for that purpose, but he would be perfectly competent so to do.

2087. Competent, but allowed? A point was raised on engineers this morning. It is substantially the same point, and I thought you were rather emphasising that these people require a special technique adapted to their own office as well?—No, what we say is—I hope we have not cut our paper too short—that the person must get his full legal qualifications—if he is a barrister, be called to the bar, if a solicitor pay his fee. The Estate Duty Office requires a clear legal qualification which would put him in the position, subject to paying his practising fee, of practising as a lawyer outside.

2088. *Mr. Menzler*: In the interests of accuracy not the L.L.B. only?—No. In the actuaries field, you have to get the full actuarial qualification, otherwise the Government Actuary is not interested in you. In local government audit there is no one professional qualification that fills the bill; it is a very special section of activity with important duties resting on the government auditor by statute, and from time immemorial various ways have been tried for recruiting the right type of people. In the end the Department has decided that it must provide its own examinations, which are a mixture of law and accountancy, and they are very tough. Approximately 50 per cent. of the lads who offer to take it are failed on the preliminaries.

2089. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I quite accept that. You suggest that some of these people should be assimilated to the works group. Is that the right group for them?—We are using the works group for some, since it is a bit of an *omnium gatherum*; you have a set of salary scales designed to be applied to professional people in the Civil Service and this seems to be the right link. In the case of the Estate Duty Office, we suggest the legal link for obvious reasons.

2090. The works group has so many people in it already it does not matter how many more you add?—I would have thought so. It is no easier to line up the lands officer of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland, for example, with the mechanical engineer, I would have thought.

2091. It is a group of miscellaneous fragments?—We do not describe them as miscellaneous fragments. We describe the process as a codification of salaries and grading for professional officers generally.

2092. I was rather interested in your suggestion that your people suffer from being linked up with the executive class. I think you used that rather peculiar word "demeaning". Do you feel in fact damaged in doing this work by this connection? Do they not do the work so well?—They do the work perfectly well, Sir, but professionally they have a proper pride in their professions, and if you have these individuals dealing, as they are every day, with members of their profession, their same profession, recognised as such and outside the Service paid as such, then there is a—demeaning is perhaps a not too fortunate way of putting it! But the executive class in its general ranges is at a lower level than the professional class.

2093. Coming down to concrete cases, let us take the auditor. You are suggesting that the professional auditor outside rather looks down on the district auditor because he is tied up with the executive class. Does he know that? Do you think the outside public take such an interest in the various ranks in the Civil Service as to know which are executive and which are not?—As regards the general run of the public the answer is obviously "No", but members of particular professions in relation to people with whom they have to work certainly do know, or have a pretty clear idea.

2094. They might know that a civil servant came from the Ministry of Local Government, or from St. Andrew's House, but whether he is a higher executive, a senior executive or an administrative, I doubt whether the outside public knows. —We do not want to make too much of this but our submission is that these people are being wrongly paid because the parallel is an executive parallel and not a professional one.

2095. Do you attach any importance to the fact that these people have received their training and have set themselves up with professional qualifications in the time, and possibly at the expense, of the State? —Yes, Sir, that is a factor which has its advantage to the individual and it has a clear advantage to the State, otherwise it would not be done.

2096. One last question. How many of these people leave because of the qualifications they get?—There is some leakage, not very considerable, because the training makes them expert in a very specialised field. Take the district auditor; the training and education in that field are very special, and the better you make yourself in that field the more you invalidate yourself for outside employment.

2097. What about your lawyer?—Again, estate duty is a very important subject but very specialised.

2098. So the Government does not find its money wasted by training people for the profession and then having them go off for a better job?—On the contrary, they have found this is the best way of filling their posts, and because of the degree of specialisation the work has its own interests and the people in these fields are intensely interested in the jobs they are doing; they get a scope that attracts them which they would not find outside. I do not mean that nobody goes out, but it would be no part of my purpose to suggest that many do.

2099. *Mr. Menzler*: Have any of the barristers in the Estate Duty Office left the Service of the Crown?—There have been some such cases, and several of them have gone over to the administrative class.

2100. Just one or two questions about actuaries. You give the impression that they are recruited through the executive class. You do know that quite a number of them have had to be recruited directly from the profession outside?—Yes.

2101. Are you aware of any difficulties in recruitment from outside?—Very considerable difficulties.

2102. Can you tell the Commission why? —Because the pay is too low.

2103. *Chairman*: Do you want to add anything on Chapter XIII?—On a point made earlier about drawing comparisons with outside categories, cartographic draughtsmen are the biggest group in this section of our submissions and the Ordnance Survey for practical purposes employs all the draughtsmen in the country, so that the sole field for recruitment, training and their employment is Ordnance Survey. There is nothing outside to which we can turn and we therefore have to base ourselves on the general education that is required, the nature of the training that they are then subjected to and what we would regard as the parallels that can be drawn in the Service.

2104. I want to ask you about Chapter XV. Have you anything you wish to add to what you have stated? We are coming back to XIV in a minute.—I have nothing further to add here, but I think I ought to say that we should much regret to feel that any shortage of time had precluded you from questioning us on points that might not be clear to you.

2105. We have no major points to raise. You are satisfied with the way you have put your case and that you do not want to add anything to it?—This is a matter of very great concern, and while we think we are satisfied with the way we put our

case, we cannot be quite sure unless you have examined us so as to indicate how far we have told our story properly.

2106. *Mr. Menzler*: One question on the 96 hour fortnight for nurses. Do the nurses in the Service have to work the same shifts as those in hospitals?—No.

2107. Do they work on a 9 to 6 basis, or round the clock?—They may have to work round the clock in particular cases but it will vary in different parts of the Service. In some cases it is the normal office hours, in other cases, like an ordnance factory, it may be a twenty four hour shift service.

2108. *Sir George Mowbray*: You draw specific attention to the anomaly in paragraph 39 as an example of the general feeling that you have. Some people might think that any change would tend to produce another anomaly which would be almost as bad, that is, members of the same class working in the same area conditioned to different hours?—Not in practice, Sir. It would create a degree of anomaly, but it would be much less serious than the present anomaly, because, at least if you follow the general line that we have suggested here, it is what would be accepted as the natural and inevitable way of arranging things. At the present moment the majority of the class—and it is the majority of the class with which we are concerned in our representations—feel that they are being differentiated against because of what may be perfectly proper in relation to a minority of the class, and that seems to be getting things the wrong way round.

2109. There would be an anomaly but it would diminish?—Yes, indeed.

Chairman: May we go back to Chapter XIV on which we have some questions to ask you?

2110. *Lady Albemarle*: This question is set against the background that already there have been a considerable number of re-groupings. Your contention is that it should go further?—Yes.

2111. You use the words "a few clear patterns"?—I think what we are really saying to the Commission is that what has happened so far has been all to the good; it has been a help to, I think, the Treasury no less than to staff organisations, and it tends to make more sense as a rational system of paying people. We put to you the details of the present scales and say "Look, there are certain obvious things here that tie in very closely together—drawing office staff, cartographic and architectural, and illustrators, and ought they not to be tied into one set of scales? What is the real point in having separate sets of scales?".

2112. You would agree that there comes a moment when simplicity does not reflect the complexity and diversity of the work?

—Yes, there comes a point beyond which you cannot carry this.

2113. But you think it should be carried further?—We think it can be carried quite a stage further. You cannot get just three sets of scales—we are fairly satisfied about that. We think, however, you might, say, halve the present number and that you might make a general recommendation that a similar operation should be undertaken in Departments. Taking the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries alone, the Institution, quite apart from other organisations, is concerned with no fewer than 70 departmental classes, and each has its own little variations of scale. Some measure of that is inevitable, but not to the present extent.

2114. You had a rounding in mind?—Yes, by and large.

2115. It would be a rounding up process?—We would certainly anticipate and hope for a rounding up!

2116. In paragraph 376 you put forward your arguments based on the general shape of the general clerical/executive/administrative side. But is not the relationship there very much more obvious and close than it would be between your classes?—I do not think so really. After all, it was only in 1920 that those classes were shaped together. Before then there were many hundreds of classes covering those fields, and the more orthodox minded people of the time said "This is completely impossible, you cannot do this frightful thing", and for many years there continued to be, for example, departmental clerical grades, until it was realised that in fact these were part of one structure.

2117. Is not that type of work more easily assessed and put in groups than such a variety of professional groups?—It is more difficult, but I should not have thought all that much more.

2118. You clearly have not such a simplified pattern?—No. If you take the works group and the technical classes, they cover an enormous range of people of varying categories and character.

2119. You are saying the process ought to go further, but that is really more in your mind than a very close analogy with the non-specialist staff?—Yes.

2120. Paragraph 377 develops an argument which appears in various Chapters. I would just like to know your reaction to this. In fact are you not asking us to take into consideration what is in essence a political decision: that is that young people should be guided into the scientific

and technical side of the education stream much earlier, and in order to do that you suggest we should put up various scales? Surely it is not for a Commission like this to take a decision of that sort in order to change the educational stream? That surely is much more a matter of national policy?

—I should have thought this was just the job you were appointed for, if I may say so with respect, because what is your job? It is to deal with proper relativities between salary scales. How are you going to assess them? I should have thought you would have assessed them against the background of your knowledge and views about what Government spokesmen and a number of other eminent people have said about what ought to happen. You either think that there should be a development of scientific thought and employment or you do not, and if you do not, you will ignore the submissions that we have put to you. You will think that a continuance of the present relationships is right. If, on the other hand, you think there is at least something in our contention, then I submit that you will want to make your decisions about relativities in the light of that view.

2121. Then, of course, we would also have to take into consideration the present short supply of scientists and technicians? —Yes indeed, there are these other factors.

(At this stage the following witnesses entered the proceedings)

MR. C. COOPER, *General Secretary*

MR. D. J. MATHESON, *President*

MR. K. GLYNN, *Assistant General Secretary*

MR. N. H. FOOTE, *General Treasurer*

on behalf of the Society of Technical Civil Servants

Called and examined.

Chairman: Thank you for coming.

2126. *Mr. Burman:* In paragraph 23 of the I.P.C.S. memorandum there is a report of a meeting between the Allied Employers' Federation and the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen. Have you any idea how much the actual overscale payments mentioned were at that time? —*Mr. Mayne:* No.

2127. The next paragraph, 24, refers to rates paid over the age of 25. Have you any idea of outside salaries which would give some basis of comparison, or is that not very easy? —*Mr. Cooper:* I think not, really. The truth is there are very few firms where there are agreements over 25, only perhaps three in the whole country. They would, I think, be Ford Motors, I.C.I. and Standard Motors. In so far as there are agreements below 25, they are of course agreements on minimum rates and are not necessarily the rates which are paid.

2122. Just a short question on 379. You mention works group and technical analogues. Would you tell us a little more what you mean by that? You say in the bottom paragraph there "... and a third covering the technical classes and their analogues". Could you be a little more specific to us? —What we are suggesting is that, taking our Appendix G, you should at any rate make specific suggestions about the 18 general service classes and linked departmental classes and bring those into relationships. The scientific classes are one fairly clear set.

2123. *Chairman:* Could you help us by grouping them yourself? —Yes, we will let you have a note.

(This information was subsequently handed in and is printed as Annex VI to these Minutes of Evidence.)

2124. *Lady Albemarle:* One final question. Have you formed any estimates of the cost of these proposals? —No, because you see we do not know what your decisions about the administrative/clerical scales are going to be, and we have concerned ourselves entirely with relativities.

2125. *Chairman:* Now, I think we can turn to the draughtsmen. —We are doing this jointly with our colleagues of the S.T.C.S.

2128. Of the rates over the minimum you have no concrete reliable evidence? —I fear not.

2129. In paragraph 240 you say the class is a linked departmental class. Is there much variation in career prospects between the different classes or, alternatively, between different Departments? —*Mr. Mayne:* Yes, as there is with every other class of the Civil Service, and the situation, of course, changes from time to time. There are Departments which are recognised black spots at a particular point in time; ten years hence they are different. The Post Office seems to be fairly normally recognised as a black spot throughout!

2130. In paragraph 244 half way through you say:—

"The basic requirements of the draughtsman are a sound understanding of architectural or engineering construction work to enable detailed

drawings to be prepared, and a sound theoretical training for design purposes."

That is a point that crops up again and again as to the work of the ordinary grade of draughtsman as against the senior grades. In outside industry one normally assumes that the draughtsman prepares detailed drawings from a design, and there is a distinction between the designer and the draughtsman. Are you implying here that the work of the basic grade of draughtsman involves an element of design?—*Mr. Cooper*: I think in honesty one ought to say it varies a bit between Departments, but taking the generality of Departments I think the truth is at the moment, and has been for some time, that because of the difficulty of getting draughtsmen the designs have been prepared in the Civil Service and they have then been sent out for detailing. It is probably true that it may be accidental but there is more designing done now than there was, shall we say, five or six years ago.

2131. But normally you would accept that there is a difference in the skill of a man who creates an original design and a man who simply works out the stresses and strains and the detailed dimensions from it?—*Indeed*.—*Mr. Mayne*: I think we must emphasise the great extent to which design work enters into civil service draughtsmanship. So much of this is associated with development work in scientific engineering that it is inevitable. I went down to an Admiralty establishment at Teddington just last week looking at the work being done there, in association with one of the scientific sections of the Admiralty, and practically all the draughtsmen there—there was a group of some 40 to 50—were on design work. You would get the same kind of thing with the electrical engineering directorate of the Admiralty, where there is an enormous amount of work on the development of the use of electricity with warships and war purposes of varying kinds, all throwing up design work. That obviously falls back on to the draughtsmen. There is very substantial reliance upon the draughtsman to do the job. You tell him what you want and leave him to get on with it and solve the problem.

2132. Is that not comparable with the instructions given by the administrator to the clerical officer?—I should not really have thought so, Sir. Take Teddington—I saw there this business of the measurement of the movement of tides; the general idea of the machine came from the scientist working with the Institute of Oceanography, but the directions given to the draughtsmen were

in quite general terms; the decision about particular metals which should be made for particular parts of it originated with the draughtsmen, out of their general knowledge and a certain amount of experimentation which they started.

2133. *Chairman*: Is it not difficult to assess the amount of design work that is done by the basic grade?—Very difficult, Sir, but there again one would expect the major responsibility for design to rest on the senior officers in any grouping.

2134. There still is quite a large element in the work of the basic grade?—Quite a substantial amount. It varies, of course.—*Mr. Glynn*: Especially in research and design or research and development—the Ministry of Supply, the Royal Naval Scientific Establishments, the Ministry of Works and Admiralty Headquarters.

2135. What proportion would be engaged on that type of work?—*Mr. Cooper*: The majority.—*Mr. Foote*: In the Admiralty each basic grade draughtsman in the basic design departments has his own book where all the work he does remains as a record and is referred to in future years to see what happened on a particular design.

2136. *Mr. Burman*: In paragraph 253 you talk about the general shortage of draughtsmen. Have you any reason to believe that the shortage is greater in the Civil Service than it is outside?—*Mr. Mayne*: The answer is yes, Sir, because the Government finds it possible to put out much of its work to private contract, which indicates that there are resources available outside the Service.

2137. Have you much evidence on wastage? There must be a fair amount of movement either way?—*Mr. Cooper*: In the Department of Atomic Energy at Risley so far this year 12 draughtsmen had left to go into industry—a number of others had left for different reasons, but the relevant number is that to industry—out of our membership there of about 250, so that if that continues during this year one could say there is about a ten per cent. wastage to industry. That may be due to the fact that they are not far away from Northwich and tend to go to I.C.I., who pay rather attractive rates as compared with the Civil Service. We have not had occasion to take a more general survey than that.

2138. During that same period in the same district did you get any in from industry?—Yes, a number. I would not care to say how many; I should think it conceivable perhaps as many came as went. They can recruit people and they

stay there for a time. They do not tend to regard it as permanent employment as one normally tends to regard the Civil Service, but as another firm to which they go for a bit, and when they find something better they go elsewhere.

2139. It is movement rather than net wastage?—Yes.

2140. Comparisons are made throughout this submission between the career prospects of the draughtsmen and those of the executive officer. Should we take into account the fact that civil service experience as a draughtsman qualifies him for outside employment in the Civil Service as compared with the executive officer?—*Mr. Mayne*: One is bound to say "Yes".

2141. And how far have career prospects for the good men been improved compared with pre-war by devolution of some of the simpler work to the assistant grade?—*Mr. Cooper*: I doubt if they have improved substantially, though I should think it probable that complements are now better than they were before the war. I should think it doubtful if, on the whole, they are as good as they were during the war, and the changes brought about by the war circumstances make it awfully difficult correctly to judge what has happened.

2142. You made the point earlier on that so many of the basic grade are doing a substantial—I think was the word—amount of original design work. Who is doing the detail work if it is not the assistant grade?—*Mr. Mayne*: There are three factors there. The basic grade do quite an amount of detail work. Drawing office assistants are being used to the fullest extent, but obviously on work much more of a routine character. Then it is the detail work which is being put outside the Service. We do not want to suggest the basic grade draughtsman does no detail work; that would be quite wrong.—*Mr. Cooper*: May I just add that this placing of detail work out to contract also works in rather a different way—that draughtsmen are brought into the Civil Service from outside firms to do detailing. For example, the Ministry of Works headquarters at the moment has, I think, as many as 30 draughtsmen from an outside firm who have been brought in to do detail work, and they work under the supervision of the civil service senior draughtsmen there.

2143. Paragraph 256 deals with this question of promotion, with which is linked the career prospects. How far would it be proper to say that draughtsmen in the basic grade who are doing generally speaking—although from what you have just said not so much as I had anticipated—the routine

technical work of detailing are on a dead end job? A man who is extremely competent at that need not necessarily have the ability to go higher up where pure original design is required.—I doubt if it occurs in quite that way, in that the common practice is to recruit draughtsmen at a common level and one hopes, and one imagines the Departments hope, that they will progress. There is of course a number of Departments where they employ so few that there is in fact no promotion for unavoidable reasons. In other Departments, because, as we think, and believe Departments think, they are unable to recruit suitable draughtsmen, we are now getting a whole spate of higher posts filled from outside the Civil Service. That is a very common practice in the Ministry of Works, the Department of Atomic Energy Research and Weapons Establishment have now said that they have virtually no one they think to be promotable. The Ministry of Supply have occasion to do it from time to time, and in so far as they are recruiting draughtsmen who are not altogether promotable, it is not I think from intention, but because they cannot recruit better draughtsmen.

2144. Then you are finding, apparently, that the difficulties of promotion lie as much with the quality of the draughtsmen as with the lack of complement at the higher levels?—There is truth in that at the moment.

2145. And it would be possible, I suppose also—I do not know the detailed layout of the various Departments—that in one Department there would be a tremendous amount of routine work, meaning a big spread down at the bottom, but less original work at the top, so that you might get an extraordinarily broad-based pyramid which would frustrate chances of promotion. In other Departments you might get it the other way. Does that happen?—Yes, it does. I do not think in this field one can expect promotion prospects to be uniform because of the nature of the work.

2146. And they cannot be transferred from one type to another very easily?—They can be. There is diffidence on the part of Departments in transferring them because they do regard their work as specialised. I think they perhaps carry that too far and that there could be more interchangeability than there is; but there is bound to be variation between prospects in Departments. Our complaint is that the variation is very much too wide.

2147. Have you got any figures of class to class promotions in recent years?—In practice there are only two Departments where one could say there is class to class

promotion worth worrying about. One is the Ministry of Supply, where I think last year there were 34 such promotions; the other is the Ministry of Works, where I fear I cannot remember the number but it was less than 20. In other Departments I doubt if there were four or five amongst the rest put together.—*Mr. Mayne*: Practically none. There is a difference in attitude of mind and practice between the engineering and the architectural draughtsmen, as you will appreciate. The architectural draughtsman is going on much more definitely for his architectural qualifications than is necessarily the case with the engineering draughtsman.

2148. Can you see any possibility or probability of increased class to class promotion?—It is always a little difficult to say. I should have thought that class to class promotion was becoming less in the Civil Service rather than more, and the establishment circular that I referred to earlier on does quite definitely set out to tie up Departments and to make it more stringent.

2149. Are the possibilities for internal or external training of the different grades such as to enable them to obtain the necessary qualifications for promotion?—*Mr. Cooper*: That varies very widely. In the Ministry of Supply I should say they are reasonably good. I do not know of any other Department where one could really say they existed. The thing that people have in their minds at the moment is whether it is worth going to all this trouble. There are lots of people who are qualified for class to class promotion who are not getting it. In the Ministry of Works, for example, it is the practice to get their professional officers from the drawing office quite substantially but even so, as I said, last year there were only about 18 in a total drawing office staff of some 1700, and people are feeling a good deal frustrated, having got these qualifications, to find that it does not immediately—or for some considerable time—get them on.

2150. Your point is that the machinery is there but it is not adequately used?—*Mr. Mayne*: Not quite that the machinery is there. In Works and Supply there is a tradition of class to class promotion which has in fact been diminished by war developments, and the establishment circular that I have referred to has tightened it up very much more, and that is why, as *Mr. Cooper* has said, you get this quite substantial number of people holding the qualifications.

2151. *Mr. Menzler*: They could go outside, *Mr. Mayne*, with those qualifications?—Yes, that is one thing we recognise.

but it does seem to us that there is a responsibility resting on the Civil Service to provide a proper career; it is not as though this is just a handful of people being employed. This is a substantial number of thousands, and it ought not to be said that the Civil Service looks to industry (a) to provide the training before they come into the Civil Service, and (b) to provide promotion out of Departments at the other end. It seems to us to be quite illogical and not the proper way of organising draughtsmen.

2152. *Mr. Burman*: In this field from the nature of things one is apt to get rapid expansions and contractions which will complicate the whole problem. Have you any suggestions to make for machinery for doing what you would like to do?—It seems to us that there is a fairly clear measurable need for the Civil Service for 10 to 15 years hence and that one ought to be able to measure that. You cannot do anything about the sudden expansions that fall on the Civil Service. That is just one of the things you have to accept, and for which you can do nothing else but “fudge” some temporary arrangements, but they ought to be temporary. Our trouble with the Civil Service is that we have been under most indefinite conditions for all too long a period, and there ought to be an end to that.

2153. *Chairman*: Why does not promotion take place? Is it because the complement does not allow it or because standards are too high?—It is the conception of the number of higher posts you need. We do not always look at this with the same eyes as the Official Side. There was a recent survey in the Ministry of Works where our two organisations jointly put proposals for substantially increased numbers of higher posts. The Ministry of Works accepted our views to a limited extent—or are in process of doing so—but they certainly did not see anything like eye to eye with us on that. These are grading issues, and the measurement of gradings in the Civil Service is always a bit of a difficulty. We make representations to the Official Side. They will undoubtedly look at them honestly and openly, but we do not necessarily come to the same conclusions. The trouble is there is nothing we can do about it after that.

2154. Is there the same trouble with class to class promotion?—That is a rather different issue, Sir: the insistence on the precise professional qualifications and particular kinds of professional experience. You may find a man holding a qualification who is considered by a promotion board and rejected. They think he has not got the right kind of outside experience.

2155. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: Is a serious attempt being made to give men a broad enough foundation training which would facilitate these transfers?—It depends upon where you are in the Service. If, for example, you are a draughtsman in a research and design establishment you are going to get an enormous range of work anyway, because it is the nature of the place. There are certain other places, of course, where that would not be true.

2156. Would these draughtsmen have a substantial amount of prior workshop experience?—Yes.

2157. Does this not provide a good enough foundation for transfer from one activity to another?—*Mr. Cooper*: There is one difficulty at the moment. Take a specific case in a large research establishment, probably the biggest, the Royal Aircraft Establishment. There is a proposal from the Ministry of Supply at the moment to bring in a number of people from outside as leading draughtsmen because they want to bring in some greater design experience. Our view is that the reason why that is necessary—I should have said the place is divided into a number of sections—is that because of the shortage of draughtsmen they require people to produce the maximum output, and there is not the desire there used to be to switch them around from one department to another. That, we think, is a bad thing.

2158. More might be done to ensure a broader basis of experience?—*Mr. Mayne*: In some cases it is being done.

2159. *Chairman*: It is a fact in outside employment that professional men do come up the drawing office way quite a lot?—Yes. It is one of the criticisms draughtsmen make about the Civil Service—that in outside employment what you have described does happen. Inside the Civil Service it is as rare as *Mr. Cooper* instanced. —*Mr. Glynn*: I should like to make a comment about the Department where this is probably a greater problem than anywhere else, the Admiralty. There are two difficulties. One is the rather specialised training of the engineering draughtsman which does not equip him to get professional qualifications. He goes through dockyard schools, takes an internal training rather than a qualification related to class to class promotion. The second is the navalisation of the professional posts. So there is virtually no class to class promotion. I mention that to complete the picture, because the Admiralty is an employer of draughtsmen.

2160. *Mr. Willis Jackson*: There is a central organisation in the Ministry of Supply to overlook this general question

of training. Is there any other such authority on the professional, scientific and technical side as a whole?—*Mr. Mayne*: There is a training committee of the National Whitley Council which reviews regularly the activities of Departments in a general way.

2161. But not one that can exercise an authority inside an establishment?—No. There is a training division in Treasury which keeps a general eye on what is happening in Departments.

2162. But it has no authority to arrange transfers for training purposes?—No, indeed. That you would expect to happen within a Department, to the extent that it happened at all. Again you are confronted with this shockingly limiting factor of shortage of supplies. You are already very short of draughtsmen, and if you say to a man in charge of a particular department "Look, I want to take X of your draughtsmen away, not in order to do some other work of greater priority but in order to give him a bit of wider experience," he goes up in smoke.

2163. If everyone takes this view we shall finish with inadequately trained people at a time when we need them more than ever.—I think we would agree with that, but one does understand the reactions which you get.

2164. *Chairman*: *Mr. Mayne*, I think we have some general questions on the S.T.C.S. memorandum. May I thank you for coming here and your patience during the two days.—*Mr. Mayne*: Thank you, Sir. We are grateful to you for listening.

(At this stage the I.P.C.S. witnesses withdrew and the proceedings continued with the S.T.C.S. witnesses.)

2165. *Mr. Cooper*, paragraphs 1 to 4 of your memorandum deal with your representative capacity. Is there anything you would like to add to that?—*Mr. Cooper*: No, Sir.

2166. Paragraph 6 sets out the fundamentals as regards the principles of civil service remuneration. In (a) it is suggested that civil service pay should be maintained at its real value in relation to the wages index up to the maximum of the clerical officer class, and to other general statistical indications for classes with higher salary scales. How would you deal with the objection that the wages index and available information about salary movements give only average figures derived from a wide range of occupations and income bands? There would have to be considerable adjustments to use them to deal with particular classes?—The wages index as we see it and statistical evidence on salaries, such

as it may be, is of use once this Commission has established an appropriate rate. It is of value in maintaining that rate for a good period, one would imagine. It may be necessary to have a review from time to time of rates as such, and see where they are going. The value of a system of this sort for maintaining wage rates is that, as for example in the 1952 pay addition agreement, everyone gets the same, and that seems to us an equitable arrangement. On the last round we did reasonably well, we have no complaints about it. We got 7 per cent. from the Arbitration Tribunal; other people got $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. In all honesty I do not think our case was any different from anyone else's.

2167. That was at the same salary level?

—Yes. Certainly part of our scale covers part of the clerical officer scale, and although, as I say, we have no complaints because on the whole we did well, it does seem to us to be quite inequitable that that sort of thing should happen. When circumstances are common—that we are all claiming increases because there has been a general increase outside—on the whole it would be far better if we all got much the same out of it.

2168. Your idea would be that a change in the index—say 5 per cent.—might be used as a starter, and that then there would be negotiations which would result in a certain amount of variation. You would not want a 7 per cent. rise all through the Service at the same time?—No, indeed not. I think, as you say, 5 per cent. might be the figure that we would regard as the starting point for negotiations. It would be evidence that there was something on which negotiations ought to commence.

2169. Would the negotiations be with separate classes or with the whole Service as in the 1952 pay addition?—I think on the whole we would prefer they were with the National Whitley Council for the Civil Service as a whole because it does create less anomalies. I think that is a reasonably honest view because, as I say, we fared well out of the recent chaos.

2170. Would you care to elaborate your references to the various factors mentioned in (b) (i), namely responsibilities involved, social position of the officers as servants of the State, etc.?—Perhaps I ought to say this. In the abstract we do not find anything terribly wrong with Tomlin, but both we and the Treasury have found it virtually impossible to apply it, partly for the reasons Mr. Burman adduced earlier. The last time we went to arbitration we and the Treasury tried very hard to get information, but the best the Treasury could do was to produce about 10 unnamed firms.

It therefore does not seem in practice that Tomlin gets us terribly far. If that is the case, it seems to us that what we must then look at is the sort of background from which people come, the sort of training they require, the sort of work they are doing—the level of responsibility they are carrying as compared with other grades—grades, if possible, which have some connection with draughtsmen, either with who they work as with professional staff, or whom they work alongside. And that I am bound to admit is not an easy thing to do. It is not a clear cut formula by any means, and, to be truthful about it, we did find some difficulty in making up our minds what the principle should be. As I say, in theory we have no great objection to Tomlin. If it could be put into practice we would be reasonably happy. But as a clear cut formula of that sort does not work in our experience, we have of necessity to fall back on something which, of its very nature, is a good deal more vague.

2171. You think internal relativities are easier to apply than outside comparisons?

—Yes, on the whole.

2172. Supposing both were applied and they clashed, to which would you give preference?—I think it might depend on the circumstances—by which I do not mean necessarily that one would pick whichever was the higher at any given time, but it might be that at a given time there was a case for placing greater significance on outside practice than internal evidence. If, for example, there was an extreme shortage of draughtsmen and industry was having to pay enormous rates to get them, on the face of it there would seem no reason why the Civil Service should not do likewise. On the other hand if the position remained reasonably static in that respect, we think internal relativities might have greater weight. And again it might depend on how much evidence could be adduced from outside. We are really not seeking to get away from outside evidence; we just find it virtually impossible to get it.

2173. We are inclined to think that in the draughtsmen field it might be easier to get evidence than in a good many others. Your experience does not coincide with that?—No, if I may give you an example. As I explained to Mr. Burman, there are practically no firms where there are agreements above 25—that is the first difficulty. In the Civil Service the majority of draughtsmen will be above 24 at all events. In so far as you have agreements with firms they do not, in our experience, get us an awfully long way. If we may take Ford Motors as an example. There is an agreement. I have not got the rates with me, but they are

minimum rates, and Fords—as I would think does industry generally—if they get a good man pay him more; if he is no more than average he probably gets the minimum rate.

2174. Could you let us have any rates you know about, if they can be quoted? We would like all the evidence you can produce.—Certainly. If I may just make a point, the minimum rate for 1953, which is common knowledge, is £594 at 25. Now in fact the rates paid—or as members of the A.E.S.D. say they are paid—are about 30 per cent. higher than that, and that is where we get the difficulty. We know what the minimum rates are at a number of firms, but we do not know what the rates actually paid even on an average are. But we have some information of this sort and by all means we will let you have it if we can.

2175. In paragraph 7 you suggest that the status of the professional, technical and scientific Civil Service should be improved. Is it your idea that the Government should give a lead to the country in this respect?—Yes, we think they are very far from giving a lead at the moment. It could, we will see, be a matter for argument whether they really ought to be far out in the front. At least we think they ought not to be so near the back as they are at the moment and, as a matter of fact, that seems to be a view that is shared, because the Ministry of Supply, in presenting a memorandum to the Select Committee on Estimates in 1952-3 Session themselves took this point and put the point, saying that, "The drawing office has a certain lack of status in the engineering world, so that the majority of entrants into Government service prefer employment as engineers and regard the drawing office only as a step towards it". I think that is true. What we would desire to see—class to class promotion by all means, but in the nature of things that cannot cater for the majority of people—is an adequate structure in the drawing office itself in order that people should not come into the drawing office as a passing phase on the way somewhere else, but regard it as a career in itself.

2176. There is a shortage of supply of draughtsmen. Why it is that the laws of supply and demand do not operate? You would have thought the civil service rates would have been forced up from the fact that they cannot get enough people. Is it this letting out of work to contract?—Yes, that eases the situation for the Civil Service, and I suppose there is another reason: that in research establishments the amount of work and the number of ideas

people have is almost unlimited, and I suppose from time to time it is decided what should be developed, and there are a number of things obviously which can be left. Indeed we all find sometimes that if something is not done it solves itself in the end without having to be done! But I suppose that putting out work to contract is probably the greatest alleviation that the Service has at the moment, and they are also using an element of dilution—a thing which we do not like at all, because it leads to this difficulty I was mentioning of staff then being unpromotable. In the Admiralty, for example, they are bringing in people with no drawing office experience, then sending them to Bath Technical College for a short period in order to acquire some knowledge before they can use them, which does not seem to us at all a proper thing. There is one other thing which is probably rather outside your terms of reference, but a thing we are pressing on the Treasury: that the Government ought to take its share of training draughtsmen. At the moment it does practically nothing. We feel they should recruit youngsters and train them, partly as a good idea in itself, partly because it will ease the shortage.

2177. Are not your two suggestions rather contradictory? Do you mean before they become established as draughtsmen?—No, sorry. What they are doing at the moment is recruiting mature people who may have had workshop experience and no drawing office experience, and then training them. What we say they should do is to have a grade of drawing office apprentice—call it what you will—bring them in at 16 to 17 as does industry, give them a proper training and by 21 or 22 they will be qualified draughtsmen.

2178. *Lady Albemarle*: What about National Service? Is that not a trouble?—I think this is in fact likely to happen, and that the Treasury may introduce such a scheme. We have had discussions with one or two Departments about it, and they are in favour of it. Whether the Treasury will agree or not I do not altogether know, but I think it quite possible that they will. National Service I do not think will be a great difficulty, it will merely place the Civil Service in the same position as industry. They will train these people, who will go off to National Service, and it is for the Civil Service to see that they pay sufficiently attractive remuneration to make them come back.

2179. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: They could get a deferment of their National Service to enable them to complete their training?—That is so.

2180. *Chairman*: If you make your profession in the Civil Service so attractive

that you get more than your share of the country's draughtsmen, what is going to happen then?—I think the fact at the moment is that the professional and technical Civil Service—and I gather the scientific Civil Service—has to be built up, as it has to be built up in industry. In other words there is a general shortage at the moment. It is, I suppose, a fair point that the Civil Service ought not to have more than its fair share. Equally, it seems to us, the Civil Service should be doing something to alleviate the shortage by itself producing such staff. What seems anomalous is that the Civil Service to get over its difficulty should merely put the work out to private drawing offices, in effect, and pay more money for it, or alternatively, bring such people in to do the drawing office work. What people find galling is that the Ministry of Works or some such Department will bring 30 to 40 people in from an outside office to do work the Ministry cannot handle itself. Staff get talking and they find that these people are getting more money than are they, and it creates a lot of ill feeling, apart from being not at all sensible.

2181. *Mr. Menzler*: I am a little confused about this training. I understood there was a magnificent training scheme at the Ministry of Supply. Is that the same as you are now talking about?—That is the point *Mr. Burman* was making about people getting facilities for external training. In the Ministry of Supply people do get time off. The basic qualification at the moment is the Ordinary National Certificate, but they get time off to study for Higher National Certificate . . .

2182. Fees paid?—Yes. But there is no other Department, so far as I recall, which has a scheme of that sort at all for draughtsmen.

2183. And are they encouraged to take the A.M.I. Mech. E.?—I think in honesty the Department does go a long way to encourage them to get any qualification relevant to their field.—*Mr. Glynn*: On the question of supply catching up with demand, there are one or two factors which are relevant. First of all it takes a long time to train the finished article—five years' apprenticeship and then two or three years on the job. In the nature of things one would not expect it to catch up very quickly.

Secondly, post-war educational developments have tended to discourage people leaving school at 15. It is much easier to stay on till 16 or 18 and go into an academic type job, than to go into a workshop at 15 and do it the hard way. Thirdly, there is the relative insecurity of a draughtsman's job either in the Civil Service or outside as compared with the clerical type job. The fact is that the expansion has not yet lasted long enough for people to be quite certain it is going to be permanent, and that there will be a permanent need for a far larger technical class, in the widest sense, than there has been in the past.

2184. *Sir Alexander Gray*: When you import a certain number of people from outside like that, how long do they stay?—Some stay many years.

2185. Do they get established?—Quite a lot do.

2186. Does that cause grievances?—It does in some cases, in that some people get established by open competition and have to lose pay.

2187. *Chairman*: Is there anything more you want to say to us?—*Mr. Cooper*: I think the only thing, Sir, is on the last couple of paragraphs, where we mention tracers and drawing office assistants. The reason we have not given you evidence on that is that it seemed to us it was probably outside your terms of reference. What we have in mind is that it is not so much pay which we want to talk about, which patently will follow the clerical pattern as it has always tended to, but rather that the structure should be more closely allied with the typing structure. That is probably a point which you would not want to investigate, although we would be very happy to give you a paper on that.

2188. *Chairman*: Are you preparing your case for anybody else?—We shall, I think, if we do not put it to you probably put it to the Treasury.

2189. If you are going to prepare the case anyway, you might present it sooner rather than later and let us have a look at it to see if we think we can do anything about it.—Yes, indeed.

2190. *Chairman*: Thank you very much, we are much obliged to you for coming.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Monday, 12th July, 1954, at 11.30 a.m.)

ANNEX I

(See question 1879, page 640)

THE INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS
INCREASES AT MINIMA AND MAXIMA OF CERTAIN SALARY SCALES

The following statement gives the Royal Commission the information asked for by Mr. Cash, but the Institution is bound to enter a number of caveats.

1. So far as the clerical, executive and administrative classes are concerned, it is possible to give precise figures as between 1939 and now—at any rate up to the level of the chief executive officer and the administrative principal. Above the administrative principal there have been organisational changes which would largely invalidate any calculation of salary figures and percentages.

2. So far as the professional classes are concerned, it is possible to give certain figures but a number of further points are made in subsequent paragraphs. The figures that can be given relate to the general body of staff and not to the higher grades. Organisational changes in the professional Civil Service, including the substantial increase in its size since 1939, make any comparisons quite impracticable. Posts which today bear names similar to those used in 1939 are not, generally speaking, comparable posts.

3. So far as the technical classes and the works group are concerned, it will be noted that in the 1939 figures it has been necessary to give two sets of scales in each case. That is because in 1939 there was a series of classes which, as from 1946, has been replaced by the linked departmental classes. The class on the lowest scale and that on the highest scale have been taken.

4. So far as the scientific officer, experimental officer and assistant (scientific) classes are concerned, no useful 1939 figures can be given. In the scientific officer field the number of grades is different and the assimilation was not on a straightforward basis. There was a reconsideration of officers in a number of grades and a fresh assimilation, some going into scientific officer grades, some into experimental officer grades. In the broadly experimental officer field there is a similar number of grades but the absorption was not on a grade for grade basis and there were wide differences in the range of responsibilities and duties of particular grades in the old organisation as compared with the new.

5. The assistant (scientific) class is really a new class. Much of the old laboratory assistant work has been passed to an industrial grade. The new type of assistant (scientific) has taken over much work which, prior to the 1946 reorganisation, fell to carpenter assistant grades, which as a whole, form the basis for the experimental officer class.

6. A recognised fact, which must be kept clearly in mind, is that the professional, scientific and technical Civil Service before the war was grossly underpaid *vis-à-vis* the rest of the Civil Service and the reorganisation of 1946 was intended to put this right. As will have been seen from the arguments in the Institution's evidence there is no doubt that this was the intention of the Government and no doubt in the Institution's mind that this intention was by no means fully carried out.

2.7.1954

PERCENTAGE INCREASES AT MINIMA AND MAXIMA OF SALARY SCALES OF CERTAIN GRADES
1939 TO 1953

GRADE	Salary scales			Percentage increases	
	1939 min. max.	1.1.47 min. max.	1953 min. max.	1939-53 min. max.	1947-53 min. max.
	£	£	£	Per cent.	Per cent.
Technical class IV	182— 200	330— 450	430— 585	136—192	30—30
	208— 350			107— 67	
Technical class III	175— 351	400— 525	540— 670	209— 91	35—28
	350— 455			54— 47	
Technical class II	253— 450	500— 625	665— 780	163— 73	33—25
	314— 500			112— 56	
Technical class I	278— 475	625— 750	780— 950	180—100	25—27
	400— 635			95— 50	
Technical class B	400— 570	750— 850	950—1,065	138— 87	27—25
	500— 720			90— 48	
Technical class A	540— 800	800— 950	1,000—1,180	85— 47	25—24
	600— 800			67— 47	
Works group basic grade ...	300— 550	475— 750	650—1,000	117— 82	37—33
	340— 600			91— 67	
Works group main grade ...	550— 800	750—1,000	1,000—1,320	82— 65	33—32
	575— 825			74— 60	
Works group senior grade	826— 953	1,050—1,270	1,375—1,575	66— 65	31—24
	900—1,025			53— 54	
Scientific officer		360— 600	470— 855		31—43
Senior scientific officer ...		650— 850	975—1,150		50—35
Principal scientific officer ...		900—1,220	1,150—1,570		28—29
Asst. experimental officer ...		210— 430	290— 645		38—50
Experimental officer		500— 650	720— 890		44—37
Senior experimental officer ...		700— 900	1,030—1,230		47—37
Chief experimental officer ...			1,260—1,510		
Assistant scientific		195— 380	250— 520		28—37
Senior assistant scientific ...		400— 550	550— 745		37—35
Assistant principal	275— 625	360—720	470— 855	71— 37	31—19
Principal	800—1,100	900—1,220	1,150—1,570	44— 43	28—29
Executive officer (minimum at age 19)	150— 525	210— 625	320— 800	113— 52	52—28
Higher executive officer ...	550— 650	650— 750	830— 995	51— 53	28—33
Senior executive officer ...	700— 860	800— 965	1,030—1,230	47— 43	29—28
Chief executive officer ...	900—1,050	1,000—1,160	1,260—1,510	40— 44	26—30
Clerical officer (minimum at age 18)	105— 350	170— 450	220— 570	110— 63	30—27
Higher clerical officer ...	400— 525	500— 625	655— 800	64— 52	31—28

Paper handed in by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants.
2nd July, 1954.

ANNEX II

(See question 1933, page 647)

THE INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS

REQUEST BY MR. NOEL HALL FOR DETAILS OF MAKE-UP OF FIGURES QUOTED IN PARA. 79 ET. SEQ. OF THE INSTITUTION'S EVIDENCE

1. In making the calculations to give the total figures of remuneration in the administrative class, the scientific officer class and the works group of professional classes, the Institution has taken as a basis the information set out below and has assumed that the officer does not proceed beyond the normal career grade of the class.

2. The following table, supplied by the central staff records of the Treasury on 1st July, 1952, shows the percentage of staff in various grades in the administrative and scientific officer classes in certain age groupings:—

Grade	Percentage of staff in grade at ages greater than:								
	21	24	26	31	36	41	46	51	56
Scientific officer	100	83·8	53·9	5·6	0·7	0·5	0·5	0·5	0·5
Assistant principal	100	83·9	48·3	3·3	0·8	0·8	—	—	—
Senior scientific officer ...	100	100	99·8	58·9	19·9	6·3	2·4	1·0	0·6
Principal scientific officer ...	100	100	100	98·8	82·2	54·3	35·5	19·3	9·8
Principal admin.	100	100	100	85·6	37·8	19·0	9·9	4·3	1·2
Senior principal scientific officer	100	100	100	100	94·0	75·0	54·2	36·7	19·5
Assistant secretary	100	100	100	100	90·1	50·6	24·7	12·5	8·4
Deputy chief scientific officer (and above)	100	100	100	100	99·4	91·9	68·3	43·5	28·6
Under secretary (and above)	100	100	100	100	100	90·8	67·3	47·5	37·3

3. The central staff records provided on 16th June, 1953, show the average age of promotees from scientific officer to senior scientific officer, and senior scientific officer to principal scientific officer over certain periods. That information was:—

AVERAGE AGE OF THE PROMOTEES

(Central staff records. Treasury figures provided 16th June, 1953)

Period	S.O. to S.S.O.	S.S.O. to P.S.O.
(a) 1.4.49—1.3.50	30·4	37·8
(b) 1.4.50—31.3.51	30·0	37·1
(c) 1951	29·6	36·7
(d) 1952	29·2	35·6

This second table gives the average age of those who were promoted which is, of course, not the same thing as the average age of promotion for the grade.

4. The Institution has not a similar table for the assistant principal but the administrative class competition is open to entrants between the ages of 20½ and 24 and the regulations of the 1954 open competition say "that a fully qualified Assistant Principal may normally expect promotion to the rank of Principal within about seven years, i.e. at about age 30". As is shown in the table in paragraph 2 above at that time only 48·3 per cent. of the grade were over age 26 and by age 31 only 3·3 per cent remained. Age 28 has been taken as a reasonable average.

5. The same detailed information is not available in respect of the works group but, so far as the Institution can ascertain, promotion to the main grade takes place at about age 37.

6. The detailed assumptions are:—

Administrative class

- That the assistant principal is recruited at age 23.
- That he is promoted to principal at age 28.
- That he is promoted to assistant secretary at age 39.
- That he remains an assistant secretary until retiring age at 60.

Scientific officer

- That he is recruited at age 23.
- That he is promoted to senior scientific officer at age 28.
- That he is promoted to principal scientific officer at age 36.
- That he remains a principal scientific officer until retiring at age 60.

Works group

- That he is recruited to the basic grade at age 25.
- That he receives the £75 special increase at age 27.
- That he is promoted to main grade at age 37.
- That he remains in the main grade until he retires at age 60.

7. The figures set out below are all based on the position as it was at the time the Institution's evidence was submitted. Since then a further increase of £100 has been given on salaries, including pay addition, of £1,600 per annum upwards and this, added to the appropriate administrative class salaries adds a further £2,200 to the administrative class total remuneration making it £64,520.

Age			Administrative class	Scientific officer class	Works group
			£	£	£
23	...	...	A.P. 470	S.O. 470	Basic 650
24	...	...	500	500	
25	...	...	580	605	
26	...	...	590	620	
27	...	...	620	650	
28	...	...	Pr. 1,150	S.S.O. 975	780
29	...	...	1,190	1,010	810
30	...	...	1,240	1,045	840
31	...	...	1,290	1,080	870
32	...	...	1,340	1,115	900
33	...	...	1,390	1,150	930
34	...	...	1,440	1,150	960
35	...	...	1,490	1,150	1,000
36	...	...	1,540	P.S.O. 1,150	1,000
37	...	...	1,570	1,190	Main 1,070
38	...	...	1,570	1,240	1,110
39	...	...	A.S. 1,600	1,290	1,150
40	...	...	1,675	1,340	1,190
41	...	...	1,750	1,390	1,230
42	...	...	1,825	1,440	1,270
43	...	...	1,900	1,490	1,310
44	...	...	2,000	1,540	1,320
45	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
46	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
47	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
48	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
49	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
50	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
51	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
52	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
53	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
54	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
55	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
56	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
57	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
58	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
59	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
60	...	...	2,100	1,570	1,320
Totals£			62,320+	48,710	40,935

+ £2,200 (Higher grades increase)

ANNEX III

(See question 1975 on page 651)

TABLE OF EQUIVALENTS

1. Permanent secretary=Some top scientific and works group posts=£6,000
2. Deputy secretary=Chief scientific officer=Some directing posts works group=£4,800.
3. Under secretary=Deputy chief scientific officer=Superintending grade works group=£3,800
4. Assistant secretary=Senior principal scientific officer=Senior grade works group=£2,400—£3,000
5. Principal=Senior scientific officer/principal scientific officer=Main grade works group=£1,600—£2,200
6. Chief executive officer=Chief experimental officer=Technical A & B=Chief draughtsman=£1,575—£1,900
7. Senior executive officer=Senior experimental officer=Technical I=Senior draughtsman=£1,250—£1,525
8. Higher executive officer=Experimental officer=Technical II=Leading draughtsman=£960—£1,160
9. Executive officer=Assistant experimental officer=Technical III=Draughtsman=£350—£925
10. Basic grade works group= ? —£1,600 (see paragraph 136 of I.P.C.S. submission).

N.B.—(i) Paragraph 187 of the I.P.C.S. submission suggests that the experimental scales should be higher because of the career question so that the actual figures are perhaps too low.

(ii) The scales put forward by the Society are said to be subject to whatever conclusions the Commission may reach, in the light of other evidence, as to the appropriate salary scales for the grades of the administrative class and to the Society's own submission as to the appropriate relationship which should exist between executive class and administrative class scales. It may, therefore, be that the figures in rows 6 to 9 should be higher, perhaps on the following rough pattern:—

6. £1,900—2,200
7. £1,600—1,850
8. £1,250—1,500
9. ? —1,200

(iii) The scales proposed also do not take into account any increases which may be due on a cost of living basis as reflected by the rise in the index of wage rates during 1953 and 1954.

ANNEX IV

(See question 1975 on page 651)

NOTE BY THE TREASURY

1. By courtesy of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, and under an arrangement made with the National Staff Side, the Treasury have been supplied with copies of the written evidence submitted by the Institution to the Royal Commission.

2. The Treasury do not question the right of any staff association to tender whatever evidence they may wish to the Royal Commission. But they have noted with regret the statement in paragraph 128 of this evidence that certain civil servants "have been made the victims of Treasury sharp practice". This, and other references to the Treasury in paragraphs 129 and 130, amount to an unusual charge which the Treasury wholly deny; and they believe that a study of the documents will lead the Royal Commission to the conclusion that the charge is unjustified.

24th June, 1954.

ANNEX V

THE INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS

(See question 2064, page 659)

TECHNICAL CLASSES

The Royal Commission asked to what extent there was class to class promotion. It was explained that the arrangements had been much tightened up by the issue of E.C. 31/52.

ESTABLISHMENT CIRCULAR E.C. 31/52

7/5/52.

“Promotions to the Professional Classes of the Works Group, including the General Service Class of Mechanical and Electrical Engineers, and to the Departmental Variants of these Classes.

1. I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to inform you of arrangements which have now been made to regulate the promotion of officers from the sub-professional classes to the professional classes of the Works Group (Architects, Surveyors, Land Officers, Civil, Structural and Sanitary Engineers and the general Service class of Mechanical and Electrical Engineers) and to the departmental variants of these classes.

2. Officers in a sub-professional class will be eligible for class-to-class promotions to posts in the established complement only if they are too old for the normal basic grade competition for the professional class in question. Younger officers should seek entry by the open competition.

If, exceptionally, there are special circumstances which call for modification of this rule there should be prior consultation with the Treasury as well as with the appropriate departmental staff representatives.

3. Eligibility for class-to-class promotion to a professional class will normally extend only to officers who hold the professional qualifications prescribed for entry by open competition, but the recognised professional qualification may be waived exceptionally in favour of an officer who has high attainments and wide professional experience, provided his Department is satisfied that no disadvantage will arise from the fact that he is not a member of the appropriate professional Institution.

Some modification of this general principle may be necessary to meet the special circumstances in certain departmental classes and departmental variants of the general Service classes. Departments should consult the Treasury in such cases.

4. Promotion of officers on an acting basis will be a matter for departmental discretion. But before any promotion can be made substantive a fresh certificate of qualification will be required (Estacode J a 4). The Civil Service Commissioners should therefore be consulted at the appropriate time in all those cases where the Department may wish sooner or later to recommend re-certification. For the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the fitness of a candidate for the professional grade the Civil Service Commissioners will at their discretion either accept the Department's recommendation without further enquiry into his knowledge and ability, or will reach their decision after examining him. Such examination will normally be by interview, and the members of the Board will be nominated by mutual arrangement between the Commission and the Department.

5. In most cases class-to-class promotion will be to the basic professional grade, but there may also be promotion of exceptionally well qualified officers in the higher grades of the sub-professional classes to above-basic grades in the professional classes (provided that they fulfil the condition in paragraph 3 above).

6. A copy of this Circular has been sent to the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council for publication.”

The Commission then went on to ask to what extent members of the technical classes held professional qualifications. It was explained that the Institution had not got this information

and that it could not readily be obtained. The Institution undertook to make available such information as it had on the understanding that it would be recognised that this was an indication and not a record nor a representative sample. The information is set out departmentally.

Air Ministry

Works Dept. Out of notes on 290 officers

7 A.M.I.E.E.

1 A.M.I.Mech.E.

2 A.R.I.C.S.

1 B.Sc.Eng.

1 B.Sc.Agric.

1 N.D.A.

N.B. A number were shown as graduates of the I.E.E.

Aeronautical inspection service. Out of notes on 200 officers

3 A.M.I.E.E.

3 A.F.R.A.S.

1 B.Sc.

N.B. Again a number were shown as I.E.E. graduates.

Post Office

Contracts Division

3 officers are graduates of the I.E.E., although the officers here have been informed that the work of this division is not such as would enable the officers to secure full qualifications.

Ministry of Supply

Out of notes on approximately 1,000 officers, 41 were holding professional qualifications.

Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation

Out of notes on 480 officers, 6 were holding professional qualifications but 4 hold A.R.I.C.S. not recognised for the highways work of the Department though it is for other Departments.

War Department

Out of notes on 66 technical grade I officers in R.E.M.E.

10 A.M.I.Mech.E.

2 A.M.I.E.E.

5 B.Sc.

Ministry of Works

Estate surveyors:

46 of these officers hold their professional qualifications. At the last open competition there were only 7 vacancies and 4 of these were filled by serving temporary officers. 28 of these officers are over 35 years old.

Engineering assistants

At least 15 hold I.Mech.E.

STANLEY MAYNE.

12th July, 1954.

ANNEX VI

THE INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS

(See question 2123, page 664)

In the examination of Chapter XIV the Commission asked the Institution to make positive suggestions as to the further groupings of salary scales that should be made. The Institution suggests two groups; one for professional officers and one for technical officers. The following tables show the two groups with their present salary scales except in the case of the actuaries where the figures are of a Treasury offer now in course of negotiations.

PROFESSIONAL SALARIES

Works group		Psychologists		Accountants		Actuaries (Treasury offer)		
	£		£		£		£	£
21	450	21	450			18	290	
22	475	22	475			19	320	
23	520	23	520			20	350	
24	570	24	570			21	380	
25	650	25	650	25	650	22	410	
26	675	26	675	26	675	23	500	
27	700	27	700	27	700	24	525	
28	725	28	725	28	725	25	550	
29	750	29	750	29	750		575	29 780
30	780	30	780	30	780			815
31	810		810	31	810			850
32	840		840	32	840			885
33	870		870	33	870			920
34	900		900	34	900			955
	930		930					990
	960		960					995
	1,000		1,000					
<i>main grade</i>		<i>senior psychologists</i>		<i>senior accountants</i>		<i>asst. actuary</i>		
£1,000 × 40 — 1,320		£890 × 30 — 980 × 40 — 1,195		£900 × 30 — 990 × 40 — 1,220		£1,030 × 40 — 1,230		
<i>senior grade</i>		<i>principal psychologists</i>		<i>chief accountants</i>		<i>actuary</i>		
£1,375 × 50 — 1,575		£1,265 × 50 — 1,550		£1,270 × 50 — 1,500		£1,260 × 50 — 1,570		
<i>higher grades</i>		<i>higher grades</i>		<i>higher grades</i>		<i>higher grades</i>		
£1,700 × 75 — 1,950		£1,700 × 75 — 1,950		£1,550 — 1,800		£1,640		
£2,050 × 100 — 2,225				£1,700 × 75 — 2,000		£1,700 × 75 — 2,000		
£				× 100 — 2,100		× 100 — 2,200		
2,200				2,200				
2,350						£		
2,600						2,500		
2,750								
3,250								
3,500								
						4,000		

TECHNICAL SALARIES

Technical classes		Draughtsmen (architectural and engineering)	Illustrators	Draughtsmen (cartographic and recording)	Photographers
£	£	£	asst. illustrator £	draughtsman £	asst. photographer £
			16 170	16 170	16 170
			17 215	17 215	17 215
			18 245	18 245	18 245
			19 265	19 265	19 265
		<i>draughtsman</i> 20 400	20 280	20 285	20 285
		21 420	21 295	21 305	21 305
		22 440		<i>draughtsman</i> 22 325	<i>photographer</i> 22 325
		23 460	440	23 340	23 345
		24 480	460	24 360	24 365
<i>grade III</i>	<i>grade IV</i>	25 505	480	<i>higher grade</i> 25 380	25 385
26 540	26 445	26 530	505	400	405
27 560	27 460	27 555	530	420	420
28 580	28 480	28 580	555	440	435
605	500	605	580	460	450
630	520	630	605	475	470
655	540	655	630	490	485
670	560	670	655	505	
	580		670	520	<i>senior</i>
	585			535	<i>photographer</i>
				550	520 × 20 — 560
				570	× 30 — 635
<i>grade II</i>		<i>leading draughtsman</i>	<i>leading illustrator</i>	<i>draughtsman senior grade</i>	<i>principal photographer</i>
665 × 20 — 725		665 × 20 — 725	665 × 20 — 725	695 × 20 — 735	670 × 25 — 770
× 25 — 780		× 25 — 780	× 25 — 780	25 — 805	× 30 — 800
<i>grade I</i>		<i>senior draughtsman</i>	<i>senior illustrator</i>	<i>chief draughtsman</i>	<i>chief photographer</i>
780 × 25 — 830		780 × 25 — 830	780 × 25 — 830	805 × 25 — 830	860 × 30 — 1,005
× 30 — 950		× 30 — 950	× 30 — 950	× 30 — 950	
<i>grade B</i>		—	—	—	—
950 × 30 — 1,065					
<i>grade A</i>		<i>chief draughtsman</i>	<i>chief illustrator</i>	—	—
1,000 × 30 — 1,180		1,000 × 30 — 1,180	1,000 × 30 — 1,180		

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

14

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

FOURTEENTH DAY

Monday, 12th July, 1954

Association of Post Office Controlling
Officers Witnesses



LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1954

PRICE 1s 6d NET

List of Witnesses

MR. E. P. HODGSON,
General Secretary,

MISS E. P. NEWTON,
Member of Executive,

MR. C. W. BARRELL,
Chairman,

MR. T. P. HUGGETT,
Member of Executive,

MR. R. SMITH,
General Treasurer and Organiser,

MR. F. W. SPENDER,
Member of Executive,

MR. S. A. R. SEATON,
Assistant General Secretary,

*on behalf of the Association of Post Office
Controlling Officers*

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

FOURTEENTH DAY

Monday, 12th July, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

THE COUNTESS OF ALBEMARLE

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, BART.

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Association of Post Office Controlling Officers.

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REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY

1. The Association of Post Office Controlling Officers is recognised by the Post Office in respect of the manipulative supervising grades which total some 14,863 (see Treasury Factual Memorandum, para. 456). Of that number approximately 11,000 are in membership of the Association.

2. There are over 40 different grades of supervising officers represented by the Association, many of them comprising both men and women. The greater numbers are engaged in the four main hierarchies, however, namely counter and writing; postal; telegraph; telephone. The membership covered in these four groups total approximately 10,500, and the remainder are employed in other functional posts such as Post Office factory foremen, etc., cable and wireless operations, supervision of cleaners, doorkeepers and liftmen, and Post Office railway grades.

3. With a view to avoiding over complication our submissions are confined to the four larger hierarchies although the same considerations apply to a greater or lesser extent to the whole of the grades we represent.

4. It is our desire to make submissions to the Royal Commission on the following subjects:—

- I. Principles which should govern pay.
- II. Pay of Post Office manipulative supervising officers.
- III. Overtime.
- IV. Hours.
- V. Leave.

I. PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN PAY

5. In negotiations with the Post Office arising from salary claims submitted by the Association we have found ourselves in difficulty to establish a basis of comparison which was acceptable to the Department. Movements in the Ministry of Labour cost of living figures were rejected by them as not being in accord with Tomlin formula considerations. Similarly, the Ministry of Labour index of wage rates was said to be unrelated to the field we represent because it is compiled from figures relating to weekly paid rank and file employees. Movements in outside salaries deduced from the yearly White Papers on National Income and Expenditure were said to form no satisfactory basis for comparison because they gave no indication of the number of people employed. Comparisons with salary earners in specific employment advanced by the Association were rejected as not appropriate. Reference to pay relativities between the Post Office supervision and the staff supervised by them met with the reply that the Postmaster General did not accept that increases granted to lower paid staff are necessarily a sufficient justification for similar increases in the pay of all supervising officers. He did agree, however, that it was proper, where allowances are paid to rank and file grades for performing part time supervision, there should be a gap between the maximum pay, plus allowance, of the rank and file grade and the minimum pay of the corresponding first line supervising grade.

6. It will be seen, therefore, that the claims of the Association were left to be judged only on what the Post Office and the Treasury regarded as a sufficient increase and on comparisons with outside salaried staffs chosen by themselves. It is, perhaps, significant that such comparisons have not been constant. For example the salaries of police sergeants and inspectors, etc., used to be quoted against us. Now they are regarded as not comparable!

7. It will be appreciated that with the changing approach which has been made by the Department to the salary question it has been impossible to discern precisely how they interpret the Tomlin formula in relation to the pay of supervising officers. Indeed it could be said that so far as the grades represented by the Association are concerned the "long term trends", revealed by such data as is available from outside sources, has been ignored. The comparisons advanced by the Post Office have always been on the basis of current pay, no regard being given to the "trend" of the pay movements of the outside grades they quoted.

8. Undoubtedly one of the main difficulties for both the Post Office and for the Association is to find groups of employees in outside industry whose work and responsibilities are "broadly comparable" with any section of the supervising staff in the Department. This is, of course, due to the facts (a) that the Post Office is a monopoly with no counterpart outside the Service, and (b) the work is of a character which bears little relation to anything carried on by employers in commerce and industry.

9. Even so it is the contention of the Association that increases in the salaries of its members should bear some relation to those enjoyed by employees outside the Civil Service who are required to carry responsibility for directing the work of subordinate staff, for heavy financial responsibilities and for administering departments and sub-departments of businesses and industries.

10. In the absence of any statistical information relating to salary movements in general which is recognised as authoritative by the Post Office the Association has argued that the index of wage rates compiled by the Ministry of Labour can and should be accepted as a broad indication of what is happening to pay levels elsewhere. It is hoped that the Royal Commission will recommend this course.

11. The basis of the argument is that if the rank and file in industry have secured increases in pay to the extent that the wages index is forced upwards, then it can be assumed—in the absence of any data to the contrary—that those responsible for the control and supervision of the basic grades included in the index have also received increases in their pay. Any other assumption would suppose that no financial regard is paid in industry to promotion, the acceptance of new responsibilities and the incentive to the individual to make progress in his or her sphere of labour.

12. The Tomlin formula then can be said to have operated against the interests of supervising officers in the Post Office. In practice the only basis on which it has been possible to secure increases in their salaries has been after the rank and file organisation has succeeded in obtaining increases for the grades supervised by members of the Association.

13. This has led to a serious time lag in reaching conclusions for the supervising staff. Firstly there is the interval before increases in the cost of living are reflected in the index of wage rates as a result of claims by outside trade unions. When there has been a sufficient upward movement in the index to justify action the organisation representing the Post Office rank and file grades has then negotiated a settlement related to the changes in the wages index. Then only has it been possible for any negotiations on behalf of the supervision to make progress. Thus it is that settlements in the latter field are already substantially out of date in relation to rises in the cost of living when they are reached.

14. It will be appreciated that there must be a difficulty in finding any yardstick against which to measure the appropriate level of remuneration for Post Office supervising grades in the absence of (a) a generally accepted statistical record of salary movements, and (b) any clearly comparable outside occupations. Nevertheless, the Association holds the view that there should be a fair measure of relativity between the pay of the members it represents and the general level outside the Service.

15. Four factors should be taken into account (i) outside trends, (ii) internal relativities, (iii) price levels, (iv) the value of work performed by the individual.

16. *Outside trends.* Regard should be paid to the *movement* over a period of years of salaries paid outside the Service for duties associated with the supervision and control of rank and file staff. As has been indicated, the line taken by the Post Office in salary negotiations is to quote current remuneration of particular groups of outside employees which, at the time, may bear some relation to the salaries of particular supervising grades. The movement of the rates quoted over a period of years is ignored, thus the implications of the Tomlin formula are lost.

17. *Internal relativities.* Increases of pay secured by the Post Office rank and file staff should be taken into account in fixing the salaries of their supervising officers. This is essential in order to induce the best of the rank and file to aspire to promotion—to give their job a career value—and to attract to the basic grades staff who see some merit in remaining in the field to which they are recruited and not, as at present, seeking outlets to other civil service grades or leaving the Service when they realise the meagre prospects offered by their job.

18. It is pertinent to draw attention to the fact that the first promotion in the Post Office manipulative grades often comes only after some twenty or more years in the basic grade. Therefore, unless the higher grades to which an officer can progress are made sufficiently attractive, a long period of stagnation in the rank and file grades can and does have the effect of stultifying the endeavours of the officers concerned.

19. Similarly, regard should be had to relativities with other supervising grades in the Civil Service. What might be termed "parallel" relativities. For example, the postal and telegraph officer at his maximum receives remuneration which is not greatly different from that of a clerical officer. (P. & T.O. £9 16s. 0d. a week—£511 4s. 6d. a year; C.O. £570 a year). The first line supervisor of the P. & T.O. is an overseer whose scale is £570 × £20—£675, whereas the executive officer, which grade is the first above clerical officer, enjoys a salary of £290, rising by various increments, to £800. Thus it will be seen that whilst the yearly difference at the maximum between the two rank and file grades is approximately £59 at present, in the case of the next higher grade it is £125 a year.

20. When in 1946 there was a comprehensive reorganisation of the work of the manipulative and supervising grades in the Post Office relativities in pay were established on the following basis:—

<i>Counter and writing</i>	<i>Postal</i>	<i>Telegraph</i>
—	Assistant inspector	Assistant supervisor
Overseer	Inspector	Supervisor
Assistant superintendent	Chief inspector	Supervisor higher grade

21. We see no reason why there should be any substantial departure from those internal relativities and would suggest that, having established fair relativities between the Treasury grades and those in the counter and writing hierarchy, the other hierarchies in our field should be brought into line.

22. *Price levels.* There are occasions when, because of rapid changes in price levels as in recent years, there is a need for some means whereby the pay of civil servants generally may be kept in closer relationship with that of outside employees. Obviously in such cases all civil servants are involved and it is suggested that the means adopted in 1952, when there was an all-service settlement, is eminently desirable. The alternative is a series of separate claims by various staff associations with all the inevitable delay which is involved.

23. It would seem that in 1952 the Treasury shared this view for in a document headed "Notes for Editors", issued by them with the routine press notice announcing the all-service agreement on pay increases, it was stated:—

"The settlement is based on general movements in wages over the last 12 months, as shown by the Ministry of Labour's Wages Index which has risen from 114 at 31st December, 1950, to 125 at 30th November, 1951. Since there is no comparable index for salaries, the amounts for the higher grades have been scaled down by 50 per cent. on the second £500 and 75 per cent. on the third. The settlement is based on the principle of meeting essential needs only.

The alternative to this central settlement would have been to deal separately with a large number of sectional claims for the hundreds of classes in the Service. Virtually all the staff concerned have the right to go to arbitration on such claims and this procedure is often frustrating and chancy. It can lead to distortion of internal relativities which produces subsequent pressure for their restoration at additional cost. The results of arbitration over the field might thus easily cost more than the settlement."

24. As will be seen from the Treasury Factual Memorandum, paragraph 159, their views had apparently subsequently changed with the result that some salary claims arising out of the rejection of the all-service claim referred to in the paragraph are still awaiting settlement or have only recently reached that stage.

25. *Value of work performed by the individual.* Reference has already been made to the difficulty of finding closely comparable employment outside the Post Office the pay for which can be set against the salaries paid to the supervising staff in the Department. There is, therefore, a greater need to pay regard to the responsibilities carried by the grades concerned. These include the number of

staff controlled, the operations carried out by the staff, the technical requirements of certain grades, the financial responsibilities carried by the officer and the degree of organising and administrative ability called for in the performance of certain duties.

26. In this connection allowance should be made for the varying conditions and requirements met with in different offices. For example, in a smaller head Post Office the only supervising officer justified by the prescribed standards on the postal side may be an assistant inspector. At another the highest grade in the same field may be an inspector and at larger offices one or more chief inspectors will be in post. Yet the assistant inspector at the smaller office will be required to perform the higher valued work which would fall to a chief inspector at a larger office. The amount of such higher valued work is, of course, greater in the latter case, but nevertheless the same regulations must be observed by both officers.

27. Similarly the size of an office and the traffic there dealt with has the same effect on the grading of officers in the other hierarchies—counter and writing, telegraph and telephone. Thus one finds a degree of specialisation in larger offices whilst at the others it is necessary for the officer or officers concerned to turn their hands to all the functions covered by their hierarchy rather than the duties of a particular grade.

II. PAY OF POST OFFICE MANIPULATIVE SUPERVISING OFFICERS

28. The numbers and the salary scales of the main manipulative supervising grades in the Post Office are set out in tabular form in paragraph 456 of the Treasury Factual Memorandum.

29. It has long been the contention of the Association that, having regard to the responsibilities carried by the officers concerned, the salary scales are too low. This is in part due to the fact that the related rank and file grades have been notoriously underpaid, and in part to the disregard of the factors such as the late age of promotion from the basic grades, the slow promotion rate, if not complete stagnation, which is not unusual in the field with which we are concerned, and the desirability of placing a career value on employment in the Post Office manipulative sphere. Paragraphs 30 to 46 briefly describe the work of the four main hierarchies.

30. *The postal inspectorate.* The officers employed in these grades are responsible for the day to day supervision and control of the staff employed in collection, sorting and delivery of letters and parcels throughout the country. Their duties cover a much wider field than is commonly assumed from such a brief description of their work and to save repetition attention is drawn to the many items of work listed as proper to postmen and postmen higher grade in paragraphs 19 to 38 of the submissions by the Union of Post Office Workers. As the grades named are supervised by the inspectorate it is the duty of the latter to see that the items there listed are adequately provided for and properly carried out.

31. In addition they are required to carry out tests of postmen's delivery and collection walks and make proposals for changes in existing arrangements with a view to providing for necessary expansion together with the economical use of manpower. They are responsible for the internal correspondence relating to their office postal organisation; for regular and systematic checks of sorting accuracy, of posting boxes, telephone kiosks, security arrangements; for the day to day arrangements of duties and such alterations and elaborations thereto which become necessary as a result of unforeseen staff absences, special deliveries or collections, spates of traffic and irregular running of mail trains; the inspection of motor mail vehicles, motor cycles and cycles. Their duties cover the 24 hours, seven days a week.

32. *Counter and writing grades.* Officers in these grades are engaged in the supervision of postal and telegraph officers employed on counter and writing duties, they are in charge of sections of work which may be at the head Post Office

or at branch and district offices under the control of the head postmaster (district postmasters in London). Such is the variation in the size of different offices that it is difficult to define precisely the actual responsibilities of a particular grade or officer but the following items are amongst those which fall to the grades as a whole :—

- Control of wages branch.
- Control of accounts branch.
- Control of remittance branch.
- Control of establishment branch.
- Control of correspondence branch.
- Control of survey branch.
- Control of mails branch.
- Management of branch office.
- Management of head office counter.
- Management of subsidiary office of joint head office.

33. As previously stated, in the largest offices an officer would probably be concerned with only one of the functions referred to above. In others one or more would be combined under a single duty, but in all cases there is a system of rotation whereby an officer may be called upon to perform any of the functions enumerated at different times.

34. Assistant postmasters, who are at the apex of the C. & W. hierarchy, are the immediate subordinates of head postmasters with whom they share in the general control of their respective areas. They deputise for the head postmaster when required. Superintendents and chief superintendents are employed only at the largest offices where they take general charge of a section of their office.

35. A chart showing the organisation of a typical large head office is reproduced at the end of this section.

36. Some idea of the financial responsibility which can attach to the duties in this sphere may be gathered from the following details relating to officers in the London postal region :—

Office and rank of officer in charge	Personal stock	Subsidiary stocks	Payments for 28th–29th May	Receipts for 28th–29th May
	£	£	£	£
WOOLWICH B.O.				
Assistant superintendent ...	30,165	29,353	12,167	8,344
CHARING CROSS B.O.				
Assistant superintendent ...	55,717	46,584	10,896	7,760
SOUTH EASTERN D.O.				
Overseer with £56 allowance...	91,218	26,345	13,061	12,494
STRATFORD B.O.				
Overseer with £56 allowance ...	41,962	28,546	6,050	4,582
WHITECHAPEL B.O.				
Overseer	19,640	18,098	2,117	2,847
SOUTH NORWOOD B.O.				
Overseer	12,087	11,412	5,044	4,856
STORE STREET B.O.				
Overseer	33,574	15,954	1,244	2,778

- NOTES.—(a) The officers in charge of these offices are also responsible for the supervision of the staff employed there, the cleaning, structure and general maintenance. They are personally responsible for all banking arrangements.
- (b) The total of stocks were those on 29th May, 1954.
- (c) The figures in the payments and receipts columns are for two days and relate to transactions other than stamps, postal orders, National Savings certificates and other negotiable documents.

37. The following figures indicate the amount of cash received from the bank and received or despatched in remittances in two representative remittance branches during the week ended 29th May, 1954. These branches are in charge of an overseer.

	South Eastern District Office	Eastern District Office
	£	£
May 24th	11,500	15,000
" 25th	16,000	—
" 26th	36,000	29,000
" 27th	59,000	51,500
" 28th	47,000	26,000
Totals	169,500	121,500

Total of inward remittances	£ 124,678	£ 150,424
Including in cash	38,000	60,860
Total of outward remittances	214,340	180,558

38. The number of staff controlled by any one C. & W. supervising officer varies considerably according to the type of work that is performed in this section. In some cases he may be working alone on a particular subject of a confidential or complicated character, whilst on the other hand he may have overall control of considerable staffs. It is to these officers that the head postmaster must look for the day to day efficiency and administration of his office and for the observance of the rules and regulations governing the service.

39. *Telegraph grades.* Officers employed in these grades are responsible for the supervision of telegraphists and for the maintenance of efficient technical and traffic conditions in instrument rooms. It is essential that they should have an intimate knowledge of the telegraph network for, when interruptions occur therein, it is their task to find rapid means of directing traffic from the resultant bottle neck in order that delay may be reduced to a minimum. Similarly, when unforeseen surges of traffic occur they are expected to evolve on the spot means of meeting the situation with the utmost expedition. Considerable technical knowledge is desirable in order that the apparatus may be used to the best advantage. Their task has been rendered more difficult in recent years by the replacement of point to point circuits by, first, a system of manual through-switching whereby offices were connected to each other for the transmission of individual messages broadly on the lines of telephone trunk connexions and, later, by the replacement of the manual system by automatic through-switching apparatus. The result of this has been a greater mobility of the staff in the instrument room and the growth of unattended circuits on which traffic may arrive at any moment, both demanding special vigilance on the part of the supervision.

40. Staffing arrangements, duty changes to meet exceptional circumstances and unforeseen absences of staff are the responsibility of the telegraph supervising officer. He compiles statistics relating to traffic and staffing for the guidance of the head postmaster and deals with internal correspondence concerning the telegraph service at his particular office.

41. *Telephone grades.* Perhaps the best overall picture of the duties of the telephone supervising officer can be given by a quotation from a document issued by the Post Office themselves. In issuing a regulation they said:—

"The purpose of this Regulation is to give supervisors, particularly officers-in-charge, some guidance in the general arrangement of their exchanges and while it includes the more important points to be watched and the more important rules to be followed, it is not exhaustive. *Much of the day to day management of an exchange must necessarily be left to the initiative of the supervisor in the light of local circumstances.*

At a large exchange the officer in charge is assisted by one or more divisional supervisors and by section supervisors. For such an exchange to run smoothly and efficiently the officer in charge must so control and organise the work of subordinate supervisors that the exchange will function harmoniously as a single unit.

Therefore although at all exchanges the officer in charge must keep in constant touch with all aspects of the day to day work of the exchange, at the larger exchanges the officer in charge must to a very large degree devolve to subordinate supervising officers the detail work connected with correspondence, with written and verbal complaints and with staff and routine matters. Not only will this improve the general management of the exchange but it will also give valuable experience to less senior supervising staff."

42. In a lecture given to newly promoted telephone supervising officers the following are amongst the items which are stressed:—responsibility for checking the adequacy of staffing; efficiency of operators; staff movement; efficiency of routine testing and fault reporting; attention to subscribers' complaints. Modern equipment requires careful and regular testing to ensure efficiency and the maintenance of a good service to the public. A good general knowledge of the various types of equipment and of a very large number of procedure variations in dealing with the recording and treatment of different types of call is essential.

43. Operating statistics, for the taking of which supervising officers are responsible, are regarded by the Post Office as very important. An official document states "the chief object of these statistics is to furnish reliable data for the provision of operating staff and exchange equipment. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that they should reflect as nearly as possible the actual traffic conditions, and every care should be taken to see that this is achieved."

44. In the telephone field considerable changes have taken place in recent years in the mechanisation and complication of operating procedure. The introduction of new types of apparatus and new types of service has been continuous and this makes increasing demands on the supervising staff.

45. It is the view of the Association that as a result the demand made on telephone supervisors and the technicalities of their work has caught up with that of the telegraph service. For that reason we believe that there should be parity between the pay of telephone supervising grades and that of their colleagues in the telegraph service. We hope that the Royal Commission will support this view.

46. The Royal Commission will appreciate that so far as the male telephone supervisors are concerned practically the whole of their duties are performed in the late evening and night and at the weekend. Consequently the staff concerned are denied opportunities for social relaxation at a time when most other employees are free to follow their own pursuits. This is a factor which warrants special consideration when the question of salaries is under discussion.

47. In the light of the foregoing paragraphs the Association submits that the pay of the grades in question, as shown in the table in paragraph 456 of the Treasury Factual Memorandum, falls short of that justified by the responsibilities carried by them.

48. The Association urges that the appropriate salary scales should be determined by a proper evaluation of the work performed by the supervising officer, duly related to the pay of the basic grade in his hierarchy. In this connexion regard should be had to the career value of the hierarchy, bearing in mind that promotion normally comes only after many years in the rank and file grade. For that reason the margin between the maximum of a lower grade and the minimum of the grade to which promotion is made should be substantial and certainly not less than the increase on promotion justified by the agreement referred to in paragraph 37 of the Treasury Factual Memorandum.

49. The number of incremental steps should be reduced to no more than three for each grade in order that an officer may hope to reach the maximum of his class within a reasonable period of years. The supervising officer is no longer an "apprentice" and should be entitled to "the rate for the job." Having in mind the fact that the various hierarchies are virtually self-contained the present long trek up the incremental scales is frustrating to the officer. The following tables show the number of incremental stages in the four hierarchies:—

<i>Counter and writing</i>					<i>Telegraph</i>				
P. & T.O. (M)	...	...	...	14	Telegraphist (M)	...	...	...	13
Overseer (M)	...	...	...	5	Assistant supervisor (M)	...	...	...	4
Assistant superintendent (M)	...	...	...	4	Supervisor (M)	...	...	...	3
Superintendent (M)	...	...	...	3	Supervisor higher grade (M)	...	...	...	4
				26					24
<i>Postal</i>					<i>Telephone</i>				
Postman higher grade	...	...	...	7*	Telephonist (F)	...	...	...	12
Assistant inspector	...	...	...	3	Assistant supervisor (F)	...	...	...	2
Inspector	...	...	...	4	Supervisor (F)	...	...	...	3
Chief inspector	...	...	...	4	Chief supervisor (F)	...	...	...	3
				18	Senior chief supervisor (F)	...	...	...	4
									24

* The P.H.G. will have already spent a varying number of years on the postmen's scale.


With a view to clarifying the implications of our submissions on this aspect of pay the position with regard to the postal hierarchy is set out in greater detail below as an example.

						s.	d.
<i>Postman higher grade</i> (Seven annual increments from starting pay to maximum.).	at 21 years of age	...	...	...	...	131	6
	at 22 years of age	...	...	...	...	135	0
	at 23 years of age	...	...	...	...	139	6
	at 24 years and over	...	...	...	...	153	0
	Then by annual increments	...	...	...	...	162	0
						168	6
						175	0
						184	0
<i>Assistant Inspector</i> (three increments)	£						
	505						
	525						
	545						
	570						
<i>Inspector</i> (four increments)	£						
	595						
	615						
	640						
	665						
	675						
<i>Chief inspector</i> (four increments)	£						
	705						
	730						
	755						
	780						
	810						

It will be seen that there are actually 22 pay points in the hierarchy. We have ignored the initial point in each grade, however, in order to show clearly how many increments there are. The tables do not purport to indicate how long it would take an officer to progress from the bottom to the top of his own hierarchy for he might be at the maximum of a particular grade for some years before securing promotion to the next grade.

50. Having once established the appropriate salary scales in conformity with the foregoing principles the Association hopes the Commission will agree that, in order that the real value of the scales may be maintained, the Ministry of Labour wages index should be used as a guide for changes on a percentage basis in order to maintain relativities between the various grades.

CHART SHOWING MAIN FEATURES OF ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL LARGE HEAD POSTMASTER'S DISTRICT



III. OVERTIME RATES

51. For the Post Office supervising grades entitled to overtime payment and Sunday duty payment the overriding maximum rate is:—

7s. 3d. an hour for weekday overtime.

7s. 9d. an hour for Sunday duty,

with a proviso that no officer be paid at a lower rate per hour than his normal single rate for weekday overtime or Sunday duty. The overtime rates are, of course, adjusted according to the rate of pay of the individual. For overtime up to 54 hours total weekday attendance weekly the extra duty rate is calculated on the basis of time rate and a quarter, for overtime beyond 54 hours total attendance up to 60 hours in one week the rate is time rate and a half, and for overtime beyond 60 hours a week total weekday attendance, double rate applies. Payment at rate and a half is made in respect of duty performed on Sundays, Christmas Day and Good Friday.

52. Assistant postmasters, officers above the rank of assistant superintendent, and other officers with allowances which bring their total pay up to or above the minimum of a superintendent (£855 in London) or assistant postmaster at the same office, are not normally eligible to receive overtime payment. During the Christmas pressure period all officers up to and including superintendents, but not assistant postmasters, are eligible for overtime payment on special certification.

53. The effect of these arrangements is that a chief inspector in London receiving the maximum of his salary scale (£810) receives payment in respect of Sunday duty at the rate of 7s. 9d. an hour. It should be added that Sunday duties are regularly scheduled for the manipulative supervising grades in the Post Office. Without the overriding maximum a chief inspector would be entitled to approximately 11s. 2d. an hour calculated on the basis of single rate plus a half. The same officer can only claim, under the existing arrangements, 7s. 3d. an hour in respect of any amount of weekday extra duty performed, the overriding maximum applying at all points. He cannot receive at the present time, therefore, any increase in his hourly rate of weekday extra duty pay, the single rate applying in the case of all overtime performed. This example is by no means isolated and is reproduced in differing degrees throughout the Post Office manipulative supervising field. For instance, an overseer (M) (London maximum £675) has a single time rate of 5s. 5d. an hour which, without the overriding maximum, would entitle him to the following overtime rates: rate and a quarter 6s. 9d., rate and a half 8s. 1d., double rate 10s. 10d. In practice this officer receives 6s. 8d., 7s. 3d., and 7s. 3d., respectively, the rate for Sunday duty being 7s. 9d.

54. The Royal Commission will appreciate that where there is a public demand for service from the Post Office the staff of the Post Office, whether from the basic or supervising grades, must attend to meet it. That being so the Association submits that the whole of that staff should receive financial compensation in respect of any extra attendances they are required to make, it being unjust that a section of the supervising force is now required to perform extra duty without monetary reward. The Association hopes that the Commission will recommend accordingly.

55. On the question of maximum rates the Association has given consideration to the position in outside industry and has found no case where a restrictive financial maximum applies. On the contrary enquiries reveal that in industry the true rate of overtime is generally paid, irrespective of the number of hours worked. In the view of the Association a flat rate of time and a half should be paid in respect of all overtime performed on any weekday. In many industries, where it is doubtless appreciated that whenever overtime has to be performed it creates a degree of inconvenience for the employee who has to sacrifice leisure time, a flat rate of time and a half for weekday overtime applies.

56. Sundays, Bank Holidays, Good Friday, Christmas Day and New Year's Day in Scotland are not normal working days even though, as has already been mentioned, members of the Post Office manipulative grades are regularly scheduled to attend on these days in order to maintain the public service. In outside industry the rate for Sunday work for operatives who are not normally required to work

during the weekend is, with a few exceptions, double time. (*Vide* page 180, "Ministry of Labour Gazette," May, 1951.) The Royal Commission will doubtless agree that the employee places a higher valuation on the days quoted at the beginning of this paragraph than on his leisure time on other days of the week. When his employment makes it necessary for him to sacrifice his leisure time on the days in question it is reasonable to suggest that his compensation for so doing should be greater than that applying in the case of weekday extra duty.

57. In view of the foregoing considerations the Association submits that:—(1) the present maximum overtime rates operating in the case of the Post Office manipulative supervising grades should be completely removed; (2) all weekday overtime should attract payment at time rate and a half, and (3) duty performed on Sundays, Bank Holidays, Good Friday, Christmas Day and New Year's Day in Scotland should attract payment at double time rate; (4) all manipulative supervising officers should be entitled to payment for extra duty and Sunday attendances.

IV. HOURS

58. There is discrimination between the hours of the Post Office manipulative grades and those of the general service classes and this is revealed in the statement which appears at the end of this section. The view of the Association is that this discrimination should be abolished, there being no justification for its continuance. The Association hopes that the Royal Commission will recommend accordingly, accepting the principle that the hours performed by the manipulative supervising grades in the Post Office should not be more than those applying now or in the future in the case of their general service counterparts.

59. The grades represented by the Association are conditioned to weekly hours, varying from grade to grade from 42 to 48, and these hours are performed on a six day basis covering, in the main, the 24 hours of each day. The hours of the general service grades are, of course, confined in the vast majority of cases to a period between 8.0 a.m. and 5.0 p.m., whilst the manipulative supervising grades are called upon to perform anti-social attendances involving all periods of the night and day. That does not suggest that a 5 day week is incapable of application in the Post Office manipulative field. On the contrary, the application of a 5 day week is a practical proposition it being relatively simple to provide for the needs of the Service during the 24 hours of every weekday on a 5 day basis.

60. In 1929 as a result of a decision of the Industrial Court the 42 hour week was introduced for certain higher manipulative supervising grades at a number of offices in addition to the few at which it had operated already as a long established practice. The names of all of the offices concerned appear in the footnote to the accompanying statement. The Association suggests that it would not be appropriate to disturb the 42 hour week at the offices named in the footnote.

PAY AND HOURS OF CERTAIN GENERAL SERVICE AND POST OFFICE SUPERVISING GRADES

GENERAL SERVICE GRADES

	Male			Female		
	London max.	Hours		London max.	Hours	
		Ldn.	Prov.		Ldn.	Prov.
	£			£		
Higher executive officer	995	42	44	860	42	44
Executive officer	800	42	44	675	42	44
Clerical officer	570	42	44	460	42	44
Shorthand typist I	483	42	44	391	42	44
Shorthand typist II	451	42	44	363	42	44
Clerical assistant	438	42	44	350	42	44
Typist I	433	42	44	347	42	44
Typist II	404	42	44	321	42	44

POST OFFICE SUPERVISING GRADES

	Male			Female		
	London max.	Hours		London max.	Hours	
		Ldn.*	Prov.		Ldn.*	Prov.
	£			£		
Chief superintendent	1,050	42	—	—	—	—
Assistant superintendent	810	42	44	650	42	44
Overseer	675	48	48	535	42	48
Supervisor H.G. telegraphs	810	42	44	650	42	44
Supervisor, telegraphs	675	42	44	535	42	44
Assistant supervisor, telegraphs	580	48	48	440	42	48
Chief inspector	810	42	44	—	—	—
Inspector	675	42	44	—	—	—
Assistant inspector	570	48	48	—	—	—
Senior chief supervisor, telephones	845	42	44	730	42	44
Chief supervisor, telephones	685	42	44	600	42	44
Supervisor, telephones	590	48	48	510	42	44
Assistant supervisor, telephones	550	48	48	440	48	48
Senior foreman of cleaners	510	48	—	—	—	—
Foreman (main line stations)	490	48	—	—	—	—
Inspector of doorkeepers	452	48	—	—	—	—

* Also includes staff at the following towns:—Barnet, Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Bromley and Beckenham, Cardiff, Croydon, Edgware, Edinburgh, Enfield, Glasgow, Harrow and Wembley, Hounslow, Ilford and Barking, Kingston-on-Thames, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Richmond and Twickenham, Romford and Dagenham, Sheffield, Southall, Sutton, Woodford Green and Nottingham.

V. LEAVE

61. The following submissions are intended to supplement those contained in paragraph 25^a of the representations on hours and leave submitted by the Staff Side of the Civil Service National Whitley Council on April 26, 1954. In that paragraph the following passage appeared:—"... the Staff Side as a whole can see no justification for applying to those grades conditions less favourable than those of office staffs on broadly comparable pay scales. They hope that the Commission will recommend that there is no case in principle and on its merits for the continuance of the more unfavourable terms." The grades referred to by the Staff Side include those falling within the Post Office manipulative supervising field.

62. Apart from that given at public counters the service given by the Post Office extends over every hour of the day and every day of the week. As a result the supervising staff are required to work irregular hours. There is, additionally, a liability to perform Sunday duty. Whilst it is only a few public counters that are open for 24 hours daily, irregular hours of attendance apply in this sphere in order to cover the requirements of the period during which the counters are open to the public. The Association suggests, in view of these considerations, that the leave scales of the manipulative supervising grades in the Post Office need to be at least as favourable as those applying in the case of the broadly comparable service classes, which have better opportunities for leisure and relaxation as a result of regular hours and free weekends and hopes that the Royal Commission will recommend accordingly. The statement at the end of this section shows the leave conditions of general service classes and manipulative supervising grades in broadly the same salary bands. In considering this matter doubtless the Commission will not overlook the fact that the general service grades are conditioned in the main to shorter attendances than those applying in the manipulative field. It is not unreasonable to suggest that within the ambit of comparable grades longer hours should justify longer leave for the purpose of recuperation.

63. The existing annual leave scales of the grades represented by the Association have, in the main, remained undisturbed since 1928, when they were determined by the Industrial Court (Award 1376). At that time the Court noted that the annual leave arrangements in general operation throughout the Civil Service indicated that the amount of annual leave should bear a more or less definite relation to salary. The Court, however, expressed the view that while the scale of pay is the main factor in the determination of leave, other considerations should not be disregarded, and in determining the amount of leave for the Post Office supervising grades, they took into account what they regarded as all other relevant factors, such as the status of the various grades and classes of officers, their leave in relation to one another, and their leave in relation to the staff of which they are in control. With the decision of the Court the grades represented by the Association received allocations of leave greater than the rank and file grades immediately subordinate to them. The result was that all officers promoted from rank and file to supervisory status at that time received an immediate increase in their annual leave entitlement.

64. This advantage was enjoyed until 1946 when a reallocation of work was introduced. During the negotiations the Association claimed that the minimum leave scale for the Post Office supervising grades should be 28 days, there being a recognition in the leave privilege of the attainment of supervising status. This claim was rejected by the Post Office on the basis that its introduction would encroach on the amount of money available to meet new salary scales introduced with the reallocation of work. Improved leave scales were, however, introduced in respect of the basic grades. In consequence some of the supervising grades in the Post Office manipulative field now receive the same amount of leave as the rank and file grades immediately subordinate to them.

65. On promotion to supervising status the officers involved find that their annual leave position has deteriorated, for whilst their seniority on a rank and file grade entitled them to a choice of leave during popular summer holiday months, their juniority on a supervising grade results in their being required to take their leave during the out of season months. The view of the Association is that the position is anomalous and that, as in the case of the majority of supervising grades, there should be an increase of leave on promotion from a basic to a supervising grade in recognition of the additional responsibilities accepted on promotion and the need for a longer period of rest and recuperation. The Association hopes that the Royal Commission will recommend the adoption of this principle in the field of the Post Office manipulative grades.

PAY AND LEAVE OF CERTAIN GENERAL SERVICE AND POST OFFICE SUPERVISING GRADES

GENERAL SERVICE GRADES

	Male		Female	
	London max.	Leave	London max.	Leave
	£		£	
Higher executive officer...	995	36 rising to 48	860	36 rising to 48
Executive officer ...	800	36	675	36
Clerical officer ...	570	24	460	24
Shorthand typist I ...	483	21 rising to 24	391	21 rising to 24
Shorthand typist II ...	451	21 rising to 24	363	21 rising to 24
Clerical assistant...	438	18 rising to 21	350	18 rising to 21
Typist I ...	433	18 rising to 21	347	18 rising to 21
Typist II ...	404	18 rising to 21	321	18 rising to 21

POST OFFICE SUPERVISING GRADES

	Male		Female	
	London max.	Leave	London max.	Leave
	£		£	
Radio superintendent	1,025	36	—	—
Chief superintendent	1,050	36	—	—
Assistant superintendent	810	28	650	28
Overseer	675	24	535	24
Supervisor, higher grade, telegraphs	810	28	650	28
Supervisor, telegraphs	675	24	535	24
Assistant supervisor, telegraphs ...	580	24	440	24
Chief inspector	810	28	—	—
Inspector	675	24	—	—
Assistant inspector	570	24	—	—
Senior chief supervisor, telephones	845	28	730	36 London
Chief supervisor, telephones ...	685	24	600	28 Provinces
Supervisor, telephones	590	24	510	27 London
Assistant supervisor, telephones ...	550	24	440	24 Provinces
Senior foreman of cleaners	510	21	—	—
Foreman (main line stations)	490	21	—	—
Inspector of doorkeepers	452	21	—	—

Examination of witnesses

MR. E. P. HODGSON, *General Secretary*,
MISS E. P. NEWTON, *Member of Executive*,
MR. C. W. BARRELL, *Chairman*,
MR. T. P. HUGGETT, *Member of Executive*,
MR. R. SMITH, *General Treasurer and Organiser*,
MR. F. W. SPENDER, *Member of Executive*,
MR. S. A. R. SEATON, *Assistant General Secretary*.

On behalf of the Association of Post Office Controlling Officers.

Called and examined.

2191. *Chairman*: Have you anything to add as regards your representative capacity? In the Factual Memorandum there is a reference to the Postal Inspectors' Association. Where do they come in?—*Mr. Hodgson*: They are a separate organisation which represents the postal inspectorate in the provinces; we have dual recognition.

2192. With regard to the principles which should govern pay, would you agree that there are two distinct aspects; first, to get the pay right in the first place, and second to keep it right in relation to changes in wages and prices outside?—*Yes*.

2193. In paragraph 7 you say it has been difficult to discern precisely how the Post Office interpret the Tomlin formula in relation to their supervising officers. What is your own interpretation of the formula?—Our interpretation of the formula is that, having established comparisons with outside employees—and we agree at once that that is very difficult—one should have regard to the trend of pay of that group to which comparison has been made. Our complaint is that in the past the Post Office have not had regard to trends but, on every occasion on which there have been negotiations, have selected at that point in time people whose pay is broadly similar

to the scales under discussion. Consequently, we have found that over the years the comparisons which have been made with us have changed. When a comparison became too favourable to us it was dropped and something else brought in.

2194. Do you think that there is anything intrinsically wrong with the Tomlin formula itself, or merely that it has been misapplied?—I think most of us, when we first saw the Tomlin formula, thought we had got somewhere; but the fact is that nobody knows, so far as I can ascertain, either on the Official or the Staff Sides, precisely what it means. If it had been precise and had meant what we thought it meant when we first saw it, I think most of us would have been well satisfied.

2195. *Lady Albemarle*: I think one of the Associations said they felt it had fallen down because it only laid down the formula and did not show by what method it should be worked. Is that what you would say, that you want a method of applying the formula as well as the formula?—There may be something in that.

2196. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In your paragraphs 8 and 9 you say it is difficult to find broadly comparable workers outside, but that increases in the salaries of your members should be related to those enjoyed by supervisory staff in business and industry. Then in paragraph 16 you complain that the Post Office in negotiations quote current remuneration of particular groups of outside employees instead of looking at the movement of salaries of outside supervisory staff over a number of years. Why do you think it is wrong to do this—leaving aside for a moment whether or not it is what the Tomlin formula meant?—Our conception of the Tomlin formula was that it was supposed to ensure broadly that outside pay trends were reproduced inside the Civil Service. We complain it has failed because if you compare, for example, an overseer with a bank cashier today, because at a point in time there is a similarity at the maximum of the two scales, and then in four years or five years' time you drop the comparison with the bank cashier because he has had, say, £100 increase, and substitute, say, one of the fourth or fifth grade railway clerks, that is not following outside trends. We take the view that if at one point in time a bank cashier is a fair comparison, then in five years' time the same comparison is justified unless it can be established that there has been a vast change in value of work and responsibilities carried.

2197. If it is relevant to consider movements—as distinct from current rates—in the salaries of these outside people, why is

it not right to have regard to the actual current salaries in determining whether the pay of civil service grades concerned is right at any particular time?—If the employments chosen for comparison were mutually acceptable to ourselves and the Post Office, I do not think there would be much quarrelling about it. The trouble is that the comparisons which they have made have not been valid. For instance, they have compared some of our grades on occasion with foremen turncocks!

2198. What you would like is that whenever comparisons are made they should be agreed comparisons?—Yes, Sir, but I would doubt whether it would ever be possible to find agreement on that subject!

2199. In paragraph 14 you say that there should be a fair measure of relativity between the pay of your members and the general level outside the Service. Would you like to elaborate that? Are you thinking in this connection in terms of rate fixing, in which case I would like to know what the general level you speak of really is, or of maintaining the real value of rates once they have been determined?—I think it is true to say that all the organisations representing our salaried staff in the Post Office are handicapped by the absence of any authoritative figures applying in the salaried field comparable with the Ministry of Labour index of wage rates; but we have a further difficulty in that it is almost impossible to get authoritative information about particular groups of salaried staff outside the Civil Service. On various occasions I have been able to get information about particular groups of staff, particularly in employments such as local government, railways, banks, and so forth, but very often that information is given to us in confidence and we are not allowed to use it. I think there is no need for me to refer here at length to the further difficulty of the unseen remuneration which we know exists in a number of outside salary fields but which would never be shown in any salary scale.

2200. *Mr. Menzler*: Among supervising staff? I would like to know what sort of things you have in mind, because I always thought this only applied to managing directors and so on.—I have in mind a neighbour who holds a salaried position in a stockbroker's office. He assures me that his salary is a nominal figure; but I understand that twice a year he gets a fairly substantial bonus. I also have knowledge of the arrangement in a number of business houses in the City of meal tickets, which are apparently exchangeable at most restaurants in the City and seem to vary in value according to the grade of the individual. I have seen some of them valued at 2s. 6d., and some at 4s. a day. They are a serious

consideration if you are going to try and find a level with salaries outside compared with the level inside the Civil Service. I have another friend who is a representative of a very large firm of switchgear manufacturers. He has a car which is renewed more or less annually and he charges up his petrol to the firm. [He is entitled to use that car for his own private purposes as well as for business, and every year he goes on holiday in it. It would be very difficult to take these things into consideration in establishing for salaries an index such as the wages index.

2201. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: This illustrates the difficulty that you acknowledge in drawing comparisons with outside salaries; but in paragraph 14 you say there should be a fair measure of relativity between the pay of your members and the general level outside the Service. In view of those difficulties I wonder how that basis of comparison could be evolved.—I cannot speak authoritatively on this because I have not the intimate knowledge which is necessary; but I am assured by colleagues in other staff associations in the Civil Service, who have a much more intimate knowledge of the situation, that it would be possible for the Inland Revenue, without disclosing any confidential information as regards individual remuneration or mentioning names at all, to construct a salaries index which would be to some extent true of the situation outside the Service, but would of course inevitably exclude the bonuses and so on. Even an unsatisfactory formula of that nature would be at least something which we could use as a measurement, and perhaps the Treasury would agree because they must have the knowledge we have of these things going on outside that there should be a certain weighting of the index in respect of these benefits.

2202. *Mr. Menzler*: Do you want several indices or an overall index?—There is a good deal of variation of opinion on the Staff Side as to that. Personally I think there is something to be said for two, or possibly three, salary indices, because we accept the view which has been expressed by the Treasury that it is undesirable that there should be frequent movements in salaries in the higher ranges of the Service. If there were separate salary indices they might well show that movement in the higher salaries was less frequent but more effective when it did take place.

2203. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Would you agree that the compilation of such an index could be influenced very considerably by the more or less indifferent state of organisation among salaried workers throughout the country?—I think that is true.

2204. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraph 15 you deal with four factors which you say

should be taken into account in determining rates of pay: outside trends, internal relativities, price levels and the value of work. Would not price levels and trends be more appropriate to maintaining the value of a salary than to fixing it in the first instance?—In fixing the appropriate remuneration of people whom I represent, it would be necessary in the first instance to assess the level of responsibility, financial and otherwise, which fell to the particular grade. Having established what might be regarded as the basic figure one would then have regard to outside trends in the kind of employments which you have in your first examination decided were broadly comparable. If the position were then seriously disturbed by movements in comparable internal grades, it would be necessary to take account of those. With regard to price levels, I think it is generally held that movements there are reflected sooner or later in outside trends. But in a period of serious inflation, which may affect any country at any time because of outside circumstances, and when it is likely that price levels might show a very rapid upward movement, then regard should be had to those in assessing rates of pay. It is conceivable that, so far as outside trends or price levels are concerned, it would be economical if the Treasury set itself to deal with the Service as a whole. We would be quite satisfied with that, having first of all established our own basic value of work.

2205. One of the internal relativities is that with the rank and file. Do you regard that as the most important relativity?—It is important and has greater importance at the present time when, in our view, the margin between the rank and file and the supervisor is inadequate. We would like to see a situation develop with regard to our salaries which would mean that every time the rank and file got a further increase we would not have to immediately attack the Post Office for further increases in our field in order to retain a reasonable margin between the rank and file and the supervisor. I have referred in the document to the question of career value, which ties up with this question of internal relativities. Most of our hierarchies are fairly watertight, and you will appreciate that, as we have a fairly broad based pyramid in relation to the size and number in the apex, it is quite common for a rank and file officer to be in that grade for many years. The result is that there has been a great deal of wastage of our best people. They go over to the clerical side, for example, not because their immediate pay is very much more—in fact in some cases it would be about the same—but because they see in that field the prospect of advancing very much quicker to the higher paid

grades, and that is a real attraction to the very people we would like to see retained in the Post Office on the important job of attending to communications.

2206. For the purposes of fixing salary you look to the outside, subject to what we have already discussed about the difficulty of getting outside comparisons. Say that we were agreed on a particular outside comparison; if that comparison showed that the differential between the rank and file and the supervising grades should be narrower than it now is, what would be your view on that? Would you find it inconvenient to apply, and go away from it?—I think it boils down to this, that changes in salaries cannot be based continually on one particular formula. If the margin between, say, the postal and telegraph officer and the overseer is fairly substantial, it would not necessarily follow that because the rank and file have an increase we should immediately press for a related increase in our field. But at present most of our grades are so close that with a little bit of overtime, which is fairly common for the rank and file members, we have a number of instances where promotion is not attractive. I have, in the files in my office, letters from rank and file officers to the Post Office asking to be removed from the acting list because they cannot afford to take promotion. The acting list is used in the Post Office for covering the absences of supervising officers; and the best of the rank and file are placed on it. When a supervising officer is absent his absence is covered by the temporary upgrading on an acting basis of one of these rank and file on the acting list. It is one of the regulations that an officer who is acting on duty in the hierarchy cannot perform overtime in his basic grade. So that to be promoted, even temporarily, in a situation such as that means, not an increase in his remuneration, but an actual fall because he is debarred from performing overtime.

2207. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Towards the end of paragraph 5 you say: "The Postmaster General did not accept that increases granted to lower paid staff are necessarily a sufficient justification for similar increases in the pay of all supervising officers. He did agree, however, that it was proper, where allowances are paid to rank and file grades for performing part time supervision, there should be a gap between the maximum pay, plus allowance, of the rank and file grade and the minimum pay of the corresponding first line supervising grade." It is not quite clear to me how the gap could be maintained unless a similar increase were applied?—There have been recent arbitration awards in respect of rank and file grades which have disturbed the relativities between the maximum of the rank and file officer and the

minimum of the supervising officer. In a recent discussion we had with the Post Office they said that that would create a *prima facie* case for an increase for the first line supervisors. In 1947, following increases granted to the rank and file, the increases granted in our field had the effect of removing only the first incremental point in the supervising hierarchy without disturbing the maximum of the first supervising grade. One reason for that was the Government White Paper, which had just been issued at about that time, with regard to personal incomes. The Post Office were not prepared to do more than restore roughly the gap which had previously existed prior to the operation affecting the rank and file. In most cases sympathetic increases have been awarded, but the Post Office do not regard it as a *sine qua non* that because the rank and file get something all the supervising officers in that particular hierarchy should have an increase.

2208. So that what has happened has led to two results: a compression of the supervisors' scale by one increment, and disturbance of the relativity between the maximum of the lower scale and the maximum of the first line supervisory scale?—Over the years, particularly since 1938, there has been a serious compression brought about by the fact that in the main, increases have been awarded on a flat rate basis all the way through.

2209. *Mr. Hall*: Do the Post Office treat the gap referred to in paragraph 5 as a money gap or as a percentage gap?—A money gap. It is roughly the same today as it was in 1938, with slight variations.

2210. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Is it part of your case that a percentage relativity should be preserved between the maximum of the lower scale and the maximum of the higher one?—Our view is that the fairest way of giving an increase would be on a percentage basis, in order to maintain the broad relativities.

2211. *Sir George Mowbray*: Do you mean that if there were increases for the rank and file grades there should be automatic increases, as I understand it on a percentage basis, for all the supervisors?—We would certainly welcome that arrangement, but we would not ask that it should necessarily be automatic. There are occasions when there may be other considerations which should be taken into account in negotiating the pay of the supervising grades by reference to the increases which have been received by the rank and file. It may be, for example, that the rank and file have got an increase of, say, 5 per cent., and also increased allowances for part time supervision. The rank and file officer on his maximum would get an increase of X in respect of his pay and an

increase of Y in respect of his allowance, which would affect the margin between the maximum of the rank and file scale and the minimum of the supervisors. In recent years there have been cases—there are some at the moment—where a rank and file officer, receiving his maximum allowance for part time supervision, is in fact getting more than the minimum of the first line supervisor.

2212. Would you say that such circumstances would create a *prima facie* case for the Post Office to consider seriously an adjustment of the supervisor's scale, but not an automatic adjustment?—Yes.

2213. *Mr. Menzler*: Is not what has been happening to your grade analogous to what has been happening in industry generally, the narrowing of differentials and the closing down of incentive?—It is very very difficult to be precise on that particular question, for there is no readily available evidence. But the I.P.C.S. have been kind enough to let me have some figures extracted from various sources, which demonstrate that between 1938 and 1945-46 the rate of percentage increase in the case of rank and file employees outside had been much greater than the rate of increase to salaried staff; but that from 1946 onwards the trend had been for the percentage increase for salaried staffs to overtake that accorded to the rank and file staff. These figures are in the Appendices to their submission to you.

2214. *Mr. Menzler*: Paragraph 459 of the Factual Memorandum says:—

“Vacancies in the supervisory grades are generally filled by promotion.”

What are the exceptions to the rule?—Very few. Vacancies can be filled by bringing in officers from one of the other departmental grades. An assistant postal controller, class 2, for example, might be transferred to a head postmastership, and occasionally a clerical or executive officer may get one of what we regard as our posts.

2215. Do you object to this?—Yes, but our objection is mellowed by the fact that they are very rare!

2216. But it goes the other way, does it not, sometimes?—No, Sir. We have access to certain departmental grades, for example, postal controller, class 2, but this is a recruitment grade, and we are not taking somebody else's promotion.

2217. Do any of your people resign from the Civil Service because of their dissatisfaction with the prospects?—There are not very many who resign from the supervising field. I think one reason for that is that I should say the average age of my membership is well above forty. They have

behind them twenty or more years of established service counting for pension, which is a very valuable tie to retain them.

2218. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: What sort of openings are there outside to which your people could reasonably aspire?—I think there are few, because their training does not fit them for outside industry as it does accountants for example. Such people as have left our fields are usually those who have contacts outside where they have had offered to them a job which was more or less up their street, shall we say, from factors not related to their Post Office training.

2219. *Mr. Menzler*: May I go on to paragraphs 19 to 21 where you refer to relativities with other supervising grades in the Civil Service. You appear to draw a parallel between your grades and the executive officer or maybe the higher clerical officer grade. Are you asking for something equivalent to the executive or higher clerical officer scale, or that there should be similar relativities to those obtaining between the clerical and executive officer?

—The former, and we think it would not be unreasonable, Sir, for this reason. As long ago as the Tomlin Commission, the Post Office said in evidence that an overseer was performing work which could be lined up in value partly with that of a clerical officer and partly with that of a higher clerical or executive officer. In 1946 there was a substantial reorganisation of work in the Post Office and the supervisors shed what were regarded by the Post Office as the lower valued duties. The overseer shed his floor supervision in the sorting office to the postal inspectorate. He shed his telegraph floor supervision to the telegraph supervisor, and so forth. The whole of his work became what had been regarded by the Post Office and ourselves before 1946 as the higher valued work, namely the administrative work of head postmasters' and district postmasters' offices. So the first rank supervision in the counter and writing field should be closely allied to that of the executive officer, who has the first line supervision of clerical duties.

2220. Is it fair to say that a closer comparison can be drawn with the higher clerical officer, in view of the fact that since 1947 it has been mainly a supervisory grade?—It would depend on particular duties. We have some overseers in charge of a block of work and others entirely on their own who would be closer to the executive officer.

2221. In paragraph 21 you draw attention to certain equations of duties which were established in 1946. Is it your claim that the scales should be equated?—Yes, Sir.

2222. And that, for example, the overseer should go up to £605—I take it you would

not wish the supervisor to be brought down to £570?—The assistant inspector and assistant supervisor are level approximately, and do not bear any relation to the overseers. They are, as it were, interposed between the rank and file and the supervision, the fact being that the assistant inspector and the assistant supervisor in the larger office at any rate are primarily concerned with floor supervision. In general we suggest one should incorporate comparisons in responsibility between the counter and writing hierarchy and the clerical/executive hierarchy because there it is more easy to draw comparisons on responsibilities, and then carry it through to the other hierarchies to maintain the internal relativities which were established in 1946.

2223. *Chairman*: Have you any comment to make on relativity with the engineering rank and file and their supervisory hierarchy?—We have never entered into a comparison there because their work is so totally different from ours.

2224. Or any further relativities other than the clerical/executive officer?—No, Sir.

2225. *Sir George Mowbray*: In paragraphs 25 to 27 you appear to suggest that the difficulty of finding closely comparable outside employment really means there is a greater need to pay regard to responsibilities carried by the grades concerned?—That is so.

2226. Given the difficulty on which you quite properly enlarged earlier, can one really evaluate the responsibility of any particular work except in relation to the responsibility of other broadly comparable work outside?—I agree, Sir, and we are as much baffled by that as I think the Treasury and the Post Office have been in the past. For example, how can you evaluate the responsibility of an assistant superintendent, in one of the larger offices who has in his strongroom negotiable documents—stamps, savings certificates, postal orders and so forth—of some million pounds, in relation to that of an executive or higher executive officer who is doing paper work? It may be very important paper work, but it is frightfully difficult to say one is worth "X" and the other is worth "Y." We would say that the Post Office and the Treasury have been inclined to put the emphasis on the man who writes the letter and not on the man who is responsible for looking after large sums of negotiable securities.

2227. Can I take it that you really have in mind here the internal relativity between your supervisory grades?—Yes.

2228. *Sir Alexander Gray*: As I read paragraph 5 it rather seems that whatever

you suggest is confronted with fatal obstacles?—I think that is so.

2229. First of all you mention the cost of living figures. You say that was objected to because it does not conform with Tomlin. Do you seriously urge that the cost of living figures should be a sort of general consideration?—I think the fairest answer I can give to that is this. Particularly during and since the war we have been concerned about the fact that our members are falling behind other people in their levels of remuneration, and we find it necessary on all occasions when arguing the salaries issue with the Post Office to try and bring to bear every gun we can. The cost of living gun was one, where we could point to the fact from figures easily available on both sides that the cost of living had gone up by "X", whereas our remuneration had only gone up by "Y". That gun has always been spiked by the rejoinder that cost of living is not a consideration in accord with what Tomlin said.

2230. And you cannot have too many guns when you go to speak to the Post Office?—We have never had enough, Sir!

2231. The second of your guns is the wage index. Have you any comments on the objection that it is on the whole confined to the lower ranks of wage earners?—The Post Office have maintained that it does not cover the same kind of people. We admit readily that the wages index is compiled from figures of wages paid in fields which are not comparable with ours. But what we do maintain, in the absence of any other available statistics, is that, if the rank and file in outside industry have received increases, then it can be assumed that the people who supervise that rank and file have also received increases because otherwise, as is said in our documents, it makes an absolute farce of any idea of advancement in outside industry being accompanied by payment for additional responsibilities. This we put as a reasonable assumption.

2232. You are rather implying that the outside world realises the need for these relativities and maintains them?—We would assume so.

2233. Would you regard the wage index as appropriate to all wage levels, or would you draw a line at, say, £600 or £700?—You would set up further stresses if you did not regard it as covering the whole of our field.

2234. The possibility of a salaries index was also mentioned, I think, in paragraph 5. If there were such an index, would you regard it as more appropriate for your people than the wages index?—You would have to know first of all how it was

compiled. I would not accept it as a pig in a poke and say "yes" at this point of time; we would have to be satisfied that it was compiled on a fair basis and related to a particular group of salaries outside the Service which would be representative.

2235. Have you any answer to the objection that both a wages and a salaries index are really an average of a great many different kinds of remuneration, which may be subject to influences of different kinds?—I think it is not serious. An index is an average of what is happening; there are some people getting considerably above it and some considerably below.

2236. What is your view on the point which is sometimes made, that there may be a difference between wages and earnings?—I think we would be able to evolve some weighting in respect of the plus element of earnings.

2237. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: It seems to me that since you represent supervisors the point on internal relativities is so vital that you cannot very well determine the position of your people until the position of those whom your people supervise has been decided.—Inevitably the pay in our field must bear some relativity to the rank and file, and until their remuneration has been settled it is not possible to decide what is the appropriate remuneration for us. But one of our complaints has been about the very long time lag we have had to suffer. On the 1946 reorganisation we were told quite frankly—and we accepted the position—that until they had resolved in negotiation with our colleagues in the Union the appropriate remuneration for the rank and file, the Post Office were not in a position to put on paper even tentative scales for the supervisory grades. Again in April, 1938, we went to the Arbitration Tribunal for increases in pay. Our colleagues in the Union of Post Office Workers followed us into the court in May and June of that year. At the conclusion of the hearing of our case the Chairman of the Tribunal referred to the fact that he was expecting to hear from the U.P.W. and any decision in respect of them would promptly have repercussions on our field. He therefore said that he did not propose to make an award until after he had reached conclusions on the rank and file. He was quite fair, however, in indicating that any award which he did make would be back dated to have regard to that. We are in a similar position at the moment. The Union of Post Office Workers have had a series of grade claims before the Arbitration Tribunal, and where awards have been made they have upset the relativities. We have been to the Post Office about it, and they say—"We will talk to you when the U.P.W. have

finished their claims." So we have the fantastic situation at the moment of certain rank and file people getting more than some of our members.

2238. That anomaly could be got over if you had an understanding that any improvement in the pay of your grades should operate from the same day as the improvement conceded to those you supervise, but the point I was trying to emphasise is that you cannot very well decide on the measure of improvement for your people until the grades below have been dealt with.—That is quite so.

2239. Does it not follow from that initially at any rate that you are not unduly concerned with the wages index?—Except that where wage index considerations are advanced by both the rank and file organisation and by ourselves the strength of the arguments is presumably the same.

2240. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraph 22 you talk about rapid changes in price levels. You go on to say that the means adopted in 1952 when there was an all-service settlement is the most desirable way of meeting such a situation. What degree of movement in the wages index would you regard as providing justification for such a settlement? Would you say 5 per cent?—I would not suggest that it should be tied precisely to a fixed pre-conceived movement in the wage index. There are occasions when it might be thought desirable by the National Staff Side to hold off because it might be merely a temporary movement in outside wages attributable to some particular change of a clearly defined nature. On other occasions it might be so obviously a nationwide movement that 5 per cent. or 6 per cent. might be regarded as an appropriate stage to open negotiations.

2241. Would you agree that such a settlement should be a tapering one, as was that of 1952?—No Sir. Tapering, in our view, has been the prime reason for the compression of the concertina and we are fundamentally opposed to it.

2242. Supposing the movement were downwards, would you agree that your salaries should conform with it?—I think that would be settled for us by governmental action. We have had experience in the past of being always the last to catch up on increases on the cost of living, and always the first to bear the cuts when cuts became a national necessity. We were used as an example by the Government to employers outside the Service.

2243. You have no feeling in the matter, no choice?—We have very strong feelings, but no choice!

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

2244. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In your paragraph 29, you say that having regard to the responsibilities carried by the supervising grades, the salary scales are too low. Are they too low in relation to comparable jobs outside, the rank and file grades, or other sections of the Civil Service?—All three, Sir. We have made enquiries, for instance, in the banking field, and we find people there who have financial responsibilities which are not comparable with those accepted by certain supervising officers, and yet the bank official has a much more attractive salary. With regard to the rank and file, we take the view that having regard to the absence of career value, the inducement held out to the rank and file officer should be such as to induce him to remain in his present hierarchy rather than seek new fields and new pastures. With regard to internal comparisons, as I said this morning it is frightfully difficult to compare things which are completely dissimilar, but we do hold the view that a number of our officers are carrying responsibilities worth as much as those carried by other people in the Service who are getting better salaries.

2245. I appreciate the difficulties, Mr. Hodgson, but you say that the salaries are too low and that obviously is a relative expression. In the absence of any yardstick to measure responsibility, what one considers to be a proper standard must be an arbitrary assessment.—Yes, but I think the Post Office and ourselves could arrive at a satisfactory settlement if they had the power and were instructed to get down to it.

2246. Later on in your document you give certain details about stocks carried and so on, and in your reply to my earlier question you said you knew of outside instances of officers with financial responsibility who were getting better salaries than what you regard as their counterparts in the Service. Could you let the Commission have some examples of those outside comparisons, giving details?—I have not got them with me, but I can send them to you.

2247. Thank you very much. My next question is, how far has the position of your members changed since 1939, or 1947, in relation to the basic grades, and could you let us have some figures showing the comparative percentage increases?—Yes I shall be happy to do that.

2248. My next is really a three fold question. Do you think that the position of your people has been depressed relatively in relation to other civil service salaried staffs, or in relation to salaried staffs generally, or do you think that the position of supervisors throughout the country requires adjustment?—Such outside comparisons as we have been able to establish in recent

years have indicated that our people have fallen behind. Inside the Service, owing if I may say so to the accident of arbitration, it seems to be very much a matter of luck whether one grade or section of the staff have done better in arbitration than have another. A recent settlement, for example, in the executive field is much more attractive than a settlement which we received from the Tribunal—something like a difference between $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. increase and 6 to 7 per cent. As regards supervisors generally, I think I must go again into the point I made this morning, that taking the salaried field as representing broadly people who are charged with additional responsibilities and supervision or direction in small or large industries, the evidence that one can derive from the Blue Books and the White Papers on national income and expenditure would suggest that the salaried people had tended in recent years to catch up with the rank and file.

2249. That is consistent with your answer a few minutes ago that there are outside comparisons which go to show that the standards are higher than the counterparts in the Civil Service. Again, if you have got useful information on that point it would be helpful.

2250. The Union of Post Office Workers seem to think that the rates for their members might be settled in relation to average rates or earnings for skilled workers. Are there any similar figures within your knowledge, or averages for supervisors, that you could let us have?—I have not got any readily available. I might be able to get hold of them, but you may be aware that in outside industry, when one gets above the basic grade, there is very much more tendency to pay according to the colour of one's eyes or the shape of one's face rather than by any recognised progressive scale. That has been our experience in trying to get evidence on a number of occasions.

2251. Then the Union of Post Office Workers referred to policemen as a comparison. Would your association wish to make any similar comparisons at the supervisory level? Would you like to call in the police force?—We would be very glad to, Sir, because at one time the Post Office, in front of the Arbitration Tribunal, quoted police sergeants as being comparable with overseers. They have dispensed with that comparison now that they have introduced the turncocks!

2252. Did you have any post-war reorganisation among your people corresponding to that of the rank and file, and, if so, does it provide a base line for the structure that you are hoping to build?—Reorganisation in our field was inevitably

tied up with that of the rank and file. After many weeks of negotiation, with regard not only to pay but to duties and conditions and so forth, an agreement was signed, but, like most agreements, probably neither side attached their signature with any degree of satisfaction.

2253. *Chairman*: It was less than the optimum?—Quite.

2254. In paragraphs 30 to 46 there is a description of the work of the four main hierarchies. We should like to know a little more about this. I have been wondering if you could elaborate it and explain in a little more detail, for instance, the way in which the different grades work in relation to each other and to the rank and file, the number of staff supervised in offices of different size and importance, and the degree of responsibility carried at each level, with reference to the chart on page 17. You would probably prefer to do that in a written statement.—We have some duty schedules of officers in this particular field, and we will be very happy to let you have a supply of these.

2255. Thank you very much. Does it include, for instance, numbers of staff supervised in offices of different size and importance?—It does not include that, but there one is up against this difficulty that, at one branch office the assistant superintendent will supervise a number of staff, but you might find an assistant superintendent in another office with relatively few staff actually under his supervision because he is engaged on some high grade writing work.—*Mr. Barrell*: Take the London postal areas N.9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21; they are offices in North London and an overseer at the head office is responsible for the organisation, but is not in direct supervision of them.

2256. In paragraph 36, you quote some examples of supervising officers in the counter and writing hierarchy. Would you tell us what is "personal stock" and what are "subsidiary stocks"?—*Mr. Hodgson*: The personal stock is the stock held by the officer in charge of the branch office. The subsidiary stocks are those held by the clerks at the counter, for which he is also responsible and which will, of course, have passed through his hands.

2256A. Thank you. What determines the grading of an officer in charge of a branch office?—The number of staff.

2257. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: At the end of your paragraph 36, you tell us that the figures in the payments and receipt columns are for two days and relate to transactions other than so and so. Would you like to tell us just what the transactions are for which these people are responsible?—*Mr. Huggett*: Yes, I can do that, Sir. In the case of Woolwich branch office, the

figure quoted for receipts is £8,344, which is a total made up of money orders issued and poundage, in savings bank deposits, bond subscriptions, telephone receipts, the revenue schedule which contains a number of incidental items, and a total of cash which was received on that day from the G.P.O. In the case of payments, £12,167, it is transactions in connection with money orders paid, savings bank withdrawals, National Savings certificates encashed, pensions and allowances paid, postal orders paid, postal drafts paid and remittances to the General Post Office and to other offices. It does not include the sale of postage stamps or any of the items which are of fixed value.

2258. *Mr. Menzler*: Have you ever pursued any comparisons of the grading of staff in M.N.I. or Ministry of Labour offices with the grading of your people, or do you think it not relevant?—*Mr. Hodgson*: We have never done a serious study of it, but I should imagine, so far as financial responsibilities are concerned, our cashiers and accountants in head postmasters' offices would come out very well in comparison.

2259. Might there be a difference in the scope for taking a decision? There is no decision to be taken in regard to a lot of the business you do, for it is defined by regulation, whereas in the case of payment of benefits someone may have to make a decision as to whether the person is eligible or not.—There are a number of spot decisions which have to be made by our supervising officers, and I should imagine that the other staff you mention have their broad directives and operate within them. Let me take an example in the postal inspectorate, you will appreciate, the postal services are dependent to a very great extent on the running of trains, and between three and four o'clock in the morning at a particular office three or four important mail train connections may arrive, if the trains run at the right time. If a particular train was running late the officer in charge, who might be an assistant inspector, would have to make an on the spot decision as to how best to effect a connection and if indeed one could be made; and if it could not be made he would then have to make a spot decision as to what to do to get the delayed mail away.

2260. *Mr. Hall*: In paragraphs 45 and 46 you make the point that the demand made on telephone supervisors in their work has caught up with that in the telegraph service, and therefore you ask for parity. There are one or two things that arise out of that. On the telephone side there are four grades; on the telegraph side three. Have you any suggestions as to how you would align the two hierarchies if your case were accepted?—The reason

for the different number of grades is that on the telephone side there are larger concentrations of staff than there are on the telegraph side, so that there is a sort of super hierarchy on the top. Again, on the telephone side the staff and supervision carry a lot of their own writing work, as we call it, which on the telegraph side is performed in the head postmaster's office by officers on the counter and writing side. We say that the alignment should be assistant supervisor to assistant supervisor, supervisor to supervisor and supervisor higher grade to chief supervisor.

2261. You mention that male telephone supervisors work largely at night and at week-ends and you suggest that this is a factor which warrants special consideration when discussing their salaries. Do you mean that the value of the work of the male telephone supervisors is really the same as that of the telegraph staff, or would you go further and say that in view of their night work their scales should be higher?—We would be content to establish parity. We have regard to this fact that the work at night is not of the same intensity as that of the telephone services during the day time, but there is this counteracting factor of hours—the whole of the men's duty is ranged between 6 p.m. and 8 a.m. and Sunday afternoons, so they always seem to be at work when everybody else is at play.

2262. Do they get some kind of time allowance?—Their duties are now arranged on a 42 hour basis. They are conditioned to a 48 hour week but six hours are knocked off for night duty when all their attendance falls between 8 p.m. and 8 a.m.

2262A. Women telephone supervisors do not do these awkward hours?—They are lined up for duty between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. and on Sundays in the morning and afternoon.

2263. I gather from your evidence that there has been a good deal of increased mechanisation over the last 20 years. Has that had any effect on the burden placed upon supervisors? Has it lightened it?—It has had the reverse effect. In the old days of manual exchanges, where all telephone calls were handled by the telephonist, a large proportion of the calls were straightforward local calls. Now it is only the more difficult call that is now referred to the telephonist—toll, trunk, and so forth, so that the value of the telephone operator's work has gone up accordingly and the intensity of the supervision necessary has also gone up. Further developments in the telephone field, of which you may be aware, serve to complicate it further. The telephone supervisor gets involved in this because when the telephonist gets into difficulties or finds that

trunk routes are overloaded, she has to suggest alternative routes.

2264. Your point is that there is a higher technical quality demanded now of the supervisor?—Undoubtedly.

2265. *Chairman*: On the length of scales, Mr. Hodgson, in paragraph 48 you say that promotion normally comes only after many years in the rank and file grade. Could you give us figures of average or median ages of promotion from the different hierarchies in recent years?—It is very difficult to get them for the country as a whole. I might get it from some representative offices.

2266. Is it normal for officers to go right through all the incremental stages set out in paragraph 49?—*Mr. Barrell*: It is more often than not impossible. I did 30 years in the rank and file, which meant that I was promoted from sorter to overseer in 1948. I am now superintendent and it will be impossible for me, by the time I reach the normal retiring age of 60, to have had three years on the maximum of a superintendent to qualify for full pension.

2267. In paragraph 49 you say that the number of incremental steps should be reduced to no more than three so that an officer may hope to reach his maximum within a reasonable period. How would you comment on the view that where it is normal for an officer to remain in a grade for some years a fairly long scale is appropriate?—The view of those I represent has been expressed at many conferences. They have, first of all, to perform a period on an acting basis in the higher grade. They are, by the time they are promoted, fully qualified to do the work and they therefore say that they are entitled to the rate for the job. When you ask me whether they would like a long scale, I can only answer that time after time at our annual conferences we are told to ask the Post Office to abolish all increments.

2268. *Mr. Menzler*: Paragraph 37 of the Factual Memorandum sets out the arrangements to ensure that when you are promoted you get something out of it. Does that not go some way to mitigate the difficulty?—Yes, Sir, but where an officer is promoted before having reached the maximum of his grade, for example in the counter and writing hierarchy, his increase on promotion would only take him to the bottom of the overseer's scale.

2269. Does not the man at the maximum of the scale get a substantial increase under this formula?—Dependent upon the maximum of the scale to which he is promoted.

2270. There is also another mitigation I must put to you. Will not some of these people be in receipt of allowances for supervision which will help them along on

the new scale when they are promoted?—There are a few allowances payable in the case of officers who are thought by the Post Office to be carrying a responsibility roughly half way to the next grade.

2271. *Chairman*: Have you a new set of scales to suggest?—We have not, Sir. Until we know the basis we are going to build on we have to wait.

2272. *Mr. Menzler*: But taking the Service as it is, have you no idea how you would fit into the pattern if you had your way?—We have ideas but our real difficulty there is this. If you were to go to the overseer, for example, the valuation which we think should be placed on him would be roughly comparable to that of an executive officer; you then have to fit in the other grades in the same hierarchy up to assistant postmaster and then head postmaster. Now if you start off with a maximum of £800 for an overseer you have also to move head postmasters who are not represented by us here.

2273. It would be helpful to us if you could give us an indication of what you feel your people ought to be paid.—We will be glad to do that.

2274. *Mr. Hall*: In paragraphs 51 to 57 you argue the point about the restrictive overtime maximum. You suggest that it should be abolished and that all supervising grades should be entitled to payment for extra duty. I understand from the Factual Memorandum that non-overtime grades are eligible for extra duty allowance. Does not that cover it?—The extra duty has to be more or less regular. In the case of the grades we represent overtime is not a regular feature. One will get a lot just before and just after Christmas on the postal side particularly. At seaside resorts they get pressure varying in intensity which creates overtime conditions for a few weeks but would not be a qualification for an extra duty allowance.

2275. The people you represent do not get the benefit of this because the work is too intermittent?—That is so, Sir.

2276. You think, therefore, that overtime would be more suitable for your colleagues?—Yes.

2277. Is there any part of the group that you represent where you feel that overtime on a hourly basis would be inappropriate and that something more like an extra duty allowance would be appropriate?—In the case of the higher grades in the hierarchy, yes; for example, the chief inspector and the assistant postmaster, though with the latter, variations in the type of work and length of attendance as between different places might make difficulties.

2278. Going to outside comparisons on this question of overtime, have you any evidence to suggest a comparison between the rates you are asking for and what happens in outside employment?—The information we have is culled from the Ministry of Labour Gazette, 1951. I have no later information than that.

2279. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Coming to hours. In paragraph 58 you say that the discrimination between the Post Office manipulative grades and the general service classes should be abolished. I take it you think it is right to look only at the rest of the Civil Service and not at outside practice in this respect?—It seems to us, Sir, that we get the worst of both worlds. Not only have we compared less favourably as regards pay with other people in the Service but we have also compared less favourably as regards hours. If we look outside the Service I think it would not be difficult to find that the hours were more favourable than those worked by our people. I believe it is true to say, for example, that if we compared the bank cashier, whom I mentioned earlier, with the overseer who is conditioned to a 48 hour week, the bank cashier would come off better. Similarly, I think it is true to say of the rank and file in industry, according to the information published by the Ministry of Labour, that their normal week is more like 44, while a number of our grades are, of course, conditioned to 48.

2280. It would seem from your tables following paragraph 60, to which I referred a short time ago, that it is only the grade—two grades on the telephone side—immediately above the rank and file that has the 48 hour week, the rest of the supervising staff being on either 42 or 44 hours. Do you think that all the supervisors should be on 42-44, whether or not the rank and file remain on 48?—Like our colleagues in the rank and file organisation, our ultimate ideal is a 40 hour week. We are being modest here and saying: "Treat us no better than the rest of the Civil Service at this point in time," and that would apply equally to the rank and file as to the supervisor.

2281. Shall I put my question in another way? Do you feel it feasible to have a different standard of hours for supervisors from that of the men they supervise?—There is a separate standard now, but we do not feel that we are here today to speak about what the hours of the rank and file should be, except to say, as I have already said, that they are with us in believing that 40 is the proper week.

2282. *Chairman*: Industry is 44 net and you are 48 gross, is that not the situation?—Yes, and the Treasury classes are 42 gross in London and 44 in the provinces.

2283. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: You mentioned just now that it was one of your objectives to secure a five day week for your people. If that were conceded would it mean the employment of additional supervisors?—I think undoubtedly it would, but not to the extent of one for one. By the introduction of the 40 hour five day week, with a reorganisation of the work, I am quite certain that the additional staff which might be required need in no way relate to the actual hours sacrificed by the administration in conceding the 40 hour week.

2284. *Mr. Menzler*: There is no suggestion here that the public will get less service in the reorganisation of the work?—We believe in the 24 hour seven day week service. It is our tradition.

2285. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: Would you like to tell us more about the operation of the 42 hour week for the higher supervising grades in the places you have listed in the footnote to the tables at paragraph 60? Suppose there were a general overhaul of civil service hours, why would it not be right to bring these staffs into line with whatever hours were laid down for other civil servants working in those places?—The 42 hour week was conceded in those particular places by the Industrial Court because they had regard not only to the work performed but to the irregularity of the attendances. Some of these grades in the provinces are working round-the-clock duties, and presumably that was one of the considerations in the minds of the Tribunal when they made their Award. Those conditions have not changed, in our submission, and therefore what had been conceded in that case should presumably be allowed to continue.

2286. *Sir George Mowbray*: We are coming to the end of the story and perhaps at this stage leave may be in all our minds! Generally speaking, in the paragraphs dealing with leave, you are asking for better leave for your people, and specifically perhaps one may say that you ask us to endorse the principle that a basic grade officer on promotion to a supervising grade ought to get an increase in leave. I would like to know whether there is any evidence from outside sources to show that promotion inevitably leads to better leave?—I have no specific evidence of that, Sir. Again, it is dependent on what one hears and what one knows of what has happened in the case of friends, and indeed, what is

happening in my own office with my own staff—when they get a little higher up they get a little more leave. I believe it would be fair to say that it is the practice, when people acquire a higher status, that they do enjoy in outside industry more leave than the rank and file.

2287. But I think you are asking specifically that it should be more or less automatic on promotion? I think we all realise that as people get higher up the ladder, speaking generally, they get rather more leave, but I was wondering whether you had any evidence from outside sources as to its being automatic on promotion?—Not specific evidence.

2288. How do your leave allowances compare with people at roughly the same level of salary outside?—I would say that broadly they are the same, if one is looking at it in the sense of weeks, but there is a difference that in outside industry there is more concession of the odd days of leave, not set off against the normal leave, plus the fact that the practice of the five day week is growing in outside industry; this gives straight off 50 more days leave than the normal recognised leave of perhaps a fortnight or three weeks.

2289. Do you feel that your own leave allowances are inadequate on merits, or are you rather indicating that they are inadequate in relation to the improved allowances which the rank and file grades received in 1946?—On merits, because most of our people, as I have already said, are getting older in the Service. Take the case of the telephone supervisor. The telephone supervisor has been a telephonist for probably fifteen or twenty years, a job she has carried out sitting down. She is promoted to assistant supervisor and immediately her responsibility is to walk up and down—I will not say for eight hours a day because she does get breaks—but her primary duty is to walk up and down behind a team of telephonists dealing with their difficulties and the difficulties thrown up by the subscribers. I suggest that coming, as it very often does, when the woman is 40 or round about that, it justifies a little bit more relaxation than when she was required to do a job sitting down, difficult and trying though it may be.

2290. *Chairman*: At the same time, it rather improves her qualities for getting the best out of her leave, does it not?—That may be so!

Chairman: May I end by thanking you for coming.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(Adjourned until Tuesday, 13th July, 1954, at 11.30 a.m.)

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

15

ROYAL COMMISSION
ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

FIFTEENTH DAY

Tuesday, 13th July, 1954

Civil Service Legal Society
Witnesses



LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1954

TWO SHILLINGS NET

List of Witnesses

MR. A. FRASER

MR. R. L. A. HANKEY,
*lately chairman of a committee appointed
by the Society to enquire into career
prospects in the legal Civil Service*

MR. H. W. W. HUXHAM,
*one of the Society's representatives on
the Salaried Solicitors' Committee of
the Law Society*

MR. G. D. WHEWAY,
Chairman

MR. J. R. B. HODGETTS,
Vice-chairman

MR. G. F. GLOAK,
Hon. Secretary

on behalf of the Civil Service Legal Society

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

Royal Commission on the Civil Service

FIFTEENTH DAY

Tuesday, 13th July, 1954

Present:

SIR RAYMOND PRIESTLEY, M.C. (*Chairman*)

MR. S. F. BURMAN, C.B.E.

MR. H. LLOYD WILLIAMS, D.S.O., M.C.

MR. W. CASH, F.C.A.

MR. F. A. A. MENZLER, C.B.E.

SIR ALEXANDER GRAY, C.B.E.

SIR GEORGE MOWBRAY, Bart.

MR. N. F. HALL

MR. G. B. THORNEYCROFT

MR. A. D. PECK (*Secretary*)

MISS F. M. LOUGHNANE (*Assistant Secretary*)

Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Civil Service Legal Society

PART I.—INTRODUCTION

1. The Civil Service Legal Society was formed in December, 1919, and its membership consists of professionally qualified officers (barristers, advocates, solicitors and writers to the signet) who hold their appointments under the Crown by reason of their professional qualifications. The total membership of the Society is at present some 570. The Society has branches in thirty Departments including the twenty two Departments referred to in Appendix C of the Treasury's Factual Memorandum on the legal Civil Service.

2. During part of the nineteenth century such legal offices as were in existence were staffed by lawyers who were appointed as permanent civil servants. The salary in 1850 of the head of one of the larger offices was as high as £2,000 a year at a time when income tax was sevenpence in the pound, and "the pound" meant a sovereign. As a result of the recommendations of departmental committees which sat between 1877 and 1888, all the legal offices then existing were disestablished, and for the next thirty years each solicitor or legal adviser was given a lump sum each year "for the hire of clerks." To quote the Report of the MacDonnell Commission of 1914: "We understand it to have been held that these professional staffs (following a practice assumed to prevail in private employment) would prove migratory, spending a few years in government employment and then passing back to the profession, but this anticipation has not in fact been fulfilled."

3. In 1919 the professional staffs of the civil service legal offices were once more established as permanent civil servants, retrospectively from September, 1918, and it is therefore only from that date that they have had a continuous history and regular salary scales. (Certain new offices, such as that of the Public Trustee, and the Land Registry, created by statute before 1919, were staffed by established civil servants from the outset.)

4. In 1943, at the instigation of the then Attorney-General, Sir Donald Somervell, a committee was appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer under the chairmanship of Sir Alan Barlow, to enquire into the remuneration and conditions of service of persons employed in Government legal departments. That committee (hereinafter referred to as "the Barlow Committee" and their Report, which is dated March, 1944, as "the Barlow Report") said in paragraph 9 of their Report:—

"The broad conclusions to which our inquiry has led us are that the deficiency of capable men in the legal civil service is at present so great as to create a very serious situation, and that it is urgently necessary to take action now in order that the public service may obtain the lawyers it will require. Government departments have hitherto been well served by their lawyers, but of those now filling the more important posts a large proportion are at or near the retiring age. There are good men in the permanent legal service suitable for promotion, but there are not nearly enough of them even to fill the vacancies that will shortly arise. The activities of government after the war must, moreover, be expected to range over a larger field than formerly, and in connection with many of its new activities the services of an increased number of efficient lawyers will be wanted."

5. The recommendations of the Barlow Committee are summarised in paragraph 54 of their Report. The Committee included the following among the main objects to be attained:—

"(a) early action should be taken to increase the number of capable lawyers in the Service; "

"(b) a very high standard of ability should be required of the occupants of the chief posts in the legal civil service, so that full advantage can be taken of their professional experience; "

* * * * *

"(d) lawyers should not be admitted to the legal civil service until it is clear that they not merely possess nominal qualifications but also are fitted to become the holders of responsible positions in it."

Among the steps recommended for the achievement of these objects were the raising of salaries and a general review of existing legal establishments, with particular regard to the proportion of higher to lower posts.

6. In paragraph 11 of their Report (which paragraph is set out in Appendix C to this memorandum) the Barlow Committee emphasised that "there is prevalent, both inside the Civil Service and outside it, a feeling that lawyers have an inferior status in the Service nowadays and that pay and prospects are better on the administrative side." The Report went on to say that suitable men would not be attracted to the legal Civil Service after the war as they were after the 1914 war unless the assistant solicitor posts were raised in status and the number of such posts were sufficient to afford the assurance that any man of more than average ability who entered the Service might reasonably expect to rise so far. In a letter to the Society, dated 23rd July, 1945, the Treasury stated: "We have reached the conclusion that, for some legal staff at least, the Senior Legal Assistant grade must be the career grade." As appears from paragraph 26 of this memorandum, under present conditions many lawyers in the Service have little prospect of attaining the rank of assistant solicitor.

7. The Barlow Committee recommended the creation of a further grade above that of assistant solicitor, to be known as principal assistant solicitor, but, as will be seen from the Treasury's Factual Memorandum on the legal Civil Service, there are only seven such posts in the whole of the legal Civil Service, and of these, all but two are in the same Department—the Treasury Solicitor's office.

8. The failure of the Treasury to carry out in full the recommendations of the Barlow Committee has resulted in a continuance of the evil which that Committee sought to remove, so that the inferior status which lawyers had in the Service still persists. The effect of this, measured in money, can be seen from Appendix A to this memorandum.

9. The nature of the work done in the legal offices of the Civil Service varies so much from office to office that it would be impossible to describe it adequately in a few words. The Barlow Report deals with it on general lines, and any details which may be required can be supplied either in writing or orally. The following considerations, however, particularly affect the higher grades and for that reason should be mentioned here.

10. Two of the most noticeable changes which have taken place in recent years have been a marked increase in the volume and complexity of legal work, and the increasing devolution of the simpler forms of legal work to non-professional grades. The former is notorious; and the Barlow Committee have been proved correct in their expectation (see the passage from paragraph 9 of their Report referred to in paragraph 4 of this memorandum) that the activities of government would, after the war, range over a larger field than formerly. The process of devolution above referred to has the blessing both of the Tomlin Commission (paragraph 198) and of the Barlow Committee (paragraphs 16, 18 and 46). The result of these two processes is to place a greater weight of responsibility on the professional grades at all levels. The effect of this is aggravated in those offices in which the proportion of lower grades to assistant solicitors is still unduly high.

11. The increasing amount of parliamentary and delegated legislation, together with the expansion of governmental control over many forms of human activity, have increased the need for the recruitment of men of outstanding character and ability. It is one of the major responsibilities of the higher grades of departmental lawyers to ensure that the wide powers, and in particular the many quasi-judicial functions, of Government Departments are properly exercised. The responsibility is the heavier now that the exercise of these powers is so often not open to review by the Courts. These matters are more fully dealt with in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the Barlow Report.

PART II.—PAY

PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN PAY GENERALLY

The present principle critically examined

12. The present principle, known as the Tomlin formula, involves two requirements:—

- (A) that there should be a sufficient number of truly comparable outside posts, and
- (B) that the details of the pay, conditions and prospects of the occupiers of those posts should be known both to the Crown and to its servants.

The Society would agree that these requirements can be met for such categories as typists, messengers and some clerks, but the difficulty of making a comparison, and of obtaining the information, increases in the higher classes where the only possible close comparisons may be those which can be made at the age of recruitment.

13. The proper application of the present formula is dependent not only on the availability of the necessary data but on the possibility of an impartial review. Again, the lower grades have this possibility in recourse to the Arbitration Tribunal, but the higher grades, whose salaries to no small extent set the standard of the Civil Service in the eyes of the world, have no such possibility.

14. Where comparisons and the safeguard of arbitration are available, the present formula may operate fairly in times of stable monetary values; where, as in recent years, there is a rapid rise in the cost of living, the civil servant must await not only the change and its effect on other incomes, but the negotiations and the award of consequent pay increases and their recognition as "long term trends" before his claims can even be preferred.

15. The present formula takes no account of benefits in kind enjoyed by persons outside the Civil Service. Both employees and self-employed persons enjoy considerable opportunities of reducing to themselves quite legitimately the cost of such items as accommodation and a car, the provision of which, or the tax relief in respect of which, may be of great value.

16. The Society does not feel that it could properly urge on the Commission any general principle governing the pay of all civil servants. If the general experience has been the same as the Society's, the principle of comparison with outside employments will require to be replaced or supplemented throughout the Service.

17. The Society does not think the Tomlin formula, based as it is on comparable outside employments, is applicable to the legal Civil Service as a whole, and indeed the Society observes that although local government appointments and some judicial offices might perhaps have been thought to provide suitable comparisons, nevertheless, 20 years after the Tomlin Report and after several arbitrations, no relativity with any of these has been accepted as a basis for comparison. The Society has observed with interest from paragraph 21 of the first memorandum of evidence by H.M. Treasury that there is official recognition of the inadequacy of the Tomlin formula to provide for professional, scientific and technical grades.

PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN PAY OF THE LEGAL CIVIL SERVICE

The need for a new principle

18. Not only does the Society maintain that the Tomlin formula is inappropriate in the case of lawyers, but it also maintains that in so far as that formula has been sought to be applied, it has resulted in producing salary scales which are inadequate at all stages.

To a certain extent this is the result of the recent war for, throughout the successive periods of economic crisis and difficulty which the nation has endured since its outbreak, civil service lawyers in common with other Government servants have been subjected to the full rigour of the Government's policy of wage restraint, and this policy has, the Society feels, overridden and prevented any attempt at full implementation of the Tomlin formula. Outside employments have not suffered the same degree of austerity. Since 1938 wages and earnings of adult males have increased by 174 per cent. and upper level salaries by 100 per cent.* The salaries of legal civil servants have, since 1939, shown the following variations:—

	Pre-war salary	Present salary	Percentage increase
	£	£	
Legal assistant, minimum	675	915	35½
Legal assistant, maximum	850	1,225	44
Senior legal assistant, minimum	900	1,315	46
Senior legal assistant, maximum	1,100	1,700	54½
Assistant solicitor, minimum	1,200	1,825	52
Assistant solicitor, maximum	1,400	2,200	57
Principal assistant solicitor	—	2,600	—
Solicitor	1,953	3,250	66

The above figures do not include extra duty allowance.

* These figures are based on the following information supplied to the Civil Service Legal Society by Professor R. G. D. Allen. From 1938 to 1952 average wages and salaries increased by 160 per cent. and 120 per cent. (in round figures) respectively. See the Table (at the bottom of p. 128) in the article by Professor Allen in "The Economic Journal" for March, 1954. Provisional estimates for 1953 (in Cmd. 9118 April, 1954) show that wages plus salaries increased by 6 per cent. from 1952 to 1953. (These provisional figures also make some, relatively small, revisions in earlier years.) Hence, as rough estimates, from 1938 to 1953 average wages increased by 170 per cent. and average salaries by 127½ per cent. These are averages over all wage earners or all salary earners and they do not come quite up to date. An increase of 174 per cent. from October, 1938, to October, 1953, can be quoted for weekly wage earnings of a particular group of adult male workers (in manufacturing and certain other trades—Ministry of Labour earnings enquiries). For salary earnings, the increases since 1938 are lower for men than for women and lower for the upper levels than for the lower and middle levels. Even so, an estimate, which is not unreasonable, for upper level salaries, is an increase of 100 per cent. from 1938 to date.

19. Members of the legal Civil Service find themselves at a marked disadvantage compared both with administrative civil servants and with the members of the other learned (the medical) profession employed in the Civil Service. Civil service lawyers have also to recognise that their service compares very much less favourably than it did before the war with the profession of the law in private practice. These comparisons are developed in paragraphs 20 to 29 of this memorandum, in which an attempt is made to ascertain so far as is possible internal relativities and to examine the position of civil service lawyers compared with lawyers in private practice.

20. At question 36 in the evidence of the Treasury before this Commission, the Treasury representative recognised that the doctors presented a difficult case because the great majority of the profession are fee paid. This is equally true of lawyers, since barristers in private practice are never salaried and solicitors who succeed in their profession are only salaried in the "apprentice" years. Doctors in the Civil Service have a salary scale which automatically (i.e., even without promotion) guarantees for them a salary which is not inadequate by contemporary professional standards. The Society is strongly of the opinion that lawyers should be put in a comparable position. At present lawyers are promoted to the grade of senior legal assistant at approximately the age of 38 and at the top of their scale, some seven years later, will still receive only £1,700 per annum, whereas the doctor in his basic grade will receive £2,100 at the age of 42.

21. Recruitment to the legal Civil Service will depend to no small extent on the appraisal which lawyers in private practice make of the terms which the Service offers them, compared with the prospects which they may enjoy if they continue outside it. In recent years, notwithstanding an increase in their numbers, the quality of applicants has been such that an average of just over 30 per cent. of the posts at each competition have remained unfilled, despite the fact that the abolition in 1946 of the grade of junior legal assistant has in effect greatly increased the starting salary of an entrant into the legal Civil Service. Particulars of the last eight open recruitment competitions for appointment to the basic grade of legal assistant are set out in Appendix B to this Memorandum from which it will be seen that the number of applicants for available posts average 2.6 per post. This failure to fill all vacant posts is not due to any lack of potential recruits among either barristers or solicitors. As regards barristers, the Attorney-General at the 1953 Annual General Meeting of the Bar referred to the drift of promising young men away from practice, indicating that although there were approximately 300 calls annually of English residents the practising Bar remained at its pre-war figure of about 2,000. The total number of calls each year has doubled since 1939. As regards solicitors, the following facts are disclosed in The Law Society's Annual Report for 1952-53. Each professional post advertised in The Law Society's *Gazette* during 1952 under the heading "Public, Commercial and Overseas Appointments" attracted six replies through the Law Society itself independently of those sent direct to the advertisers. Replies to advertisements under the heading "Situations Vacant" averaged about six in each case and the corresponding figure for "Partnerships Offered" was about ten.

22. The reason for the present unattractiveness of the legal Civil Service is, the Society feels, primarily a financial one. Not only, as stated in paragraph 18 above, have lawyers in the Service failed to keep pace with salary earners generally, but they have also lost ground compared with lawyers in private practice, and by failing to achieve proper increases in salary, lost their place in the general economic hierarchy. The extent of this loss can best be expressed by stating that whereas in 1939 a legal assistant received at the top of his pay scale a salary equivalent to a representative average professional income, members of the legal Civil Service do not now attain to such a salary until they reach the maximum of the senior legal assistant scale. In short, the same professional status, financially speaking, which was attained by members of the Service at an early stage in their pre-war career now represents, for many of them, their utmost expectation.

23. For the purpose of comparison with other classes of civil servants most nearly comparable with lawyers there is set out in Appendix A to this memorandum a comparative table showing the salaries received, age for age, and in total, by entrants into the administrative class, the medical officer class and the legal Civil Service during their service from age 30 to age 65. All such entrants will have similar academic qualifications, but the lawyer and the doctor, at their own expense, acquire their professional qualifications and experience during the years when the administrator is an assistant principal. At about the age of thirty a legal assistant and a principal are reasonably comparable, but thereafter the rates of progress throughout the remainder of their careers are so different that no direct comparison step by step and rank by rank is possible, until the highest rank is reached, where the deputy secretary and the solicitor again provide a fairly close parallel. It will be seen that the table in Appendix A to this memorandum is based on the average age at the date of promotion of the lawyers in post on 1st January, 1954; but, as appears from paragraph 26 of this memorandum, the future ages of promotion for lawyers are likely to be higher.

24. In paragraph 37 of their Report, the Barlow Committee said :—

“The improvements we have suggested in the salary scales payable in respect of legal posts will not succeed in attracting enough candidates of the requisite ability unless the number of higher posts ultimately available is sufficient to offer to a good man reasonable prospects of advancement.”

Reference has been made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this memorandum :—(a) to the recommendations of the Barlow Committee for raising the status and number of assistant solicitor posts and for the creation of a further grade above that of assistant solicitor to be known as principal assistant solicitor; (b) to the fact that, notwithstanding the former recommendation, the Treasury have taken the view that for some legal staff the senior legal assistant grade must be the career grade; and (c) to the fact that there are still only seven principal assistant solicitor posts. The failure to implement these recommendations has resulted in depressing the career prospects in the legal Civil Service by comparison with those in the administrative class. As against only seven posts of principal assistant solicitor grade in the legal Civil Service consisting of over 500 persons, there are in the administrative class, consisting of 2,594 persons, 217 posts of under secretary. Similarly, whilst there are 703 posts of assistant secretary there are only some 80 posts of assistant solicitor.

25. Unfavourable as the financial rewards of the lawyers are by comparison with those of the administrators, as shown in the table set out in Appendix A to this memorandum, the Society fears that they are likely to become even more unfavourable in the future by reason of the worsening of the career prospects. The Society has for some time been gravely concerned about the poor career prospects which appear to face the lawyers and it recently appointed a committee to inquire into this matter. It would not be appropriate to trouble the Commission with details of the result of this investigation, but the Society feels that, as it is little use to establish a sound principle for determining the pay of any class of the Service if there are not reasonable prospects for those who enter the Service of attaining the various grades for which scales of pay are thus determined, it is right that the Society should provide the Commission with some indication of what the prospects really are for many of the lawyers.

26. An essential difficulty in estimating career prospects is, of course, the uncertainty of the operation of the factor of “wastage” (that is to say, the possibility that those who are in the Service will die or retire before the normal retiring age). It is impossible to estimate the operation of this factor in relation to so small a class as the legal Civil Service particularly because that Service is not one unit but is divided into some thirty Departments, each of which, for the purposes of career prospects, must be regarded as a separate self contained unit, so that wastage occurring in one of these Departments does not affect the position in another. Nevertheless, it is possible to show what the career prospects are on the assumption that there is no wastage, and if they appear to be bad,

to consider whether any wastage which it is reasonable to allow for will improve them to such an extent as will provide a proper future for those in the Service and one sufficient to attract newcomers of the right kind to enter it. Approaching the matter on the basis that there is no wastage, that promotion will be by seniority and that 65 will remain the normal retiring age, the Society finds that—

- (i) of the 187 legal assistants, fifteen only will have served less than ten years before they are first promoted, i.e., to senior legal assistant. Thirty seven will have served ten to fifteen years and will have an average age of 50.5 years on promotion. Twenty-six will have served fifteen to eighteen years and have an average age of 51.7 years on promotion, and the remaining 109 will be promoted after eighteen or more years' service at an average age of 54.4 years ;
- (ii) fifty-one of the 204 senior legal assistants and seventy one of the legal assistants cannot hope to reach the rank of assistant solicitor ; and
- (iii) a recruit aged 30 who enters to fill an existing vacancy or one arising within the next three years cannot expect promotion to senior legal assistant before the age of 52 or to assistant solicitor before the age of 58.

27. It can hardly be questioned that career prospects such as those described in the preceding paragraph are inadequate, and would, if properly understood by the outside world, deter the right kind of recruit from entering the Service. There is little doubt that the operation of wastage is likely to improve these prospects, but the Society sees no reason to suppose that the amount of wastage which is likely to occur will improve them to an extent sufficient to make them attractive to the right kind of recruit in the future, or to provide for those already in the Service an adequate career. Moreover, such wastage as the Society finds to be occurring is occurring substantially in the two lowest of the legal grades. Thus, in the period between 1st January, 1949, and 30th September, 1952, of forty one lawyers who left the Service before the age of 60, twenty seven were in the legal assistant grade and eleven in the senior legal assistant grade.

28. To some extent these adverse prospects arise from promotion blocks existing in many of the legal Departments as a result of the combined effect of the wartime suspension of recruiting and the subsequent intake into these Departments of a substantial number of recruits of approximately the same age. Whatever the cause, however, the career prospects are those stated above and, except as improved by wastage, are those which will affect the careers both of those now in the Service and those who will enter it for a considerable period in the future.

29. For the reasons set out above, the Society submits that whether judged by internal relativities or by such analogy as is possible with lawyers in private practice the salaries of civil service lawyers in all grades are markedly lower than they should be.

Principles advocated

30. The Society would ask the Commission to approach the question of lawyers' salary scales on the principle that these scales should, taken together, afford within the framework of the Civil Service as a whole a reasonable career by contemporary professional standards. It is not, in the Society's submission, sufficient that the starting salary should be adequate; for lawyers who enter must do so with the intention of making the legal Civil Service their life's work. The fundamental principle enunciated by the Anderson Committee and referred to in paragraph 145 of the Treasury's Introductory Factual Memorandum dated 15th December, 1953, that employers should pay what is necessary to recruit and retain an efficient staff, is not being observed, because the career offered is under-remunerated. The Society derives some support for the relevance of this consideration from question 7 of the Treasury evidence before this Commission. In the Society's view a sufficient number of recruits of the calibre necessary to secure and maintain an efficient legal Civil Service—that is to say, persons

already in the legal profession and likely to succeed in it (see paragraph 22 of the Barlow Report)—can only be obtained if that Service offers to qualified lawyers a general career prospect at least as good as they can reasonably hope to enjoy elsewhere.

31. If the problem is approached on these lines primary importance must be attached to the salaries fixed for the higher posts (the Barlow Committee emphasised this point in paragraph 31 of their Report—see Appendix C to this memorandum). The Society realises that the Service cannot offer prizes comparable with the highest rewards secured by the leaders in the profession outside but the prizes that are offered must be such as to attract some men at least of outstanding ability. In the nature of things, the eighteen posts of solicitor and legal adviser and the seven posts of principal assistant solicitor cannot reasonably be included in the expectations of any entrants to the Service and the Society feels that the eighty-six posts of assistant solicitor constitute the highest practical expectation which the Service offers. It follows, therefore, that the salary of that grade will necessarily determine the quality of the best type of applicant it can hope to attract.

In the Society's view that quality should not be below that of men who would regard a County Court Judgeship, the role of a busy junior at the Bar or a clerkship to an important local authority as typical of the status to which they expect to attain (in this the Society would refer the Commission to paragraph 11 of the Barlow Report—see Appendix C to this memorandum).

32. In the light of the foregoing the Society recommends that within the framework of the Civil Service as a whole:—

- (A) The salary of an assistant solicitor should be regarded as fixing the career value of the Service and should be approximated to that of some official position in the law acceptable to a not unsuccessful man; and
- (B) The salary scale of a legal assistant should assure to every officer, at the maximum of that scale, a salary equivalent to a representative average professional income. The Society wishes to develop in its oral evidence how this can be ascertained.

SUGGESTED RATES OF PAY FOR THE LEGAL CIVIL SERVICE

33. On consideration of the available information relating to the earnings of the groups considered in paragraphs 20 to 23 of this memorandum and in implementation of the principles (A) and (B) stated in paragraph 32 hereof, the Society suggests the following annual rates of pay for the various grades within the Service:—

<i>Solicitor</i> (now in receipt of £3,250)	£4,000
<i>Principal assistant solicitor</i>	£3,250
<i>Assistant solicitor</i>	£2,800
<i>Senior legal assistant</i>	£1,800–£2,300
<i>Legal assistant—</i>	
On confirmation of appointment	£1,100 (with deduction of £50 for each year under 30)—£1,700
During probation... ..	£800 at age 26 with an addition of £50 for each year above that age subject to a maximum of £1,000

NOTE.—Since these scales were formulated the Society has been made aware that the staff associations have suggested to the Commission substantial increases in salary scales for the various grades in the Civil Service.

These increases, if granted in whole or in part, would make more striking the disparities shown in Appendix A to this memorandum. They would also provide further support for the scales suggested above, and would remove the only obstacle which prevents the Society from suggesting a substantially higher salary for the posts of solicitor and principal assistant solicitor, so as to bring them into line with salaries paid in local government (see paragraph 34 hereof).

34. With regard to the scale as a whole the Society submits—

- (a) that it is very moderate having regard to the nature of the work performed by the legal Civil Service, the volume and complexity of which has greatly increased in the last twenty five years ;
- (b) whatever disturbance of particular relativities would ensue the scale would not conflict with the need for general relativity between the pay of the main categories of the Civil Service as a whole if account is taken of the ages at which those scales operate. Particularly is this so if account is taken of the need to open out what has been called the concertina (see question 47 of the Treasury evidence to this Commission) ;
- (c) it would do no more than restore the various grades to approximately the same positions in the general economic hierarchy which were enjoyed by them from the inception of the Service in 1919 to the outbreak of war in 1939 ; and
- (d) it is not out of proportion to other public legal salaries such as—

(i) those payable in the local government legal service where the highest paid appointments offer salaries in excess of £4,000 per annum, and in a few cases exceed £5,000 per annum. There are also at least twenty three county boroughs where the maximum of the town clerk's recommended salary is £2,750 ; thirty four where it is below that figure, and twenty six where it is above. There are six county councils, the maximum of whose clerk's recommended salary is £2,750 ; there are thirteen where it is below, and forty one where it is above that figure. In all scales applicable to clerks to county councils, the salary of the clerk of the peace is additional ;

(ii) that of a county court judge (i.e., £2,800 per annum) and those of the thirty five whole time county court registrars whose salaries range from £1,575 to £2,125 per annum with pay additions ranging from £70 to £100 per annum.

35. With regard to the particular rates, the Society submits as follows :—

Solicitor.—In the Society's view the office of solicitor and legal adviser to a Government Department is by no means inferior in status or in the importance or complexity of the work involved to a clerkship to a major county council or to the town clerkship of a big city. Those offices demand of their occupants very much the same qualities (described in paragraph 15 of the Barlow Report) as those of a man who could expect in any other walk of life today to earn at least £5,000 a year, yet a solicitor to a Government Department has today a salary comparable, in industry, to that of an executive not of the first rank. The Society does not think that such a salary can deflect outstanding men from the pursuit of what have been called the "glittering prizes" available to them in their profession outside the Service. The proposed increase of £750 a year still fails to do justice to the office, and the Society only refrains from suggesting a higher figure because to do so would be to approach too closely the present salary of a permanent secretary. As appears from the note to paragraph 33 hereof the Society is aware that an upward revision of scales paid to the administrative class is being sought, and if the Commission recommends any increase in the remuneration of the highest grades of that class the Society would suggest a correspondingly higher figure for the solicitor and principal assistant solicitor so as to ensure that the former is not paid less than a deputy secretary.

36. *Principal assistant solicitor.*—This is numerically the smallest grade in the legal Civil Service, to be found only in three Departments. The Society has no complaint as to the relation that the present salary of this grade bears to those above and immediately below, and in its recommendations that relation has been retained.

37. *Assistant solicitor*.—The Society has little to add to the observations made on this grade in paragraph 11 of the Barlow Report. (See Appendix C of this memorandum.) Departing from the existing salary structure, the Society recommends a fixed salary for this grade since it considers that there is no justification for any postponement of the full reward. The responsibilities of an assistant solicitor are in general as great when he is first promoted as when he retires: the average age of promotion of those now in post, 45, and the anticipated higher average age for new entrants ensure that assistant solicitors are fully experienced from the beginning of their service in the grade.

38. *Senior legal assistant*.—All entrants should be expected to be able to attain this grade, in which they may well pass the years of greatest personal expense. Before the war, as stated in paragraph 22 above, senior legal assistants faced this period with a salary substantially above a representative average professional income: today they only just attain such an income at the top of their scale, with all the differences in professional standing that that change entails. The Society feels that it is an unjustifiable reflection on the legal profession that whereas a doctor, in the grade in which he enters the Civil Service, will be certain to attain a salary of £2,100, a lawyer after one, and in many cases his only, promotion will at his maximum be £400 a year below that figure. If, during the years when their obligations are greatest, promising lawyers are to be retained in the Service, their salary will need to be substantially raised.

39. *Legal assistant*.—The Society would like further to emphasise the present particularly unsatisfactory position of this grade. It must be borne in mind that legal assistants are qualified lawyers who have usually had outside experience in their profession and that the usual age of entry is about 30. As stated in paragraph 26 above, the future normal expectation of promotion from this grade is estimated to be related to the age of 50 or higher.

The Tomlin Commission (see paragraph 196 of their Report) stated that they thought it undesirable, where it could be avoided, that professional officers should normally have little chance of securing promotion until the early forties. "One of the attractions of outside practice is the prospect of early success, and we think it likely that promising candidates will refrain from offering themselves for Government employment if by doing so they see little chance of obtaining a responsible post for a period of fifteen years." The Society emphatically endorses that view, and is of the opinion that the danger there foreseen now exists, and will continue unless there is a marked improvement in promotion prospects.

Pre-war, as stated in paragraph 22 hereof, a representative average professional income was attained by legal assistants. The maximum of the salary scale that the Society recommends would at least restore that position.

Equal pay for men and women

40. The principle of equal pay for men and women in the Civil Service is generally accepted and the Society welcomes the announcement that discussions are to take place with a view to its implementation. The Society nevertheless urges the Commission to make a recommendation that implementation should begin at an early date and that equal pay in full should be reached within a very short period.

PART III.—HOURS OF WORK, OVERTIME, REMUNERATION FOR EXTRA DUTY, AND ANNUAL LEAVE

41. The Society realises that its members, having chosen to enter the Civil Service, must be content to follow the general conditions laid down for the Civil Service as a whole with regard to hours of work and leave. The Society does not claim any special treatment for lawyers, but wishes to make the following general observations.

42. It is exceptional to find a full attendance at a solicitor's office on Saturdays and barristers rarely attend their chambers on that day. The number of hours' attendance at the office per week is not a true measure of the work of professional

men. Their concern is not to do any specified amount of work, but to deal with the problems and cases allotted to them. This may necessitate work sometimes at home for hours far beyond those which are standard and often involves periods of travel. The legal profession, as a whole, operates on the principle of working very hard indeed as occasion requires and then recruiting physical strength and mental vigour in fairly substantial vacations.

43. The Society thinks it right to point out that in weighing up the inducements offered to a potential recruit to the legal Civil Service, the requirement for Saturday attendance compares unfavourably with conditions obtaining in the profession outside.

PART IV.—SUPERANNUATION

Scale of awards and reckoning of established service

44. Most of the legal offices, in common with the rest of the Civil Service, come within the ambit of the Superannuation Acts, 1834 to 1949. The rate of pension payable under those Acts is governed by length of service; one eightieth of the average salary for the last three years is allowed for every year of service up to a maximum of forty five. There is also a lump sum gratuity of three eightieths of the same average figure for every year of service, with a maximum of 135 eightieths.

45. While members of the administrative class in the Civil Service are usually recruited on leaving the University and those in the executive and clerical classes at the age of 20 or earlier, the age of entry for lawyers must of necessity be greater owing to their having first to qualify and then gain some practical experience in their profession. It is laid down in the rules governing the recruitment of legal assistants that candidates must be between the ages of 26 and 40. Lawyers are thus in a less advantageous position than most other civil servants (though doubtless there are other professional, scientific and technical groups similarly placed) because, even if they remain in the Service until age 65, they cannot rely on qualifying for a pension factor of more than 39 eightieths if recruited at age 26 and only 25 eightieths if recruited at age 40. Members of the administrative class recruited at about the age of 22, and other classes at 20 or earlier, and retiring at age 65 are able to qualify for 43, or for 45 eightieths. As stated in paragraph 183 of the Treasury's Introductory Factual Memorandum dated 15th December, 1953, assistant principals form a trading or cadet grade; whereas, as mentioned in paragraph 23 hereof, lawyers have to acquire their knowledge and experience outside the Service at considerable cost to themselves.

46. Civil service lawyers have long maintained that they should be compensated by the addition of a notional number of years to the numerator of the fraction by which pensions are calculated, known as "added years." Such an addition has been widely accepted in principle. Thus section 2 of the Superannuation Act, 1946, applies the principle of adding notional years of service but only to persons joining the Civil Service over the age of 35, where the Treasury so directs, and every direction must be laid before each House of Parliament.

47. A principle similar in character to "added years" was recognised in section 1 of the 1946 Act, which enables persons who entered the Civil Service between 3rd September, 1939, and the end of the reconstruction period to count "war service" during that period for the purpose of superannuation in the same way as temporary service, i.e., at half its length, and this has been extended by section 44 of the 1949 Act to war service in the 1914-1918 war in the case of the limited class who, having been accepted for the Civil Service, undertook war service before taking up their appointments.

48. It is also to be noted that the superannuation scheme for the National Coal Board makes provision for "added years" for late entrants, subject, of course, to the payment of additional contributions seeing that this is a contributory scheme. Similar provision for "added years" was also contained in the L.M.S. Railway Superannuation Scheme of 1924.

49. When the Superannuation Act, 1949, was going through Parliament the Government opposed amendments designed to extend the principle, basing their opposition on the ground that adequate provision was already made by section 2 of the Superannuation Act, 1946. Thus it was said (column 231 of the Report of Standing Committee B dated 17th May, 1949) that section 2 of the Act of 1946 "meets the case of the individuals we all have in mind" and (column 233) "We have gone a long way towards meeting the problem which is exercising the minds of Honourable Members. The Act of 1946 is working well." In relation to the legal Civil Service such a statement is not apt for the reasons set out below.

50. In the first place, the age limits laid down in that section make it quite valueless in the case of the ordinary entrant to the legal Civil Service who, under the rules governing recruitment, cannot come into the Service unless he is between the ages of 26 and 40.

Between 1946 and 1954 over eighty people entered the legal Civil Service in the normal way whose age on entry was over 35 but in no instance was the power exercised: in fact, up to 1954, in the whole of the Civil Service directions under that section have been given in only twenty three cases; and even if it were intended to apply it more freely in future, nobody who has been in the Service for more than six months could get any benefit from it (subsection (3)).

51. Again, it was said in relation to recruitment (column 232), "the Act of 1946 is a sufficient inducement to those who come into the Service during their middle years." Such a provision can have no influence on the mind of an applicant between the ages of 26 and 35 (the average age of entry is about 30).

52. It was also alleged (column 232) that the 1946 Act was one outcome of the Barlow Committee's deliberations; and it was pointed out that under section 2 a late entrant could acquire a full pension at the age of 65. The relevant recommendations will be found in that Committee's Report, where the view was expressed that "the practice of allowing lawyers to remain in the Service until the age of 65 or even later, in order that they may improve their pensions is very unsatisfactory . . . If a man is to be retained much after the normal retiring age, it should be because the Service has need of him and not because it has failed to make proper provision for his retirement." (Barlow Report, paragraph 40.) The Report continues (in paragraph 43):—

" . . . we therefore consider that action is necessary whereby the pension rights of men who, by the exigencies of the Service itself, are prevented from entering the Service until they can bring to it the fruits of experience gained outside, should be assimilated to those enjoyed by their administrative colleagues who are allowed to reckon for pension the years during which they served their apprenticeship within the service.

" Our other recommendations cannot be expected to produce the desired results unless substantial improvements are made in the pension conditions applicable to members of the legal civil service, either by the re-introduction of a system of 'added years' or otherwise."

53. It seems clear that section 2 of the Act of 1946 was designed to deal with extraordinary appointments and is quite inadequate for the object now sought to be attained. In the known instances mentioned above it has not been applied to any officers of the legal grades contemplated by the Barlow Committee. Accordingly, the reply given in Standing Committee (column 249) that doctors and lawyers can take advantage of the 1946 Act does not represent the true position.

54. The Society's object is not to benefit the man who enters the legal Civil Service late merely to suit his own convenience or because he has not succeeded in qualifying in the average time. All that is sought is to make fair provision for the man who enters late by reason of the requirements of the Service itself. This could be readily achieved by basing the "added years" on the number of years' experience before entry into the Service certified by the Civil Service Commissioners. The present position is that the longer the experience a lawyer has when he enters the legal Civil Service the less pension will he get when he retires.

55. While it is no doubt true that in 1931 the Tomlin Commission did not favour the granting of "added years" to members of the legal Service (see Cmd. 3909—page 187) the Society submits that this attitude has been superseded by the subsequent recommendations of the Barlow Committee and the Chorley Committee (see paragraph 52 of this memorandum and paragraphs 41 and 46 (viii) of the Report of the latter Committee (Cmd. 7635)).

Widows' and children's pension scheme

Dependants' pensions scheme

56. The Society desires to refer briefly to two aspects of these schemes. In the first place it is common knowledge that since the 1949 Act was passed the value—i.e., the purchasing power—of money has appreciably fallen: hence a pension on a scale which might have been regarded as fairly adequate five years ago will not necessarily suffice to avert the possibility of hardship in the future. The Society is, therefore, strongly of the opinion that participants in these schemes should be allowed, if they so desire, to augment their compulsory contributions so as to secure improved pensions for the beneficiaries. The existing voluntary allocation of pension scheme does not always meet the point; because a person who avails himself of it in favour of his dependants on retirement must thereby reduce his personal resources at a time when his earning capacity has virtually disappeared. This proposal is not a novel one: thus, for example, under the National Coal Board's superannuation scheme an employee can exercise an option either to pay the compulsory minimum contribution for normal family benefits or a higher contribution for added family benefits (Rule 12 (1) (c) and (2) (f)).

57. Secondly, the Report of the Millard Tucker Committee on the Taxation Treatment of Provisions for Retirement (Cmd. 9063) has only recently been published and it is not yet known to what extent it will be adopted. Accordingly, the Society is not in a position to do more than make a submission in general terms that, notwithstanding section 49 of the Superannuation Act, 1949, if any benefits are provided for other groups—particularly as regards income tax relief in respect of contributions—civil servants should be treated not less favourably, without suffering an increase of deductions from their emoluments.

Reckoning of unestablished service in the case of established civil servants

58. Prior to 1st January, 1919, unestablished service, whether continuous or broken, preceding established service was not reckonable at all for superannuation purposes. Between that date and 13th July, 1949, such service, if continuous with established service, may reckon as to one half. As a result of a Government defeat in Standing Committee B on 12th May, 1949 (column 185, *et seq.*), such service after 13th July, 1949, is reckonable in full (Superannuation Act, 1949, section 38). The Society submits that unestablished service (including service in the armed forces) before 13th July, 1949, should also count in full.

Miscellaneous

59. It is submitted that if any method of granting "added years" is adopted, it should be given retrospective effect so as to cover not only future entrants, but also everybody in the legal Civil Service at the operative date.

60. It is the view of the Society that there should be far wider powers to deal with superannuation matters (including variation of rates of pensions, etc.) by means of subordinate legislation. If an additional safeguard is thought to be necessary it could be provided that statutory instruments should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

61. The Society considers that, in the case of a woman who retires on or after the date on which the principle of equal pay is implemented in whole or in part, superannuation benefits should be calculated on the basis that she had been in receipt of male rates of pay during the whole of the period of three years preceding the date of her retirement, notwithstanding that during part of that period she had not been in receipt of such rates.

APPENDIX A

(See paragraphs 8, 23, 25 and 33 of this memorandum)

COMPARATIVE TABLE SHOWING THE SALARIES RECEIVED, AGE FOR AGE AND IN TOTAL, BY ENTRANTS INTO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS, THE MEDICAL OFFICER CLASS AND THE LEGAL CIVIL SERVICE BETWEEN THE AGES OF 30 AND 65.

Age	Administrator's salary		Doctor's salary	Lawyer's present salary		Lawyer's proposed salary	
	Finishing as A/Sec.	Finishing as U/Sec.		Finishing as S.L.A.	Finishing as A/Sol.	Finishing as S.L.A.	Finishing as A/Sol.
30	(P)	£1,150	(M.O.)	£915	(LA)	£1,100	(LA)
31	...	1,190	£1,250	950	(LA)	1,150	£1,100
32	...	1,240	1,300	985	(LA)	1,200	1,150
33	...	1,290	1,350	1,020	(LA)	1,250	1,200
34	...	1,340	1,400	1,060	(LA)	1,300	1,250
35	...	1,390	1,450	1,100	(LA)	1,350	1,300
36	...	1,440	1,500	1,140	(LA)	1,400	1,350
37	...	1,490	1,550	1,180	(LA)	1,450	1,400
38	...	1,540	1,600	1,215	(SLA)	1,500	1,450
39	...	1,570	1,650	1,265	(SLA)	1,550	1,500
40	...	1,570	1,700	1,315	(SLA)	1,600	1,550
41	...	1,570	1,750	1,365	(SLA)	1,650	1,600
42	(A.Sec.)	1,700	2,000	1,415	(SLA)	1,700	1,650
43	...	1,775	2,100	1,465	(SLA)	1,750	1,700
44	...	1,850	2,200	1,515	(SLA)	1,800	1,750
45	...	1,950	2,300	1,565	(SLA)	1,900	1,800
46	...	2,050	2,400	1,615	(SLA)	2,000	1,900
47	...	2,150	2,500	1,665	(SLA)	2,100	2,000
48	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
49	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
50	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
51	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
52	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
53	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
54	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
55	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
56	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
57	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100
58	...	2,200	2,600	1,700	(A.Sol.)	2,200	2,100

59	...	...	2,200	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,200	2,300	2,800
60	...	...	2,200	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,200	2,300	2,800
61	...	...	2,200	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,200	2,300	2,800
62	...	...	2,200	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,200	2,300	2,800
63	...	...	2,200	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,200	2,300	2,800
64	...	...	2,200	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,200	2,300	2,800
65	...	...	2,200	2,600	2,100	1,700	2,200	2,300	2,800
Totals ...			£67,855	£75,505	£69,300	£54,270	£63,705	£73,100	£83,000

NOTES.—(a) The average ages of promotion to the grades of assistant secretary (42) and under secretary (47) are based on information supplied by the Treasury in June, 1954.

(b) It has been assumed that the medical officer will not receive promotion.

(c) The average ages of promotion to the grades of senior legal assistant (38) and assistant solicitor (45) relate to officers in post on the 1st January, 1954.

(d) The salaries given do not include extra duty allowance.

APPENDIX B

(See paragraph 21 of this memorandum)

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF COMPETITIONS FOR LEGAL ASSISTANTS, 1948-1953

	Jan.-Feb., 1948	Sept.-Oct., 1948	Mar.-Apr., 1949	Apr.-May, 1950	Winter 1950-51	Winter 1951-52	Autumn 1952	Autumn 1953
(a) Total applications	110	85	55	81	219	97	136	168
Established civil servants ...	2	3	3	5	11	3	7	8
Unestablished civil servants ...	18	17	12	28	51	46	26	33
(b) Number interviewed	90	68	54	69	110	75	76	89
Established civil servants ...	1	2	3	4	7	3	3	2
Unestablished civil servants ...	15	17	12	28	41	42	24	30
(c) Number successful	45	26	26	27	52	25	21	32
Established civil servants ...	1	1	2	1	2	1	—	1
Unestablished civil servants ...	10	11	7	17	22	14	6	18
(d) Total number of vacancies declared	50	60	45	35	65	37	30	42

APPENDIX C

(See paragraphs 6, 31 and 37 of this memorandum)

EXTRACTS FROM THE BARLOW REPORT (DATED MARCH, 1944)

Paragraph 11 of the Barlow Report

There is prevalent, both inside the Civil Service and outside it, a feeling that lawyers have an inferior status in the Service nowadays and that pay and prospects are better on the administrative side. There is some justification for this idea because there is an ineradicable tendency to judge of the status of a Branch of the Service by the salary attached to the chief posts in it, and whereas before the last war many legal advisers were in receipt of a salary equal to, or even higher than, the Head of the Department, not one of the heads of the offices to which this report applies at present receives a salary approaching that payable to a Permanent Secretary, and all except the Treasury Solicitor and the Director of Public Prosecutions receive salaries inferior to those payable to Deputy Secretaries. In this connection it must be observed that, although the salaries attached to the chief posts have an important influence upon the regard in which the legal Civil Service is held, the position of an assistant solicitor is one which has a special interest both to junior men within the service and to those who contemplate entering it, for almost all of them aspire to attain to that position though they realise that the chief posts can only be achieved by a select few. Many of the men who, in recent years, have done the best work in the legal Civil Service entered that Service immediately after the last war, some of them on the grade of assistant solicitor and some with expectations of early promotion to it. Men who were in legal practice before 1914 had been accustomed to regard a county court judgeship as typical of the kind of honourable official position which would be acceptable to a not unsuccessful man, and, in view of the high rates of war bonus then in force in the Civil Service, the salary paid to an assistant solicitor compared favourably with the £1,500 a year which had long been the salary of a county court judge. Since that time, however, as the result of cuts and super cuts in the rates of war bonus and of subsequent adjustments made in the case of county court judges but not in the case of assistant solicitors, the salary payable to an officer of that grade is now less than three-quarters of that paid to a county court judge, and inferior even to that received by some county court registrars. Suitable men are not therefore likely to be attracted to the legal Civil Service after this war as they were after the last, unless the assistant solicitor posts are raised in status and the number of such posts is sufficient to afford the assurance that any man of more than average ability who enters the Service may reasonably expect to rise at least so far.

Part of paragraph 31 of the Barlow Report

It seems to us that the most important point, in connection with questions of salary, is to determine what remuneration is to be paid to the occupants of the highest posts. Not only is it inevitable, though doubtless unfortunate, that the status and position of the whole legal service should be very largely judged by this, but it is also a question of much concern to the young man with a determination to get on, and such men are just those whom it is especially necessary to attract into the Service.

Examination of Witnesses

MR. A. FRASER

MR. R. L. A. HANKEY

MR. H. W. W. HUXHAM

MR. G. D. WHEWAY, *Chairman*MR. J. R. B. HODGETTS, *Vice-chairman*MR. G. F. GLOAK, *Hon. Secretary*

on behalf of the Civil Service Legal Society

called and examined

2291. *Chairman*: I will start with the usual question about representative capacity: is there anything you wish to add to what you have already said in your memorandum? The First Division Association did not claim to speak for the two highest grades of the administrative class; do you want to make any similar reservation about the highest grades in the legal class?—*Mr. Fraser*: Our position is exactly the same, that although some of the

highest grades are members of the Society they do not descend into the arena!

2292. In paragraph 6 of your memorandum there is a reference to the "career" grade. Could you tell us what you have in mind when you use the expression? Is it the grade that all or most entrants should reach early on but beyond which very few should go?—No, our use of the term is in the sense that there is a point which all competent people should

reach and, which would be the goal to attract people into the Service. In our view it should be possible for everybody to reach the rank of assistant solicitor, which would provide an adequate goal. Unfortunately it is not possible for everybody to reach that grade.

2293. *Mr. Menzler*: Your paragraph 6 does rather imply that it takes a man of more than average ability to get to the post of assistant solicitor. Is that consistent with your definition of career grade?—We assume the people who are taken into the Service would be people of average ability.

2294. This says "more than average".—That is the man who is sorted out and reaches the top.

2295. *Chairman*: In paragraph 8 there is reference to the failure of the Treasury to carry out in full the recommendations of the Barlow Committee. Could you tell us how far the recommendations other than those on pay have been carried out; for instance, the suggestion that the legal service should be regarded as one for the purposes of promotion?—That has proved extremely difficult in practice, and the suggestion that a central committee should be set up to govern interchange between Departments has not been carried out at all, so far as I am aware.

2296. So you are really almost as badly off as regards that as you were before?—Yes.

2297. And you do not see any easy way of getting out of the difficulty?—No, but might I add there that another recommendation we had in mind is that for an increase in the number of higher posts, principal assistant solicitor and assistant solicitor, and the increase has been extremely small and, in our view, quite inadequate.

2298. *Mr. Cash*: Inadequate *vis-à-vis* the work to be done or from the point of view of careers?—Both. As regards the work to be done, we get the impression, rightly or wrongly, that in the Civil Service higher rank is only granted to people who have some sort of supervisory capacity, and when we have individuals who are doing work considerably more difficult than the average we find very little sympathy when we attempt to get a higher rank for them.

2299. *Chairman*: In paragraph 9 you say that the legal work of the Civil Service varies so much from office to office that it could not be described in a few words. Would it be possible to give us a brief description of the functions and responsibilities carried by the various grades?—That varies very much from office to office, and in particular I think one must emphasise that as between the two lower grades, the legal assistant and the senior

legal assistant, there is virtually no distinction at all. In a particular office you may have half a dozen of one rank and ten of the other, but the work goes, broadly speaking, in accordance with its weight and difficulty, to the older and abler of the people, almost regardless of rank. In many offices there is a slight break between the senior legal assistant and the assistant solicitor, because the assistant solicitor does have some supervisory functions. Frequently work is concentrated in teams or groups with an assistant solicitor in charge, but that is not universal. In some places an assistant solicitor may act almost independently. I find it difficult to particularise, because almost every different office varies.

2300. *Mr. Menzler*: Is the analogy with the organisation of private practice, with work parcelled out as it would be among partners?—In some offices the work of an assistant solicitor is very similar to that of a partner in private practice, but one cannot take it too closely.

2301. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I should rather like the witness to have an opportunity, Mr. Chairman to tell us what in fact the lawyers do and how it varies from office to office. In some places you are, I understand, interpreting Acts of Parliament, giving legal advice, in others you go into the courts, and all that kind of thing. Have you any general observation to make with regard to this?—May I start in this way: we have some twelve main offices, which are staffed on approximately similar lines, the office of the Treasury Solicitor and the other ten or eleven which have solicitors or legal advisers with a salary of £3,250. They are identified in the Treasury's Factual Memorandum. Most of them have their own solicitor who conducts litigation; some of them have a legal adviser and in those cases their litigation is conducted for them by the Treasury Solicitor. Apart from that there is not any very big distinction between them. To generalise over that group of offices, one may divide the work roughly into four or five main groups. To begin with, there is the work in the creation of the law, that is to say, in preparing the material which goes up to Parliamentary Counsel to be embodied in statutes, advising the administrators on that material before it is sent up, and drafting statutory instruments. It has become the fashion since the war to pass Acts of Parliament in much shorter form, giving powers to Ministers to amplify them by statutory instrument, and those statutory instruments are almost entirely prepared by the lawyers in these offices. The work involves discussing with the administrators what policy they want, what policy is feasible, and then producing the instrument in terms which are intelligible. That is regarded

by those officers who do most of it as the most important work we do. Then after the law has, so to speak, come into existence, possibly our next most important function is to advise the administrators of our Department on putting into execution that which is required by the Act of Parliament. That is a function which does not correspond precisely with anything you find outside, except perhaps the functions of the Law Officers and the Standing Junior Counsel to the various Departments, because you have to advise on a matter which affects your Department and also affects an enormous number of Her Majesty's subjects; you have got to be consistent, and you have got to maintain a standard which will not give rise to questions in Parliament, if I may put it at its lowest. Beyond this purely advisory work, I think the next thing to take is civil litigation. That varies, some Departments do much more than others. It begins in many Departments with the conduct of proceedings before tribunals of a lower level than the High Court; some of them are departmental tribunals. There is a certain amount of work in the county courts, not very much in most Departments. The work before some of the departmental tribunals is not very well known outside, but in many cases it rises to a very high level of responsibility, because one has to deal with matters affecting the subject vitally. To take one or two random examples, in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries it is necessary to hold enquiries from time to time, and Minister's representatives appear to deal with cases where a farmer is to be dispossessed of his farm, which means ruin for him; and, rather a similar case, where departmental lawyers sit themselves as the tribunal, Ministry of Health enquiries into the activities of doctors, which again may result in a man losing his livelihood. Then, in the Department with which I am more familiar, we have to appear before Commissioners to discuss principles of taxation, and as the litigation there is extremely heavy in these days because of the amount of money involved, the subject finds it advisable to brief eminent counsel. In a vast number of cases it is commonplace for a legal assistant to find himself opposed by a well known leader of the Bar.

Beyond that level comes the High Court litigation, which again of course varies from Department to Department. The Treasury Solicitor, Board of Trade, Board of Customs and Board of Inland Revenue, for example, carry on a good deal of litigation, one or two other Departments perhaps rather less. There the Government lawyer acts purely in the capacity of a solicitor; he instructs counsel, but of course he has to be able to put to counsel the policy of the Department and is expected to have a knowledge of its specialised branch of

the law, which would rarely be expected of a solicitor in private practice when instructing counsel in a similar matter. Then criminal prosecution takes up a large part of the time of some branches—again it varies from branch to branch; some Departments have to conduct an enormous number of comparatively small prosecutions for breaches of regulations; others have to conduct a large number of prosecutions which on the face of them appear to be small but each is a case of fraud depending on a different pattern of fact, and requiring the attention and the services of an able and trained lawyer. Above that level, in a number of Departments it is necessary to conduct from time to time very substantial prosecutions for fraud and conspiracy, where proceedings in the magistrates' court may last for many days, and it is normal practice for those to be taken by the Government lawyer, usually of the rank of legal assistant or senior legal assistant. When they go on to the assizes it is of course necessary to brief counsel, and the Government lawyer acts simply in the capacity of instructing solicitor. There is another branch of work, which is very important in some offices but not many, and that is conveyancing; the principal example of that is in the office of the Treasury Solicitor, where most of the conveyancing work is concentrated, and I think I should mention this because it is easy to imagine that conveyancing is rather a routine job. One thinks of the country solicitor conveying a small villa, and conveying it again when the owner dies or sells it. But the Treasury Solicitor of course has to convey factories and aerodromes and estates which are handed over when their owner dies, in settlement of their death duties, which are very large individual jobs which do not compare with the ordinary run of conveyancing in private practice.

I do not know if that gives the outline?

2302. *Chairman*: I think that gives us just what we needed.

2303. *Sir Alexander Gray*: How far does that kind of picture make lawyers perhaps a little too specialised? There has been some question of a pool, and moving from office to office. If a man has been in health insurance for years and years, is he any good for fisheries?—In many cases, yes. One can get into a highly specialised line where after 15 years it would be rather difficult to change; but the Ministry of National Insurance, for example, is a comparatively new Ministry and its legal staff was drawn largely from people in other Government offices.

2304. *Chairman*: It is true to say, is it not, that both the volume and importance of your work has increased immensely with the growth of government by regulation?—That has increased our work both for

the reason that we have to draft the regulation and because there is a far wider field of legislative matter to be enforced.

2305. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You go on to say that because of this great increase in the volume and complexity of legal work there is an increasing devolution of the simpler forms of legal work to the non-professional grades. Does that mean that non-professional posts are taking the place of basic grade legal posts?—May I explain how this process goes on: at the time of the Barlow Report, in 1944, it was pointed out that some legal offices were devolving the lower grades of work to non-professional staff, and this was regarded as a process which should be continued so that it would be unnecessary for the Government to hire the services of qualified lawyers to do clerks' work. Since that time every effort has been made to continue the process; for example, the Director of Public Prosecutions since 1945 has been able to devolve to non-professional staff a very large part of the work at assizes which was formerly done by professional staff. To go back to the two examples mentioned in the Barlow Report, the Treasury Solicitor and the Solicitor of Inland Revenue have both succeeded in devolving a fair amount of work to their non-professional staff, and we find now that though the proportion of non-professional to professional staff has not increased body by body, in both places the type of non-professional staff has been changed very substantially. They used to be clerical staff, and now a large proportion of executive staff has been introduced. The result of that is that more important work can be devolved to them; for example, in the office of the Solicitor of Inland Revenue virtually the whole of the work in bankruptcy and companies winding up is done by non-professional staff, who attend in the courts themselves without any immediate professional control at all. It is normal practice for work of that sort to be done by managing clerks in the outside world, but unfortunately we are handicapped because we cannot develop a managing clerk class for ourselves. The Treasury requirement of mobility means that if you get an intelligent executive officer he will pick up fairly quickly the run of the court work, and then having proved his value, he will be promoted and taken to another office, and you may have to start training someone else.

2306. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: This process of devolution is increasing and can go further?—It would be possible to take it further if it were possible to train up a regular class of managing clerks.

2307. Has it had the effect of reducing the proportion of the lower basic to the higher legal posts?—I think it would have, because the people who have been

released were mainly the legal assistants. But in fact it has made very little difference, because the expansion of the work has absorbed the legal assistants who have been released by the effect of devolution of work.

2308. There has been no increase in the higher posts?—No.

2309. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 11 there is a reference to the increased responsibility. Has there been a further increase since 10 years ago, when Barlow reported?—Yes, I should say it is a continuing process. The Government is penetrating further into the private lives of the individual, and it is absorbing more of the functions formerly exercised by the local authorities.—*Mr. Whewy*: May I just cite an example of a block of work which has been newly devolved by Parliament on to the Government Department concerned, and that is the legislation with regard to water supplies. That used always to be done by means of Private Bills. With the Water Act of 1945 the whole of the responsibility for water legislation was passed on to the Minister of Health—now the Ministry of Housing and Local Government—and all that is done by a Government Department by means of statutory instruments. It is very rarely that you get a Water Bill, but an enormous number of orders are being made the whole time. They involve a good deal of discussion with the administrators and of course with the parliamentary agents who are engaged by the companies and local authorities.

2310. *Mr. Cash*: When private Bill legislation with regard, for instance, to public utility undertakings, took place in what used to be called the Golden Gallery, of course there still fell upon the Government a good deal of legal responsibility for its representation there. In so far as private Bill legislation has very nearly ceased, or is only a trickle, it is true I suppose that though there is a new block of work which you have just described, yet on the other hand there is another block which has disappeared?—Yes, but I would say that the block which has descended on to the Department is out of all proportion to that of which it has been relieved.

2311. But you have only got one public utility undertaking now, water, whereas before you had gas and electricity.—Yes, but where the Minister has to draft the statutory instruments and make provision for everything that is required in that instrument, the work involved is far more than merely reporting on the Bill which is promoted by the undertakers themselves.

2312. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 11, you say, having regard to all these widened functions, that this has "increased the need for the recruitment of men of outstanding character and ability". I take it

you mean a sufficiency of men of outstanding character and ability, not all of them?

—*Mr. Fraser*: I think the intention there is that the more you interfere with the subject the more necessary it is that your lawyers should be men of character and integrity.

2313. But if the whole of the legal Service were composed of "men of outstanding character and ability", I should be horrified at the complaints which would arise about absence of promotion! However, you would agree that you mean a sufficient number of them?—Yes.

2314. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: In paragraphs 12 to 17 of your memorandum you examine the Tomlin formula. May I ask if you object in principle to the doctrine of fair comparisons, or is it only the difficulty of applying it that in your opinion makes it unsuitable in relation to the legal class?

—It is primarily the difficulty in applying it. The Tomlin formula refers to occupations, which could be interpreted either to mean employments or professions, and so far as employments are concerned we find it almost impossible to get any outside comparison which throws any light on the amount of remuneration which should be received by lawyers, and we think it should be made quite clear that to the extent that outside comparisons are to be used one has to fall back on what are the profits made by people in private practice. But we have the further difficulty that those are very difficult to ascertain, and that is why we feel that the Tomlin formula is not quite sufficient for present day needs. In addition, there is the question of the long term trend. We feel that there has been a long enough term trend in regard to some of our grievances, if I may so call them, to satisfy the Tomlin formula. But, with respect, we agree with the point of view of the Treasury that one must not always wait for the long term trend in adjusting civil service pay, otherwise one would always be five or ten years too late.

2315. *Mr. Cash*: If it was always going in the same direction, but not if it was going in the opposite direction, I suppose?

—If the direction is being reversed from time to time it just depends on the comparative sizes of the valleys and hills.

2316. *Mr. Thorneycroft*: What the Treasury said in that regard applied particularly to the lower range of staff.—It operates more easily, yes, down at the level where weekly wages change more rapidly and can be more readily ascertained.

2317. In paragraph 13 you say that the proper application of the Tomlin formula is dependent on the possibility of an impartial review. Would you agree with the Treasury in regarding the Arbitration Tribunal as a long stop, or do you think that

an impartial review should be the normal method of settling civil service salaries?—I think the impartial review should be the normal method of settling civil service salaries, but I do not see how you can get an impartial review by Treasury officials who are working under orders to keep down the cost of living, or otherwise carry out an economic policy.

2318. There is provision at the moment for cases to be remitted to the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal within certain limits, and beyond those limits they can be remitted by consent of both parties. What did you mean exactly when you said you felt that it would be difficult to have an impartial review in present circumstances?

—That provides an example. When the Government issues a statement on national incomes and prices, and openly declares that so far as possible no wages or salaries should go up at all, it is inevitable that when you ask the Treasury to agree to an arbitration above what they call the compulsory level, they are virtually bound to refuse, and the provision for arbitration by agreement becomes meaningless.

2319. But there have been quite a number of instances where that reference to arbitration by consent has taken place, in fact.—Yes, but in recent years there have been equally cases where it has been refused, and the tendency must be to refuse it where it is the public and declared policy of the Government that no wage increases should be allowed.

2320. Do you feel that the higher grades of the legal class, including the very highest, should be allowed to go to arbitration?

—We do not speak, of course, for the highest grades, except in the sense that we should like to see their salaries raised, in the hope that some day we may step into their shoes. But I feel quite certain that they would not wish to trail their affairs before an arbitration court.

2321. So that broadly you agree with the Treasury view, as expressed in a document, a copy of which I understand has been furnished to you, on this general question of arbitration, and where the line should be drawn?—I am certain our Society would be in agreement with it on everything except one point, and that is the question where the line should be drawn. It is just possible that we should prefer the line to be drawn slightly higher. We would like to make quite certain that the legal assistant and senior legal assistant grades should always have the right to arbitration, and there is a large body of opinion in our Society which would like to see it possible for the assistant solicitor scales to be arbitrated upon too.

2322. *Mr. Menzler*: Have not the senior legal assistants the right to go to arbitration now?—Yes, but we are in this

danger, that if through your good offices the salary of the senior legal assistant is very slightly raised we shall lose the right.

2323. *Mr. Cash*: Would it not be much better that the right to go to arbitration should be fixed not on a pound basis at all but on a grade basis?—It would be more satisfactory to us. I imagine the Treasury may take the line that it is better to have the pound basis in fairness to the Service as a whole, but from our point of view as a Society it would be much better to have it drawn on a grade basis.

2324. *Chairman*: Have you thought of any sort of impartial review apart from arbitration?—Not apart from an occasional Commission such as this, or that presided over by Lord Chorley. In the meantime the best method seems to be for the Treasury to give an impartial review without too much pressure from the Government of the day, with recourse to arbitration as far as that will conveniently go.

2325. *Mr. Cash*: There is one small point, with regard to the various privileges which are enjoyed by your confrères outside the Service, to which you refer in paragraph 15. You are saying there, I suppose, that they really could not be taken advantage of within the Service?—The point we mean to put is that when you compare the salary which is paid to a civil servant with either the salary or the earnings of somebody outside, you must remember that the civil servant gets, so to speak, nothing on the side.

2326. Are you prepared to put any sort of figure on it, say, 5 or 10 per cent. on salary, or would you rather not attempt to quantify?—I do not think you can possibly attempt to quantify it, because the typical example of the motorcar only applies to some people and not to everybody.

2327. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: There again, you are speaking for the whole of the Civil Service now, and not for your particular class?—I think this is a point which affects us in the same way as the rest of the Service.

2328. What would you say the barrister gets in the way of perquisites—presents from grateful clients?—I imagine the motorcar is one of the very few advantages which he can get. If you yourself wish to run a car you have got to pay for the whole price of the car, the whole price of the garage and the whole price of the maintenance, whereas if you run a car for the purposes of your business or profession you charge 75 per cent. of the total cost to the business or profession, and then at weekends you have your car sitting in the garage ready for use, and you are only paying a quarter of its maintenance and garage charges.

2329. What you are saying is that the Inland Revenue is kinder to barristers than to civil servants.—May I suggest that it is a little harsh to say it is kinder to barristers than civil servants. It is kinder to outside employments and still kinder to outside business and professional people.—*Mr. Whewy*: I believe the barrister, if he sets aside a room in his home as a study, and stocks it with a certain number of law books, can then get some relief.

2330. A civil servant does not do work at home, of course.—He does, actually.—*Mr. Fraser*: But he gets no extra relief for doing so.

2331. *Chairman*: You claim that this factor should not be left out of consideration when salary scales are being negotiated?—We do not want to go into precise details.

2332. In paragraph 16 you say that the Society does not think it could properly urge on the Commission any general principle governing the pay of all civil servants. Do you mean there is no set of principles which would fit the whole Civil Service or no single principle which would fit any section of the Civil Service?—What we mean is that our small voice should not be raised to say what is to be done to the Civil Service as a whole.

2333. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 17 you observe, with some satisfaction, that the Treasury appear to have officially recognised the inadequacy of the Tomlin formula. On looking at that we did find that it is rather a qualified remark the Treasury make in paragraph 21 of their memorandum. They say that the outside yardstick may have to be modified in relation to internal relativities. I do not think they discard the outside criterion altogether.—As I understood the Treasury attitude, it was that it is still necessary to look at internal relativities and at outside comparisons, but the extent to which it is possible to make use of either method is a matter for further consideration.

2334. Can I pass on to paragraph 18, where you give the percentage increases in the minimum and maximum salaries of the legal grades since pre-war. In paragraph 19, you say that members of the legal class find themselves at a marked disadvantage compared with the administrative class. We have had worked out the percentage increases of the administrative class on the principal minimum, the increase on pre-war is 44 per cent.; principal, maximum, 43 per cent.; assistant secretary, minimum, 43 per cent.; assistant secretary, maximum, 47 per cent.; under secretary, 53 per cent. By and large, on the basis of your percentages would you agree, you have held your own?—Yes. Since before the war we have at one or two stages done slightly

better than the administrators, but the point here is that paragraph 19 is looking forward to what follows, and not backwards to the percentages.

2335. In paragraph 18 there is a reference to the "Allen" calculation, and I would like to put a point to you on that. If 100 per cent. is the right figure, would you not agree that that conceals a wide variation in increase of remuneration according to occupation, and so on? It is an all-in average, an average of averages, almost?—As I understand it, the object is not to say what should happen to any particular section or class of occupation, but what should happen to people who are at a certain level in the hierarchy of salary earning or profit earning members of the public.

2336. Are you saying that on the basis of the "Allen" calculation there is a *prima facie* case for 100 per cent. increase on pre-war for the grades which you represent?—Yes.

2337. *Chairman*: You have no additional material besides the Allen calculations to put before us? You have not made any statistical enquiries yourselves?—No. Professor Allen advised both the First Division Association and ourselves, and he put his material so fully before you that, apart from this brief general statement, we have nothing to add.

2338. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: On the question of recruitment, in your paragraph 21, you say that the quality of applicants for the legal class has been such that an average of 30 per cent. of the posts in each competition have remained unfilled although the average number of applicants for available posts is 2.6 per post. In the last two years, I see that it was 4.5 and 4.0. Does that suggest that the candidates are not up to the mark?—Yes. At each examination which is held a number of vacancies are left open because an insufficient number of suitable candidates have presented themselves to satisfy the Commissioners.

2339. Plenty of candidates, but not suitable?—It is difficult to say what is a plentiful number of candidates, because in the 'thirties one used to get as many as a hundred or more for a single post. The total number of applicants is vastly reduced from the number which was customary then.

2340. *Mr. Cash*: And of course in the 'thirties there was a good deal of unemployment, and now you have got full employment.—In the 'thirties the Government were able to stock up their legal departments on a cheap market.

2341. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: And today, you go on to say that it is not due to any lack of potential recruits amongst either barristers or solicitors. Is the suggestion

that the attractions to these people elsewhere than the Civil Service are greater than in the Civil Service?—That is the only inference we can draw. The picture seems to be that if an individual Department tries to get somebody in a temporary capacity, or the Civil Service Commissioners announce a competition, a very limited number of substantially qualified people turn up, and there is a tendency sometimes to see the same faces more than once. We think they are not attracted by the civil service salaries.

2342. It is a matter of finance, very largely?—Very largely. By that I do not mean simply the salary which they are offered at the competition, the starting salary, but they must have some prospect of reaching a reasonably secure position in life and a reasonably good salary in middle and old age.

2343. There are some, of course, who prefer the adventurous life of the open competitive world.—I could recommend as an adventure, going before a tribunal on what appears to be a perfectly simple case, and finding an ex-law officer with a strong team behind him, unexpectedly opposed to you.

2344. What was the size of the legal class before the war?—About 350, very approximately.

2345. *Mr. Hall*: If you work out the number of applicants per post over the last eight competitions, it is 2.2, 1.4, 1.2, 2.3, 3.4, 2.6, 4.5, and 4. It would appear that you had a bottle neck in recruitment in 1948-1949, but the position has not been quite so bad with regard to the number of candidates for posts in the last two years?—I think the reason for that was that there was a certain lag after the war. People who come back after the war and were admitted as solicitors only achieved that qualification after several years, and then to acquire a year or two more of experience meant that they were not available for these competitions until about 1950.

2346. *Sir Alexander Gray*: What is it that attracts a lawyer into the Civil Service?—It has been put to me that nobody ever goes to Gibson & Weldon to assist him to get through his Bar examination or his examination for the Law Society with the intention of going into the Legal Civil Service. It is an idea which usually occurs to them later, when they have seen something of private practice, and it may be then that they think that they have a wife and children to keep and the risks of the Bar are too great, or that some of the work of a solicitor does not appeal to them, but whatever their reason for coming in it is unlikely that they will come unless they

are attracted by the prospects of a career with some advancement, a reasonable dignity of post and a reasonable salary.

2347. I was putting aside money for the present. It is clear there must be some kind of attraction for some people in the Civil Service.—It has been suggested to me by one of my colleagues that there may be some attraction in having a comparatively respectable client.

2348. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: What proportion of the legal class are barristers and what proportion are solicitors?—I could not give you an exact figure, because it fluctuates from time to time. The tendency at the moment is for more barristers to come in, and I think perhaps—and one of my colleagues may correct me—the proportion is something like three barristers to two solicitors, in the present Society.

2349. When they come into the Civil Service is the work apportioned as between barristers and solicitors, or do they from that point move together?—With two exceptions, I think they move entirely together. The exceptions are more or less accidental; the one is conveyancing and the other is county court work. Owing to a pure technicality some omissions from the statutes under which we operate, barristers are unable to undertake that sort of work. It is pure accident.

2350. But they are more or less interchangeable?—In all other respects.

2351. You have told us that there is better recruitment amongst barristers today than solicitors? I do not think we have to look very far for the reasons.—That is possible.

2352. *Mr. Menzler*: I would like to ask one point on recruitment. You say that the Service is not attractive, for whatever reason, to the legal profession. But is the Bar itself very attractive to those who take the Bar examinations, in view of the fact, on your figures here, that they get twice the number of calls compared with pre-war, yet the practising Bar remains constant at 2,000? Do those who take the examinations seek other opportunities?—The total of people who are called to the Bar includes half or more than half of people who come from abroad, with the intention of going abroad again either to practise or merely to be able to say they are barristers-at-law. Of those who live in England, perhaps at the moment 300 a year are called, but they include people who merely want the paper qualification and have no intention of practising.

2353. *Chairman*: There may be an increasing demand for legal qualifications in industry, for instance?—I think a great many people like to have something after their name, to make a better impression on

their prospective employers.—*Mr. Hankey*: Could I just make one observation on the question of the advantages of the Service, and that is, the real interest of the work. One is dealing with affairs which do not affect just one person but large sections of the community; one sees how those affairs impinge on the community, in the papers, and one does really feel one is taking some small part in events of some considerable importance. I am quite sure that a lot of people do find that a real attraction and advantage.

2354. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 23, there you compare the career value of lawyers' salaries with those of other civil servants, such as medical officers and administrators. Can you tell us on what basis you make those comparisons? Is it comparison of responsibilities or functions, or vocational qualifications and training?—*Mr. Fraser*: I would like to make clear the purpose of Appendix A, to which we are referring. We are not attempting to compare ourselves in detail with the other people in the separate columns. We are simply giving examples of people roughly in the same walk of life, showing how there is a vast difference between a career and a salary scale. I think this is a point which has been made quite independently by the Institute of Professional Civil Servants. If you compare our salary scale with that of the administrator, we appear to get a slight advantage at one or two points; but if you look at the effect of that scale on the career of the lawyer, you will see that on present salaries we draw a total of £54,000 which compares with the administrator's salary of £67,000, or £63,000 which compares with the administrator's £75,000, and the extreme modesty of the proposals set out in our third column I think may be illustrated by this: with all fairness to our friends the administrators, if the figures they are suggesting are granted in full the effect would be that over their total career they will get respectively £94,000 and £109,000 to our £73,000 and £83,000. We are not in the least envious of those figures, we are merely putting this forward to show the difference between a salary scale on paper and a career in fact.

2355. But implicit in the salary scales you give later are certain equations. I think you bracket an assistant solicitor with an assistant secretary, do you not?—[Looked at as a salary scale, the present position is that the maximum salary of the assistant solicitor and of the assistant secretary is the same, the assistant solicitor starts slightly higher. When you are merely comparing scales and ignoring all other factors, it is a fact at present that as a scale they very nearly approximate.]

(At this stage the proceedings were adjourned for a short time.)

2356. In the comparative table, in paragraph 23 are you making a comparison on the basis of function or education or what?—Only in the very general sense that we have picked two classes of people who are very generally similar to ourselves. The object of the table is simply to show the different effect of salary scales as applied to the different circumstances and organisations which we give as examples.

2357. I think somewhere you say that we must have regard to the service structure?—Yes.

2358. So that implicitly you must draw certain comparisons between yourselves on grounds of function and other people?—When we say we must have regard to the service structure our main point is that somebody somehow has to decide what shall be the top level of salary in the Service. The Chorley Committee looked at this, they hesitated with the idea of £5,000 and they finally decided in favour of £4,500. That in effect puts a limit on what anybody in the Service can have; the second in command in any office must have something less and so on downwards, and it is within the structure in that sense that we use the expression.

2359. You would not make similar comparisons, would you, with, say, the civil engineer in chief in the Admiralty or the director of naval construction?—We are not comparing functions at all, but the effect of putting a limit on the maximum salary for any civil servant would have its effect on them just as it would on us.

2360. May I go on to paragraph 24 where you rather suggest that there has been a departure from the recommendations of the Barlow Report in there not being more P.A.S. posts?—Yes.

2361. May I draw your attention to paragraph 33 of the Barlow Report where towards the end a short way down it says:

“We suggest it only for those departments in which the nature or volume of legal business is such as to make it impossible for all work of importance to be supervised by the solicitor or legal adviser personally.”

That is the qualification. Is your suggestion that there are places where that principle has not been applied?—Yes, there are a number of larger Departments where different types of work have to be dealt with and where in effect branches of the work are being supervised by assistant solicitors

2362. You think there is scope for reclassification of duties?—Yes.

2363. In the same paragraph, paragraph 24, you suggest that there are not enough assistant solicitor posts. And you say that the Treasury have taken the view that for

some legal staff the senior legal assistant grade must be the career grade. Can you tell us how the ratio of assistant solicitor posts to lower posts has altered since Barlow reported?—Yes, you will see in the Barlow Report that they were taking the figure of one assistant solicitor to seven lower posts. The expansion of the legal service, and the increase which has taken place in the number of assistant solicitor posts now gives a ratio of one to five and a half, as you will see from the figures in the Treasury Factual Memorandum.

2364. In the Barlow Report, paragraph 37, it does say:—

“Superfluous posts could not be sanctioned for the sake of offering promotion which, however well merited, was not justified by the requirements of the Service.”

You accept that, I take it?—Yes.

2365. And your case is that all the assistant solicitor posts could be justified on the work not merely to create careers?—Yes.

2366. There is rather a fundamental question of what the career grade should be. The Treasury take the view that it is the senior legal assistant grade, and I imagine that they would rely upon paragraph 33 of the Barlow Committee's Report when they talk metaphorically of the need for a “landing” beyond which some members of the Service will not advance. Would you like to comment on that at all in view of your suggestion that the career grade should be that of assistant solicitor?—If you have too many people stopping at the landing which they suggest the careers as a whole will not be sufficiently attractive to bring in the right kind of people.

2367. *Chairman:* This landing would be rather like the promotion bar we have in the universities beyond which the not very brilliant people would not go, but normally people would expect to leave and go on to the next grade?—That would be unexceptionable, but what we take exception to is having a landing half way up the staircase which is bigger than either the front hall or the floor above.

2368. *Mr. Menzler:* May I revert to a question I asked on paragraph 6 on this question of the career grade? I am not very certain even now whether you are claiming that the average man, or, as you call it in paragraph 6, the more than average man should reach assistant solicitor level with some degree of certainty?—It should be the person slightly more than average who should reach the assistant solicitor grade with some degree of certainty because we assume that everybody who comes in will be of at least average ability.

2369. *Mr. Hall:* Are you saying that more can be done on the lines that the Barlow Committee have already suggested.

always bearing in mind the need for the volume of work to justify the posts, or is the explanation that the Committee's expectations about the future scope for additional posts have proved to be over optimistic?—I think the Committee's hope that more high posts should be created in the future has not been fulfilled, for the reason which I gave previously, that too much attention is paid to supervisory duties in having regard to promotion.

2370. Your point would be then that having regard to the professional content of the work and ignoring the supervisory point there is in your judgment scope for more of these high posts?—Yes

2371. And that on that basis the forecast would not have been over optimistic?—No, and that unless that forecast is fulfilled there will be no attraction to anybody in the profession who has a reasonable chance of succeeding in it to come in and run into the danger of being left as a senior legal assistant to the end of his days.

2372. There is another possible way of getting at this. Let us suppose that it does turn out that the number of these higher posts cannot really be justified. Would your case then be that the earlier earnings ought to be higher so that the career value on the whole would be improved that way?—Most definitely yes.

2373. The area of the triangle put right. If you can widen it at the top and get the improvement that way, that is acceptable, but, if it is not so possible, improve the rates further down and you help with career possibilities?—The first alternative would be preferable, but if the Government find it necessary to hire a certain number of lawyers to do their work and are not prepared to agree that a proportion of them are worthy of promotion, then they should see that the people they hire are given a decent living.

2374. There is one further point. You mentioned I think twice this supervisory element involved in the decision as to whether a higher post is made. Can you give me an illustration of how that works?—This is really inference. We can only attribute the results to the Treasury refusal to grant some applications which have been made for increasing the status of posts.

2375. It is through interpretation of the decision?—Yes.

2376. *Mr. Cash*: Of course outside the Civil Service promotion is by no means certain?—No.

2377. Would you care to make any comparison of the situation now with what it was before the war amongst your Society's members?—Before the war the situation was this, that in the early 'twenties it was comparatively easy to get lawyers who had

come back from the 1914-18 war having lost their practices, and a number of people came in of reasonably mature years, and the Service was able to survive by reason of their services. In the early thirties the financial crisis enabled the Government to get better people than at an average period because the need for money drove them in. By the end of the thirties the position was that there was roughly one assistant solicitor post to every nine junior posts.

2378. *Mr. Menzler*: You work it out that 51 of the 204 senior legal assistants cannot hope to reach the rank of senior assistant solicitor?—Yes

2379. Then by a process of deduction 153 senior legal assistants can hope to reach the rank of assistant solicitor?—Yes.

2380. And it will be more than that because of wastage and the luck of life?—With respect, no. The wastage occurs almost entirely below the level of the rank of assistant solicitor. We give you the figures for 1949 to 1952 at the end of the paragraph, and if I might expand those to give you the figures for the seven years from the end of the war to 1952, out of 69 people who left 47 were legal assistants, 18 senior legal assistants, 3 assistant solicitors and one was a head of an office retired at the age of 59 who hardly counts for this purpose, so that the chances of becoming an assistant solicitor were increased only by about three posts.

2381. I belong to a profession which would not exist if it were not for the fact that people have a habit of dying and breaking down in health, and therefore the prospects are better than the figures, because nature being what it is a proportion, however small, will die or break down in health before reaching the age of 60; so that some of the 51 can also hope to reach the rank of assistant solicitor. But even accepting your figures, would you not agree that three chances in four of going to the next grade is a very good prospect of promotion in any graded service?—It means that a quarter of the people, accepting that figure for the moment, will never get to the rank which we think should be the career rank, and that is complicated by the fact that it is not one single office with which we are concerned but a group of offices which have different structures and slightly different functions, which means that almost inevitably the difficulties of promotion will hit some more hardly than others.

2382. Was it not a recommendation of the Barlow Report that there should be something equivalent to a pooling of vacancies?—That is a matter beyond our control, and no such pool has been created. There are great difficulties in the way of creating it because if one office announces

a vacancy it is only human nature for another office to recommend the second best possible candidate to fill it.

2383. May I take it then that you are not in favour of that recommendation of the Barlow Committee?—If it were found to be made workable we should be very strongly in favour of it.

2384. Have you any idea how your wastage rate expressed as a percentage compared with other classes on the professional side of the Service?—I am afraid we do not know that.

2385. We have some figures showing the resignations—for the period 1950 to 1952—and it shows that five legal staff, senior legal assistants and above, resigned from the Service at the average age of 42. Have you any idea where they went?—I am afraid I do not know the particular cases. We ourselves have investigated destinations of people who left in the years after the war, and broadly speaking they all went out into the world to do something more remunerative. Some went into private practice, others went into employment of various kinds, but it is very difficult to generalise beyond saying that we are reasonably satisfied that where they went they were being better paid than in the grades they had left.

2386. *Mr. Hall*: I suppose there are cases where with practical qualifications plus legal experience industry is attractive.—I do not know of any cases of direct entry into industry, but some people who have left us have gone into industry. For example, I know of one case where a man left the Service and went into private practice at the Bar, and after some years of successful practice then went into a big commercial company in an administrative capacity.

2387. You do not get analogies like those sometimes quoted of people with taxation experience and so on reaching a stage in their careers where they are very useful on the other side?—In the taxation sphere in the business world and the accountancy world the recruits are taken mostly from the inspectorate of Taxes. The Bar is so attractive, the fees on the tax side are so high, that that is the main attraction to anybody who leaves with experience of tax work from the legal Civil Service.

2388. *Mr. Menzler*: Is there much transfer today of lawyers into the administrative class?—I do not think it occurs on a very large scale, but I know several personal friends who have changed over. That took place some years ago.

2389. Does your Society think there should be more of it?—I do not know that I can speak for the Society on that.

2390. Do you know the point has been made by the I.P.C.S. speaking for other professions?—I do not know of any

general body of opinion on that.—*Mr. Hankey*: Although one swallow does not make a summer and I have no details, I am thinking of a case of a person who is not only one of the most able of those that are in that group I am thinking of but who would nevertheless wish very much to transfer to the other side of the house, and certainly would I know be very acceptable to them on the score of ability, but there the impression I got was that there would be considerable difficulties if he tried to do it, and perhaps he could do it at the cost of stepping down for a time.

2391. *Sir Alexander Gray*: You have had people on the legal side who have gone right to the top as administrators?—*Mr. Fraser*: Yes, there have been in the past.

2392. And I take it you would agree that the legal side is very eminently qualified to do certain types of administrative work?—Yes.

2393. *Chairman*: We raised this question because the I.P.C.S. made something of the point that the transfer to the administrative side was not easy or common enough. You have no strong feeling about it?—I do not think so.

2394. *Sir Alexander Gray*: I would have thought that you would have welcomed the opportunity for one of your legal people to become the head of an office on the administrative side.—*Mr. Wheway*: That happened in my own Ministry, the Ministry of Health, with Sir John Maude.

2395. *Mr. Menzler*: It is part of your case that much of your work is of a quasi-administrative character?—*Mr. Fraser*: In some Departments, yes.

2396. Would that not point to the desirability of your crossing right over and becoming 100 per cent. administrative rather than 50 per cent. in particular cases?—That largely would be a matter of taste, whether we preferred the legal work or not. I wonder if I might go back a little into history on this, because I think it is relevant. In the nineteenth century the lawyers to the Government Departments were paid more than they were in 1939. I think the position was that before the reforms of 1854 the rather miscellaneous appointments which sometimes occurred as a result of patronage made it more necessary for the administrators to have a competent lawyer to teach them their administration, but since 1854 the Service has bred its own administrators, and for that reason tended to regard the lawyers as less essential for that part of their function. I am speaking entirely personally, not for the Society.

2397. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraph 30 the Society is asking the Commission to approach the question of lawyers' salary scales on the principle that these scales

should afford within the framework of the Civil Service as a whole a reasonable career by contemporary professional standards. What exactly do you mean by the term "within the framework of the Civil Service as a whole"?—That relates primarily to the point I mentioned before, that before you can begin to decide on scales or rates of pay for intermediate ranks of the Civil Service you must first of all determine what is to be the highest pay for the heads of the Government Departments. There I should perhaps explain we are not merely referring to the permanent secretaries. We are referring to the heads of all Government offices, of which at least two are scientists and three are lawyers, but once you have fixed that top rate for the head of the Department you can then begin to find how the other people fit in. For example, in the ordinary big Government Department where the head is a permanent secretary we would not expect in the ordinary way the solicitor to be paid more than him but to have a salary the next step down, approximately the same as that of the deputy secretary.

2398. You do not claim to be on an equality with that head?—Not where he is the head of the Department.

2399. Other associations claim that the people they represent should be on an equal footing?—In a Department which is primarily concerned with legal matters, if I might instance a mythical Department of Justice which might be formed, it would probably be necessary to have a certain number of administrators in it, but we would not expect the chief administrator in such a Department to be the head over the head of the chief lawyer.

2400. Now we come to paragraphs 31 and 32. In paragraph 31 you say that in order to attract the best type of applicant the career grade should be that of assistant solicitor. How do you think the responsibility carried by an assistant solicitor compares with that of a county court judge?—We are not comparing the responsibilities. Our point is that when a man comes into the Service—this is mentioned at least twice in the Barlow Report—he should be able to look forward to a career so that when he reaches the age of 50 or so and decides whether he did the right thing at the age of 30, if he is in the Service he will say to himself "Where should I have got to if I had been outside?" whereas if he was outside the Civil Service he would say "I wonder where I should have stuck if I had gone inside?"

2401. "How much would I have been getting if I had been a busy junior at the Bar today, or would I be the clerk of an important local authority?"—really a matter of income?—Partly a matter of income and partly a matter of position. The

county court judge is treated with a certain amount of deference which is not usually accorded to an assistant solicitor. If I might just enlarge on that for a moment, we picked a county court judge largely because that is the chief example put forward in the Barlow Report. It has quite an interesting history. When the legal Civil Service was formed immediately after the first war the effect of the cost of living bonus was to give the assistant solicitor a salary higher than the then salary of a county court judge. When the assistant solicitor's salary was finally consolidated at £1,400 at the maximum in 1936 the county court judge was still getting £1,500 so that he had caught up and was just ahead. In 1937 the salary of the county court judge went up to £2,000. The assistant solicitor later caught him up and the county court judge took another jump ahead in 1952, so that the relationship has been fairly close.

2402. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Can you tell us about the sheriff substitute?—The sheriff substitute's remuneration was provided for by the Act of 1907 but there was no scale fixed; I understand that the present rate of salary for the sheriff substitute in Scotland varies according to the neighbourhood. The highest pay is in Glasgow where I believe he receives £2,400 a year, in the other large towns, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and so forth, the rate is £2,200 and elsewhere £1,900. If I might just add to that, we should also consider the superannuation advantages which are enjoyed both by the county court judge and by the sheriff substitute. They can qualify for a pension equivalent to half their salary after 15 years' service and that is an attraction which we can hardly claim.

2403. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: You have talked about sheriffs substitute in Scotland. We have metropolitan magistrates here in London.—Apart from the chief metropolitan magistrate who is paid at the same rate as the county court judge, the standard rate for the metropolitan magistrate is, I think, £2,500, unless they have benefited by any recent increases, and in the country the rates vary up to a maximum of £2,500 for the stipendiary magistrates.

2404. Have you been running parallel with High Court Masters and Registrars for the High Court?—I cannot tell you the history of their salary scales but I think the present basic scale for High Court Masters is £2,000 to £2,500.

2405. Do you know of any outside organisations which employ lawyers in reasonable numbers on a salaried basis?—I think there are very few apart from the new nationalised boards.

2406. You may have organisations which employ a single lawyer as an adviser?—And, of course, in local government, but

there the structure varies from town to county and there is no standard structure such as we have in the Civil Service.

2407. I want to refer to questions 36 and 37 in the evidence given by the Treasury witnesses. They are dealing with doctors and making comparisons with doctors outside and doctors in the Civil Service. They point out how a comparison with the great majority of outside doctors who earn fees is not appropriate and the comparison has to be with the small number of salaried doctors. How would you comment on that proposition when we are talking about lawyers?—So far as the Bar is concerned, the Civil Service is almost the only possible salaried occupation for a barrister in pursuit of the law. So far as solicitors are concerned I think I am right in saying that outside local government the employed solicitor is usually a qualified managing clerk. On the barrister side there is practically no outside example and on the solicitor side the majority of them are people who are not at all comparable.

2408. Comparisons with outside lawyers are inappropriate?—Outside comparisons of salaries are almost impossible.

2409. And comparisons with fee-paid staff inappropriate?—We do not agree that they are entirely appropriate, but if you have nowhere else to look, no other market to look in to find the price of a lawyer, we think that is the appropriate place to look.

2410-11. Turning to suggested rates of pay would you explain how the figures were reached in paragraph 33?—Yes, may I start from the top? There again we have to face this question of what is to be the salary of the head of the Government office. We are dealing mostly with a Government office where the head is an administrator and we assume that the salary of a solicitor cannot go higher than £4,500 at present available to the head of the office, so the highest figure we can put for the solicitor is £4,000. We have no particular justification for it except that it is reasonably obvious that outside the Civil Service it is possible for a successful lawyer to make much more money than that, and that there are some posts of comparable dignity and class of work which are paid more than that. It is as a cross check that, given a case for a 100 per cent. increase on pre-war, the solicitor before the war was paid the odd figure of £1,953 and I do not think many people would quarrel with the odd £47. The principal assistant solicitor we arrived at simply as the second in command in the legal office and the second in command must step down by about the conventional amount at that stage. Sir Edward Bridges made the point that in the higher ranks you must have a sufficient distinction. The remainder of our ranks come entirely

within the 100 per cent. betterment factor as expounded by Professor Allen and as adopted by Mr. Justice Danckwerts. The assistant solicitor was paid before the war a maximum of £1,400 and to add 100 per cent. to that gives you £2,800. The Barlow Committee recommended that the salaries of the assistant solicitors should be raised by £100, saying of course that their salary recommendations were restricted by the overriding framework of the Civil Service, so that we think it would be fair to take somewhere rather more than £2,800 there, but (with extreme moderation as we hope) we leave it at the 100 per cent. and thereby do not jump one ahead of the county court judge who is the person in particular who the Barlow Report suggests gives some standard of comparison. Then at the other end of the scale, with the senior legal assistant we apply the 100 per cent. measure. For the legal assistant we arrive at our figure in this way. Before the war there was a rank of junior legal assistant starting at the absurd figure of £315; this rank, fortunately, as a result of the Barlow recommendations, was abolished. Now, after a brief period of probation, a legal assistant at about the age of 30 starts on the legal assistant scale, whereas before the war his appointment was slightly younger, and you would have had to wait for about seven years in order to become a legal assistant. We therefore say that the proper factor is the age of 35, making the salary equivalent now at 35 to what it would have been before the war at 35 when he first became a legal assistant. His salary was then £675, and the equivalent of that, £1,350, we put at 35 and the appropriate figure if he started at 30, £1,100.

2412. And in your note you have taken account of the fact that there may be higher salaries proposed for the other professions and for the administrators?—I am afraid we have simply mentioned the administrators, but the real point as I have said is that we are limited by the salaries available to the heads of Government Departments, and if those do go up we think there is a case for some increase for the solicitors.

2413. Mr. Menzler: Over and above these?—Yes.

2414. Sir George Mowbray: In your paragraph 34 you discuss the nature of the work and the volume and complexity of it. In answer to the Chairman you have in the main, if I may say so, justified your suggested scales of relativities between one and another, relativities between the head of the Department and relativities with pre-war salaries and the like. In paragraph 34 (a) you rather go on to another leg if I may so describe it, and I wondered whether you would indicate at all what sort of yardstick you are using for your assessment of

the value of work.—I think this is a general comment rather than a basic principle. Having arrived by a process of reasoning at those figures, we think the average person who knew anything of the work being done would not regard them as extravagant.

2415. In other words you are not really attempting to assess them by any yardstick at all, are you?—It is virtually impossible. If you look at the fees which are paid to solicitors for conveyancing you can hardly compare them with the salary which is paid to a Government lawyer for conveying a large piece of Government property. When our people meet members of the Bar in litigation it is almost impossible to compare the fees paid to the individual members of the Bar for that individual case with the salary of the individual except in the very broad sense that if you find our legal assistants are sometimes meeting leading counsel with large fees it suggests that the sums we are claiming as their remuneration are not unreasonable.

2416. You go on in paragraphs 34 (d) and 35 to make a specific comparison with town clerks and clerks of the council. Is it altogether reasonable to compare your people with the clerks of those councils bearing in mind the enormous amount of administrative content that goes into their work, more I think than you indicated earlier goes into yours?—I should make it clear that the basis of the comparison is not that we think a solicitor does the same work as the town clerk. We are looking at the prospects which a man would have before him. If he chooses to go into local government then this is what he can expect to get. If he chooses to practise at the Bar in the hope of becoming a county court judge this is what he can expect to get and we are suggesting that the expectations which would be given in the salary scales compare not unreasonably with those expectations.

2417. It is much more on a basis of expectations than comparability?—We are not comparing job for job at all.

2418. *Mr. Cash*: Could I intervene here. I suppose there is a feeling about when your people appear in a court as you say getting a salary which they feel perhaps rightly is quite inadequate, and on the other side there is learned counsel, perhaps silk, whose fee is out of all proportion to what they are earning. In some senses that comparison is a little illusory, is it not, because after all the other man has to pay some pretty heavy expenses out of his fee.—I am not suggesting it is a comparison to show how much he is earning, but merely to the extent that one sees these figures, and looks at the sort of work done, and they do not seem unreasonable when one

looks at the sort of fees being earned by the people one comes up against, it is no closer than that.

2419. I must say that I can understand a man feeling rather sore about a comparison of that sort possibly, forgetting for the moment the fact that the other man's fee is so to speak gross, whereas his salary is, so to speak, net.—It is not quite so bad now, but it used to occur to our junior legal assistants in the old days to meet men with briefs marked with a fee higher than their salary for the year, even allowing for expenses, and that did cause some discontent.

2420. That I can well understand, but today you would not say that happens so often?—No.

2421. *Mr. Burman*: We have dealt with the salaries which you suggest, Mr. Fraser, and now we come up against the problem how to keep them right for the future. Have you anything to say about any method of keeping the salaries right with fluctuating conditions outside?—First of all I think we would agree with the Treasury that the long term trend test can be carried too far and we should not have to wait ten or twenty years. We would like to keep an eye on the principles which we set out in paragraph 32 so as to keep our starting grade and our career grade in relation to reality. The difficulty is to know how to do it, and the only way we can suggest is to find some machinery for discovering the movements of earnings and salaries in the smallest possible group of closely associated professions.

2422. Taken over the generality of the country as a whole, would you have several ranges for this, because what would be appropriate for the lower grades would probably be inappropriate in the higher grades?—If it were possible to split up statistics in such a way it would be of great value.

2423. And assuming that one could get those sort of indices which would give a *prima facie* case for discussion, have you any machinery in mind to bring the matter to the notice of the Treasury?—It would be necessary to have some sort of indices which would be available both to the Treasury and ourselves, and in the ordinary way one would imagine that the line of approach to the Treasury would be that a substantial increase had occurred and no change has been made for perhaps a year or two and we would suggest that now was the time for a change. I do not think it would be necessary to have any more rigid machinery at that stage.

2424. You think an outside body would not be necessary?—The only difficulty would be if the Treasury differed and said "It is too soon since you had the last

change, you must wait," and therefore it might be necessary to bring in an outside body. That is why we do not want to see the two lower ranks, at least, deprived of the right of arbitration.

2425. There are certain signs from the evidence we have heard so far that the staff bodies would like to pick the best out of any range of indices they could find for their part and the Treasury would like to pick the worst, and there seems to be the difficulty, whatever indices are available, of agreeing that they do provide common ground.—I think it is inevitable where you have a staff association representing a large body of civil servants that they should try to do the best for their association, and it is equally right that the Treasury, although it should look after the Civil Service, must at the same time look after the public purse. I think that divergence of approach is inevitable.

2426. *Mr. Lloyd Williams*: In paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 dealing with hours of work and holidays, I do not quite know what you are contending.—The only point is that we really have no comments at all on hours of work and leave and so forth, except that the question of Saturdays off seems to agitate a great many people and it was thought right that we should merely touch on it. I am told, I am afraid, that the first line of paragraph 42 is a little unfair to Scotland because apparently most of them there do attend at their offices on Saturdays. In effect our position is very similar to that of the administrators. You cannot keep hours if you have to be in the House of Commons at night, or if you have to be in conference with counsel or if you get a rush of work. You have to do your work at night, at home or in the office, and we are not really enormously concerned with it at all.

2427. You are not tied by hours but by the work just as the practitioner outside?—Yes.

2428. *Chairman*: The crux of your submission is really the last sentence in paragraph 42?—Yes.

2429. *Mr. Menzler*: Mr. Fraser, there is a great deal in your case about added years. I would very much like to hear from you the case for added years. Is it based upon an appeal to outside practice; is it a desire to improve recruitment or is it a moral right?—Mainly it is a sense of injustice. It is thought that this is the proper thing to do, to give people some reasonable sort of pension in the Civil Service. The present method of calculation makes that impossible. It is also thought that it would make the Service more attractive, to bring in a good standard of recruit, and we do not really rely to any great extent on outside practice because this has been a key

point with the lawyers ever since they were established, that the late entrants say "You must allow us to qualify for the same sort of pensions as other people who came in at the age of 20 and retire at the same sort of salary level as ourselves." You know the history, no doubt, that it was on the statute book down to 1914, when unfortunately the provision of Section 4 of the Superannuation Act of 1859 was repealed, and the reason given by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury in moving the repeal was based on the report of the Ridley Committee of 1888, which he interpreted as meaning that they were critical of the power to give added years, as it would give rise to "jobs," to use his expression. In those days there may have been some notion that it was possible to put one's nephew into the Civil Service, but that seems to have been destroyed and so the main reason for the abolition of the system of granting added years has gone. Quite recently, in 1949, we made a serious attempt with the assistance of our friends to get this restored, and an amendment was moved both in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords to add a clause to the Superannuation Bill of 1949 to provide for this. That was opposed on two grounds, both in the Lords and the Commons, by the Government spokesmen. The first ground in the Commons was given as this, that because we came in at a higher salary we therefore got a higher pension. That was withdrawn before the end of the debate, because it was obviously wrong. The other ground was that this point was adequately provided for by the provision in Section 2 of the 1946 Superannuation Act, and that of course does not apply at all; it has never been applied to lawyers. It has only been used, I think, about 20 times, and it cannot work after you have been in the Service for six months and it only applies over the age of 40, or perhaps over the age of 35, at 40, and it does not cover the whole field. In the House of Lords substantially the same reason was given, that people who claimed for added years were higher paid anyway, whatever that means; that it is simply the number of years service you have and the number of pounds you are earning in the last three years, and that the 1946 Act was sufficient. With great respect we thought both those reasons were wrong and the only reason why our clause did not become part of the Act was that everybody was afraid of spending too long on our clause and risking depriving the widows and children of the benefits that they did get in that year.

2430. You remember that the Tomlin Commission said this was not a matter of superannuation at all but a matter of salaries?—They also said that in a contributory superannuation scheme added years would give rise to a further contribution

and therefore it could not be provided for in a non-contributory scheme, and our answer is this, that if you want to attract the right people you should give them the right salary, but that if the method of pension does not suit this particular group of people who come in late for the benefit of the Service this provision should be made.

2431. In paragraph 54 you suggest the adding of years. You mean the 1859 practice?—Yes.

2432. On experience certified by the Commissioners. What experience would you take into account? Would it be experience after taking qualifications including any time spent as an articulated clerk?—Basically the principle is all time spent in professional experience after qualification, but that is a matter which once the principle is established, could be gone into, in detail. It might not suit other professions in the same way as it would suit us.

2433. This concession if granted on those lines would raise a wider issue which sometimes expresses itself in the claim that anybody entering after 20 should be enabled to earn the maximum pension by some form of added years? Would you like to comment on that?—Our point is that it should apply only when the requirements of the Service make it necessary that a man should qualify himself at his own expense during those years, roughly between 20 and 35 or so.

2434. In paragraph 48 you refer to the National Coal Board precedent for added years. I would like to put it to you that it is not very helpful because the new entrant has to pay for the added years.—That is so. I accept that it is not at all a strong precedent. We rely on the merits of our scheme and not on a comparison with outside.

2435. I am not quite clear why you should say that what is done outside in quite a number of places in my experience does not afford a precedent for the Service?

—I did not mean to put it in that way. What I meant was that we think, looking at the Service and the service superannuation scheme, it is elementary justice we should be given this particular advantage. There are so few outside schemes which come near to the service non-contributory scheme that we cannot derive much support from them, but simply we can say there are outside schemes which have the means of obtaining added years.

2436. If you do not rely upon outside practice, why should civil servants have a pension related to a period longer than their reckonable service?—May I give two examples: a county court judge and a sheriff substitute who qualify for pension at half their retiring salary after fifteen years' service. That is simply an example of what

we would call added years. They used to get two thirds until 1950, and they sacrificed the difference between two thirds and one-half in return for getting the family benefits which civil servants get under the 1949 Act.

2437. May I suggest if you are rewriting your evidence you might substitute British Electricity Authority for National Coal Board?—I am very grateful.

2438. *Mr. Cash:* Going back to the Tomlin Commission Report on contributory schemes you are not suggesting that there should be any contribution to the added years?—No.

2439. It should be entirely on a non-contributory basis?—Yes.

2440. I just wanted to clear that point because the Tomlin Commission were advocating a contributory scheme through-out.—Yes.

2441. One of the difficulties we had in 1929-31 with the contributory scheme was the legal position of the civil servant who is still capable of being dismissed without notice. Directly you get a contributory scheme the difficulty is in case of dismissal—is the civil servant entitled to the return of his contributions?—Yes, that is so.

2442. I do not know what view you have on that?—I do not know that we have formulated a view on that.

2443. Tomlin envisaged a civil servant being neatly cut in half. In other words there were two civil servants, one legally subject to instant dismissal, the other a person who was entitled to receive back contributions which he had made under the contributory scheme. I am thinking of your added years and your widows and children.—For the purpose of added years, our suggestion would be that if a man leaves the Service in respectable circumstances, if he is not discharged, before reaching the age limit, he should only have a proportion of his certified years added to the years he has actually served.

2444. It all wants a little more working out in detail. I was just wondering whether you had met that particular problem?—We have not had to meet that problem as far as I know.

2445. *Mr. Hall:* May I ask a question on the clarification of one point relating to the reference which was made to section 2 of the 1946 Act both in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords. Have I understood it aright that under the provisions of that section it is administratively impossible to operate any scheme of added years?—It is virtually impossible. It is clearly designed for dealing with specific individual cases. Every case must be dealt with by itself within six months of the man's entry, whereas the old 1859 scheme was that the Treasury could certify

a particular individual or class of individuals as being entitled to have years added. What we envisage is a scheme where a particular class could be designated and then the Civil Service Commissioners would simply certify the number of years.

2446. The first six months would be inappropriate in your class of case?—It would not cover people already in post.

2447. *Chairman*: Section 2 was never intended to meet this sort of case; it really arose out of the recruitment of distinguished scientists at a mature age.—Subject to the views expressed by the Government spokesmen, I would respectfully agree.

2448. *Sir Alexander Gray*: Would you be satisfied with a flat five years or ten years without any questions asked, and without regard to the particular case in question?—I think that would be a little unsatisfactory. There was something of the sort in existence before the war for a different purpose. The underpaid junior legal assistant was allowed to have one increment for every year over the age of 25. That is a rule of thumb which is all very well at that end, but we may get, for example, a man who reads for the Bar or becomes a solicitor at the age of 35 just because he has got tired of doing something else and comes into the Government legal service at 39. We are not suggesting he should be entitled automatically to added years. We think that would be wrong, because from the Government point of view he has been wasting his time before he was 35.

2449. I mentioned a flat addition of a certain number of years because, if I may

put another example from the old pension schemes for university professors in Scotland before F.S.S.U., the pension was based on n , plus 10, not the number of years n , but n plus 10.—We do not feel that would meet the fairness of our requirements.

2450. *Mr. Menzler*: In paragraph 56 you say you wish to augment dependants' benefits by having the right to make voluntary contributions so that you can improve the provisions.—Yes.

2451. Would you be prepared under that proposal to pay as it were both parties' contributions, the State's and yours, or are you asking the State to make a further contribution?—I do not think any specific proposal has been debated by our Society. It was simply a feeling that it would be desirable to extend the benefits of this advantageous form of savings and guarantee to one's family.

2452. *Mr. Cash*: Would it be voluntary or compulsory?—Wholly voluntary.

2453. *Mr. Menzler*: Under the present scheme, if my memory serves me, the contribution is $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.—Yes. I think the suggestion is simply that one should be allowed to pay $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. instead of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and get correspondingly increased benefits.

2454. *Chairman*: Is there anything else you would like to say to us, or do you think we have covered everything?—We have nothing else to say.

Chairman: Thank you very much for your help.




(The Witnesses withdrew)

(Adjourned until 16th September, 1954 at 11 a.m.)

PRINCIPLES OF REMUNERATION

(Chapter II)

MOVEMENTS IN SALARIES AND WAGES SINCE 1938



ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CIVIL SERVICE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

12th and 13th DAYS

ERRATA

Page 641. Question 1891. *Delete the last four lines and substitute: "some more staff".* But on the demand, circumscribed as it is by ceilings at the present moment, there is clearly nothing I can dispute."

Page 666. Question 2140, line 7. *Between the words "employment" and "in" insert "if he sees no prospect of employment"*

LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 1954

(30322) D.L.
